ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

Greek Foreign Policy since 1974
Theory and Praxis

La politique étrangère grecque depuis 1974
Théorie et praxis

Edited by / Sous la direction de

Stephanos Constantinides

Van Coufoudakis

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Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis

Stephanos Constantinides*

I. Introduction

In an article published in this journal - vol. 4, no.1, 1996 - I tried to present the evolution of the field of international relations in Greece and its subsequent influence on the country's foreign policy. I tried to demonstrate the existence of a dialectical relationship between theory and praxis, between politicians and academics on the formulation of Greek foreign policy.

Even though theoretical work in this field remains in an embryonic state,[1] it is possible to tease out some trends in the discipline of international relations in Greece and to link its theoretical orientation to practical applications. This endeavor becomes especially relevant since we have witnessed in recent years a confrontation between opposing theoretical approaches, combined with an effort to influence the course of Greek foreign policy. Equally relevant is the forging of alliances between scholars and politicians on the important issues of foreign policy.

In writing the article published a year ago, I sought not only to summarize the theoretical debate among Greek scholars but also to open up a new one. It seemed that discussions were taking place in newspapers and magazines rather than in academic journals and I expressed the hope that debate at an academic level would enhance the development of the discipline of international relations in Greece.

From this point of view the article has been well received. The field of international relations in Greece is a relatively new one - introduced essentially after 1974 - and IR scholars, after years of building their discipline and their recent rather "wild" debates are now prepared for an exchange based on academic criteria.

Of course Greek IR scholars did not always agree on the way in which I summarized their views. They did, however, recognize that I had worked in good faith, which explains why they accepted to collaborate on this special issue of *Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies* and to present an accurate picture of their discipline.

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Professor Van Coufoudakis, a distinguished Greek-American scholar, graciously accepted to be co-editor of this special issue. In a concluding chapter, he will first present the specific trends represented by the articles published here. He will then express his own views on the Greek foreign policy.

My task is to present a theoretical framework of the field of international relations in Greece by referring to the evolution of the discipline and then discussing what is currently going on.

II. The Present Debate

The present debate on international relations in Greece is blurred. I believe the main problems lie in the underdevelopment of theory and the tendency to consider political ideologies as theoretical trends of the discipline. I am aware that there is no pure theory; in one way or in another, ideology is present at the core of any theory. Ideology is above all a force in the political arena. As such, it demands acceptance and full faith. Theory, however, is a scientific tool and as such must be verified against reality - in our case it must confront praxis.

Yet it is illusory to consider the present debate as only a political and ideological one. The Greek scholars of international studies - at least a number of them - tried all these years to transplant elements of theories developed outside Greece to their discipline. Their own contribution to the development of theory remains very limited and weak. Unfortunately, the present theoretical debate is not broadened and enriched with elements from Greek reality.

Although this situation constitutes somewhat of a paradox for the country that gave us Thucydides, the father and first theorist of international relations, there is an explanation. We alluded in the article published in this journal a year ago, to the fact that for political reasons[2] social sciences in Greece where never in the forefront of mainstream Greek society before 1974. This delay explains why the field of international relations is more than half a century behind the USA and a generation behind the Western European countries.

Inevitably this new field of study developed within conditions of theoretical confusion characterized by a mixture of theoretical elements and ideology. Scholars of the new discipline came from various backgrounds, having studied or taught abroad in different countries. They necessarily brought the experience of those countries with them. Furthermore, they had different academic backgrounds; i.e., some of them had completed their first university degree in law, history or economics. Since there was no Greek tradition of international relations as a discipline, they tried to cobble one together, each scholar contributing according to his background and foreign tradition.

As a result, there were two basic orientations seeking to influence the establishment of a Greek tradition of international relations. The first orientation, the Anglo-American, originated essentially in the USA. The second, the European, was imported essentially from France and Germany. To these two main influences, we must add a third, the influence of the Greek diaspora. Indeed, scholars of Greek origin abroad had fruitful exchanges with their colleagues in the "homeland" and exercised an important influence on the foundation of the discipline in Greece.

The theoretical trends in each of the above orientations are numerous and generally not clear. Nonetheless, they may be divided into two streams: the first stream is linked with international theoretical approaches; the second, with the "ideologico-political" realities of the country.[3] These streams are very important in the present debate. One can proceed from the hypothesis of the primacy of political ideology or, on the contrary, from the primacy of theory, but making such a choice presents no special interest here. The researcher will be more effective in analyzing each particular situation in order to understand the influence of either the ideology or the theory as an explanatory tool or even as a guiding instrument for politicians.

Given the current state of development of IR theory in Greece, however, there can be little doubt that the politico-ideological tool precedes the theoretical one in a considerable number of studies on Greek foreign policy. Neither can there be any doubt that corporate interests play an important role in the present debate, although camouflaged by either ideological or theoretical considerations. But in the end, this is a way to progress, go step by step and eliminate as much as possible what is not "scientific" in this debate. Saying this, I must add that even an ideological confrontation at a certain level is useful in advancing the study of Greek foreign policy. Indeed, a number of social scientists contest the possibility of a "scientific" study of social phenomena. They consider that any study in this area is of an ideological nature. One could also argue "that any scientific analysis, if it is well done, is by definition, at the same time an ideological one".[4]

The scientific approach in the area of social sciences - which is also applicable to the field of international studies - is based essentially on: a) an effort to separate value, moral or partisan judgement from a clinical look of reality; b) the use of methods and techniques of investigation which are common to all social sciences and are acceptable by researchers of the same field; c) an effort of systematization by proposing some general models of analysis in search of possible laws - or at least consistencies - governing social phenomena.

Naturally I am aware of the difficulty of applying this approach in a country like Greece. In fact even in countries where the social sciences are more developed, this difficulty exists. As Raymond Aron wrote: "Sociologists are always partial; they study a part of reality pretending to study the whole. They have the tendency to only notice the positive aspects of societies they like and the negative aspects of the societies they don't like. The sociologist behaves as a politician even without being conscious of it, not just because he expresses from time to time a judgement of value, but in going directly to what is the deadly sin of politicians - and unfortunately of savants, - which is to see what they want to see."[5]

I think that in the international studies debate in Greece we must consider three specific themes in order to clarify the situation:

— The influence of Greek "Ideologico-Political" patterns;
— The impact of different schools of thought regarding international relations;
— The present political situation in the country and especially the weight of Greek-Turkish relations.

A. The Influence of the Greek "Ideologico-Political" Patterns

There have been in Greece, even before independence (1830), two basic "ideologico-political" currents which have had an important influence in the vision the Greeks have of the place of their country in the world. The first current after the Enlightenment maintains that Greece belongs to Western Europe. Adamantios Koraes (1748-1833), a notable figure of the Greek Enlightenment who spent much of his life in Western Europe (Amsterdam, Montpellier and Paris), is an eminent representative of this current. He worked to convey to Greeks the Western ideas of statehood, nationality and rationality. Koraes regarded modern Greeks as the legitimate descendants of the ancient Hellenes and as the heirs to the classical Greek culture, rejecting Byzantium as a medieval period. The second current considers Greece as Eastern. The roots of neohellenism are to be found in Byzantium and consequently Greece has to resist Western influence.

These East-West patterns are ideological and political references, "largely imaginary constructs".[6] Scholars and intellectuals of this orientation are convinced that their nation could not imitate any other culture and that Hellenism had to be based on its own sources, rejecting Western ideas. Around the beginning of the twentieth century, when Eleftherios Venizelos, the eminent representative of Greek bourgeoisie, managed some kind of Europeanization of the state, others were seeking "a sense of mission in the East", in "framing" even "the ideology of a multinational

Eastern State" comprising Greeks and Turks.[7] As one historian puts it, "strangely enough, it took a civil servant (Ion Dragoumis) and an officer of the Greek army (Athanasios Souliotis) to formulate the most systematic criticism against the state and propose a viable alternative to it". At the time when Venizelos reformed the Greek State and set it on course toward Europeanization, Dragoumis and Souliotis proposed the alternative of the "multinational Eastern" Greco-Turkish state.[8]

This idea is not really new and may be traced to the Ottoman Empire when the Patriarchate of Constantinople and Greek élites were in a sense part of the Ottoman administration. Even in Byzantium, the Church and some élites resisted the efforts of the Pope and the Latin West to impose their spiritual and dogmatic domination on Greek Orthodox citizens. On the contrary under the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Orthodox Church of Constantinople became a real political power over all Orthodox peoples inside the Empire.

The East-West patterns present a new dimension in the eighteenth century when the Greek diaspora composed of bourgeois and intellectual elements, mainly in Western and Central Europe, received the influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution and began to work on Greek nationbuilding, thus preparing the war of independence. The ideals of liberalism and Enlightenment were to form the weapon opposed to internal conservative elements like land-owning citizens and ecclesiastic administration. The Church defended traditional values and generally "the *status quo* as it existed in the framework of the Ottoman Empire".[9] As mentioned above, we can go even further to find the roots of these patterns at the time of the Schism (1054) between the Orthodox Church of Constantinople and the Catholic Church of Rome. The anti-European attitude of Orthodox Greeks was also influenced by "the sack of Constantininople and the adjacent lands by the "crusaders" in 1204".[10]

However, it would be a mistake to consider that the patterns involved in this conflict are clear. As one scholar noted "reality is always more complex and less clear-cut than such constructs propose."[11]

This conflict was supposed to be over when Greece became a member of the European Union in 1981. Nevertheless, there is always a strong group of intellectuals and others, known as the neo-Orthodox, who continue to express this anti-Western position, favoring a non-Western Greece with a romantic vision: "organic communities", "anti-rationalism", a return to the roots, to the lost paradise of traditional values, etc. As Thanos Veremis noted, this romantic view of communal life under the Ottomans survives to this day and is presented as a model against the nation-state considered to

be a "western product that has nothing to do with the values and culture of Hellenism". Veremis points out that "the myth surrounding communal life was challenged by historical works presenting the communities as a functional component of the Ottoman tax system rather than a product of national volition."[12]

Even the Nobel laureate, Odysseus Elytis, insisted on the importance of tradition, worried about Greek identity and considered that the West was always hostile to the Greek nation. Elytis also referred to the Schism and the crusades in remarks such as the following: "The West always tried to make us dance to its tune. And these days it has succeeded in doing so. From now on we have to walk with one foot in the European Community and the other in NATO".[13]

The "Europeanists" oppose modernizing patterns to this traditional vision, and try to insert them in a European schema, as elements reinforcing Greek ethnocultural identity.

From another point of view, nationalism is a very strong current influencing the formulation of Greek external policy. Nationalism may coincide with the neo-Orthodox vision in some points; however, overall it does not reject a European orientation.

It should be remembered that Greek nationalism was initially the product of Western influence. Nationalism shaped the Greek identity by favoring the building of the Greek nation-state *vis-à-vis* the cultural identity put forward by the Church and its allies who preferred the framework of the Ottoman Empire.[14]

The question to ask at this point is how these "ideologico-political" orientations can be combined with the different schools of thought on international relations coming from abroad in order to trace the theoretical trends that scholars use. Nowadays one could question the real influence of these patterns.

Studying what is going on in the present debate enables us to link elements of these patterns with theoretical orientations from abroad. However, some difficulty arises when we try to pin these patterns to one or another theory, to one or another school of thought in international relations. The matter becomes all the more delicate in the case of Greece, where we know that these schools of thought are still being formed.

B. The Influence of the Different Schools of Thought Regarding International Relations

I consider that there are two major schools of thought regarding the study of international relations in Greece: Realist and Transnationalist.[15] The Marxist-Dependency School, which played a significant role up to the end of 1980s, is marginal like other paradigms (feminism, environmentalism, etc.) are also marginal. Even important currents like structural realism are not well known yet. Even if we consider that the two major schools mentioned - realism and transnationalism - are not well assimilated within the Greek realities and that Greek scholars are not always able to articulate their theoretical discourse, we cannot deny some influence from these schools in the study of international relations and Greek foreign policy.

Nevertheless, neither of the two basic "ideologico-political" patterns presented above can be identified with the one or the other of these schools of international relations. Identifying the realists as "anti-Europeanists" and "nationalists", for example, would be to forget that Greek nationalism in the era of Enlightenment was the product of European and Western influence. Identifying the transnationalists as opponents of the nation-state and the fervent supporters of Europe would be to affiliate them with the ideology of a multinational state developed strangely enough by those who opposed the West and Europe and regarded Byzantium and even the Ottoman Empire as a model for Hellenism!

As a result, we must remain aware of the manipulation of these constructs and remember that "reality is always more complex and less clear-cut than such constructs propose".[16]

C. The Present Political Situation in Greece

Beyond theories and political ideologies, there lies the political reality, a country facing a major security problem and a continuous challenge from its eastern neighbor, Turkey. Any discussion on international relations and the formulation of Greek foreign policy must, therefore, take into account this reality.

The opposing schools of thought mentioned above are not always convincing. Unfortunately the use of epithets to attack the "enemy" has nothing to do with serious debate between scholars. The confrontation is not always one of theoretical or even ideologico-political arguments but rather one of petty political and personal disputes. The result is a kind of simplification of the reality leading ultimately to manichean bipolarism.

One would expect a scholarly exchange of views with explicit reference to theory and paradigms in support of the arguments that each side provides even in a debate concerning the security of the country. Unfortunately, the use of terms loaded the heavy political overtones and significance due to the history of the country does not foster an open and serious debate.

I consider that there are valid arguments advanced in this debate concerning the particular situation of the country in the area of security. Policymakers may benefit from such a debate if they succeed in distancing themselves from it. This is not always the case, of course, as politicians are identified with one or another school of thought.

In short, as long as the country continues to face a security problem, security will remain an important factor determining the nature of the debate described above.

III. The Influence of the Current Debate in the Formulation of Greek Foreign Policy

On one hand, it is clear that there is a dialectical relation between theoretical paradigms and Greek ideologico-political patterns. But a relation does not mean full identification of one or another of these constructs to a paradigm.

On the other hand, we assume that there is a dialectical relation between the current debate and the praxis of Greek foreign policy. The theoretical and ideological visions in this debate exercise their influence in the application of Greek foreign policy. In some cases, however, it is not sure whether the theoretical and ideological visions proceed to praxis or whether this praxis produces theoretical and ideological orientations.

As we enter a new transitional era in the international system, Greek scholars have to clarify their objectives, adapt theoretical patterns to Greek reality and link theory with praxis. Decision-making in this field is a little old-fashioned but, undoubtedly, it advances in a dialectical manner. Of course, decision-making is influenced by many factors, such as cultural values and customs, economic reality, political power and information.

If we analyze the impact of theory and ideology in the post-dictatorial period of Greek foreign policy (1974-1998), based on the preceding developments, we notice such influences in the decision-making process. It is also clear, however, that during this period theoretical patterns were confused without clear lines and without real development.

During the Caramanlis period (1974-1980), his right wing government experienced different influences and received different pressures in the formulation of Greek foreign policy. These influences and pressures came from diversified theoretical and ideological patterns; e.g., transnationalism, dependency theory, and nationalism.

In the Papandreou period (1981-1989), the theoretical framework of socialism was very present but the realist theoretical orientation had also gained ground.

Nevertheless caution is required because nothing is so clear. From appearances the Caramanlis period could be seen as under the influence of transnationalist patterns; the Papandreou period, under the influence of dependency patterns. However the reality is more complex and one must not mistake the appearances for reality. How can we explain the withdrawal of Greece from NATO by Caramanlis in terms of transnationalist patterns or the Davos summit between Papandreou and the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in terms of dependency patterns?

The return of the Right to power with Mitsotakis (1990-1993), but also the upheaval of the international system, changed the theoretical framework of Greek foreign policy. This time it was clear that the transnationalist-interdependence patterns had gained ground.

Nevertheless nationalism poses an obstacle to such an orientation, - especially given the exasperation over the Macedonian issue. Prime Minister Mitsotakis was unable to impose his vision on even his foreign affairs minister, Antonis Samaras, a devoted nationalist.

The new PASOK period with Papandreou as premier (1993-1996) was one of contradiction between discourse obeying realism and dependency patterns yet with a number of actions obeying interdependence logic.

It seems that at first with Constantine Simitis as Prime Minister (1996), the interdependence-transnational paradigm has gained ground. But the Imia Crisis forced Simitis and his government to be very cautious in foreign policy orientation. Even if Simitis is a dedicated transnationalist technocrat, his responsibility for the security of the country from the perceived Turkish threat forced him to go ahead with the purchase of new army equipment in order to restore the balance of power between the two countries. Again, reality is more complex than the clear-cut theoretical or ideological patterns.

Meantime, debate over the formulation of Greek foreign policy among scholars, journalists and politicians continues. At the end of the millenium, it is permitted to hope for an open and serious debate.

IV. Concluding Remarks

The traditional formula of both good and bad news could apply as a conclusion here.

The good news is that the discipline of international relations is currently enjoying increased popularity. Programs are already established in the universities, research projects are carried out in specialized institutes or centers, books and articles are published. There is therefore tremendous interest in the field as the current debate has shown.

The bad news is, of course, a certain confusion in the present debate, combined with degeneration into petty politics and personal disputes. Simplification of a complex reality in the name of theories and ideologies is yet another negative aspect of the situation.

This volume presents a pluralist snapshot of Greek international relations in the hope that the debate will continue at an academic level and will enhance the development of the discipline in Greece.

Let us conclude with Constantine Cavafis, the Alexandrian poet :
It's sure, in the Colony many things unfortunately are not going well;
but is there any human creature without fault?
At the end, however, we move forward.

NOTES

1. Stephanos Constantinides, "Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis", **Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 4, No.1, Spring 1996, pp. 43-61

2. As it is pointed out in the academic journal **Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies,** vol.3, No 1, Autumn 1994 (Editor's note, p. 7-8) "Research and dialogue in the social sciences as such have never been in the forefront of the mainstream Greek society. A variety of reasons have been offered for this seeming lack of interest in the social research field, the primary being some kind of "socio-political conspiracy" on the part of the conservative élites that have governed Greece almost exclusively since Independence. As a matter of fact, it is not accidental that neither sociology, psychology nor education faculties exist in Greek universities, where systematic research on political and historical issues has been minimal". This point of view was presented for the first time in 1983 in the first issue of the journal. In the edition of 1994, it is pointed: "we can repeat what we published in 1983 with slight modifications. As a matter of fact, in Greece progress has been made in numerous fields of studies and research in the social sciences, especially in the fields of sociology, psychology, education and political science. There is now an openness in the Greek universities. Research institutions have also appeared since 1983. Nevertheless, the situation is precarious and in comparison with other western countries, Greece remains behind in all these fields."

See also **Koinonikes kai Politikes Dynamis stin Ellada (Social and Political Forces in Greece)**, Hellenic Society of Political Science, Athens, Exantas Publishers, 1977 (in Greek)

3. Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*

4. Henri Mendras, **Eléments de sociologie**, Paris, Armand Colin, Coll. U, 1975, p. 233

5. Raymond Aron, **Dix-huit leçons sur la société industrielle**, Paris, Gallimard, coll. Idées, 1970, p.30

6. Argyris Fatouros, "Greece's Integration in the European Community", in Harry Psomiades and Stavros Thomadakis, **Greece, The New Europe and the Changing International Order**, New-York, Pella Publishing Company, 1993, p.24

7. Thanos Veremis, "From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910", in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis, **Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality**, Athens, ELIAMEP, 1990, p.17

8. Thanos Veremis, *op. cit.* p.17. See also Dimitri Kitsikis, **Istoria tis Othomanikis Aftokratorias** (History of the Ottoman Empire), Athens, Estia, 1985, p.85 (in Greek)

9. Argyris Fatouros, *op. cit.*, p.25, Constantinos Dimaras, **A history of Modern Greek Literature**, Albany, editions of the same work, Athens, 1975, pp. 152-156

10. John Cambell and Philip Sherrard, **Modern Greece**, New-York, Washington, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968, p.33

11. Argyris Fatouros, *op. cit.*, p. 25

12. Thanos Veremis, *op. cit.*, p. 25

13. Interview of Odysseus Elytis to the Greek Weekly **To Vima**, December 1978, cited in the monthly **Diavazo** (Athens), April 1996, p. 74

14. Argyris Fatouros, *op. cit.*, p. 25, Constantinos Dimaras, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-152

15. Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53

16. Argyris Fatouros, *op. cit.*, p. 25

Politique étrangère grecque: Orientations théoriques et praxis

Stephanos Constantinides*

I. Introduction

Dans un article publié dans cette revue - vol.4, no 1, 1996 - j'ai essayé de présenter l'évolution de la discipline des relations internationales en Grèce et son influence sur la politique extérieure du pays. J'ai essayé de démontrer l'existence d'une relation dialectique entre la théorie et la praxis, entre les politiciens et les membres de la communauté académique dans la formulation de la politique extérieure grecque.

Même si le travail théorique dans ce domaine est dans un état embryonnaire, il est possible d'essayer de faire ressortir quelques traits essentiels de la discipline et lier son orientation théorique avec des applications pratiques. Ces dernières années, en particulier, il est possible de procéder à une telle analyse puisque nous assistons à une confrontation d'approches théoriques opposées et à des alliances entre hommes politiques et membres de la communauté académique.

En écrivant l'article publié il y a un an, je voulais d'abord résumer le débat théorique dans ce domaine entre les universitaires et intellectuels grecs et ensuite essayer d'en ouvrir un nouveau. J'avais remarqué que les discussions se déroulaient dans les quotidiens et les magazines plutôt que dans les revues académiques. J'espérai qu'un débat académique contribuerait au développement de la discipline en Grèce.

L'article a été bien accueilli. La discipline des relations internationnales est relativement nouvelle en Grèce - introduite essentiellement après 1974 - et les membres de la communauté académique, après plusieurs années d'effort et leurs derniers débats plutôt "sauvages", sont maintenant assez matures pour des échanges d'une nature académique.

Bien sûr ils n'étaient pas toujours d'accord avec la façon avec laquelle j'ai présenté leurs points de vue; toutefois j'ai travaillé de bonne foi et je suppose qu'ils le reconnaissaient . C'est pour cette raison qu' ils ont accepté de collaborer dans cette édition spéciale des *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies* et de présenter une juste image de leur discipline.

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Van Coufoudakis, un éminent universitaire grec-américain a accepté d'être le co-éditeur de ce numéro spécial. Il présentera dans un chapitre-conclusion, les orientations spécifiques des articles publiés dans ce numéro, puis il présentera quelques idées de son cru sur la politique étrangère grecque.

J'essaierai pour ma part de présenter un cadre théorique de la discipline des relations internationales en Grèce, en me référant à son évolution et finalement, je discuterai de ce qui s'y passe en ce moment.

II. Le débat actuel

Le débat actuel dans le domaine des relations internationales en Grèce est trouble. Les principaux problèmes résident dans le sous-développement de la théorie et dans la tendance à considérer les idéologies politiques comme les axes théoriques de la discipline. Bien sûr, je suis conscient de l'absence d'une théorie pure; d'une façon ou d'une autre, l'idéologie est présente au cœur de toute théorie. Mais l'idéologie est en premier lieu une force au sein de l'arène politique qui demande notre approbation et foi entière; la théorie est un outil scientifique et doit donc être vérifiée sur le terrain - dans notre cas, la confronter avec la praxis.

Il serait illusoire cependant de considérer le présent débat comme étant seulement de nature politique et idéologique. Les universitaires grecs, spécialistes des études internationales - au moins un certain nombre d'entre eux - ont essayé pendant toutes ces années de transposer dans leur discipline des éléments théoriques développés à l'extérieur de la Grèce. Leur contribution propre au développement de la théorie est cependant pauvre et très limitée. Malheureusement, le présent débat théorique n'est pas élargi et enrichi par des éléments propres à la réalité grecque. Situation paradoxale, dans un pays qui a produit Thucydide, le père et le premier théoricien des relations internationales.

En effet, pour des raisons politiques [2], les sciences sociales n'ont jamais figuré au premier plan des préoccupations de la société grecque, à tout le moins avant 1974. Ce fait explique la situation présente et aussi pourquoi la discipline des relations internationales accuse un retard de plus d'un demi-siècle sur les États-Unis et d'une génération sur les pays d'Europe occidentale.

Dans ces circonstances, le nouveau domaine d'études s'est inévitablement développé dans des conditions de confusion théorique, qui plus est avec un mélange d'éléments théoriques et idéologiques. Les spécialistes de la nouvelle discipline provenaient de différents milieux, avaient étudié ou enseigné à l'étranger. Ils ont apporté en Grèce un bagage d'expérience de ces pays. De plus, leurs parcours académiques diffèrent: certains

étudièrent le droit, d'autres l'histoire ou l'économie. Comme il n'y avait pas de tradition grecque des relations internationales en tant que discipline, ils ont essayé d'en ériger une, chaque spécialiste contribuant à raison de son expérience et de la tradition étrangère à laquelle il avait été exposé.

Ainsi, deux orientations fondamentales ont cherché à influencer l'établissement d'une tradition hellénique dans la discipline des relations internationales. La première orientation, anglo-saxonne, tire ses origines principalement des États-Unis. La seconde, européenne, fut importée pour l'essentiel de France et d'Allemagne. A ces deux influences principales, on doit ajouter l'influence de la diaspora. Les spécialistes d'origine grecque de l'étranger entretenaient de fructueux échanges avec leurs collègues de la métropole et jouèrent de ce fait un rôle important dans l'établissement de la discipline en Grèce.

Les traits théoriques dans chacune des orientations précédemment citées sont nombreux mais plus souvent qu'autrement flous. On peut les diviser cependant en deux courants: le premier courant est lié aux approches théoriques internationales; le second, avec les réalités "idéologico-politiques" du pays[3]. Ces courants sont les plus importants au sein du présent débat. On peut procéder avec l'hypothèse de la primauté de l'idéologie politique ou au contraire avec la primauté de la théorie. Cependant, dans le débat actuel, un tel choix présente peu d'intérêt. Le chercheur sera plus efficace s'il analyse chaque situation particulière dans le but de comprendre l'influence soit de l'idéologie, soit de la théorie comme outil d'explication ou même comme instrument pouvant guider les politiciens.

Cependant, vu l'état actuel du développement de la théorie des relations internationales en Grèce, il ne fait aucun doute que l'outil d'idéologie politique a préséance sur l'outil théorique dans un nombre considérable d'études sur la politique étrangère grecque. Aussi, il ne fait aucun doute que les intérêts corporatifs jouent un rôle important dans le débat actuel, même camouflés par des considérations idéologiques ou politiques.

En fin de compte, on ne peut procéder qu'étape par étape et élimine - rautant que possible - ce qui n'est pas 'scientifique' dans ce débat. Je dois souligner tout de même qu'une confrontation idéologique d'un certain niveau n'est pas inutile dans le développement en cours de l'étude de la politique étrangère grecque. On doit aussi se rappeler qu'un nombre de spécialistes des sciences sociales conteste la possibilité même d'une étude 'scientifique' des phénomènes sociaux, considérant que toute étude dans ce domaine est forcément de nature idéologique. On pourrait argumenter ainsi que «toute analyse scientifique, si elle est bonne, est par définition, que le sociologue le veuille ou non, en même temps, une étude idéologique»[4].

L'approche scientifique dans le domaine des sciences sociales - qui est aussi applicable au domaine des études internationales - se fonde essentiellement:

a) Sur un effort de distinction entre les valeurs, les jugements moraux ou partisans et la vision clinique de la réalité.

b) Sur l'utilisation de méthodes et de techniques d'enquête communes à toutes les sciences sociales et acceptées par les chercheurs du même domaine.

c) Sur un effort de systématisation des connaissances, en proposant quelques modèles théoriques généraux d'analyse dans la recherche de lois uniformes - ou au moins de quelques constances - gouvernant les phénomènes sociaux.

Je suis bien sûr conscient de la difficulté accompagnant l'application d'une telle approche en Grèce. En fait, même dans les pays où les sciences sociales sont plus développées, la difficulté d'appliquer une telle approche existe toujours. Comme l'a souligné Raymond Aron:

«...les sociologues sont toujours partiels, ils étudient une partie de la réalité en prétendant étudier le tout. Ils ont tendance à remarquer surtout les beaux côtés des sociétés qu'ils préfèrent et les côtés sombres des sociétés auxquelles ne vont pas leurs sympathies. Le sociologue devient politique, même sans le vouloir, non pas en exprimant de temps en temps un jugement de valeur, mais en se laissant aller au péché majeur du politicien, et hélas aussi du savant, qui est de voir ce que l'on a envie de voir.» [5]

Afin de clarifier la situation, je pense, que dans le débat en cours sur les études internationales en Grèce, trois thèmes spécifiques doivent être pris en considération :

A. L'influence des modèles 'idéologico-politiques' grecs.

B. L'influence des différentes écoles de pensée concernant les relations internationales.

C. La présente situation politique du pays et spécialement le poids des relations gréco-turques.

A. L'influence des modèles "idéologico-politiques" grecs

Même avant l'indépendance (1830), il y a eu, en Grèce, deux courants idéologico-politiques fondamentaux, qui ont exercé une influence importante dans la vision qu'ont les Grecs, de la situation de leur pays dans le monde.

Le premier courant, apparu après le siècle des Lumières maintient que la Grèce appartient à l'Europe occidentale. Adamantios Koraes (1748-1833),

une figure intellectuelle notable du siècle des Lumières grec, qui vécut presque toute sa vie en Europe occidentale (Amsterdam, Montpellier et Paris), est une éminente figure de proue de ce courant. Il travailla à la transmission des notions occidentales de l'État, de la nationalité et de la rationalité aux Grecs. Il considérait les Grecs modernes comme les descendants légitimes des Grecs anciens et les héritiers de la culture grecque classique, reléguant Byzance à une période médiévale.

Le second courant considère que la Grèce appartient à l'Orient, et que les racines du néohellénisme se trouvent à Byzance. Conséquemment, la Grèce se doit de résister à l'influence occidentale.

Ces modèles Est-Ouest constituent autant de références idéologiques et politiques, mais ce sont des «constructions largement imaginaires» [6]. Les universitaires et les intellectuels qui adhérent à cette orientation sont convaincus que leur pays n'a pas à imiter d'autres cultures et que l'hellénisme doit se fonder sur ses propres racines en rejettant les idées de l'Occident. Au début du XX[ème] siècle, lorsqu'Eleftherios Venizelos, l'éminent représentant de la bourgeoisie grecque, réussit une sorte d'européanisation de l'État, d'autres cherchaient «un esprit de mission en Orient», en concevant même «l'idéologie d'un État multinational en Orient» comprenant Grecs et Turcs [7]. Comme un historien l'a remarqué, «étrangement, il fallut un fonctionnaire public (Ion Dragoumis) et un officier des forces armées grecques (Athanasios Souliotis) pour formuler la critique la plus systématique contre l'État et proposer une alternative viable». Pendant qu'Eleftherios Venizelos réformait l'État grec et le dirigeait vers une européanisation, Dragoumis et Souliotis proposaient l'alternative de "l'État multinational gréco-turc en Orient" [8].

L'idée n'est guère nouvelle. Elle nous renvoie à l'Empire ottoman, quand le patriarcat de Constantinople et les élites grecques faisaient d'une certaine façon, partie intégrante de l'administration ottomane. Même à Byzance, l'Église et une partie des élites ont résisté aux efforts du pape et de l'Occident latin, d'instaurer leur domination spirituelle et dogmatique sur les orthodoxes grecs. Au contraire, sous l'Empire ottoman, l'Église orthodoxe grecque de Constantinople devint une véritable puissance politique, pour tous les Orthodoxes résidant au sein de l'Empire.

Le modèle Est-Ouest présente une nouvelle dimension au XVIII[ème] siècle, lorsque la diaspora grecque, composée d'éléments bourgeois et intellectuels, principalement en Europe occidentale et centrale, influencés par le siècle des Lumières et la Révolution française, commencèrent à travailler sur la construction de l'État-nation grec, préparant ainsi la guerre d'indépendance. Les idéaux du libéralisme économique et idéologico-

politique et le siècle des Lumières allaient constituer l'arme contre les éléments conservateurs de l'intérieur, comme les notables terriens et l'administration ecclésiastique. L'Église défendait les valeurs traditionnelles et plus généralement «le *statu quo* tel qu'il existait dans le cadre de l'Empire ottoman»[9]. Comme il a été mentionné précédemment, on peut remonter encore plus loin afin de trouver les racines de ce modèle, au temps du Schisme (1054) entre l'Église orthodoxe orientale de Constantinople et l'Église catholique de Rome. L'attitude anti-européenne des orthodoxes grecs a aussi été influencée par le pillage de Constantinople et des régions adjacentes par les «croisés» en 1204 [10].

Cependant, il serait erroné de considérer que les modèles en question dans ce conflit soient clairs. Comme un universitaire l'a noté, «la réalité est toujours plus complexe et moins nettement définie que de tels modèles suggèrent». [11]

Ce conflit était supposément chose du passé, lorsque la Grèce devint membre de l'Union européenne en 1981. Néanmoins, il demeure toujours un fort groupe d'intellectuels et autres connus sous le nom de neo-orthodoxes, qui continuent d'exprimer cette position anti-occidentale fondée sur une vision romantique: «communautés organiques», «anti-rationalisme», un retour aux racines, au paradis perdu des valeurs traditionnelles, etc. Comme Thanos Veremis l'a souligné, cette vision romantique de la vie communautaire sous les Ottomans survit encore aujourd'hui et est présentée comme modèle concurrent à celui de l'État-nation, considéré comme un produit «occidental» étranger à la culture et aux valeurs de l'hellénisme. Veremis fait d'ailleurs remarquer que «le mythe entourant la vie communautaire a été remis en question par le travail d'historiens présentant les communautés comme une composante fonctionnelle intégrante du système de taxation ottoman plutôt qu'un produit de volonté nationale». [12]

Même le poète Odysséas Elytis, prix Nobel 1979, a insisté sur l'importance de la tradition, inquiet qu'il était à propos de l'identité grecque, et, considérant que l'Occident fut toujours hostile à la nation grecque. Elytis, faisant aussi référence au Schisme et aux Croisades, déclara: «L'Occident a toujours essayé de nous mettre au pas. Et aujourd'hui, il l'a réussi. Dorénavant, on doit marcher avec un pied dans la Communauté européenne et l'autre au sein de l'OTAN». [13]

A cette vision traditionaliste, les "Européanistes" opposent les modèles modernistes tout en essayant de les insérer dans un cadre européen, comme des éléments renforcant l'identité ethnoculturelle grecque.

D'autre part, le nationalisme est un courant fort important qui influence la formulation de la politique extérieure grecque. Le nationalisme coïncide peut-être sur certains points avec la vision néo-orthodoxe mais il ne rejette point - à tout le moins ses composantes les plus importantes - l'orientation européenne.

Rappelons-nous que le nationalisme grec fut initialement le produit de l'influence occidentale. Le nationalisme façonna l'identité grecque en favorisant l'établissement de l'État-nation grec *vis-à-vis* l'identité culturelle avancée par l'Église et ses alliés qui préféraient le cadre de l'Empire ottoman [14].

La question qu'il faut se poser à ce stade-ci est la suivante: comment les orientations 'idéologico-politiques' peuvent-elles être combinées avec les différentes écoles de pensée des relations internationales provenant de l'étranger, dans le but de dépister les tendances théoriques que les universitaires utilisent? De nos jours, on pourrait se questionner sur l'influence réelle de ces modèles.

Sans aucun doute, en étudiant ce qui se passe dans le débat actuel, on peut se permettre de relier les éléments de ces modèles avec les orientations théoriques provenant de l'étranger. La difficulté apparaît cependant lorsqu'on essaie de lier clairement ces modèles à l'une ou l'autre des théories, à l'une ou l'autre des écoles de pensée des relations internationales. Particulièrement lorsqu'on sait que ces écoles demeurent dans un état de formation dans le cas de la Grèce.

B. L'influence des différentes écoles de pensée en ce qui concerne les relations internationales

Je considère qu'il y a deux écoles de pensée majeures dans l'étude des relations internationales en Grèce: l'approche réaliste et l'approche du transnationalisme-interdépendance[15]. L'école du marxisme-dépendance qui a joué un rôle significatif jusqu' à la fin des années 80 est une école marginale tandis que d'autres paradigmes (ex. féminisme, paradigmes environnementaux, etc.) demeurent aussi marginaux. Des courants importants comme le néo-réalisme ou bien le réalisme structurel ne sont pas non plus très connus. Même si nous considérons que les deux écoles majeures mentionnées - le réalisme et le transnationalisme - sont mal assimilées avec les réalités grecques et que les universitaires grecs ne sont pas toujours capables d'articuler un discours théorique, on ne peut nier une certaine influence de ces écoles dans l'étude des relations internationales et celle de la politique étrangère grecque.

Par ailleurs, aucun de ces deux modèles 'idéologico-politiques' fondamentaux présentés plus-haut peut être identifié avec l'une ou l'autre de ces

écoles des relations internationales. Identifier par exemple les réalistes comme 'anti-Européanistes' et 'nationalistes' est oublier que le nationalisme grec tire ses origines de l'époque des Lumières et est le produit de l'Europe et de l'influence occidentale. Identifier les transnationalistes comme les opposants de l'État national et les fervents supporteurs de l'Europe, c'est les affilier à l'idéologie d'un État multinational, développé, fait étrange par ceux-là mêmes qui étaient opposés à l'Occident et l'Europe et qui considèrent Byzance et même l'Empire ottoman comme un modèle pour l'hellénisme.

Par conséquent on doit demeurer conscient de la manipulation de ces modèles et se souvenir de ce qui a été mentionné plus-haut, à savoir, que «la réalité est toujours plus complexe et moins nettement définie que de tels modèles suggèrent»[16].

C. La présente situation politique en Grèce

Au-delà des théories et des idéologies politiques, on doit considérer la réalité politique de la Grèce. La Grèce a un problème majeur de sécurité, faisant face à un défi constant de la part de son voisin oriental, la Turquie. Dès lors, toute discussion sur le domaine des relations internationales et sur la formulation de la politique étrangère grecque doit prendre cette réalité en considération.

Ces écoles de pensée opposées mentionnées plus haut ne sont pas toujours convaincantes. Malheureusement, l'usage d'épithètes afin d'attaquer l' 'ennemi' n'a rien à voir avec un débat sérieux entre universitaires. Cette confrontation n'en est pas toujours une d'arguments théoriques ou même 'idéologico-politiques' mais plutôt celle de politicailleries et de disputes personnelles, avec comme résultat une sorte de simplification de la réalité, menant finalement à une bipolarité manichéenne.

Sans exclure quelques remarques abrasives dans un tel débat, concernant la sécurité du pays, on s'attendrait malgré tout à un échange académique de points de vue avec une référence explicite à la théorie et aux paradigmes afin de soutenir les arguments avancés par chaque partie.

Au contraire, l'usage de quelques termes aux lourds sous-entendus et significations politiques, relié à l'histoire du pays, ne facilite pas un débat ouvert et sérieux.

On considère que des arguments valides ont été avancés dans le débat concernant la situation particulière du pays dans le domaine de la sécurité. Les responsables politiques peuvent tirer profit d'un tel débat s'ils réussissent à s'en distancer. Ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas puisque les politiciens sont identifiés à l'une ou l'autre des écoles de pensée.

En conclusion, aussi longtemps que le pays continue à affronter un problème de sécurité, ledit problème demeurera un facteur important, déterminant, de la nature du débat mentionné plus haut.

III. L'influence du débat en cours sur la formulation de la politique étrangère grecque

D'une part, il est clair, qu'il y a une relation dialectique entre les paradigmes théoriques et les modèles 'idéologico-politiques' grecs. Mais une relation ne signifie pas pour autant une identification complète de l'un ou l'autre de ces modèles à l'un ou l'autre de ces paradigmes.

D'autre part, on assume qu'il y a une relation dialectique entre le débat en cours et la praxis de la politique étrangère grecque. Les visions théoriques et idéologiques dans ce débat exercent leur influence dans l'application de la politique étrangère grecque. Dans certains cas, cependant, on n'est pas sûr si ce sont les visions théoriques et idéologiques qui mènent à la praxis, ou si c'est la praxis qui produit les orientations théoriques et idéologiques.

Alors que nous entrons dans une ère nouvelle de transition du système international, les universitaires grecs doivent clarifier leurs objectifs, adapter les modèles théoriques à la réalité grecque et lier la théorie à la praxis. Le processus décisionnel dans ce domaine est quelque peu suranné, mais sans aucun doute, cela suit un comportement dialectique. Bien sûr, le processus décisionnel est influencé par plusieurs facteurs, tels les valeurs culturelles et les coutumes, la réalité économique, le pouvoir politique et les médias.

Si on analyse l'impact de la théorie et des idéologies durant la période post-dictatoriale de la politique étrangère grecque (1974-1998) en nous fondant sur les développements précédents on remarquera la présence d'une telle influence dans le processus décisionnel. Mais il est clair aussi que durant cette période les modèles théoriques étaient peu développés et dépourvus de lignes définies.

Durant la période de Constatin Caramanlis (1974-1980), le gouvernement de droite connut différentes influences et reçut différentes sortes de pressions dans la formulation de sa politique étrangère. Ces influences et ces pressions provenaient de modèles théoriques et idéologiques aussi divers que le transnationalisme, la dépendance, le nationalisme, etc.

Durant la période d'Andréas Papandréou (1981-1989) le cadre théorique s'appuyant sur l'école de la dépendance fut très présent mais l'orientation théorique réaliste gagna aussi du terrain.

On doit toutefois procéder avec prudence car rien n'est si limpide. Il est facile par exemple, en se fondant sur les apparences de considérer la période de Caramanlis sous l'influence transnationaliste et la période Papandréou sous l'influence de la théorie de dépendance. Mais la réalité demeure toujours plus complexe et on ne doit pas prendre les apparences pour la réalité. Par exemple, on ne peut expliquer le départ de la Grèce de l'OTAN par Caramanlis en termes du modèle transnationaliste ou le sommet de Davos entre Papandréou et le premier ministre turc Turgut Ozal en termes du modèle de dépendance.

Le retour de la droite au pouvoir, avec le premier ministre Constantin Mitsotakis (1990-1993) mais aussi les bouleversements du système international, changèrent le cadre théorique de la politique étrangère grecque. Cette fois, c'est le modèle du transnationalisme - interdépendance qui gagna du terrain.

Cependant, le nationalisme demeura un obstacle à une telle orientation; on se souviendra particulièrement, de l'exaspération suscitée par la question macédonienne. Le premier ministre Mitsotakis fut incapable d'imposer sa vision, même sur son ministre des affaires étrangères, Antonis Samaras, un nationaliste convaincu.

La nouvelle période du PASOK avec Papandréou comme premier ministre (1993-1996) en est une de contradiction entre un discours obéissant davantage au modèle du réalisme et de l'école de dépendance et un nombre d'actions obéissant davantage à la logique de l'interdépendance.

Il semble à première vue, qu'avec Constantinos Simitis au poste de premier ministre (1996), le paradigme transnationaliste-interdépendance ait gagné du terrain. Mais la crise d'Imia força Simitis et son gouvernement à user de prudence dans l'orientation de la politique étrangère grecque. Même si Simitis est un technocrate transnationaliste convaincu, sa responsabilité pour la sécurité du pays - face à la Turquie - le força à donner son aval à l'achat de nouveaux équipements pour l'armée en vue de restaurer l'équilibre entre les deux pays. Encore là, la réalité est plus complexe que les limpides modèles théoriques ou idéologiques.

Entretemps, le débat sur la formulation de la politique étrangère grecque parmi les universitaires, les journalistes et les politiciens continue. Au tournant du millénaire, il est permis d'espérer que ces discussions faciliteront un débat ouvert et sérieux.

IV. Conclusion

En conclusion, on peut tirer des remarques positives et négatives de tout ce qui a été développé précedemment.

Examinons d'abord le côté positif: la discipline des relations internationales jouit d'une popularité accrue durant cette période. Des programmes existent dans les universités, la recherche a lieu au sein d'instituts et de centres spécialisés, des livres et des articles sont publiés. Il y a ainsi un intérêt accru pour le domaine des études internationales comme le démontre le débat en cours.

Du côté négatif, bien sûr, une certaine confusion existe dans le présent débat: le fait que le débat dégénère en politicailleries et disputes personnelles. La simplification de la réalité complexe au nom des théories et des idéologies accentue l'aspect négatif de la situation.

Ce volume présente une image pluraliste de ce qui se passe dans le domaine des relations internationales en Grèce avec l'espoir que le débat continuera à un niveau académique et aidera au développement de la discipline en Grèce.

Laissez-moi conclure avec le poète Alexandrin, Constantin Cavafy:

C'est certain, dans la Colonie, bien des choses laissent à désirer, hélas;
mais y a-t-il rien d'humain sans défaut ?
Et finalement, eh bien, nous avançons.

NOTES

1. Stephanos Constantinides, "Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis", **Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 4, No.1, Spring 1996, pp. 43-61.

2. Comme il a été signalé dans le journal académique **Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies,** vol.3, no 1, automne 1994 (note de la rédaction, p. 5) "La recherche dans le domaine des sciences sociales n'a jamais connu de développement sérieux en Grèce... Il y a plusieurs raisons qui expliquent ce phénomène, mais l'explication principale réside dans le fait que les élites conservatrices qui sont depuis l'indépendance aux commandes de la société grecque ont toujours banni les sciences sociales, les considérant comme subversives. Ce n'est pas un hasard s'il n'existe pas au sein des universités grecques de département ou de faculté de sociologie, de psycho-logie ou d'éducation, alors que même en histoire et en science politique les recherches ont été et restent toujours très limitées". Ce point de vue a été présenté pour la première fois en 1983 dans le premier numéro du journal. Dans l'édition de 1994, on remarquait : "... nous pouvons répéter ce que nous avons écrit en 1983 avec quelques légères modifications. Il est en effet vrai que depuis on remarque un certain progrès dans un nombre de secteurs de recherche et d'études tels la socio - logie, la psychologie, l'éducation et la science politique. Il y a actuellement une ouverture pour ces secteurs dans les universités grecques. Quelques institutions de

recherche ont aussi fait leur apparition depuis 1983. Néanmoins, la situation reste précaire et la Grèce tire de l'arrière dans tous ces domaines en comparaison avec les autres pays de l'Europe occidentale".
Voir aussi **Koinonikes kai Politikes Dynamis stin Ellada (Forces sociales et politiques en Grèce)**, Société hellénique de science politique, Athènes, Editions Exantas, 1977 (en grec)

3. Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*

4. Henri Mendras, **Eléments de sociologie**, Paris, Armand Colin, Coll. U, 1975, p. 233

5. Raymond Aron, **Dix-huit leçons sur la société industrielle**, Paris, Gallimard, coll. Idées, 1970, p.30 .

6. Argyris Fatouros, "Greece's Integration in the European Community", in Harry Psomiades and Stavros Thomadakis, **Greece, The New Europe and the Changing International Order**, New-York, Pella Publishing Company, 1993, p.24.

7. Thanos Veremis, "From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910", in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis, **Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality**, Athens, ELIAMEP, 1990, p.17 .

8. Thanos Veremis, *op. cit.* p.17. Voir aussi Dimitri Kitsikis, **Istoria tis Othomanikis Aftokratorias (Histoire de l'Empire ottoman)**, Athènes, Estia, 1985, p.85 (en Grec).

9. Argyris Fatouros, *op. cit.*, p.25, Constantinos Dimaras, **A History of Modern Greek Literature**, Albany, Edition du même ouvrage (en grec), Athènes, 1975, pp. 152-156 .

10. John Cambell and Philip Sherrard, **Modern Greece**, New-York, Washington, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968, p.33 .

11. Argyris Fatouros, *op. cit.*, p. 25 .

12. Thanos Veremis, *op. cit.*, p. 25 .

13. Entrevue avec Odysséas Elytis dans l'hebdomadaire grec **To Vima**, décembre 1978, cité dans le mensuel **Diavazo** (Athènes), avril 1996, p. 74 .

14. Argyris Fatouros, *op. cit.*, p. 25, Constantinos Dimaras, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-152 .

15. Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53 .

16. Argyris Fatouros, *op. cit.*, p. 25 .

Greek Foreign Policy and the Community of International Relations Scholars

Dimitri Constas*

RÉSUMÉ

Entre 1974 et 1996, les acteurs domestiques ont joué un rôle important dans la formulation de la politique étrangère grecque. La communauté des spécialistes des relations internationales, a cependant échoué à s'établir comme une force respectée et autonome capable d'influencer la politique extérieure, en raison de lacunes théoriques, de l'emphase accordée aux analyses superficielles et à court terme et de la fragmentation du domaine. En conséquence, malgré quelques exceptions notables, les spécialistes grecs des relations internationales ont endossé des thèmes reflétant des divisions idéologiques et politiques dans la société grecque ou des intérêts professionnels étroits. De plus, les spécialistes n'ont pas cherché à introduire une perspective indépendante fondée sur la richesse de la connaissance accumulée dans le travail académique de la communauté des relations internationales.

Les concepteurs de la politique de la Grèce et la communauté des spécialistes des relations internationales doivent unir leurs forces afin de faire face au principal débat-dilemme de la politique étrangère du pays: dans quelle mesure le détournement des rares ressources qui permettraient d'atteindre le niveau de développement économique nécessaire à l'intégration européenne causera-t-il un dommage irréparable à la sécurité du pays dans la perspective de la très réelle menace turque?

Les spécialistes des relations internationales peuvent relever ce défi en mettant de côté les catégorisations artificielles, telles "Européanistes" et "Nationalistes" et en rétablissant de nouveau la confiance dans les relations internationales en tant que domaine d'étude scientifique. Autrement, elle court un réel danger de marginalisation, au détriment autant de ses membres que du pays.

ABSTRACT

In the period from 1974 to 1996 domestic sources have played an important role in the formulation of Greek foreign policy. The community of International Relations scholars, however, has failed to become a respected, autonomous factor in influencing foreign policy due to the neglect of theory, emphasis on superficial, short-term, policy-related analyses and its fragmentation. Consequently, some notable exceptions not withstanding, Greek I.R. scholars, rather than introducing an independent perspective based on the wealth of knowledge accumulated in the scholarly work of the International Relations community, endorsed views reflecting ideological and political divisions in Greek society or narrow professional interests.

Greek policy-makers and the community of I.R. scholars must join forces in addressing the country's central foreign policy dilemma: how the diversion of scarce resources to the attainment of a level of economic development that will

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The views of the author, who is currently Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Greece to the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, are not necessarily those of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

bring Greece to the path of European integration will not cause irreparable damage to the country's security in view of the very real Turkish threat.

The community of I.R. scholars can only meet this challenge by putting aside artificial categorizations into "Europeanists" and "Nationalists" and reestablish confidence in International Relations as a scientific field of study. Otherwise it runs a real risk of marginalization to the detriment of its members and of the country as a whole.

Introductory Remarks

Writing a chapter on Greek foreign policy and International Relations in Greece after 1974 and the influence exercised by the academic community on the course of the country's foreign policy, presents me with some quite unique dilemmas and challenges. Since 1979, when I started teaching an "International Relations" course at Panteion University (then Panteion Graduate School of Political Sciences) - the only course on the subject available at that time in Greek University curricula, I have been an active participant in the debates and academic politics that have determined the course and present status of the field. Detached analysis and objective assessment of facts require therefore an exceptional effort which, even if successful, will not be easily convincing to others.

To the outsider, even to the most intelligent student of Greece's foreign policy who is not a member of the Greek academic establishment, the intensity of the domestic foreign policy debate or the monologues that often substitute as debate, represent both a paradox and a challenge. A constructive reaction is to approach the problem with the analytical tools of International Relations. A recent article in this journal represents a good example of a response of an academic to a clash among other academics over issues related to their discipline. The author, a distinguished Greek-Canadian scholar, takes for granted the primacy of academic dictates over ideology, politics and professional interests and argues that the differences of view among Greek academics result from their adherence to established but conflicting Schools of Thought: "Realist", "Interdependence", "Marxist-Dependency".[1] It is my thankless task, in this chapter, to sustain a different line of argument. The current state of academic debate on Greek foreign policy reflects the primacy of political ideology and professional interests over academic discipline requirements.

2. The Evaluation of the Fields of International Relations in Greece: a Synopsis

Prior to the dictatorship (1967-1974), the social sciences in Greece were both marginalized and underdeveloped, with the possible exception of economics. Among the various explanations put forward by students of

post-WWII Greek history, the one associating the status of the social sciences with the degree of academic freedom and social criticism tolerable within the political system of the victors of the Civil War, appears the most credible. Scientific analysis and interpretation of official state preferences concerning the regulation of social, economic and political interaction dominated University curricula until the late 1970's including that of the Panteion School of Political Sciences, the sole institution of its kind in Greece, which had just one chair in the field of specialization, i.e. political science. Although the school offered no law degrees, it covered thoroughly all fields of law including criminal and civil jurisprudence.

The study of state interaction was the prerogative of Professors holding chairs of international law at the Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki as well as at Panteion. International organizations, including the United Nations, fell within the competence of such chairs, for example, diplomatic history was taught either separately or in conjunction with legal subjects.

The need that the political, social and economic analysis of international society take its proper place, next to international law, in a "new program" of study of social sciences was first recognized and put into practice by the Panteion School faculty in the immediate post-dictatorship period; i.e., from 1974 to 1978. Most of these faculty members were prominent social scientists or jurists conscious of the limits of their discipline. Most had lost their faculty positions during the dictatorship and were either detained in Greece or forced to work in European universities. They now were given incentives to test a fresh approach to their field. In general, the significance of teaching the social-sciences in consolidating democratic institutions and modernizing Greek society was repeatedly noted. George Tenekides, a prominent international lawyer and professor at Panteion, played an instrumental role in placing "International Relations" as a separate course in the "new program" of study and then elevating it to "compulsory course" status for senior year students (1978).

Since then, the growth of international studies in Greece has been spectacular indeed. Six Universities have either separate Departments of International Studies: (Economics University of Athens, University of Macedonia and, since September 1997, Panteion University); or Sections of International Studies within Departments of Political Science or Law (University of Athens, University of Thessaloniki and University of Thrace). When, in 1993, graduate studies were officially institutionalized in Greece, four of the above Universities (University of Athens, University of Thessaloniki, Economics University and Panteion) included international and/or European studies, or international and European economics in their graduate programs, while one of them (University of Athens)

offers two different programs one through its Department of Law and the other through the Department of Political Science and Administrative Studies. A total of 138 faculty members and 47 visiting professors and assistants (39 Professors, 22 Associate Professors, 49 Assistant Professors and 28 Lecturers) serve in these Departments and sections. Although only a segment are international law/international relations specialists, the growth from a total of approximately 10-12 in the late 1970s to the present figure is very impressive indeed.

Among the reasons that could be cited to explain this development, two seem particularly pertinent. First, and foremost, was a new law (1982) that abolished the old system of chairs and introduced a university organization similar to the North American one, especially as regards the establishment of departments as basic academic units. Within the course of a few years, the law multiplied the available programs of study in all fields and created hundreds of new faculty positions. It should also be kept in mind that during the 1980s the number of Universities in Greece also multiplied with the upgrading of independent schools (agriculture, economics and commercial studies, political sciences) to the status of independent Universities (Agricultural University, Economics University of Athens, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, University of Piraeus, University of Macedonia) and the creation of new Universities in different parts of Greece: Epirus, Thrace, Thessaly, Aegean, etc.

A second reason, exclusive to the growth of international studies, is the renewed interest in international society and state foreign policy resulting from the new phase that Greek-Turkish relations entered after the 1974 Cyprus crisis and, equally important, the Greek accession to the European Economic Community that materialized in 1981. Universities rushed to cover the existing gap in European Studies and a whole new generation of graduates sought post-graduate education abroad in the same field in anticipation of jobs in Universities, Greek public administration and the European Community itself. Over the course of time, Greek membership in the Union introduced revolutionary changes in the Greek IR community to the extent that research programs and related opportunities became available to scholars individually and not through the traditional university hierarchies and structures. University position and assessment of each researcher's academic competence became secondary to connections, particularly in Brussels. Research centers, either in the form of small entities set up to compete for a particular program or large institutions with a much broader scope and range of activities became veritable power-houses competing successfully with the Greek university establishment. Among the most notable such institutions are three which were all established in the course of a two-year period (1988-89): The Hellenic

Center for European Studies (EKEM) founded in 1988, closely supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Hellenic Foundation for European (originally Defense) and Foreign Policy (1988) (ELIAMEP) founded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense and, finally, the Institute of International Relations or I.I.R. (1989) formally affiliated with Panteion University.

3. The Greek International Relations Community*

Those impressed by the number of scholars actively involved in international studies in Greece should withhold final judgment as to the effect of such figures on IR research and theory or on political praxis until several additional factors are drawn into the picture. The first factor is that the overwhelming majority of scholars involved are international or European Union law and institutions specialists, while another significant group comprises historians and economists. Indeed, a review of both graduate and undergraduate courses offered in Greek Universities will establish that political science/international relations courses represent about 20% of the total.

Should one scratch a little deeper and look into the academic background of those teaching IR courses, one would conclude that those who have studied the field and retain a theoretical orientation in their work represent a much smaller figure. It is somehow paradoxical that while all major textbooks used in Greek universities as an introduction to the field of international relations[2] emphasize theoretical orientation as a sine qua non to the scientific study of foreign policy the authors of such text books often show no particular zeal in reconfirming those commitments while evaluating the work of candidates for university positions including the rank of full professor.

A second related factor is that the majority of the few political science scholars deal with current issues of Greek foreign policy and, by and large, with topics suitable to policy-oriented analysis and practical recommendations to decision-makers. Very rarely do such works contain any citations to general theoretical works in international relations, or, attempt to correlate their findings with the *problematique* of established IR paradigms. It was uncommon in the past for the government and the public to turn to "experts" for answers to complicated international problems. Primarily the international lawyers , deemed eligible for such consultation, commanded an established discipline[3], but by the middle 1980s a number of factors reversed the situation. Among these was the rapid expansion of the IR academic community as a result of the new university law[4], the influx of private radio and television that resulted in a wave of aggressive reporters willing to interview anyone who appeared able to speak with authority on

*The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Heleni Androulaki, Research Assistant at the Institute of International Relations in documenting parts of this section.

any subject that would attract an audience and last, but not least, a long and growing list of problems in Greece's external relations with Turkey as well as with the European Community and the United States. The circumstances were fitting for an innovative response and this came with the establishment in 1988 of the "Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy" with the initiative provided by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The foundation was to operate as a private law institution but it would be endowed with public funding. The initial nine - member governing council was appointed by the two Ministries. According to the foundation's by-laws, members of the governing council were to be selected from the ranks of the military, the diplomatic corps, journalists and academia. In a revision of its by-laws, effected in 1993, the number of governing council members rose to 13 while it was stipulated that the membership be selected, "in a representative way", from the academic, diplomatic, military, mass media and business communities.[5]

Institutes of international politics or foreign policy, bringing together retired diplomats, foreign policy decision-makers, journalists, businessmen and academics, play a useful role in establishing contacts with similar institutes in other countries, by holding conferences and seminars on current issues of foreign policy and debating sensitive issues without officially involving their governments. Yet in most countries with a tradition in the field of IR such "think-tanks" coexist with academic research institutes that conduct other than policy-oriented research.

The creation in the same year of EKEM, whose purpose was to specialize in European Community affairs and whose officers are appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the year after of the IIR, whose Executive Council and Director are elected every three years by the faculty and student representatives of the Department of Political Science and International Studies of Panteion University, did not shift the balance from policy to academic research and could not prevent the erosion of the status of I.R. as an academic field of study. This, despite the fact that both EKEM and IIR have tried to keep a balance between policy-oriented and non-policy oriented research.[6]

A third and final factor is the fragmentation of the community of I.R. scholars with the main division line that of the Political Science Departments of the Universities of Athens and Panteion and the Institutes associated with them (ELIAMEP informally and I.I.R.formally). Perhaps, the saddest effect of this fragmentation was that on the Hellenic Society of International Law and International Relations the professional association of virtually all members if the I.R. Community. Since the early 1990s all ELIAMEP - associated members of the Society - with the notable excep-

tions of Professors Christos Rozakis and Argiris Fatouros - including its former President, Th. Couloumbis, have abstained from all activities of the Society, including a round-table discussion on the state of the field in Greece and the problem of the IR community fragmentation organized in June 1995.[7]

The virtual paralysis of the Hellenic Society, especially with regard to non-legal foreign policy questions, had a prominent victim: the Society's Yearbook of International Law and International Politics (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis Publishers) ceased publication with evident consequences on informed communication among members of the community. Younger scholars were faced with the dilemma either to be associated with ELIAMEP activities and be given the opportunity to publish in the foundation's Yearbook (until 1996 the only such publication in Greece) or try their luck in foreign-refereed journals. A related effect of this situation was that newspapers, especially the Sunday editions, emerged as the sole opportunity an IR expert had to communicate his or her views to a wider audience and answer criticisms addressed through the same medium. An uglier consequence was the systematic attempt to gain "monopoly" positions in the widely read Sunday papers.

4. The Current Foreign Policy Debate

Obviously under the above mediatic conditions, it is an exaggeration to treat conflicting views on Greek foreign policy as a genuine scholarly conflict. The latter pressuposes fundamental agreement on who qualifies as a member of the community of scholars, a basic familiarity of all those involved with the essentials of the literature - something that is hard to apply to the readers of Sunday papers - and a consensus on methodology. Such conditions being absent, arguments had to be presented in a concise form with convenient categorizations, and ideological overtones.

A review, therefore, of the debate concerning the principal orientation of Greek foreign policy should focus not so much on the theoretical frameworks of the IR community of scholars as on the ideology of the political elites. This is particularly true with regards to the aspect of the debate that has attracted most attention: the clash between "nationalists" and "europeanists"[8] whose evolution in the post 1974 period could be summarized along the following lines.

A singular development of the political ideology of the period after the dictatorship was the erosion of the role of the conservative "Right" as the principal guarantor of the country's national interests. The involvement of the three main bastions of the pre-1967 political order (i.e.:the army), the monarchy and the "foreign protector" (i.e.:the U.S.) in a mix that led to a

"national disaster" (i.e.: the Turkish invasion of Cyprus), motivated the forces of modernization within the Greek conservative political establishment to adopt an increasingly pro-European political agenda that culminated with the country's accession to the EEC in 1981.

On the other hand, the traditionally internationalist Greek left, for tactical reasons, espoused themes that could pave the way to a new version of Greek nationalism.[9]

The emphasis on serving Greek interests as the essential precondition for continued membership in main institutions of the Western/Capitalist bloc became a major policy line for PASOK, in its transformation from a small party to the first post-WWII Greek government representing the forces that were defeated in the civil war. At the same time, the perception of a Turkish threat against Greek territorial integrity and the need for policies that would effectively deter Turkey emerged as an additional goal shared by leftist political forces. Differences of opinion concerning the kind of policies that would serve this goal were secondary to the unifying perception that Turkish imperialism, despite a certain degree of autonomous motivation, was in effect, an expression of American imperialist designs.

The segment of the left that would somewhat distance itself from such interpretations of the historical process was the Eurocommunist party later transformed into the "Coalition of the Left". Although sharing the perception of the Turkish threat, Greek Eurocommunism, by elevating the European Community to the level of the most significant battle ground for the promotion of the socialist cause and the realization of a "Europe of the Working People", retained a highly internationalist profile. It is well known to students of contemporary Greek history that this rather small party had a political weight far superior to its electoral strength in the sense that it represented the vast majority of the Greek intelligentsia that during the years of the dictatorship was exposed, in heavy doses, to leftist western variations of "progressive ideas". However paradoxical it might appear, for almost the entire 1974-1989 period, the core of Greek europeanists comprised modernist conservatives and heretic Communists.

On the other hand, the "patriotic PASOK" along with the die-hard Communist Party (KKE) put major emphasis on the preservation of national sovereignty within the bipolar international order. Each player had different reasons, emanating either from political expediency or lessons of Marxist-Leninist and contemporary "Dependency" doctrines.

In the post-1989 period a number of developments caused significant changes in the array of "Europeanist" and "Nationalist" forces. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc shrank the influence of

the Greek Communist party which could no longer present a credible challenge to PASOK. For the latter, the counterbalancing of domestic and foreign policy goals became a much less politically expedient exercise. At the same time, Andreas Papandreou himself, fighting a tough legal battle with his political opponents over the "Koskotas affair" and in fragile health, was no longer the man likely to resort to the familiar - and politically successful - moves of the past. Actually, with the "Soviet Block" alternative eliminated, any talk about an "independent" Greek path in foreign policy sounded meaningless. European integration appealed more and more to PASOK's leadership but also to the rank and file as a sensible foreign policy course.

On the conservative side, the "Macedonian" question, i.e. the struggle to prevent the tiny independent state that emerged in Greece's northern frontier after the collapse of Tito's Yugoslavia, from assuming the name "Republic of Macedonia", became a catalyst for internal changes. There were other provocations to Greek sensitivity stemming from an overnationalistic political debate in other neighboring countries like Albania and to a lesser extent Bulgaria. But the issue of the name of "Macedonia" was soon elevated to number one foreign policy concern of the Greek public with grave consequences on Greek domestic policies as well. The weak, one-seat majority, Mitsotakis government that somehow survived three years of strife between the hard-liner Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras and the Prime Minister, collapsed in 1993 after having introduced another division line along the Europeanists versus nationalists dichotomy inside and outside the New Democracy Party. This time the focus had been on the rather "shallow" Macedonian issue. Greece's uphill fight over the "Macedonian cause" confused and disturbed international public opinion especially that of Western partners, whose patience had been repeatedly tested in the past over Andreas Papandreou's "heretic" policies and Greece's policy of transfering issues arising from Greek-Turkish disputes to Western organizations.

World television coverage of massive rallies condemning the "Republic of Macedonia" featuring priests in black robes hoisting the Greek flag was seen as inexplicable nationalist hysteria. However embarrassing this sight might have been for the Greek intelligentsia, the effect was negligible compared to their feeling of alienation in view of grass-roots support of Bosnian-Serbs, by then the "villains" of Western media. Greeks appeared as a backward Balkan nation placing religious affinities above humanitarian and anti-racial preoccupations as well as questions of international justice - as understood by major media networks. For some time, a real gap seemed to have emerged between the perceptions of the average citizen and those of the intellectual élites.

It was evident that there would soon be a backlash with PASOK's kiss to power, following the overthrow of Mitsotaki's government by Samaras and his supporters. Uncompromising policies toward FYROM continued, but heretic views within the party would find their way to the media with an increased frequency. As the deadlock over the name of FYROM dragged on, the parties of the left originally the Communist party alone followed after a while by the Coalition of the Left - took more and more outspoken positions against the country's "intransigent" attitude on the issue. It should be reminded at this point that while the two large parties had both important electoral constituencies in Northern Greece and faced strong resistance from deputies elected there, the parties of the left were much less concerned over the regional electoral cost of a more conciliatory policy concerning the name of FYROM. On the other hand, "New Democracy's" official party line remained the same but real enthusiasm for the "Macedonian case", by now a *raison d'être* for its principal contender for the conservative vote: Samaras' "Political Spring" had all but vanished. Editorials and contributions by prominent intellectuals in some of the country's most influential newspapers reflected a more and more outspoken opposition to the nationalist agenda.

The New York Agreement lifted the Greek embargo against FYROM and by leaving the question of FYROM's name to be settled through negotiations under UN auspices, allowed the normalization of that Republic's relations with Greece. The agreement was a turning point as regards the Macedonian - related nationalist vs. Europeanist clash to the effect that it removed the issue from its prominent position in the Greek foreign policy agenda. Attention was once more diverted to the traditional preoccupations of Greek foreign policy, i.e. Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations. In the upcoming battle within PASOK over the succession of Papandreou, whose health was declining rapidly, Gerassimos Arsenis and Akis Tsohatzopoulos would represent the traditional "patriotic line" of the party with a prominent item in their agenda the doctrine of a "Unified Defense Space"[10] between Greece and Cyprus, while Kostas Simitis would give priority to the political and socio-economic prerequisites that would allow Greece to remain a Union partner in the forthcoming advanced stages of European integration. The latter's victory in securing the PASOK leadership transformed the party's foreign policy profile into pre-eminently Europeanist with very few, if any, distinct differences from that of the Coalition of the Left.

It was the 1996 Imia crisis that revitalized the foreign policy debate in Greece and presented on its own merits the most credible challenge to the "Europeanist" vision. However appealing, the European orientation could not by itself provide a credible immediate solution to Greece's security

concerns. In the Imia crisis Turkey demonstrated to all skeptics that, under a favorable balance of forces, it would not hesitate to advance its claims against Greece for fear of making Europeans unhappy for a while. The provocation proved an embarrassing yet valuable lesson for the Simitis government which since then has paid sufficient attention to the upgrading of the country's armed forces, in order to restore the balance of power between the two countries. On the other hand, the effort by New Democracy under the leadership of Miltiadis Evert, to build a case of general governmental inadequacy out of the handling of the Imia crisis and upgrade it to the number one item of his party's electoral platform for the September 1996 elections, failed to convince voters. The revival of nationalist sentiment that the crisis caused was short-lived and the subsequent debate failed to address convincingly the country's long-lasting foreign policy dilemmas.

5. The Greek Foreign Policy Debate and the IR Community: 1990-1996

The Greek IR community contributed in three different ways to the post-1990 debate concerning fundamental orientations and basic options of Greek foreign policy. The first kind of involvement is the direct participation of academic members of the IR community in policy-planning bodies within the Foreign Ministry or other Ministries whose functions have a direct effect on foreign policy. In the pre-1990 period such participation was very rare since governments resorted to scientists already serving in existing bureaucracies, like the Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry or the body of experts that supported the work of diplomats. A notable exception was the Programming Committee of the Information Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Deputy and later Alternate Foreign Minister Yannis Kapsis.[11] The Committee operated for approximately three years: 1985-1987. Although its assignment was limited to support "Athena" a monthly news magazine presenting a semi-official Greek view of current, domestic and international developments, this first cooperation of representatives of the I.R. community prior to its fragmentation has had some positive results. Limited financial assistance was secured for projects with a combined academic and policy interest and the invitation to Greece of important scholars and influential public figures was facilitated.

In the post-1990 period the first major case of I.R. community collective involvement in official policy making mechanisms was the establishment of a Policy-Planning Committee under Deputy General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador E. Megalokonomos. The Committee[12] whose membership at some point exceeded 40 persons, comprised all the academics associated with ELIAMEP and several retired

diplomats. The Committee, began its work in early 1991 and ceased to exist a few months prior to Samaras' decision to resign the post of Foreign Minister (June 1992). About six months after the commencement of its work, a representative of IIR (P. Ifestos) and a representative of the now defunct Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies were invited to join the Committee. In the period of approximately 18 months that the Committee functioned regularly, it accomplished relatively little in terms of concrete policy-input. On the other hand, the involvement of the great majority of IR scholars in a Policy-Planning Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a time when a hard-line policy vis-à-vis FYROM was implemented and nationalist sentiment in Greece had reached a climax is significant in itself. Certainly, membership in the Committee does not imply complicity in the actual policies followed. On the other hand, involvement in the policy-making procedure appears to have had a restraining effect on published criticism and prevented the debate from focusing on the essential question: "Are national security threats, emanating from the consolidation of FYROM in Greece's northern frontiers and the possibility to pursue revisionist claims against Greece's territorial integrity, serious enough to justify the undermining of the dominant "ethnic group" in that state and, consequently, to justify the backing of Albanian and Bulgarian objectives for its partition and/or annexation to a Greater Albania or Greater Bulgaria?" [13]

The case of this Committee is significant for an additional, more general reason, since it demonstrates a risk inherent in any case of participation of scholars in similar bodies: identification with official decisions and neutralization of their independent role. There was no follow-up to the Policy-Planning Committee experiment until April 1996 when the Simitis Government decided to establish a Scientific Council in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The council, endowed with broad jurisdiction, has since then become a major advisory body primarily due to the academic reputation of its members.[14] One should note, however, that the fragmentation of the I.R. community and the undermining of its scientific credibility have had a noticeable effect on the membership of the council: all are professors of either international or constitutional law,not a single member is a political scientist with specialization in International Relations or Foreign Policy Analysis.[15]

Recently two more ministries have set up committees with the participation of members of the IR community. In February 1997, the Ministry of the Press and Mass Media established a Scientific Council on International Public Opinion,[16] while recently, the Ministry of Defense has announced the creation of a new body of as yet unspecified membership and purpose.

Besides official involvement in institutionalized consultative processes, there is the possibility to exercise effective influence through informal means. An illustration of the potential of this first type of interaction is the close contact of Gerassimos Arsenis, at a time when PASOK was an opposition party, with P. Ifestos, Ath. Platias and Chr. Yallourides.[17] The three scholars contributed to the formulation of the "Unified Defense Space" doctrine between Greece and Cyprus and influenced G. Arsenis' thinking in strategic affairs, before and after he became Minister of Defense, while their writings facilitated public understanding of the doctrine.

A second method of directly influencing official thinking on foreign policy issues is through the preparation of special studies commissioned either by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense. All major Institutes have prepared such studies, some of which, under contractual constraints, remained confidential while others were later published. It is evident that data concerning unpublished studies are not easily accessible, especially given the lack of communication among Greek IR institutes. Among the major studies undertaken by IIR itself in the past, one should mention those prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[18], the General Secretariat for the Greeks Abroad[19] and the Ministry of Defense.[20] In so far as non-confidential studies are concerned, EKEM has recently published a study it had undertaken for the restructuring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[21]

Effective utilization of special studies undertaken by IR "think-tanks" pressuposes the existence of an adequate "analysis and planning mechanism" within the public authority that commissions the study. This is crucial both for providing appropriate specifications for the work undertaken as well as for the optimum use of the findings. Often, specifications are too broad, leading to voluminous studies that are difficult to absorb and run the risk of being outdated by the time of their completion. Equally important, a competent policy-planning division is a sine qua non condition for a mutually beneficial cooperation between IR Institutes and government instrumentalities. Despite difficulties, the commissioning of studies is a much preferable policy[22] to that of offering grants. Recently, both the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense have shifted from providing grants to allotting funds for studies, in an effort to set the relations with research institutes on a new, more equitable and useful basis.

A third, more traditional, method for scholars to influence the foreign policy debate, has been through the publication of their works. Occasionally this kind of debate has taken the form of direct juxtaposition of opposite views concerning either an evolving major international crisis

or the formulation of new policies on pending foreign policy questions. Perhaps, the most typical exchange of views of the first variety were the five short articles, three by this author and two by Th. Couloumbis, on the effects of the Cold War on the emerging post-cold war international system and the Greek interests involved.[23] Although the texts contained here and there some abrasive remarks, this remains the only published scholarly exchange of views, where both writers made explicit reference to theory in support of their arguments.

Debates have also taken the form of conflicting arguments supporting existing policies or advocating their revision in specific ways. An example of this kind of debate, conducted primarily through the publication of books rather than short articles, was that between Panayiotis Kazakos arguing in a 1989 ELIAMEP publication that a Cyprus application for membership to the European Community would be ill-advised and premature and Panayiotis Ifestos arguing exactly the opposite.[24] Another case in this category stems from the controversial proposal put forward in an article in Kathimerini, by the Director of ELIAMEP, Yannis Valinakis that, under certain conditions, the Republic of Cyprus could extend recognition to the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". There was an immediate response by Yannos Kranidiotes[25] in the same newspaper and a meeting to discuss Valinakis' ideas, sponsored by the Hellenic Society of International Law and International Relations. These ideas, which at that time caused an uproar both in Greece and Cyprus,[26] were repeated six years later, again in an ELIAMEP publication, co-authored by four former Greek Ambassadors but caused little noticeable public reaction.[27]

Much more common is the publication of articles in which authors express their views or respond to those of others without citing specific sources. This variety of debate, by far the most popular form of communication through newspapers and magazines, has attracted some prominent IR scholars of the younger generation. Proponents of the realist school have popularized their ideas concerning the primacy of states, their quest for power either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends, the concept of balance of power and the "neo-realist" emphasis on the structure of international systems and their effects on state behavior.[28] Panayiotis Ifestos and Athanassios Platias, prominent representatives of this school in Greece, with a solid educational background and contribution to I.R. literature, attempted to apply realist theory to specific issues of Greek foreign policy. Their writings appeared in Greece at a time when the fragmentation of the IR community had eliminated traditional channels of scholarly communication and had upgraded newspaper columns into the most appropriate means. Under the circumstances, the introduction in Greece of political realism, one of the most popular schools of IR theory,

proved a formidable task. Limited space and readers, evidently uninterested in citations to theories, forced the authors to focus directly on policies and policy-recommendations emanating from their theoretical persuasion. In the mass media, where the foreign policy debate was dominated by the nationalist - europeanist clash, "realist" analysis[29] was conveniently classified as "nationalist" with all the heavy political overtones that it carries due to the Greek civil war and post-civil war troubled political history. The two authors were consequently subjected to attacks, by writers that referred to them not by name, but through the use of imaginative variations of the term "nationalist".

A writer with a solid academic background but a different theoretical persuasion is Alexis Heraclides, whose preoccupation with transnational aspects of international life, especially human rights, ethnic minorities and the right to secede from multiethnic states led him to argue occasionally that the solution advocated by the British colonial rulers and partition-policies of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot leadership corresponded to international legal rules and practices.[30] Rather than draw attention to the real division line between scientific and non-scientific work in international relations, Th. Couloumbis, a senior member of the community, has shown impressive creativity in dividing scholars in, always two, categories whose particular names change: pro-"Achilles", vs. Pro-"Ulysses"[31] "optimists" vs. "pessimists",[32] "status quo" vs. "revisionists"[33], "realists" vs. "pragmatists"[34] etc... The implication is that on one side stand the prudent, pro-Europeanists, eager to advise peaceful cooperation with neighbors while on the other side are the "isolationists" and the "adventurists", "ready to create faits accomplis against Balkan states"(!)[35]

6. Concluding Remarks

Neglect of IR theory, dominance of policy-oriented institutions and research and fragmentation of the community of scholars have adversely affected the growth of the field of international relations and foreign policy analysis in Greece. This is a reality that should not be concealed either by the proliferation of conferences and seminars on current foreign affairs issues or by the increase of University programs of study. In terms of the scholarly contribution to Greek foreign policy, there have been instances of positive influence exercised by individual scholars or groups of scholars to particular government echelons or individual policy makers. On the other hand, the very fact that the I.R. community of scholars shares with everybody else the same media (newspaper and magazine columns, radio programs, TV talk shows etc), either to exchange views or communicate views to the public, affects the content of the analysis and equates its quality to that of a professional commentator of current affairs. It is, there-

fore, only natural that after a brief interval, international institutional and legal analysis has made an impressive comeback both in average citizen perceptions as to what a true "scientific discipline" is as well as to policy-makers utilitarian needs.

Particularly devastating for the scholarly reputation of the field is the division of scholars into "nationalists" and "europeanists". It is well understood by Greeks and knowledgeable foreigners, that Greece is not a typical European Union country in the field of security. The dilemma that Greek policy-makers are facing is, and will continue for a long-time to be, whether the diversion of the country's energies and resources to attain advanced levels of European integration could make-up for the growing imbalance of forces between Greece and Turkey in favor of the latter. Greece needs its "nationalists" i.e. the political realists specializing in strategic studies in order to maximize the return of its diminishing investment in defense and explore other long-term external and internal balancing strategies. But it needs as much its European orientation and all those who advocate it, in order to maximize the political and economic advantages of membership as well as to motivate various institutions and social groups in the modernization of Greece's domestic structures. However, portraying the European Union as a panacea to all of Greece's problems is a simple-minded and dangerous illusion.

The Greek government and Greek political parties have a vested interest in a competent IR community able to carry out a task where it definitely enjoys a comparative advantage over international law specialists or professional journalists: the long-term planning of Greek foreign policy in a period where the international system is in a process of transition. They should, therefore, place their confidence in academic research and take the various foundations and Institutes of foreign policy for what they really are: means of supplementing and supporting diplomatic work and engaging in public exchanges with similar Institutes in other countries. But the ultimate task for mending bridges and bringing together the IR community in Greece should be carried out by its own members, who are under serious risk of becoming collectively marginalized.

NOTES

1. S. Constantinides "Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis", **Etudes helleniques / Hellenic Studies**, (Vol.4, No1, 1996, p. 43-61) See also Varvarousis, "The Scientific Field of International Relations in Greece: Evolution and Prospects" **International Law and International Relations** (1993), pp. 325-352 (in Greek).

2. The author of the first textbook was the late George Tenekides: **Subjects of Sociology of International Relations** (Athens: Papazisis, 1976). The Greek translation of the American original edition of Th. Couloumbis and J.F. Wolfe **Introduction to International Relations - Power and Justice** (Athens: Papazisis, 1981) followed. The same year another shorter introduction, the work of P. Varvarousis, a lecturer of the University of Athens: Introduction to International Relations (Athens: A. Sakkoulas, 1981). Two years later, another introduction, written by the author of this article, became available to Greek students and younger scholars: D. Constas: **Theory and Methodology of International Relations** (Athens: A. Sakkoulas, 1983). The book familiarized for the first time the Greek community of I.R. scholars with the debate on Paradigms in International Relations. A little later Th. Couloumbis and D. Constas co-authored a two-volume work under the title: **International Relations: A Global Approach** (Athens: Papazisis, 1985) which became the basic textbook in the field in Greece. Recently the two authors followed separate paths each publishing a separate introduction: D. Constas in collaboration with K. Arvanitopoulos: **International Relations: Continuity and Change** (Athens: Library of the Institute of International Relations, I. Sideris Publishers 1997) and Th. Couloumbis **Introduction to International Relations** (Athens: Papazisis, 1995).

3. D. Constas "Foreign Policy and International Law" **To Vima**, August 27, 1995.

4. See supra #2.

5. Of the three academics in the first nine-member council, the author resigned shortly, Chr. Rozakis remained for some years, while Th. Couloumbis, joined by Th. Veremis and Y. Valinakis - all three associated with the Department of Political Science of the University of Athens - have filled over the years the main executive posts in ELIAMEP's governing body.

6. I.I.R. in particular, despite its meager financial means, has tried to retain links with the scientific community of I.R. in the United States and elsewhere. See e.g. **Cosmos Yearbook 1995**: "International Relations Theory at the Crossroads" with contributions from Joseph Grieco, Stephen Krasner, Seyom Brown, Robert Cuttler, Mathew Evangelista etc. Karl Holsti and James Rosenau have contributed to D. Constas and Ath. Platias (eds.) **Modern Diasporas in World Politics** (London: Macmillan, 1993), while Georgi Arbatov, Shlomo Avineri, Godfried Kinderman, Bruce Russett and many others have taken part in the annual Corfu Seminar on Conflict Resolution. Robert Keohane and other prominent I.R. scholars have lectured under the auspices of the Institute in Athens.

7. For the proceedings of the round-table discussion see: **Institute of International Relations Yearbook of the Institute of International Relations**, v. 1, pp. 52-119 (1996).

8. For a useful review of the historical origins of this debate, see supra #1.

9. For a discussion of the evolution of Foreign Policy objectives of Greece's major political parties see D. Constas, "Greek Foreign Policy Objectives 1974-1986" in S. Vryonis Jr. (ed.), **Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK 1974-1986** (N. York: A.D. Caratzas Publishers, 1991) pp. 37-69.

10. On the "Unified Defense Space" see C. Arvanitopoulos, "The Extended Deterrence Doctrine and its Role in Promoting Cooperation", in Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. And D. Kerides (eds.) **Security in the South-Eastern Mediterranean - Europe and the United States - Greek Relations** (Virginia: 1997) 163-169; and Ath. Platias "Greek Deterrence Strategy" **Etudes helleniques**, v. 4, No 2, (1996) pp. 33-54.

11. Members of the Committee were Professors: D. Constas, Th. Couloumbis, Chr. Rozakis and Th. Veremis; journalist V. Mathiopoulos, the late Nikos Kotzias, one of the most prominent writers of his generation; Ambassador Rodousakis and Mrs. F. Toma-Konstantopoulos.

12. The author of this Chapter, having reservations concerning the composition and the role of the Committee, declined the invitation to participate.

13. See D. Constas "foreword" in M. Koppa, **A Fragile Democracy: FYROM Between the Past and the Future** (Athens: Papazisis Publishers, Library of the Institute of International Relations, 1994) pp. 9-19 at 13-14 (in Greek). On this author's criticism of the policies of Mitsotakis government on the "Macedonian question" see **Sunday Eleftherotypia**: November 11, 1992, p. 13 "...instead of capitalizing on our many advantages as the only European Community state in the region that understands Balkan problems we were trapped in uni-dimensional policy which upgraded the question of the name of Skopja into number one issue of Greek Foreign Policy". See also similar views in **Sunday Eleftherotypia**, February 20, 1994, pp. 26-27.

14. Professors A. Fatouros, K. Ioannou, Chr. Rozakis and G. Papademetriou. The latter is also Legal Advisor to the Prime Minister.

15. Two members of the Scientific Council: Professor Fatouros and Ioannou were appointed as Greek "negotiators" in the negotiation process of Greek-Turkish Disputes initiated by the Dutch Presidency of the European Union in early summer 1997.

16. The majority of the members of the Council are journalists. Professor Thanos Veremis and Assistant Professor Constantine Arvanitopoulos are the representatives of the I.R. community.

17. The first two scholars, now Associate Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies, were invited by G. Arsenis to discuss the concept of "extended deterrence" first analyzed in Greece in their joint publication: **Greek Deterrence**

Strategy (Athens, 1992): Chr. Yallourides, as an informal advisor to G. Arsenis, after he became Minister of Defense, played an instrumental role in establishing effective communication between the political leadership of the Republic of Cyprus and the Minister, eventually securing public acceptance of the "Unified Defense Space".

18. An anatomy of the Greek Balkan Reality (December 1992).

19. **The Greek Diaspora and its Role in the Promotion of National Issues** (1994).

20. Two volumes of studies were undertaken on behalf of the Ministry of Defense in the period 1994-1997 and were submitted under two different headings: **Defense Questions of the Balkan Peninsula-International & Regional Aspects and Greek Security Considerations** (v. I.); **Turkish Policies Towards Greece and Cyprus and the Security of the South-Eastern Mediterranean** (v. II.)

21. See E. Stoforopoulos and A. Makrodemetres, **The Greek Foreign Policy System: The Institutional Dimension**: (Athens: Hellenic Center for European Studies:1996, in Greek).

22. According to a recent ELIAMEP Memorandum to the Ministry of Defense the Foundation received in the period 1993-1995 99.000.000 Drs. from the Foreign Ministry and in the period 1993-1996 74.600.000 Drs. from the Ministry of Defense. During the same period IIR received 8.000.000 and 50.000.000 Drs. respectively in payment for studies commissioned. EKEM however continues to be financed almost entirely through the budget of the Foreign Ministry.

23. D. Constas, "The Crisis", "the Critics" and the Policy: "Which Optimism?" **Sunday Eleftherotypia,** January 20, 1991: Th. Couloumbis "In the post-cold war world Greece identifies with "Europe of the Twelve" **Sunday Avghi,** January 27, 1991; D. Constas, "The War in the Gulf. Time for Debate" **Sunday Avghi,** February 3, 1991 Th.Couloumbis "The War in the Gulf and The War of the International Relations Scholars - Time to conclude the Debate" **Sunday Avghi** February 10, 1991; D. Constas, "The War and the International Relations Scholars: Time to talk seriously" **Sunday Avghi,** February 17, 1991. All five articles, were published in **International Law and International Relations** (1993) pp 227-242, so that all members of the Greek IR community could read and assess the merits of each author's views. Sadly this was the last issue of the only Greek scholarly I.R. journal.

24. See P. Kazakos, **The Accession of Cyprus to the European Communities** (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1990); and P. Ifestos, **The Cyprus Application and the Enlargement of the European Communities** (1987-1992) (Athens: Papazisis, 1992). The two authors are Professors at the University of Athens and Panteion University respectively.

25. See Yannis Kranidiotes, **Kathimerini**, October 7, 1989, p. 7. The author is today Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece.

26. Condemnation was voiced from many directions including the Senate of the University of Athens and the Archbishop of Cyprus.

27. See my article "Return to Cyprus", **Kathimerini**, June 9, 1996.

28. See K. Waltz, **Theory of International Politics** (Reading, Mass: Addison-Welsley, 1979).

29. See supra #2.

30. A. Heraklides: "Need for a Radical Change of Policy in Cyprus", **To Vima**, November 11, 1996.

31. Th. Couloumbis: "Greek Foreign Policy objectives in the Balkans" in D. Constas and P. Tsakonas (eds.) **Greek Foreign Policy - Domestic and External Parameters** (Athens: Library of the Institute of International Relations, No7, 1994) pp. 87-95 in 93-94 (in Greek).

32. Th. Couloumbis, **Sunday Eleftherotypia**, July 9th, 1995.

33. Th. Couloumbis, **Sunday Eleftherotypia**, August 20, 1995.

34. Th. Couloumbis, **Sunday Eleftherotypia**, March 24, 1996, p. 13.

35. Supra notes 33-34. For a criticism of Th. Couloumbis practice to separate the members of the Greek I.R. community in arbitrarily drawn categories and the distortion of scholarly arguments to fit his categories see D. Constas, **Sunday Eleftherotypia**, March 31, 1996, p. 16.

Greek Foreign Policy Since 1974: Theory and Praxis

Theodore A. Couloumbis*

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude juxtapose deux écoles de pensée, en théorie et en pratique, soit les écoles "multilatérales" et "inulatérales". Les multila-téraux tendent à être Eurocentriques tandis que les unilatéraux sont plus à l'aise avec l'ethnocentrisme. De plus les multilatéraux mettent l'emphase aussi bien sur les variables économiques et politiques que militaires, alors que les unilatéraux recommandent une confiance au seul pouvoir militaire. L'auteur conclut que le paradigme multilatéraliste est devenu dominant durant les dernières années mais il estime qu'il s'est opéré une synthèse des aspects principaux des deux écoles de pensée.

D'autre part, les socialistes ont tenu une position pro-UE et pro-OTAN alors que l'opposition conservatrice fut et continue d'être de manière enthousiaste résolument pro-occidentale. Ainsi, l'auteur conclut que le pronostic pour le profil occidental de la Grèce est solide et en sécurité. Malheureusement, la situation en Turquie est moins fluide et peu amène à supporter un gouvernement fort, ayant les appuis nécessaires pour mener de manière décisive une politique authentique de réconciliation.

ABSTRACT

This paper juxtaposes two schools of thought, in theory and practice, entitled respectively "multilateralist" and "unilateralist" . The "multilateralists" orientation tends to be Eurocentric whereas the unilateralists feel more comfortable with ethnocentricity. The former emphasize economic and political variables in addition to military ones. The latter recommend reliance on power - military - alone. The author concludes that the multilateralist paradigm has become dominant in recent years but he feels that there has been a useful synthesis of aspects of both schools of thought.

The author also concludes that the prognosis for Greece's Western profile is solid and secure given that the Greek socialists have unequivocally adopted a pro-EU and pro-NATO policy while the Conservative opposition's stance has been and continues to be enthusiastically pro-Western. Unfortunately, the situation in neighboring Turkey appears much more fluid and less likely to sustain a strong government that will have the necessary backing to move decisively toward a policy of genuine reconciliation with Greece.

The study of international relations in Greece had not developed independently of international law and diplomatic history until the early 1980s.[1] Stephanos Constantinides has carefully reviewed and classified a

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representative sample of foreign policy-oriented literature that has appeared mostly in the last decade (1986-96). He rightly concludes that "... the theoretical contribution of Greek scholars to [the study of] international relations is very limited and poor."[2]

This is not the place where we can attempt an in-depth explanation as to the reasons accounting for the pessimistic but accurate conclusion that Constantinides has reached. If one were to adopt a comparative perspective, one would probably find that countries classified in the category of small, economically less developed, internally divided and strategically located (hence externally dependent and/or penetrated) also tend to exhibit a similar lack of scholarly productivity in the fields of foreign policy analysis and international relations. The author was rudely awakened to this fact in the mid-1960s after he finished delivering a lecture at the American University in Washington DC on the subject of Greek foreign policy. During the question-answer period which followed, an experienced and somewhat cynical gentleman in the audience made the following observation: "You did not need 45 minutes to discuss Greek foreign policy. You could have summarized it with two words: *Yes, Sir!!* "

It was not until the years following the restoration of democracy in 1974 that the field of international relations began its gradual development in Greece. Greek society, after the traumatic experiences of two major schisms in the twentieth century, irrevocably entered a course of reintegration and reconciliation. Extra-parliamentary institutions, such as the Armed forces and the Throne, which had functioned as vehicles of foreign interference in politics[3] were democratically reoriented. Of course the Throne as institution was eliminated by vote. (See the December 8, 1974 plebiscite on the question of the monarchy.)

After 1974, the Greek Armed Forces assumed a most vital external deterrence/defense mission vis-à-vis Turkey, abandoning the communist counter-insurgency role that had been assigned to them by NATO during the Cold War years.[4] The defeated side of the Civil War was finally permitted to re-enter politics through the legalization of the Greek Communist parties and the establishment of PASOK by Andreas Papandreou whose third-world style, anti-dependency and anti-American rhetoric struck several sentimental chords in the psyche of the Greek public. These developments clearly served to reintegrate the badly divided Greek society. Most importantly, the Greek economy had made quick developmental strides in the 1950s and 1960s, having crossed the threshold of relative abundance. Symbolic as well as substantive affirmation of the Greek metamorphosis[5] was Greece's hotly debated, but ultimately overwhelmingly accepted, accession to the European Community (European Union today) in 1981.

Students of international relations in Greece adopted by and large a historical-sociological approach,[6] avoided the luxurious temptation to indulge in behavioral/quantitative searches, and moved within what one would call a traditionalist/realist paradigm. With Greek-Turkish relations and the question of Cyprus dominating the foreign policy agenda, Greek scholars at home and the diaspora focused on these issues almost exclusively. Simultaneously a second strand of research, which was progressively gaining in importance, focused on the institutional aspects of the EC/EU with special attention to Greece's integrative fortunes in the steadily evolving European unification process. Few Greek scholars escaped the hellenocentric orientation in their research and publications, with notable exceptions among scholars such as Poulantzas, Mouzelis, Tsoukalis, Heraclides and Papadopoulos, who have entered the mainstream literature in their respective fields.[7]

Indeed, we should pause here and ponder the handicaps facing European scholars (especially those functioning in non mainstream countries) in their attempts to penetrate the narrow circles of North American research communities that have all but dominated the field of international relations. With the continuing process of European integration, as well as the globalization and enlargement of the communities of research through internet, e-mail and related technologies, one could safely predict the progressive involvement of Greek IR specialists in the mainstream of theoretical discourses.

Standing at the threshold of the 21st Century, Greece may be classified as a country which is democratic, internationalist, developed, free-trading, interdependent, and status-quo— in one word, Western. It is a member state of nearly all important international organizations (most notably the European Union, the Western European Union and NATO) having linked its fate with a "club" of advanced economies and consolidated democracies. It is the thesis of this paper that despite two "not so great" debates that have been conducted among scholars, journalists and politicians since 1974, the substance of Greek foreign policy has followed a steady course oriented toward European unification (the positive challenge) and deterrence of Turkey based on an adequate balance of forces (the negative challenge).

The first debate divided scholars and politicians in the 1970s into either **pro-** or **anti-**accession camps on the question of seeking membership in the European Community. Strongly favoring accession in the mid-1970s were New Democracy, the Center Union and the Greek Communist Party of the Interior. Vocally opposed to accession were PASOK and the Greek Communist Party (KKE). The debate could have been summarized as

"Karamanlis versus Papandreou." Karamanlis's famous slogan was "Greece belongs to the West", to which Papandreou would retort "Greece belongs to the Greeks." The pro-EC camp viewed an integrating Western Europe as a greenhouse of democracies that would contribute to Greece's economic advancement and to the consolidation of post-1974 democratic institutions. The anti-EC forces declared that the EC was no more than an appendage of American capitalism contributing to and feeding on dependency relationships of the Center-Periphery variety. For the anti-Europe camp the answer was to search for a "third road" toward socialism that would place Greece firmly in the camp of neutral and nonaligned countries of the European or Third World variety.[8]

The pro-EC forces commanded enough votes in parliament to ratify Greece's accession agreement which had been signed in Athens in May of 1979. Following ratifications by all member States, Greece entered the Community as its tenth member on January 1, 1981. Ironically, PASOK won an overwhelming victory at the polls in October of the same year and took over the reins of government. The first great debate quickly and predictably subsided as Andreas Papandreou (under the shadow of the then powerful president, Constantinos Karamanlis) opted to remain in the EC declaring that objective conditions had changed and that the cost of withdrawal would have been much greater than the cost of active and assertive participation. The conclusive cessation of the debate was confirmed following the resignation of Karamanlis from the presidency early in 1985, the second victory of PASOK in the June 1985 elections, and the revision of the Greek Constitution to reduce the powers of the head of state to ceremonial levels early in 1986. Andreas Papandreou, having emerged in total control of the situation, made a further move to the "right" by appearing in his second term as an ardent supporter of Eurofederalism. The inflow of billions of ECUs in structural funds as well as the apparent deterrent impact of EC membership on Turkish revisionism convinced Greece's most flexible politician to completely abandon the anti-european rhetoric of the late 1970s.[9]

The second "not so great" debate in Greece was the product of the momentous changes surrounding the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the attendant restructuring of Cold War bipolarity and the nuclear balance of terror. The centerpiece of the exchange had to do with the "reading" of the emerging contours of the international system and the derivation of conclusions and recommendations that would safeguard Greek national interests in the emerging global order/disorder of things. As in the case of the late 1970s, there was much more smoke than fire to the whole enterprise. At the academic level, according to Constantinides, scholars were divided into two ideologically

distinct schools of thought which he dubbed "ethno-realists" and "trans-nationalists-idealists" respectively.[10] He concluded that the "...result of this confrontation is a certain confusion because discussion deteriorates rapidly from the academic-theoretical point to a political one if not to partisan politics and personal disputes. Besides, these discussions lead to a simplification of the reality and finally to a Manichean bipolarism."[11] We take, however, a somewhat different perspective. The debate was not one between realists and idealists but one juxtaposing the arguments of two alternative strands of realism which we could call "unilateralist" and "multilateralist." The unilateralists tend to define security in a narrow and traditionalist fashion as denoting "territorial integrity and regime maintenance." Consequently, they emphasize the decisive role of military force in international politics. For the multilateralists,[12] security is a wider concept which includes, in addition to territorial integrity and regime maintenance, economic variables (free trade, free markets) as well as political freedoms and the protection of human rights (democracy). Hence, the multilateralists believe that economic, political and alliance variables provide practical and effective levers of exerting influence in addition to the military capabilities of a given State.

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by momentous events such as the reunification of Germany, the relatively peaceful fragmentation of the former Soviet Union, the collapse of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and one party socialism, and the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. There followed also what appeared to have been "peace breakthroughs" in the Middle East, South Africa and Northern Ireland. The international community greeted these events with a sense of relief and George Bush characterized the post-Cold War system as a "new world order" while Francis Fukuyama pronounced "the end of history."[13]

Unfortunately the euphoria was not destined to last long. The death of communism led a number of new and recycled politicians in post-communist countries to substitute Marxism-Leninism with new "isms," in this case nationalism and ethnic autonomism of the expansionist, revanchist or irredentist varieties, in order to attract attention and votes among the dizzy and disoriented masses that were plunged into processes of multiparty elections without sufficient preparation. As a number of crises logically erupted in regions of the former Soviet bloc (the wars in Yugoslavia and the butchery in Bosnia taking center stage), as well as in Africa and South and Southeast Asia, the initial euphoria gave way to unqualified pessimism and the Western media were inundated by catastrophic scenarios positing a "new world disorder", the "return and revenge of history," "from Sarajevo to Sarajevo" and so forth.[14]

Greek students of international relations, reflecting these wider streams of thought, divided themselves into two distinct groups projecting pessimistic unilateralism and quasi-optimistic multilateralism respectively.[15] The multilateralists over-emphasized good prospects for the building of a new global order that would be the product of the convergence of ideologies and the mutuality of interests of major powers (such as the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany and Japan). In their view, the United Nations would gain new strength and would be in a position to legitimize international interventions against aggressive nations and leaders (such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq). They also predicted that, as a minimum, collective humanitarian assistance would be made available in nightmarish situations such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, etc. The multilateralists, accordingly, recommended to the Greek government the adoption of a policy that would exploit the leverage provided by political-diplomatic-economic factors while integrating/-harmonizing its objectives with those of multilateral institutions such as the EU, NATO, and the WEU. The unilateralists, on the contrary, predicted that the planet was returning to a Hobbesian state of nature characterized by international anarchy (rather than a concert of powers), multi-fragmentation, and escalating regional conflicts in which the strong "do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Consequently they counseled policy-makers to reinforce military capabilities, employ the craft of frequent and shifting alliances, and take advantage of tactical opportunities to reverse past losses.

In the final analysis, we could argue that the multilateralists could be described with epithets such as internationalists and functionalists who are deeply influenced by the thought processes of Mitrany and Monnet.[16] Alternatively, the unilateralists could be described as ethnocentrists who follow the power-political premises of Karl von Clausewitz.[17] The following point should be made clear. In a progressively globalized world economy, in an era of transnational interdependence, it would be at best confining to leave realism within the anachronistic confines of late 19th century geopolitics. In short, it can be argued that Monnet is as much a realist as is Morgenthau.[18]

As we are approaching the end of the 1990s and new realities unfold before us, one could propose that, paradoxically, the "truth" lies somewhere between the projections of the unilateralists and the multilateralists. Specifically, every effort to characterize the international system (as a totality) as either stable/orderly or as anarchic/disorderly is risky indeed. For, simply, one part of the planet is currently stable while another (the larger part) is in a state of transition leading to either stability and peace or, more likely, to instabilty and war. A new "bipolarity" seems to be in the

works dividing the world along a North-South rather than an East-West axis. The North comprises States with industrial and post-industrial economies and consolidated democracies located in North America and West Europe, and includes Japan and other advanced OECD-member states. The premises of Jean Monnet and geoeconomic interdependence best fit into the patterns of relations of this world island of relative stability and peace. The South groups the developing States of what we used to call the Third World as well as certain sections of the former Soviet Union and Southeastern Europe. Here the norm appears to be political instability, economic scarcity, explosive population growth and frequent internal (ethnic/tribal) and regional (interstate)conflicts.

If we accept the above problematics, we should expect that the conflicts of the 21st century will continue surfacing in the global South but will also spill over (especially in the sensitive areas of refugee movements and illegal immigration) into the vulnerable and porous North. It would make sense for the major powers (including Russia and China) of the stable pole to address in concert the challenges of the South with collectively authorized preventive measures (peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian and developmental assistance). Unfortunately, the task of North-South economic convergence appears at best herculean and at worst quixotic, especially if we take into consideration that the gap between the privileged of the North and the suffering of the South is growing with every day that goes by.[19] The most likely response of the major powers of the North (with the agreement or acquiescence of Russia and China) is that they will adopt a damage-control strategy for the South. This strategy is designed to serve their national interests and in some cases (e.g. the 1990 Gulf War) their collective benefit.

Future flash points in the unstable South will be likely divided into three categories in classic triage fashion: The first category will involve zones of vital interests, such as the Persian Gulf and the oil-rich Middle East, where one should continue to expect collective military intervention and other types of sanctions applied by so-called coalitions of the willing. The second category refers to zones of mid-level interest, such as Bosnia, where the most probable collective responses will employ peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations authorized by the UN Security Council and implemented by NATO (with its new out of area missions), the WEU, the OSCE and other institutions in the proliferating alphabet soup of international organizations. In the third category, in the zones of low or no interest (we could also call them zones of indifference and benign neglect), such as Sudan, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Burundi, the former Zaire and elsewhere, one should expect non-involvement or at most humanitarian assistance — the latter mainly in cases noticed and dramatized by CNN, BBC *et al.*

As both multilateralists and unilateralists in Greece are digesting this hybrid state of affairs, their thinking is beginning to converge. For the multilateralists Greece belongs to the pole of stability but it borders on zones of instability and intermittent conflict. The greatest error that policy makers could make, according to multilateralist reasoning, would be to permit the country to become entangled in nationalist/irredentist problems in its immediate neighborhood. The unilateralists are less sanguine about Greece's ability to insulate itself from regional conflicts and their answer is: armaments, armaments, armaments!

In terms of praxis, it appears that the multilateralists have carried the day in the years since 1974 and especially since 1981. With the exception of a short interval of flirtation with unilateralist thinking (1991-94), Greek governments have kept themselves on a steady course in what we will describe below as the dominant paradigm of Greek foreign policy.[20]

The dominant (multilateralist) paradigm relies upon conservation through a synthesis of adequate military preparation, European integration and prudence. The revisionist/unilateralist approach, on the contrary, emphasizes the concepts of survival and growth in a world where conflicts and dangers are normal conditions. For the unilateralists, the so-called dominant school reflects a synthesis of well-meaning utopianism, steadily retreating appeasement, preemptive defeatism, as well as heavy dosages of wishful thinking. We will be returning to their views in some detail below.

The key assumption of the dominant paradigm (shared incidentally by the gamut of political parties including those politicians, journalists and scholars who consider themselves unilateralists) is that Greece faces a continuous revisionist challenge from its eastern neighbor, Turkey. This, in turn, requires vigilance as well as the maintenance of an adequate balance of forces to attain and maintain the value of deterrence. The use of force by Turkey in Cyprus in 1974 and the continued occupation of the northern third of the island's territory, reminds the Greeks that Turkey would again be ready to employ force in the Aegean and in Thrace at the expense of Greece's territorial integrity should a new opportunity be offered to it.

According to the dominant paradigm Greece is firmly placed in the space of politically and economically advanced states that have over the decades developed strong bonds of political and economic interdependence embodying the principles of pluralist democracy and market economy. Greece's membership in the European Union is at the heart of a strategy of integration with a cluster of advanced democracies that have since World War II abandoned past practices that had equated national interests with territorial claims, opportunistic and temporary alliances, spheres of

influence, competitive colonialism and unbridled ethnocentrism. The –strategy of European integration has been designed to accomplish the twin objectives of sustainable political and economic development as well as add a powerful diplomatic weight to deterrence vis-à-vis Turkey.

Following a central tenet of the multilateralist strategy, Greek policy makers have systematically sought to avoid the creation of additional diplomatic fronts, given the severity and immediacy of the Turkish challenge. Accordingly, even during the Cold War years, starting with the mid-1960s, Greece had sought to promote detente and cooperation in the Balkan region. This prudent policy was nearly abandoned, however, in the 1991-94 period.

All in all, Greece has emerged after 1974 as an economically privileged state with every reason to maintain political stability and the territorial *status quo* in its region. This means that it will not advance territorial claims against its neighbors but will be, simultaneously, ready to go to war, if necessary, in order to defend its territorial integrity against foreign aggression. Furthermore, it has become apparent that the best way to protect the human rights and to promote the well-being of the Greek minority in southern Albania is to adopt a strategy of contributing (with Greece's allies and partners) to the rapid and effective transition to democracy and economic growth in Albania, the poorest state on the European continent.

The revisionist/unilateralist school of thought has grown at an accelerated pace in the last seven years, coinciding with the end of the Cold War. Unilateralist proponents define themselves and their policy recommendations as activist, energetic, counteroffensive, pre-emptive, ethnocentric and patriotic in orientation. They also claim an exclusive hold on the values and practices of "realism." They dismiss the so-called dominant strategy as reactive, passive, idealist, spasmodic and appeasing in nature, and they warn of grave dangers if the multilateralist recipes are followed. For them, Greece faces dangers from all directions and appeasement only serves to wet the appetite of the country's enemies. The threat from Turkey is clearly territorial, the dangers from the North (especially from FYROM) are irredentist, while the challenge from the West is cultural (threatening Greece with the loss of linguistic, religious and traditional identity).

The unilateralists call for a rude awakening of modern Greeks from the slumber of consumerism, hedonism, cynicism and corruption. They long for a heroic mobilization of the disoriented masses in order to give battle and save a small and "brotherless" nation.[21] They perceive the global system as anarchic, dangerous, conflictful, amoral as well as unjust: an arena in which the strong survive and the weak disappear.

Some unilateralists recommend what they call the "Israelization" of Greece.[22] They fear that the alternative would be Greece's "Finlandization." They admire Israel for its military prowess, its special relationship with the United States, its ability to employ force pre-emptively, and to negotiate only from a position of strength. Here the unilateralists not only disregard the very different circumstances informing Greece and Israel, but also miss the point that the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians (despite serious setbacks) is founded on assumptions of mutual restraint and mutual interest leading to a much desired historic reconciliation. In the view of this author, the unilateralist analogy of Greece fits much more the Israel of 1967 rather than that of today.

The unilateralists frequently argue that Greek membership in the EU has been overestimated, fearing that it cultivates illusions of security among the people and creates pressures for unilateral disarmament. Further they are dubious about the effectiveness of policies seeking to link Turkey's behavior in Cyprus and the Aegean to that country's aspiration to join the European Union. They, instead, recommend "realistic" tactics calling for "understandings" with Turkey's "enemies" east of its borders (Armenia, Iran, Syria) as well as supporting the Kurdish population's aspirations for a place in the geopolitical sun. They strongly criticize the passive and accomodationist Greek policies on Cyprus, the Aegean, Thrace, Northern Epirus and Skopje for lacking nerve and direction and relying on toothless campaigns regarding the "righteousness" of Greece's case. Finally, they support assertive and unyielding policies in all directions (considering dialogue and diplomatic exchange as signs of weakness) and give little thought to the dangerous implications of Greece becoming entangled in a conflict with two or more of its neighbors.

Despite the serious risks that unilateralist thinking entails, the dialogue that is continuing between the two schools of thought and action is useful and even profitable. In a democracy, foreign policy (and politics in general) needs to be the product of open and serious debate. It is more than apparent that both schools advance some arguments and offer criticisms that can serve the purposes of open-minded and well-meaning political elites, whether in the government or in the opposition.

Given Greece's foreign policy profile presented above, the country can be described today as a satisfied, *status quo*, strategically located, medium-sized power whose main objective is to engage heavily in institutionalized multilateral arrangements such as the EU, NATO and the WEU that help to consolidate a structure of cooperation and peace in its troubled neighborhood.

NATO, throughout the years of the Cold War, tended to be equated in Greece with the political and strategic will of the United States and was viewed as being the primary instrument for Soviet containment. Although strategists in Greece were concerned with the country's inadequate conventional capability that was facing more powerful Warsaw Pact conventional forces stationed in Bulgaria, they accepted a front-line-state status (similar to Germany's) which afforded security on the basis of strategic deterrence and the balance of nuclear terror. There were two additional dimensions, however, which were specific to Greece: the first dimension had to do with the after-effects of the Greek Civil War which called for a counter-insurgency mission for the Greek armed forces against a potential attempt of Greek Communists to take over the country. The second dimension, which remains of special concern to the present day, is related to a highly troubled partnership with neighboring Turkey over the issue of Cyprus (1955 to present) and over a number of highly disturbing Turkish claims in the Aegean region (1974 to present).

The momentous changes surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact called for an appropriate reexamination of NATO's post-Cold War future. The Greek reading of the situation -not unlike that of other European partners- views NATO today as a gradually expanding alliance providing the values of collective defense and (increasingly) collective security to its member states. The Soviet threat has been replaced by a whole new set of high level risks which include the spread of nuclear and biological weapons as well as missile launchers. The "risk list" includes international terrorism, narcotics cartels, and a variety of forms of internal and regional conflicts stemming from a sudden resurgence of nationalism, ethnic autonomism and religious fundamentalism.

Expectations in Greece are that the United States will perpetuate its useful strategic presence in Central Europe. However it is assumed that the American presence there will be progressively reduced to symbolic levels. On the contrary, the Greeks project that the United States will raise its profile (in and out of NATO) in the most strategic central and eastern Mediterranean regions and that the new risk calculus of post-Cold War NATO will focus on a North-South rather than an East-West axis. In this respect, Greek policies have been adjusting toward preparing the country to capitalize on strategic assets such as the island of Crete (especially Suda Bay) and other important Aegean and Dodecanese islands.

Given that Greece's main security concern has been emanating from Turkey, Greek policymakers have sought to solidify a strategy of adequate deterrence founded on factors of hard as well as soft power. Thus Greece

has been spending around 6% of its GDP for defense purposes over a number of years and has sought to maintain sufficiency in land, air and naval power vis-à-vis Turkey. In terms of soft power, Greek policy has sought to deepen multilateral ties in the European Union, NATO and the WEU, the premise being that Turkish policy-makers would think twice before attacking a country that is highly integrated into the Western family of nations.

Greece's recently announced defense doctrine (involving modernization and reorganization procedures) calls for a sum of $14 billion to be expended in the next ten years (over and above the $3 billion per year for military expenditures). The new doctrine retains military conscription but strongly reinforces the category of 5-year enlisted professionals and reorganizes the Army reducing the number of Divisions and increasing that of Brigades relying on flexible, mechanized and highly mobile smaller units designed to fit needs for multinational peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations under NATO auspices.

In its new weapons procurement program, Greece continues to rely primarily on US supplied sophisticated equipment with Germany and France running a distant second and third in the suppliers list. "Bargain-basement offers" from post-Cold War Russia, in the spirit of PfP and the special NATO-Russia relationship, are logically to be added to the future list of important suppliers.

Finally, we should stress here that the welcome improvement in Greek-Turkish relations which took place last July during the Madrid NATO Council meeting can open -if prudently pursued- avenues toward a Greek-Turkish reconciliation over the issues of Cyprus and the Aegean. Such –reconciliation would dramatically facilitate NATO's stabilizing role in regions such as the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa.

In conclusion, we can propose that Greece, as is the case with most of its Western partners, has gravitated toward a widely shared consensus regarding important questions of foreign policy strategy with occasional debate and disagreement on matters of tactics and policy implementation.

Following the death of Andreas Papandreou (June 1996) and the rise to undisputed power (after the September 1996 election) of Constantinos Simitis (a moderate, a technocrat and multilateralist in political philosophy) the pendulum has decisively swung in the direction of the multilateralist paradigm. This process has been further strengthened by the election of Costas Karamanlis (in March 1997) as the leader of the loyal opposition party, New Democracy. This 42-year-old holder of a doctorat from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy promises to provide effective and substantive opposition that avoids the populist excesses in foreign policy of his immediate predecessor.

In short, the prognosis for Greece's Western profile is solid for the foreseeable future since Greek socialists have unequivocally adopted a pro-EU and pro-NATO policy while the Conservative opposition's stance has been and continues to be enthusiastically pro-Western. Unfortunately, the situation in neighboring Turkey appears much more fluid and less likely to sustain a strong government that will have the necessary backing to move decisively toward a policy of genuine reconciliation with Greece. A Greek-Turkish rapprochement will permit Turkey to concentrate on the multiplicity of problems in its eastern fronts be they with Syria, Iran and Iraq, not to mention the simmering Kurdish question. It will be necessary, therefore, to continue the efforts toward building confidence and reducing tension. The result could eventually permit strong leaders in both countries to emulate the courage of Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Ataturk who had crafted a long lasting period of Greek-Turkish friendship in the early 1930s.

NOTES

1. Stephanos Constantinides, "Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis", **Hellenic Studies / Etudes helléniques**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1996, pp. 43-62. The literature on Greece's political, economic, social, cultural and diplomatic profile in the English language is quite rich and steadily growing. For an inclusive, up-to-date, annotated bibliographical guide see Mark Dragoumis and Thanos Veremis, **Greece, The World Bibliographical Series** (Oxford: Clio Press, 1998), Forthcoming.

2. **Ibid.**, p. 57.

3. T. A. Couloumbis, J. A. Petropulos, H. J. Psomiades, **Foreign Interference in Greek Politics**, New York: Pella, 1976.

4. Thanos Veremis, "Greek Security: Issues and Politics", **Adelphi Papers**, No. 179, London, the IISS, 1982.

5. For an excellent and challenging study of the subject of metamorphosis, see William Hardy McNeill, **The Metamorphosis of Greece since World War II**, Chicago, 1978.

6. See the classic work on this subject by Raymond Aron, **Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations**, New York: Doubleday, 1966.

7. Nikos Mouzelis, **Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America**, (London: MacMillan, 1986); Nikos Poulantzas, **The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece and Spain** (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities, 1976); Loukas Tsoukalis, **The New European Economy Revisited** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Alexis Heraclides, **The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics**

(London: Frank Cass, 1991); and Yannis Papadopoulos, **Complexité sociale et politiques publiques**, (Paris: Montchrestien, 1995).

8. For this author's views on the gradual transition of PASOK from non-alignment to a Western orientation, see Theodore A. Couloumbis, "PASOK's Foreign Policies, 1981-89: Continuity or Change?" in Richard Clogg, ed., **Greece 1981-89: The Populist Decade**, London: MacMillan, 1993, pp. 113-30.

9. It would be fascinating to conduct a systematic content analysis on the writings of scholars that had adopted a strongly anti-accession stance in the 1970s and to establish whether, when and how quickly they turned necessity (or inevitability) into a virtue.

10. See Stephanos Constantinides, *opus cité*, p. 57.

11. **Ibid.**

12. For a detached presentation and discussion of the views of unilateralist scholars such as Athanasios Platias and Panayiotis Ifestos.

13. Constantinides, *op. cit.*, classifies Thanos Veremis, Nikos Mouzelis and the author of this article, among others, as fitting the category of "transnationalists-idealists" which we have renamed "multilateralists" for the purposes of this discussion.

14. Francis Fukuyama, **The End of History and the Last Man**, New York: Free Press, 1992.

15. Representative of this genre of thinking are Samuel P. Huntington, **The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order**, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996; John J. Mearshimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," **International Security**, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994-5, pp. 5-49; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, **Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century**, New York: Scribner, 1993.

16. For a sampling of the views of scholars T. Veremis, T. Couloumbis, D. Constas, E. Chela, Ch. Chardanidis, A. Platias, P. Kazakos, P. Ifestos, Ch. Rozakis, Th. Christodoulides, and S. Dalis see the selection by A.A. Fatouros, " O Polemos ston Kolpo kai oi Ellines Diethnologoi," in **Diethnes Dikaio kai Diethnis Politiki**, Thessaloniki, Vol. 21-22 (undated), pp. 221-92.

17. One of the early and most influential proponents of functionalism was David Mitrany. See his seminal essay, **A Working Peace System**, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966. The best known and celebrated practitioner of functionalism was the European statesman Jean Monnet.

18. See Karl von Clausewitz, **On War**, New York: Modern Library, 1943.

19. Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the major proponents of post-World War II realism, concluded that the debate between idealists and realists was not one of morality versus cynicism, but one of alternate conceptions of collective morality. It is worth quoting him at some length here: "The contest between utopianism [idealism] and realism is not tantamount to a contest between principle and expediency, morality and immorality, although some spokesmen for utopianism would like to

have it that way. The contest is rather between one type of political morality and another type of political morality, one taking as its standard universal moral principles abstractly formulated, the other weighing these principles against the moral requirements of concrete political action, their relative merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of the political consequences to which they are likely to lead." See his **Dilemmas of Politics**, University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 86.

20. The tragic distances separating the privileged from the underprivileged of our planet are recorded in full in **Human Development Report, United Nations Development Program**, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

21. In this category one could list scholars such as Alexis Heraclides, John O. Iatrides, P.C. Ioakimidis, Panos Kazakos, Nicos Mouzelis, Harry Psomiades, Christos Rozakis, Loukas Tsoukalis and the author of this essay among others: diplomats (retired) such as Georgios Papoulias, Byron Theodoropoulos and Costas Zepos among others: journalists such as Costas Iordanides, Yannis Kartalis, Alexis Papahelas, A.D. Papayannides, Yannis Pretenderis and Richardos Someritis among others; and politicians such as Andreas Andrianopoulos, Leonidas Kyrkos, Michalis Papaconstantinou and Michalis Papayannakis among others.

22. The introduction of this term in the Greek political vocabulary has been attributed to a former President of the Republic — Christos Sartzetakis — who has recently emerged as a vocal proponent of unyielding and patriotic causes.

23. See Stelios Papathemelis, "Finlandopoiisi I Israilinopoiisi (Finlandization or Israelization)", Athens, **To Vima** (March 17, 1997).

24. In this category one could list scholars such as Marios Evriviades, Charalambos Giallourides, Panagiotis Ifestos and Athanassios Platias among others; diplomats such as Michalis Dountas and Themis Stophoropoulos among others; journalists such as Giorgos Harvalias, Liana Kanelli, Chrysanthos Lazarides and Panos Panagiotopoulos among others and politicians such as Panagiotis Kammenos, Yannis Kapsis, Giorgios Karatzaferis, Stelios Papathemelis, Sakis Peponis and Christos Vyzovites among others.

25. The multi-front war scenario, that has proven so disastrous (even for great powers whenever they have engaged in it) does not seem to concern unilateralist politicians, journalists and scholars.

Fetishistic Internationalism: Jousting with unreality in Greece

Panayiotis Ifestos*

RÉSUMÉ

Cette analyse se veut fondamentalement une étude de la philosophie politique des relations internationales, en relation avec les tendances générales et la diplomatie d'un petit pays comme la Grèce. L'auteur explore quelques aspects fondamentaux de la théorie actuelle des relations internationales, plus particulièrement ceux qui concernent les nouvelles tendances et structures au niveau international. En se référant sur les approches alternatives développées dans les années 90, l'auteur conclut qu'aucune de ces approches n'est crédible face au paradigme de la souveraineté-anarchie.

Se penchant sur le cas de la Grèce, l'auteur se réfère à des points de vue représentatifs qui montrent que le discours académique et politique, endorse presque sans questionnement, la forme la plus radicale de "l'idéologie néo-libérale". Enfin, l'auteur suggère que la politique étrangère d'un petit pays est soit rationelle, avec comme critère et axiome suprêmes, l'intérêt national, soit irrationelle; dans ce deuxième cas, elle est improductive.

ABSTRACT

This analysis is basically a study of political philosophy of international relations relating both to general trends and to the diplomacy of a small state, namely Greece. The author examines some fundamental aspects of current IR theory as regards evolving trends and structures at the international level. Referring to alternative approaches as they develop in the 1990s, the author concludes that, no credible alternative to the sovereignty / anarchy paradigm is provided. Turning to Greece, the author refers to representative views which show the academic and political discourse endorse, almost unquestionably, the most radical form of "neoliberal ideology". The foreign policy of a small state, it is suggested, is either rational, in which case it has national interest as a supreme criterion and as a beacon for orientation, or it is irrational and counterproductive.

Introduction and Some Basic Questions

This article attempts to sketch some basic trends as regards Greek foreign policy. What are the main issues for Greek national strategy? As any other small state situated in an unstable region like the Balkans, Greece faces foreign policy and defense dilemmas.[1] When a country faces direct military threats, one crucial issue is the adoption and implementation of an effective deterrence strategy.[2] Vital preconditions for effectiveness include the ability to define and achieve consensus across a critical mass of

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the societal corpus - the 'survival' and the 'vital' national interests, plus the ability to adopt rational diplomatic and military strategies in harmony with the predominant trends in interstate relations.[3] The questions Greek politicians should ask are many and the answers controversial and complex: Is the international system a self-help system? Perhaps the degree of regulation and governance at the interstate level allows for relaxation and reduction of the defense effort.[4] Should, however, the threatened nation face the dangers along the lines of internal and external balancing? Perhaps the appropriate diplomatic course is reliance on international instances such as the United Nations or the International Court of Justice. Should one country's diplomacy favor 'international intervention' in the internal affairs of other sovereign states? Should Greek diplomats favor NATO's development into a regional security organization with far reaching competencies as regards interstate (or even intra-state) disputes? Or, should it favor its gradual abolition and the creation of a "Federal Europe" with collective military capability?

Should Greek diplomacy submit to hegemonic demands, because, as some argue, this is something inevitable? Or, should it, instead, in its relations to bigger powers, continuously pursue autonomy of decision making and independently minded diplomatic attitudes? Should, diplomatic representatives, pursue a balanced patron-client relationship? Should they, instead, seek big powers' benevolence by systematically and unconditionally supporting their strategic aims? Further questions may query international institutions as an independent variable and international politics as dependent variable. Of course, the wisdom and the very definition of international law may be questioned. How is international law influencing great power strategies? Lastly, if Greece appeals for the application of international law in the Aegean sea or Cyprus, how do big powers determine their positions?

The answers to the above questions are paramount for all states - small and large, weak and strong. In all cases, a precondition for rational answers is the correct evaluation of the "form and character" of the international system in the historical and contemporary context. That is, a critical mass, both at the élite and societal level, should be competent enough so as to think, plan and function, in ways which do not contradict underlying trends in the international system. Undoubtedly, at the élite level, the issue is, *inter alia*, related to the talents of the political and military leadership; i.e., its wisdom, and its knowledge of historical and geopolitical trends. Farsighted leaders ignore opposition and seek to follow strategies which strengthen their nations' role and position in the international system.[5] Historical evidence, even in the exceptional case of Woodrow Wilson, is telling: Utopianism / internationalism and diplomacy based on

national interests are incompatible concepts. Utopian political leadership, in other words, leadership which ranks its utopian philosophical preferences higher than rational considerations of international reality, could prove detrimental for the security and the other national interests of the country. Small states cannot afford utopianism and (diplomatic) jousting with unreality.

In order to comprehend the utopian and distorted character of Greek internationalist dogmas, it is necessary to include, in the forthcoming pages, some elementary analysis of the basic dilemmas and issues in current international relations theory. Included are an outline of the debate among IR theorists, a projection of the trends in the post-Cold War era and an attempt at conclusions relevant to the foreign policy of a small state such as Greece. Since the purpose is not to offer an introduction to current International Relations (IR) theory, the references to the debate will not be extensive.

Greek Internationalism: *Prolegomena*

Greek internationalism is composed of many stripes, colors and shades. The three most identifiable brands of Greek internationalism are, first, mainstream communist thinking of the Stalinist tradition, second, neo-liberal internationalism and , third, European supranationalism.[6] In the 1990s, a predominant trend cut across traditional political parties and produced a most peculiar 'ideological animal' which draws from all three traditions[7] and converges on a common neo-ultra conservative/neoliberal platform.[8] In other words it acknowledges American hegemony in a way which differs little from corresponding ultra-conservative political attitudes of the 1940s.[9] External penetration and external dependence since Greek independence prevented the development of an identifiable 'indigenous' ideology regarding Greece's foreign policy[10], its role in regional and world affairs and its fundamental orientations regarding vital national interests in time and in space. In terms of IR theory, the Greek state of the 1990s is, ideologically, a most "penetrated" political system. Certainly, the purpose of this analysis is not to suggest that the antidote to ultra-conservatism is a reversion to missionary anti-imperialistic rhetoric in Greek foreign policy in a way which reproduces the counterproductive attitudes of the 1980s. Instead the purpose is to suggest that modern diplomacy should not be regarded as a zero sum game between options whose color is limited solely to "black and white". The dialectics of missionary anti-imperialistic rhetoric is a completely different thing if compared to what is suggested here: 1) internal balancing and a defense policy safeguarding a robust deterrence strategy against external threats, 2) external balancing of threats through rational external linkages, 3)

prudent as well as "cool" strategies which seek balanced patron-client relations with big powers, and 4) attitudes and policies which ceaselessly aim at strengthening state sovereignty, at increasing national autonomy and at safeguarding sufficient margins of national independence. Such approaches, it is suggested here, are incompatible with internationalist ideologies of all shades and of all colors. In any one country, a foreign policy is either rational, in which case it has national interest as a supreme criterion and a beacon for orientation, or it is irrational and counter-productive because it is thrown off by the baffling winds of internationalist nonsense or alien criteria by external actors which penetrated the political and societal system. As argued in this paper, fetishist internationalism has traditionally been some sort of political epidemic casting a shadow over Greek diplomacy throughout the post war era.

INTERNATIONALISM IN GREECE AND ELSEWHERE:

Misconception of Interstate Reality in Historical and Contemporary Context

Some Basic Questions

A basic question regarding peace and stability at the international level refers to the degree of governance or anarchy in the international system. Another basic issue, possibly the single most important source of conflict in interstate relations, refers to hegemony. That is to the cases when stronger states or their agents attempt to achieve a dominant position and to benefit from superior/subordinate or strong/weak relationships. Hegemonic behavior may result in unwarranted influence or may lead to resistance by the subordinate unit and eventually even to conflict. Irrespective of morals in such a situation, there may also be "temporary"[11] hegemonic governance and stability.

Implementing fully the principle[12] of state sovereignty or establishing supranational rules and institutions beyond the nation state is an endeavor related to extremely complex and controversial issues. The world is divided into distinct and heterogeneous polities aspiring to autonomy, independence and sovereignty. That is, we have a world fragmented into distinct "nation states".[13] The system is thus diffused and fragmented in terms of ethics, culture and governing rules.

This societal fragmentation preceded the establishment of the international -politically fragmented - system based on distinct normative structures.[14] That is, society precedes normative structures. The problem with utopian thinking in international relations, be it in hegemonic states

or in small states such as Greece, is that purpose and fact are often confused. In international relations, as Edward H. Carr notes, "the utopian sets up an ethical standard which purports to be independent of politics, and seeks to make politics conform to it. ... the absolute standard of the utopian is conditioned and dictated by the social order, and is therefore political. Morality can only be relative not universal. Ethics must be interpreted in terms of politics; and the search for an ethical norm outside politics is doomed to frustration".[15]

At issue here are the norms and values for regulating relations among the distinct states of the world. How then are interstate relations regulated? Do we have constant balance of power which provides stability (and, unfortunately so, at certain cases instability)? However questionable in ethical terms, do we have hegemonic regulation and hegemonic stability? By eroding national sovereignty and by escaping state control, is the 'invisible hand' of transnational actors going to regulate the system? Or, alternatively, is the 'hand' of the transnational forces, such as multinationals or means of mass communication regulating the system for the benefit of the 'metropolis' ? 'Interdependence' and 'penetration',[16] are they by themselves, regulating processes? Or do they operate for the benefit of the strong and for the detriment of the weak?[17] These questions and dilemmas suffice to make obvious that the issue of regulation of interstate relations involves complex and controversial questions.

The absence of legitimate governance at the international level is what makes the world anarchic. In such a context, each different and distinct nation state makes up its foreign policy decisions on the grounds of what its members perceive as their collective national interest. Perceptions of national interest at the level of the nation state is therefore the single most important input in diplomatic behavior. It is also the most rational basis for interstate interactions.[18] International institutions and international normative settings of whatever kind, certainly play a role. However, they are intermediary variables, the dependent variables of war / peace / cooperation / conflict and the independent variable of international politics; in other words, the interaction of national interest and consequences of anarchy and structural shifts of power at the global level.[19] National interests and interactions among the poles of power at the regional and the world levels are the decisive factors which influence the form and character of whatever normative structures exist beyond state sovereignty.[20] Any international normative order and its operation draw legitimacy not from a coherent and identifiable societal corpus, but from the predominant balance of power making up the international system.[21] An important characteristic of this sort of normative structure is its democratic deficit and the many opportunities it provides for hegemonic powers

to achieve hierarchical dominance and superior/subordinate relationships.[22] In fact, by definition, any normative structure at the international level which remains without a controlling societal corpus is 1) either essentially intergovernmental, 2) or hegemonic (or 3) a combination of the two). Various ideas proposed in the 1990s lead to a paternalistic institutionalized hegemonic control in new and existing intergovernmental organizations. These ideas will be explored in what follows.

Cosmopolitanism[23], as a political stand in a small state, is of little or no relevance to the real world, diplomatic practice, foreign policy goals and priorities. An abundance of historical evidence and the very history of the United States[24], leave no doubt that cosmopolitan rhetoric has always been the mantle of hegemonic aspirations. It is precisely in this context that, Edward H. Carr, in his 1939 monumental analysis of perennial value, observed that, "pleas for international solidarity and world union comes from those dominant nations which may hope to exercise control over a unified world".[25] Also Carr "diagnosed" that, nebulous statements on "orders" over and above state sovereignty are never "innocent". This is a symptom, he pointed out, not of a change of heart, but of the fact that they are now approaching the time when they may become strong enough to espouse internationalism. 'International order' and 'international solidarity' will always be slogans of those who feel strong enough to impose it on the others."[26]

In other words, internationalist rhetoric is the privilege of the strong. As the Athenian diplomats pronounced to the Melian representatives in the famous dialogue reproduced by Thucydides, 'in fact, the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept'.[27] In fact, state sovereignty essentially exists to safeguard the weak through the exercise of internal self-determination in accordance with predominant preferences within each societal system. This is particularly significant for weak states. If cosmopolitanism prevails, if borderlines defined by the existence of heterogeneous and distinct sovereignties are eliminated, the sovereignty of smaller states would be penetrated, thus easing the way for the power factors of the strong states. Another serious side effect, of course, would be the shift from the state of anarchy (no governance over and above the states) to the state of chaos (all against all and a paradise for criminals, opportunists, mafia and everyone else who dislikes regulation at the international level).

At the international level, the regulation of transactions among groups or individuals necessitates either benevolence (by the stronger units of the system) or an international authority which would distribute roles, costs and benefits in a way acceptable to all parties involved. Hitherto the only

and the imperfect method is defined by the principle of state sovereignty, which prevents chaos and provides tolerable/acceptable regulation in the context of a *de facto* anarchic international context. Interestingly, even authors searching for alternative international regimes acknowledge the fact that state sovereignty is the only 'institution' on the basis of which some sort of regulation at the international level is accomplished. Robert Keohane, for example, acknowledges that, "Hobbes dilemma cannot be ignored. Without well developed constitutional institutions, the alternative (to state sovereignty) in many countries lie between anarchy and predation, neither of which is attractive".[28] This said, it is now time to sketch the fundamental characteristics of the international system.

State Sovereignty, Hegemony and International Law: Complex Interrelationships

One way to begin is to identify borderlines between interstate and intrastate order. Once the current state of affairs regarding governance is defined, another way is to distinguish between 'many' and 'few' international normative structures. (Please see table.) As earlier supported, the fundamental character of intrastate order is the existence of a societal corpus and institutions drawing their legitimacy from it; i.e., the existence of a viable normative structure. (Please see column one.) Correspondingly, the basic characteristics of the intrastate order are heterogeneity among the units, absence of a regulating overlay, unequal growth among the states and constant hegemonic behavior.

What is 'international law' and what is the role of international organizations?[29] In a non-legalistic definition, the underpinnings of international law may be four basic principles: 1) interstate parity, 2) non intervention in the internal affairs of other states, 3) no use of violence (or threat to use violence), 4) adherence to peaceful means to solve disputes and societal self - determination within the boundaries of each state. The fact that states do not always respect them is subsequent to the fact we have "principles" and not "rules" (as we understand them in the social and institutional context of interstate order). Expressed differently, while for intrastate rules the terms for political interchange are defined in the context of a critical societal consensus, the rules at the international level are inevitably conditioned by the complexity of international politics, the antagonistic national interests and the fragmented societal base. Fundamentally, at the international level, we do not speak about a strictly binding legal structure[30], but about principles which the states promise - basically a political promise - to abide by. When a state violates these principles, none exists to 'enforce the law'.[31] Only rarely and only when big powers are in agreement, the Security Council of the United Nations compels competing parties to

comply. This may be attributed either to the defender's ability to face the threat, or the existence of strong national interests held in other states which will unilaterally or through the Security Council take action against the aggressor. As regards the latter aspect, it is common knowledge that the preconditions for an effective Security Council intervention is agreement among the permanent members, and strong interest by one or more permanent members.

A Brief Review of the Debate in IR Theory

The debate among IR theorists on alternative organizational structures, particularly in relation to collective security, is controversial and open-ended. Earlier this century, Rationalists, Grotians and Realist analysts, were disciplined in respecting the borderline separating utopian or imaginary schemes and pragmatic approaches which pursued peace and stability on the grounds of the principle of state sovereignty.[32] The evolution of the theory of international relations since World War II is adventuresome. In the course of the three decades following this war, monumental works by such scholars as Edward H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, George Kennan and Henry Kissinger were succeeded by a wave of writings of, by and large, marginal value. In many writings, especially by behaviourists, only scant attention was given to the fundamental causes of instability and conflict, much less so to the internal logic, the philosophical questions and the moral foundations of ethics of interstate relations and of 'international interventions'. The fragmentation of the world into distinct societies, which if not peacefully integrated are perpetually aspiring for power, sovereignty, autonomy and fulfillment of national interests, were all questions overlooked on the grounds of ideological and other expediencies.[33] The common ground of many writings was, first, a nebulous (and misleading) attachment to universality (and "idealism"), concepts never really defined with precision; second, a nebulous and never really explained ideological hostility against state sovereignty as the principle governing regime of the international system; third, an equally nebulous support of transnational, supranational and internationalist institutions[34] and, fourth, as regards methodology, attachment to an almost irrelevant empiricism.

Phrased differently, instead of setting out as primary and pragmatic objective the implementation of the Westphalia model, the political and academic debate was overflowed with unrealistic proposals for its transgression.[35] Still, societal and political reality at the world level makes the Westphalia model the only credible set of principles which, if respected, could form the basis for the *de facto* achievement of some sort of collective security system; i.e., an effective system which secures state

sovereignty as the governing regime of the international system. However, the Westphalia principles were never really implemented. Few would disagree that the single most important factor for this fact, was revisionism and hegemonic ambitions. Nonetheless, many focused their attention on supranationalism or even on more nebulous internationalist ideas[36] which targeted state sovereignty as the cause of nationalism, conflict and instability, and paid little or no attention to the principal cause of conflict, that is, hegemony and revisionism.

The transgression of "state sovereignty" as the regime on the basis of which the organization of the international system takes place, necessitates credible and workable proposals on at least two issues. First, approaches to overcome the societal heterogeneity of the world without violence and genocide, leading to the predominance of the strong and extermination, absorption or subordination of the weak. Second, the disappearance of hegemonic behavior among groups of differing strength, size, differential rates of growth and unequal capabilities.

The basic thesis on the aforementioned issues relies on four assumptions:

– First, there is only one kind of collective security system, the 'ideal', that is, basically, the one approaching the principles embodied in the Society of Nations.

– Second, a collective security system is viable only if big powers accept to respect the sovereignty of other nations and to commit the necessary resources for the restoration of state sovereignty, if and when it is attacked by revisionist states.

– Third, a collective security system is not an internationalist, transnationalist or supranational endeavor. It is precisely the opposite, that is, it is a set of principles aiming - on the basis of state sovereignty - at helping the state to defend itself against external aggression.

– Fourth, it could not get into nation-building activities. Instead, it could only strictly abide by what it is currently stipulated in Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, that is: "nothing shall authorize to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state". In other words internal self-determination of independent societal systems should be respected and guarded against revisionism and hegemony.

International normative structures which would fail to take into account the political and social conditions are by definition deadlocked and confounded to failure by their inherent contradictions.[37] All prospective internationalist schemes must take into account the fact that the international societal structure is characterized by fragmentation. It does not exist one world society but one world composed of many different and

distinct societies. At the level of each distinct society, it takes place a distinct and different process of articulation and aggregation of interests, morals and values, as well as a distinct process of political socialization and recruitment.[38] Consequently, moral values and norms are fragmented leading to a corresponding number of state structures whose societies aspire to independence, sovereignty and undisturbed self-determination.

In a rather perennial process, the strongest units attempt to penetrate and promote their power factors while the weaker units struggle to deter attacks or establish a balanced framework of patron-client relations. Moreover, another political characteristic of the international system is that differing societal structures often lead to differing preferences on norms and values as regards global issues. A corollary of this reality is the differing opinions as to what is 'best for the world', that is, what is right or good for the 'universe of mankind'. As Hedley Bull correctly noted, "there is, indeed, no lack of appointed spokesmen of the common good of "spaceship earth"... In the end of course, it is confirmed that universal ideologies that are espoused by states are notoriously subservient to their special interests".[39] Similarly, Edward H. Carr notes that leaders such as Woodrow Wilson, Lord Cecil and Hitler, when they speak about the 'supreme interest of the same world' are in effect making the same claim, 'that their countrymen are the bearers of a higher ethic'.[40] 'Pleas for international solidarity and world union come from those dominant nations which may hope to exercise control over a unified world'.[41] Historical evidence suggests that, 'supposedly absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based on particular interpretation of national interest at particular time'.[42]

A fact never understood by Greek utopians is that interstate relations should be distinguished from inter-personal relations, two completely different matters. Similarly, that the internal logic and interconnections of such concepts as law, order, justice, morality, values and vision for a better world in the context of any given society, have a completely different application at the international level. These theoretical propositions, put forward by scholars such as Carr[43], Bull[44] and Kennan[45], are relevant to the position taken earlier, that the application of "law and order" at the interstate level is a completely different matter than law and order within the boundaries of any state. Expectations by the leaders of small states should be conditioned by this cruel reality. If they fail to do so, their states could be severely penalized.

At the intra-state level, order, the collective security of its members and parity before the law, are legal matters for the respect of which exist a normative structure, including police, courts of justice and societal "checks

and balances". Rules and the legitimizing moral values are defined by an identifiable social body. At the interstate level, most relations not only are of antagonistic, controversial and fluctuating nature, but in addition, there are no clear and easily identifiable norms and values to guide their application. For that very reason, order and security fluctuates in accordance to the national interests concerned, the differing (collective) moral values of the parties involved and the constellation of power relations at the desired level.

The reasons explaining convergence among states are limited and restricted to some broad principles, yet there could be several. First, states and their societies, are reluctant to accept anyone outside their boundaries as the one which determines the form and function of their internal interactions. Second and related, at any level and in all cases, a regulating authority is not ephemeral, only if it is founded on an articulated and sustainable societal system. At the required level, be it the world, a region or a state, a critical mass of people must converge on the definition of a critical mass of norms and values. At the international level, the fluctuation or differing societal situations debase transnational arrangements because they are not founded on such a critical and sustainable consensus. Third, one of the few substantial constraints that states accept, which stems directly from the above-mentioned principle of state sovereignty, is the commitment not to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Still, few accept it wholly. Most states continually try to penetrate others in order to increase their influence, although not always at the interest of the recipient. Fourth, there are objective and probably insurmountable difficulties in any attempt to reach a universal or regional consensus on great issues, great conflicts and historical antagonism among collectivities. History abounds with the effects of religion, culture, collective memories, ideology, differentials in economic growth, geopolitical antagonism for the control of resources or access to resources, and differing perceptions as to what is good or bad on many other international issues. Fifth, continuously guaranteeing the interstate territorial and sovereignty boundaries is probably not feasible. One should observe, in this respect, that territorial claims and other revisionist behavior not always unjustified or uncontroversial[46] relates to the fluctuations of power and the "windows of opportunity" created by these fluctuations. Sixth, as made clear from UN discussions on defining aggression and other related international practices, actual aggression is realized when it already has taken place. Thereafter, the process leads to the adaptation of the weak part to the faits accomplis rather than to the restoration of the territorial status quo ante.[47] Seventh, while within each state moral values and norms are the prerogative of a pre-defined societal corpus, at the international level, any attempt

to impose norms and values defined by other societies generates hostility. This hostility is almost always justified because hegemony is the rule rather than the exception. No doubt the prerogative to define the norms belongs to the strong and the strong who see matters from the angle of the prevailing values in its society.

In short, no credible internationalist scheme is identifiable on the horizon of international relations. Clearly seen are the following:

1) An ever increasing hegemonic tendency by dominant powers;

2) Globalization, interdependence and dependence which cause asymmetries in economic and political relations among states;

3) Immense problems in the North/South divide;

4) Anarchy and absence of legitimate international governance, and

5) very few chances to see international law and the Westphalia model (parity, non intervention, internal self-determination, no use of force) fully implemented. The preceding analysis, leads to the conclusion that we live in an 'imperfect' world and a self-help system.

The Triumph of Neo-Liberal Internationalism in a Small State

The Origins of Greek Internationalism

Unlike all other states of the earth which function and behave strictly on the basis of national interest, Greece[48] retains an unrealistic analysis which contemplates the world as cosmopolitan and the international system as governed by an ever-growing set of 'internationalist' norms and values[49] to which Greece, even at the expense of its vital national interests, is compelled to comply. References to positions taken by a representative sample[50] of academics, diplomats, intellectuals, politicians and 'mainstream' columnists in Greek media[51] reveal the paradox.

It should be noted that, as argued elsewhere[52], theoretical speculation on international relations theory in Greece is poor or inexistent. Most often, publicly expressed opinions on international relations are not based on any valid theory but simply express the personal views of the writer. Until recently[53], Greek diplomacy was tormented by internationalist rhetoric of Marxist origin. It is no exaggeration to argue that the majority of Greek intellectuals, who nowadays espouse neo-liberal doctrines, have their intellectual roots in Marxist internationalism. At the dawn of the 21st century, we observe the opposite. Nowadays mainstream thinkers, even of Marxist origin, either adopt fully the neo-liberal argument or adapt to the prevailing conventional wisdom on the superior powers of 'globalizing forces' with regard to which Greece has no option but to submit, in a process of a 'damage control' exercise. The most salient characteristic of

Greek academic writing on international relations, which has profound repercussions on Greek diplomacy, is the almost uncritical reproduction of controversial neo-liberal positions regarding the role of trade, economic interdependence, institutions and democracy in the modern world.[54]

Neo-Liberal Institutionalists or Internationalism with Two Gears

As seen earlier, mainstream foreign policy assumptions of economic liberalism[55], suggest that, international stability is mainly a function of international economic considerations, the existence of regulatory institutions, the advent of democracy[56] and other processes at the world level which promote, interdependence, integration[57] and institutional structures. For many neo-liberals, states are not the main actors in world politics. Some accept the centrality of the state as an objective reality[58] and take the normative position that this must change. Industrialization and democracy, the argument continues, increasingly create welfare states which are less oriented to power and prestige and more oriented towards economic growth and social security. "In a world of multiple issues, [it is further suggested, imperfectly linked,] in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgovernmentally, the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining is greatly increased."[59] Detached from the ethical dimension of the issue and other questions mentioned earlier regarding functionality, neo-liberals stationed in big states, have no hesitation to point out that hegemonic power may be necessary to establish cooperation among states in conditions under which states pursue this cooperation 'in their own interests'.[60] Of course, it is added that, "when we think about cooperation after hegemony, we need to think about institutions"[61], that is, about institutions which will survive after the decline of the power of the hegemonic power.

Needless to say, while national leaders of big states, leaders such as de Gaulle, Nixon, Reagan, Thatcher and Mitterrand design their countries' strategies in an ideological environment of divine attachment to national interests, national purposes, national independence and national strategic interests, smaller states are lectured about globalization, regional cooperation, confidence-building measures, the need for institutions and about the 'anachronism of state sovereignty'. Careful retracing in academic writings reveals that this political and ideological discourse is often called another name in sophisticated neoliberal academic writings which attack sovereignty without providing a non-hegemonic and credible alternative.

At this point, a distinction could be made between internationalist neoliberal views spelled out in a hegemonic state and internationalist neoliberal views pronounced by intellectuals or political leaders in small states. The first category, neoliberal internationalism flowing from a hegemonic

state, consciously or unknowingly, directly or indirectly, facilitates this state's power factors to penetrate smaller or weaker sovereignties. The weaker the sovereignty of a small state, the easier its penetration by spies or multinationals and the fewer the chances of the small state's achieving symmetrical interactions in the context of interstate parity and balanced patron-client relations. The second category of cosmopolitan neoliberal views in small states is by all means less straightforward. Experience in Greece[62] shows that, the 'spokesmen' of this sort of internationalism could very well be some politicians, but also, some professors serving other scientific fields and not aware of the neoliberal/realist debate in IR theory. In some other cases, they might be professors of economics in small states who did not have the time to study and work out in their minds the differences between economic liberalism in any given country and internationalist liberalism, which is in fact an ideology of dominant capitalist countries, and the concepts of which are analyzed in many books of political economy of international relations. (See the writings of authors such as Robert Gilpin and Immanuel Wallerstein.). Another category of cosmopolitan neoliberalism in a small state may be traced in the writings of some ideologically confused intellectuals, adherents to a 'missionary - Wilsonian' sort of diplomacy. The latter group either has little knowledge of the theoretical debate or is brainwashed and trained during their studies to think in these terms in hegemonic states by being out-talked or out-persuaded by former professors. Furthermore, given the keen interest of the agents of hegemonic powers to spread neoliberal ideas in small dependent states, one could also refer to the well known phenomenon of 'locals' seeking personal fulfillment or "touchable interests" by serving the objectives of strong external actors and their agents.[63] I borrow the term 'touchable interests' from Panayotis Kondylis[64], a clear, articulate and distinguished scholar based in Germany. In the same article, seemingly addressed to the audiences in small countries, Kondylis points out that, 'propagandists' of globalization pay little or no attention to the prerequisites and to the internal logic of the processes which, supposedly, would induce international peace through the abrogation of the nation state. On another occasion, challenging the conventional wisdom of internationalist concepts, Kondylis notes that, the only sure thing about universalist/ecumenical views is not international peace but the transformation of all international conflicts into civil wars.[65]

The Greek (Neoliberal) Version of a 'New World Order'

It is probably time to refer to some characteristic cases of underlying trends in Greek foreign policy analysis. One example is Nikos Mouzelis, a London-based professor well-known to the Greek public and a prolific columnist in the realm of Greek internationalist thinking. Referring to the

conclusions of two prominent and influential Greek professors, who, in 1994, predicted some sort of harmony and perpetual peace in the post cold war era[66], devoted two full pages in the influential Sunday newspaper "ToVima"[67], calling for a new foreign policy which would repeat the 'successful' agreements between Palestinians and Israelis, as well as the agreements in Ireland.[68] The political message was clear: in the new world order, regardless of a Turkish threat, Greece had the luxury to appease Ankara. The logic is simple: In the 'new world order', Palestinians are appeased. Why not Greeks? However, Nikos Mouzelis goes even further. Not only Greece should appease Turkey, but Greece should also volunteer diplomatic and strategic support to its adversary by promoting Ankara's European objectives.[69] In the new international context, he concludes, Greece should even play a leading role for the development of the closest possible links between Europe and Turkey.[70] Recessives and flexibility, he went on, are not only possible but also in Greece's interests.[71] Another leading analyst and a distinguished professor of sociology is Kostantinos Tsoukalas. As a columnist and a professor very close to the highest political echelons[72], Tsoukalas is known to prefer analysis not only of philosophical questions but also of issues relevant to international relations. Analyzing the issue of globalization, the well-known leftist professor of the 'utopian era' (May 1968), reaches conclusions which could not be closer to the neo-liberal assumptions about the irreversible globalizing forces. In rather axiomatic terms, he comes to the conclusion that, through economic development, the world's capitalist system already homogenized world structures limiting national exclusiveness in the spheres of symbols, language, art and entertainment.[73] The reproduction of an ecumenical ruling system, based on the fragmentation of the impoverished political and the predominance of supranational capital, may be able to carry the day.[74] Without determining the exact nature of the emerging international rule, he goes on to observe that "...no society is able to determine its own perception for its global future. .... compulsory adherence to national traditions, therefore, functions as an ecumenical alibi which rejects the already preponderant homogenizing processes".[75] On another occasion, Tsoukalas became more specific when he endorsed the emergence of an utopic new European political consciousness, which could, as he argues, prove of historic significance for Europe and the world at large.[76]

Evidently leading analysts, whose views are by all means the dominant strand of thinking in Greece, regard with fetishism the 'new world order' and international political integration, phenomena which take place in the context of the post-cold war era. In all the writings of Greek intellectuals, hegemony, an esoteric element of all collective endeavors, is overlooked, forgotten or underestimated. In this prospective international system, even

for specialists, that is, even for IR academics and political philosophers, questions referring to values, morality, justice, violence, authority, rule and governance at the world level, are all disregarded, degraded or taken for granted. The philosophers state the obvious (globalization, interdependence, transgression of sovereignty), without, however, examining the many questions of political philosophy which such a process poses with regard to existential matters, e.g., the associations between the specific and general, between the real and fictitious. What, after all, does this means for a small state like Greece? Ariadne's clue as threaded through the political thinking of some Greek intellectuals, is left no doubt. At the outset, intellectual unrest is caused by deeply rooted philosophical reservations about the 'appropriateness' of the nation state as the principal unit in international relations.[77] The same reservations are also evident with regard to national consciousness, national identity and national culture as appropriate concepts in the 'modern world'. The least they could concede to the nation-state and to the national cultures is that they are unavoidable evils to be washed away eventually by the irresistible forces of internationalism, integration and interdependence.[78] Interests, culture and moral values, it is supported, are articulated and aggregated at the global level, inevitably making the nation-state an anachronism and national identities a danger for peace, stability and world order.

Among Greek intellectuals, fetishist expectations for a classless international system, or, alternatively, a neo-liberal cosmopolitan peaceful 'world of trading citizens', lead to a process of perpetual questioning of the nation-state, of national consciousness, of national identity and of national interest. Furthermore, in the context of these imaginary emerging 'new world orders', whose democratic deficit escapes the attention of most Greek analysts, Greece's chances of survival rest in resignation and submission to the dictates of those - never clearly identified - commanding the 'globalizing processes'. It is only natural that, in such a context, analysis does not explain how the government of a small state claims and wins its vital interests. What is more urgent for a small state's foreign policy, according to Greek conventional wisdom, is to explain what is the best 'damage limitation exercise'.[79] Similarly, small nation-states are either by definition constrained to follow the dictates of the dominant powers or are expendable for the cause of imaginary homogenized worlds.

With regard to the political implications of globalization, a recent book written by Panayiotis Yennimatas[80], Vice-President of the European Investment Bank, produces a genuine argument suitable for a penetrated and dependent small state. Essentially, Yennimatas exemplifies the widespread but not always spelt out view that the Greek nation-state has no chance of acting autonomously and independently. In an approach charac-

teristic of contemporary foreign analysis in Greece, the focus is on limits and limitations rather than on capabilities and possibilities. "In international society, the margins of free ethnocentric options are relative. ... The structure of contemporary international community, international law, the complex interrelations of power, internationalization of economics, institutionalized alliance commitments or other commitments of a small state, impose objective commitments and limitations on the exercise of national policy, to the extend that, in the end, national strategy is impossible, it loses the character of autonomous national action and acquires the character of passive adaptation to the structural predicaments of the environment".[81] Further on, the author argues that "the concept of nation-state as the subject of international relations and the concept of national power as a full expression of national interest is an empty and obsolete formalism, if no reference is made to the specific social configuration the nation-state is integrating".[82] Making these arguments more specific, he goes on to suggest something inconceivable in big states where the neoliberal ideas originated. As it is written, "the concept of limited autonomy in the decision making process when political and strategic objectives are formulated, ... does not mean setting these objectives externally. Precisely, it means the political 'internalization' of the limits, limitations and barriers imposed by the international system in the decision making process".[83] The implications are more than obvious. These arguments were supported by former minister of Foreign Affairs Papakostantinou who presented the book at its launching, when he said that they should become 'Greece's national anthem'. This line of argumentation is actually proposing the commitment of an act of self-abnegation/self-deprecation leading to 'Finlandization' for a forthcoming imaginary international order in the context of which nation-states are expendable. Even more importantly, it is supported that, not only small states could not resist this inescapable reality, but also that, they should internalize the constraints imposed by this reality. In other words, the organic structure of small states should be adapted to the prevailing structure of the balance of power at the world level, be it military power, financial power or trading capabilities of big governmental or non governmental actors. The ideological underpinnings of these views, by and large dominant in Greece, become more than obvious when the author compares the — basically involuntary and forced through threats — limited autonomy/sovereignty of Finland with neoliberal arguments as regards an interdependent and increasingly integrated world. As he put it, "an extreme example of committed national action has always been the case of formally sovereign Finland (the term 'Finlandization' is essentially synonymous to limited sovereignty)".[84] In other words, subordination and submission to power is envisaged by Greek intellectuals as the inevitable fate of small states in the face of

integration, interdependence and complex governmental or non-governmental interactions.[85] No neoliberal analyst has pushed the argument to its logical conclusion as Panayiotis Yennimatas does, or, at least, not as explicitly. The fact that it is so explicitly stated in Greece and that the former foreign minister this argument as 'Greece's national anthem', is a strong indication of the state of IR analysis in Greece.

This intellectual unrest, preponderant in modern Greek politics, could only influence the political discourse. Kostas Simitis, for example, the professor and PASOK leader who succeeded Andreas Papandreou as Greek prime minister in 1996, did not elaborate on such crucial issues as social and political control. However in a 1995 interview he observed that, "the socialists, in order to fulfill their political objectives, are obliged to shape policies of supranational character. The historic challenge for the left is to revert to internationalism".[86] Later on in the interview, Simitis supported the construction of a supranational structure in Europe, a kind of integration whose ideological roots may be traced to the writings of some radical political idealist of the 1940s and 1950s. Namely, he supported that "history, culture, political systems, language, are all elements which separate the people of Europe." The construction of political Europe[87] tramples on the history of the nation-state, entails the transfer of authorities, explicit and touchable, to a supranational centre. This move would directly concern the perceptions, values and habits, and political culture of the peoples of Europe.[88] In other words, the nation-state and its culture are expendable in the name of internationalist experiments in Europe. Certainly such a course has long since been abandoned. Few or none outside Greece would ever make such a daring statement, that is, that European integration should 'trample on' the cultures and history of the participating member states. Indicative of the preponderant internationalist ideological trends in Greece is the fact that they are explicitly stated at the highest political echelons.

Some Concluding Remarks

If the above sample of ideological and analytical trends in Greece were widespread, the policy relevant conclusions could be many. In the first place, the nature of the international system leaves no doubt: the only base for interstate interaction is national interest.[89] Still, as already mentioned, the Greek attachment to national interest is considered 'ultranationalism'. Both liberal and Marxist internationalist attitudes, predominant in the country's political life, are considered by Greek conventional wisdom as 'peace loving' attitudes, 'progressive' ideology and 'proper' behavior in international relations. Such attitudes, according to these dominant views, are in harmony with global trends. Greece, therefore, should swiftly adapt

and pass by short term losses. The endorsement of this logic basically calls for the partial abandonment of national interests, encompasses vital interest and even Greece's survival interest; in other words, territory and sovereignty, part of which - contrary to international law and Treaties - are claimed by countries such as Turkey and FYROM. Certainly, a non-revisionist state such as Greece has strong interest to plea for the implementation of existing international law. However, international law is neither all-encompassing nor automatic in its application.[90] Furthermore, while some positive results may be expected on straightforward cases, when other states' interest differ from Greece's, as past experience shows[91], such institutions will either turn a blind eye or give arbitrary interpretations which serve their countries' national interest. Illusions for the existence of an internationalist new order, in the context of which, solidarity is forthcoming in case of danger may prove extremely dangerous for the security of any one state. Of course for Greece, the threat posed by a militarily powerful revisionist state encompasses the survival interest as well.

This is not the place to suggest strategies[92] for a small state such as Greece which faces a military threat. Nonetheless, it could be pointed out that, when faced with an external threat, a nation may resort to a number of auxiliary approaches which may or may not strengthen deterrence against the aggressor. However, attention should be focused on external and internal balancing. Such a policy encompasses the following:

1) a prohibitive military deterrence against military threats;
2) a persistent diplomatic cost;
3) psychological cost through manipulation of deterring threats;
4) the development, beyond traditional Greek alliances, of robust alliances or other arrangements with the 'enemies of the enemy';
5) secret operations which weaken the enemy and provide valuable information about his capabilities and weaknesses, and
6) resistance to pressures to legitimize - politically or otherwise - claims against Greek territory.

Last but not least, any strategy should be founded on robust and infallible national morale, an inflexible refusal to negotiate on matters of sovereignty, and extreme caution to neoliberal or other internationalist intellectual exercises about the anachronism of nation-states, structures, cultures and national interests. Whatever happens in the long run, in the foreseeable and ongoing perennial process between the strong and the weak, between the deterred and the deterrees, between the one in favor of the *status quo* and the revisionist state, sovereignty would be the basic instrument to safeguard one's interests. In other words, there is no conceivable cause or reason establishing a rational which may consider the nation-state and its interests dispensable or expendable.

Though a difficult task, this article has hopefully provided enough evidence to show that this is not the preponderant view in Greece. In case of different opinions about the crucial issues briefly examined above, any query or comment will be promptly answered with further evidence and detailed analysis on views and trends.[93] As in any other country, the predominant political philosophy of international relations determines the life and soul of Greece's foreign policy. We should, therefore, have a clear mind as to which philosophy dominates Greek thinking and what is at stake.

NOTES

1. The two most important security issues, by and large unchanged despite the termination of the cold war, are, first, the Turkish threat and second, instability as well as revisionism in the Balkans. From another perspective, Greek-American relations have always been crucial for Greek security. For an analysis of Greek perceptions of the Turkish threat, see Athanasios Platias, "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence", in D. Constas / Ath. Platias, **The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s** (Macmillan, London, 1991). For an excellent analysis of the legal questions see Christos Rozakis, "An Analysis of the Legal Problems in Greek-Turkish Relations 1973 - 1988", **Yearbook 1989** (Eliamep, Athens, 1990). For analysis of both the Turkish threat as well as Balkan balances in the context of the post-cold war era, see D. Constas, "Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy: Domestic and External Parameters", in D. Constas / Th.Stavrou (eds) **Greece Prepares for the Twenty First Century** (The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Wash. DC, 1995). Athanasios Platias, convincingly argues that the perception that Turkey follows a revisionist strategy cuts across party lines (pp 92 - 95). Dimitris Constas concludes that "the difficult, potentially contradictory tasks, set by new conditions in Western Europe and the Balkans, require a clear cognition of the challenges involved and the political determination necessary to meet them effectively" (p. 93).

2. For introductory analysis on the issue of the Greek deterrence strategy see (in Greek) Pan. Ifestos / Ath. Platias, **Greece's Deterrence Strategy** (Elliniki Apotreptiki Stratiyiki) (Papazisis, Athina, 1992). (Also Ath. Platias, "Greek Deterrence Strategy" in **Etudes helléniques/Hellenics Studies**, vol. 4, no 2 (1996) pp. 33-54).

3. By this I refer to the question of "anarchy" in the international system.

4. This is the dominant view in the political comments of some influential Sunday newspapers. In the context of the "new international order", it is often supported, emphasis should not be on deterrence but on appeasement and disarmament. This stand, implicitly or explicitly, relates to attitudes which underestimate or deny the existence of a Turkish threat.

5. For example, General De Gaulle, despite strong domestic and external opposition accelerated the French nuclear program. The General correctly sensed that, in the years ahead, nuclear power was crucial in its endeavor for international status,

national independence and national security.
Similarly, President Mittterand surprised many of his followers when he gave the strongest possible support to the double track decision of 1979 to install the euromissiles. His decision was based on the correct assumption that the correlation of forces played distributive role in international power relations. Stronger forces between France and the adversary, supported, was a strengthening element in France's guest for national independence and diplomatic autonomy. Power disequilibrium, for Mitterand, like for many other western leaders at the time, was the prelude for political disequilibrium and surrender to the political will of the adversary.

6. The existence of these three traditions are well known by anyone living in Greece. No scholarly analysis was found which specifically examines the influence of these internationalist ideas on Greek diplomacy since independence.

7. For corresponding traditions at the world level analyzed from the perspective of culture and international political economy, see Wallerstein Immanuel, **Geopolitics and Geoculture, Essays on the Changing World System** (Cambridge University press, 1991), esp. pp 1-15. Wallerstein refers to three leading ideologies at the world level: conservatism, liberalism and socialism, emanating from Wilsonian and Leninist eschatologies.

8. Scholarly analysis on the ideological component of Greek foreign policy is scarce. For some elements of traditional trends see (in Greek) Dimitris Constas, "The Objectives of Greek Foreign Policy": 1974 - 1986, in D. Constas/Ch. Tsardanidis (eds), **Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy** (Sakkoulas, Athens, 1988).

9. See below.

10. The period during which Eleptherios Venizelos governed Greece is possibly an exception to the rule. It should be also noted, of course, that, both with regard to foreign strategy and domestic policies, Venizelos changed attitudes and orientation during his last tenure of office.

11. Pax Romana prevailed over many centuries, Pax Sovietica for almost eighty years and Hitler's "new order" for only some years.

12. Turning the "principle" into a "rule of law" at the international level means 1) no revisionism, 2) respect of other states' territorial integrity, 3) respect of the right of every independent society to exercise self-determination and definition of the form and character of its normative structures.

13. As it was noted by Immannuel Wallerstein, "in the two parallel contradictions - tendency to one world vs. tendency to distinctive nation-states and tendency to one nation state vs. tendency to distinctive ethic groups within each state - it has been the states which have had the upper hand in both contradictions". He also notes that, "the history of the world has been the very opposite of a trend towards cultural homogenization; it has rather been a trend towards cultural differentiation". See Immanuel Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, pp 189 & 192.

14. The term "normative structures", basically, refers to the norms, values and institutions. Professor Alfred Rubin of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,

considers the following as important "normative orders": Divine law, natural law, customary law, values\morality, legal orders based on positive law and comity. See his paper, "Conflict Resolution", presented to the summer educational seminar of the Institute of International Relations of Panteion University, in Corfu, Greece (August 1997). See also Alfred Rubin, **Ethics and Authority in International Law** (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997). If I may add a comment regarding the two just quoted texts, unlike some other authors originated in big states, I appreciated the objectiveness and concrete approach of Alfred Rubin in analyzing the complex political, moral and legal questions involved in "international intervention" and in other acts over and above state sovereignty.

15. Carr H. Edward, **The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919 - 1939, An Introduction to the Study of International Relations** (Macmillan, St. Martin' s Press, London, 1940), p. 28.

16. For important works analyzing these phenomena, see Keohane Robert and Nye Joseph (ed.), **Transnational Relations and World Politics** (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge Ma., 1973). Keohane Robert and Nye Joseph, **Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition** (Little Brown, Boston, 1977). Keohane Robert, **After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy** (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1984). Rosenau James, **International Politics and Foreign Policy** (The Free Press, NY, 1969) .Rosenau James, **The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy** (Frances Pinter, Nichols, London & New York, 1980)

17. It is obvious that in the latter case, it is more appropriate to speak not of interdependence or penetration but of dependence, infiltration and corrosion.

18. This is so because it provides criteria on the basis of which interactions take place. It also makes it possible to anticipate the evolution of bilateral or muldilateral relations thus facilitating planning and the search for cooperative approaches. Regarding the latter aspect, needless to state the obvious, that is, the fact that national interests are not always incompatible and conflictual. For classical analysis upholding the argument that the national is the correct basis for international interaction, see Morgenthau Hans, **In Defence of National Interest** (A. Knopf, NY, 1951). Morgenthau wrote this book in the 1940s in order to support the view that the new interventionist strategies of the United States should refer to national interest and not to vague internationalist values. Half a century later, we could hardly find a single interventionist policy (Vietnam, the Gulf, Haiti, Bosnia), not justified in terms of "America's strategic interests".

19. As regards the latter aspect, see the classical argument in the analysis of Waltz Kenneth, **Theory of International Politics** (Addison - Wesley, 1979).

20. For analysis of this point, see (in Greek) Athanasios Platias, **To Neo Diethnes Perivallon** (Papazisis, Athina, 1996), ch. 2, esp. note 47, p. 51.

21. This may refer not just to states as actors but also to other factors directly or indirectly linked to the states.

22. Such relationships involve not only hierarchical dominance and superior/subordinate interactions but also unequal cost/benefit equations among the parties involved. For discussion of this issues and varying views, see R. Keohane & J. Nye,

Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1977), esp. ch. 3. Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", **International Organization**, vol. 36, no 2, 1982. R. W. Cox, "Labor and Hegemony: A reply", **International Organization**, vol. 34, no 1, 1980. Philip Acton, "Regimes and Hegemony", **Paradigms**, vol. 3, no 1.

23. Cosmopolitanism as I use it, refers to various proposals or ideas which propose regulation of the system in ways which overcome state sovereignty and individual societal particularities.

24. I suggest the following books: Carr E. H., **The Twenty Years Crisis**, *op. cit.* Carr E.H. **International Relations Between the Two World Wars 1919 - 1939** (The Macmillan Press LTD, London, 1947). Osgood Robert, **Ideals and Self - Interest in Americas Foreign Policy** (Univ. of Chicago press, Chicago, 1953). Lafeber Walter, **The American Age** (W. W. Norton & co, NY, 1989). See also my book (in Greek) **American Foreign Policy, From "Idealist Innocence" to "National Destiny"**(Odysseas, Athens, 1994), vol. I.

25. Carr E. H., **The Twenty Year Crisis**, *op. cit.*, p.109

26. **Ibid**, p. 110.

27. Thucydides, **History of the Peloponnesian War** (Penguin books, NY, 1982)

28. Keohane Robert, **Hobbes Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society** (Harvard University, working paper series, paper no 93 - 3, pp. 3, 4, 27. Citation from p. 27)

29. Answering this question is probably the most crucial question for the diplomacy of all states, especially when facing military threat. This is so because, depending on the answer, the governments measure the "proportions" of the "components" of national strategy: Resort to international organizations? Military deterrence? Threats? External balancing? Internal balancing?, or, what mixture of these factors?

30. Much less so of a binding normative structure, given the absence of a societal corpus at the world level.

31. Seyom Brown remarks that, "there is no centralized international mechanism for the enforcement of state - to state treaty obligations". See **International Relations in a Changing Global System**, opus cite, p. 19. See also E.H. Carr, **The Twenty Year Crisis**, ch. 11.

32.See the excellent book of Martin Wight (introduction by Hedley Bull), **International Theory, the Three Traditions** (Leicester University Press, Leicester, London, 1991).

33. This aspect is overlooked even by integration theory. Societal integration received little scholarly attention. For a good approach of this issue see Smith Anthony, "National Identity and the idea of European Unity", **International Affairs**, vol. 68, no 1, 1992. We could also refer to Bull Hedley, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, no 1-2, September/December 1982.

34. It is ironic that, though many writings supported ambitious schemes for

supranational structures, the single most important issue related to existing international law, that is, the question as to how the United Nations could become more effective and less hegemonic, received little, if any attention.

35. To my view, the debate reached its climax in the writings of some "younger" IR specialists during the first half of the 1990s. A part of this debate can be found in the "Merasheimer versus Keohane, Kupchan, Merle, et. al.", in **International Security** from 1989 to 1997. See also, Krasner Stephen, "Compromising Westphalia", **International Security**, vol. 20, no 3, Winter 1995 - 96.

36. I need not go into details to explain that, as already remarked, many proposals are a far cry of idealistic schemes. In the writings of such prominent authors as Keohane, Kupchan and others, the rational is based on "power relations", "concerts of power", etc. See especially Kupchan Charles & Kupchan Clifford, **Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe**, cit. Ruggie j. Gerald, "The False Promise of Realism", **International Security**, vol. 20, no 1, Summer 1995. Keohane Robert, **The Promise of Institutionalist Theory**, *op. cit.*

37. 1) Nothing guarantees the perpetual absence of conflict of interest among the dominant powers. 2) Concerts of hegemonic powers may have operated relatively smoothly in earlier times but it is not certain it could be repeated in a world of 200 states striving for autonomy and independence. 3) Mass communications and domestic opinion in hegemonic states (as Vietnam, Afghanistan, Somalia and Tchetchenia have shown) do not allow sustainable interventions against other societies. 4) Given its slim moral grounds, its viability and sustainability would be always in question.

38. See the classical analysis of Bull Hedley, **The Anarchical Society** (Columbia Univ. Press, NY, 1977), p. 85.

39. Bull Hedley, *op. cit.*, p. 85 & 86.

40. E. Carr, **The Twenty year Crisis**, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

41. **Ibid**, p. 109.

42. **Ibid**, p. 111.

43. *op. cit.*

44. *op. cit.*, esp. ch. 4.

45. See Kennan George, **American Diplomacy, 1900 - 1950** (The University Of Chicago Press, 1951), esp. pp 95 - 96.

46. Who could confidently determine "wrong"and "right" as regards Palestinian and Israeli land disputes or the differences among Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo?

47. The best example of this fact, and probably the best case for students of international relations, is the Cyprus conflict and the "mediation" of the UN since the invasion of Turkey in 1974. Contrary to the Chapter of the United Nations, and even the early decisions of the Security Council, successive General Secretaries summit proposals leading headfastly to the adaptation of the weak side to the faits accomplis of the use of force.

48. As noted earlier, even University professors claim that national interests and national issues are an anachronism and a "caprice" to be observed only in Greece. It is remarkable that such views could be spelled or written publicly without, as regards their factual and theoretical base, being checked by other professors or intellectuals. For the underlying reasons of this fact see my views in **I meleti ton Diethnon Skeseon stin Ellada kai i Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki**, Epetirida Institoutou Diethnon Skeseon tou Panteio Panepistimiou (Sideris, Athina, 1996). Also, Dimitris Constas (in Greek), **Exoteriki Politiki kai Diethnes Dikaio. To Vima**, 28.8.1995. Dimitris Constas, pointing at the legalistic approach preponderant among Greek IR specialists, observes that, it is inconclusive and counterproductive if, as it happens in Greece, one overlooks state power and its priorities and upgrades institutional and environmental factors as the quintessence of international relations.

49. This is evident in almost every single statement of political leaders across Greece's political spectrum. The references made in this spirit, occasionally, give the impression of a divine attachment to the "international law" and "international legality" as if they are positive law differing little from the corresponding laws of the intrastate order.
They are also extremely skeptical about the role of the nation-state in the supposedly integrated "world system". See, for example, the statements of the Greek Prime Minister after the Imia crisis between Greece and Turkey in January 1996, when he referred to the "unbeatable/invincible legal weapons of Greece" ("aitita nomika opla tis Elladas").

50. The few lines which follow tentatively refer to indicative and commonly known ideological trends in Greek intellectual and political discourse. The fact that a detail scholarly study on the role of ideology on Greek diplomacy is not available is both an anomaly and a challenge for further study on the role of intellectuals and the predominant political philosophy of international relations among Greek politicians.

51. Similar views to the ones to be quoted below, dominate the discussion on international relations in Greek media.

52. See "I analysi ton Diethnon Skeseon stin Ellada", **op. cit.**

53. As already noted, scholarly analysis as regards the impact of ideology on Greek diplomacy is rare or inexistent. For general analysis from which one may draw some conclusions, see (in Greek), Michalis Charalampidis, **Prolehthenta, Koinonia-Kyvernisi-Aristera** (Gordios, Athina, 1994) , esp. ch. 3 - 9 which refer to ideological issues relevant to foreign policy. Also, Meleti Meletopoulou, **H Ideoloyia tou Dexiou Kratous** (Papazisi, Athina, 1993). Also, Yiorgou Karampelia, **Sta Monopatia tis Outopias** (Nea Synora - Livanhs). Also, Michalis Charalampidis, **Ethnika Zitimata** (Irodotos, Athina, 1990).

54. It should be noted that some confusion is not excluded. Politicians and intellectuals such as Stephanos Manos, appear publicly to adopt "liberal" positions as regards the management of Greece' s national economy. However, it seems as if the corresponding positions concerning international relations may escape their attention. This is not the case of Andreas Andrianopoulos who attributes globalizing "forces" a dimension of fetishism unrelated to actual interstate practice. See his

book (in Greek), **Dimokratikos Kapitalismos kai Koinonia tis Gnosis** (Libro, Athens, 1997). The "confusion" is also apparent in everyday political intercourse. During the pre-election campaign of 1996, for example, the leader of the conservative party Miltiadis Evert reproached Kostas Simitis that he is "neoliberal". As regards foreign policy, this argument seems to be accurate (see below).

55. For further positions of neoliberals see the analysis of part II above, esp. Keohane and Kupchan / Kupchan. For an outline of the neoliberal argument and critical analysis, see Grieco Joseph, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", **International Organization**, vol. 42, no 3, summer 1988, esp. pp 489 - 492. Also, Mearsheimer John, "Back to the Future", **International Security**, vol 15, no 1 Summer 1990, esp. pp 42 - 51.

56. One need not to mention that, in the political discourse in hegemonic states, when these arguments are borrowed, we could observe tactics of double standards and abuse of concepts and "universal ideals". The term democracy, for example, is defined by the dominant power, irrespective of particularities, cultures and other "local" factors and with different applications when it refers to an ally or to an adversary.

57. Supranationalism, the only really touchable phenomenon underpinning neoliberal theories, is a far reaching endeavor whose success in Europe is not confirmed. As Haas defined integration, it is "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national setting are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-–existing ones". Haas Ernst, **The Uniting of Europe** (Stanford Un. Press,1958), p.16.

58. See, for example, Axelrod Robert, **The Evolution of Cooperation** (Basic books, NY, 1984). Also, Keohane, **After Hegemony**, cit., esp. p. 9 & 26, & 245 - 6, where he acknowledges the validity of the realist insights on the role of power and the effects of hegemony.

59. Keohane Robert and Nye Joseph, **Power and interdependence**, (Little Brown, Boston, 1977), p. 35.

60. Keohane R., **After Hegemony**, p. 246. This apostrophe, that is, "in their own interests", could be easily translated into a political attitude of hegemonic powers outwardly dictating other nations as to what their interest is about. In the context of the Greek-Turkish conflict, there is abundance of evidence for such attitudes. In Cyprus, Western diplomats, anxious to secure stability in Turkey, put enormous pressure on the Greek side to accept solutions which serve this purpose (for hegemonic stability). Moreover, in the context of the same logic, American and Western leaders exert tremendous pressure on the Greek political leadership to have a dialogue with Turkey and help Ankara' s European objectives, because this is also, as they - arbitrarily define it - "in the interest of Greece". In Greece, this logic, finds many, who, consciously or unknowingly, without any substantial argument go along this "external definition" of Greece's national interests". Michalis Moronis, a leading columnist in **Eleftherotypia** most often writes in favor of a rapprochement with Turkey. The logic of this rapprochement, is explained in

terms of the supposedly irresistible strategic purpose of the United States which Greece could not but follow in a damage limitation approach which demands leaving off tactics aiming at Turkey' s isolation (which counter western strategies to upgrade Turkey's regional role). As he put it, "the dilemma for Greece is apparent. What to do? To follow the strong allies and partners, by accepting an arrangement as regards the Greek-Turkish issue and the Cyprus problem". See his article in **Eleftherotypia**, 11.3.1997. In another occasion and in the same logic, Moronis wrote that Greeks should accept (and even promote), *inter alia*, the establishment of two states in Cyprus (this is precisely the objective of Ankara' s strategy for over many decades). In another article, in much revealing apostrophe showing the underlying philosophy, he argues, that the only chance to survive in Greece if "do not follow policies which counter the established opinions, perceptions and dominant thinking ... we must prove our ability to act in a spirit of appeasement and stability" (**Eleftherotypia**, 16.10.1995). The same or similar views are also very often expressed by journalists who dominate Greek media such as Richardos Someritis, G. Pretenteris, diplomats such as Theodoropoulos / Lagacos / Papoulias / Tsounis (see their small book **Skepseis kai Provlimatismoi**, Sideris, Athina, 1995, p.81) and academics such as D. K. Psychogios and Nicos Mouzelis (see below).

61. Keohane R., **ibid.**

62. This is an issue which could not be analyzed here. It deserves another study, probably a content analysis of speeches and writings of Greek intellectuals and Greek politicians. Such an analysis not only could provide evidence that neoliberalism is massively reproduced in Greece, but also that this is done in an exaggerated manner which causes distortions of the original - admittedly subtly defined - concepts.

63. Vindication of this point would be easier if an official report by the Department of State and other services inform us on the money spent by USA officials and other agents during the last seven years in order to promote contacts of intellectuals, bilateral meetings of business people, seminars, concerts, confidence building measures and other related activities of "rapprochement" between Greece and Turkey. The expediency for such activities is self-evident in terms of American strategy (though this may fluctuate or be severely questioned domestically in Washington) but this is not the case as regards Greece's national interest. Notwithstanding the Turkish threat, most Greeks consider these activities as attempts to hide the substance of the Greek - Turkish conflict behind procedural or insignificant matters until the next phase of Turkish aggression takes place. Suffice to mention that resistance to confidence building measures on these grounds have been rejected by all political parties and governments the last quarter of a century. Nonetheless, American agents (diplomats, as well as other "agents") in Athens, never ceased to attempt recruitment of Greek intellectuals in this line of thought and action. The writer of this paper received tenths of invitations in his capacity of professor (all rejected) and I have personal knowledge of tenths of others who accepted this American -basically neoliberal- approach.

64. "Globalism as an Ideological Construction", **To Vima** 15.3.1997 (in Greek).

65. See (in Greek) "Oikoumenismos - Sxetikismos: Proÿpotheseis tis Anoxis stin

Maziki Dimokratia", **I Kathemirini**,14.7.1996.

66. See (in Greek), Thanos Veremis - Th. Couloumbis, **Greek Foreign Policy Prospects and Questions (Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki Prooptikes kai Provlimatismoi)** (Sideris, Athens, 1994).

67. **To Vima**, 26.2.1995. Reportedly, Nicos Mouzelis is a close political friend and occasional adviser to Prime Minister Costas Simitis, the internationalist minded politician who took office in January 1996 as Andreas Papandreou's successor.

68. Irrespective to other reservations relating to the different character of these conflicts if compared to the Greek - Turkish conflict and the Cyprus question, we all know that these agreements proved to be a total failure. For a critique of this view see (in Greek) P. Ifestos, "Greeks: "Idiots and Isolated?"", **Eleftherotypia**, 16.3.1997.

69. See my earlier made observation regarding American pressures to accept Turkey's hegemonic role in the region.

70. This extraordinary argument is fully in line with neoliberal views in IR theory. The crux of neoliberal argumentation as regards the prospective structure of the international system is that 1) the "market" (political and economic) will regulate the system and the international institutions should reflect this reality, 2) hegemony may flourish but it should be tolerated because it could be "temporary", and 3) at both the world and the regional/subregional levels, arrangements which are beneficial for the national interests of one country at the expense of the national interests of another could be imposed by "concerts of power" for the sake of stability (i.e. hegemonic stability). If the above profoundly neoliberal views of Nicos Mouzelis, written in 1995, are compared with the views of the same author in 1997 (**To Vima**, 2.11.1997), the storm in the brain of Greek internationalists is fully displayed. Namely, portraying a "progressist" image to the Greek public, the author, who I presume is not aware of the relevant debate in IR theory, *inter alia*, attacks neoliberalism. The profound contradiction lies in the fact that, whilst the only effective means to resist the erosion, corruption and hegemonism caused by unregulated "globalization" is to reinforce the nation-state, its sovereignty and interstate parity, the most salient characteristic of Greek internationalist intellectual take up is to challenge the logic of the nation-state's relevance in the "age of modernity".

71. I write these lines few months after the major diplomatic move made by Greece in spring 1997, when its government adopted proposals such as the ones suggested by the distinguished authors. The "Madrid declaration", is considered by many in Greece as a classical appeasement stand. However, not only Turkish attitudes did not shift to moderation, but threats of war increased. Moreover, following a meeting in the "spirit of Madrid" in New-York on September 26, 1997 between the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers, the climate seem to have changed dramatically. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that, one could not possibly discuss with "murderers, extorters and bandits". He also compared Turkey' s policies with Hitler's expansionism. See the Greek press from 27 to 28 September, 1997. For the latter point see **I Kathimerini**, 28.9.1997.

72. In an interview before he took office, Prime Minister Costas Simitis, declared

that in critical moments, if he wishes to have an opinion from two or three persons, one of them is Kostantinos Tsoukalas.

73. **To Vima**, 23.10.1990.

74. **Ibid**. The last phrase in Greek reads as follows: "... themelionetai ston katakermatismo tou apodynamomenou politikou kai tin katischysi tou yperethnikou kefalaiou, prepei na mporei na dikaionetai ".

75. **Ibid**

76. **To Vima**, 7.9.1997.

77. This is no surprise. Modern Greeks, of both marxist and liberal traditions grew up in an intellectual environment which either show dependency as fetish or international political integration as inevitable.

78. It goes without saying that underestimating the national dimension and the "local" cultural dimension after what happens on Eurasia, shows, *naiveté*, to say the least.

79. See the indicative references made above to some views of representative authors such as M. Moronis, D. Phychogios and N. Mouzelis, R. Someritis, and Y. Pretenteris. For some of these views, see above, esp. note 66.

80. **The Problem of National Strategy** (Ellinika Grammata, Athens, 1997). One may consider the comments which follow on Yennimatas book as critical. Upon reflection, however, this may not be so. One may disagree with the philosophical content of his views but no one could possibly deny, both the honesty with which they are formulated and their value in determining underlying intellectual trends in Greece. The author, frankly, honestly and with clarity, makes explicit what other Greek analysts are either not capable of doing or intentionally they hide behind half truths. That is, that, what they see as "emerging orders" renders the nation state expendable or dispensable for the cause of inescapable global integration. Furthermore, the view of Yennimatas to be quoted below supporting the "internalization" of constraints in small states' decision making structures, by all means a controversial as well as novel suggestion, is again what everyone else want to say but is either "shy" or unable to do so. Last but not least, the views of a distinguished economist are valuable in the sense that they reveal deeper thoughts and images of officials in financial and economic centers. The same or similar views are expressed if one interviews - as I did lately - individuals originating in small states and serving international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. In this respect, it is highly interesting to note, first, that, there is almost total absence as regards the political and social control of such processes, and second, that, even for the European Union to which the author often refers, questions of morality, values, political control etc. (until Political Union is accomplished) are not part of the speculation as regards present and future implications.

81. **Ibid**, p. 29.

82. **Ibid**, p. 35.

83. **Ibid** p. 37.

84. **Ibid**, p. 29.

85. Successive conservative governments after the end of the civil war followed the "doctrine of dependency". The architect of this stand which influenced Greek diplomatic thinking was late Panayiotis Pipinellis, Foreign Minister of successive Greek governments. The culture generated by this thinking revived in the 1990s in many other political sectors. For the views of Panayiotis Pipinellis, see his book (in Greek) ... **Istoria tis Ellinikis Exoterikis Politikis tis Elladas 1923 - 1941** (Saliverou, Athina, 1948). It is maybe worth noting that, there is a qualitative difference between P. Pipinellis and analogous Greek attitudes at the dawn of 2000. The Foreign Minister, in the aftermath of world war two, basically called for submission and subordination in order to preserve and protect sovereignty and territorial integrity and not in order to lose it for ever. For analysis of the issue of "dependency attitudes", see (in Greek), P.Ifaistos, **I Exoelliniki Nootropia kai ta Aitia tis, To Zitima tou Diethnismou, Patriotismou, Ethnikismou kai i Ethniki Stratiyiki tis Elladas** (Poiotita, Athina, 1977).

86. **Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia**, 12 / 3 / 1995.

87. Here, precisely, we can observe a typical representative opinion of Greek internationalist to be found in almost nowhere else in Europe. Fifty years after the first steps in integration, everyone else in Europe sees the European venture as an opportunity to strengthen their language, their culture and all other national factors. In Greece, Europeanism is synonymous to gradual "dispersion" of the Greek nation into an imaginary internationalist "guinea pig". No need to observe that, any attempt to resist these obsolete dogmas lead to accusations of anti-Europeanism and hypernationalism.

88. **Ibid.**

89. It is inconceivable that a political leader of any state, who gives oath to serve national interests, to think and act in internationalist terms. This is a contradiction in terms. Internationalism, in fact, is the opposite of national interest.

90. This paper did not touch upon another major issue, which is the legalistic approach on issues of major importance as regards national strategy. This question deserves another study.

91. See for example the shift of attitudes as regards the Macedonian question during the cold war and recent positions taken by the United States and other western states. The same applies to the Greek-Turkish conflict and the Cyprus problem.

92. The author has done so in other publications, some of them quoted above. See **Greek Deterrence Strategy**, *op. cit.*, part II. Also, P. Ifaistos, **I Exoelliniki Nootropia kai ta Aitia tis**, *op. cit.*

Post-1974 Greek Foreign Policy

Thanos Veremis*

RÉSUMÉ

La politique extérieure grecque après la chute du régime militaire peut être divisée en deux périodes: avant et après la défaite du communisme en Europe orientale et en Union Soviétique. Tant Karamanlis que Papandreou représentent la desaffiliation de l'identification de la Grèce d'après-guerre avec les politiques et les institutions de l'ouest. Karamanlis a initié un processus de multilatéralisme dans les Balkans communistes, alors que Papandreou a poursuivi des affiliations tiers-mondistes durant son premier mandat au pouvoir. Des relations plus étroites avec les pays de l'Union européenne ont obligé Papandreou à effectuer un virage complet de sa politique occidentale. Cependant l'échec de l'Union européenne à présenter un front uni face à la crise yougoslave, ainsi qu'à développer une politique étrangère et de sécurité a influencé le virage vers les États-Unis. Les relations de la Grèce avec ses voisins des Balkans se sont améliorées après une période de tension avec le FYROM et l'Albanie, mais la Turquie demeure la préoccupation de sécurité la plus urgente pour le gouvernement grec.

ABSTRACT

Greek foreign policy after the fall of the military regime can be classified within two periods, before and after the demise of communism in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Both Karamanlis and Papandreou represent a departure from Greece's post-war identification with western policies and institutions. The former initiated a process of multilateralism in the communist Balkans and the latter pursued third world affiliations throughout his first term in power. Closer relations with the EU obliged Papandreou to make an about face turn in his policy *vis-à-vis* the West, but the European Union's failure to face the Yugoslav crisis in unison and develop a common foreign and security policy accounts for Greece's swing towards the US. Greece's relations with its Balkan neighbours improved after a period of tension with FYROM and Albania, but Turkey remains the most pressing security consideration of the Greek government.

The conditions under which Greece's Foreign Policy was conducted after 1974 can be roughly classified into two periods a) 1974-1989 and b) 1989 - present. During the first period the country's position in the southern flank of NATO gave it a vital role in the defense of Western Europe from Soviet threats. Greece's and Turkey's geostrategic importance was mutually reinforcing so that any disruption of their strategic continuum diminished their individual value to western security.[1]

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Greece's deviation from its western orientation after 1981 was waged with a war of words rather than deeds. US compliance, *vis-à-vis* the Greek military regime and its subsequent inaction during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, opened the door to Andreas Papandreou's criticism of the West and his third-world experiment.

With the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and its satellites, the geostrategic value of the states that constituted NATO's southern flank appeared to diminish. In this new security environment the US expressed its unwillingness to maintain naval, air-force and monitoring bases in Greece. Consequently, PASOK's platform against US military presence lost its meaning. It was therefore not long before the implications of global changes in South Eastern Europe became obvious. With Russia out of power-politics and the European Union unable to play a decisive role in the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, the US remained the only credible force that could stabilize the volatile region.[2]

Papandreou's series of *volte-face* turns began with his stance *vis-à-vis* the EC during the second half of 1988. In Greece's second term in the rotating EC presidency, he declared his unqualified support for European federalism. By doing so he was in fact committing Greece to an EC credo that challenged the traditional dependence of the economy on the Greek state and required a significant trimming of the public sector.

Relations with the European Union are not classified under "foreign policy" in Greece but belong to a special category with a profound input on domestic developments. The benefit of membership and the structures of convergence have gradually created a realignment of political forces beyond the traditional right-left divide. With the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and especially with the rise of technocrats in PASOK, the new "modernisers" and "traditionalists" have cut across the membership of both major parties in parliament. The new divide was nowhere more obvious than in the cross-party voting that contributed to Costas Simitis' victory in the 1996 elections.

Restoration of democracy in Greece was largely due to a dramatic external event. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus on 23 July 1974, triggered the disintegration of the military regime and led to the return of Karamanlis as Prime Minister. Only one day after the second Turkish offensive in Cyprus, Greece withdrew from the military structure of NATO in protest against the alliance's lack of active concern over the invasion. Another serious development was Turkish claims over a portion of the Aegean territorial waters, seabed and airspace, extending well to the west of the major east Aegean islands. This convinced the Greek public that Turkey

would attempt to realize these claims by using its powerful Aegean army. According to Greek government evaluations, Turkish diplomacy, skilfully diverted international attention from the maintenance of its forces on Cyprus to a 'composite of directly and indirectly related and mutually reinforcing issues' in the Aegean.[3] A broad consensus was thus formed among Greeks of all political tendencies that the immediate security threat was no longer directed from Greece's northern neighbors but from Turkey.[4] Karamanlis' government took immediate measures leading to the fortification and the militarisation of the east Aegean islands.

Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military structure was more of a trial separation than a divorce as the country remained in the political arm of the Alliance. Karamanlis repeatedly rejected the non-alignment option and after the normalization of the internal situation, expressed his willingness to reenter the military structure of NATO. The Greek reintegration attempts were vetoed by Turkey, which having raised a claim over the reallocation of the Athens FIR, was, in effect, also demanding a reallocation of the operational control zones of the Aegean airspace. According to pre-1974 arrangements, NATO had ceded the military responsibility over the Aegean airspace (Greek and international) as well as the Aegean Sea (Greek and international sea waters) to Greek command. Any other arrangement would result in a situation where Greek territories (eastern Aegean islands) would be placed under Turkish protection.[5]

Negotiations for the country's re-entry proved long and arduous. Three reintegration plans with settlement proposals by the Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe (SACEUR) General Haig (1978-1979) and a fourth one by his successor General Rogers (1980), were rejected. A solution was finally accepted in October 1980, with a provision allowing the reallocation question to be settled later within the Alliance.

Throughout his post-junta years as Prime Minister, Karamanlis accomplished the double feat of transforming himself into a liberal politician and emancipating his political camp from its past subservience towards the United States and NATO. No doubt it took a disaster of the Cypriot magnitude to shake up the Greek conservatives, (both in Greece and the United States) and an event of national significance to release their reaction against their traditional loyalties. Karamanlis, however, managed to temper such reactions into a constructive criticism of western insouciance that proved effective both through the American embargo of February 1975 - on weapons to Turkey - and the plethora of UN resolutions over Cyprus.[6]

Greece's role as an interlocutor among Balkan states suspicious of each other's motives, profited greatly from the July 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Helsinki final act. Although the spirit of Helsinki ultimately contributed to the erosion of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, in 1975 it appeared that the Communist *status quo* had been secured in exchange for "unenforceable promises on human rights".[7]

This allowed Communist Balkan leaders either to seek further emancipation from Soviet tutelage (Rumania) or to feel reassured that regional cooperation did not threaten their relations with Moscow (Bulgaria). In Helsinki, Karamanlis secured the agreement of Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for an interbalkan meeting at the level of Deputy Ministers of Coordination and Planning.[8] Of the three, Rumania was traditionally the most positive toward political multilateralism and Bulgaria, the least.

Reluctant to enter a multilateral relationship, even on a limited basis, Sofia attempted to dilute the Balkan initiative by including other East European states. A renewed effort by Karamanlis to make the Summit Meetings a recurring event, was politely rebuffed by Bulgaria, reflecting Soviet fears that institutionalized Balkan cooperation could affect the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. Belgrade took a middle position. Without discouraging multilateralism, Tito felt that it presupposed a settlement of differences between such states as Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria and Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania. Of the two remaining Balkan states, Albania was adamant in its opposition to multilateral arrangements and Turkey agreed to participate once the meeting was determined. The interbalkan conference of Deputy Ministers of Planning took place in Athens between 26 January and 5 February 1976, with the participation of all Balkan states, except Albania.

Bulgaria and the Soviet Union began to change their views on Balkan multilateralism in 1978. Karamanlis'1979 visit to Moscow was therefore perfectly timed for a significant Greek-Soviet rapprochement and the approval of a follow-up on Balkan multilateralism, although this process was confined to fields of technical cooperation. After securing Zhivkov's agreement, Karamanlis proposed to the other Balkan leaders a conference of experts on telecommunication and transportation. The conference took place in Ankara on 26-29 November 1979. The outcome of the second conference on interbalkan cooperation made it clear that political questions could not be dealt within a South Eastern Europe divided into blocs. Karamanlis nevertheless was not discouraged from his plan of approaching political cooperation indirectly, through confidence building in non-political fields.

Full membership in the European Community, concluded in May 1979 after tortuous negotiations, was the hallmark of Karamanlis dogged pursuit of an "organic Greek presence in the West". Yet the domestic debate on the merits and liabilities of membership between 1975-81 focused on the ideological and even security aspects of being part of the European Community "rather than on the practical decisions needed to absorb the shock of accession and transform the institutional and administrative system into flexible and effective instruments capable of responding to EU policy requirements". The road to a sober evaluation of Greek membership was still a long way ahead. In the meantime Greece would undergo a new ideological phase under the Panhellenic Socialist Movement's (PASOK) advent to power.

During Papandreou's first tenure as Prime Minister, Greece sought to pursue a more "independent" foreign policy. Certain aspects of PASOK's policy, however, were veritable exercises in irrelevance. At a time when the non-aligned movement was in general decline, Papandreou chose to establish ties with essentially anti-Western neutrals of northern Africa and the Middle East. When the Reagan-Gorbachev tug of war on disarmament was beginning to bear positive results, he joined the leaders of five other states (Mexico, Argentina, Sweden, India, and Tanzania) to promote world denuclearization and continued to press for nuclear-free zones in the Balkans. Finally, Papandreou's reluctance to join with the United States and Western Europe in condemning the Soviet Union on issues such as the introduction of martial law in Poland and the downing of the KAL airliner, won his government points with Moscow but created ill-will in Washington, whose support was far more important for Greek security.

Stripped of its declaratory aspects, however, PASOK's policy toward the West did not differ widely from that of many Community members. Soon after his advent to power in 1981, Papandreou quietly abandoned his threat to withdraw from NATO and to hold a plebiscite to decide Greece's membership in the EC. Furthermore, instead of closing the US bases in Greece, he signed a new defense cooperation agreement in 1983. This agreement maintained the bases for five more years, although publicly he sought to portray the move as the beginning of their removal. Without any visible benefit for Greece, Papandreou consciously tried to create the impression of being the maverick of the Western alliance. It has often been claimed that the electoral support which Papandreou derived from his much publicized rebellious image justified the damage it wrecked on Greece's position in the West. Of course the justification was on Papandreou's terms.

PASOK reflected a resurgent isolationism in certain segments of society that sought to protect themselves from Western competition and the dislocations of adjustment posed by closer integration with Europe. Based on a parochial sense of moral superiority but acknowledging the economic power and technology of the West, PASOK opted for the fantasy of the "third way."[9]

Both major parties, PASOK and New Democracy, shared similar perspectives regarding the problems between Greece and Turkey. Unlike former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, who had conducted bilateral discussions with Turkish officials without success, Papandreou had insisted from the outset that any discussion with Turkey would be tantamount to sacrificing Greek security. The Davos meeting between Papandreou and (then) Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in February 1988 therefore represented a significant deviation from PASOK's basic foreign policy stand. Almost a year earlier, a crisis caused by Turkey's decision to send a research vessel escorted by warships into the disputed continental shelf region - around the islands of Lesbos, Lemnos, Samothrace - had brought the two states close to an armed clash. The crisis was eventually defused, but it underscored the delicate state of relations between the two countries in the Aegean.

Furthermore, the enormous burden of defense spending on the Greek balance of payments and the long military service which detracted from the government's populist image, convinced Papandreou that he needed to reduce the prospect of a possible outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey. In the spring of 1988, however, Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz raised the question of the "Turkish" minority in Greek Thrace and dismissed any possibility of a Turkish military withdrawal from Cyprus before the two communities came to an agreement. Although some progress was made in developing a set of confidence-building measures regarding accident prevention in international waters of the Aegean, the "Davos spirit" gradually lost momentum and ground to a halt in 1989.

After winning the election of 1990, the New Democracy's main task was to curtail the huge internal and external deficits while improving Greece's image as a dependable member of the West. Both priorities were associated with Greece's two main foreign policy considerations: (1) the evolving shape of the European Community, that would determine Greece's economic future; and (2) the forms of Western collective defense cooperation which would assure its security.

Greece, along with other southern EC members, favored an acceleration of the Community's political union through a "deepening" of its institutions.[10] To the Greeks, broadening EU membership would blur the focus of the intergovernmental conference on political union and possibly diminish the prospects for economic and monetary union. In the field of security, Greek policymakers favored the absorption of the WEU by the EU over the long run.

The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, adopted in December 1991, was greeted with satisfaction in Athens and was ratified in the Greek parliament with the support of all parties except the Greek Communists. At Maastricht, Greece was also invited to become a member of the WEU. However, the EC's decision that Article 5 of the modified Treaty of Brussels - which provides a security guarantee in case of attack on members - should not be applied between member-states of NATO and the WEU, caused considerable irritation in Athens and diminished the importance of WEU membership from Greece's point of view.

At the same time, the WEU's decision to invalidate Article 5 in case of Greek-Turkish conflict renewed Greek interest in the United States and NATO as the most credible deterrents against threats to Greece's security. Greece considered the CSCE to be a useful forum for problem-solving in such areas as arms control and monitoring of human rights violations, but an unwieldy mechanism for collective security.

Relations with the United States improved as a result of the defense cooperation agreement in July 1990, which would regulate the operation of American bases and installations on Greek soil for the next eight years. Greece's naval support for the allied cause during the Gulf War aided the positive climate in Greek-American relations and Mitsotakis was the first Greek Prime Minister to visit Washington since 1964. Stressing the necessity of decisively opposing invaders, Greece also made its airspace and bases available to the Western coalition's forces. The island of Crete, in particular, was an important launching pad for US operations in the Gulf.

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe was not greeted with enthusiasm by many Balkan states. Albania's Stalinist regime initially resisted change, despite the mass exodus of its people to Greece and Italy. Serbia considered communism as the only tissue binding its different ethnic groups together. Rumania's National Salvation Front, which won 66 percent of the popular vote in the May 1990 elections, included a number of high-ranking former Communist Party officials, including President Iliescu. Bulgaria's Socialist Party, which secured 47 percent of the vote in the June 1990 elections, was actually a modified version of the old ruling party.[11]

Given the rigid structures of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union's fear that institutionalized Balkan cooperation could diminish bloc cohesion, Greece traditionally placed strong emphasis on bilateralism in its relations with the Balkans states. The first attempts at multilateral cooperation initiated by Premier Karamanlis, involved meetings of Balkan experts on such subjects as transport, communications, energy and commerce, and left political issues aside. Papandreou broadened the agenda to include political subjects by reviving an old Rumanian proposal for a regional nuclear-weapon free zone.[12]

With the change in the policy initiated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the meeting of six Balkan foreign ministers in Belgrade in February 1988, dealing with confidence and security-building measures and minority questions, heralded a new period of inter-Balkan relations. Balkan foreign ministers met on several occasions since then to monitor progress on issues of common interest. The meeting of foreign ministers, held in Tirana during January 18-20, 1989, examined guidelines to govern relations between Balkan neighbors, while the meeting of experts in Bucharest, May 23-24, 1989, dealt with confidence and security-building measures.[13]

Greece's bilateral relations with Bulgaria were institutionalized with the signing of the "Declaration of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation" in September 1986. The gradual reduction of Soviet influence in the region contributed to Bulgaria's fear of isolation, while Greece wanted to secure its northern flank in case of conflict with Turkey.[14] The advent of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) to power, however, led to a shift in Bulgaria's policy toward Turkey. The October 1991 elections resulted in a narrow victory by the UDF over the Socialists and made the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the party representing the interests of the Turkish minority, the decisive factor in forming a government. This, along with US leverage over Bulgaria, increased Turkey's role in Bulgarian affairs.

The most sensitive issue between Greece and Bulgaria was the decision by the UDF government in January 1992 to recognize the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent state with the name "Macedonia." Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev made clear, however, that this recognition did not entail Bulgaria's recognition nor acceptance of the existence of a separate Macedonian nation. While the threat to Greek security posed by Skopje was negligible, the sensitivities of the inhabitants of Greek Macedonia to any challenge to their identity proved acute.

By August 1991 Yugoslavia had almost completely collapsed as an integral state. In the September 8, 1991, referendum in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Slavic majority voted overwhelmingly for independence, but the Albanian minority (26 percent of the total population) signaled its preference for becoming an autonomous republic, in April 1992. Greek public opinion only gradually became aware of the significance of these developments while Prime Minister Mitsotakis initially displayed flexibility on the question of the emerging state's name.[13] Greece's main concern was that the new state entity would not use the term "Macedonia" without signifying its geographic confines in order to exclude an implicit irredentist claim on its neighbors. Given the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's forty-five-year history of school indoctrination and maps that claim both Bulgarian and Greek Macedonia, the Greeks considered such qualifications to be essential. In an effort to block unqualified recognition of the Republic, Greek Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras recognized Slovenia and Croatia, on December 17, 1991, and adopted a common EC declaration establishing conditions for recognition, which included a ban on "territorial claims toward a neighboring Community State, hostile propaganda (and) the use of a denomination that implies territorial claims."[14]

Other Greek objections concerned the preamble of the Constitution to the founding manifesto of the People's Republic of Macedonia in 1944, which stressed "the demand to unite the whole of the Macedonian people around the claim for self-determination."In the meantime, the controversy over the terms of recognition hit the Greek media with full force. With a little help from both rightist and leftist politicians, public opinion was inflamed by fears that Skopje would monopolize the term "Macedonia." Although Mitsotakis privately adopted a moderate position, his precarious majority in parliament (two seats) reduced his room to maneuver. When he sacked Samaras and assumed the duties of foreign minister himself in April 1992, he was obliged by domestic pressure to maintain his predecessor's basic position. The subsequent saga of Greek foreign policy *vis-à-vis* FYROM has become a case study of how diplomacy fails when it is determined by domestic priorities. After many mishaps the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 signed by Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias, FYROM Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and Cyrus Vance (as a special envoy of the UN Secretary-General), although not a final agreement, cleared the way for a tacit relationship between the two states.

Ties between Greece and Albania were expanded through a cross-border trade agreement signed in April 1988. A year before, Greece renounced its old claims to southern Albania and terminated the state of war that had remained in force since World War II. After the thaw during the

Papandreou period, relations vacillated between carrot and stick politics. The fate of the Greek minority, which constituted the main obstacle in Greek-Albanian relations in the past, persisted as a contentious issue.[15]

The Albanian elections in March 1991 allowed the Socialists (formerly Communists) to retain power but the March 1992 elections gave the Democratic Party, headed by Sali Berisha, a clear mandate. The Greek minority was represented in the Albanian parliament by five deputies of the minority party "Omonia" in 1991, its deputies reduced to two in 1992 and its name changed under government pressure to "Union for Human Rights".

The deterioration of economic and social conditions in Albania have brought over three hundred thousand illegal immigrants to Greece. If this number is multiplied by five dependents on average that remained back home, it can be assumed that close to half of Albania's population is supported by the remittances of the illegal workers in Greece. In spite of this state of financial dependence, former President Berisha chose to strain relations in 1994 by imprisoning five members of the "Omonia" minority organization on shaky charges of conspiracy against the state. Although the "Omonia" group was granted amnesty through American intervention, mutual suspicions persisted.[16]

The May 1996 elections in Albania that gave Mr. Berisha's party 122 parliamentary seats and only 10 seats to the Socialists, provoked wide accusations of fraud confirmed by foreign observers. By 1997 the "Pyramides" scandal began to unfold leading the country into a major social upheaval. Shady financial companies promising investors interest that would double their capital, began to collapse depriving thousands from their hard-earned savings. Within months, Albania reverted to a state of anarchy as armed rebels captured villages and cities. When the government and the CSCE summoned foreign troops to maintain order, Greece was quick to take part in the operation. The elections of June 29 -July 6 1997 yielded 110 seats for the Socialists and their allies and 25 seats for the Democratic Party. Sali Berisha resigned from the Presidency and Fatos Nano became Prime Minister. The new government is faced with a collapsed economy and a breakdown in law and order but commands a two-thirds majority in parliament which allows it to validate a new constitution for Albania. Relations with Greece could not be more promising and the members of the new cabinet are hand-picked personalities from all the parties that coalesced with the Socialists.

With Rumania, Greece had no serious outstanding problems. Without common borders and old feuds to settle, the two states shared a cultural history that goes back to Ottoman times. After the overthrow of Ceausescu, Greece was one of the first states to aid Romania and continues to act as an intermediary between that state, the EU and NATO.

From the very beginning of the outbreak of the Yugoslavian crisis, Greece supported a form of confederation in Yugoslavia that would guarantee the rights of the country's constituent parts and prevent the subsequent strife that would destabilize the region. Drawing on its ties with Serbia, Greece tried on several occasions to act as a credible interlocutor between Serbia and the EU and sought to keep the lines of communication open. Greek mediation was instrumental in freeing Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic from Serbian captivity in Sarajevo during the spring of 1992 and in maintaining contact between Ibrahim Rugova (leader of the Albanian Kosovars) and the Serbian government in Belgrade throughout the latter part of 1992. In addition, Prime Minister Mitsotakis played a key role in brokering the Athens Agreement on Bosnia in May 1993.

The Bosnian settlement of November 21, 1995 in Dayton Ohio, may not have solved the question of Croat-Bosniac-Serb relations, but at least put a temporary stop to the bloody conflict among the three. The partial lifting of the embargo on Serbia and the prospects of reconstruction opened an entire vista of possibilities for Greek investment and commerce in the region.

Prompted by the precarious state of affairs in the Balkans, Prime Minister Mitsotakis sought to improve relations with Ankara throughout the winter of 1991-1992. His attempt to revive the Davos summit with Prime Minister Demirel and promote the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, failed to bear fruit because of the lack of progress on the Cyprus question. The reluctance of Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to reach an agreement with his counterpart George Vassiliou on the basis of UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "set of ideas" during meetings in New York in August and September 1992, suggested that the Turkish government was not prepared to make substantial concessions.

In March 1995, Greece raised its objections to Turkey's entry into the EU Customs Union agreement, with the understanding that the application of Cyprus for EU membership would be discussed after the intergovernmental meeting of 1997. Greece's move elicited no positive response from Ms. Tansu Ciller's government. A series of incidents between the two states that began in 1994 over Greece's right to extend its

territorial waters from six to twelve miles, reached a high point on 8 June 1995 when the Turkish parliament granted the government license to take whatever action necessary (including military) if Greece exercised its right (foreseen by the International Law of the Sea Convention) to extend its territorial waters.

In January 1996 a team of Turkish journalists removed a Greek flag from the barren islet of Imia that belongs to the Dodecanese complex and hoisted a Turkish one in its place. Greek soldiers replaced the Greek flag and the incident was deemed as innocuous by the Greek Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos until Tansu Ciller herself layed an official claim on the islet and began a confrontation that almost led to war. The crisis was defused through US mediation but another yet negative item was added to the overburdened agenda of Greek- Turkish problems.

The Erbakan-Ciller government of July 1996 was too preoccupied with western criticism and opposition from the Turkish military, to resume pressure against Greece in the Aegean. It was however debited with the murder of three unarmed Greek Cypriots in a series of events that brought the island into the headlines. The fall of the Erbakan-Ciller government, a year after its formation, allowed a new Greek-Turkish rapprochement to materialize, engineered by American Foreign Minister M. Albright at the Madrid Summit Meeting of NATO in July 1997. An agreement signed by Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Turkish President Demirel, provided that the two sides would desist from coercion and initiatives that would affect each other's vital interests and would respect the provisions of international treaties. Some commentators considered this an exchange of Greece's right to extend its territorial waters with Turkey's withdrawal of the *casus belli*.

The most important issue that continues to preoccupy Greece's foreign policy and security considerations since the demise of its military dictatorship, are relations with Turkey. Throughout the seventies and eighties, tensions revolved mainly around the continental shelf question which brought the two countries close to war in 1987. Subsequent efforts by its two prime ministers to discover a *modus vivendi* based on the peaceful resolution of differences, foundered in 1989 on the European Union's negative reply to the Turkish application for membership. Deprived from a vital incentive to pursue a Greco-Turkish detente, Ozal and his successors reverted to a series of pressures and demands on the Aegean front that inevitably led to the 1996 crisis over a barren islet of the Dodecanese.

The Gulf War enhanced Turkey's strategic value in western perceptions and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up prospects of renewed relations with the Turkish people of central Asia. Although confronted with a hostile eastern and southern neighborhood and a host of formidable domestic problems, Turkey is encouraged by western appreciation to pursue the policy of a regional power. The threat of military force has therefore become a standard Turkish bargaining chip in Cyprus and the Aegean.

Greece's strategy in the Balkans has been to improve relations with its northern neighbors and promote its stabilizing role in the region. At the same time Greece has kept its vigilance *vis-à-vis* Turkey, while seeking opportunities for minimizing tension and improving relations. The increasing decay of the Turkish parliamentary system has impeded efforts of reconciliation and western "even-handedness" has become a constant source of frustration for Greek policy makers.

NOTES

1. Thanos Veremis, "Greek Security: Issues and Politics", **Adelphi Paper** No. 179, London: The IISS, 1982.

2. Yannis Valinakis, "Greece's Security in the Post Cold War Era", **Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik-S394**, April 1994, Ebenhausen/ Isartal.

3. Van Coufoudakis, "Greco-Turkish Relations and the Greek Socialists: Ideology, Nationalism and Pragmatism", **Journal of Modern Greek Studies**, I, no. 2 (October 1983), p. 375.

4. Statements by Turkish high officials confirmed public fears. The Turkish Prime Minister stated on 30 July 1974 "The defence of the Aegean islands should be jointly undertaken by Greece and Turkey as allies within NATO". Half a year later on 4 April 1975, the Turkish Foreign Minister went even further: "Neither the government nor Turkish public opinion can accept that the Aegean belongs exclusively to Greece. Half the Aegean belongs to Turkey and the other half belongs to Greece. This has always been the official view".

5. A division of the operational control of the Aegean would make the coordination in times of war in such a restricted area difficult to achieve without violating –national airspace or sea waters. This would be against a basic Military Committee principle (36/2) which provides that 'countries retain their sovereignty and are, therefore, ultimately responsible for the defense and security of their own territories and space.'

6. T. Veremis, "Greece & NATO: Continuity and Change" in John Chipman (ed.), **NATO'S Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges**, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 269-270. Theodore Couloumbis, **The United States, Greece and Turkey. The Troubled Alliance**, New York: Praeger, 1983, pp. 204-206.

7. James E. Goodby, "CSCE: The Diplomacy of Europe Whole and Free", **The Atlantic Council**, Washington DC., July 1990, p. 2.

8. C. Svolopoulos, **Elliniki politiki sta Valkania 1974-81**, Athens: Euroekdotiki, 1987, pp. 74-79.

9. Panayiotis Ioakimidis, "Contradictions between Policy and Performance" in Kevin Featherstone & Kostas Ifantis (eds.), **Greece in a Changing Europe**, Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 36.

10. Thanos Veremis, "Greece," in Douglas Stuart (ed.), **Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance**, London: Macmillan, 1988, p. 137-139.

11. Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," **Survival**, March/April 1991, pp. 99-110. See also Robero Aliboni, ed., **Southern European Security in the 1990s**, London: Pinter Publishers, 1992.

12. "After strenuous diplomatic efforts, the Greeks were accepted as full members of the Western European Union at last year's summit. Yet, they were also asked to provide guarantees that they will never invoke some of the security provisions in this organization, a requirement at best contradictory and at worst downright insulting against a full EC member." Jonathan Eyal, "A Force for Good in a Cauldron of Turmoil," **The European** (September 3-6, 1992).

13. Geoffrey Pridham, "Political Parties and Elections in the New Eastern European Democracies: Comparisons with the Southern European Experience," **Yearbook 1990**, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, 1991, pp. 261-268.

14. Evangelos Kofos, "Greece and the Balkans in the '70s and the '80s," **Yearbook 1990**, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, 1991, pp. 217-220.

15. **Ibid.**, pp. 220-221.

16. F. Stephen Larrabee, "The Southern Periphery: Greece and Turkey," in **Problems of Balkan Security**, ed. Paul S. Shoup and George W. Hoffman, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), p. 191: "Noteworthy in this regard has been the expansion of military ties, highlighted by the visit of Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff, Atanas Semerdzhiev, to Athens in April 1988."

17. Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and A European Dilemma", **RFE/RL Research Report** 1. No. 25 (June 19, 1992), p. 36.

18. Interview in **Eleftherotypia**, 19 November 1991.

19. Declaration on Yugoslavia, Extraodinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, December 16, 1991, EPC Press Release, p. 129/91.

20. Reference in Yannis Valinakis, Greece's Balkan Policy and the Macedonian Issue (Ebenhausen: **Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik**, April 1992), 27. See also John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict," **Adelphi Paper** No. 270 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992), 55, concerning an interview with IMRO leader Ljupe Georgievski expressing irredentism regarding Greek territory.

21. Estimates of the size of the Greek minority vary. The Albanians claim that there are only forty thousand, while Greek estimates range as high as 400 thousand. The number probably lies somewhere in between the two estimates. For a discussion of the minority issue, see Larabee, "Southern Periphery," p. 191; James Pettifer, "Albania's Way out of the shadows", **The World Today** (April 1991), pp. 55-57.

22. Nicos Ziogas, "Developments in Albania in 1994", **Southeast European Yearbook 1994-95**, ELIAMEP, 1995, p. 123.

23. Nicos Ziogas, "Albania", **Southeast Europe Factbook & Survey 1996-97**, ELIAMEP, 1997, pp. 13-14.

The Greek Economy in the Post-Maastricht Era

Challenges and policy perspectives

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RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet article, l'auteur analyse les nouveaux défis auxquels fait face l'économie grecque après le traité de Maastricht et le pacte de stabilité signé à Amsterdam, les 16-17 Juin 1997. Afin de comprendre les conditions dans lesquelles se meut l'économie grecque, l'auteur a utilisé une approche méthodologique qui consiste à analyser trois périodes régulatoires distinctes: 1962-1981; 1981-1992 et 1992 à maintenant.

ABSTRACT

The author of this article analyses the new challenges facing the greek economy in view of the Treaty of Maastricht and the Stability Pact endorsed in Amsterdam on June 16-17 1997. The methodological approach used to understand the new policy environment is to go back and analyse what appear to be three distinct regulatory policy periods that span the years 1962-1981, 1981-1992 and 1992 to the present date.

Introduction

The expected adjustment of any economy to a shock depends largely on initial conditions. Accordingly the first section of this article highlights the principal characteristics of the Greek economy which have emerged from the developmental process in the post-war era.

It is difficult to comprehend the Greek development paradigm without reference to the significance of the geo-political position of Greece at the crossroads of three continents. Greece is the only European Union country that does not share a land border with any other EU member state. Furthermore, Greece occupies a strategic location on the international transportation, energy and communication networks that link the energy reserves of the Caspian Sea and Middle East to the major consumption centers of the West. From this perspective, the tensions arising from international competition over spheres of influence in the Balkans, Middle East or Black Sea region, as well as the inherent instability in the area, constitute fundamental factors in explaining the country's performance and development. The economic history of Greece is thus intertwined with prevailing conditions in the broader regional market of South Eastern Europe, since the latter influences directly various indicators such as the size of the effective Greek market, the entrepreneurial expectations of

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Greek and foreign investors, exchange receipts from trade and tourism, the Greek balance of payments, the level and rate of growth of defense expenditures.

Within this context, the prospects for Greek economic development can be evaluated with reference to the "régime switch" that is taking place in the 1990s as a consequence of the Treaty. The new policy environment becomes clearer through an analysis of what appear to be three distinct regulatory policy periods that span the years 1962-1981, 1981-1992 and 1992 to the present. In line with this methodological approach, the turning points of the Greek development process are the years 1981, when official entry of Greece into the EU took place, and 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed.

Policy Régimes and Maastricht

The Pre-entry Policy Régime: State-Corporatism

The regulatory framework prevailing during the period 1962-1981 has been identified as a peculiar form of "state corporatism" (Katseli; 1990), characterized by the interplay of interests and actions among the state, a highly centralized banking system and a small number of businesses, which enjoyed preferential access to the financial and credit markets.

Within the context of "state corporatism", the Monetary Committee, which operated until 1982 and consisted of top government and banking officials, was responsible for all credit decisions including the actual amount of credit and the terms of loans extended to each and every company. The financial and credit system, led by a few major public banks subsidized, through negative interest rates, specific enterprises and excluded many others from access to credit. The absence of capital markets and the presence of exchange restrictions further restrained the free access of businesses to capital, thus forcing firms to remain very small and under-capitalized. On the contrary, those companies, especially the export-oriented ones, which enjoyed preferential access to the financial and credit system, soon became over-capitalized and their capital-labor ratio sky-rocketed (Katseli;1990). Distortions were amplified through the *ad hoc* application of various trade protective measures, including duties, import taxes and export subsidies on sectors or enterprises. Economically unviable enterprises were kept running through the prevalence of "soft budget constraints", a situation which implied the presence of selectively favorable regulations concerning such areas as debt-servicing, debt-cancellation and tax treatment. (Katseli, 1990).

These conditions gave rise to:

a) intense dualism of the Greek production system, featuring, on the one hand, the over-capitalization and over-enlargement of a few companies in each industrial sector and, on the other hand, the presence of many small and undercapitalized units.

b) prevalence of pre-capitalist organizational patterns, especially in the agricultural and service sectors, in conjunction with artificially enlarged and not necessarily viable enterprises in the industrial sector.

c) weakening of entrepreneurial incentives in the private sector of the economy and, consequently, the delay in the emergence of an entrepreneurial class, familiar with the operations of a competitive market.

d) extensive clientelism in the workings of the political system, and the perpetuation of a centralized, yet essentially weak, public administration system that has traditionally acted as the employer of last resort in an economy overburdened with hidden unemployment.

In the context of "state corporatism", the weaknesses of both the production and the political system were cushioned and sustained by the continuous flow of transfers from abroad, initially in the form of foreign aid, later of shipping and emigrant remittances, and finally, in the form of invisible receipts from the European Community. The flow of transfers from abroad has supported domestic incomes, has acted as an anti-cyclical policy tool and has covered between 34 and 44 per cent of imports during the period 1957-1981 (Maroulis, 1991, Table 15, p. 82). If one subtracts tourist receipts, transfers have covered 43 per cent of imports during the period 1960-66, 39.8 per cent during 1967-1973, 37.2 per cent during 1974-1978 and 34,2 per cent during 1979-1981 (Bank of Greece, Monthly Statistical Report; various issues).

The structure of the labor market, characterized by the relatively small share of wage income in total income and the weakness of the tax system have not allowed for the enlargement of the taxation base and, consequently, the collection of high tax receipts. Public receipts have fluctuated from 22 per cent of GDP, in the period 1958-66, to 26 per cent, during 1974-1981, where almost half of this percentage consists of indirect taxes (Katseli, 1990, Table 8.3, p. 250). Already in the 1980s, the growing claims on public expenditures coupled with the hysteresis of tax collection have given rise to budget deficits that needed to be financed either via monetisation or via the issuance of public debt.

The Post-entry Policy Régime: Liberalization and Deregulation

With Greece's entry into the European Community in 1981, the Greek economy became exposed to a completely different institutional framework. Markets became liberalized as trade barriers were lowered and

selective protection was abolished. Major changes took place in 1982 and 1983, including the abolition of the Monetary Committee, the rationalization of the interest rate structure, and a significant rise of average nominal interest rates to the rate of inflation. During the period 1981-86, trade was liberalized through the reduction of tariffs and quotas for final products. This process was concluded with the abolition of the remaining tariffs, of export subsidies and of the regulatory import tax in 1989.

The liberalization of the capital market started in 1986 and was completed within a decade, including both short-term as well as long-term capital flows. At the same time, state procurement policy was liberalized and "soft budgets" were hardened.

Under the new regulatory framework, the adjustment of the Greek economy was quite abrupt and brought about significant income and wealth redistribution. The over-indebted enterprises of the earlier regime were now unable to function under positive interest rates, and were rendered problematic. Since these enterprises were mostly export-oriented, the rise in debt-servicing costs and the removal of subsidies hurt their international competitive position. The structural competitiveness of the Greek economy, as measured by the Balassa Index, was reduced in all sectors of the Greek economy, including those traditional sectors in which, under normal circumstances, the Greek economy was supposed to possess a comparative advantage (Katseli, 1996, Table 7). The deficit in the trade balance expanded as a percentage of the GDP from 8 per cent in the period 1980-1985 to 13.4 per cent in 1986-1992.

The restructuring of the country's traditional productive base was slow and coincided with a period of a sharp decline in wages as a percentage of GDP from 74.2 per cent in 1985 to 64.5 per cent in 1993 (European Economy, 1996, No. 62). Many large corporations were forced to close down and this contributed to a vicious circle of deindustrialisation in regions which exhibited a high concentration of manufacturing units.

At the same time, however, dynamic new businesses emerged while domestic investment activity and capital flows from abroad increased. During this period, the inflation rate was reduced and inflationary expectations became stabilized.

The adjustment process was cushioned once again by the financial flows extended through the First Community Support Framework (1988-1992). Community transfers rose to 6.5 per cent of GDP in 1993, amounting to 20 per cent of the country's total export receipts. They financed 29.2 per cent of the country's trade deficit (Bank of Greece, 1997).

Market liberalization was completed in the early 1990s. While the structural adjustment of the Greek economy accelerated, the Maastricht Treaty, was signed in 1992. Under the Treaty, member states proceeded to deepen the integration process and to set the rules for an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to be in place by the end of the century. The Greek economy entered a third phase where macro-economic policy became constrained and in line with the convergence criteria imposed and policy instruments allowed. The Supra-national institutionalization of the macro-economic policy régime was completed with the Stability Pact decided in Dublin in 1996 and approved in Amsterdam a year later.

The Maastricht Treaty and its Effects

The Maastricht Treaty created a new framework for the conduct of economic policy in Europe. All member states adopted the convergence criteria proposed by the Treaty with the aim of lowering inflation and interest rates, constraining budget deficits to less than 3 per cent of the GDP and lowering debt towards 60 per cent of the national income. Common restrictive policies were thus imposed upon all member states that wished to be included in the Economic and Monetary Union.

Similarly, the degrees of freedom that member states enjoyed in the selection of policy instruments were seriously curtailed.

The approval by the European Commission of the multi-year Greek Convergence Program (1993-99), submitted in 1993, legitimized the pursuit of domestic deflationary economic policies. The macro-economic policy mix adopted since 1992 consisted of restrictive fiscal policy practices in conjunction with a strict monetary policy stance. The primary budget deficit was trimmed through cuts in real government spending and increases in tax receipts, largely from the imposition of "objective taxes" on the self-employed. Furthermore, a hard currency policy was pursued so as to prepare the grounds for the obligatory maintenance of a stable currency parity, for at least two years prior to integration in the third stage of EMU.

To avoid balance-of-payments problems and to limit domestic liquidity, high real interest rates were maintained throughout the post 1992-period. The combination of high real interest rates, an appreciating drachma (in real terms) and decreasing real *per capita* wages succeeded in restraining demand and lowering the inflation rate from almost 16 per cent in 1992 to 8.5 per cent in 1996.

The macro-economic performance of the Greek economy in this 'post-Maastricht era' can be summarized in the basic policy indicators presented in Table 1, and in the macro-economic performance indicators presented in Table.2.

TABLE 1
GREECE : ECONOMIC POLICY INDICATORS
(Annual Percentage Change)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
MoneySupply (M2)	15.3	12.3	14.4	15	8.9	10.3	9.8
Public Deficit (% GDP)	-16.1	-11.5	-12.3	-14.2	-12.1	-9.1	-7.9
Nominal Wage	23.1	14.3	10.7	8.1	12.2	12.5	11.5
Real Per Capita Wage	2.6	-4.5	-3.8	-5.0	1.2	2.9	2.4
Interest Rates of Bonds (12-month)	22.83	23.33	21.63	21.23	18.96	15.47	12.87
Real Interest Rates (nominal minus average inflation for the next 12 months following expiration of bonds)	1.67	5.88	6.47	9.05	8.61	6.76	
Real Interest Rates (nominal minus current inflation)	2.50	3.78	5.70	6.76	8.04	6.16	4.34
Real Weighted Parity Index 1990=100	100.0	101.2	104.5	104.1	104.4	108.2	

Source:
Eurostat & DGII (1997), EC Economic Data Pocket Book, No 4/97

It is worth noting that after 1992 real interest rates fluctuated between 6 and 8 per cent. During that same period, the drachma appreciated in real terms by approximately 8 per cent.

TABLE 2
GREECE: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
GDP Growth Rate	-1.0	3.2	0.4	-1.0	1.5	2.0	2.4
Inflation (%)	20.3	19.6	15.9	15.5	10.9	9.3	8.5
Unemployment Rate (%)	6.4	7.0	7.9	8.6	8,9	9.1	9.0
Employment Rate (%)	1.3	-1.8	1.4	0.8	1.9	0.9	1.2
Trade Deficit (% GDP)	-14.5	-14.1	-13.9	-13.7	-13.7	-14.4	-14.4
Income Capital Share *	44.4	48.2	49.3	51.7	50.5	49.4	48.5
Adjusted Wages Share **	77.2	72.5	68.9	64.5	68.8	70	71.6

Sources :
Eurostat & DGII (1997), EC Economic Data Pocket Book, No 4/97
° OECD (1996), Economic Outlook, June
°° European Economy (1996), No. 62 . For the year 1990 : European Economy (1995), No. 59
°°° European Economy (1997), No. 63.

The combination of market liberalization - nearly completed by the early 1990s - and of convergence to meet the exigencies of the Maastricht Treaty depressed demand and caused a major structural adjustment in the Greek economy. Unemployment increased throughout the 1990s, while a major redistribution of income took place, mainly in favor of financial capital.

The unemployment rate exceeded 10 per cent in 1997 while the wage share declined by 5 percentage units between 1990 and 1996 (Table 2). The average GDP growth rate in the period 1992-1996 remained under 1.5 per cent (1.45%) while the trade deficit as a percentage of GDP - a good indicator of structural competitiveness - has exceeded 14 per cent in recent years.

There is substantial evidence that the adopted policy mix has stabilized inflationary expectations and has contributed to bringing about a significant deceleration of inflation from 15 per cent in 1992 to 4.5 per cent (year to year) in December 1997.

The adjustment costs associated with the low-growth environment of the 1990s have been mitigated by the influx of funds transferred by the European Union, under the Second Community Support Framework (1994-1999). These transfers, amounting to approximately 7 trillion drachmas, have supported incomes and the demand for goods and services. They have provided the necessary financial resources for the improvement of infrastructure, the upgrading of human resources, and for the assistance of structural adjustment of Greek businesses (Katseli, 1996). The developmental repercussions of the "Delors package", however, have not yet been evident due to considerable delays in the design and implementation phase, which have postponed the expected positive multiplier effects on income. These delays, have contributed to the ineffective use of resources and to their channeling towards consumption as opposed to investment purposes.

The Stability Pact

The Stability Pact[1], decided upon by the Dublin Summit Conference of December 13-14, 1996 and ratified by the Inter-governmental Conference of Amsterdam, has tied the hands of member states in the conduct of fiscal policy. The obligation to submit consecutive "convergence programmes", which would safeguard the nominal adjustment of each economy to the Maastricht targets, combined with the introduction of fines in the case of budget deficit "excesses", have restrained significantly each Government's flexibility in regulating economic activity. Beyond its deflationary impact on the European economy, the Pact has created incentives for the promotion of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Specifically, should an external disturbance reduce demand, GDP and, consequently, tax revenues, governments will be forced to adopt restrictive fiscal policies to secure the 3 per cent target. In so doing, demand will be further reduced and the downturn of economic activity will be prolonged.

The depletion or the permanent loss of policy instruments will become more severe in the face of the progressive integration of international capital markets. Small countries, such as Greece, already appear incapable to use tax policy instruments for budget purposes, as this option discourages investment activity by Greek or foreign business alike. Hence, the pursuit of a highly restrictive budget target has to rely increasingly on expenditure cuts. The margins for sizeable cuts, however, are limited, since public expenditure finances investment needs and covers social priorities.

Consequently, the "institutional regulation" of macro-economic policy at the European level, which originated in Maastricht in 1992 and was concluded in Amsterdam in 1997, entails the danger of a prolonged recession for the less-developed countries of the Union.

Through the Maastricht Treaty, the right of seignorage has been transferred to the European Central Bank and national public policy has been streamlined to the policy demands of European institutions. Through the Stability Pact, European governments have given away the remaining fiscal policy tools and have relegated their responsibility to regulate domestic economic activity and to meet policy challenges, such as unemployment.

Many European economists have already raised their voices against the increasing inadequacy of demand in Europe due to the systematic restrain of domestic expenditure and the deflationary bias in national policies. The low level of the Community's own budget and the absence of a unified tax and transfer system across European countries exacerbate the situation, since they preclude the pursuit of counter-cyclical fiscal policies at the European level. There is already evidence of social unrest against rising unemployment - especially among young people -, decreasing real incomes and the marginalisation of the weakest social groups. This social dynamic, should it be let out of control, would not only have negative repercussions for national governments but would eventually undermine the course of European integration.

Until today, demand in Greece has been sustained by the transfers provided through the Second Community Support Framework, which expires in 1999. The inflows of funds are expected to be reduced under the Third Community Support Framework due to increased demands by the incipient entrants to the Community, most notably by the Eastern European countries, as well as due to increased pressures by developed countries to meet rising social needs of underprivileged social groups.

Sustaining growth will thus be the primary challenge for the Greek economy in the years to come. Avoiding currency and financial instability is going to be the second most important policy challenge for Greek policy makers.

The financial vulnerability of the Greek economy has increased in recent years. In view of rising financial costs at home, many businesses have increased their foreign exchange exposure. At the same time, many households have increased their direct or indirect bank borrowing to sustain their consumption patterns.

The European Monetary Union is likely to become a reality by the end of the century. However, Greece will not join the EMU from its very beginning and will likely face increased currency pressures either because of speculative or more systemic reasons (Yotopoulos & Josling, 1996). These pressures are likely to be exacerbated since the drachma is overvalued in real terms and this overvaluation does not reflect a sustainable improvement in productivity.

The prospects of sudden capital flight due to either external shocks or speculative pressures on the overvalued currency would lead to a further increase of interest rates or to a devaluation of the currency. This situation will increase the debt burden of both businesses and households, threatening their financial sustainability, as witnessed amply in the recent Mexican peso experience.

Thus, the pursuit of the Maastricht convergence criteria have contributed to the reduction of deficits and inflation at the cost of prolonging the recession and increasing the financial fragility of the Greek economy.

As the degrees of freedom in the conduct of policy have been reduced, so have policy options. A more expansionary policy stance or a faster adjustment of the exchange rate, which would have looked optimal under a different policy regime, have become extremely difficult under Maastricht. Under present circumstances they might spur a vicious circle of capital flight, devaluation, inflation and/ or financial failures. The policy challenges that present themselves, need, therefore, to be evaluated under the present policy regime, namely that of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact.

It is important to realize that the restriction of policy options is an integral part of the Maastricht/Amsterdam deal. The decision to enter the EMU under the Maastricht and Amsterdam stipulations inexorably implies the loss of national sovereignty with regard to macroeconomic policy. Preservation of policy autonomy would have required a different policy stance at Maastricht and Amsterdam.

Policy Challenges and Policy Priorities

Within that policy régime, the first priority for Greece is to safeguard the smooth entry of the drachma into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and to do so with minimum destabilisation of its economy.

It is a public secret that the external balance of payments position of the country remains extremely vulnerable to short-run speculative movements,

in view of the fact that the necessary productive restructuring and the improvement of structural competitiveness have not yet been achieved. Both the trade balance and the current account are instead worsening despite transfers from the European Union. Currency reserves may easily be depleted, should there be a sudden change of expectations with regard to the currency parity.

According to the Maastricht timetable, every member-state is required to tie its currency rate to the central rate at least two years prior to its official entry into the EMU.

The market is already becoming jittery. Market participants expect the parity value to be adjusted downwards, prior to entry, so as to safeguard competitiveness once the currency's value is tied to the central rate.

Naturally as the time for the integration of the drachma into the ERM is approaching, the speculative pressures on the drachma are intensifying. This situation makes it necessary to stabilize expectations and to avoid the speculative pressures arising from the entry process before it is too late.

A timely and orderly transition into the ERM through appropriate Central Bank action is therefore a necessary prerequisite to preserving exchange-rate and financial stability.

Early entry into the ERM, with a realistic parity will not be without its price. Firms which have borrowed abroad and the government, will have to bear significant adjustment costs, while, policymakers will lose forevermore the exchange rate as an adjustment instrument for meeting internal and external balance objectives.

The second policy objective is to obtain a firm commitment from the Community with regard to the flow of future structural funds. The assurance of continuous financing under a Third Community Support Framework, would help stabilize expectations with regard to the economy's future financial vulnerability.

Given the prospects of the European Union's enlargement, the market already anticipates these funds to be substantially curtailed. This possibility becomes more credible in view of the limited capacity of state agencies to manage efficiently the transfers associated with the present Community Program.

As the absorption rate continues to be relatively low, despite the fact that this program is in its fourth year, the negotiating position of the country *vis-à-vis* the Commission is eroding. It is thus essential that the government give top policy priority to the implementation of the present CSF. To do so,

state agencies and social partners need to be mobilized effectively. It is only, then, that productive restructuring can be promoted; productivity, enhanced. Within that context, priority should be given to administrative reform, including the simplification of procedures and the containment of red tape, which are expected to reduce the costs of doing business and to accelerate the decision-making process.

The modernization of infrastructure, the adoption of new technological processes, the introduction of training and modern managerial techniques into both the public and private sectors, and the restructuring of small-scale industries constitute important policy priorities. If important steps are not taken towards implementation of the existing investment program, the outlook for growth and development will become bleak.

Meeting the dual challenge of financial stability and productive restructuring is thus the major task of policy on the eve of the 21st century.

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(1) - For a full analysis of the terms of the Pact and of its results, refer to Katseli, 1997.

Greece in the European Union: The "Maverick" Becomes an 'Orthodox' Member State

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article retrace l'évolution de la pensée grecque en ce qui a trait à la participation de la Grèce à l'Union européenne. La Grèce appuie une Europe fédérale et a développé une politique européenne cohérente. Elle doit maintenant compléter les ajustements de son système économique, politique et social face aux exigences de l'Union européenne.

L'auteur ajoute que la Grèce n'est plus considérée comme le "mouton noir" de l'Union. Au contraire, le pays est maintenant perçu comme un "état-membre orthodoxe", qui prône une plus grande intégration selon les axes fédéralistes.

ABSTRACT

This article traces the evolution of greek thinking on the participation of Greece in the European Union. Greece supports a federal Europe and has developped a coherent European Union policy. It now needs to complete the adjustment of its economic, social and political system to the European Union's requirements.

The author also concludes that Greece has ceased being the "black sheep" of the European Union. On the contrary, it is regarded as an "orthodox member state", advocating closer integration along federalist lines.

Greece's Entry into the European Union

Greece joined the European Community (as the European Union was known at that time)[1] in January 1981[2], after a long and troubled period of association. Indeed Greece was the first country to sign an association agreement (Athens Agreement) with the incipient European Community in 1961. This agreement was actually never implemented properly owing to different views both on the part of Greece and the EC on its interpretation.[3] The agreement was frozen in 1967 following the imposition of the military dictatorship in Greece.[4]

After the collapse of the military regime in July 1974, the association agreement was reactivated, but in the meantime, Greece opted for full membership. Karamanlis, the Prime Minister, submitted the application for full membership in June 1975. Despite some reservations from the Commission[5], official negotiations started in 1976 and were concluded in May 1979 with the signing of the Act of Accession.[6] Greece became the

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tenth official member of the EC in January 1981. Greece decided to join the European Union/Community for three main reasons:

— to stabilize its newly-founded democratic institutions. The EC institutional framework was seen as the safety net around democratic politics, capable of contributing to the consolidation of democratic process and institutions.[7]

— to strengthen its external security and to lessen its dependency on foreign protection, especially its post-war dependency on the USA.

— to acquire the financial means and other market conditions for the modernization and development of its underdeveloped economy.

What is important about the decision to accede to the European Community is that the idea did not enjoy widespread political support. It was a decision taken by the conservative New Democracy party and more accurately, by Karamanlis himself, with very little support from other political forces. The Communist Party of the Interior, as the Alliance of the Left (Synaspismos) was known at that time, and the centrist forces endorsed Greece's European orientation. However the orthodox/hardline Communist party of Greece (KKE) and, more importantly, the nascent but dynamically rising political force, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) were vehemently opposed to Greece's joining the European Community. Indeed PASOK, as the main opposition party at the time of the accession negotiations (1977-1979) declared that, once in power, it would conduct a referendum with the view of withdrawing Greece from the EC.

PASOK came to power in October 1981, only a few months after Greece's official entry into the European Community. Between 1981 and 1986, PASOK displayed a rather ambivalent attitude towards the Community, although it did make a serious effort to improve Greece's position in the Community's institutional system and policies.[8] This effort resulted in the adoption of the Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMPs) in June 1985. This ambivalence was mainly expressed in the context of the European Political Cooperation (EPC).[9] Here Greece distanced itself from, and even vetoed, important EC decisions concerning vital foreign policy issues (East-West relations, Middle East, terrorism, etc.) This stance earned Greece various pejorative titles ('odd country out', 'maverick country', 'black sheep of the EC').[10]

This period of ambivalence came to a close towards the end of the 1980s, starting from 1986, when PASOK began to change into a pro-European, pro-integrationist political force. Three basic factors contributed to this transformation[11]:

— the substantial and rising budgetary benefits that Greece had begun to accrue from the EC. Net receipt from the EC budget increased from mere 150 m. ECUs in 1981 to 1300 m. ECUs in 1986, something which turned the Greek electorate enthusiastically in favor of the EC. This could hardly have been ignored by PASOK.

Table 1: Greece's net receipts from the EU budget

Year	Net Receipts	Year	Net Receipts
1981	+ 140,2	1990	+2470,2
1982	+ 604,3	1991	+2926,4
1983	+ 973,7	1992	+3604,0
1984	+1008,2	1993	+4136,7
1985	+1314,8	1994	+3851,9
1986	+1272,7	1995	+3488,9
1987	+1536,5		
1988	+1491,6		

Source :Court of Auditors/EU

— the realization that Greece had come to enjoy considerable bargaining power, especially *vis-à-vis* its neighbors, most notably Turkey,[12] by virtue of Greek EC membership.

— the socializing effect that participating in the EC organs had upon PASOK figures, who discovered that the EC was not dominated, as some tended to believe, by the large member states. Small states could exert considerable influence, provided that they had the right strategy for doing so. In essence, from the mid 1980s the PASOK government and Greece as a whole came to realize that the expectations placed upon EC membership had begun to be fulfilled.

The transformation of PASOK into a pro-European force[13] meant that the bulk of Greek political forces were by the late 1980's supporting Greece's participation in the EC. Membership had thus become a consensual element in Greek politics, one which reflected the overwhelming support that European integration enjoyed among the Greek electorate. As a result, Greece was gradually able to assemble a coherent overall policy on European integration, the European Community/Union and Greece's role within it.

The European Policy of Greece Today

The central theme of Greece's current European policy can be summarized as support for the federal evolution of the EU. By now Greece stands with the member States which openly advocate the federal construction of the Union, even though, for reasons of political expediency, they do not utter the term 'federalism'. In Greece's view, the federal construction comprises four basic elements[14]:

Strong Supranational Institutions

The existence of strong, supranational institutions, capable of formulating policy and making decisions, democratically legitimized and independent of the control of any country or group of countries, constitutes an overriding objective of Greece's European policy. In this context, Greece supports strengthening the role of the European Commission and its eventual evolution into the role of a truly European government. A strong European Commission is seen as a vital component of the institutional system, ensuring the equilibrium of relations among small and large member States of the Union. In many cases, Greece has discovered that the Commission is the body which counterbalances the political excesses of the large member States in formulating policy. According to an official Greek government publication, "the Commission, along with the European Parliament, represent the best allies of Greece in the European Union".[15]

In recent attempts at revising the treaties, and, more precisely, in the most recent attempt which led to the Treaty of Amsterdam[16], Greece has supported substantial extension of the Commission's powers to embrace areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the so-called second pillar of the Union's edifice, as well as the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation, the third pillar of the Union's structure. More concretely, Greece wants the Commission to have the right to initiate policy ('right of initiative') and to be extensively involved in the process of implementing policies, particularly Common Foreign and Security Policy. Like all other small States of the Union, Greece is a staunch supporter of the exclusive right of initiative, which the Commission has been enjoying since the establishment of the European Community in the 1950s. Attempts by larger member States at curbing the Commission's exclusive power to initiate policy have met with severe opposition from Greece.

Nevertheless, Greece is categorically opposed to the idea of downsizing the Commission by reducing the number of commissioners. Greece insists that each member state should have the right to nominate a commissioner. The right of every member state to be represented in the Commission, even though the latter, a supranational body, is viewed as an indispensable element underpinning the legitimacy of the institution and, indeed, the European Union as a whole. Moreover, Greece supports the election of all the members of the Commission, including its president, by the European Parliament.

As far as the European Parliament is concerned, Greece also enthusiastically supports strengthening its legislative and political powers, thus essentially transforming the institution into a full-fledged legislative body. In this connection, Greece has supported the transfer of legislative powers from the Council of Ministers to the European Parliament in successive

revisions of the founding treaties. In particular, it has endorsed the drastic extension of the so-called co-decision procedure, which allows the European Parliament to act as co-legislator with the Council of Ministers in a wide range of policy areas. Moreover, it has sought to expand the Parliament's competencies in the CFSP and JHA, but with little success.

Again, Greece's stance towards the European Parliament is shaped by both general and specific considerations. The general ones relate to the desire to enhance the democratic nature of the European Union through the reinforcement of the European Parliament, the only elected, representative body of the Union's institutional system. The specific ones derive from the fact that the European Parliament, like the Commission, has acted as a body contributing to political equilibrium in the Union and more interestingly, to the balance and symmetry in the relations between small and large member states of the Union. On the other hand, Greece has concluded that the European Parliament is more sensitive to the views and goals of the small member States and, of course, to the views of Greece, especially as regards some vital political issues, including the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish relations. The European Parliament is thus seen as an effective and reliable ally of Greece in the Union's policy-making process.

On a broader basis, the European Parliament and Greece appear to share the same overall federalist philosophy with respect to European integration and the evolution of the Union's institutional system.

Greece attaches the same overwhelming importance to the role of the other supranational institution, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and to the auxiliary institutions, especially the Committee of the Regions. For Greece, the strengthening of the supranational institutions is seen as the surest way to prevent any group of countries or a *directoire* of Countries from dominating the policy-making process of the Union. As a Greek official paper has put it[17], the existence of institutions of a federal character, associated with the system of checks and balances, prevents the domination of the EU system by a hegemonic country or by a group of countries.

Naturally, Greece, like other small countries, especially the Benelux, feels quite dissatisfied by the recent trends towards strengthening the intergovernmental elements in the European Union's institutional system.

Strong Budget and Strong Common Policies

Greece is one of the member states that does not appear to have any real problem in transferring sovereign jurisdictions to the European Union for the purpose of framing common policies at the Union's level. Indeed, Greece believes that the Union should not confine itself to promoting

negative integration, i.e. the establishment of the single, internal market, indispensable as it may be for the European economy, but should also promote positive integration through the formulation and implementation of common policies in all areas where the nation state appears incapable of acting alone.

In this respect, Greece steadfastly supports the objective of establishing full economic and monetary union (EMU), even though the Greek economy is the least qualified to join the first group of countries to launch the single currency (Euro) in 1999. Despite the remarkable progress achieved in recent years in reducing the macro-economic imbalances, the Greek economy has a long way to travel before it is deemed suitable to adhere to the single currency. Most estimates agree, however, that by the year 2001 it would be in a position to do so. Greece is currently rigorously enforcing a program of economic convergence, designed to meet the economic criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty for joining the single currency. In fact the present Greek government, led by Simitis, has made the adjustment of the economy to the conditions required for full participation in the EMU a paramount objective in its economic policy. Greece fears that, if left outside the EMU, it will become politically marginalized in the European Union and thus unable to influence the policy outcomes likely to affect its economic and political interests.

Moreover Greece considers the existence of a strong structural policy with a redistributive function aimed at advancing economic and social cohesion and reducing inter-regional and social disparities, as an integral part of the positive integration process. To that end, Greece has fought hard in the negotiations leading to the single European Act (1985-1986) and the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty, 1990-1991) to strengthen the provisions concerning the structural and redistributive aspects of the common policies, most notably of the regional and social policy. The adoption in 1988 of the so-called 'Delors packages' and the new structural policy, as well as the creation of a cohesion fund by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, are considered essential achievements to which Greece has contributed. More recently, Greece has insisted that the European Union should develop the policies to deal with the worsening unemployment problem in Europe. Strengthening the 'social dimension' of the Union is viewed as a necessary complement to the lopsided emphasis placed by the Treaty of Maastricht on 'nominal convergence' and monetary policy in the process of achieving full-fledged Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Of course the preservation of the common agricultural policy (CAP) is part of Greece's overall policy towards the Union.

Not surprisingly, a vital component of Greece's European policy is advocacy for a sizable Union budget, with functions similar to those performed by budgets in federal systems; i.e., stabilization, allocative and redistributing functions. For Greece, fiscal federalism is an indispensable element of the federal construction of the Union. Consequently, Greece has consistently supported the increase of the Union budget, which at present cannot exceed the equivalent of 1.27% of the Union's cumulative GNP. For Greece, the establishment of the EMU, the enlargement of the Union to include the less developed countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE) and the development of new activities in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy should be accompanied by a substantial increase in the Union budget beyond the 1.27% ceiling. Such an increase may appear extremely difficult politically, as the member states with 'net contribution' to the budget, especially Germany, are vehemently opposed to the idea.

Because Greece is such an ardent advocate of positive integration, it remains lukewarm about the concept of 'subsidiarity'. It thinks that at this stage of integration the concept tends to hinder rather than advance the deepening of integration.

A Strong and Effective CFSP

The third main component of Greece's European policy is the support for the endowment of the Union with a strong, effective foreign and security policy, embracing defense policy and 'common defense'.[18] Although initially markedly antithetical to the idea of transforming the Union from a 'civilian' to a 'military power', Greece realized that, both for wider and more narrow national reasons, the Union should acquire the political, institutional, and eventually the military means to play a more active role in handling regional and international crises. As a result, starting from the negotiations for the Single European Act (1985), Greece has begun to pour proposals for the expansion of the Union's competence into the area of foreign and security/defense policy. The operation, since the early 1970s of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) on a purely intergovernmental basis for the coordination of the foreign policies of the member States was rightly thought to be a very imperfect system, incapable of producing effective results. The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the form of a second pillar of the Treaty on European Union, as an intergovernmental system of foreign policy was supported by Greece, but as a preliminary step towards the ultimate objective of building a fully-fledged system of foreign policy.[19]

In the negotiations for the elaboration of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1996-1997), Greece came up with the idea of fully 'communitarizing' the CFSP. Moreover, Greece proposed the merging of the West European Union (WEU) into the European Union and the assumption by the latter of all defense functions, especially functions concerning soft defense (humanitarian missions, peace-keeping and peace-making, crisis-management functions) enshrined in the so-called Petersberg protocol (1992) for the WEU. Although the proposal for integrating the WEU into the EU was supported by a majority of member states, it was eventually abandoned due to stiff resistance from Britain, as was the idea for bringing the CFSP fully into the Community's system. Yet the soft defense functions ('Petersberg tasks') were incorporated into the new Treaty as defense functions of the European Union.[20]

On the other hand, Greece sought to broaden the objectives of the CFSP so as to cover the protection of the external borders of the Union and the territorial integrity of the member states. This was more or less fulfilled through relevant provisions embodied in the new Treaty. Consequently, Greece feels that in the future the Union will be better positioned to project a more effective political role thereby assisting Greece in its handling of regional conflicts and safeguarding its security interests.

On a more general level, Greece believes that the end of the cold war and the division of Europe necessitates the construction of a new European security architecture around the EU, complementary to that of NATO, an institution still perceived as an essential element of Europe's collective defense system.

An Inclusive European Union

The enlargement of the European Union to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE), recently liberated from totalitarian rule and striving to build democratic institutions and market economies, represents perhaps the greatest historical challenge for the EU. The extension of the Union's political system to Eastern Europe is regarded as a factor capable of contributing decisively to the stability, security and prosperity of the region. Along with NATO expansion, the enlargement of the EU is perceived as the most important pillar of this new European architecture.

Greece favors enlarging the Union for political and economic reasons. Yet Greece wants EU enlargement to embrace Cyprus as well as the Balkan States.[21] As far as Cyprus[22] is concerned, Greece managed to secure the opening of accession negotiations early in 1998, as part of a compromise for the implementation of the third phase of the customs union

between EU and Turkey. Although Cyprus fulfills all the criteria for accession, the act of opening negotiations does not necessarily mean the entry of Cyprus into the Union, given that a number of member nations do not wish to see a divided state within the Union. The resolution of the perennial Cyprus problem thus appears to be a prerequisite for the accession to the Union. Greece could hardly accept this prerequisite and stresses that if Cypriot membership is blocked, then Greece will be forced to veto the entry of any other country into the Union.[23]

The European Commission has proposed recently to open negotiations with only five of the ten applicant States of Eastern Europe, (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia)[24]. The other five, including Rumania[25] and Bulgaria[26] should wait for a later, unspecified date to start negotiations. Greece, like a number of other member states, has objected to this proposal arguing that accession negotiations should start simultaneously with all applicant CEE countries. Greece is deeply concerned about the integration of the Balkan region into the EU. It considers that the history of instability and conflict in the Balkans can be overcomed only through the full integration of the latter into European institutions and structures.[27]

The Problem of Adjustment

Having formulated a coherent European policy, the main challenge Greece faces as a member state of the European Union is the adjustment of its economic, social and political system to the EU requirements[2], in other words, the 'Europeanization' of Greek politics and economics. This process has turned out to be extremely difficult in the Greek case for a number of reasons, including (a) the gigantic size and overcentralized nature of the Greek State and its paramount role in the economy, either in terms of tightly regulating economic activities, or in terms of producer, (b) the peripheral location of Greece with no common borders with any other member state of the EU, a location aggravated by the instability and the conflictual dynamics of the regional environment, (c) the external threat Greece faces to its territorial integrity and independence, a threat forcing it to spend approximately 5% of its GNP on military expenditure, the highest share of any other member state of the EU.[29]

Other cultural and historical factors have also rendered the process of adjustment exceedingly difficult.[30] Thus, while EC membership entailed the redefinition of the role and size of the state, Greece followed during most of the 1980's a policy leading to the expansions of the State's role and functions. This brought Greece into direct conflict with the European Community and complicated the process of adjustment and economic convergence. Indeed, despite a sizable transfer of financial resources from

the EC budget (Table 1) , Greece was the only member State to register divergent rates of economic performance. The Greek GNP per capita dropped from 52.3% of the EC average in 1981 to 44.6% in 1991.[31]

Similarly, Greece experienced problems in adjusting its foreign policy to the EC/EU requirements and logic. It therefore pursued foreign policy objectives which were clearly not in line with the EU, or which did not take into account its membership.[32] The most striking example in this respect was the handling of the so-called 'FYROM question'[33] (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). By choosing to focus its policy on the historical aspects and the name of the newly founded State instead of concentrating on the real issue of security that FYROM posed, Greece became thoroughly isolated within the European Union. This policy did not allow Greece to take advantage of the changes in the Balkans and thus strengthen its regional role.[34]

The systematic effort of adjusting Greece to the requirements and dynamics of EU membership was inaugurated with the election of Simitis as Prime Minister of Greece (January 1996). The advent of Simitis to power was rightly interpreted as the rise of pro-European political forces to power and the defeat of the traditionalist forces. Similar changes in the New Democracy party with the election of Karamanlis as leader helped create the political climate needed to introduce the long delayed modernization of Greek economy, state and foreign policy. The over-arching objective set by Simitis' government is to prepare Greece for full EMU membership by the end of the century through the rigorous application of the 'convergence program' for balancing Greek public finances and restructuring the economy.

Moreover, a successful attempt has been made to develop Greece's relations with its Balkan neighbors by solving outstanding problems, including that of FYROM and promoting inter-regional cooperation.[35] Two meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, one in Sofia in 1996 and a second one in Thessaloniki in 1997,[36] laid down the conditions for advancing inter-regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe. In fact, Greece has emerged as the main champion[37] of 'Balkan integration' within the European Union and NATO. Recently Greece even entered into the process of normalizing relations with Turkey,[38] by seeking solutions both to the problems in the Aegean as well as in Cyprus.

Concluding Remarks

The attempts at domestic and external adjustment along with the modernization pursued in earnest by Greece recently have turned the country into a so-called ordinary member State of the European Union.

Greece has ceased being the "black sheep" of the EU. On the contrary, it is regarded as an 'orthodox member State', advocating closer integration along federalist lines. Nevertheless, Greece's position in the EU will be determined by its ability to participate fully in the EMU and the single currency (Euro), if this project goes ahead as planned. Fortunately, the situation appears to be fully understood by Greek political élites.

NOTES

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4. See V. Coufoudakis, 'The European Community and the "Freezing of the Greek Association", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, vol. XVI, no.2, 1977.

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6. As to the importance of Greece's accession to the EC, see C. Karamanlis "The Accession: a very significant historical fact for Greece and for Europe", (the Prime Minister's speech after signing the Treaty), **Oikonomikos Tachydromos**, 7.6.1979.

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10. Nutall, **European**, *op. cit.*, pp 306-307

11. See P.C. Ioakimidis, **Europe in Transformation, the European Community and Greece in a New Perspective**, Athens, Themelio, 1990 (in Greek).

12. P. Kazakos, "The Normalization of Relations Between the European Communities and Turkey and the Greek Foreign Policy" in A. Alexandris, Th. Veremis et al., **Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987**, Athens, Gnossi, 1988 (in Greek).

13. On this issue see, P.C. Ioakimidis, "Preconditions for Greece's Effective Participation in the European Community in the 1990's", Athens, **ELIAMEP Yearbook, 1991** (in Greek), K. Featherstone, **Socialist Parties and European Integration**, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988.

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24. See Commission, Agenda 2000 For A Stronger and Wider Union, Com(97), 2000 final.

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27. Cf. S. Dalis (ed.), **European Integration and Balkan Multi-rupture. The role of Greece**, Athens, I. Sideris, 1994 (in Greek).

28. See L. Tsoukalis (ed.), **Greece in the European Community: the Challenge of Adjustment**, Athens, Papazissis/EKEM, 1993 (in Greek).

29. Y. Valinakis, "Security Policy" in P. Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis (eds.), **Greece and EC Membership Evaluated**, London, Pinter, 1994, pp.199-214.

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31. See, European Commission, **Report on Progress in Economic and Monetary Convergence and Progress with the Implementation of Community Law Concerning the Internal Market**, 1993.

32. On this issue see Th. Couloumbis, "Introduction: the Impact of EC (EU) Membership on Greece's Foreign Policy Profile" in P. Kazakos, P.C. Ioakimidis, Greece... *op. cit.*, D. Constas, **For the Foreign Policy**, Athens, Papazissis, n.d. (in Greek), Th. Veremis and Th. Couloumbis, **Greek Foreign Policy, Prospects and Problems**, Athens, Papazissis, 1994 (in Greek).

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36. See, Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Countries of South Eastern Europe, Thessaloniki, 9-10 June 1997, Declaration on Good Neighbourly Relations, Security and Cooperation in the Balkans.

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La politique étrangère de Constantin Caramanlis

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ABSTRACT

The author of this article compares the foreign policy objectives of Constantin Caramanlis to those of Andreas Papandreou, the two preeminent figures of post-1974 Greece. He concludes that Caramanlis' Cyprus policy was a failure. On the contrary, his European option served the economic, political and security objectives of Greece. This option has been adopted by all post-1974 Greek Governments. Thus, Caramanlis greatest contribution has been leading Greece to Europe.

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur de cet article compare les objectifs respectifs de la politique étrangère de Constantin Caramanlis et d'Andréas Papandréou, les deux plus éminentes figures politiques de la période après 1974. Il conclut que la politique suivie par Caramanlis au sujet de Chypre constitua un échec.

L'option européenne, au contraire, a servi les objectifs économiques, politiques et de sécurité de la Grèce. Cette option a par ailleurs été adoptée par tous les gouvernements grecs, après 1974. Ainsi, la contribution majeure de Caramanlis a été de guider la Grèce vers l'Europe.

"Nous appartenons à l'Occident". Cette déclaration de Constantin Caramanlis à l'occasion de l'adhésion de la Grèce aux Communautés européennes, le 1er janvier 1981 définit parfaitement le fondement des options diplomatiques de celui qui a dominé la politique grecque pendant plus d'un demi-siècle. A cette formule du chef de la droite grecque, Andréas Papandréou, le fondateur du PASOK, qui lui succéda au pouvoir devait répliquer par son célèbre slogan : "La Grèce appartient aux Grecs"[1]. Le fait est que l'option européenne de la Grèce définie dès le début des années soixante par Caramanlis n'a jamais été vraiment remise en cause par ses successeurs qui comme lui ont considéré que la construction européenne offrait à leur pays une opportunité unique de développement économique, de stabilité politique et de protection contre toute agression de l'un ou l'autre de ses voisins.

Mais Constantin Caramanlis et à sa suite Andréas Papandréou ont sacrifié la cause de Chypre afin de pouvoir faire participer la Grèce à l'édification européenne. Il n'était pas question en effet pour les Européens que les Grecs puissent entraver les travaux des institutions européennes

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par l'instrumentalisation de la question chypriote. La République hellénique se borne donc, depuis qu'elle constitue le dixième membre des Communautés européennes, à défendre de façon ponctuelle les intérêts de Chypre par exemple quand sont en cause les relations de la Turquie avec Bruxelles.

Né en 1907 à Proti, petit village de Macédoine alors sous domination turque, le futur Président de la Grèce est l'aîné d'une famille nombreuse dont il devient rapidement le chef à la suite du décès de son père. Avocat, il est élu député (Parti populaire de tendance royaliste) en 1935 : il est nommé vingt ans plus tard Premier ministre à la mort du maréchal Papagos, et fonde l'ERE (Union nationale radicale), parti politique de droite à la tête duquel il gouverne la Grèce pendant huit ans. Durant cette période il se heurte à la couronne mais aussi aux partis du centre et de la gauche qui lui reprochent ses méthodes autoritaires pour gouverner un peuple, il est vrai, très divisé. Ainsi que l'écrit De Gaulle dans ses "Mémoires d'espoir" : "Ce peuple dont la vie politique est aussi dentelée que les côtes et complexe que le relief, Constantin Caramanlis parvient à le gouverner".* Caramanlis après la défaite électorale de son parti, en novembre 1963, qui intervient quelques semaines à la suite de sa démission de la tête du gouvernement, quitte la Grèce pour Paris où il séjourne onze ans. Pendant cette traversée du désert, il modifie peu à peu ses anciennes positions politiques pour devenir un vrai libéral et se détache de ceux de ses partisans qui soutiennent le régime des colonels mis en place en 1967. Le 24 juillet 1974, il effectue un retour triomphal à Athènes pour succéder aux militaires, qui désarçonnés par l'invasion turque à Chypre, lui abandonnent le pouvoir.

Le nouveau gouvernement Caramanlis proclame une amnistie générale, légalise tous les partis politiques, dont le Parti communiste, qui est alors dans la clandestinité depuis 1947. Mûri par son exil parisien, le Premier ministre - qui fonde un nouveau parti, la Nouvelle Démocratie - a pour ambition de moderniser son pays déjà associé, sur son initiative, depuis 1962 au Marché Commun. Grâce à sa ténacité, la Grèce, le 1er janvier 1981, adhère à l'Europe communautaire [2].

L'âge venant, Caramanlis désireux de se placer au dessus des partis politiques et de se décharger de la gestion gouvernementale, accède le 5 mai 1980 à la Présidence de la République. N'ayant pas véritablement préparé sa succession, il déplore de voir ses dauphins se disputer la direction de la Nouvelle Démocratie, qui perd les élections législatives de 1981 ce qui consacre le triomphe du parti socialiste, le PASOK d'Andréas Papandréou.

* Mémoires d'Espoir, Le Renouveau 1958-1962, Paris, OMNIBUS-PLON, 1996 page 209.

De 1981 à 1985, le Président Caramanlis va cohabiter sans problème majeur avec son Premier ministre qui se garde bien de mettre en oeuvre ses promesses électorales les plus hardies. Admirateur de Thucydide, le plus fameux des historiens grecs qu'il cite souvent pour illustrer ses appels à l'unité nationale, il va s'efforcer de devenir le Président de tous les Grecs. Hanté par son propre destin, et ayant à l'esprit la fin tragique de ses grands prédecesseurs comme Démosthène, à l'époque antique ou Vénizélos à l'époque contemporaine, il réussit à apparaître comme le guide incontesté de la nation et parvient à faire oublier qu'il a été autrefois le chef d'une droite très contestée. C'est pourquoi en 1985 il se déclare prêt à assumer un second mandat présidentiel à la seule condition que sa candidature soit présentée à la fois par le Premier ministre Papandréou et Constantin Mitostakis, le chef de l'opposition.

Profondément blessé, tant par le refus des socialistes de le soutenir que par le choix de son successeur, Christos Sartzetakis (le magistrat instructeur, en 1963, de l'assassinat du député Lambrakis, affaire qui à l'époque avait éclaboussé son gouvernement), il décide sans attendre l'expiration de son mandat de renoncer à ses fonctions de chef de l'Etat. De nouveau Président de la République de 1990 à 1995, Constantin Caramanlis dont l'élection n'est acquise qu'à une très courte majorité ne joue pendant cette période qu'un rôle représentatif, la fonction de chef de l'Etat ayant beaucoup perdu de son importance après la révision constitutionnelle de 1986. Atteint par l'âge et la maladie, il démissionne en mars 1995 dès l'élection de son successeur, Costis Stéphanopoulos, abrégeant de quelques semaines son second mandat présidentiel.

La politique étrangère menée par Caramanlis a essentiellement eu ses effets dans deux périodes très distinctes: la période 1955-1963 et la période 1974-1980.

I. La Politique Etrangère de Caramanlis de 1955 à 1963

1. L'amitié gréco-turque

Lorsqu'il accède au pouvoir en octobre 1955 Caramanlis doit faire face à une crise avec la Turquie. D'une part la guerre d'indépendance de Chypre menée par les Chypriotes grecs à partir du 1er avril de cette année inquiète les milieux politiques d'Ankara et les pogroms antigrecs de Smyrne et d'Istanbul des 6 et 7 septembre suivants obligent Athènes à porter plainte contre la Turquie devant le Conseil de l'OTAN. Or la politique étrangère de la Grèce après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et la guerre civile grecque (1946-1949) avait pour fondement des relations d'amitié avec la Turquie qui était cimentée par la prédominance d'un fort courant anticommuniste dans les deux pays. Cette tension gréco-turque survient peu de temps après

la conclusion du Pacte balkanique signé à Ankara le 28 février 1953 qui établit un accord d'amitié et de coopération entre la Yougoslavie, la Turquie et la Grèce.

Les développements de la guerre d'indépendance de Chypre vont miner la politique d'amitié gréco-turque. Toutefois C. Caramanlis, qui souhaite éviter à tout prix un conflit direct avec les Turcs va minimiser dans la période 1955-1963 tous les incidents provoqués par Ankara au détriment de la Grèce. De fait compte tenu des menaces qui pèsent tant sur le Patriarcat oecuménique, que se propose de démolir bénévolement en novembre 1957 l'association des étudiants de la faculté de droit d'Istanbul,[3] que sur la communauté grecque de Turquie que les autorités d'Ankara veulent contraindre au départ, le gouvernement héllénique adopte un profil bas. Cette volonté d'apaisement d'Athènes va se heurter à l'intransigeance turque.

2. La fidélité aux États Unis et à l'OTAN

Homme de droite, C. Caramanlis, très naturellement a appliqué une politique favorable aux États-Unis et à l'OTAN. Jean Meynaud, dans son livre les "Forces politiques en Grèce" publié en 1965 [4] pense d'ailleurs que le choix par le roi Paul de Caramanlis comme Premier ministre en 1955 est dû au fait qu'il a été jugé "par sa dureté et sa rigueur apparente, plus capable que ses rivaux d'inspirer confiance aux Américains au titre de la lutte contre le communisme". Cet auteur croit même pouvoir affirmer : "Caramanlis était en contact avec les services des États-Unis en Grèce et il n'était pas impossible qu'il soit parvenu à se faire reconnaître par ceux-ci comme *persona grata* avant même d'avoir été remarqué par le Palais.

En pleine guerre civile grecque les États-Unis prennent le relais des Anglais en 1947[5] dans leur soutien aux nationalistes grecs qui combattent leurs compatriotes communistes soutenus par les pays voisins de la Grèce qui se transforment en démocraties populaires. Avec l'application à la Grèce de la doctrine Truman visant à y contrer l'influence de l'URSS et de ses satellites, les Américains exercent sur ce pays, qui bénéficie de l'aide du plan Marshall, un véritable protectorat. L'allégeance de la Grèce aux États-Unis va se concrétiser avec son adhésion en 1952 à l'OTAN. La mainmise des Américains sur la vie politique grecque intérieure ou extérieure va alors devenir de plus en plus pesante. C'est ainsi que la diplomatie d'Athènes sera à la remorque des orientations définies par le Département d'Etat. Par exemple en avril 1961 C. Caramanlis, en visite officielle à Washington au moment même où survient la désastreuse opération de Kennedy sur Cuba crut devoir justifier la tentative de débarquement américain sur la baie des Cochons en affirmant que "tout pays a le droit de se sentir concerné par ce qui se passe dans son voisinage immédiat"[6].

A vrai dire Caramanlis se trouve contraint de solliciter l'appui des Américains et de l'OTAN compte tenu des menaces périodiquement avancées par Khroutchev de bombarder la Grèce si ce pays devait accueillir sur son territoire une artillerie nucléaire. Toutefois, le souci de préserver l'indépendance de la Grèce l'amène aussi à se démarquer parfois de la politique de la Maison Blanche. Ainsi en juillet 1958 le gouvernement d'Athènes refuse aux États-Unis, lors de la crise du Liban, l'usage des aéroports situés en territoire héllénique. A cette époque Caramanlis, qui développe une politique active d'amitié avec les Etats arabes en raison des développements de la question chypriote ne souhaite pas favoriser ouvertement les intérêts américains au Proche Orient. A la fin de sa première période de gouvernement qui se termine le 11 juin 1963 avec sa démission du Premier ministère ses relations avec Kennedy ne sont plus très bonnes, Washington voulant se démarquer d'un homme devenu encombrant depuis l'affaire Lambrakis [7].

3. L'indépendance de Chypre

L'île de Chypre dont la population est très majoritairement héllénophone, est le dernier territoire grec à se trouver encore après la Seconde Guerre mondiale sous une domination étrangère et devait donc en toute logique être rattachée à la Grèce et former avec elle une union. "L'Enosis" de Chypre à la Grèce a constitué l'objectif fondamental de la politique chypriote des gouvernements Papagos et Caramanlis. Puissance souveraine de Chypre depuis 1878, la Grande-Bretagne accepte le principe de l'autodétermination des Chypriotes dont la mise en oeuvre toutefois est repoussée à une date indéterminée. Mais la dure répression contre les Chypriotes grecs de l'EOKA qui luttent contre la domination anglaise et l'arrestation puis la déportation aux Seychelles de Mgr Makarios, Archevêque de Chypre, en mars 1956, minent les efforts de Caramanlis partisan d'une politique de négociations entre ce dernier et le maréchal Harding, le gouverneur de l'île.

Le gouvernement grec qui veut que la solution du problème chypriote, ainsi que le lui conseille Washington, soit trouvée dans le cadre de l'OTAN ou dans celui d'un dialogue direct avec Londres se voit contraint d'internationaliser la question de la décolonisation de Chypre. Athènes d'une part va se rapprocher des pays du tiers monde dont le poids s'affirme sur la scène mondiale et d'autre part va dénoncer devant l'ONU la politique chypriote des Anglais.

Caramanlis qui affirme souvent la loyauté de la Grèce à l'Occident est entraîné dans un rapprochement spectaculaire avec le mouvement des pays non alignés qui combat durement les intérêts des puissances "impérialistes" selon la terminologie alors utilisée. En août 1957, il se rend en visite au

Caire où le colonel Nasser soutient vigoureusement le principe d'autodétermination du peuple chypriote. En décembre de cette année ce principe n'obtient pas à l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU la majorité requise des 2/3 pour être adoptée, Caramanlis et Makarios s'opposant curieusement à une motion en faveur de l'indépendance de Chypre proposée par la délégation de l'Inde[8].

Concilier une politique étrangère proche du camp neutraliste avec ses engagements auprès de ses alliés de l'OTAN va s'avérer pour la Grèce un exercice très difficile. Le gouvernement d'Athènes, par exemple, refuse pendant la crise de Suez de l'automne 1956, le droit d'atterissage aux avions anglais et français se rendant à Chypre. A la même époque, seul parmi les pays de l'OTAN, il accepte de se faire représenter à l'Ambassade de l'URSS, le jour de la fête nationale de ce pays, oubliant ainsi l'affaire hongroise. Par ailleurs le manque d'expérience internationale de Constantin Caramanlis et la mauvaise image à l'étranger de son ministre des affaires étrangères Evangélos Averoff [9] déconcertent des pays comme la France qui n'arrivent pas à suivre les méandres de la politique chypriote à Athènes.

Acceptant finalement l'indépendance de Chypre par les accords de Zurich et de Londres de février 1959, qui excluent toute possibilité d'Enosis avec la Grèce, Caramanlis s'associe aux gouvernements britannique et turc pour imposer aux Chypriotes une solution dont ceux ci ne voulaient sans doute pas[10].

Il est clair que Caramanlis, ainsi qu'il devait l'affirmer le 27 février 1962 à l'ancien président du Conseil français René Pleven de passage à Athènes[11] "a pris personnellement la responsabilité de mettre fin à l'affaire de Chypre d'une manière qui n'était pas conforme aux aspirations historiques du peuple grec" parce que la pierre angulaire de la politique de la Grèce était son appartenance à l'Occident. Pour cette même raison Caramanlis a provoqué l'Association de la Grèce au Marché Commun.

4 . L'Association à la Communauté européenne

Une fois réglée, certes provisoirement, la question chypriote, Caramanlis, peut alors entamer dès juin 1959 la procédure d'association de la Grèce avec la Communauté européenne.

A vrai dire, ainsi que le souligne Roger Massip[12] cette démarche avait une grande importance politique. Elle signifiait qu'entre le projet britannique de création d'une zone de libre échange (A.E.L.E.) et la Communauté européenne, la Grèce avait fait son choix.

Le fait est que Caramanlis, qui rencontre à plusieurs reprises le général de Gaulle, en particulier le 12 juillet 1960 à Paris, est vivement encouragé par ce dernier à s'éloigner de l'orbite anglo-américaine et à privilégier le processus de construction européenne auquel participe la France. Les négociations du gouvernement grec avec Bruxelles ont conduit à la conclusion du traité d'Association signé à Athènes le 9 juillet 1961 et qui entra en vigueur le 1er novembre 1962. Ce traité a notamment prévu :

- l'établissement d'une union douanière
- le développement d'actions communes et l'harmonisation des politiques de la Communauté et de la Grèce, en particulier dans les domaines de la concurrence et de l'agriculture
- la mise à la disposition de l'économie grecque de ressources destinées à faciliter son développement accéléré.

L'accord d'Athènes comportait également une clause qui prévoyait la possibilité d'adhésion à terme de la Grèce à la Communauté européenne. Premier pays à s'associer au Marché Commun, la Grèce, dès le début des années soixante, affirme avec Caramanlis sa vocation européenne.

II. La politique étrangère de Caramanlis de 1974 à 1980

Au cours de son exil parisien qui dure de 1963 à 1974 Caramanlis se tient hors du champ politique. Il est cependant amené à commenter les conséquences néfastes sur la politique étrangère de la Grèce du coup d'État des colonels qui intervient à Athènes le 21 avril 1967. Il souligne ainsi que les Turcs essaient de tirer profit de la situation anormale qui règne en Grèce [13]. Mais c'est le rejet par la famille des nations libres de son pays jadis noyau de l'Europe qui préoccupe surtout l'ancien Premier ministre retiré à Paris [14].

Le coup de force fomenté par le régime militaire grec contre Mgr Makarios en juillet 1974 sert de prétexte à la Turquie pour envahir l'île de Chypre. Désemparée la Junte d'Athènes remet alors le pouvoir aux civils. Revenu de Paris dans la nuit du 23 au 24 juillet Caramanlis forme un gouvernement d'unité nationale.

1. L'intervention militaire turque à Chypre

Confronté au délicat problème sur le plan intérieur de la "déjuntisation", Caramanlis doit également affronter l'éventualité d'une guerre totale avec la Turquie. Se rendant compte que l'armée grecque, sous équipée, mal entraînée et très divisée à la suite des différentes épurations opérées pendant la période de la dictature n'était pas en mesure de mener un combat efficace contre les forces armées turques, il préfère alors utiliser les cartes de la diplomatie afin de trouver une solution à la question chypriote[15].

Sur ses instructions Georges Mavros, ministre grec des affaires étrangères, signe à Genève le 30 juillet 1974 une déclaration avec ses collègues britannique et turc qui met fin aux hostilités à Chypre. Cet accord tripartite se trouve rapidement violé lorsque la Turquie le 14 août suivant lance une deuxième offensive dont le résultat sera l'occupation de près de 40 % du territoire chypriote.

Face à cette provocation turque Caramanlis se bornera à décider le retrait de la Grèce de l'OTAN ce même jour et à susciter par la suite le vote par l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU de résolutions favorables au respect de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance de la République de Chypre[16]. Le gouvernement grec obtiendra aussi grâce à l'appui de l'importante communauté grecque des États-Unis que le Congrès de ce pays impose un embargo, de février 1975 à août 1978 sur l'aide militaire à la Turquie.

Au total, Caramanlis en 1974, comme en 1959 accepte qu'il soit mis fin au conflit chypriote dans des conditions peu favorables aux intérêts helléniques. Il s'agissait en 1959 de faciliter l'association de la Grèce au Marché commun. En 1974 c'est pour assurer l'adhésion de ce pays à la Communauté européenne que son gouvernement accepte de ne pas mobiliser tous ses moyens pour que soit sanctionnée effectivement l'intervention militaire turque. Caramanlis a en effet compris qu'un pays qui veut faire partie de l'Europe communautaire ne peut y entrer avec le handicap de problèmes majeurs susceptibles de mettre en difficulté ses partenaires.

2. La Grèce et l'OTAN

Pendant la période qui précède l'indépendance de Chypre, Caramanlis poussé par une opposition de gauche et d'extrême gauche avait agité la menace du retrait de la Grèce de l'OTAN. Ce n'est que le 14 août 1974 que ce pays, compte tenu de la relative indifférence de ses alliés après la double intervention militaire turque à Chypre causant plus de 5000 morts, est passé à l'acte en se retirant de cette organisation.

Caramanlis par cette décision approuvée unanimement par le peuple grec a su prouver qu'il avait rompu tout lien de dépendance à l'égard des États-Unis et entendait agir sans tenir compte des intérêts du Département d'Etat. Pour comprendre cette attitude de l'ancien Premier ministre grec il faut savoir que celui-ci pendant son séjour parisien a été influencé par sa fréquentation des milieux gaullistes très américanophobes. En particulier il semble que Michel Debré devenu un des ses plus fidèles amis ait joué un rôle déterminant auprès de lui. Cette méfiance de Caramanlis envers Washington a été renforcée par les manoeuvres obscures de Henry Kissinger lors de la chute du régime des colonels dont un des objectifs a été d'empêcher son retour au pouvoir [17].

Au cours des années 1975 à 1977 le gouvernement grec s'est efforcé, mais en vain, de conclure avec l'OTAN un accord spécial tenant compte des nouvelles réalités nées de la décision du 14 août 1974. Puis Caramanlis a estimé que la politique de la chaise vide à l'égard de l'OTAN était préjudiciable pour la Grèce et qu'il était préférable pour elle de réintégrer cette organisation. Mais la Turquie va alors opposer pendant plusieurs années son veto à cette réintégration tant que certaines questions comme le partage des responsabilités entre Athènes et Ankara en mer Egée ne seraient pas préalablement réglées. La Grèce au cours de l'année 1980 décide de brusquer les négociations sur sa réintégration dans l'OTAN en faisant savoir à Washington que si avant la fin de cette année celle-ci n'avait pas été réalisée elle serait contrainte de fermer les bases américaines sur son territoire, dont le statut était alors en cours de révision.

Devenu Président de la République le 5 mai 1980, Caramanlis laisse à Georges Rallis qui lui succède à la tête du gouvernement le soin de finaliser les négociations sur la réintégration de la Grèce dans l'OTAN qui interviendra le 20 octobre suivant.

3. Les tensions gréco-turques

Avec le retour de la démocratie en Grèce en juillet 1974 débute une période de tensions gréco-turques qui se poursuit encore aujourd'hui. Outre la question chypriote, le contentieux entre la Grèce et la Turquie s'alourdit de problèmes que soulève sans cesse Ankara qui s'efforce d'affaiblir par tous les moyens les intérêts helléniques. Le gouvernement turc remet ainsi en cause le statut de la mer Égée, agite la question de la minorité turcophone de Thrace, et laisse se développer sans réagir les attaques des milieux islamistes de Constantinople contre le Patriarcat oecuménique et la minorité grecque qui y vit encore.

* Les problèmes de l'Egée

La question du plateau continental de la mer Egée sur lequel Athènes, conformément au droit international affirme ses droits souverains a été posée dès 1973 avec la délivrance par Ankara de permis de recherche pétrolière. Le gouvernement Caramanlis qui saisit simultanément le 10 août 1976 le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU et la Cour internationale de justice n'obtient pas de ces institutions de solution aux difficultés dont il souhaitait le règlement. Au problème du statut du plateau continental est liée la question de la délimitation de la largeur des eaux territoriales, la Turquie refusant à la Grèce le droit de porter cette étendue de 6 à 12 milles marins.

Le contrôle de l'espace aérien de l'Egée dont la Turquie conteste le *statu quo*, au moment même de son intervention militaire à Chypre, a entraîné de 1974 à 1980 une suspension des vols internationaux ce qui a obligé, par exemple les vols civils desservant la Turquie à passer au dessus de la Bulgarie. Finalement la circulation aérienne civile au dessus de la mer Egée a pu être rétablie le 22 février 1980 grâce à un assouplissement de la position de la Turquie qui toutefois persiste toujours à faire survoler cette mer par ses avions militaires dont le refus de se soumettre aux règles de contrôle imposées par la Grèce entraîne très souvent de graves incidents.

Ankara s'est aussi insurgée contre la militarisation par la Grèce des îles de l'est de l'Egée et du Dodécanése qui selon les traités de Lausanne (1923) et de Paris (1947) doivent être démilitarisées. De fait en raison de l'implantation de la quatrième armée turque forte de cent mille hommes juste en face de ces îles le gouvernement Caramanlis a été effectivement contraint pour des raisons de sécurité de doter celles ci d'équipement militaire.

*** La minorité turcophone de Thrace**

Le traité de Lausanne qui avait prévu un échange de populations entre la Grèce et la Turquie ne s'est pas appliqué à la minorité turcophone de Thrace, le gouvernement grec souhaitant, moyennant cette concession, que les citoyens héllenes habitant Constantinople puissent y demeurer.

De l'ordre de 120 000 personnes, cette minorité bénéficie d'écoles spécifiques, de mosquées, de journaux et dans la pratique de quatre représentants au parlement héllénique. L'exode rural qui a affecté en Thrace essentiellement la population grecque a été tel que dans certains villages la majorité des habitants est formée de musulmans parlant turc. C'est pourquoi en 1979 le Premier ministre turc B. Ecevit a cru devoir dénoncer les pressions administratives qu'exerceraient les autorités grecques sur cette minorité notamment pour la contraindre à quitter la Grèce. Le gouvernement Caramanlis en réponse a lié le sort de la minorité turcophone de Thrace à celui de la minorité héllénophone de Constantinople[18].

*** Le Patriarcat oecuménique et la minorité grecque de Constantinople**

Sur un ton très mesuré le gouvernement Caramanlis ainsi que tous les gouvernements qui lui ont succédé ont protesté auprès des autorités d'Ankara contre les difficultés rencontrées par le Patriarcat oecuménique et la minorité grecque de Constantinople. Très régulièrement les milieux islamistes mais aussi parfois les autorités civiles de Turquie laissent entendre que le Patriarcat oecuménique doit quitter le pays ou limiter son rôle à celui d'une simple église locale. De la même manière, la population grecque de Constantinople forte de 200 000 personnes en 1923 est depuis

en constante diminution car soumise à des vexations et menaces souvent liées à l'évolution de la question chypriote comme ce fut le cas en 1955 et en 1974 [19]. De même les îles d'Imbros et Ténédos rétrocédées par la Grèce à la Turquie en 1923 et dont la population était à majorité grecque ont été progressivement totalement déshellénisées.

Caramanlis désireux de contenir le contentieux gréco turc a proposé à Ankara en avril 1976 puis en juin 1978 la conclusion d'un pacte de non agression. Cette proposition s'est heurtée à une fin de non recevoir. Il a alors eu l'heureuse idée de s'appuyer sur les Etats balkaniques afin de mieux faire face à la pression de la Turquie qui s'est trouvée ainsi contrainte de participer à la coopération multilatérale proposée par la Grèce. C'est ainsi que le gouvernement grec a réussi à réunir à Athènes du 26 janvier au 5 février 1976 une conférence interbalkanique de coopération multilatérale qui a constitué la première application régionale de la Déclaration d'Helsinki.

La coopération interbalkanique qui va se poursuivre jusqu'à l'effondrement des pays communistes de l'Europe centrale a eu le grand mérite de rapprocher les Etats appartenant à des camps politiques opposés et de permettre à la Grèce d'étendre son influence dans une région très importante pour elle. Mais si l'appartenance de la Grèce à l'Europe balkanique a constitué un objectif majeur de la politique étrangère de Caramanlis l'adhésion de son pays à l'Europe communautaire a été pour lui l'objectif prioritaire de toute son action gouvernementale dès son retour au pouvoir en 1974.

4. L'adhésion de la Grèce à l'Europe communautaire

Une des conséquences du coup d'Etat des colonels du 21 avril 1967 a été le "gel" par Bruxelles des principales dispositions de l'accord d'Association de la Grèce à la CEE qui a été réactivé en 1974 avec le rétablissement de la démocratie à Athènes. Puis le 12 juin 1975 Constantin Caramanlis après avoir reçu quelques semaines plus tôt un soutien de la France à qui il réserve sa première visite officielle à l'étranger après son retour au pouvoir, formule la demande d'adhésion de son pays à la Communauté européenne.

Grâce à Giscard d'Estaing qui se fait le champion de l'adhésion grecque il parvient à vaincre les réticences de la Commission de Bruxelles et de la plupart des neuf pays composant alors la CEE à un élargissement trop hâtif de la Communauté à un Etat dont le développement économique était assez faible. Finalement la Grèce devient le dixième membre du Marché commun par le traité signé à Athènes le 28 mai 1979. A cette occasion Caramanlis après avoir évoqué l'unification de l'Europe déclare que "la Grèce accepte à partir d'aujourd'hui d'une manière définitive ce défi historique et sa destinée européenne, tout en conservant son identité nationale" [20].

La ratification du traité d'Athènes par le Parlement héllénique intervient le 28 juin 1979 par 191 voix, 2 contre, 3 abstentions et 104 refus de vote qui émanent du Pasok et du parti communiste de l'extérieur, deux partis très hostiles à l'option européenne de la Grèce. Grâce à son adhésion à l'Europe communautaire, qui est effective le 1er janvier 1981 la Grèce réalise un triple objectif. D'une part par son appartenance à un ensemble d'Etats qui sont tous dotés d'institutions démocratiques elle assure sa stabilité politique acquise après une période de dictature militaire de plus de sept ans. D'autre part elle obtient l'octroi d'aides financières qui vont lui permettre d'accélerer son développement économique. Enfin elle sait que son voisin turc hésitera désormais à donner suite à ses menaces d'expansion territoriale, toute violation de ses frontières devant être considérée comme une violation du territoire de la CEE. Au cours de son premier quinquennat de Président de la République (mai 1980 - mars 1985) dont la majeure partie a lieu en période de cohabitation avec le gouvernement socialiste de Papandréou, nommé en octobre 1981, Caramanlis adopte un profil bas laissant le Pasok mener le pays comme il l'entend. Il est toutefois certain que ce parti ne met pas en oeuvre son programme annoncé de retrait de la Grèce de l'OTAN et du Marché commun ainsi que sa promesse électorale de fermeture des bases américaines autant par réalisme politique que par souci de ne pas engager un conflit avec le Chef de l'Etat. Très affecté par le refus du Pasok en 1990 de le présenter pour un second mandat présidentiel[21] Caramanlis se retire alors de la vie publique.

Force est de constater que le second mandat présidentiel que fera finalement Caramanlis de mai 1990 à mars 1995 n'aura aucun impact sur la politique étrangère de Grèce. Celui-ci qui entame son second quinquennat à l'âge de 83 ans et avec des compétences très réduites depuis la révision constitutionnelle de 1986 ne troublera en rien l'action gouvernementale en politique intérieure ou extérieure de ses deux Premiers ministres, Mitsotakis jusqu'en octobre 1993 puis Papandréou. N'effectuant aucun voyage à l'étranger, absent du Conseil européen de Corfou de juin 1994, Caramanlis semble étranger à la conduite de la diplomatie d'Athènes, si on excepte certaines manifestations de son intérêt pour la question macédonienne, lui-même étant originaire de Macédoine.

Si on veut faire le bilan de la politique étrangère menée par les différents gouvernements dirigés par Caramanlis on doit constater que la prise en charge par celui-ci de la question chypriote aussi bien dans la période 1955-1963 que dans la période 1974-1980 n'a pas été très bénéfique pour les intérêts héllèniques[22]. En revanche il faut reconnaître que Caramanlis a eu avant beaucoup d'autres la vision de l'importance que prendrait la construction européenne à laquelle il a su associer son pays.

Caramanlis, peu disert, confiait parfois à ses visiteurs durant son exil parisien qu'il souhaitait que son nom soit inscrit un jour en lettres d'or dans l'histoire de son pays. Il est certain que celui qui a rétabli la démocratie à Athènes en 1974 et assuré en 1981, dans l'Europe qui s'unit une place méritée à la Grèce figure, déjà, dans le panthéon de son histoire.

NOTES

1. Voir Jean Catsiapis "La politique étrangère d'Andréas Papandréou", **Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Printemps 1997, p. 13-28.

2. Voir Jean Catsiapis, "La Grèce dixième membre des Communautés européennes", **Notes et Etudes documentaires n° 4593-4594**, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1980.

3. Pour justifier cette proposition de démolition de Patriarcat oecuménique l'Association des étudiants de la faculté de droit d'Istanbul considère que celui-ci constitue "une institution ingrate abolie à Lausanne par ATATURK et privée de tout fondement historique".

Voir Dépêche de M. Henry Spitzmuller, Ambassadeur de France en Turquie du 18 novembre 1957.

4. Voir Jean Meynaud, **Les forces politiques en Grèce**, Montréal, Etudes de Sciences Politiques, 1965, p.245-246.

5. Le 20 février 1947 le Trésor britannique s'oppose à toute continuation de l'aide à la Grèce. Le 12 mars suivant, le Président des États-Unis prononce devant les deux chambres du Congrès le discours posant les bases de la doctrine Truman de lutte contre le communisme.

6. Sur la visite de Caramanlis à Washington voir Christopher M. WOODHOUSE, "Karamanlis, the Restorer of Greek Democracy", New York, Oxford Press University, 1982, p. 108.

7. En mai 1963 le député de l'EDA (extrême gauche) Grigoris Lambrakis est tué à Thessalonique au cours d'une manifestation par des nervis de la police. Ce meurtre éclabousse sur le plan interne et à l'étranger le gouvernement Caramanlis qui toutefois n'en est pas directement responsable.

8. La délégation de l'Inde à l'ONU propose que soit adoptée une résolution sur l'indépendance de Chypre, mais Makarios pour des raisons inexplicables, lui qui six mois plus tôt, en juillet avait préconisé parallélement à l'ENOSIS de Chypre à la Grèce le principe de l'indépendance de son pays, s'oppose alors à cette initiative de Krishna Menon. Celui-ci, face à cette surprenante opposition déclare: "Je croyais que les Grecs avaient la réputation d'être intelligents". Sur ce point voir C. Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p.72.

9. L'Ambassadeur de France en Grèce, Guy Girard de Charbonnières dans une dépêche du 11 décembre 1958 qualifie E. Averoff de "fort mauvais ministre des affaires étrangères". Voir Annexe 1.

10. Voir sur ce point la dépêche de l'Ambassadeur de France en Grèce Guy Girard de Charbonnières du 24 février 1959. (Annexe 2).

11. Voir la dépêche de l'Ambassadeur de France en Grèce Guy Girard de Charbonnières du 28 février 1962 (Annexe 3).

12. Roger MASSIP, **Caramanlis, un Grec hors du commun**, Paris, Stock, 1982, p.135.

13. Entretien avec Eric Rouleau, **Le Monde**, 29 novembre 1967.

14. Déclaration à la presse du 30 novembre 1969 (texte intégral reproduit dans le livre de Maurice Genevoix, **La Grèce de Caramanlis**, Paris, Plon, 1972.

15. Sur les événements de 1974 à Chypre voir le dossier sur la question chypriote établi par Jean CATSIAPIS, "Problèmes politiques et sociaux "n° 308 - 15 avril 1977, Paris, Documentation française.

16. Voir en particulier la résolution n° 3212 de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU du 1er novembre 1974 dont le texte est reproduit dans le dossier sur la question chypriote mentionné à la note 15.

17. Constantin Caramanlis a confié à l'auteur de cet article, peu avant la chute de la dictature militaire, le 24 juillet 1974, que les Américains ne voulaient pas de lui pour gouverner la Grèce. De fait on sait que dans un premier temps c'est Panayiotis Canellopoulos qui avait été désigné par le général Ghizikis pour former le nouveau gouvernement avant que ce dernier ne se résigne à faire appel à Caramanlis qui apparaissait à l'évidence comme le seul homme fort capable de sauver le pays du chaos.

18. M.Zaïmis, Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires étrangères en réponse aux déclarations de M. Ecevit, a affirmé le 31 août 1979 que les deux minorités devaient s'équilibrer en nombre.

19. Réduite à 8000 personnes en 1980 la minorité grecque de Constantinople serait aujourd'hui composée de moins de 5000 membres.

20. Les principaux extraits du discours du 28 mai 1979 de C. Caramanlis sont reproduits dans le livre de R. Massip, cité à la note 12.

21. Voir sur ce point le livre (en grec) de Dimitra Papandréou, **10 ans et 54 jours** Athènes, Nea Sinora, Groupe d'édition Livani, 1997, p. 134-137.

22. Il semble que Caramanlis lui même est très amer que sa politique chypriote n'a pas été comprise par Mgr Makarios. Dans une lettre adressée le 8 novembre 1966 à son ami Constantin Tsatsos, auquel se réfère C. Woodhouse page 180 de son ouvrage, il regrette de n'avoir pas reçu un mot de remerciements de l'Archevêque de Chypre après avoir contribué à la solution du problème de Chypre en 1959. Caramanlis a aussi indiqué à l'auteur de la présente étude dans un entretien le 8 mars 1977 qu'il ne s'était jamais rendu à Chypre car il n'y avait jamais été invité.

Annexe 1

Dépêche du 11 décembre 1958 de M. Guy GIRARD de CHARBONNIERES, Ambassadeur de France en Grèce (Extraits).

Archives du Quai d'Orsay.

Sur le plan proprement diplomatique, le Gouvernement hellénique se révélait incapable de définir, face au plan MAC MILLAN, une politique nette et de s'y tenir. Il repoussait ce plan mais laissait la porte ouverte à d'éventuelles négociations. Sans paraître se rendre compte que les circonstances avaient changé et qu'il était maintenant engagé dans une partie où il fallait jouer serré, il annonçait le retrait de revendications qui étaient depuis des années le leitmotiv de sa politique chypriote, comme par exemple celle de l'autodisposition, ce qui ne contentait aucunement ses adversaires mais affaiblissait en revanche sa position pour de futures discussions autour du tapis vert. Lorsque de telles discussions s'ouvrirent effectivement au Palais de Chaillot, j'ai à peine besoin de souligner quelles furent les hésitations, les vacillations et les contradictions de l'attitude de la délégation hellénique qui finirent par lui faire attribuer la responsabilité de l'échec de ces discussions. Moi-même, me trouvant à Athènes en contact régulier avec les chefs de la diplomatie grecque et étant animé du plus grand désir d'aider mes interlocuteurs, j'étais dans l'incapacité de renseigner exactement le Département sur les projets ou intentions du Gouvernement hellénique, les propos qui m'étaient tenus par les principaux membres de ce gouvernement se démentant les uns les autres et les communications qui m'étaient faites de la manière la plus officielle n'étant fréquemment suivies d'aucun effet.

Ce qui s'est passé à l'occasion du débat de l'ONU illustre singulièrement cette manière de procéder. Je rappelle que, convoqué spécialement par le Premier Ministre la veille de ce débat, je fus chargé par lui de transmettre au Général de GAULLE un message lui demandant de soutenir la thèse qui serait présentée à Manhattan par la délégation grecque, la suite que comporterait le vote d'une telle résolution étant également exposée. Or le texte déposé 48 heures plus tard par M. AVEROFF n'avait aucun rapport avec ce qui m'avait été ainsi solennellement déclaré. De même, alors que le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères m'avait affirmé qu'il aurait recours à toutes les ressources de la procédure pour obliger les Nations Unies à se prononcer sur un texte reconnaissant le droit des Chypriotes à l'indépendance, il finit par participer à la rédaction d'un projet présenté sous la signature du représentant mexicain et qui ne faisait aucune allusion à cette indépendance. Hésitante, velléitaire et même parfois contradictoire, telle a été la politique chypriote du Gouvernement grec au cours des derniers mois. Il n'est donc pas étonnant qu'elle ait abouti à un échec.

Cela est d'ailleurs dû en grande partie à la personnalité des hommes qui en avaient la direction. M. CARAMANLIS n'est certainement pas dépourvu de valeur. Mais il n'a aucune expérience internationale et agit essentiellement en fonction de la situation politique intérieure. Les critiques d'une opposition pourtant incohérente et les attaques d'une presse dont il devrait plus que quiconque

connaître l'insignifiance, le mettent hors de lui. Convaincu du bon droit de la Grèce dans l'affaire de Chypre et de la volonté de l'opinion publique de voir cette affaire réglée conformément au bon droit, il souffre sincèrement de ne pouvoir le faire triompher et donne depuis quelques mois l'impresion d'un esprit torturé. Quant à M. AVEROFF, dont l'intelligence ne manque pas de séduction, c'est l'homme le plus instable qui soit. Impulsif, se laissant aller sous le coup de l'irritation à des déclarations intempestives, sautant en quelques heures d'une idée à une autre, il faut reconnaître que c'est un fort mauvais ministre des Affaires Etrangères et qu'il mérite toutes les critiques qui lui sont actuellement prodiguées. Non pas menteur, mais homme à sincérités successives, il rend singulièrement difficile la tâche des diplomates qui doivent garder le contact avec lui. Même les mieux disposés, comme moi-même, ont de la peine à le suivre dans ses méandres et à se faire ses interprètes auprès de leur gouvernement.

Annexe 2

Dépêche du 25 février 1959 de M. Guy GIRARD de CHARBONNIERES, Ambassadeur de France en Grèce (Extraits).

Archives du Quai d'Orsay.

Que le Gouvernement grec n'ait pas hésité à s'associer aux gouvernements britannique et turc pour imposer aux représentants chypriotes par le recours à un ultimatum une solution dont ceux-ci ne voulaient pas est sans doute ce qu'il y a dans toute l'affaire de plus contraire à la position prise et affirmée jusque là par ce gouvernement. Je n'ai pas besoin en effet de rappeler que les dirigeants d'Athènes avaient maintenu en toutes circonstances que le problème de Chypre ne concernait ni la Turquie ni la Grèce elle-même, cette dernière intervenant seulement pour obtenir que le peuple chypriote puisse faire entendre sa voix, et que c'était ce peuple et le gouvernement britannique qui étaient les deux seuls interlocuteurs qualifiés. Il est impossible d'imaginer un reniement plus complet que la manière dont ont procédé MM. CARAMANLIS et AVEROFF. Non seulement, en effet, ils ont élaboré un statut de Chypre en dehors des Chypriotes et ont contribué à l'imposer à ces derniers contre leur volonté, mais ils ont rédigé leur projet au moyen d'une négociation directe avec les dirigeants turcs dont ils n'avaient cessé de proclamer qu'ils n'avaient aucune qualité pour intervenir à quelque titre que ce fût dans un règlement de l'affaire. Je n'ai pas non plus besoin de rappeler les innombrables déclarations du Gouvernement hellénique en ce sens. A la dernière réunion des Nations Unies, c'est-à-dire il y a moins de trois mois, ses représentants se révoltaient encore à l'idée que l'on puisse reconnaître la Turquie comme "puissance intéressée". On aura rarement vu un retournement plus rapide et plus total et il faut avouer qu'il y a là de quoi déconcerter à la fois les observateurs étrangers et l'opinion hellénique elle-même.

Le statut qui vient d'être concédé à Chypre prévoit, lui, une véritable co-souveraineté des communautés grecque et turque de l'île en dépit de la flagrante infériorité numérique de cette dernière, une possibilité constante d'intervention de

la part de la Grande-Bretagne, de la Grèce et de la Turquie et une garantie de ces trois puissances leur permettant collectivement ou même isolément de s'opposer par la force à toute modification, en particulier sous la forme d'une union à la Grèce. Celle-ci se trouve donc effectivement exclue pour toujours.

La solution du problème chypriote qui vient d'être réalisée avec la collaboration du gouvernement hellénique lui-même et que celui-ci présente comme une satisfaction donnée à ses revendications essentielles tourne en fait à peu près exactement le dos à tout ce que ce gouvernement avait réclamé dans un passé non seulement lointain mais même extrêmement récent. Il accepte en revanche tout ce qu'il n'avait cessé de repousser avec indignation.

La poursuite du combat pour Chypre entraînait donc de telles conséquences que l'on comprend que M. CARAMANLIS et son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aient refusé de les affronter et qu'ils aient sauté sur la possibilité qui leur était offerte de conclure une transaction qui, si coûteuse qu'elle fût, était au moins honorable.

C'est là que la diplomatie turque a fait preuve une fois de plus de beaucoup d'habileté. M. ZORLU a su prendre M. AVEROFF par son point faible qui est la vanité. Je tiens du Ministre grec lui-même que son collègue turc l'avait abordé en lui disant : "Nous avons gagné mais c'est vous qui êtes le plus fort", ce qui voulait dire, me précisa M. AVEROFF avec complaisance, qu'il avait fait preuve au cours des débats d'une supériorité personnelle manifeste sur ses interlocuteurs. M. ZORLU eut l'air d'autre part de se présenter comme demandeur et donna à M. AVEROFF l'impression que le Gouvernement turc, inquiet de la situation provoquée par les événements d'Irak, désirait ardemment retrouver la collaboration militaire de la Grèce et l'amitié de ce pays. C'est donc dans des conditions favorables pour leur amour-propre que les dirigeants d'Athènes s'engagèrent dans des négociations leur ouvrant la perspective d'une solution dont ils avaient eux-mêmes tellement besoin. Causant avec M. AVEROFF, j'avais été surpris de voir l'étendue des concessions qu'il était prêt à consentir.

Conscient des sacrifices qu'il a dû s'imposer, mais conscient aussi des périls auxquels il a échappé et dont son opinion publique ne se rend certainement pas compte, le Gouvernement grec éprouve avant tout aujourd'hui un sentiment de soulagement. Comme me l'a dit le Roi il y a quelques jours, comme me l'avait dit bien avant lui le Président du Conseil, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et d'autres membres du Gouvernement, l'affaire de Chypre avait peu à peu créé ici une atmosphère de cauchemar. Les erreurs accumulées par la diplomatie hellénique à son sujet avaient fini par mettre la Grèce en opposition déclarée avec les pays qui étaient non seulement ses alliés mais ses amis traditionnels tandis qu'elle était obligée de courtiser des pays pour lesquels elle n'avait aucune sympathie particulière ou dont elle était même l'adversaire sur d'autres points. Une telle situation ne pouvait pas se prolonger. Le jour devait venir où un choix serait inéluctable et, étant donné ce que sont, non pas peut-être le peuple grec lui-même, mais en tout cas ses dirigeants, ce choix ne pouvait pas ne pas être celui de l'Occident. Dans les milieux officiels d'Athènes, comme dans les cercles d'affaires

et dans la société, la satisfaction éclate. Tout en admettant que le peuple chypriote est injustement dépouillé de droits qui auraient dû lui être reconnus et en déplorant que le Gouvernement n'ait pas été en mesure de faire pleinement triompher une cause aussi légitime, chacun se félicite de ce que, du moins, la Grèce puisse désormais suivre une politique sans équivoque et conforme à ses véritables intérêts.

Annexe 3

Dépêche du 28 février 1962 de M. Guy GIRARD de CHARBONNIERES, Ambassadeur de France en Grèce (Extraits).

Archives du Quai d'Orsay.

Le Premier Ministre a déjeûné hier chez moi dans l'intimité à l'occasion du passage à Athènes du Président Pleven. Il a fait, à l'intention de ce dernier, un très long exposé de sa politique qui, à vrai dire, ne contenait rien de très nouveau pour moi, mais était assez frappant par sa vigueur et la netteté des vues qu'il exprimait. M. Caramanlis a affirmé qu'en dépit de son éloignement géographique, la Grèce faisait partie intégrante de l'Occident, et que c'était là la pierre angulaire de sa politique. C'est pour cela qu'il avait pris personnellement la responsabilité de mettre fin à l'affaire de Chypre d'une manière qui n'était pas conforme aux aspirations historiques du peuple grec, c'est pour cela aussi qu'il avait provoqué l'Association de la Grèce au Marché Commun.

The Umbilical Relationship: Greece and the United States

Marios L. Evriviades*

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet article l'auteur examine les relations gréco-américaines de l'après guerre et en particulier la période après 1974. Il souligne que le sujet dominant de ces relations est celui de la sécurité. Ce facteur demeure toujours plus important pour la Grèce que pour le États-Unis aussi longtemps que la Turquie tente de modifier l'équilibre des forces en Méditerranée orientale.

Par ailleurs, l'auteur souligne que la Grèce et les États-Unis entament une nouvelle phase de leurs relations, qui est caractérisée par une maturité nouvelle de la part des deux acteurs.

ABSTRACT

In this article, the author examines the post-WW II and especially the post 1974 Greco-American relations. The author underlines that the one constant, dominant and characteristic factor that stands out in the relations between the two states is security. The security factor will remain more important for Greece rather than the USA as long as Turkey threatens the balance of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.

However, the author underlines that Greece and the United States are entering a new phase in their relations which is characterized by a new maturity by both parties.

The Umbilical Relationship: Greece and the United States

From the perspective of Athens, half a century after the Truman Doctrine, Greek relations with the United States remain dependent on the US in matters of security.

The Greek-US security relationship was founded on mutual need, convenience and expediency, all consequences of a common security threat. Greece desperately needed US political and military support to counter the post-WWII Communist threat against its political system and its territorial integrity. The US needed to secure its lines of communication in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in the context of its global strategy to contain (and counter) the Soviet Union, and its regional strategy for unhindered access to the oil wealth of the greater Middle East.[1] The Greek-US bilateral relationship, that was established by the 1947 Truman Doctrine, was further strengthened and enhanced with the 1952 admission of Greece into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

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Until the mid-fifties, the security relationship between Greece and US was as good as it could get. Through bilateral and multilateral treaties, Greece opened up its land and sea facilities to American forces and agreed to the disposition of its army, in accordance with alliance directives, in exchange for massive military and economic aid but, most importantly, for an American and NATO guarantee of its independence and territorial integrity.

The Cold War was at its height and the Americans and the NATO alliance, which Americans led by consensus, identified only one enemy against whom their guarantee was good: Soviet-backed communism. The domestic politics notwithstanding, Greece, one of the poorest and weakest members of the Atlantic Alliance, was content with the guarantee offered because without it Greece was dangerously exposed.

The Greek-US security relationship began to change from the mid-fifties onward. The change was almost imperceptible at first. But by 1975, the change was such that Greek security policies were at odds with those of the US and of the NATO alliance. From 1955 to 1975, Greece, reluctantly at first and almost against its will, but, left without a choice after being pushed to the wall and nationally humiliated in Cyprus in 1974, modified its defense doctrine. It downgraded the threat from the north, that is from the Soviet Union and its allies, and substituted it with the threat from the east, that is from Turkey. By the mid-eighties, Greek defense planners were totally immersed with ways to counter an attack from Turkey and were unconcerned with any threat from the north. The Greek Prime Minister at the time identified Turkey as a country threatening Greece's territorial integrity.[3] When in 1987 war between Greece and Turkey seemed imminent, Greece's Foreign Minister was dispatched to communist Bulgaria to solicit that country's help in case war did break out between Greece and Turkey.[4]

Turkey was, however, a prized US ally and, in the context of the Cold War, viewed as strategically more important than Greece. It was also a NATO member and as such Greece's nominal ally. Furthermore the US was the most important arms supplier for both Greece and Turkey.[5] Neither the US nor NATO were willing to accept or act upon the Greek thesis that one member of the Atlantic alliance was threatening the territorial integrity of another. And the alliance, at any rate, had no mechanism and was unwilling, even on an ad-hoc basis, to act either as a mediator or a conciliator between Greece and Turkey.[6]

Because of the centrality of Turkey in Greek foreign policy and defense planning, the vital importance to Greece and Turkey of the US as leader of NATO and as the most important ally of both countries on a bilateral level and, in the context of arms supplies to both countries, as the state holding the key to the political and military balance between Greece and Turkey, relations between Greece and the US cannot be studied or understood unless viewed within the nexus of Greek-US-Turkish relations. The same cannot be said if one were to study the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the US. That relationship can be examined apart of US relations with Greece without must distortion. But not the relationship between Greece and the US, if Turkey were to be ignored.

In the post-1974 relationship between Greece and the US a number of episodes can be cited to confirm the above thesis. I shall confine myself to just one that is particularly revealing. On March 26, 1976, the United States and Turkey signed a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) which, *inter alia*, called "for defense support for Turkey consisting of grants, credits and loan guarantees of $1.000.000.000 during the first four years this Agreement shall remain in effect."[7] The signing of this agreement (which by mutual consent was never implemented) so alarmed - panicked may be the most appropriate word - the Karamanlis government that the Prime Minister dispatched his Foreign Minister to Washington literally overnight, with an Olympic Airways plane exclusively used for this purpose, in order to meet and discuss the effects of the American-Turkish DECA on Greece.[8] Foreign Minister Dimitri Bitsios met with the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on 10 April 1976. The meeting had been preceded by an urgent communication from the Greek to the American government in which the Greeks were expressing their grave concern over American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.[9] The Bitsios-Kissinger meeting produced the 'Kissinger letter' which represents the closest the US ever came in acceding to the Greek supplication for a security guarantee against Turkey and by implication accepting the Greek thesis about Turkey as a presumed aggressor. The 10 April 1976 Kissinger letter to Bitsios contains "a carefully hedged but not insignificant security guarantee...."[10] *Inter alia*, the letter read:

"You have asked about our attitude toward the resolution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and particularly in the Aegean area. In this regard I should like to reiterate our conviction that these disputes must be settled through peaceful procedures and that each side should avoid provocative actions. We have previously stated our belief that neither side should seek a military solution and will make a major effort to prevent such a course of action.[11]"

Not insignificantly and in addition to the signing of the US-Turkish DECA, the Kissinger letter was preceded by the announcement, in February 1976, that the Turkish research ship, the Hora, later renamed Sismik, would conduct research in the Aegean sea. The decision signaled Turkey's intention to assert or re-assert Turkish claims on the Aegean seabed and in Aegean airspace, claims that were officially put forward in November 1973 and reinforced by Turkish actions in the Aegean during the war on Cyprus.[12] Greek fears of Turkey's aggressive intentions against it (as opposed to designs against Cyprus, where presumably the issues were more complicated but the stakes not that high) and for which the American guarantee was sought, were confirmed with the August 1976 first real Aegean confrontation between Greece and Turkey. That crisis prompted Greece to seek recourse against Turkey both from the U.N. Security Council and the International Court of Justice.[13] It was, incidentally, during this period and in the context of this crisis, that Turkey inaugurated its policy of coercive diplomacy against Greece and publicly pronounced the policy of *casus belli* if Greece were to exercise its right to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles.[14]

The Kissinger letter, in the form of an exchange of letters with Bitsios, found its way into the never implemented 1977 Greek-US DECA. Later, and following an unsuccessful attempt by the Greek Socialist government to obtain a NATO guarantee,[15] which once again spoke to the territorial insecurity of Greece *vis-à-vis* Turkey, Greece sought and obtained renewed assurances that the US was against any attempt to settle Greek-Turkish differences other than by peaceful means. These assurances were incorporated into the preamble of the 1990 US-Greek Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) couched with the appropriate diplomatic language. In this most revealing statement of principles, the US and Greece reaffirmed their respect for international law including existing treaties of particular relevance to the [Aegean] region, and their resolve to act in accordance with treaties as well as bilateral and multilateral arrangements to which they are both party, including the North Atlantic Treaty and the Helsinki Final Act.[16]

The preamble further declared the mutual commitment of the two countries to "respect the principle of refraining from actions threatening peace;" reiterated their determination to mutually protect their respective countries against "actions threatening peace, including armed attack or threat thereof;" confirmed their resolve "to oppose actively and unequivocally any such attempt or action and their commitment to make appropriate major efforts to prevent such course of action;" and finally the two countries reaffirmed, their dedication to the principle that international disputes shall be settled through peaceful means, and their continuing

resolve to contribute actively to the early and just settlement of existing international disputes in the [Aegean] region with particularly concern either Party to this Agreement through peaceful means that accord to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.[17]

The last words of the preamble noted that "nothing in this Agreement is intended to harm the relations of either Party with any third country," did nothing to ameliorate Turkey's concern over the language of the preamble. Turkey was in fact "extremely hostile" to the wording of the preamble and Turkish-American relations were set back even after Ankara extracted the appropriate public disclaimers from the Americans that Turkey was not that "third country."[18] But the chain reaction that commenced with the 1976 US-Turkish DECA, the Greek reaction to it and the American balancing act, illustrated only too well the complex and intricate relationship between Athens, Washington and Ankara and provided a paradigm for similar or analogous actions that were to follow over the next two decades and up until current times.

The 1976 Bitsios-Kissinger meeting, in addition to the Kissinger letter, produced a set of principles that were to guide Greek-US relations ever since and, in particular, on the critical matter for Greece of American security assistance to Greece.[19] Out of these principles and with the supplementary role of the American Congress, within a few years, evolved the seven-ten ratio (7:10) of US military assistance credits to Greece and Turkey. The 7:10 ratio would soon thereafter become a landmark. It would define not only the parameters of Greek-US and Turkish relations, but would assume a highly symbolic importance for both Greece and Turkey. The former tried to sustain it, with the help of Congress, against attempts by the Turks, sometimes aided by the US Administration and sometimes not, to break it.

The matter warrants some discussion because it highlights the complexities and nuances of the Greek-US security relationship. The 7:10 ratio provides an acknowledgment of the necessity for a military balance between Greece and Turkey, a balance unsustainable without the American input. Its very existence speaks of an implied threat against Greece, while its almost religious pursuit by Greece demonstrates the shift of the Greek threat perception from the north to the east. Finally, the 7:10 ratio highlights the critical role of the American Congress which, over the last twenty years, has acted as a cushion between Greece and the American Administration whenever Greek-US relations, as for example during the first part of the decade of the eighties, were severely strained.

The origins of the 7:10 ratio may very well be traced to the two signed but never implemented defense agreements between the US and Turkey in the 1976 and the US and Greece in 1977. The former called for one billion dollars in grants, credits and loan guarantees to Turkey over a four year period while the Bitsios-Kissinger principles referred to earlier, and incorporated into the 1977 Greek DECA, made reference to an American four-year commitment of military credits and grant aid to Greece totaling $700,000,000.[20]

Following the lifting of the Congressionally mandated partial arms embargo against Turkey, imposed on account of her invasion and subsequent actions on Cyprus that violated the legislative conditions of US arms supplies to Turkey, the relevant Congressional legislation referred, *inter alia*, to the need that the present balance of military strength among countries in the region, including between Greece and Turkey, were preserved.[22] While no specific mention is made of the actual ratio in the relevant legislation, a Congressional tradition has evolved since based on the arithmetical ratio of the aid numbers in the two DECAS.[22]

During the Reagan Administration and in particular while Richard Perle, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, held sway over American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Administration persistently attempted to break the 7:10 ratio in favor of Turkey.[23] In this effort the Administration was aided by numerous well paid lobbying firms working for Ankara. But it never succeeded. Congress religiously restored the ratio. The Administration's concern was that the ratio prevented the appropriation of funds needed to modernize Turkey's armed forces in the aftermath of its upgraded strategic role following the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afganistan.[24] Its officials argued incessantly before Congressional committees that the ratio distorted US and NATO military priorities and that these should be set on the basis of military merit and not through a mechanical ratio based on political considerations.[25]

Greece spent an enormous amount of energy and political capital in Washington in order to maintain the 7:10 ratio more for what it stood politically than for what it provided her militarily.[26] The political message was that Congress agreed with the Greek position, that Turkey's policies were threatening to Greece and Cyprus and that Congress may once again impose sanctions on Turkey if her behavior became overtly aggressive in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In recent times the Administration has all but given up efforts to change the ratio with the Turks going along so well. The ratio has in fact become, as Monteagle Stearns has brilliantly argued, "an all-purpose bureaucratic device that serves everyone's interests, even those of the Turks."[27] It is logical, serviceable and above all, notes Stearns, expedient. The existence of the ratio allow the US, Greece and the Turks "a politically expedient excuse for doing the politically expedient thing."[28] The Administration would otherwise have had to explain annually to Congress how aid figures other than those expressed by the 7:10 ratio complied with the legislative requirement of preserving the military balance between Greece and Turkey; the Greek government would have had to explain to its public the high levels of US aid to Turkey; and by not receiving the desired amount of aid, the Turks were justified in imposing restrictions on US activities at American bases in Turkey a practice they have been implementing on and off since 1964.[29]

It is true that during the decade of the eighties, when Greece was run by the Socialists and its leader A. Papandreou, attempts were made and the declaratory and confrontationist foreign policy record of the Greek socialists, give credence to the view that the Greeks attempted to strike the umbilical security chord with the US. Careful analysis however suggests that this was not the case.[30] Papandreou postured, gambled a lot and did walk on a tight rope on a number of occasions and at a dear cost to Greece.[31] But he never followed the logic of his arguments and never took that fateful decision that would have damaged Greek-American relations irreparably. Papandreou was at heart and philosophically an Adlai Stevenson liberal.[32] He was also aware that anti-Americanism, though present, did not run deep in Greek society. It was more a reaction to real and perceived injustices against a friend than hatred against an enemy. He was aware, for example, that the Greek public, or at any rate a vast majority of it, would not kick the Americans out of Greece as PASOK's manifestos and he himself proclaimed. But more importantly he was keenly aware that the US held the key to the balance of power between his country and Turkey, and his generals were there to remind him of that were he to forget it or allow his rhetoric to get in the way of Greece's security interests.

Papandreou's pragmatism was evident throughout the eighties. He did accept Greece's reintegration into the military structure of NATO, negotiated by the Greek conservatives but really made possible by American pressure on Turkey[33], despite the fact that the terms of reintegration were less favorable to Greece than those existing prior to the withdrawal. Of course Papandreou did this because he recognized that Greece's security *vis-à-vis* Turkey could be better defended from within NATO's integrated

structure than from without. This explains why Papandreou, while accusing NATO and the Americans for not taking a stand against Turkey's aggressive behavior, confined himself to vetoing NATO communiqués, refused to participate in NATO exercises, but did not withdraw from the integrated command. The 1974-1980 period of withdrawal from NATO's integrated command had been a sober lesson to the entire Greek political leadership, except perhaps the Communists, because it underscored Greek vulnerability *vis-à-vis* Turkey. The absence of Greece from the integrated command permitted Turkey to 'legitimize' within NATO its claims to 'defend' Aegean airspace beyond Turkey's borders. Turkey achieved this claim by saying that the country was feeling a 'gap' within NATO air defenses created by the withdrawal of Greece, when in fact Turkey was implementing a revisionist strategy against Greece. This explains the urgency with which Greek conservatives pressed for the reintegration of Greece into NATO's command structure and the subsequent socialist acquiescence to that policy.

Another classic example demonstrating Greece's unwillingness to damage Greek-American relations came with the signing of the 1983 Greek-US DECA. Papandreou finally signed an agreement in which the authentic Greek text stipulated that at the end of five years (1988), the American military presence in Greece would 'terminate' (termatizetai) whereas the equally authentic English text stated that the DECA was 'terminable' in five years; i.e., it could be renewed.[34] In this manner Papandreou and his socialists could claim domestic victory by fulfilling their promise to close the bases in five years but in fact they were conceding to the Americans that they might not. Indeed, they did not.

It was the conservative government of Mitsotakis that renewed the DECA before the final timetable for base closure was reached. The Socialists had by then been ousted from power. Of course, Papandreou would have done the same thing for the following three reasons. First, there was the March 1987 crisis, that is, the second serious Aegean crisis which brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Much has been said and written about that crisis, but the American role in diffusing it has not received due credit. While this article does not intend to dwell on that role, a few comments are necessary. The critical handling of the crisis took place within the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS/J-5).[35] It was coordinated by the officer handling Greek and Turkish affairs who had open channels with the American military missions in Greece and Turkey and the Greek and Turkish military commands and spoke for the JCS. A backchannel was also established between the JCS and the office of the Greek Prime Minister.[36] The Pentagon assessment was that the Greeks were going to stop the Sismik by whatever means if, under Turkish

military protection, it drilled on the Greek continental shelf. Their assessment was also that the Turkish military, through a decision in the National Security Council, had decided to proceed with drilling. This decision was taken in the absence of Prime Minister Ozal who at the time was in the US for medical treatment. It is well known that what diffused the crisis was the March 27, 1987, public statement by Ozal in London that the Turkish vessel would remain within Turkish territorial waters. What is not known is that it was the American Pentagon that made the critical assessment that the weak link in the Turkish war plans was the absence of Ozal from Turkey and that if he, as Prime Minister, were convinced to publicly pull rank on the Generals while outside Turkey they would have to go along. It was critical that Ozal did so while outside Turkey because within Turkey, he, like everyone else, had to march to the soldier's orders. For reasons of his own, Ozal went along. His return to Turkey was delayed in London where he presumably rested. The western, i.e., American, and NATO, successful intervention with Ozal took place with its known consequences.

Papandreou was kept informed of the intricate developments through the Washington backchannel referred to earlier and was aware that the crisis was under control before the public statement by Ozal.[37] The March 1987 crisis was the closest Papandreou personally came to war with Turkey. It had quite an effect on him and did lead to the unsuccessful Davos process.[38] But it also revealed to him the critical role and the weight of the American intervention in matters of war and peace affecting his country.

The second reason for Papandreou to have renewed the presence of American military bases, regardless of his party's declaration, was that by 1988, Papandreou had made his peace with the Americans. In fact, he was trying officially and through various emissaries to solicit an official invitation to visit Washington. The Americans sensed this from the outset and toyed with him relaying 'conditions' under which such an invitation would be extended. In the event none was extended but not for Papandreou's lack of trying.

The third reason was related to the rapidly changing international environment at the end of the 1980s when Eastern Europe was in turmoil. Yugoslavia was about to unravel with all kinds of unpredictable changes, especially changes affecting Greece. Saddam had invaded Kuwait and the US/UN-led coalition war was at hand and, with it, the upgrading of Turkey's regional role for the West and the US. Under these circumstances what Papandreou would have done was a foregone conclusion. When the conservative government of Mitsotakis signed a new DECA with the US in the summer of 1990, the Greek socialists had hardly anything to say.[39]

In fact, Greek-US relations in the nineties have come full circle. Today the umbilical security chord is stronger than ever before, even when Greece lay prostrate during its civil war years. The irony is that during the height of the Yugoslav crisis, when Greece felt that the Macedonian question might eventually lead to the questioning of its northern borders, Greek governments, especially the Papandreou government, which returned to power in 1993, used security arguments drawn from the Truman period to solicit and ensure US support for its policies *vis-à-vis* the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.[40]

The most ominous threat to Greece, however, still emanates from Turkey. In the nineties, this threat has become more insidious because it is no longer confined to undefined claims in the Aegean or threats against Cyprus, where Greece has important national and security interests. Everyone in Greece recognizes, even those who prior to the January 1996 Imia crisis had advocated or followed policies of accommodation with Turkey, that Turkey has territorial claims against Greece.[41] People also generally recognize that Turkey abandoned any pretenses and threatened Greece with war unless Greece entered into political dialogue for the revision of the status quo in the Aegean. Worse for Greece, Turkey has taken a number of decisions in its arms procurement policies since 1987 and especially following the Persian Gulf War, of which there are no Greek equivalents. The military imbalance between the two countries is steadily deepening.[42] If the current trends continue, Greece may soon have no credible military deterrence against Turkey.[43]

In this respect, the 7:10 ratio is of little comfort to Greece because American military assistance to both Greece and Turkey has been decreasing steadily since the end of the Cold War. Turkey, as already mentioned, has taken a number of decisions that are dramatically increasing her military capabilities, independent of the American factor. The Turkish alliance with Israel, for example, is one such decision that enhances Turkey's military might.[44]

These Turkish moves do not, by any means, free Turkey from dependence on the US and this is critical for peace in the region. But they do make Greece more dependent on the US politically and militarily than ever before. Richard Holbrook's averting the Imia crisis, a Greek-Turkish war, "while Europe slept" as he put it, demonstrates this situation dramatically. Even before Imia, the Papandreou government was taking steps to strengthen Greek-US relations. Papandreou was cognizant of the fact that only the US can help Greece balance off Turkey militarily and also act as a catalyst and even guarantor of a new security regime in the Eastern Mediterranean that would include Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.[45]

This brief survey of Greek-US relations since 1974 has highlighted the one constant, dominant and characteristic factor that stands out in the relations between the two states. That factor is security. Security has been more important for Greece than for the US and will remain so in the future and for as long as Ankara remains a revisionist power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There are, no doubt, other important aspects in Greek-US relations that deserve attention. Greece and the United States are entering a new phase in their relations. This phase is characterized by a new maturity on the part of both. Greece is perceived by the US as an important regional player and an important stabilizing factor. In this sense and in contrast to Turkey, for example, Greece's most important assets are its democratic and pluralistic institutions of which there are hardly any to speak of in the Eastern Mediterranean or volatile Middle East.[46] Ambassador to Greece Nicholas Burns reflected on Greece's role in his confirmations hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He spoke of Greece "as a valued NATO ally, an increasingly prosperous member of the European Union, a leader in the Balkans, and as a force for peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean." Greece and the US, he said, "should have the closest possible relations."[47]

Greece, on the other hand, has outgrown its ideological predilections. Through pragmatic policies the country has been working hard to straighten out its economy in order to keep pace with partners in the European Union. Greece has steadily improved relations with all neighbors including FYROM and has been working with the US in a number of projects aimed at strengthening democratic institutions in the region, establishing a more secure environment and creating opportunities for Greek and American business ventures.

Confrontation with Turkey remains the only bleak aspect in Greece's foreign relations. It is a dangerous bleak aspect that may yet lead to war. This possibility explains why all aspects of Greek-US relations must take second place to that of security, as has been highlighted in this work, at the expense of other important elements in relations between the two states.

ENDNOTES

1. See Melvyn R. Leffler, **A Preponderance of Power** (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 141-311 passim; Bruce R. Kuniholm, **The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 68-129.

2. Cf. Yiannis P. Roubatis, **Tangled Webs: The US in Greece 1947-1967** (New York: Pella Publishing Press 1981), passim.

3. John O. Iatrides, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy" in Theodore C. Kariotis, editor, **The Greek Socialist Experiment** (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1992). p. 154.

4. On this and related information see Yiannis P. Kapsis. **Oi 3 Meres tou Marti** (Athina: Ekdoseis Nea Europi: 1990).(In Greek in the text)

5. See Ellen B. Laipson, **US Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Greece and Cyprus** (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Report No. 83-735 of April 19, 1983), passim. Idem, "Greece and Turkey: US Foreign Assistance Facts" (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief No. 1B86065, Updated February 13, 1990), passim.

6. See Monteagle Stearns, **Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus** (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1992), pp.77.

7. Ellen B. Laipson, **The Seven-Ten Ratio in Military Aid to Greece and Turkey: A Congressional Tradition** (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, Report No. 85-79 of 10 April 1985), p. 4.

8. For additional details see Stearns, *op.cit.*, p. 42-49.

9. **Ibid**, p. 47

10. **Ibid.**

11. For the full text see **ibid.**, Appendix C. The text is taken from **Pera apo ta Synora** (Athina:Estia 1982), sel. 253-54.(In Greek in the text)

12. See Marios L. Evriviades "The Problem of Cyprus" **Current History**, Vol. 70, No. 412 (January 1976), pp. 18-21 and 38-42.

13. See Andrew Wilson, **The Aegean Dispute** (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 155, 1980) and Leo Gross "The Dispute Between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean", **American Journal of International Law**, Vol. 71, No. 19 (October 1977).

14. See Sukru Elekdag's revealing article "2 1/2 War Strategy" in **Perceptions**, (Ankara) Vol. 1 No. 1 (March-May 1996), p. 41.

15. Stearns, *op.cit.*, pp. 100-101.

16. See citations in note 11 above.

17. **Ibid.**

18. Stearns, *op.cit.*, pp. 100.

19. See Laipson, **The Seven-Ten Ratio and Military Aid to Greece and Turkey**, *op.cit.*,p.4-5.

20. **Ibid.** See also Stearns discussion of the matter in chapter 3 (pp.40-50) of his excellent monograph. Stearns credits the Greeks for inventing the ratio by comparing the aggregate US aid totals to Greece and Turkey from 1946 to 1976 and demanding the ratio resulting from the comparison, in the 1977 negotiations.

21. For the text of the relevant legislation see Appendix C, (p.21) in Laipson, **The Seven Ten Ratio in Military Aid to Greece and Turkey**, *op.cit.*, pp.21-22.

22. **Ibid.** p.5

23. On Perle's thinking see his article, "Turkey and US Military Assistance" in George S. Harris, **The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations** (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, The Foreign Policy Institute of Ankara, 1985), pp. 23-26.

24. On the upgraded and strategic role of Turkey during the period see the contributions in Harris, *op.cit.*, On the Pentagon's plans to turn Turkey into a staging post for the Rapid Development Force and Perle's decisive role in this see Evripides L. Evriviades, "The Evolving Role of Turkey in US Contigency Planning and Soviet Reaction", study submitted at the John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, 1984.

25. Stearns, *op.cit.*, p. 45. Stearns demonstrates the spuriousness of this argument.

26. Actually in the eighties millions in military credits for Greece accumulated and were unused at a time when Turkey was absorbing its credits as fast as it could obtain them. The reasons for this situation were complicated but they also had to do with Greek procrastination in deciding how to spend the credits. This condition was seized upon by Administration officials (Richard Perle) who argued that since Greece was not using its credits it did not need them and there was no need for them. Therefore there was no threat from Turkey and the 7:10 ratio should be abolished.

27. Stearns, *op. cit.*, p. 43-44.

28. **Ibid.**

29. The on and off restrictions and closings of US military bases in Turkey commenced with the 1964 Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter that so incensed the Turks. It has gone on regularly ever since even in the aftermath of the lifting of the partial arms embargo. It has become a favorite Turkish tactic in negotiations with the Americans even in non military matters such as trade negotiations. And it is practised to this day with regards to American military activity at Incirlik base, for example, where the Americans are limited by a quota on how many planes they can deploy.

30. Cf. Van Coufoudakis "PASOK on Greco-Turkish Relations and Cyprus, 1981-1989: Ideology, Pragmatism, Deadlock," in **Kariotis**, *op.cit.*, pp. 161-178.

31. Iatrides, *op.cit.*, highlights there costs.

32. That is why those who knew him from his long sojourn in the US or got to know him extensively in Greece had no serious trouble with his outlook and disposition. Such persons included the prominent economist John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert Kennedy, Ambassador Monteagle Stearns and others. See also the critique against Papandreou by James Petras "The Contradictions of Greek Socialism" in **Kariotis**, *op.cit.*, esp. 115-119. According to Petras "Andreas Papandreou virtually abandoned even the bourgeois liberal legacy of his father and made Greece safer for US interests than at any time since the late Fifties."

33. On the American role see Mehmet Ali Birand, **The General's Coup in Turkey** (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987), pp. 84-85.

34. See Iatrides, *op. cit.* p. 157. For the text of this agreement and other relevant and useful information see US House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee in Europe and the Middle East, Committee Print, U.S. Military Installations in NATO's Southern Region, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, October 7, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 329-346.

35. The account that follows is based on the author's notes and recollections while serving as an official of the Cyprus government in Washington during the period of the crisis.

36. The American officer involved was Colonel Ed Moore. The backchannel with Papandreou's office was established through a Greek journalist working in Washington.

37. See also the Kapsis account in his book cited earlier (note 4). No mention of the American role is made in this account.

38. On Davos see the Kapsis accounts and the documents cited. Cf. also Dimitri Constas, editor, **The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s** (London: MacMillan, 1991).

39. Papandreou and the Socialists were by then discredited by a series of scandals. Papandreou had had serious health and personal problems and he was furthermore accused of corruption. Many of his top associates were put on trial or went to trial. On the other hand Prime Minister Mitsotakis was treated to the red carpet by the Bush Administration during his Washington visit.

40. The US has been extremely sensitive to Greek concerns over the Macedonian problem and implemented a sophisticated policy in order not to alienate Greece. The American Ambassador to Greece at the time, Thomas Niles, played an important role in this regard.

41. The Imia crisis had produced an avalance of material. An informative and revealing work which includes extremely useful documentation on the crisis and on the Turkish mindset can be found in Alkis Kourkoulas, **Imia: Kritiki Prosegkisi tou Tourkikou Paragonta.** (Athina: I.Sideris, 1997). (In Greek in the text) See also Carol Midgalovitz, **Greece and Turkey Aegean Issues - Background and Recent Developments** (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service,

April 21, 1997) and idem, **Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis** (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, March 7, 1996).

42. See "Turkey's War Arsenal Grows", **Cosmos**, Vol. 1, No. 3 (October 1995), p. 2 (Analytical newsletter published monthly by the Institute of International Relations, Athens. See also the **Military Expenditure Database of SIPRI**, "Turkey, military spending 1986-1995) (www.sipri.se/) and also **SIPRI Yearbook 1996** - Chapter 8. During the 1993-95 period Turkey led all European states in arms import expenditure by spending USD 3 billion on arms.

43. See Athanasios Platias "Synergasia i Antagonismos me tin Tourkia; Realistiki Prosegkisi" **Epetirida Instituotou Diethnon Scheseon 1996** (Athina: I.Sideris, 1996), sel. 17-29.(In Greek in the text)

44. On the alliance between the two countries see Marios L. Evriviades, "Israel and Turkey: An Alliance Now Flaunted," **The Greek-American**, July 20 1996. See also Marios Evridiades "I Prosfati Symfonia Israïl-Tourkias: Politiko-praktiki Simasia kai Epiptoseis", **Tetradia** Tomos 39-41. (Anoixi-Chimonas 1996) sel. 31-42. (In Greek in the text)

45. On this see the insightful suggestions by Ambassador Stearns in his study already cited. Stearns suggests a direct US and NATO involvement with a NATO guarantee of a Greek-Turkish non-aggression pact. See pp. 79-80 and pp. 145-153.

46. On the transformation of Greece see P. Nikiforos Diamantouros, "Greek Politics and Society in the 1990s" in Graham T. Allison, Kalypso Nicolaidis, editors, **The Greek Paradox** (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 23-34.

47. The text of Ambassadorial nominee Nicholas Burns before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of September 23, 1997 has been made available through the "News from the USIA Washington File" on the Internet.

Greece and the Balkans since 1974

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou*

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur retrace l'histoire et l'évolution des relations entre la Grèce et ses voisins, les Balkans. L'article indique aussi jusqu'à quel point la politique domestique de la Grèce se trouvait influencée par ses relations extérieures. M. Triantaphyllou souligne les efforts des hommes politiques grecs et démontre les enjeux de la guerre dans l'ancienne Yougoslavie et de la "Question de la Macédoine"/Skopje.

ABSTRACT

The author traces the history and development of Greek relations with the Balkans. The article shows how much Greek domestic politics were influenced by the country's external affairs. The author points out the efforts of Greek politicians and shows the significance of war in the former Yugoslavia and the Macedonian Question.

The advent of democracy in Greece in 1974 after seven dark years of military rule coincided somewhat with the détente in East-West relations. In an attempt both to secure Greece's northern borders and to defer some of the focus away from Cyprus, former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis took advantage of the changing political environment by visiting Bucharest, Belgrade and Sofia within a two-month span in 1975. Greece's version of Ostpolitik was thus well underway.

Encouraged by developments during the July Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting in Helsinki, Karamanlis put into place a multilateral Balkan policy by securing an inter-Balkan meeting at the level of Deputy Ministers of Coordination and Planning.[1] Greece was in search of multilateralism in the Balkans much as it was in the past (the Balkan Pact of 1934 comes to mind). The basic difference from previous multilateral approaches is that the initiative Karamanlis launched in 1975 was not addressed against any particular state in the area,[2] although it clearly aimed to assure that Greece would not face a threat on its northern border as it faced in the east from Turkey. The 1974 invasion of Cyprus necessitated the restructuring of Greek security considerations leading to an instinctive deemphasis and at times even indifference towards developments within the Warsaw Pact.[3] The Papandreou government followed Karamanlis' policy in the conviction that Greece's northern

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neighbors had ceased to have designs on Greek territory. A stable north implied reduced possibilities of multi-front conflicts and made it easier to address the threat from the East.[4]

Rapprochement with Albania was underway since 1971 with the establishment of diplomatic relations (though the state of war between the two states would be in effect until 1987). The principal thorn in Greece's Balkan relations was the 'Macedonian Question' which survived the interwar years to the post-Cold war period. As long as Yugoslavia remained a single entity and the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) a part of it, the issue was left dormant for the sake of stability.

Once in place, Karamanlis' multilateral diplomacy in the Balkans led to the inter-Balkan conference of Deputy Ministers of Planning in Athens in January-February 1976. All Balkan states, except for Albania, participated in a discussion that centered around themes of "low" politics.[5] This conference clearly brought out the cleavages that existed between and among Balkan states at the time. Albania remained opposed to multilateral arrangements until 1988; Enver Hoxha's regime preferred to retain its isolationist position. Yet among participating states at the 1976 meeting (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Romania, and Greece), there were deep divisions. This was especially evident with regard to the positions of Bulgaria and the other participating countries. As the Balkan state most closely affiliated with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria found itself at odds with the other communist states in the area and attempted to reduce the importance and content of Karamanlis' initiative. Its position reflected "Soviet fears that an institutionalized Balkan cooperation could affect the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact."[6] Karamanlis refused to be dissuaded. A conference of experts on telecommunications and transportation took place in Ankara on 26-29 November 1979 coinciding with a more positive attitude toward such meetings by Bulgaria. Although it was evident that political questions could not be addressed directly, Karamanlis sought to approach political cooperation indirectly, "through confidence building in non-political fields."[7] He continued to play an active role in the multilateral dimension of Greece's Balkan policy even after his accession to the presidency in 1980. Sofia was the venue of the next conference between 15-19 June 1981 while a fourth and fifth took place in Bucharest (7-12 June 1982) and Belgrade (19-23 June) respectively. As shown above, the advent of PASOK in 1981 did not produce significant changes in Greece's Balkan Policy as adopted by Karamanlis. Once Andreas Papandreou saw the virtues of his predecessor's multilateral diplomacy opted for the development of close relations with all of Greece's northern neighbors. A new dimension in Greece's thinking was its accession to the European Union as a full member in January 1981. Thus, Greece sought

simultaneously to develop a European orientation to its Balkan policy. With regard to its northern neighbors, the cornerstone of PASOK's policy in the Balkans was the development of a "special relationship" with Bulgaria. Despite their different economic, social, and political systems and the divide of belonging to adversarial blocs, Greece and Bulgaria shared concerns "over the Turkish threat as well as over occasional "Macedonian" propaganda".[8] Papandreou attempted to introduce "high politics" and security to inter-Balkan cooperation by developing along with Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria and Nikolai Ceausescu a Balkan nuclear weapon free zone at the cost of a loss of prestige among its NATO allies while enhancing Greece's status with the Warsaw Pact members. The nuclear weapon free zone concept was finally shelved in 1984.[9]

Conventional wisdom suggests that PASOK's Balkan policy, both at the multilateral and bilateral level, had more elements of continuity than innovation from the policy inherited from New Democracy. Yet despite this continuity, during the PASOK era, the first Conference of Balkan Foreign Ministers took place in Belgrade in March 1988. Thanos Veremis correctly assesses that 1988 would have been a watershed year for Balkan multilateralism "if the protagonists of the Belgrade meeting could have foreseen the cataclysmic developments in Eastern Europe that were only a year away."[10] It must be noted that Albania participated for the first time in the process.

Despite the political importance of the Conference with the ecumenical participation of all Balkan Foreign Ministers, progress was only made in the fields of education, communications, environment, commerce, and culture. After careful preparations, the Second Balkan Foreign Ministers Conference took place in Tirana on 24-25 October 1990.[11] Despite proposals by Greece and Bulgaria for the establishment of a permanent Balkan Secretariat designed to act as a referee to ethnic and territorial disputes which had "bedeviled relations in Southeastern Europe," the Yugoslav Wars froze all multilateral efforts in the region until 1995.[12] The last opportunity for constructive multilateralism had been lost. It should also be noted that the security challenges and threat perceptions had changed. Instead of external threats posed by ideological or military blocs, the new threats came from within the states in the form of ethnic fragmentation as Yugoslavia was to discover.[13] By 1990, the new circumstances imposed by the fall of communism radically altered the basic premises of Greece's traditional Balkan policy. According to Yannis Valinakis, four major factors of change have influenced Greek policy since. These include the strategic re-orientation of Bulgaria; the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the prospect of border revisions; Turkey's Balkan activism; and regional political and economic instability.[14]

Bulgaria with a new centre-right government sought to find a *modus vivendi* with Turkey as the survival of the new government depended on a party dominated by ethnic Turks. The disintegration of Yugoslavia brought to the forefront the 'Macedonian question' which would dominate Greece's Balkan diplomacy between 1991 and March 1995. The end of the Cold War also affected the dynamics of the Greek-Turkish antagonism for influence in the Balkans as Turkey embarked on a systematic process of concluding various agreements with Bulgaria, FYROM, and Albania raising Greek fears that an "Islamic" arc was being formed along its northern and eastern borders.[15]

These developments put multilateralism on ice and Greece began to view the Balkans through the prism of bilateralism. Bulgaria's re-orientation brought about a controversial decision from Greece's point of view when the UDF government recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as an independent state with the name "Macedonia." The disintegration of Yugoslavia also contributed to the Greek concerns about the Macedonian question which would hold Greek diplomacy captive for over five years. This issue would isolate Greece from its Balkan neighbors and lead to the decline of its credibility *vis-à-vis* its European Union partners.[16] Although the details of the Greek-FYROM differences lie outside the purview of this article[17], the aftereffects do not. The positive Greek diplomatic efforts in the Balkans during that particular time frame went almost unnoticed. These included the establishment of Greek businessmen in most Balkan capitals and the opening of Greece's borders to some half a million "economic refugees and illegal migrant workers from the former communist states" who supported the economies of their countries of origin by providing remittances back home.[18] Greece, which had been ideally suited to play a stabilizing factor in the Post-Cold War era, had found itself marginalized. The signing of the Interim Agreement with FYROM in September 1995 coupled with the Bosnian Settlement, otherwise known as the Dayton Accords, of November 1995 and the normalization of relations with Albania allowed for the gradual re-establishment of multilateral diplomacy in the Balkans. Although Karamanlis was basically motivated by political considerations in his search for multilateralism in the Balkans, European Union membership in 1981 and the emergence of post-communist democracies at the beginning of the 1990s coupled with the Wars of Yugoslav Successions shifted the focus for Greece to the politico-economic dimension. That is to say that Balkan multilateralism as pursued by the Mitsotakis government in the early 1990s, and later by Papandreou upon his return to power, and now by Costas Simitis, has increasingly stressed the need for economic cooperation. According to a recent Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication:

A new era of collaboration and of mutually beneficial economic relations among Balkan countries has opened up since the transition of most of these countries to market economies. For Greece in particular, it has facilitated the re-establishment of historical economic and trade relations with these countries which had experienced significant shrinkage in relative terms during the post-war period.[19]

Within the aforementioned context, the current government has specifically defined its Balkan policy since 1996. The crux of its policy is to assure peace in the Balkans "within today's established borders and constitutional realities" by putting to use Greece's "capacity as a member of the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe, Western European Union and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as her excellent relations with her Balkan neighbors."[20] The specific objectives of Greece's current diplomatic activity in the Balkans are:

– A conference of the Balkan states aiming at the adoption of a regional Agreement that will safeguard the respect of borders, will encourage good neighborliness and cooperation and will promote the protection of human rights in general and of minorities in particular.

– The steady improvement of bilateral relations of Greece with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on the basis of the Interim Accord of New York, placing emphasis on the concrete definition and implementation of its provisions of economic and financial nature.

– The consideration of expanding NATO's Scheme for Partnership which has not been incorporated.

– The further improvement of relations with Albania.[21]

In the economic sphere, the Simitis government has stressed four priorities for action aimed at enhancing the prospects for economic development in the region including investment in value-adding activities; fostering human resources; creating a stable macroeconomic environment; and integrating the region with the European Union by creating the energy, transport, and telecommunication infrastructure of the Trans-European networks.[22] In the trade sector, Greek exports to the countries of the Balkans increased from some 300 million USD in 1989-1990 to 800 million USD in 1994 while Greek foreign direct investment in the Balkan states grew significantly in the fields of trade, services, finance, and manufacturing.[23] The problem for the Simitis government, like previous governments, is to find a balance between stability and instability. As Theodore Couloumbis has so aptly put it, "Greece belongs institutionally to the pole of stability but, unlike its remaining partners, it borders on a region of fluidity and real or potential conflict north and east of its frontiers."[24] The telling economic (and, to a certain extent, political) divergences between the northern and southern post-communist tiers in

Europe significantly affect the region's stability. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, "the Balkans has experienced larger falls in output, have been less successful in controlling inflation and have incurred greater social and demographic costs during the transition. The discrepancy between the two regions in the post-1989 drop in output has been dramatic, even when allowance is made for the impact of the wars in former Yugoslavia."[25] A second issue confronting Greek policy in the Balkans is European Union policy which has been one of bilateral rather than multilateral approach. The absence of EU multilateralism in the Balkans has made it the stalking ground of individual EU member states, thus complicating Greece's approach.

Despite these particular problems, Greece might be able to assume a leadership role with regard the European Union's policy for the Balkans. This is especially true with regard the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which should aim at upholding the values constituting the essence of European integration. The asymmetrical geographical relationship between Greece and its European partners *vis-à-vis* the Balkans allows Greece to pursue the aforementioned ends. The European Union's attractiveness and influence in the Balkans after the fall of Communism stems from the hope that, at some future date, it will open its gates to the countries of the region. The European Union's lack of clearly defined objectives and the requisite instruments to deal effectively with the Yugoslav and other crises does not imply that Bulgaria, Rumania, the Yugoslav Successor states, and Albania do not preserve the hope for future integration into the Union.[26] The promise of EU membership gives the ruling elites a clear sense of direction and purpose thereby creating a tremendous driving force for change. From the politico-economic standpoint, Greece is, in many ways, bearing the burden of the European Union's limited efforts to date in the Balkans. The EU's presence, to date, has been limited to the Royaumont Initiative for Good Neighbourly Relations and Stability in Southeastern Europe with the aim of restoring dialogue, preventing tensions and crises as well as establishing permanent good neighborly relations among all states in the region. The ambivalence of the European Union's attitude towards the Balkans has deprived the ruling élites of the sense of purpose and direction of their counterparts in East-Central Europe. This is also the case for Rumania and Bulgaria which are on a faster track of EU membership as signatories of associate agreements than the rest of the states in the Balkans. The Yugoslav crisis seems to have dominated the debate in Brussels and elsewhere in the West by concentrating on the pros and cons of direct intervention thereby allowing various European states to focus on bilateral ties with area states in an effort to accommodate their patron-client predispositions. It could

well be that, with hindsight, "the most fateful event was the brush-off delivered in 1989/90 by Brussels to the Yugoslav federal government, which under the reformist prime minister of the time, Ante Markovic, sought to buttress a bold reform program (akin to Poland's shock therapy) with Western aid and, especially, EU Associate status."[27]

Although it seemed towards the end of 1995 that the Balkans would take a turn for the better, with the Dayton Accords in place, the cease-fire in Bosnia upheld, the UN sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro suspended, and the Interim Agreement between Greece and FYROM signed, illusions were shattered as political and economic instability in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia took hold. Despite these odds, the process of multilateral diplomacy took hold anew with the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Countries of Southeastern Europe in Sofia in 1996 leading to a follow up meeting in Thessaloniki in June 1997. The Thessaloniki Conference had brought "high" politics to the agenda for good by focusing on enhancing stability, security and good neighborliness, developing multilateral regional economic cooperation, proposing measures to stimulate trade and investment and accelerating the development of infrastructure in transport, telecommunication and energy sectors. It was also the stepping stone to the First Summit of the Leaders of the Countries of Southeastern Europe which was held in Crete on 2-4 October 1997. This Summit had finally brought Karamanlis' and later Papandreou's Balkan policies full circle after 23 years. In Crete, the heads of state of Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania, Rumania, and Yugoslavia gathered in an attempt to institutionalize this sort of meeting and to establish a Permanent Secretariat which would propel further multilateralism in the Balkans.

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

	GDP (1989=100)		GDP growth (%)		Inflation end-period (%)	
	1996	1995	1996	1997	1995	1996
East-Central Eu.	**95,2**	**5,5**	**4,6**	**4,6**	**14,8**	**12,3**
Hungary	86,0	1,5	0	3	28,3	19,8
Poland	104,5	7	6	5,3	21,9	18,5
Czech Republic	85,9	4,8	4,1	4	7,8	8,6
Slovakia	89,9	7,4	6,5	4,8	7,2	5,4
Slovenia	96,3	3,9	3,5	4,2	8,6	9
Balkans	**73**	**5,2**	**1,5**	**1,6**	**33,3**	**74,6**
Albania	82,1	8,6	5	0	6	17,4
Bulgaria	67,4	2,6	-10	-3	32,9	310,8
Rumania	88,1	7,1	4,1	2	27,8	56,9
Croatia	69,2	1,8	4,5	5	3,7	3,5
FYROM	59,1	-2	2	4	9,1	0,3
Yugoslavia	51,2	6	5,8	3	120,2	58,7

	Exports per head ($) 1996	Cumulative FDI ($m) 1990-95	FDI stock $ per head end-1995
East-Central Eu.	**2 000**	**25 312**	**381**
Hungary	1 335	11 190	1 094
Poland	647	7 148	185
Czech Republic	2 135	5 692	551
Slovakia	1 591	783	146
Slovenia	4 289	499	251
Balkans	**434**	**1 796**	**35**
Albania	78	200	63
Bulgaria	532	353	42
Rumania	335	954	42
Croatia	1 042	251	53
FYROM	459	38	18
Yugoslavia	161	n/a	n/a

Sources: national statistics; EIU estimates and forecasts in The Economist Intelligence Unit, Economies in Transition, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: Regional Overview, 1st quarter 1997, p 11

While the crux of Greece's Balkan Diplomacy since 1974 focused on multilateralism, there was a simultaneous development of bilateral relations with her Balkan neighbors. These relations were not always smooth yet their cultivation on the part of successive Greek governments was instrumental in strengthening the multilateral dimension of its foreign policy.

Greek-Albanian Relations

The 1971 agreement though did not guarantee as significant benefits for the Greek minority in Albania as the September 1975 Albanian Edict, was to prove. It called on all Greeks in Albania to change their Greek and Christian names to Albanian ones inspired by the ancient Illyrian traditions. Yet the relative lack of reaction from the Greek side demonstrates a willingness to emphasize stability (as in stable borders) within the overall framework of its Balkan multilateral policy. PASOK's rise to power in 1981 did not imply significant changes in Greek-Albanian relations. In fact, the presence of a left-wing government in Greece implied better cooperation and understanding with Enver Hoxha's orthodox Communist regime. Despite the worsening of the status and conditions of the Greek minority due to the pogroms implemented by Hoxha's regime, PASOK pursued, in general terms, the policy of goodwill of the previous government toward Albania. This led to the lifting of the state of war between the two states on 28 August 1987 despite massive negative reaction from opposition parties both on the right and left of the political spectrum.[28]

Though Albania steadfastly refused to participate in any multilateral initiatives in the Balkans, excluding itself from such meetings until 1988, successive Greek governments reiterated the need for a stable relationship with Albania. Albania was not the focus of Greece's multilateral diplomacy, its self-imposed isolation basically neutralized it. Yet, for Greece, the normalization of relations with Albania implied a security that irredendist claims on the part of a powerful segment of Greek society - which demanded undue attention on the rights of persecuted Greeks of Albania - would be offset. Greece's preoccupation, in fact, made it a non participant in a number of international fora such as the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which, in 1988, passed resolutions condemning Albania for its various human rights violations.[29] The fall of Communism in central and Eastern Europe since 1989 brought relations between Greece and Albania to a new era which also coincided with a new centre-right government in Greece. Within two years, the new Greek premier Constantine Mitsotakis visited Tirana twice; his Foreign Minister, Antonis Samaras, once. Samaras attempted to upgrade Greece's interest in the Greek minority there and made it a point to stress that during his visit to Albania in October 1990 to participate in the Second Balkan Foreign Ministers Conference.[30]

Greek-Albanian relations soured significantly with the coming to power in Albania of Sali Berisha and his Democratic Party at the time of PASOK's return to power in 1993. A border incident and the persecution of Greek minority leaders in early 1994 led to the deterioration of bilateral relations between the two countries as Greece perceived these events to be a witchhunt perpetrated by the Berisha regime, which sought to find political scapegoats in order to assure its political survival.[31]

Relations have again taken a turn for the better with the victory of the Socialist Party under the leadership of Fatos Nano in the summer of 1997. Albania's dire economic and political straits have led the new government to embark on a policy of conciliation with all its neighbors. In this respect, the Simitis government in Greece has taken the lead both in promising and providing economic assistance to Albania and the technical know-how necessary to rebuild the economy.

Greek-Bulgarian Relations

Though Bulgaria like Albania is considered one of the revisionist states in the Balkans, Greek-Bulgarian bilateral relations have steadily improved since the end of the Second World War. Although for a few years after the war, the two states did not have diplomatic relations and were immersed in the ideological East-West divide, relations began to take a significant turn for the better after 1964. Between 1964 and 1974, relations improved

significantly. For Greece, the worsening situation in Cyprus and its relations with Turkey necessitated a normalization of relations with Bulgaria. It became evident to Bulgaria that staunch entrenchment in the Soviet camp had estranged it from neighboring states. In fact, relations were improved during the Colonels' regime in Greece with the visit of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister to Athens in May 1970.[32] In May 1973, relations were further improved with a Joint Declaration stressing the principles of Good Neighborliness, Mutual Understanding, and cooperation. Mention has already been made of Karamanlis' emphasis on multilateralism which found Bulgaria participating in the process, albeit with reservations. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 forced Greece to secure its northern borders and to improve its relations with her Balkan neighbors. In the Bulgarian case, Karamanlis' diplomatic initiatives began to bear fruit because the Turkish invasion was coupled with the worsening of relations between Greece and the United States and Greece and NATO. Sofia thus attempted to exploit the inter NATO divisions and responded favorably to Greek attempts to improve ties, despite the ideological divide.[33] PASOK's victory in 1981, further consolidated the bilateral ties, due to its emphasis on a "special relationship" with Bulgaria and to its rampant anti-Americanism, which struck a positive chord both in Sofia and Moscow. Part of the groundwork for improved Greek-Bulgarian relations had been done by Karamanlis. His visit to Moscow, in 1979, implied a Greek-Soviet rapprochement and, by extension, the green light from Moscow to Sofia for greater participation in Balkan multilateralism. Mention has already been made, earlier, of the perceived Turkish threat to both countries and to the so-called Macedonian issue which found both countries at odds with Belgrade and Skopje. In September 1986, a Greek-Bulgarian Declaration of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed which surpassed qualitatively and substantially the 1973 document. This document paved the way for a number of common initiatives between Papandreou and Zhivkov for a nuclear-free Balkans (February 1988 in Sofia and April 1989 in Haskovo). The fall of Zhivkov and the changes that occurred in Bulgaria in 1990 and 1991 had a drastic impact on its foreign policy. In a marked change from the previous regime, the anti-Communist Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) which came to power with the support of the predominantly Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) changed its policy toward Turkey. The new government felt that cooperation with Turkey would be to Bulgaria's advantage for a couple of reasons. First, the reduction of tensions between the two states would impact Bulgaria's security positively. It was estimated in 1991 that 70% of Turkey's tanks and 55% of its artillery were stationed near the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Secondly, rapprochement with Turkey would allow Bulgaria to play a leading role in

the Macedonian Question by recognizing the emerging "Macedonian" state and enlisting "Turkish support against a future military challenge from Serbia."[34] Despite the aforementioned developments, Greek-Bulgarian relations have developed smoothly, as the two countries, have signed agreements concerning three new border posts and settled a dispute over the waters of the Nestos River.

Greek-Yugoslav Relations

For Greece, the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia became a principal concern with the return to democracy in 1974. Motivated by the 1974 Cyprus crisis, Greece sought to secure its northern borders; in this context, it especially sought Yugoslavia's help, influenced by that country's leadership role in the non-aligned movement as well as the fact that access to Western Europe went through Belgrade. In fact, Greece and Yugoslavia agreed to free their common border of the concentration of troops and to transfer them to other borders. Greece also offered free trade facilities in Thessaloniki to Yugoslavia providing it with an economic outlet to the Mediterranean.[35]

There were disagreements with regard to Belgrade's support in 1978 of Skopje's demands of the existence of Slavo-Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. Yet Belgrade differentiated itself from Skopje in the sense that, while in Skopje, it was felt that the recognition of a 'Macedonian minority' in Greece was a necessary condition for the improvement of Greek-Yugoslav relations; Belgrade thought that cooperation and friendly relations with Greece would bring about positive developments in the Macedonian question.[36] Papandreou's election in 1981, caused apprehension in Belgrade due to PASOK's pre-election calls for withdrawal from NATO as Belgrade felt more secure with a Greece aligned with the West. Overall relations, though, were good since the Greek threats did not materialize and as negotiations for admission to the European Community progressed. Belgrade hoped to reap economic as well as political benefits from Greece's entry into the EEC since its geographical position "was expected to accrue direct and indirect economic benefits."[37]

Thus, until the collapse of communism and the spitting asunder of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia warmly championed the Cypriot cause due to its leading position in the non-aligned movement to which Cyprus also belonged. On the other hand, Greece maintained a neutral position with regard to Belgrade's periodic crackdown of its Albanian population and in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia despite the greater commonality of positions with the Bulgarian one. Thus, the biggest thorn in Greek-Yugoslav relations - the Macedonian question - remained

neutralized for the sake of stability and security. This security concern was augmented by the Yugoslav crisis which found Greece at odds with its EU allies. While the rest of the EU and the West, in general, laid blame on the Serbs for the 1991 crisis, Greece felt that things should remain as they were. This difference in opinions took a turn for the worse after December 1991 with the so-called "Skopjeanization" of Greek foreign policy which would keep Greece diplomatically isolated in the region until the fall of 1995.

In other words, "Greece had been caught unprepared to face the challenge of an old federal entity turned suddenly into an aspiring independent state without shedding its irredentist claims."[38]

Greece maintained a pro-Serb attitude throughout the Yugoslav crisis. This stance was demonstrative of Greek non-conformity with the EU position. This pro-Serb position has helped in maintaining influence in Belgrade, despite the fact that the two countries do not share a border anymore. Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia's and Yugoslavia's strongman, has been particularly responsive to Greek mediation attempts throughout the war in Yugoslav and has also been willing to participate in the new multilateral diplomatic initiatives proposed by Greece ever since.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the overall assessment of Greece's Foreign Policy in the Balkans since 1974 has been a positive one. The policy of multilateral diplomacy has taken a force of its own and is rapidly becoming all the more important in the post-Cold War and post-Dayton era. The states in the area, still licking their wounds from the transition to democratic norms and market economies, from the war in Yugoslavia, and from the European Union's dismissive approach to the region, are on the whole, on the road to recovery (stability). Much of this recovery is owed to their conviction that they need each other's support to overcome their political, economic, and social woes. Credit should be given to the successive Greek governments which, despite their tumultuous relationships with their northern neighbors (the revival of the 'Macedonian' question between 1991 and 1995 being a case in point), have never lost sight of the overall objectives of stability and good neighborly relations in the region ,based on the ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act. The significant element here is the national consensus on the multilateral dimension of Greece's Balkan policy which guarantees a relatively steadfast diplomatic effort that transcends periods of failure such as that in1991-1995.

NOTES

1. For more on this meeting, see Thanos Veremis, **Greece's Balkan Entanglement**, (Athens: ELIAMEP-YALCO, 1995), p. 36.

2. The Balkan Pact of 1934 included Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, but left out revisionist states such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Italy.

3. Yannis Valinakis, **Greece's Security in the Post-Cold War Era**, (Ebenhausen/Isartal: Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik, April 1984), p. 40.

4. **Ibid.**, p. 41.

5. Agriculture, water resources, energy, transportation, commerce, tourism were some of the issues discussed.

6. Veremis, **Greece's Balkan Entanglement**, p. 37.

7. **Ibid.**, p. 38.

8. Valinakis, **Greece's Security in the Post-Cold War Era**, p. 41.

9. For more on this issue, see Veremis, **Greece's Balkan Entanglement**, p. 39; Also see, Donna J. Klick, "A Balkan Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: Viability of the Regime and Implications for Crisis Management," **Journal of Peace Research**, 24:2, 1987.

10. Veremis, **Greece's Balkan Entanglement**, p. 41.

11. For more on the background leading to Conference, see Evangelos Kofos, "Greece and the Balkans in the `70s and `80s," **Yearbook 1990**, Athens, ELIAMEP, 1991, pp. 193-222.

12. Veremis, **Greece's Balkan Entanglement**, p. 41.

13. **Ibid.**, p. 43; see also Thanos Veremis, "A Redefinition of Security Considerations in Southeastern Europe," **Southeastern European Yearbook 1992**, ELIAMEP, pp. 153-161.

14. Valinakis, **Greece's Security in the Post-cold War Era**, p. 42.

15. **Ibid.**, p. 48.

16. See Thanos Veremis, "The Revival of the 'Macedonian' Question, 1991-1995," in Peter Mackridge and Eleni Yannakakis, eds. **Ourselves and Others**, (Oxford: Berg, 1997), p. 227.

17. See Thanos Veremis, "Greek Foreign Policy After 1974," in this issue; Also see Yannis Valinakis, **Greece's Balkan Policy and the Macedonian Issue**, (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 1992); Duncan Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia and the Odds for Survival," **RFE/RL Research Report**, 20 November 1992; Christos Rozakis, **Politikes kai Nomikes Diastaseis tis metavatikis Symphonias tis Neas Yorkis**, (Athens: Sideris and ELIAMEP, 1996); Yannis Valinakis and Sotiris Dalis, eds. **To Zitima ton Skopion. Episima Kimena 1990-1994**, (Athens: Sideris and ELIAMEP, 1994); Memorandum of Greece, New York, 25 January 1993, (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1993); Thanos Veremis, **The Revival of the 'Macedonian' Question, 1991-1995.**

18. Veremis, **The Revival of the 'Macedonian' Question, 1991-1995**, p. 233.

19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Press and Mass Media, **European**

Perspectives: Economic and Foreign Policy Issues, (Athens, 1996), p. 29.

20. Costas Simitis, "Greece in the Emerging System of International Relations," in **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade, 15 August 1996), XLVII:1046-47, pp. 3-7.

21. **Ibid.**, p. 5.

22. **Ibid.**, pp. 5-6.

23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Press and Mass Media, **European Perspectives: Economic and Foreign Policy Issues**, p. 33.

24. Theodore Couloumbis, "Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy Since 1974," in Van Coufoudakis, and Harry Psomiadis, eds. **Greece and the Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities**, (forthcoming 1998).

25. **The Economist Intelligence Unit, Economies in Transition, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: Regional Overview**, 1st quarter 1997, p. 10.

26. Thanos Veremis and Theodore Couloumbis, **Greek Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Era** (in Greek), (Athens: ELIAMEP and Sideris, 1997), pp. 31-32.

27. **The Economist Intelligence Unit, Economies in Transition**, p. 23.

28. See George Harvalias, "Albania" in Thanos Veremis, ed., **The Balkans: From Bipolarity to a New Era** (in Greek), (Athens: Gnosi, 1994), p. 191.

29. The Greek Representative abstained from the voting which took place on 27 March 1988. For more on this issue, see Harvalias, pp. 185-186.

30.In fact, Samaras returned by car to Greece making a point to visit minority villages in the south. The visit created tensions as clashes between the police and minority Greeks broke out. Many analysts also suggest that Samaras' trip opened the way for a huge wave of migration with Greeks in Albania to Greece in the Winter of 1990-1991. **Ibid.**, pp. 188-189.

31. For more on these events, see Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, **Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity**. (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), pp. 186-208. Also see Nikos Ziogas, "Developments in Albania in 1994", in Theodore Couloumbis, Thanos Veremis, and Thanos Dokos, eds., **The Southeast European Yearbook, 1994-1995**, (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1995), pp. 205-219.

32. The first of its kind since World War II.

33. Kyriakos Kentrotis, "Bulgaria" in Veremis, ed., **The Balkans: From Bipolarity to a New Era**, pp.397-398.

34. Valinakis, **Greece's Security in the Post-Cold War Era**, pp. 43-44.

35. Kofos, **Greece and the Balkans in the'70s and '80s**, p. 200.

36. Thanos Veremis, "The Trilateral Struggle for Macedonia after the Second World War," in Veremis, ed., **The Balkans: From Bipolarity to a New Era**, p. 623.

37. Kofos, **Greece and the Balkans in the '70s and '80s**, pp. 201-202.

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The Dynamics of Greek-Turkish Strategic Interaction

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RÉSUMÉ

Le but de cet article est d'examiner le différend gréco-turc sous la perspective des facteurs dynamiques qui influencent l'interaction stratégique entre Athènes, Nicosie et Ankara. L'auteur se concentre sur deux aspects fondamentaux de cette ineraction: d'une part l'équilibre entre les facteurs qui peuvent intensifier l'interaction stratégique et d'autre part sur les facteurs qui peuvent diminuer ladite interaction.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Greek-Turkish confrontation from the perspective of the dynamic factors that shape the strategic interaction between Athens, Nicosia and Ankara. The focus will be on the balance between factors that might escalate this strategic interaction towards armed conflict, and factors that have a de-escalatory influence.

Greek-Turkish relations in the second half of the 1990s are at their worst level since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Armed conflict between Greece and Turkey nearly broke out in January 1996 during the Imia crisis. Thereafter, the possibility of a Greek-Turkish war has continued to preoccupy statesmen and strategic planners in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

The analytical framework of this paper derives from the Realist theory of international relations. Accordingly, the analysis will focus primarily on the distribution of power and on geopolitical factors. The influence of domestic politics will be taken into account, but as a subsidiary factor within the context of the regional geopolitics.

The first section of this paper will focus on trends in the Greek-Turkish strategic balance, and on their consequences in terms of strategic interaction. The second section will place Greek-Turkish relations within the broader contexts of Western policy, as well as the geopolitics of South-Eastern Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Asia. The third section will examine the relevance of the domestic politics of Greece and Turkey to the dynamics of Greek-Turkish strategic interaction.

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1. The Greek-Turkish Strategic Balance

Both Greece and Turkey have a strong interest in the prevention of armed conflict between them, since warfare would halt or even reverse the current Greek and Turkish economic modernization efforts. Greece is struggling to meet the macroeconomic convergence criteria that would permit it to participate in the European Union's monetary union (Greece has not met these criteria in time for 1999, but strives to meet them so as to be able to join the monetary union by 2001)[1]. Turkey is consolidating its modernization leap of the 1980s, and seems determined to continue on the path towards becoming one of the world's major emerging markets. Both countries' modernization efforts, which deeply engage their respective business communities and other social forces, would be threatened or undermined by a Greco-Turkish armed conflict.

The question is whether the dynamics of the strategic interaction between Greece and Turkey are sufficiently strong in an escalatory direction to lead them towards conflict, in spite of the contrary dynamic of the imperatives of their modernization efforts.

The most consequential dynamic factor in Greek-Turkish relations is the steady change in the bilateral strategic balance in favour of Turkey. This is evident from long-term trends:

First, the population of Turkey has grown rapidly, from 31.1 million in 1964 to about 62 million in the mid-1990s. The Greek population grew slightly from 8.4 million in 1961 to 10.2 million in 1991.[2]

Second, from the mid-1970s onwards the Turkish GDP has been growing faster than the Greek thus reversing the trend in the 1960s and early 1970s when the Greek economy was growing faster than, and catching up in total size with the Turkish.

Table 1: Average annual GDP growth rates[3]

	1960-73	1973-79	1979-89	1989-94
Greece	7.7	3.7	1.8	0.7
Turkey	5.6	4.5	4.0	3.6

The result is a growing Turkish superiority in total GDP.
Greek per capita GDP is about triple the Turkish, but since Turkey has approximately six times the population of Greece, Turkish total GDP is approximately twice the Greek GDP.

Table 2: Ratio of Greek/Turkish total GDP[4]

1980	1985	1990	1995
0.77	0.65	0.54	0.49

Third, Turkish military expenditures and armament acquisitions have exceeded the Greek since the mid-1980s, resulting in a growing Turkish military superiority over Greece.

Table 3: Ratio of Greek/Turkish military expenditures[5]

	1980-84	1987	1990	1995
Total Expenditures	1,0	0,89	0,73	0,61
Expenditures on Armaments	1,94	0,73	0,78	0,32

It must be stressed, that Turkish armaments are motivated in part by factors extraneous to Greek-Turkish relations and are largely aimed at deterring the Syrian threat to Turkey and at fighting the Kurdish insurrection in South-East Turkey. It is thus by no means the case, that the increasing Turkish military spending is exclusively motivated by the Greek-Turkish disputes. Greek military spending, by way of contrast, is primarily driven by the growth of Turkish armaments and the need to limit Turkish military superiority *vis-à-vis* Greece. The growing military strength of Turkey forces Greece to follow suit, resulting in a regional arms race. An economically burdensome consequence has been that Greece has spent a higher proportion of its GDP on defense than any other Western nation in the 1990s.

The growing overall superiority of Turkey over Greece in the bilateral strategic balance is compounded by two geostrategic factors:

a) For geographic reasons Cyprus is strategically highly vulnerable to Turkey. The distance from Greece to Cyprus is so large, as to place the island only barely within the operational range of the Greek airforce. The Turkish mainland, by way of contrast, is only 90 miles from Cyprus. The geographic factor is augmented multifold, ever since 1974, by the presence on northern Cyprus of a Turkish army.

Turkey's dominant strategic position in Cyprus is relevant not only to the Cyprus problem, but also to the bilateral Greek-Turkish relations, since it adds a powerful instrument of pressure against Greece regarding the Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean. Holding Cyprus as a strategic hostage, Turkey can implicitly threaten to attack the remaining territories under the control of the Republic of Cyprus in the event that Greece moves

against Turkish interests in the Aegean. According to Mr. Sukru Elekdag, former Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also former Turkish Ambassador to the United States, "Greeks are cognisant of the fact that in the event that they escalate the crisis in the Aegean to a hot conflict, this will force Turkey to take military measures in Cyprus. Greece is aware of her vulnerability in Cyprus. This assessment in turn leads Greece to be cautious in the Aegean". [6]

b) The geography of the Aegean also favours the Turkish side, from the perspective of strategy. Over twenty significant Greek islands are located near the Turkish mainland and are thus vulnerable to invasion in the case of a Greek-Turkish war. It would be difficult for Greek strategy to aim for the strong defence of all these islands, since this would mean the strategic dispersal of Greek forces. On the other hand, the Turkish side would be able to concentrate its forces on its chosen invasion target. Yet Turkish geography does not offer similar invasion targets for a prospective Greek counter-offensive. There are only two significant Turkish islands in the Aegean, Imvros and Tenedos, which can be strongly defended without a significant dispersal of the Turkish armed forces. A Greek invasion of the Turkish mainland would result in a Greek beachhead vulnerable to Turkish counter-attacks by land forces, whereas the recapture of a Greek island occupied by Turkish forces would require a difficult amphibious assault. *Ceteris paribus*, the consequence of this geostrategic asymmetry is that Turkey is likely to find it easier than Greece, in a Greek-Turkish war, to capture territory and thus enter the peace negotiations with a critical bargaining advantage.[7]

The growing Turkish superiority in the bilateral Greek-Turkish strategic balance, combined with Turkish strategic dominance in Cyprus and the geostrategic asymmetry in the Aegean, has several consequences that could result in escalation towards armed conflict.

Regarding Turkey, the possibility cannot be completely excluded that Ankara might deliberately seek to provoke a war with Greece, in order to use Turkey's strategic superiority to impose its will by force in the Greek-Turkish disputes. Even if one accepts as unlikely this scenario of a deliberate Turkish move to provoke war, the growing Turkish strategic superiority does affect Turkish policy in ways that make conflict escalation more likely.

First, in the last two years Turkish policy in the Aegean has widened the Greek-Turkish disputes, by questioning territorial boundaries in relation to uninhabited rocks (and even the inhabited island of Gavthos, south of Crete, though apparently this issue arose out of a bureaucratic mistake,

and has been quietly dropped by Ankara[8]). Thus, for the first time has Turkey questioned the territorial *status quo* in the Aegean, adding to the previous disputes over the demarkation of continental shelf, territorial waters, and air-space.

Second, Turkish governments can afford to commit acts of brinkmanship, without fear of risking strategic defeat in case of crisis escalation. The most dangerous incident was the landing of Turkish marines on one of the Imia rocks during the Clinton Administration's mediation effort at the height of the Imia crisis in January 1996. Such brinkmanship, which may result in uncontrolled conflict escalation, is usually more likely to be exhibited by the side which enjoys strategic superiority and thus has less to fear from escalation.

Regarding Greece, strategic inferiority has by no means produced a willingess to retreat from vital national interests in the Aegean and Cyprus. Greek politics remain under the heavy shadow of the 1974 Cyprus defeat, and the Greek public is likely to react very badly to a new humiliating national retreat.

As a result, Greece has attempted to counter growing Turkish strategic superiority in a number of ways. The most significant Greek strategic move has been the growing effort to strengthen the strategic capabilities of the Republic of Cyprus, and to coordinate Greek and Cypriot strategic planning, in order to reduce Cypriot vulnerability to Turkey. This linking of Greek and Cypriot defence planning constitutes a coherent bid to lend greater credibility to Greek extended deterrence regarding Cyprus. The Greek threat to declare war, should Turkey attack the remaining territories under the control of the Republic of Cyprus, is more credible as a deterrent if Cypriot defence capabilities are enhanced, and if Greek and Cypriot strategic planning is coordinated.[9]

Given the overall Turkish strategic superiority over Greece, and especially over Cyprus, Greek and Cypriot deterrence is based on the objective of inflicting unacceptably high losses on Turkey. More specifically, in case of a Greek-Turkish war the Greek objective is that, while the Greek armed forces will be fighting to hold their own in the direct Greek-Turkish fronts (Aegean and Thrace), the Turkish side will be unable to gain easy victories in Cyprus. If the Cypriot armed forces acquire capabilities strong enough to give a protracted fight against Turkey, then the Turkish armed forces will be confronted with a real two-front war.

The single most significant Turkish strategic advantage in Cyprus is the fact that Turkey dominates in the air. Given the large distance from Cyprus and the nearest Greek air bases, Greek airplanes can only operate in the

Cypriot skies for short periods. The proximity of the Turkish mainland provides the Turkish airforce the ability to establish command over Cyprus easily. To counter this Turkish superiority in the air, Cyprus has decided to acquire new surface-to air missile (SAM) capabilities.

The planned deployment by Cyprus of Russian S-300 SAMs, with a range long enough to enable attacks on aircraft fliging over Turkish territory opposite Cyprus, has resulted in a situation with potentially grave escalatory consequences. Cyprus has declared that it will proceed with the deployment in 1998, and will not be intimidated to cancel the missile deal. Turkey has declared, that it will bombard the missile sites to eliminate what is perceived as a strategic threat to its air bases on the Turkish mainland opposite Cyprus. And Greece has declared, that any Turkish attack against Cyprus is *casus belli)*. If the declared intentions of the governments of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece are to be taken at face value, then a war involving the three countries ought to break out during 1998. It will be interesting to observe, whether any of the three sides will fail to act upon its declared intensions, and risk losing credibility, or whether some mutually acceptable way out of this apparent war path will be found.

In the long run, Greece will only be able to defend her vital interests if it maintains a strategic balance with Turkey. But this presupposes high economic growth rates, to reduce the difference, in total size, between the Greek and the Turkish economies. High economic growth, in turn, presupposes radical economic reforms in the direction of down-sizing the enormous and unproductive Greek public sector, which has grown cancerously through the patronage system that dominated Greek politics until recently. Thus far, economic reforms have failed to deal with this central problem of Greek political economy. Privatisation and deregulation have been limited and have scarcely changed the conditions of economic stagnation that have plagued Greece since the late 1970s. As long as this Greek stagnation continues, and as long as the Turkish economy grows rapidly, the bilateral strategic balance will steadily tilt ever more in favour of Ankara. [10]

In conclusion, the growing bilateral strategic superiority of Turkey *vis-à-vis* Greece, which is augmented by Turkey's strategic dominance in Cyprus, and Greece's efforts to mitigate and counter the consequences of an inferior strategic position, threaten to result in an unplanned conflict escalation towards warfare. Neither Greece nor Turkey seem likely to put at risk their economic modernization efforts by deliberate steps towards armed conflagration. Yet their policies in the Greek-Turkish disputes cannot preclude the possibility of an unintended escalation with disastrous consequences for both.

2. The Wider Geopolitical Setting

The Greek-Turkish confrontation does not take place in a vacuum. The policies of the United States, the EU and NATO, as well as the geopolitics of SouthEast Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East must be taken into consideration, to the extent that they affect the Greek-Turkish strategic interaction.

Both Greece and Turkey are to a large extent dependent on the West, strategically, politically and economically. Therefore, diplomacy and legitimacy, with regard to the West, necessarily figure very largely in Greek and Turkish policy. From the perspective of the West, both countries are important allies, so that Western powers avoid taking sides in the Greek-Turkish disputes and seek to prevent an armed conflict that would destroy NATO's southern flank. This Western position tends to favour Turkey, in the sense that Ankara can apply its strategic superiority to intimidating Greece and Cyprus without fear of a strong anti-Turkish reaction in the West. It does make less likely Turkey's using her strategic superiority to launch an aggressive war against Greece and Cyprus, which would completely discredit Turkish policy in the West.

The EU constitutes the forum in which Greece enjoys its most significant advantage over Turkey. As an EU member, Greece can veto any further steps in the relations between Turkey and the EU. Given that the Turkish Kemalist élite seeks to anchor Turkey firmly in the West by accession to the EU, Greece has some leverage and might extract some Turkish accommodation in the Aegean and Cyprus. It must be stressed, though, that Greece is not the only EU factor blocking Turkish accession. The Luxembourg summit of mid-December 1997, in which the EU heads of government refused to include Turkey in the list of prospective EU members, revealed that other EU members consider Turkey ineligible in the foreseeable future on account of poor domestic conditions (human rights abuses, partial underdevelopment, the ongoing Kurdish insurrection). On the conference sidelines, Chancellor Kohl indicated that a Muslim nation with a population of over 60 million cannot, in the forseeable future, become a full member of the EU with unrestricted immigration rights.[11] Already Western European societies are strained by the presence of large Muslim immigrant communities that have not always integrated well with the indigenous population, causing "Le Penstyle racist backlashes". If Turkey is to be excluded from the EU for such intrinsic reasons, rather than merely on account of policies in Cyprus and the Aegean, then the Turkish leadership has no incentive to moderate its positions in these Greek-Turkish issues. Thus from the perspective of Greece, leverage over Turkey is diminished by the latter's exclusion from the future prospect of accession in the EU. This factor accounts for the failure of Greek maneuvers in the EU to moderate Turkish policy thus far.

Greece has been more successful in promoting the accession of Cyprus to the EU, which is likely to take place with the first wave of EU enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, Turkey's threat to annex northern Cyprus in case of the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU prior to Turkey's own accession is a factor that would complicate the Cyprus problem enormously, unless the Cyprus problem is resolved prior to the entry of the island republic in the EU. In response to this situation, the EU is pursuing a particularly fine balancing act, involving apparently contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, it seeks to give Cyprus the impression, that her accession to the EU is unlikely prior to a solution of the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, it seeks to give Turkey the impression, that Ankara will not be permitted to veto Cyprus' accession through obstinacy in the Cyprus problem. Behind these apparently contradictory positions, one can discern the deep-felt desire of the EU, with United States backing, to convince both sides that they stand to lose more through intransigence than through mutual accomodation. Yet this stance does not mean, that the prospect of Cyprus' accession will moderate Turkish policy. It seems possible, that Cyprus will acceed in its present condition, with Turkey occupying the northern part of the island, which would increase the security of the Republic from further Turkish attacks, but would also deepen and perpetuate the island's current division.

Overall, the West is a major factor in the dynamics of Greek-Turkish strategic interaction that makes less likely a full Greek-Turkish war. This limits Turkey's ability directly to use her strategic superiority against Greece and Cyprus. On the other hand, the Western position of not taking sides allows Turkey to continue to occupy northern Cyprus and to intimidate Greece in the Aegean without incurring significant costs in her relations with the West.

The geopolitics of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East also affect the dynamics of Greek-Turkish strategic interaction. The following analysis will examine a) the regional third-party threats to Greece or Turkey, and b) regional opportunities for Greece and Turkey of increasing their power or influence in a manner that might affect the Greek-Turkish strategic interaction.

For geographic reasons, Greece is more deeply involved in Balkan geopolitics than Turkey. The long Greek borders with Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bulgaria would pose a defence nightmare for Greek strategic planners, if Greece were to face powerful enemies from that direction. Yet such a possibility is very remote in the forseeable future. All former Communist states in the Balkans are economically prostrate and strategically weak. As an indication, Greek

defence spending is half the Bulgarian GDP. Greek GDP is by some measures equal to the total of the GDPs of all former Communist states in the Balkans put together, including Romania and all former Yurgoslav republics.

Table 4: GDP and population, Balkans. [12]

	GDP 1995, $ billions	Population, millions
Yugoslavia (new)	14	11.3
Croatia	15	4.6
Slovenia	19	2
FYROM	1.5	2.2
Bosnia-Herzegovina	d.u*	3.5
Rumania	28	22.8
Bulgaria	11.7	8.4
Albania	1.7	3.6
Greece	99	10.5

* d.u.=data unavailable after 1991

Consequently, Greece faces no strategic threat from the Balkans. On the contrary, Greek economic and military superiority, combined with Greece's status as the only Balkan state in the EU, have created an opportunity for Greece to become the center and the paramount regional factor in Balkan economics and politics. Such a development is bound to increase the influence - currently meager - that Greece wields in NATO and the EU.

It must be added, that Turkey has failed, for a number of structural reasons, to become a strong enough factor in the Balkans to threaten the predominance of Greece. First, Turkey is a Muslim nation, while major Balkan powers such as Bulgaria and (new) Yugolavia face potentially disastrous problems with their Muslim minorities. Thus, Turkish influence in the Balkans depends on the ability of Turkish foreign policy to distance itself from religious considerations. But the Bosnian War led Turkish foreign policy to identification with the Muslims in Bosnia.[13] Thereafter, Turkey lost credibility as a potential leader in this region. As long as the secular Kemalist regime in Turkey is challenged domestically, as long as the Islamist political forces gain popular ground, Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans will remain severely handicapped.[14]

Second, geography and economic factors work against Turkish influence in the Balkans. Turkey occupies a tiny corner at the south-eastern end of the Balkan peninsula, bordering on one Balkan state -Bulgaria- apart from Greece. This presents inherent barriers to any prospect of the Turkish

economy becoming the core of the regional economic system. This factor is compounded by the relative underdevelopment of the Turkish economy, compared to the Greek.

Third, Turkey since the end of the Cold War has become deeply involved in areas away from the Balkans, which will be examined immediately below. Here it will suffice to note, that the Turkish confrontations with Russia, Syria, and the Kurdish insurgents, in addition to the Greek-Turkish disputes, have absorbed the main resources of Turkish grand strategy, leaving little for Turkish efforts in the Balkans.

While Greece is likely to remain the leading regional actor in the Balkans, Turkey is geopolitically well-placed to play a major role in the Caucasus and the Middle East, areas in which vital Western interests are at stake relating to the world's oil supplies. Indeed, this is the main reason why Turkey is so highly valued as an ally by Western powers in the post-Cold War era. By way of comparison, Greece's role in the Balkans does not carry anywhere near the same weight in global politics. This Turkish advantage, in terms of geopolitical significance, works in favour of Turkey in terms of the reluctance of the West to take one-sided pro-Greek positions in the Greek-Turkish disputes.

Yet Turkish engagement in the Caucasus and the Middle East also has its disadvantages for Turkey. Unlike Greece in the Balkans, Turkey faces considerable actual or potential strategic threats in these regions, which diminish the ability of Turkey's strategic planners to concentrate their armed forces in the direction of Greece and Cyprus. This factor reduces to some extent the efficacy of Turkish strategic superiority *vis-à-vis* Greece and Cyprus.

Turkish efforts to gain influence in the Muslim former Soviet Republics in the Cacasusus and Central Asia have resulted in a political Turkish-Russian confrontation, in which Russia has the upper hand. By involvement in civil wars or through other forms of indirect intervention, Russia has become the dominant foreign factor in Georgia and Azerbaijan, while she can count Armenia on her side in any confrontation with Turkey. So long as Turkish influence in these three Caucasus republics in Turkey's immediate vicinity is weakened, Ankara's ability to wield influence in the more distant Central Asian republics will be severly handicapped.[15]

Thus far, Russia has not posed an actual strategic threat to Turkey. Yet if the competition between these two states for influence in the Caucasus intensifies, Russia may well adopt a more menacing posture *vis-à-vis* Turkey. Evidence of Turkish paramilitary engagement on the side of the separatist Chechens during the Chechenya warfare shows the extent to

which Russo-Turkish relations are becoming strained.[16] If they become still more strained, Turkey will be forced to readjust the order of battle of its armed forces to cover more fully the front towards Russia, thereby weakening the forces facing Greece and Cyprus.

In the Middle East, Turkey faces the enmity of Syria, which demands a return of the Hatay province that was transferred from Syria to Turkey in 1939 (Syria was governed by France at the time, by League of Nations Mandate). Syria has indirectly backed the Kurdish insurrection that has been festering in Turkey's south-eastern provinces since the mid-1980s. [17] As a result, leading Turkish analysts take the possibility of a war with Syria quite seriously. Ambassador Sukru Elekdag, for example, has proposed a "two-and-a-half war strategy" to enable Turkey to win a simultaneous war against both Greece and Syria, while keeping down the Kurdish insurrection.[18]

In the mid-1990s, Turkey counter-balanced the Syrian threat by reviving and deepening her strategic cooperation with Israel. This move has earned Turkey considerable dissatisfaction in the Arab world. Yet the benefits are tangible and significant. Ankara has implicitly secured Iraeli cooperation, should Syria ever attack Turkey. Moreover, the Turkish armed forces are also benefiting from the sharing of Israeli intelligence and from the upgrading of some of their weapons systems by the Israelis.[19]

The Turkish-Israeli strategic cooperation constitutes a formidable factor in the geopolitics of the Middle East. In strategic terms, it is virtually unbeatable. Only if Syria, Iraq and Iran combine forces, will a potent strategic counterbalancing alliance be possible. All three have expressed their deep antipathy to the Turkish- Israeli joint venture, yet they are divided amongst themselves by very deep fissures. In the 1980s Iran and Iraq fought the bloodiest Middle-Eastern war of the twentieth century. Syria participated in the UN alliance against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991. These recent conflicts are likely to prove effective barriers to the formation of a tri-partite group coherent enough to threaten Turkey and Israel. Consequently, Turkey is unlikely in the forseeable future to face a military attack from the Middle East. But when it comes to indirect threats, such as external support for the Kurdish insurrection in Turkey, the picture is different. It is at this lower level of conflict intensity that Turkey is likely to continue to face active threats from the Middle East, which constitute a notable but not decisive strategic diversion from her confrontation with Greece and Cyprus.

In conclusion, Greece is effectively free from strategic threats on the Balkan flanks, and can thus concentrate its strategic effort on the

Greek-Turkish confrontation. Turkey, by way of contrast, is engaged in a poltical struggle with Russia over influence in the Caucasus. Turkey also faces hostility from Syria, which constitutes an indirect srtategic threat in the Kurdish insurrection. Turkey's strategic cooperation with Israel secures the country from more serious threats in the Middle East. On the whole, Turkey is unable to concentrate all its strategic assets against Greece and Cyprus, yet even if one takes into account the other fronts, these do not at this time amount to diversions decisive enough to undermine Turkish strategic superiority *vis-à-vis* Greece and Cyprus.

3. Domestic politics

The purpose of this section is to examine whether major political and institutional forces in Greece and Turkey have an interest in policies that make conflict escalation more likely, or whether they have an interest in policies that make economic modernization more likely and hence would be apt to favour conflict de-escalation. As will be seen, there are some similarities between the two countries, but also significant differences, regarding the domestic configuration of forces pushing towards either conflict mitigation or conflict escalation.

In general terms, public opinion in each of the two nations tends to be a very negative of the other nation, though this does not extend to private individuals (in other words, the mutually antagonistic nationalistic images are not racist). As a result of the mutually negative national images, the mass media of both countries stand to gain, in terms of short-term increases in viewers or readers, by presenting any Greek-Turkish crisis in a hyperbolic way (hype). The escalatory potential of the editorial policy of the mass media was amply demonstrated in the Imia crisis of January 1996, which was largely a creation of the media of the two sides interacting with one another in an escalation of mutually hostile images. In times of relative calm in Greek-Turkish relations, the mass media are more varied in their presentations, though a mutually antagonistic nationalistic mode tends to prevail, reflecting the underlying tendencies of public opinion. It is only in op-ed pieces in the more sophisticated newspapers that one may find a more balanced and less hostile presentation of the Greek-Turkish disputes.[20]

The domestic politics of Turkey form a complex configuration of forces with a bearing on Greek-Turkish relations. The business community and growing middle class, which is located mainly in the western provinces of Turkey, constitute the main beneficiaries of Turkish economic modernization. They are represented by the current Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz' Motherland Party, and to a lesser extent by Mrs Tansu Ciller's True Path Party, which support Turkey's entry into the EU.

Opposing their Western and secular orientation is the Islamist Welfare Party, which has gained enough support among the lower classes across Turkey to come first, with 21%, in the most recent Turkish elections. The Welfare Party favours an islamization of the Turkish state, and a foreign orientation closer to the Islamic powers of the Middle East and North Africa, including Iran and Libya.

The armed forces have an institutional and constitutional position in the Turkish political system more paramount than is the case in any other Western nation, which they use to uphold Turkey's secular Kemalist state and Western international orientation.[22] But being engaged in the decade-and-a-half old armed struggle against the Kurdish insurrection in South-East Turkey, the armed forces have become accustomed to violent policies in a manner that might have a deliterious influence on the prospects of conflict prevention in Greek-Turkish relations.

This is all the more evident in regard to shady paramilitary forces which have grown in the context of the darker side of the struggle in South-East Turkey. These groups are linked to organised crime and have tended recently to join the ranks of Mrs Ciller's True Path Party.[23] These forces, and Mrs Ciller herself, constitute the most militant anti-Greek nationalistic faction in Turkish politics. One alarming example of how they might harm Greek-Turkish relations was provided by the boast of the True Path MP Mr. Sedat Bucak, on Turkish television, that paramilitary forces accused of organised crime should be praised for their patriotic acts such as forest arson on Greek tourist resort islands opposite Turkey.[24]

Thus the business community and other pro-modernization and pro-Western forces in Turkey have to confront two separate opposing groups of forces in Turkish politics. The first is the Islamic movement, which in the Welfare Party has found the best grass-roots organization in Turkish politics. While not belonging to the more militant anti-Greek nationalistic forces, the Welfare Party would not be inhibited in an escalation of Greek-Turkish tensions by concerns over the progress of Turkey's modernization or her European prospects. The second is the growth of shady paramilitary forces which have sprung from the conflict in South-East Turkey, which have grown financially strong through organised crime, which have introduced violent, illegal methods to Turkish politics, and which support a militant and even violent approach to Greek-Turkish relations, at the expense if necessary of Turkey's relations with the EU.

The domestic politics of Greece are less complex. The armed forces ceased to interfere in Greek politics with the fall of the military dictatorship of 1967-74. The paramilitary forces which sprang from the Greek civil war

in the 1940s, and which acted in a militant direction in the early phases of the Cyprus problem, also disappeared by 1974. The anti-Western nationalism of the late Andreas Papandreou had become bad politics by 1990, if not earlier, leading to his wholeheartedly embracing the goal of Greek participation in the EU's monetary union during his last premiership (1993-1996). His successor, the current Socialist Prime Minister Simitis, is among the most pro-European politicians in Greece. Currently, all major Greek political forces support Greek participation in the EU's monetary union, with the economic modernization and fiscal discipline agenda that it entails, which would be undermined by a Greek-Turkish war.

Nonetheless, any Greek-Turkish agreement, either on bilateral issues or on Cyprus, that is perceived by Greek public opinion as a humiliating retreat ("surrender"), is likely to be politically unacceptable within Greece. This factor forces the Simitis government to be cautious in its efforts to prevent GreekTurkish relations from escalating towards a serious crisis.

In comparison with their Greek counterparts, the pro-Western and pro-European groups in Turkey face a far more formidable array of domestic political forces that do not share their modernization agenda, and that might opt for nationalistic inflexibility, even at the risk of conflict escalation at the expense of economic modernization. In Greece, on the other hand, the humiliation of the 1974 defeat in Cyprus makes public opinion extremely sensitive to any perceived further retreats, so that anti-Turkish feeling is likely to grip public opinion whenever Greek-Turkish tensions rise. Domestic politics in both countries force their respective governments to avoid any agreement that involves "losing face", and nationalistic factions are apt to present any steps back from the brink of confrontation in the least favourable light possible.

Conclusions

In the case of the Greek-Turkish disputes, it seems likely that neither side desires deliberately to provoke armed confrontation. Nonetheless, the growing bilateral strategic imbalance in favour of Turkey, which derives from long-term increases in the Turkish factors of power (population, total GDP, armed forces) relative to the Greek, lends to Greek-Turkish strategic interaction dynamic elements that entail significant risks of unintended escalation to warfare.

Western policy exerts a de-escalatory influence, in the sense that it constrains Turkey from actually using its bilateral strategic superiority through armed conflict to impose its will on Greece and Cyprus. Yet the West refuses to take sides in the Greek-Turkish disputes, in order to avoid alienating either side. The result is that Turkey can intimidate Greece and

Cyprus, without fearing a strong anti-Turkish backlash in the West, by displays of force just short of war, which nonetheless increase the risk of unintended escalation towards warfare.

The geopolitics of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East have an asymmetric effect on Greece and Turkey. On the one hand, they provide for Turkey a far more important role in global politics than for Greece, making an anti-Turkish stand by the West in Greek-Turkish disputes less likely. On the other hand, they also create significant strategic threats on Turkey's flanks, whereas this is not the case for Greece. Thus the Greek side can concentrate strategically on the Greek-Turkish confrontation without diversions, whereas the Turkish side must divert considerable strategic resources in fronts away from Greece and Cyprus. Yet this factor is thus far inadequate in terms of counter-balancing Turkey's strategic superiority in the Greek-Turkish confrontation.

In terms of the domestic political configurations, in both countries, but more notably in Turkey, the political and societal forces that strongly support economic modernization are faced by opposing forces that are more likely to support inflexible positions and brinkmanship in Greek-Turkish relations, even if thereby they increase the risk of unintended war which would set back these modernization efforts.

The dynamics of Greek-Turkish strategic interaction are driven by the central factor of the growing Turkish strategic superiority, which makes escalation towards warfare, even if unintended, all the more likely. Other factors, which work in a de-escalatory direction, are not potent enough to guarantee avoidance or prevention of conflict escalation. Thus in the long run, the normalisation of Greek-Turkish relations seems unlikely, and the risk of warfare will remain significant, unless Greece succeeds in restoring strategic equilibrium with Turkey.

ENDNOTES

1. The criteria for participation in the European monetary union are a) budget deficit no more than 3% of GDP, b) inflation and nominal interest rates no higher than 1.5% from the EU average, and c) public debt moving towards 60% or less of GDP. In 1997, Greece met none of these criteria.

2. Panayiotis Kondylis, **Theoria tou Polemou**, Athens: Themelio, 1997, pp. 387.

3. **Historical Statistics. 1960-1994**, OECD, 1996, p. 50.

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Greek Foreign policy since 1974
Intellectual debates and policy responses

Van Coufoudakis*

This volume of *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies* summarises the post-1974 intellectual debate in Greece on the direction and objectives of Greek foreign policy. It also contains articles assessing post-1974 Greek foreign policy and provides insights into policies *vis-à-vis* the European Union, Balkans and United States. Other essays evaluate the influence of Constantine Karamanlis on post-1974 Greek foreign policy, and the risks of a Greco-Turkish confrontation.

The contributions from professors Constas, Couloumbis and Ifaistos aptly summarize the theoretical and practical policy debates and dilemmas that the community of Greek international relations scholars face. Professor Constas argues that Greek international relations scholars have failed to become a respected, autonomous factor influencing Greek foreign policy. He calls upon policymakers and the IR community to join forces and address a central issue; i.e. Can the diversion of scarce resources intended to assist the integration of Greece in the European Union cause irreparable damage to the country's security? Professor Ifaistos shows how internationalism and Euro-supranationalism has become a political epidemic casting a shadow over post-war Greek diplomacy. In contrast Professor Couloumbis stresses the pragmatism of Greek foreign policy which is based on a synthesis of the Eurocentric and the ethnocentric schools of thought. He concludes that the multilateralist paradigm remains the dominant element guiding the consensus on which post-1974 Greek foreign policy is based.

Professor Katseli analyzes the challenges that the Greek economy faces given the implementation of the Maastricht guidelines and of the 1997 Amsterdam stability pact. The Greek economy faces the dual challenge of financial stability and productive restructuring. Professor Ioakimidis, in turn, traces the evolution of Greek thinking on the participation of Greece in the European Union. Greece supports a pro-federal Europe and has developed a coherent European Union policy. It now needs to complete the adjustment of its economic, social and political system to the European Union's requirements.

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Professor Catsiapis contrasts the foreign policy objectives of Constantine Karamanlis to those of Andreas Papandreou, the two pre-eminent figures of post-1974 Greece. He concludes that Karamanlis' European option served the economic, political and security objectives of Greece. This option has been adopted by all post-1974 Greek governments. Thus, Karamanlis' greatest contribution has been that he led Greece to Europe.

Professor Veremis reviews trends in post-1974 Greek foreign policy before and after the end of the Cold War. He discusses how Karamanlis and Papandreou sought to broaden the dimensions of Greek foreign policy and to lessen the dependence of Greece on the United States. However, the European Union's failure in the Yugoslav crisis and in addressing the on-going Turkish threat have shifted the focus of Greek foreign and security policy back to the United States. This point is also highlighted by Professor Evriviades who concludes that in the 1990's, because of the Greco-Turkish problems, the "umbilical cord" between the United States and Greece in the security area may be stronger than in the early days of the Cold War. Thus, despite the post-1974 quest for Greek foreign policy independence, the relations of Greece with the United States in the area of security appear to have come full circle.

Dr. Triantafyllou examines the objectives of Greek diplomatic activism in the Balkans and concludes that the consensus backing Greek foreign policy has helped Greece overcome the failures in its Balkan policy during the period of 1991-1995.

Finally Dr. Papasotiriou in his article points at the risks of a Greco-Turkish confrontation. He finds that even though neither side is deliberately seeking such a confrontation a number of conditions may contribute towards one. These conditions include the growing strategic imbalance between the two countries, Western policy attitudes that encourage limits testing by Turkey, and political and societal forces that support inflexible positions. Thus, the author pessimistically concludes that the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations seems unlikely and that the risk of conflict remains significant unless Greece succeeds to restore the strategic balance with Turkey.

Despite rhetorical pyrotechnics, post-1974 Greek foreign policy reflects a fundamental consensus that cuts across partisan and ideological lines. In the post-Cold War period, and especially in the aftermath of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, Greece is the stabilizing factor in the Balkans. It is a country committed to the widening and the deepening of European institutions, but it is also the only European country whose territorial integrity is threatened by Turkey's revisionist policies. Greece's

commitment to regional stability appears to be challenged by the twin forces of Turkish revisionism and Balkan irredentism. With the restoration of democracy in Greece, Prime Minister Karamanlis sought the integration of Greece in the European Economic Community in order to enhance the country's economic performance, to support its democratic institutions, and to lessen the dependence of Greece on the United States. However, the European Union's inability to define a common foreign and security policy, the crisis in Yugoslavia, and the growing Turkish threat in the Aegean and Cyprus, have brought Greek-American relations back full circle. This all the more evident, given Washington's pro-Turkish policies in the post-Cold War era.

Greece has overcome its isolation from the days of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Today, Greece is the source of stability in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. In contrast to its neighbors to the North and East, Greece is politically stable with established and functioning democratic institutions and processes. Moreover, Greece is a *status quo* power that has no revisionist and no territorial claims against any of its neighbors. Greece will protect its borders but, in contrast to many of its neighbors, it does not look beyond its borders to satisfy nationalist sentiments. Greece supports the *status quo* established by international treaties including those of Bucharest (1913), Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947). Greece is not just a member of major international and regional organizations but also the only European Union member located in the Balkans. Greece, in contrast to its neighbors, particularly Turkey, has made its political, economic, strategic and cultural commitment to an integrated Europe. It is committed to widening and deepening the European Union, to both free trade and free markets. The active positioning of the Greek private sector in Bulgaria and Romania shows that Greece has the entrepreneurial know-how to be a major player in a region confronting the challenge of transition to a free economy. Finally, Greece continues to occupy a most important strategic location vis à vis the Balkans, Northeast Africa, the Black Sea and the Middle East. This was shown during the Gulf War.

Post-Cold War Greek security considerations arise from three distinctive and overlapping areas, that is the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, and Greco-Turkish relations and Cyprus. Each of these areas and particularly issues in Greco-Turkish relations and Cyprus impact on the relations of Greece with the United States and with the European Union. They are also the main focus of Greek foreign policy and security policy.

Multiple issues burden Greco-Turkish relations. Some issues date back several decades; for example, the minorities, the Patriarchate and Cyprus.

Most of the Greco-Turkish issues, however, arose after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. These issues include the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf, the extent of the Greek airspace and territorial waters, NATO's operational and control areas in the Aegean, and claims on Greece's sovereign rights over certain Aegean islands. It is the intensity and the aggressive pursuit of these Turkish claims that have raised serious questions in Athens and Nicosia about Turkey's regional objectives. These issues are complicated further by Turkey's involvement in the Balkans, by the arms race between the two countries which consumes between 5-7% of their GDP, and the internal instability in Turkey. Turkey's domestic problems include the state of the economy, the Kurdish problem, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the pivotal role of the military in the political life of the country. Turkey appears to externalize these problems and to use Greece as a scapegoat. Finally, there is the unresolved problem of Cyprus. The Cyprus problem is not a Greco-Turkish problem, but a problem of invasion and occupation. Although its resolution may have a positive effect on Greco-Turkish relations, it cannot be part of a broader Greco-Turkish package deal. Cyprus cannot be held hostage to the resolution of the problems in Greco-Turkish relations which have their own dynamics.

Ever since 1974, Greece has continued to pursue a policy of moderation and pragmatism in the face of Turkish provocations. The Greek approach combines firmness, when needed to protect sovereign rights, and negotiation, where legitimate issues existed as in the case of the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf when upheld its right under international law to extend Greek territorial waters to 12 miles, even though Greece has not chosen to do so until now.

The American response to Turkey's challenge has been presented as one of "even handedness". The United States has called for negotiations between the two countries without regard to the validity of the issues raised by Turkey. Characteristic of this position was the American response during the 1996 Imia Crisis. As Senator Biden said during the September 23, 1997, nomination hearing of the new U.S. Ambassador to Greece R. Nicholas Burns, "even handedness" has no place when Turkey, a friend and ally of the United States stands in violation of international law. The Imia Crisis was of vital importance not only to Greece's territorial integrity but also to American foreign policy. Imia affected fundamental American foreign policy principles, such as the respect of international agreements and the respect of established international boundaries. Turkey has mastered the art of creating incidents and provocations which are then systematically followed by calls for negotiations in a generous show of goodwill and peaceful conduct for the rest of the international community

to witness. Had there been an unqualified American renunciation of these tactics, subsequent Turkish governments would have found it difficult to challenge Greek sovereignty over other Aegean islands under the theory of the "grey areas" in the Aegean. When Washington finally criticized Turkey's behavior in the fall of 1997 following serious violations of the Greek air space by the Turkish Air Force, that response may have been "too little too late" to have had any effect. Hence Washington is increasingly perceived in Athens not as an objective mediator in Greco-Turkish issues, but rather as Ankara's silent partner in destabilizing the region. Such an assessment may contradict previous remarks about the growing dependence of Greek security policy on that of the United States. However, this may be a practical policy option that takes into account the important role of the United States in the region.

The pro-Turkish tendencies of American policy have also been manifested in Cyprus where Washington

— opposed the defense cooperation between Cyprus and Greece

— opposed the acquisition of defense weapons systems by Cyprus and has refused to sell such systems to Cyprus

— armed the Turkish armed forces with sophisticated weapons that are a clear and present danger to Cyprus and to the Greek islands in the Aegean

— stood silent during the course of 1997 when Turkey threatened to use force against Cyprus because of the acquisition of the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system.

Washington has taken two other steps indicative of its pro-Turkish policies: (1) it has promoted through the United Nations constitutional schemes that undermine the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus much as Turkey has demanded since 1974, and (2) it has linked the integration of Cyprus to the European Union with the political solution of the Cyprus problem and with progress in the integration of Turkey in the European Union.

The dilemma of Greek foreign policy can be understood even better when examined within the context of American interests in the region. These interests include:

(1) The American interest in the gas and the oil resources of the Caspian Sea and the movement of these resources through a new system of pipelines in Turkey. This choice is the direct result of America's "double containment" policy against Iraq and Iran, and the American reluctance to endorse alternative routes through Russia, the Black Sea, Bulgaria and Greece.

(2) Washington's recognition of the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism to the region and to Turkey in particular. Washington appears fearful to antagonize the Turks in order not to strengthen nationalist and Islamic political forces.

(3) The growing internal political instability in Turkey which can be attributed to the bad state of the economy, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the Kurdish insurrection, corruption, human rights violations, and the interventionism of the military in the political life of the country. Repressive measures against the Kurds and the Islamic fundamentalists are not likely to succeed. Nor will American pressures for concessions by Greece and Cyprus will help retain in power secular Turkish governments. On the contrary, they are likely to destabilize the region further. Secularism does not guarantee either democracy or peaceful conduct on the part of Turkey.

Greece, Cyprus and the United States share the goal of regional stability. There is also complementarity in American, Greek and Cypriot interests *vis-à-vis* Turkey. All three countries are interested in a stable, democratic, secular Turkey that follow rule of law and Europe-oriented policies. Any disagreement arises over the method not the content. Washington's policies aim to achieve American objectives by appeasing Turkey, by placing at risk the regional *status quo* and by undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Greece and Cyprus.

Regional stability and the relations of Greece, Cyprus and the United States will be enhanced if the following conditions obtain:

(1) Washington acknowledges that neither Greece nor Cyprus are Europe's or America's stepchildren, and that like other nations they will not sacrifice their vital national interests to mollify unstable régimes like that of Turkey;

(2) Washington must give an unqualified endorsement of the regional *status quo* which has been established under international treaties such as those of Lausanne of 1923, Montreux 1936 and Paris 1947;

(3) The unqualified renunciation of Turkey's threat to use force in Cyprus and the Aegean.

(4) The abandonment by the United States of the so-called "even handed" policy. When dealing with Turkey's revisionism, "even handedness" violates fundamental principles of American policy, contributes to the instability of an already unstable region and does not help Turkey address the serious problems that it faces on the eve of the 21st century.

At the end of the current century, there are additional challenges facing Greek foreign policy. It must capitalize on its strengths as a source of stability and peaceful change in the Balkans. Moreover, since 1974, there

has been a fundamental consensus on Greek foreign policy priorities including Greece's role in the European Union, its role in the Balkans and its confronting the Turkish threat. The challenge for the Greek government and for the opposition parties remains that of channeling this consensus into practical policies. Using foreign policy for short-term partisan gain, as during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, has had the effect of isolating Greece from its allies and undermining Greek interests in the region.

As an equal member of the European Union and of other regional organizations,Greece must stand ready to cooperate and share in the burdens of multilateral policies. To do this, Greece must continue along the road of economic convergence with the Maastricht criteria. In terms of political objectives, Greece can take a page from Turkey's diplomacy and learn to promote its national interest in pragmatic ways in bilateral and multilateral fora.

Of course, Turkey remains Greece's greatest foreign and security policy challenge. Greece has not refused negotiations with Turkey to resolve real issues such as the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf under contemporary rules of international law. But international law cannot be used at Turkey's convenience. Greece lifted its objections and supported Turkey's Customs Union with the European Union. The European Union's Luxembourg summit last December clearly proved that Turkey's future in Europe depends solely on Turkey's domestic and international behavior. Greece asks nothing of Turkey but conformity with its international obligations. Legitimate differences, such as the delimitation of the continental shelf, can be resolved easily within the context of international law. However, no Greek government will negotiate its territorial integrity or its sovereign rights.

For any meaningful negotiations to occur, Turkey must acknowledge the international treaties defining the regional *status quo* and must renounce the use or the threat of force in its relations with Greece. Even though the Greco-Turkish Declaration in Madrid on July 8, 1997, pointed Greco-Turkish relations in the right direction, that declaration met the sad fate of its predecessors following Turkey's aggressive behavior in the Aegean and intransigence in Cyprus.

Although a member of the European Union, Greece is directly affected by problems not shared by the other member-states. These problems emanate from the dangerous neighborhood in which Greece resides. It is in the interest of Greece as well as Greece's European and American partners to cooperate in the search for peaceful solutions to regional problems. These solutions must conform to international law. They must also enhance regional stability and the credibility of the institutions that will lead us into the 21st century.

CHRONOLOGIE-CHYPRE

Période du 1er mars au 30 septembre 1997

24-25 mars : Le Conseil du parti populaire européen (PPE) réuni à Porto condamne "toute pression extérieure visant à empêcher que Chypre devienne membre de l'UE".

27 mars : La Banque européenne d'investissement (BEI) a accordé un prêt global de 25 millions d'Ecus à la Cyprus Development Bank (CDB) pour le financement de projets menés par des PME de l'île.

10 avril : Résolution du Parlement européen sur les violations des droits de l'homme des enclavés chypriotes grecs et maronites vivant en zone occupée.

17-19 avril : une cinquantaine de femmes chypriotes grecques et turques ont dialogué à Bruxelles dans le cadre d'une rencontre "Give peace a chance" soutenue par la Commission de l'UE.

28 avril : Diego Cordobez ancien ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Equateur est nommé Conseiller spécial pour Chypre du Secrétaire général de l'ONU en remplacement de Hang Sung Joo.

- Quarante personnes sont blessées à Nicosie en marge d'un "concert pour la paix" organisé sur la ligne de démarcation.

4 juin : Richard Holbrooke est nommé par le président Clinton émissaire présidentiel pour le problème de Chypre.

9-13 juillet : Négociations à Troutbeck, dans la région de New York, entre le Président Clérides et Rauf Denktash.

16 juillet : La Commission européenne décide que Chypre fera partie du premier groupe de six pays avec lesquels l'UE ouvrira des négociations d'adhésion à partir de janvier 1998.

6 août : la Turquie et la "République turque de Chypre nord" signent un accord d'association prévoyant un processus d'intégration partielle.

11-15 août : Négociations Cléridés-Denktash à Glion près de Montreux qui se terminent sur un échec.

15 septembre : De passage à Chypre, la secrétaire d'Etat Madeleine Albright annonce une prochaine reprise de discussions interchypriotes.

19 septembre : le Premier ministre turc Mesut Yilmaz déclare que son gouvernement a chargé l'armée de "prendre des mesures militaires supplémentaires" pour faire face au déploiement de missiles S-300 achetés en janvier à la Russie par le gouvernement chypriote.

CHRONOLOGIE-GRÈCE

Période du 1er mars au 30 septembre 1997

11-12 mars : Colloque à Athènes de l'Assemblée de l'UEO sur une "sécurité élargie". Georges Papandréou, le ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères de Grèce insiste sur la nécessité de maintenir l'objectif d'une Europe unifiée à laquelle appartiendraient l'Albanie et la Turquie.

22 avril : Le président de la République héllénique Costis Stéphanopoulos dans un discours devant l'assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe invite la Turquie à entendre la "voix de la raison".

30 avril : La Grèce et la Turquie forment à Luxembourg un Comité des sages sous parrainage européen chargé de trouver les formules appropriées sur les points litigieux bloquant le rapprochement des deux pays.

29 mai : Le gouvernement grec se conforme à l'obligation d'indépendance des banques centrales imposée par le traité de Maastricht en déposant un projet de loi selon lequel "la banque de Grèce sera désormais seule compétente pour tracer la politique monétaire".

6 juin : Le ministre grec des affaires étrangères Théodore Pangalos déclare que la Grèce est prête à signer un pacte de non agression avec la Turquie.

11 juin : La Grèce ratifie la convention de Schengen.

30 juin : Les deux experts grecs du Comité des sages remettent à la présidence néerlandaise leurs remarques sur le rapport des experts turcs. Ils suggérent le recours à la Cour internationale de justice pour trouver des solutions à certains contentieux comme celui d'Imia/Kardak alors que les experts turcs proposent un dialogue gréco-turc global, ce qu'Athènes rejette catégoriquement.

9 juillet : En marge de la réunion de l'OTAN à Madrid, Costas Simitis et le Président Demirel conviennent de se consacrer à la recherche de la paix, de la sécurité et du développement continu de leurs relations de bon voisinage.

5 septembre : Athènes obtient l'organisation des Jeux Olympiques de 2004 par 66 voix contre 41 à Rome.

8 septembre : Le ministre turc des affaires étrangères Ismaïl Cem déclare qu'il est futile d'attendre de la Turquie qu'elle accepte de porter le contentieux sur Imia/Kardak devant la CIG en contrepartie d'une levée du veto grec aux financements communautaires en Turquie.

Recensions / Book Reviews

Ann Cacoullos: "Women in the Political Culture of Greece" Athens University Press, 1996. 215 pp.

This is a unique English language book on Greek politics by a professor in the University of Athens, based on two studies done between 1988 and 1994. The former is more general and theoretical on the "quiet revolution" brought about by women in the politics of Greece, while the latter is more specific and practical on the involvement of rural women in that country.

The first study argues that recent years have witnessed a dramatic social change which politicized women in Greece, as elsewhere; thereby challenging traditional male dominated politics. During the last twenty years since the fall of the Greek Junta, feminist movements made great strides in promoting and consolidating women's rights in both constitutional law and political action.

In reviewing the literature, Professor Cacoullos finds that androcratic political science had sustained and reinforced the idea that politics is exclusively a game of elderly men. In that male dominated culture, the political role of women had been ignored and their historical contribution suppressed.

On the contrary, the author argues that since political knowledge does not require any special training or education, women have the same natural political abilities and interests as men. So if women are not willing or able to engage in politics, it can only be the fault of a culture that belittles and marginalizes them. Such traditional culture of elitism and etatism, as well as factionalism and clientism, dominated Greece and still makes it very difficult for women to penetrate the inner sanctums of masculine national politics. At best, all women can do is participate in the rather trivial lower and limited arena of local community affairs.

The second case study finds the role of rural women in the collective decision-making processes of Greece very restricted. The research method of that pilot study centered on participant observation and qualitative survey techniques carried out in a few representative locations.

In her conclusion of various interviews, Professor Cacoullos found rural women to be the most excluded group or class in Greek politics. Their involvement varied inversely with the power attached to the political

office, so, although women exert some power in insignificant private matters, they count very little in important public affairs.

If anything, their influence has declined lately due to technologic and demographic developments that demote their work and economic contributions. These recent trends reinforce the elitist democracy at the expense of the populist one. Women are therefore caught in a double-bind which puts them in a dilemma of either being coopted in the world of male politics or being trivialized in the margins of real power.

Indeed, as true as these observations are, they apply not only to women but to men. Most people do not partake of politics, other than vote once in a while, so the author does admit that neither rural men nor women control the political process in the first place.

Although, in some instances, the author found women's vote to be the deciding factor in local elections, in most times and places, women are still compelled to exert their influence in unconventional, indirect and manipulative ways, including the power of sex and purse, something that apparently demeans them.

So how are people in general and women in particular to become more active in public affairs? Of course, there are many ways of political participation. Cacoullos even suggests being silent and refusing to vote is such a way. But if that were so, most people would be politically involved, so we would not have to worry about them.

Unfortunately, that is not such an effective way to shape the political agenda and get things done. So the dilemma for women still remains to either focus on so-called women's issues involving kitchen, school and children exclusively, or expand to broader public issues common to both genders. The former concentrates but marginalizes them, while the latter includes yet dilutes their clout. What is sure is that they cannot have it both ways, something that Cacoullos, to her credit, seems to acknowledge.

Thanos Veremis:
"The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy"
Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1997. 225 pp.

This a good episodic account of the involvement of a military establishment in national politics, by the Director of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy as well as professor of political science in the University of Athens.

The dozen chapters of the book include both historical developments and thematic subjects. The former span the 150 years of the modern Greek state, with the greatest emphasis given to the first forty years of the 20th

century; while the latter treat such topics as officer selection and education, the military and nationalism, professionalism and patronage.

The main discovery that the author claims to have made is that, contrary to popular belief, armed intervention in politics is a latecomer in modern Greek history. For most of the time since its establishment in 1828, the military accepted their subordination to the civilian governments which dominated the Greek state.

A reason for this is that the army was hardly in a position to get involved, given that it was created *ex nihilo* after the war of independence and took fifty years before it become a credible war fighting force. Until then, it was nothing more than a ten thousand strong militia barely maintaining internal order.

It was not until 1909 that Greece witnessed its first autonomous military intervention in politics, and even then its byproduct was to introduce the liberal politician Venizelos into national prominence. This first attempt was followed by sporadic interventions in 1916, 1922, 1923, 1933, and 1935. These military coups intended to to clean up political corruption and institute social reforms, as the self-appointed guardians or guides of the nation, rather than to take power and form a government. Of these, the most significant according to the author, who devotes a long chapter to it, was the last one, even though it failed miserably.

But the scope and aim of most army conspiracies, coups, revolts and insurrections were to redress personal and professional grievances or to replace one civilian government with another, and republican versus monarchist parties; not to establish a military regime, as it did in 1967.

As a result of these limited aims, a peculiarity of the Greek political culture was that leaders of even failed military coups could continue their carriers and even rise to high political offices afterwards, as did Generals Plastiras, Papagos, and Metaxas.

As a nationalist, bourgeois, conservative institution, the army operated on the traditional concept of populism and clientism which impaired professionalism and modernism. It was only recently, after the restoration of liberal democracy in the mid-seventies that the Greek military was finally brought up to modern, western professional standards.

Political scientists have long tried to fit the Greek case into some theoretical framework, but to no avail. As a result, the author rarely goes beyond descriptive narrative and event analysis to document the complicated evolution of Greek military-civilian relations. As such, it requires some historical and cultural background for a reader to appreciate the Byzantine character of Greek politics. All in all however, the book is worth reading as a good companion to modern Greek civil-military history.

G. T. Allison & K. Nicolaidis (Eds):
"The Greek Paradox: Promise vs Performance"
MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997.180 pp.

This anthology of fifteen articles collected by the Center for Science and International Affairs is the result of a special Harvard Leadership Symposium held at the Kennedy School of Government in 1995. Its paradoxic title was meant to be provocative because it juxtaposed the gap between high expectations and low realizations which disappointed, disturbed and intrigued many observers of the Greek scene.

It is said that macrohistorically, geopolitically and socioeconomically, Greece should have been the natural hub of the Balkans; and yet it has lately lagged in its development and lost that privileged position. So the Symposium organizers asked some leading Greek and American academics, diplomats and journalists, including Constantine Stephanopoulos and Michael Dukakis, to determine the causes of this infamous gap and propose some policy solutions to fill it.

The editors did a good job in culling the various diagnoses and therapies proffered into a fairly consistent whole where crucial questions are impassionately debated and uninhibited answers are often given. In her editorial introduction, Professor Nicolaidis sets the agenda by defining the Greek paradox and summarizing the subsequent discussions on its political, economic and military aspects; focused around Europe, America, and the Hellenic diaspora.

Assessing the Greek paradox, Professor Diamandouros opens the discussion by pointing out the structural weaknesses of Greek society whose political factionalism and particularism did not prepare the country for the turbulent times of the nineties. As Dr Woodward reminds us, in her article, isolationism is the greatest threat to national survival in the contemporary interdependent world.

Similarly, the chronic backwardness of Greek economy, according to Professor Thomadakis, contrasts starkly with the individual prosperity of Greek entrepreneurs. As a small and poor country, Greece has wavered between the Scylla of oligopolistic heavy industry and the Charybdis of inefficient small business.

Finally, as far as Greek foreign and security policy goes, former US Ambassador Stearns, points out the gap between diplomatic potential and military performance, especially in the Macedonian fiasco which isolated Greece politically more than it did FYROM economically. Professor Tsoukalis explains this mishandled toponymy, as well as national pathology, on the highly emotional and exaggerated sense of Greek importance and insecurity which emphasizes ancient rights rather than current interests.

Unfortunately, most foreigners do not share the deeply held belief of Greeks, as reflected in their President's article, that their position is always right. To the outside world, Greece therefore has a long way to go to close its "credibility deficit" as Larrabee calls it in his article.

In trying to answer what's to be done, all analysts agree on the need for reform. Pulling together their proposals, the challenge and agenda of reform boil down into three strategies for Greece: engage in a reevaluation of its actions, begin a reconstruction of its policies, and move towards a rapprochement with its Western allies.

More specific proposals are given as to the Turkish, Cypriot, and Balkan problems, such as an independent foundation for the study of the future of Hellenism. As Professor Nye concludes recalling Thucydides, since honor, fear and interest are the main causes of war, if it wants peace, Greece must work to reduce its neighbors' fears by recognizing their interests, and thus demonstrate its own honorable intentions.

If it does so, Greece can easily become the leading country of the Balkan region, economically, politically and culturally, with its key foreign assets being the European partnership, American friendship, and Hellenic diaspora. To maximize their impact and contribution in international affairs, Greeks must replace their old reactive politics of complaint and veto with new policies of proaction and persuasion.

Fortunately, since these proposals were proffered two years ago at the low point of recent Greek diplomacy, most of them have been adopted by its reformed government. Unlike the dogmatic and emotional policies of Papandreou, those of Simitis are more pragmatic and realistic. As a result, Greek reputation has improved both in its regional and global scope, thus narrowing the gap between the promise and performance of the Greek paradox.

Paris Arnopoulos
Concordia University

Livres reçus / Books Received

1. Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, London, Mcmillan Press, 1997.

2. *Kosovo: - Avoiding Another Balkan War* (Edited by: Thanos Veremis and Evangelos Kofos), Athens, ELIAMEP - UNIVERSITY of ATHENS, 1998.

3. Anastasios Tamis, *An Illustrated History of the Greeks of Australia*, Melbourne, Dardalis Archives of the Greek Community. La Trobe University, 1997.

4. *I Ellines tis Rossias ke tis Sovietikis Enosis* (The Greeks of Russia and the Soviet Union) edited by I.K.Hassiotis, Thessaloniki, University Studio Press, 1997 (in Greek).

5. Antonis Kakaras, *To polemiko naftiko sti diktatoria 1967-74*, Athens, 1997 (in Greek).

6. Athanasios Platias, *To neo diethnes systima*, Athens, Ekdosis Papazissi, 1995 (in Greek).

Activités académiques / Academic Activities

Launching of the Spring Issue of *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*

Number 1, Volume 5 of the Journal was launched in Montreal on October 31, 1997. Present on that occasion were Demetris Ioannou, Greek Consul in Montreal, Christos Syrros, MNA in the National Assembly of Quebec, as well as many academics, community leaders and other supporters of the publication.

The guest speaker was professor Geaorge Kourvetaris of Northern Illinois University who spoke on "Hellenism in the USA: Future and Perspectives for the 21st Century". Yannis Philipoussis opened the meeting by welcoming the assistance; professors Paris Arnopoulos and Stephanos Constantinides, respectively President of the Board and Director of the Centre spoke briefly on this new issue of **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies** and on the future activities of the Centre.

L'hellénisme vers le 21ème siècle Congrès en Australie

Le Centre de recherches helléniques (Canada) a participé au Congrès international des Instituts de recherche de l'hellénisme en Australie (Melbourne - Adélaïde - Sydney) qui s'est déroulé du 30 juillet au 10 août 1997. Le Congrès, qui avait pour thème, "L'hellénisme vers le 21ème siècle", était organisé par le Comité de coordination des instituts de recherches de l'hellénisme dont le Centre de recherches helléniques (Canada) fait partie en tant que représentant du Canada.

Le directeur du Centre, Dr. Stephanos Constantinides, a fait une communication sur le thème "Défis pour la politique étrangère grecque au 21ème siècle". Le Forum des études helléniques (Australie) était l'hôte de la conférence.

Par la même occasion, à sa réunion du 6 juillet 1997 à Melbourne, le Comité de coordination des instituts de recherches de l'hellénisme a confié la présidence pour les deux prochaines années au Centre de recherches helléniques (Canada). Ainsi le 3ème Congrès international des Instituts se tiendra à Montréal en 1999.

Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE)

The SAE first Convention took place in Thessaloniki from the 1st to the 7th December 1997. The Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research (Canada) was represented by its director Dr. Stephanos Constantinides.

Conférence à Athènes pour les 30 ans depuis la prise du pouvoir par les militaires

Le directeur du Centre de recherches helléniques Dr. Stephanos Constantinides a participé à Athènes à une conférence sur la dictature mlitaire que la Grèce a connu de 1967 à 1974. La conférence a eu lieu du 10 au 12 décembre 1997 et a été organisée par la Société hellénique de science politique.

Le Dr. Constantinides a fait une communication sur le thème "Activités contre la dictature militaire du 21 avril 1967 au Canada".

Projet Éducation des Grecs à l'étranger

Le Centre d'études interculturelles et migratoires (Université de Crète, département de l'éducation) a confié la responsabilité du Projet Éducation des Grecs à l'étranger pour le Canada au Centre de recherches helléniques (Canada). Les responsables de ce projet pour le Canada sont les professeurs Stephanos Constantinides et Peter Chimbos, respectivement, directeur du Centre et membre du conseil d'administration.

Advice to Contributors

Three copies of all manuscripts, typewritten on computer, double-spaced should be submitted on paper and disk. Manuscripts should follow the APA Manual, or the MLA Style Sheet or be consistent with practice in the discipline of each particular author.

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Avis aux collaborateurs

Les textes doivent être soumis en trois exemplaires dactylographiés à l'ordinateur à double interligne et conformément à la présentation en usage sur papier et sur disquette.

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