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The Classical Theorist of International Relations

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Foreword

As guest editor I would like to express my gratitude to the editorial board of *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies* for devoting this issue to the modern Greek contribution to the study of Thucydides. In addition, I would like to thank the contributors to the volume. The late Panayiotis Kondylis, an important political realist of modern Greece, had also been invited to contribute to the present volume, but his untimely demise unfortunately prevented him from sharing his insights on the impact that Thucydides exercised on Hobbes. This volume is devoted to his memory.

Athanassios Platias

Introduction

Athanassios Platias*

Stephanos Constantinides**

As Thucydides claimed, the events of the past, "will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future."[1] His *magnum opus*, therefore, was meant to have a lasting significance ("was done to last forever"),[2] not merely as an account of the war, but as a source of generalizations about state behaviour in the context of changing political and security challenges. The *History of the Peloponnesian War* "lasts forever" not only because history repeats itself, but also because this text sharpens the reader's outlook and enables him or her to analyze and respond to current experience.

Louis Halle did not exaggerate when he claimed that "Thucydides, as he himself anticipated, wrote not only the history of the Peloponnesian War. He wrote the history of the Napoleonian Wars, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War."[3] Despite the recent discussion concerning the alleged "discontinuities in international politics"[4] and the "transformation of world politics"[5], it is difficult to disagree with Robert Gilpin when he states that "international relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy. The classic history of Thucydides is as meaningful a guide to the behaviour of states today as when it was written in the fifth century B.C.".[6]

It comes therefore as no surprise that most international relations scholars tend to begin their books with such phrases as: "ever since Thucydides"[7] or with references to Thucydides as the father of realism.[8] Indeed, Thucydides is regarded as the founding father of political realism, the dominant approach in international relations. Yet, in modern Greece the study of Thucydides has been relatively neglected. The purpose of this thematic issue of

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Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies is to correct the situation by presenting the contribution of Greek scholars to the study of Thucydides. These scholars come from various disciplines, and reside both in Greece and abroad.

The papers included in this volume touch upon seven themes that are central to the current debate in the field of international relations. These themes are :

1. Causes of the Peloponnesian War.
2. Relative distribution of power between Athens and Sparta.
3. Polarity of the Greek city-state system.
4. Nature of political realism.
5. Nature of the strategy in Thucydides' *History*.
6. Nature of the Athenian imperialism.
7. Pathology of war.

Let us summarize each one as a general introduction to this volume.

I. Causes of the Peloponnesian War

First and foremost Thucydides is categorical on this issue:

> I propose first to give an account of the causes of complaint which the Athenians and the Peloponnesians had against each other and of the specific instances where their interests clashed: this is in order that there should be no doubt in anyone's mind about what led to this great war falling upon the Hellenes. But the real reason for the war is, in my opinion, most likely to be disguised by such an argument. What made war inevitable was the growth of the Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.[9]

However, Thucydides' ambition to determine once and for all the causes of the Peloponnesian War has not been achieved, since the dispute about these causes continues to this day. In this volume, as well as in the rest of the literature, opinions fall into two extremes: a) Some scholars support Thucydides' argument of the "real reason for the war" being "the growth of the Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta". For example, Platias' contribution in this volume reflects this point of view. b) Other scholars give primary attention to "the causes of complaint" as Thucydides calls them and claim, for instance, that Pericles' handling of the Megarian Decree was misguided and

responsible for the war. Indeed, we can infer from Thucydides that this issue was central in discussions in Athens on the eve of the war. Conventional wisdom of Thucydides' day held that the Peloponnesian War was provoked by the Megarian Decree. Aristophanes made this point clearly in *The Acharnians.* Arnopoulos, in this volume, refers to the views of Aristophanes: "His vitriolic attack on demagogues was especially directed at Pericles and his party, whom he held responsible for the war. As a result, he applauded another playwright, *Eupolis*, who went so far as to suggest that Pericles should be tried as a "war criminal" (*Poleis*).

Another point of view is presented by Boucoyiannis in this volume. She focuses on "the big influence of small allies" and argues that Corinth dragged a reluctant Sparta into the war. As she puts it: "it was minor allies, rather than the major states in the bipolar system of the Greek world that engaged in power politics and tipped the system into conflict. Sparta is shown by Thycydides to be singularly uninterested in the activities of the Athenians; it was the Corinthians who persisted in bringing the matter to their attention."

II. The Distribution of Power between Athens and Sparta

One may get a better understanding of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War by approaching the problem from another angle. Thucydides points to structural causes of the war, such as the growth of the Athenian power. This insight is central to realist analysis of international politics. Platias and Taxiarchi discuss in some detail the factors that, according to Thucydides, prompted the shift in the power distribution in favour of Athens. Both approvingly cite Thucydides' analysis, according to which Athenian commercial and naval activities and the strategic environment emerging after the Persian Wars were responsible for the emergence and growth of the power of Athens.

Donald Kagan, in his *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, challenges Thucydides' views by arguing that Athenian power did not increase between the end of the so-called First Pelloponnesian war and the beginning of the Second.[10] Platias in this volume offers a response to Kagan's position, on the one hand, to the assymetry between the economic power of Athens and Sparta, and, on the other, to the importance of economic power, the

enabling force behind military power. As a result, he restores Thucydides' claim that Athenian power was rising, thus posing a threat to Sparta and its allies.

Boucoyiannis disagrees with this analysis. She points out that Thucydides shows Athens having suffered serious set-backs in recent expeditions, as in Egypt. Its capacity to project power had thus been undermined. Even if still overall superior in power this factor alone cannot explain the outbreak of war: structure *per se*, she argues, can yield no determinate predictions on outcomes.

III. The Polarity of the Greek City-State System

A related issue is the bipolarity of the Greek world. Thucydides claims that the Greek world was basically partitioned into two spheres of influence whose major opponents were the Athenian (what had started as the Delian League) and the Spartan alliance. Yet, this view is not fully shared by all modern scholars. Platias and Taxiarchi review the arguments in the literature, which suggest that the system was multipolar due to the existence of other powerful actors, such as Thebes, the Greek colonies of Southern Italy and Sicily, and Corcyra.[12] However, they both reject these arguments. Platias defends Thucydides' view, stating that "although these actors (Thebes, etc.) tried to exploit the conflict between Sparta and Athens to their own advantage, they ended up siding with the central protagonists of the conflict. Hence the distribution of power was essentially bipolar." Arnopoulos also seems to agree with the view that the system was as bipolar as that of the modern cold war era.

Taxiarchi, however, takes the middle ground between the two competing arguments. According to her, the system was "bi-multipolar" or "quasi-bipolar", with two relatively stronger powers, but with other influential actors as well.

Constantinides introduces a different point of view. He considers bipolarity as the trait of the system as long as we analyse it on the basis of the hellenic world. But as we consider the system with the presence of Persia, it presents a different configuration, that of multipolarity.

IV. The Nature of Political Realism

Thucydides' text has been characterised as the most important clasic treatise of international relations, not because of its description of the events of the Peloponnesian War, but due to the the-

oretical positions that can be extrapolated from it, *vis-à-vis* the approach of political realism in international relations. Robert Gilpin reflects the consensus in the field when he describes Thucydides as the first political scientist, the first realist who paid attention to the significance of the changes in the distribution of power.[13]

Although there is no disagreement about the role of Thucydides as a father of political realism, scholars tend to disagree on the limits of the theoretical propositions that can be extrapolated from the *History of the Peloponnesian War*. For some, this text is an ideal statement typical of power politics, equating "might" with "right" as the Sophists had done. It is in this context that Philippoussis in this volume focuses on the principles of *Machtpolitik*, in his analysis of Pericles' *funeral oration*. He examines the antithesis and the dynamics of these principles, present at the beginning of the War, between Pericles and the Sophists as well as the Spartans.

From another perspective, Arnopoulos contrasts the Realpolitik approach of Thucydides with the pacifist theory of Plato. Arnopoulos considers Thucydides as the consumate realist because he recognized the complexity of circumstances and accepted the limitation of human intelligence to understand, let alone control events. In this sense, classic realism is opposed to idealism which engages a single facet of reality: be it the Platonic principle of Justice on the one hand or the Thracymachian policy of power on the other, as the determinant factors of history.

Others, such as Platias tend to focus on structural imperatives and therefore analyze the causes of major wars, in the same vein as Gilpin[14] and Waltz,[15] namely in terms of shifts in the balance of power.

Boucoyiannis does seem to disagree in principle with this version of political realism. However, she disagrees with the application of this model to the Peloponnesian War itself.

Others, like Taxiarchi in this volume, present an image of Thucydides as a complex realist,[16] operating at three different levels of analysis: a) human nature; b) domestic structure of society and c) interstate system.

Constantinides focuses on the famous dialogue in Thucydides' *History* between Athenians and Milians and argues that this implacable realism is the trait of international relations of any period of human history. The evocation of the great ethical principles, international law, human rights, etc. doesn't change the nature of these relations: "...it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule

wherever one can. This is not a law we Athenians made ourselves, nor are we the first to act upon it since its establishment. We found already in existence, and we shall have it in existence forever among those who come after us... anybody else with the same power as that which is now ours would act in exactly the same way". (Thucydides V,105,2)

V. The Nature of the Strategy

Although Thucydides stands out prominently as the forefather of international relations, his contribution to the study of strategy has been comparatively neglected. Platias attempts to highlight this contribution by arguing that in Thucydides' text we find for the first time in history an outline of a complete theory of grand strategy. He analyzes the grand strategy that Athens, under Pericles' direction, employed during the first phase of the Peloponnesian War and claims that the Periclean grand strategy was an excellent strategic design, which ensured Athenian success in the struggle. This view was vindicated in the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war -the period known as the Archidamian War. Platias agrees with Thucydides' interpretation of the Athenian defeat, namely that Athens was defeated only when it abandoned the Periclean grand stategy.

Philippoussis argues that, although the Spartan strategy remained constant and consistent throughout the Peloponnesian War, the Athenian strategy changed dramatically after Pericles' death with the Sophistic shift of polity due to the ideological differences. The resulting political infighting divided the Athenians, brought social anarchy and consequently weakened their military position.

In a somewhat fragmented manner Constantinides refers to the Periclean strategy as one of equilibrium and he opposes it to that elaborated by Alcibiades as the strategy of ambition. He considers that the failure of Alcibiades' strategy was not only the result of an unmeasurable imperialism but also that of the internal political games which finally gave the leadership of the sicilian expedition to Nicias, a man opposed to Alcibiades' strategy. Constantinides considers also that the innovative strategy of Lysander hasn't been studied cautiously.

Boucoyiannis, in her own contribution, pays detailed attention to the diplomatic strategy and tactics that the Corinthians used in order to drag Sparta into war. She presents the Corinthian

techniques in public diplomacy, lobbying, manipulation of other small allies, and the combination of threats and promises. In the end, according to her, Corinthian threats proved effective: "Through least heard in debates, the threat of Corinthian defection may have been the only fear that could goad the Spartans into action."

VI. Nature of the Athenian Imperialism

Athenian Imperialism has been interpreted either in political or in economic terms. De Romilly for instance argues in favour of political interpretation. Constantinides agrees with this interpretation, but adds an economical dimension to that picture and emphasises the importance of the sea in the development of Athenian imperialism making the parallel with Venise or Great Britain. Finally Arnopoulos synthesizes both points of view by his realistic interpretation of Thucydides. He points out the classical imperialism of the Greeks which was limited to domination of one greek polis by another, but unlike Persian, Roman, or modern imperialism. never included foreign nations before Alexander the Great. Thus, it combined not only economical, political, but cultural and national considerations. In that sense, the Athenian Empire was a result of the failure to confederate Greece voluntarily. That is why it became necessary for the Athenian democracy to behave undemocraticaly abroad.

VII. Pathology of War

In his contribution to this volume, Hourdakis presents the pathology of war in Thucydides' *History*. In his interpretation of the historian's text, Hourdakis argues that the war seems to be an illness of human nature and tries to find its origin and symptoms. Thus, Thucydides' history constitutes a diachronic study of human psychology and a tool of education for the amelioration and the change of human mentality.

Arnopoulos summarizes Thucydides's diagnosis of the war pathology as a loss of control. War is a disease that makes societies loose control of events in general and themselves in particular. Thus the great historian did not mince words in denouncing the *pathos* of *polemos* in no uncertain terms.

This volume illustrates the complexity of Thucydides' thought and the necessity to continue to study and analyse what the historian himself considered a creation "to last forever".

NOTES

1. Thucydides, **History of the Peloponnesian War,** trasl. by Rex Warner, London Penguin, 1972, A 22.

2. Thucydides, **History**, A 22.

3. Louis J. Halle, **The Elements of International Strategy,** Lanham: University Press of America, 1984, p. 15.

4. See, among others, Bruce Russett, "A Post-Thucydides, Post-Cold-War World", **Occasional Research Papers**, Athens: Institute of International Relations, 1992.

5. See, among others, John Mueller, **Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics**, New York: Harper Collins, 1995.

6. Robert Gilpin, **War and Change in World Politics**, Cambridge: University Press, 1981, p.7.

7. Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation, **World Politics** 40, 3 (April 1988). See also Michael Doyle, **Ways of War and Peace**, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 45.

8. See, among others, Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics", in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), **Neorealism and its Critics**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 7; Joseph Nye, Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism", **World Politics** 40, 2 (January 1988), p. 235.

9. Thucydides, **History**, A23.

10. Donald Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War,** Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969.

11. Anton Powell, **Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 B.C.**, London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 59-135.

12. W.R. Connor, "Polarization in Thucydides", in Richard Ned Lebow and Barry Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry from Thucydides to the Nuclear Age**, Boulder: Westview, 199, pp. 54-57.

13. Gilpin, **War and Change in World Politics**, p.53.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Kenneth Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

16. See also Doyle, **Ways of War and Peace**, pp. 49-92.

Thucydide hier et aujourd'hui

Entretien avec Jacqueline de Romilly

Conduit par Jean Catsiapis*

Dans un entretien avec Jean Catsiapis, Jacqueline de Romilly, helléniste, professeur à la Sorbonne et au Collège de France, deuxième femme à accéder à l'Académie francaise après Marguerite Yourcenar, sans doute la plus grande spécialiste de l'oeuvre de Thucydide, parle de l'historien ainsi que de son amour de la Grèce, ancienne et moderne. Nous publions aujourd'hui son point de vue sur Thucydide, entrecoupé de passages significatifs de son oeuvre sur l'historien de la guerre du Peloponnèse. Nous publions aussi des extraits de Thibaudet un auteur à qui fait référence Jacqueline de Romilly, et qui complète ainsi ses propres analyses.

Dans notre prochain numéro nous publierons la partie de l'entretien avec Jacqueline de Romilly dans laquelle elle parle de la Grèce antique et moderne, de l'importance de l'enseignement du grec ancien ainsi que de l'influence de la pensée grecque sur le monde contemporain.

L'importance de Thucydide aujourd'hui, insiste-t-elle dès le début, ce n'est pas tellement pour connaître la Grèce antique.

Je la situerais plutôt par rapport à deux idées. D'abord parce que c'est le premier dans la création du genre historique. Il est vrai qu'Hérodote a été le père de l'Histoire mais Thucydide par opposition à Hérodote invente une objectivité très exigeante, une histoire politique reposant sur des témoignages nombreux de réflexion et se concentre sur les choses qu'il peut connaître et voir de près. Il n'y a plus ni légende ni intervention des dieux ni anecdotes entendues ici ou là, ce que certains regrettent. Mais il y a quelque chose de follement nouveau et qui restera pour l'histoire objective. Cependant son histoire n'est pas du tout moderne au sens de l'histoire telle que nous l'entendons à cause de ce désir d'analyser et de trouver derrière les évènements l'aspect essentiel qui pourra se retrouver ailleurs et qui fait réfléchir aux événements. Et cela est le second aspect. Quelque chose qui reste et qui reste vraiment, une sorte d'intelligence politique qui tourne à la philosophie politique.

On peut encore trouver chez lui des analyses non seulement sur l'état des batailles et comment et pourquoi celui-ci va ou peut gagner surtout le rapport de l'impérialisme et des résistances qui s'y opposent, sur la démocratie, et la démagogie, le rôle des ambitions sur des problèmes politiques qui sont encore les nôtres et cela c'est ce qu'il y a de plus important dans son histoire. Thucydide a dit lui-même qu'il souhaitait que ses récits soient utiles pour ceux qui voudront voir clair dans ces événements et aussi dans ceux qui dans la suite, à cause de leur élement humain, pourront leur ressembler.

> A l'audition, l'absence de merveilleux dans les faits rapportés paraîtra sans doute en diminuer le charme; mais, si l'on veut voir clair dans les événements passés et dans ceux qui, à l'avenir, en vertu du caractère humain qui est le leur, présenteront des similitudes ou des analogies, qu'alors, on les juge utiles, et cela suffira: ils constituent un trésor pour toujours, plutôt qu'une production d'apparat pour un auditoire du moment.[1]

Pour moi, il est caractéristique de voir à toutes les époques des gens reconnaître leur présent et voir leur présent s'éclairer grâce aux analyses de Thucydide. Un des exemples est la campagne de Thucydide avec Thibaudet où il reconnaît la guerre de 1914 dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide.

"Les deux guerres, écrit Thibaudet, paraissent dès le début aux esprits clairvoyants se comporter comme des forces de la nature, qu'il est impossible d'arrêter avant qu'elles aient donné leur plein effet, occupé et épuisé une totalité d'espace et de temps.

Dans l'espace, elles s'étendent plus loin qu'aucune des guerres qui les ont précédées. Dans la guerre du Péloponnèse, le Péloponnèse lui-même n'est pas la partie du monde grec la plus directement touchée, mais tout le monde grec, depuis l'Euxin jusqu'à la Sicile, subit successivement l'ébranlement de la guerre générale. L'Asie Mineure, Chypre, l'Egypte sont attirées dans le tourbillon. Le monde grec de la Méditerranée orientale et centrale se comporte comme un monde fermé et total, et c'est dans la planète entière qu'en 1914 il trouve son analogue, lorsque l'entrée en scène du monde britannique, de la Chine et du Japon, de l'Amérique du Nord et du Sud transforme pour la première fois - et non peut-être pour la dernière- une guerre locale en une guerre planétaire."[2]

"A d'autres époques, même récentes, écrit dans *Alcibiade* Jacqueline de Romilly, ces rapprochements et ces perspectives se seraient sans doute présentés à moi dans un ordre d'importance différent.

Je suis certaine, par exemple, qu'il y a cinquante ans, alors que j'écrivais une thèse sur *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien*, et que la guerre contre Hitler faisait rage dans toute l'Europe et au-delà, le plus frappant à mes yeux, dans la vie d'Alcibiade, aurait été la façon dont il s'identifie avec l'impérialisme d'Athènes et, grâce à Thucydide, avec l'impérialisme en général. J'aurais été frappée par son désir d'intervenir même dans le Péloponnèse, puis par l'audace de l'expédition de Sicile et du grand dessein, qui se cache, dans ce premier désir de conquête. J'aurais admiré la façon dont sont dégagées, à son sujet, les forces qui poussent le puissant à des conquêtes toujours nouvelles, parce qu'il doit faire face à des ennemis de plus en plus nombreux; et j'aurais apprécié l'exemple de cette expédition qui constitue le début du désastre final; car contre le conquérant, tous, finalement, s'unissent. J'aurais par conséquent été sensible à la façon dont Thucydide marque les différences entre cet impérialisme d'Alcibiade et celui, plus modéré, et plus prudent, qu'avait incarné Périclès. J'aurais souligné la façon dont, comme ces analyses de Thucydide le laissaient prévoir, l'union se fit bientôt contre Athènes, d'abord en Sicile, puis en Ionie et dans presque tout le monde grec. Et je me serais émerveillée de voir, au fil des ans, les conquérants hitlériens recommencer les mêmes dépassements et finir dans le même désastre".[3]

"Aujourd'hui, continue dans *Alcibiade* Jacqueline de Romilly, toujours dans ce domaine de la politique extérieure, peut-être serions-nous plus sensibles au drame de ces querelles entre cités grecques, qu'arbitre durement l'or des riches Asiatiques.

Là aussi l'expérience fut cruelle pour les Grecs. Mais, comme c'est si souvent le cas avec eux, elle devint bientôt féconde. Car ils comprirent la folie de ces luttes opposant entre elles des cités si proches par la culture. Alcibiade avait été mêlé à ces querelles, les avait encouragées, exacerbées; et il leur devait indirectement sa perte. Mais déjà, dans sa vie, on rencontre des réactions grecques contre ces pactes avec les barbares. Et, quelques années plus tard, juste au début du IVe siècle, des voix vont s'élever pour réclamer l'union et constituer un bloc des Grecs, opposés à ces trop puissants barbares: Gorgias, Lysias, Isocrate soutiennent ce

programme et bataillent pour lui. Il se crée des fédérations et des confédérations. Nous qui créons l'Europe, ne nous reconnaissons-nous pas, dans ce scandale des dernières années d'Alcibiade et dans ses intrigues, auprès des satrapes, l'incitation à réagir, et à faire mieux?

La leçon est qu'il ne faut faire ni comme l'impérialiste Alcibiade des débuts, ni comme le quémandeur des cours barbares, qui joue tantôt la carte d'une cité grecque et tantôt celle de la cité rivale. Les actes d'Alcibiade appellent une prise de conscience, qui vaut encore à l'heure actuelle.

Mais ce rapport avec la création de l'Europe n'est, à propos d'Alcibiade, qu'indirect et surajouté: quand nous nous penchons sur sa vie aujourd'hui, c'est la crise de la démocratie qui nous frappe et nous émeut. Cette fois, les parallélismes sautent aux yeux et nous surprennent à chaque instant.

C'est d'abord l'existence de ces rivalités entre les hommes, qui finissent par paralyser l'État."

A chaque fois qu'il y a un événement quelqu'un trouve dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide l'explication, le commentaire d'événement tout à fait récent. J'ai fait une thèse sur Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien. C'était au moment d'Hitler, des guerres, de la défaite d'Hitler. On voyait ces problèmes de l'impérialisme athénien. Après cela j'ai fait mon livre sur Alcibiade.

"...j'écris ce livre, [mentionnne Jacqueline de Romilly], à un moment ou nous vivons dans une démocratie et où, obligés de faire face, jour après jour, à bien des crises et des problèmes, nous ressentons un urgent besoin de les comprendre, afin de nous en tirer au mieux. Avec un tel bagage de lectures et dans une telle ambiance intellectuelle, je ne pouvais évidemment m'en tenir à l'évocation de ce destin exceptionnel, sans être sensible aussi aux rapprochements et aux réflexions que ce destin suggère pour nous.

A cet égard, j'étais bien servie: de page en page, il m'a semblé que chaque détail me faisait signe et me parlait, plus ou moins clairement, de notre temps; et, de page en page, à la lumière des réflexions de Thucydide, il m'a semblé voir s'ouvrir des perspectives générales, qui, elles aussi, nous concernaient."[5]

C'est dans Thucydide qu'on trouve l'analyse des oppositions entre un chef qui se conduit de telle façon et un autre et par conséquent les problèmes de la démocratie. C'est cela qui me paraît le plus important. Cette leçon de philosophie et cette faculté de trouver des schémas intelligibles pour les événements postérieurs. Donc l'étude de Thucydide ce n'est pas pour connaître la Grèce. C'est pour nous connaître.

NOTES

1. Thucydide, I, XXII, 4.

2. Albert Thibaudet, La campagne avec Thucydide, in Thucydide, **Histoire de la guerre du Péloponnèse**, Paris, Ed. Robert Laffont, 1990, p.125.

3. Jacqueline de Romilly, **Alcibiade**, Paris, Éditions de Fallois, 1995, pp. 244-245.

4. Jacqueline de Romilly, *op.cit.*, pp. 246-247.

5. Jacqueline de Romilly, *op.cit.*, p. 244.

Thucydides, Yesterday and Today

Summary translation of the Interview with Jacqueline de Romilly

Conducted in French by Jean Catsiapis*

Renowned Hellenist, Professor at the Sorbonne and the Collège de France, the second woman to become a member of the Académie française, Jacqueline de Romilly is also an international authority on Thucydides. The following interview, including passages from her work, sheds light on her view of Thucydides. A future issue of Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies will include Romilly's comments on ancient and modern Greece as well as her opinions on the importance of teaching ancient Greek and on the influence of Greek philosophy.

Thucydides' importance is not limited to learning about ancient Greece. Romilly situates Thucydides from two perspectives. First, he created the historical genre. Herodotus may be called the father of history, but it was Thucydides who developed a demanding level of objectivity, a political history which relied on reflexion and on what he could know and actually see. There are no legends, anecdotes or divine interventions; instead, there is something wildly new in terms of historical objectivity and rationality.

Second, he created a historical political philosophy and a theory of international relations which, unlike history as we understand it today, analyzes the historical events and searches for the essential. Thucydides analyzes and reflects not only on battles, but also on the causes of the war, democracy, demagogy and the role of ambition on political problems. He said himself that he wanted his history to be useful for those wishing to understand those events and, because of the human element, to understand their own.

Romilly sees people across the ages recognizing their present and trying to understand it through Thucydides. She cites Thibaudet who recognized WWI in Thucydides' writings. The parallel, similarity and extensive nature of WWI and the

Peloponnesian War are detailed and analysed therein. In the Peloponnesian War, the most directly touched was not Peloponnesus but the entire Greek world; the same can be said about WWII which became a global war.

Romilly refers to her works *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien* and *Alcibiade* in which she had discussed these similarities between the two wars and the desire for conquest as well as the subsequent disaster (*Alcibiade*, pp. 244-245). She also compares the international relations and foreign policies among the ancient Greek City-States with those, today, among world powers and states. As the Greek states, in the 4th c. BC, asked to unite against the non-Greek world by forming federations and confederations (cf. the voices of Gorgias, Lysias, Isocrates), Romilly mentions the European Union today. The lesson she draws from the case of Alcibiades is that we must become conscious of our actions, consciousness which is needed today more than ever in the international scene. Yet what she considers more important is the crisis of democracy and, on this point, the parallels are even more surprising since the existence of rivalries among men end up by paralysing the State (*Alcibiade*, pp.246-247).

According to Romilly, for every recent event one may find an explanation or a commentary in the work of Thucydides. As she says, at the time of Hitler and WWII, she wrote *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien*; later she wrote *Alcibiade*. She insists that what is important, in the work of Thucydides, is (a) that we find the analysis of rival theories and aspirations and of the problems of democracy; (b) that this philosophical lesson and this capacity to find the theoretical schemas of analysis help us understand subsequent events. The study of Thucydides, she concludes, is not so much in order to learn about Greece as to know ourselves.

The Theory and Praxis of War and Peace in the Thucydidian Era: 450-400 BC*

Paris Arnopoulos**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article présente les idées et les actions exopolitiques grecques de la seconde moitié du Vème siècle av.JC. Pour être en mesure d'obtenir la perspective nécessaire à cet effet, l'auteur juxtapose les théories aux pratiques impliquées avec les évènements cruciaux ayant ébranlé le centre du monde ancien.

À cette époque, les relations inter-cité se sont traduites principalement par la guerre du Péloponnèse dont l'Histoire monumentale nous est livrée par Thucydide. L'oeuvre de Thucydide, qui s'insère dans un ensemble brillant formé des ouvrages des plus grands penseurs de l'âge d'or, se penche sur le dilemme entre patriotisme et nationalisme, entre idéalisme et réalisme. L'hypothèse de travail de cet article s'articule autour du fait que ces dilemmes peuvent être débattus et résolus de manière dialectique, de sorte que la synthèse résultante explique bien des contradictions anciennes ou actuelles de la macropolitique.

ABSTRACT

This articles presents the salient exopolitical ideas and acts of the Greeks in their Golden Age at the latter half of the fifth century. In order to put this particular place and time in its proper general perspective, this study juxtaposes the relevant theories and practices involved in the great events which shook the epicenter of the ancient world.

At that time, the defining activity of inter-city-state relations was the Peloponnesian War as recorded in the monumental History of Thucydides. This work, together with those of other great thinkers of that fateful era give us an idea of the perrenial dilemma between patriotism and nationalism, as well as idealism and realism. The working hypothesis here is that these issues may be discussed and resolved dialectically, so that their resulting synthesis explains many classic and current contradictions in macropolitics.

* This article is adapted from a chapter in the author's forthcoming book on: *Exopolitics: The Theory and Praxis of Classical Hellenic Foreign Affairs,* Nova Publishers, N.Y., 1999.

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Introduction

Describing the conduct of macropolitics or international relations and prescribing foreign affairs or exopolitics has been going on for a couple of millennia by diplomats and academics alike. Consequently, there is no dearth of histories and theories which try to explain the phenomenal complexity of world events by simplifying them to their fundamentals.

In spite of their plethora, macropolitical theories can be and are classified into two dominant schools, Moralism and Materialism. According to contemporary nomenclature, materialists are also called "Realists" who believe in national interests and descriptive power politics, whereas moralists or "Idealists" prefer legal influences and prescriptive social ethics as the primary factors of foreign policy and interstate activity.

Of course, this classic dichotomy began with the ancient Greeks by confronting the polemic history of Thucydides with the pacific theory of Plato. After two thousand years of intellectual debate on the subject, the issue between competition and cooperation or war and peace, has not yet been resolved and perhaps never will.

Nevertheless, we will attempt to do so here by showing that this old antagonism may be transcended in the dialectical synthesis of true Realism, as the closest approach to "reality". Accordingly, it is not so much that force reflects the real world any more accurately than law, but that both are really present in various degrees at different times and places. In that sense, it is our thesis that the Greeks tried to resolve these contradictions by aspiring for relatively idealistic policies inside Greece, while resigning themselves to brutally realistic ones outside.

In the case of classical Greece during the fifth and fourth centuries BC, conditions conspired to highlight the materialist-idealist dichotomy and intersect it with the city-patriotism and country-nationalism dilemma. The city-states were faced with great opportunity to unite in a national polity, but were held back by their exaggerated love of political independence. The question is which of these options was more realistic or idealistic. How did the Greek intellectuals evoke their situation and evaluate their options, while the statesmen explained their policy and executed

their diplomacy.

We try to answer these questions in full recognition of many taxonomic, anachronic, methodologic and ideologic biases or discrepancies. As we shall note throughout this article, the pros and cons of these positions were skillfully presented and defended by different people. So, with these salient points in mind, we proceed to see how classical theory developed and interacted with Greek reality; keeping in mind that similar comparisons hold in all cultures and for all times.

The Golden Age

After the Persian Wars, the Greek world presented a very bright picture indeed. The general prosperity which followed its military triumph, increased its population to about three million people, of which a third were male citizens, another third females, and the final third foreigners or slaves.

Having overcome their common crisis, the Greek *poleis* were drawn together by a strong spirit of brotherhood. The external threat seemed to have built up their internal cohesion and the danger of foreign domination increased their sense of collective defense. Thus, the centrifugal tendencies of the city-states were temporarily submerged in a fit of national exhilaration.

No *polis* was affected so much by the general euphoria as Athens. Its citizens idealized their contribution to the common effort and claimed to be the saviors of western civilization. Believing themselves as the purest and brightest of all Greeks, they took it upon themselves to become the guardians of the Hellenic world and the trustees of its culture.[1]

By the middle of the fifth century then, Athens reached its Golden Age and became the unofficial capital of Greece. It would be superfluous here to recount the artistic, literary, scientific, social, economic and political creations of Athens which established the reputation of that city throughout the ecoumene.

Our concern here is to focus on the development of exopolitical thought, so we follow the theory and praxis of foreign policy and conflict resolution which attempted to establish peace in Greece and project its strength abroad. In this, as in other endeavors, Athens led the country and tried to impose its policies upon a

reluctant and recalcitrant political system.

Imperialism

The rise of Athens was more a matter of historical chance than of state policy or political theory. The road from the Corinthian League of 480, via the Delian Confederacy of 475, to the Athenian Empire of 450, may well be said to have been traveled "in a fit of absent mindedness." Ultimately, the *Pax Atheniensis* caught the Athenians, just as everyone else, by surprise.[2]

Within a few decades, as the fear of a Persian threat decreased appreciably and the pride of Greek strength increased tremendously, Athens developed from a pastoral and agrarian society into an urban manufacturing and trading center, thus attracting people from far and wide. Along with its own rural emigrants, great numbers of slaves and foreigners precipitated into the city, changing its demography from a small homogeneous community into a large multinational cosmopolis.

This transformation of Athens, as of any society, may be explained by a proper juxtaposition of time and place, as well as a combination of social, economic and political power factors. The social aspects involved the quantity and quality of its demographic resources. The population of that megalopolis at its acme has been estimated at almost 300,000, a good part of which was concentrated around its urban center and the rest spread out in the Attic countryside (T,ii.14; AA,1256a; AP,1305a). Of these, the adult male citizens hardly numbered 50,000, their wives and children another 150,000; the rest being at least 75,000 slaves and 25,000 metics from all over the Mediterranean and Black seas.

In the decade that followed their victory, the Athenians managed by a series of brilliant diplomatic and military maneuvers to consolidate their lead over their confederates. At its zenith, their Delian League combined with the Delphic Amphictiony became an interstate organization of over 250 city-states around the Aegean. Like modern Inter-Governmental Organizations, each member state had one vote in a General Assembly; but Athens, of course, was the primus inter pares, being its prime mover, main treasurer and ultimate hegemon.[3]

Within a few years, the League became increasingly centralized, with a common democratic ideology and a single administrative, fiscal and judicial apparatus. With the collective strength of its League and foreign alliances, Athens preempted a third Asian

invasion of Europe by engaging Persia in its own territory. In 460, the League launched its only international aggression by sending an enormous 200 ship armada from Cyprus to support Egypt in its war of independence against Persia. The outcome of this five year war was such a disaster that it ended any further thoughts of foreign adventures. Nevertheless, by mid-century the League was able to contain Persia by the Peace of Kallias in which the Ionian colonies of Asia Minor were guaranteed their freedom for the next forty years.[4]

It was about then that plans for a permanent peace and unity were conceived in the minds of some Athenians who wanted to take advantage of the favorable political situation. Foremost among them was Pericles, whose "Grand Design" was meant to transform the Athenian Empire to a Greek Confederation. To that end, he called a Panhellenic Congress in 448 to negotiate a common peace -*koine eirene*- as the first step towards a national union (Plutarch, Pericles,17-30; H, ix,106).

Unfortunately, this great dream was not realized. Resentment against Athenian power and suspicion of Pericles' motives made most Greeks reject his plan. Some people however, like the rival politician Cleon, complained that the failure was due to Athens' lenient treatment of its allies. A democracy, they concluded, was unable to govern an empire, let alone unite Greece (T, iii.37)

Undaunted by the failure of his grandiose scheme, Pericles proposed a lesser but more concrete plan to build Thurii, a Pan-hellenic *polis* in Magna Graecia, to replace the infamous Sybaris which had been destroyed some time before. This was to be a practical experiment in polyethnic living -*synoecism*- to prove that the Greeks of many clans could live together within a single state.[5]

Established in 443, Thurii was made up of many Greek tribes who were supposed to start anew in perfect equality. It was the first state to have specific legislation safeguarding minorities and a distinct government department to enforce human rights. Yet, in spite of the efforts of its illustrious godfathers, Thurii only lasted a few years. Its Dorian population soon expelled the Ionians and took over the whole state. So, like the Pythagorean attempt to form a "United States" of Croton, Sybaris, Pandosia and Temesa, in the previous generation, the Thurian model also soon unraveled.[6]

If anything, the abortive experiment proved that the people of Greece could not live together politically. The only way that its

various ethnic groups would unite was if one of them was strong enough to enforce its will upon the rest. Without such preponderance of power wielded ruthlessly by someone, every supra-political attempt sooner or later deteriorated into its separate components.

This is precisely what happened in the case of the Delian League which by mid-century was transformed into the Athenian Empire of 150 tribute-paying satellites. It is ironic that Pericles, the champion of democracy at home, was now preaching the fatal doctrine of imperialism abroad. The widening gap between the domestic liberalism of Athens and its foreign hegemonism, made a mockery of its policies and ideals.

On the one hand, Athens claimed to be the bastion of freedom, the defender of the weak, the protector of the persecuted and the scourge of tyrants. On the other hand, Athenians treated their allies with contempt, their subjects with severity, and increasingly acted with the arrogance of power. Their imperial exploitation was not only economic and financial, but legal and political. Interstate disputes had to be adjudicated only in Athenian courts and foreign or defense policy was the exclusive prerogative of Athens.[7]

Yet, unlike the multinational Persian or Roman imperialism, the Athenian Empire was merely national, because it contained generally Greek and particularly Ionian poleis, with only few Hellenized Karian principalities. Nevertheless, Athenian imperialism also included colonialism, as the metropolis sent out settlers with allotment holdings -*Cleruchies*- in the lands of its satellites (T.iii.50).

At least half a dozen such colonies were established, involving over ten thousand emigrants. These Cleruchies not only eased Athenian overpopulation, but also served as strategic outposts, guarding imperial trade routes and preventing or punishing local uprisings; thereby becoming another point of friction between Athens and its putative allies.

Many writers of the period reflected on this discrepancy between the liberal ideals and the imperial actions of Athens. Some accepted the benefits of empire in high status, pride and honor, as privileged entitlements stemming from the extraordinary Athenian services to Greece, but others were more skeptical and critical (T, ii.63; vi. 82).

Among the latter was Pindar who expressed his anti-Athenian and anti-war sentiments in his famous poems. The Theban aristo-

crat criticized Athens as the embodiment of hubris and predicted its ultimate ruin. Like him, even patriotic Athenians voiced their concerns with the moral issues of power and the corrupting influence it had upon those who abuse it.

Undoubtedly, for most citizens patriotism was unequivocal and their belief in the cause of Athens unshakable. The city's playwrights were quite hostile to their state's rivals, and their laudatory epithets for the metropolis indicate where they stood. For Aeschylos, Athens was a beautiful and prosperous *polis*, while for Euripides she was illustrious and shining: the land of the free and the home of the brave.

It should be kept in mind that although Athens was indeed all that, its citizens could not publicly criticize official foreign policy with impunity. Athenian authorities would not have allowed and its audiences could not have applauded openly unpatriotic expressions.

In this light, we should appreciate that it must have taken a lot of courage for a few critics to voice their political opposition as Aeschylos did in the *Oresteia* when he said that the Athenians committed hubris by their imperial pride or *folie de grandeur*. They of all people should have learned the lesson of how the mighty inevitably fall when they overreach themselves, as the Persian defeat clearly demonstrated. More diplomatically, Sophocles praised the Athenians for their daring, but advised prudence and self-control in their outreach (*Helen*, 40).

In the *Suppliants* (490, 745, 950), Euripides castigated the shortsightedness and overconfidence of states who dream of empire, without counting the power of their opponents. While he admired those who sacrifice their lives to defend their country (*Phoenicians*,1000), he considered the duty of every wise man to avoid violence and only engage in it as a last resort; warning that as one sows, so he shall reap (*Trojans*, 95, 400). Consequently, the dramatist counseled his countrymen to return to the proven and prudent tradition of humility and moderation, thus giving up the fleeting illusion of imperial glory (*Orestes*, 920; *Electra*, 390).

In a lighter vein than the older tragedians, the younger comedian Aristophanes ridiculed politics as he did everything else. In the *Babylonians*, he criticized Athenian foreign policy as exploitative and its democratic leaders as vainglorious fools. In the *Birds*, he made fun of the Syracusian expedition and in the *Knights*, he mocked the flattery of demagogues when they declared the

Demos was good and wise enough to command over all Greeks.

More seriously, Aristophanes decried Athenian imperialism because it maltreated and exploited its allies (*Wasps*, 707). Lack of measure and control eventually lead empires to ruin, so a democracy should avoid entangling alliances and concentrate in improving its domestic situation. Thus he showed that in spite of all the criticism, he loved Athens, and later on in the *Frogs* he made up for his past ridicule by comforting and consoling his defeated *polis*.

The famous pamphlet of the *Old Oligarch* also emphasized the correlation between populism and imperialism, because rule by a lumpen-proletariat inevitably led to a government dominated by the navy and thereby leading to a policy of adventurist expansionism, against the conservative interests of the rural landed gentry. This thesis became so well-established by the aristocratic critics of democracy that it was taken for granted by political theorists, including Plato and Aristotle.

Pericles, of course, realized the credibility gap between his domestic and foreign policies. He had to admit, somewhat apologetically, that the Athenian empire was indeed a tyranny. But he insisted that the realities of power politics necessitated such regretable conduct. "If you intend to rule," he told his fellow citizens, "you must carry out what your interest requires however immoral it might seem, or else give up your empire and cultivate honesty with impunity." (T, i.76; ii.63). However, as Isocrates later concluded, imperialism was not only immediately immoral but ultimately unprofitable (*Eirene*, 69-74).

The Athenians living in the *Pentekontaetia* of their Golden Age between 480 and 430 had neither the time nor inclination to construct detailed theories of imperialism; leaving this task to the philosophers of the next century. The only social thinker of that period who tried to generalize on the subject of power politics was, of course, Thucydides. It is in his *History* where one finds some of the most penetrating insights on human nature as they apply to international affairs.

Thucydides was not only a great historian but the first theorist of the strategy and sociology of power. Influenced by Hippocrates, he combined natural and cultural factors in his explanations of exopolitics; coming close to proposing a progressive evolution of power in world affairs from nature to culture. His classical theory

thus combines both physics and ethics in a grand synthesis of power politics.

Accordingly, natural necessity *-phuseos anagkaias-* dictates that the strong dominate the weak. Right as the world goes, is only a question between equals. Actually, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must; since by their very nature, both men and gods, strive to dominate their environment (T. v.89,105).

At the root of this drive to power is a natural predisposition of men to action and ambition, coupled with cultural pressures to loyalty and glory. In all cases, the crucial factors are to be found in political institutions and policies, as well as natural conditions and resources.

Moreover, power begets power: because to keep power, one is forced to increase it. States involve themselves in imperial ventures imperceptibly, so by the time they become aware of their involvement it is too late to retreat. Once a state commits itself to play a world role it can never reverse its thrust without loss of face. Unfortunately, people condemn those who give up and respect only those who stand up. So the worst faults of an empire are pity, sentiment and indulgence. To hold unto what it acquires, a state must then adopt the principle of Alcibiades and keep on expanding until checked by a superior force.[8]

In spite of all that, Thucydides recognized that sooner or later too much power spells its own doom. What was a religious hubris in Herodotos became political hubris in Thucydides. It is not only the Gods who envy powerful men, but all those who have to submit to them. Fear, hostility and hatred follow the powerful, who eventually make enemies even of their friends.

Indeed, that is precisely what happened in Greece. As the power of Athens increased, its reputation decreased and from being the most respected city of Greece, it soon became its most despised. Gradually, this hate was translated to action, and Athens was defeated amidst general rejoycing.[9]

This lesson seems to have been well taken, because from Thucydides to Polybios, ambition and greed *-philotimia kai pleonexia-* were said to lead into conflict and revolt *-philonikia kai stasis*. All historians realized that it is harder to hold power than to get it. In order to keep it, they advised against corrupting the virtuous habits *-ethe-* that make for real power: i.e. clemency, generosity, gratitude, kindness, goodness, humility, moderation, trust

-epieikia, philanthropia, eugnomosune, metrioteta, praoteta, kalok-agathia, prothumia, euergesia, megalopsychia, pisti.

Although the drive for empire *-arche-* is fear, honor and interest; a state can dominate others by either force and fear or trust and goodwill (T.i.75.3). Lasting victory then depends not merely on heavy weapons and much money, but in proper training and intelligent strategy: both of which stem from a strong political constitution. The ultimate factors of state power thus are: *epitedeusis, politeia, ethos, tropoi, nomoi*: all of them social, rather than military virtues. Since loosing power is due to moral corruption first and foremost, retaining power takes courage, wisdom and control, which are cultural rather than natural virtues, promoted by *ethos kai paideia*.

As Demosthenes put it later: by natural inertia, men and states alike, tend to take the path of least resistance, thus compromising virtue for quick and easy gains. So in order to do better, we need culture to educate people to moral conduct (*Chersonnesos*, 712).

It is difficult to know to what extent this sophisticated theory of *realpolitik* was understood, accepted and practiced by the Greeks. Some states may have been content to exchange liberty with security, so they supported the Athenian Empire, because the benefits of peace and prosperity were worth the sacrifice of local sovereignty. But to most it was anathema, to be opposed at all costs.

Imperial policy, no matter how high its domestic ideals, could not offer to foreigners what they desired most: political participation in decision-making. The furthest a hegemonic system of representation went was to give a low voice in decision-making to the small allied states, but not to matters of vital interest (T, ii,8; 63.2; iii,37.2).

To go beyond that and give aliens a greater say in public policy would have destroyed political exclusivity; something unthinkable to most Greeks. Athenian dominance then was opposed, not so much because it was so oppressive, but because it was inconsistent with its own principles. Since Pericles could not apply throughout the empire the ideals he so eloquently expressed in the "*Epitaphios*" (T, 38-43), his supra-political plans were built on shifting sand and doomed to failure.

Interstate Bipolarity

Leading the opposition against Athens, by trying to undermine its

policies and counterbalance its power, was Sparta. This other great city-state of Greece became the obvious antagonist of Athenian expansionism for many reasons: sociohistorical, geopolitical, and ideological. The diametric opposition of Athens and Sparta on all these areas, created a bipolarity of power in the Greek interstate system which compounded the difficulties for national conciliation and integration.

First of all, Spartans and Athenians led the two main Hellenic tribes, Dorian and Ionian, who were distinguished by dialect, custom, religion, physiology and psychology (H, i. 56). The Dorians were considered as backward, slow, cautious, introverted, simple-minded, dull-witted and grave (Euthydemos, 302). Whereas, the Ionians were innovating, swift, adventurous, extroverted, versatile, sophisticated and irreverent (T, i. 70).

These characteristics stemmed partly from the geographical regions the two peoples occupied. The Dorians had settled inland thus becoming a land-locked, isolated, parochial and rural folk; whereas the Ionians filled the coasts and islands, thus developing into seafarers, traders, travelers and urbane cosmopolites. Consequently, the Spartan army rose to be the dominant power on the mainland, while the Athenian navy ruled the waves of the Aegean.

Related to these differences was also the opposite development of their political systems, both of which diverged significantly from the mainline traditional Greek culture. Whereas Sparta created a militaristic oligarchy, Athens evolved into a civic democracy. By the middle of the fifth century the latter was the most egalitarian, progressive and open society in Greece; while the former remained essentially closed and frozen for two centuries.[10]

Sparta is the perfect example of how legislation and education can effect radical social change. Until 750, that city was evolving like every other. It welcomed and even granted citizenship to foreigners who contributed to its development (AP,1270a). But then, its development was stunted by conquering its Messinian neighbors. In order to keep a population ten times their own subjugated, the Lacaedemonians became a garrison state in chronic alert.

Finally, the Lycourgian constitution around 600 froze Sparta into a militaristic regime in permanent mobilization, in a three-tier system of *homoioi, perioikoi and helotes.* Thus the Spartan curse was to dominate the Peloponnese and spend its destiny as goaler of the surrounding serfs. Its narrow foreign policy even forced its

allies far and wide to tow a strict line of common friends and enemies.

The transition from archaic to classic Sparta is reflected in the change from the melic poetry of Alkman to the elegic poetry of Tyrtaios. In his *Doric Partheneion*, Alkman gave a pleasant, peaceful and romantic view of Spartan life (Frg. 4). A contemporary of Homer, Alkman may not even be Greek, since he was born in the capital of Lydia, Sardis, and brought to Sparta as a slave, so his poetry has a decidedly unspartan flavor.

Unlike him, by mid-seventh century, the most famous native Spartan poet Tyrtaios represents the new revolutionary ideals of his country, thus becoming the official voice of its resulting warrior ethic and military creed. In his Eunomian elegy, he summarized the legal basis of his city-state, around the principles of uniformity, simplicity, austerity and solidarity. Combining these Spartan virtues in the *Exhortations*, he sang what a fine thing it was for a man to fight and die for his country (Frg.10).

This poetic Sparta served as an ideal model for philosophers from Socrates to Diogenes who praised and promoted it in their political discourses. Its legendary self-sufficiency, exclusivity, stability, authority, uniformity, community and simplicity appealed to all moralists. Being able to maintain its way of life without change for centuries, Sparta exuded an air of utopian perfection so dear to conservative ideologues.

By contrast, the Athenian experience left them cold. Very few poets sang the praises of democracy. One exception was Archilochos of Paros, a contemporary of Tyrtaios, who unlike the Spartan, lauded the ideal of synoecism which made Athens share Attica with its neighbors in peaceful coexistence rather than subjugation. These differing point of view then set the two standard opposing political paradigms from then on.

After 600, unlike Lycurgos, the Athenian law-giver Solon reformed the ancient Draconian regime by the principle of eunomia, thus preventing violence and improving social justice throughout Attica. The poems of the great nomothetes show his horror for civil war and love for his country. In his Fourth Elegy, he gives a graphic description of the plight of cities under strife and exhorts his fellow citizens to civic unity and harmony.

Within a century, the democratic reforms of Kleisthenes not only gave more power to the people or demos through *isegoria* and *isonomia*, but distributed it throughout Attica by dividing the ten

Athenian tribes into *demes* of regional *trittyes*, with proportional representation in a Council of 500.

These internal reforms eventually spilled over to external relations. As Herodotos noted (H. v.77): when ruled by tyrants, the Athenians were no better than their neighbors, but when they were freed, they became far superior. The addition of a radical ideology to its foreign policy, soon made Athens a net exporter of political revolutions throughout the Greek world and eventually set it on its road to glory.

Based on their diverging developments, the foreign policies of Athens and Sparta were bound to clash. Sparta's was isolationist, conservative, xenophobic, militaristic. Athens' was interventionist, revisionist, expansionist, commercialist. Athenian activism propagated the new radical democratic ideology to all people and had its greatest appeal in the lower class masses to whom it promised a better life. As such, it was inflammatory and subversive to the established order; it incited revolutions everywhere and instigated discontent.

It is easy to see how the aristocratic and *status quo* regimes would naturally oppose Athens and how the dissatisfied or oppressed would support her. In the second half of the fifth century these two sides crystallized into rigid military blocks bent upon each other's destruction. The vested interests throughout Greece, under the leadership of Sparta, were committed to contain and reverse the disturbing influence of Athens and its allies. Interstate relations, thus became increasingly a struggle between the two camps; with the conflict gradually escalating from cold to total war.[11]

Worse still was that the conflict inevitably spread outside Greece to involve the Persian Empire. Ever since their defeat in Ionia, various factions within each Greek *polis* tried to secure Persian support to defeat their internal or external enemies. Usually the Persian monarchy sided with conservative or aristocratic parties against radical or democratic governments. It was therefore rather expected that Sparta eventually invited the Asian colossus to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica in order to distract the Athenians from their Egyptian expedition against Persia (T,i.109). Even if that particular gesture was not very effective, it did set the pattern for the permanent financial involvement of

Persia as the key holder of the balance of power in Greek affairs from then on.

Although the conflict between Athens and Sparta was waged on many fronts, the one that concerns us most is the propaganda used by both sides to win people's hearts and minds. The psychological war raged between the imperialists, as Cleon of Athens or Lysander of Sparta, on the one hand and the sovereignists, as Pagondas of Boeotia or the representatives of Metylene, Platea, Melos, on the other; with the more moderate position of Diodotos of Athens or Brasidas of Sparta, somewhere between.

Ideologically, Athens had the advantage of a popular and dynamic movement which promised social justice and equality. As we have seen however, the practical application of these rousing slogans in the Athenian imperial policy clashed directly with political loyalties and local patriotism. This weakness of Athenian foreign policy eventually outweighed its strength. The ideological advantages of liberalism were more than canceled out by the practical disadvantages of imperialism.

On the other hand, the doctrinal disadvantages of oligarchy, were more than compensated by its emphasis on political independence. By making capital of the sacred ideal and soft spot of all Greeks, the oligarchs were able to overcome the attractions of democracy. The innate love of the Greeks for *"eleutheria kai autonomia poleos,"* was in the final analysis stronger than the new class siren song of *democratia*.[12]

Although the Thirty Year Peace with Sparta in 445, succeeded in establishing the bipolar balance of power in Greece for a few years, with Athens as the ruler of the sea and Sparta of the land; it proved too fragile to last more than fifteen years. While everyone paid lip service to the sacred principles of non-intervention and self-determination, both sides practiced gross and open interference in the domestic affairs of smaller states, as well as meddling in each other's sphere of influence.

As its wealth and welfare depended on foreign trade and investment, Athens found it increasingly necessary to build a large navy to protect its sea lanes, as well as to use force to sustain its markets and subversion to expand its power. Spartan policy, motivated by fear, jealousy, honor and interest, could not allow another state to dominate Greece. So when all other means failed to contain the Athenian challenge, the Spartan coalition felt compelled to resort to war. Although both sides saw their actions as a defensive strug-

gle for survival, the ultimate issue was whether Greece would continue to be a politically pluralistic geographical expression or become a united country under Athenian leadership.[12]

The Peloponnesian War

The long anticipated conflict came in an atmosphere of popular enthusiasm and optimistic expectations of speedy victory. Public opinion seems to have favored the Spartan side who was hailed as the liberator of Greece from Athenian expansionism.[13]

Soon however it became evident that neither side could gain a decisive advantage, so the fight deteriorated into a war of attrition to exhaust rather than defeat the enemy. As it dragged on, the conflict grew both in scope and intensity. The participants lost sight of their higher objectives and military victory became an end in itself.

The war soon escalated into a multifacet conflict: involving ideological, economic, cultural, social, political and military aspects. Although it began as a Greek dispute, it gradually engulfed the whole Mediterranean world. From a regional fight, it thus escalated into a world war which marked the beginning of the end of a great civilization.[14]

Thanks to Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War remains to this day a model in miniature of all great conflicts. Whereas Herodotos acclaimed his international war as an epic struggle between civilization and barbarism, Thucydides performed a scientific anatomy of interstate war in all its clinical details. His account is thus a classic not only of the history but the theory of interstate violence.[15]

An Athenian aristocrat by birth, well educated and travelled, Thucydides was thirty when the war began. As befitted his station, he was made admiral of an Athenian fleet operating in Thrace. Unfortunately, he failed to prevent Amphipolis from falling into the hands of the enemy. As a result, he was disgraced and spent the rest of his life as a historian in exile, where he died without completing his *magnum opus*.

Much has already been written on the great historian, so we will not go into a detailed analysis of his ideas. Suffice to reiterate that the importance of Thucydides lies both in his generalizations and impressions. The significance of his comments for our purpose is

that they represent a vocal segment of public opinion on the causes of war and the search for peace, as well as theoretical insights on macroeconomics and exopolitics.

According to Thucydides, violence has a tendency to feed on itself and become all-consuming. As in a primeval collective frenzy, restraints break down, laws are trampled, distinctions disappear and morality is forgotten. The Amphictionic laws designed to limit war were consistently violated by both sides. Everything belonged to the victor and to be taken a slave was considered an act of clemency. The many aspects of war: revolts, secessions, interventions, counter-revolutions, treachery, bitterness, denunciations and reprisals, raged on all fronts and became normal behavior in these terrible times.[16]

It is as if after a while people loose sight of events and become slaves to the monster they have created. While all men pay lip service to peace and condemn war, they continue perpetrating acts of violence. Civilized persons turn into barbarians, brutal passions and naked force rule the day. All reason is lost and basic instincts reign supreme. Destruction is rampant and wanton, so the whole situation gets out of control and stretches beyond comprehension (T, i, 78-82).

Although Thucydides denounced these syndromes of collective pathos, he did not consider war intolerable or unnatural. This dramatic transition of a culture from cosmos to chaos indicates a breakdown of *nomos*, not *physis*. Since human nature is animalistic, it is only artificially kept in check by custom and law. Under normal circumstances individuals and states can afford to behave in proper civility. But in times of crisis and confusion, instinctive human nature gets a chance to brake out of its civilizing restraints and shows itself at its naked or baser underside. Desperate people cannot afford the luxury of high ideals, so they are forced to let their lower needs rise to the surface and dominate their actions (T, iii, 82-4).

As protracted conflict deteriorates and degrades men and states, it reduces their character down to the level of their fortunes and enervates all those involved to impotence. Thus Thucydides concluded, war was the ruin of Hellenism, it undid the work of centuries and left Greece in shame and despair. The reestablishment and maintenance of peace therefore became everyone's most vital task ahead.[17]

The ruinous effects of war were also recognized by many other writers of that period. Ever since Hesiod (*Theogony*, 901), war had

fallen from its epic pedestal and was regarded as the scourge of mankind.[18] Thus, from Herodotos to the Old Oligarch, fifth century writers registered their opposition to war and praised the advantages of peace.[19]

Herodotos considered war to be monstrous and advised people, who spoke the same language at least, to settle their disputes by diplomatic negotiation and arbitration, rather than by violent means (H. vii.9). Moreover, interclass conflict was much worse than interstate war. As Herodotos put it, *stasis* was to *polemos*, as *polemos* was to *eirene* (viii, 3). The Larisan pamphleteer, Herodes Atticos echoed this comparison by repeating it later on, and Iamblichos went further to blame war as the cause of disaster and slavery, attributing these evils to anomia. (Frg. 89, 7, 32-5).

In his odes, Pindar of Boeotia sang the praises of peace along with justice and equity as the offsprings of right (*Olympian*, xiii.6), because he recognized that only under peaceful conditions did cities flourish (*Pythian*, viii.1). His contemporary Bacchylides of Ceos concurred that peace was indispensable for prosperity (*Paeans*, vii.46). Finally, Prodikos, another Ceosian and the reputed teacher of Socrates, advised young men to serve their *polis* honorably, but at the same time benefit all Greece peacefully. Only then would they be admired for their virtue -*arete*- by everybody (XM, 2.1.27).

The criticism of internecine war was nowhere more evident than in Athens, the cultural and intellectual center of Greece. Athenian thinkers and writers were the most outspoken in their opposition to war and in their demands for peace. Yet, whereas civil war among Greeks was particularly sad and strongly condemned, international war against the barbarians was accepted with equanimity (*Gorgias*, Frg. 5b, 8a). This distinction between intra, inter and extra-state war, created significant gradations which were supposed to improve the former by worsening the latter.

Especially effective in influencing public opinion towards peace were the popular playwrights of Athens, among whom Sophocles and Euripides were the most vocal. Sophocles described war as the most shameful activity of men. His compassion for its victims made him the advocate of the common man and the foe of the powerful warlords.

In spite of his personal divided loyalties and professional conflict of interests,[20] Sophocles emphasized the great grief caused by war

and cursed whoever first taught men to arm and fight (*Ajax*,1185-1210). Finally, he reminded his audiences that war never slays the evil and guilty; only the good and innocent perish in it (*Philoctites*, 435).

Euripides, the last of the three great tragedians, went even further in his hate for war and filled his plays with the suffering and grief of this great evil. In the *Trojan Women*, he dramatized the injustices and horrors of war which were sent by the gods to punish human hubris. For that reason, Greeks must have sinned much, since they were paying such a heavy price.[21]

Beyond divine retribution, however, Euripides blamed human vanity and history, as the direct causes of social conflict (*Helen*, 40; *Andromache*, 700). "Foolish states" he lamented in the *Suppliants*, "you have the choice of settling your differences by negotiation, yet you prefer to do so by killing." And concluded by wishing "If you could only settle your differences by logic rather than force, then perhaps you will put the common good of all Hellas above your own particular interests."[22]

Using comedy, rather than tragedy, as his weapon, Aristophanes made his opposition to war quite plain. His vitriolic attack on demagogues was especially directed at Pericles and his party, whom he held responsible for the war. As a result, he applauded another playwright, Eupolis, who went so far as to suggest that Pericles should be tried as a "war criminal." (*Poleis*)

From his first play in 425, Aristophanes ridiculed the warmongers and insisted that the war should never have started in the first place. Now that it had, it ought to be ended pronto, because it has unforeseen consequences and brings out the worst in men. For the failure to achieve peace, he blamed the machinations of demagogues who fooled the masses to support their mistakes.

In desperation, he had Attic farmers conclude private peace treaties with their enemy neighbors in defiance of official Athenian policy; thus pointing out that the local transborder interests of the simple rustics united them against the complex interstate quarrels of their sophisticated urban governments (*Acharnians*, 510-20, 860).

Reflecting widespread public opinion, Aristophanes accused wealthy arm dealers of war profiteering, while poor people everywhere suffered. The great comedian was equally critical towards

both Spartans and Athenians for treating each other like barbarians. So in support of the Peace of Nikias in 420, he wrote *Peace* to applaud the end to war and hail the Atheno-Spartan treaty as the prelude to national reconciliation and renaissance.[23]

Unfortunately, that peace hardly lasted a year and war resumed worst than ever for another decade. Once again poverty and misery accompanied it, culminating in the Sicilian disaster of 414. Soon thereafter, Aristophanes took up his pen once again to write his most antiwar play, *Lysistrata*, where he gave up on men altogether and turned to women for a more rational policy. Therein, women chide men for forgetting their common nature and culture by their internecine fighting and incite them to revert to their pacific Panhellenic ideals (1130).

It is often said that the peace movement was an intellectual exercise of Athenian elites and did not reflect public opinion. From the fact that the war not only continued in spite of all this peace propaganda, but spread outside Greece, it would seem that it must have had the support of many people. On the other hand, it could be that, as Thucydides noted, the war went on by its own momentum. Men and states were consumed within it, not knowing how to extricate themselves from the holocaust.

In vain Xenophon (H, vi, 3.15) proposed that industry and commerce, rather than militarism and imperialism, were the way to peace and prosperity; or Alciphron (3.16) advised young men to go back to work in the farm rather than fight in the army. However true, these proposals were a luxury that most states could ill afford. So each *polis* chose a much faster but a lot riskier road to wealth by beggaring its neighbors through fratricidal conflict. It seems that the brutal "natural law" of Alcibiades "punish or perish" allowed no option other than dominate or be damned (T, vi.18), so it proved stronger than the calls to calm, work and trade.

The final blow for Athens came when Sparta allied with Persia. Thereby, following an absence of seventy years after its ignominious defeat, Persia entered Greek politics once again. Henceforth, Persian policy practiced and perfected the principle of "*divide et impera*" (T, x.51; xi.6). By shifting its weight from one side to the other, the "Evil Empire" became the holder of the balance of power in Greece, thus preventing either Athens, Sparta, or anybody else, from doing to Greece what Rome was destined to do for Italy.

Even after the war ended with the utter defeat of Athens, its legacy haunted Greece forever. A generation of conflict left the country exhausted, never to recover from its grave losses. War destroyed the Greek economy, agriculture, population and ecosystem, since scorched earth became the norm of invaders and defenders alike. The great law of interdependence which involves all aspects of a complex system in a chain reaction, meant that when one link went down, so did all the others eventually.

The destruction was not only physical but moral. Old values broke down and disappeared. The foundations of the social system were loosened beyond repair. Egoism and factionalism helped by sophism and militarism broke up old traditions. Men became mainly motivated by selfish biological impulses, thus force and fraud replaced law and order.

As the Persian War was the beginning of the flowering of Greece, the Peloponnesian War was the beginning of its wilting. At the end of the fifth century, Greece entered its period of decline and by the fourth century the whole country was bent on self-destruction.

But, while traditional values were on the way out, new ones had not yet come in to replace them. In this moral anomie and cultural vacuum, conflict was the outlet of the contradictions between the old and the new. Hellenic society descended into a state of violent flux and spasm. Thus, the system had become dysfunctional as a result of the deep shock, never to regain its normal equilibrium.

Political Reforms

The upheaval in which Greece found itself around the turn of the century gave rise to a lot of soul-searching among its intelligentsia. Serious doubts arose about the efficacy of the political system and grave warnings were sounded on the future of Hellenism. The literati, as we saw, were the first to engage in social criticism and their scathing attacks on the political institutions of the city-state were unsurpassed for a long time.

A major criticism was the growing influx and influence of foreigners and mercenaries in Greece. Various commentators condemned this sad state of affairs by saying that the *polis* would be better off when citizens alone serve in its army, rather than

together with barbarians like Lydians, Phrygians and Syrians; just because these foreigners had become residents (X, Poroi, 2.3; T,ii.13.6; 31.2).

The deteriorating situation however demanded more than military criticism. Some thought that the Greek malaise went deeper than political institutions and thus required more drastic measures for a complete cure. It was from these men, of whom first and foremost was Socrates, that political philosophy *per se* was born.

Much has been said about Socrates, the wise old man *par excellence*. Among other things, he embodies the "model citizen" of Periclean democracy and the "political animal" of Aristotelian philosophy. His life and death summarizes the highest point which classical theory and praxis could reach. For that reason it is necessary to point out the views of Socrates on interstate affairs and then see how they influenced classical thinking after him.

Of the little that we know of Socrates' opinions on Hellenic affairs, we can be sure that he was a good Athenian and considered patriotism as the highest virtue of man. He took his citizenship so seriously that he preferred to die than give it up. His sense of honor and pride -*philotimia* - for being an Athenian has been reported so often as to be beyond dispute.[24]

For Socrates, the *polis* was the highest and most enduring of human works; so urban life was the only civilized way for man. Although his knowledge ranged far and wide, Socrates' interests were circumscribed within his city and its citizens.[25]

It is thus ironic that he was accused of being an agent of a foreign conspiracy to subvert the Athenian regime. Because he mixed easily with foreigners and citizens alike, he was looked upon suspiciously. The young followers of Socrates came not only from the best families of Athens but from all parts of Greece. He, therefore, had connections everywhere and it would have been an easy matter for him to go and live wherever he liked.[26]

But Athens was the epicenter of his existence, so he spent all his life within its walls and only went out to fight its wars. His attachment to the city was so strong that he repeatedly refused many invitations, such as from Archelaos in Macedonia, Scopa in Cranon, and Eurylochos in Larissa to visit them there. He would not hear of living in some semi-barbarian country where apolitical disorder and lawlessness prevailed.[27]

Nevertheless, the charge of impiety against Socrates was hiding the suspicion that he was a member of an international secret cult of

Pythagoreans: the aristocratic elitist hetairia of which the Athenian democrats were so fearful. Moreover, his friendship with notorious Spartan sympathizers, like Alcibiades, Critias and Charmides, made his a classic case of guilt by association.[28]

Yet, Socratic opposition of Athenian foreign policy was constructive and reformist. So, in spite of his dismay for the decline and fall of Athens, he never lost faith in the *polis* as the ultimate form of politics.[29] He thus differed sharply from the sophistic internationalism which scorned civic life.[30] His criticism and individualism were those of a free citizen: always predicated within a strong and healthy *polis*. For Socrates, loyal political citizenship was the yardstick for assessing human action and the premise governing moral behavior, so high treason would be unthinkable.

Socratic attachment to the *polis* was so influential that it dominated political philosophy for a long time. As developed and perfected by Plato, the theory of the *polis* reigned supreme throughout the fourth century. Socrates' introspective philosophy thus nipped at the bud any nascent trends for naturalism and internationalism which arose at that time. The Socratic cure for the ills of Greece was simply the reeducation of individual citizens within the *polis*.

The complex personality and seminal ideas of Socrates however could be interpreted in various ways. Thus in addition to the direct line represented by Plato and Aristotle, the Socratic influence can be found in such diverse thinkers and schools as the Panhellenists and the Cynics. Each school, led by a different student of his, focused on a particular aspect of Socrates which was then turned into a separate and distinct philosophy.

In the following century three most significant developments branched out of the original Socratic circle: panhellenic nationalism of Isocrates; political patriotism of Plato or Aristotle; and cosmopolitan individualism of Antisthenes. Each one of these movements tried to give an answer to the Greek predicament by proposing some changes on the Hellenic political system. Of these only the last succeeded somewhat, not in saving Hellenic politics, but in easing its transition to the Hellenistic world.

Conclusion

Returning to our original quest for a dialectic resolution of the Idealist-Materialist thesis-antithesis dilemma, we can now reaffirm

our Realistic synthesis. Because of this ontologic and semantic complexity, only a proper mixture of different options can best explain human behavior and expose foreign policy in its historical and geographical context.

Accordingly, the real realist realizes the complexity of things and the limitations of human understanding to comprehend, let alone influence it intentionally; while the ideal idealist implies the simplicity of a dominant factor, be it power or principle, which human intelligence can discern and public policy control. In that sense, classical realism recognizes and respects limits to both means and ends of human thought or action, instead of idealizing and magnifying either cultural liberty or natural necessity.

In the final analysis, a good political theory should eventually result in a successful social praxis, so it must be judged on both its theoretical explanations and policy applications. In this respect, classical exopolitics had something to say about state sovereignty, power politics and legal order, as well as foreign policy, strategy and diplomacy. The official application of ideological positions first in interstate and then in international relations was widely accepted. That is why classical thinkers were also policy consultants as well as practicing diplomats.

The primordial foreign policy decision that any sovereign state has to make or accept is whether to have any foreign relations at all. Although a purely isolationist policy is rare; most philosophical utopias make it the cornerstone of their foreign policy, thus indicating a definite preference for maximizing internal and minimizing external affairs.

This philosophical bias stems from the conviction that an ideal *polis* must be static, exclusive and sovereign. Splendid isolationism is thus the best way to attain and maintain a necessary independence for both self-sufficiency -*autarkeia*- and self-government -*autarchia*. Accepting this line of thought, even when practical considerations did not permit strong isolationism; ideal foreign policy leaned towards passivity: external affairs were controlled, entangling alliances avoided, and foreign relations eschewed.

With this minimalist attitude towards exopolitics, classical theory took an explicit stand in its abhorrence of economic, cultural, and political interdependence among states or nations. Only as the necessary lesser evil did philosophers accept interstate law and organization as the means to attain a semblance of peace and

order in the global system.

In fact, the actual Greek historical record does not follow its predominant ideal. City-state foreign policies range between passive and active, isolationist and interventionist, defensive and offensive, allied and neutral, dogmatic and pragmatic. Even if most people preferred a minimalist foreign policy, events beyond their control forced them to act differently.

Moreover, the Greek love for local autonomy did not preclude various confederate arrangements. Both political independence and Pan-Hellenic interdependence then were to some extent facts as well as ideals. Thus, in spite of the predominant theory, actual policy had to recognize and compromise them in different degrees at different times and places.

All these deployments and developments however were too little and too late. As a shame-honor society, no man or state could appear to submit to others without loss of face or virtue. If only the Greeks could recognize that compromise and cooperation rather than domination or subjugation was the way to honor -*time*- and virtue -*arete*- history might have turned out differently. As it was, their self-defeating ideas and acts simply continued for another century, going from bad to worse, until their whole system was snuffed out.

NOTES

N.B. Classical works are abreviated as follows: AA=Aristotle *Atheneon Politea*; AP=Aristotle *Politics*; H=Herodotos; T=Thucydides; X=Xenophon.

1. An Athenian foreign policy slogan was "Protect the weak and punish the wrongdoer." X, **Hellenika**, vi, 5.45; Isocrates, **Panegeric**. 52; Euripides, **Suppliants**, 310-1; H,iii, 144; ix, 7; Plato, **Menexenos**, 240-5; **Laws**, 692-8.

2. The Delian League of 460 had about 300 members and Aristophanes spoke of the "thousand cities of the Athenian empire." **Wasps**, 707.

3. The transformation of the League into an Empire is reflected in Aristotle's writings when he used the term hegemonia to describe Athens until 453, and arche afterwards.

4. For comments on the League see: Agard, 84, 180; Baldry,137; Bowra, 97-101; Caldwell, 51, 67, 81; Davis, 44, 68, 77; Dover, 84; Ehrenberg, 108; Grun, 13; Hettich, 29-35; Knorringa, 128, 290; Raubitschek, 16; Watson, 34; Zimmern, 170-93.

5. For that purpose Pericles engaged the best minds of the time: including Hippodamos of Miletos as its town-planner, Protagoras of Abdera its legislator, Empedocles of Acragas its educator and Herodotos of Halicarnasos as its historian, to plan this model city.

6. Old prejudices about each one, i.e. Thessalians were untrustworthy, Thebans cruel, Phaselites tricky, Dorians valiant and Ionians cowardly, proved insurmountable. Iamblichos, Pythagoras, 129, 249.

7. X. **Hellenika**, vi, 5.54; T, i, 2; xiii, 26; Isocrates, **Panegeric**, 62; Demosthenes, **Megalopolitans**,14, **Rhodians**, 22; A. **Ethics**, 1123a. See also: Allendy,16; Glotz,193; Greenridge, 203; Philipson, 134; Webster, 22, 38.

8. So for a long time afterwards, Alcibiades' dream of a Mediterranean empire headed by Athens was considered the best example of hubris. T, iii, 37-40; iv,18, 85, vi. 90.2.

9. Plato rejected Thucydides and Aristotle ignored him. **Rhetoric**, 1412b; **Politics**, 27.1; 23.2.; Isocrates, **Philippic**, 61; **Panegeric**, 119; **Peace**,101. For commentary on these ideas see: Ferguson,103; Romilly, 38-41, 69; Sabine, 24.

10. The Spartans were really a people without history, thus it was a historian Herodotos (i,65), who among all the ancient writers called Sparta the worst governed state in Greece. See Botsford, 83-94; Bury,123-7; Osborn, 177; Toynbee, 54.

11. For the causes of war see: H. v, 91; T. i, 67; ii,39, 63; Aristophanes, **Peace**, 609; **Frogs**, 362; Demosthenes, xix, 286.

12. For the incidents that led to war and the final moves to avert it see: T. i.75, 122; iii, 44; AA.19.4. Also Jones, 68; McDonald, 43; Tenekides, 4.

13. Aristophanes, **Knights**, 576ff; Euripides, **Heraclides**,199ff; T, ii, 8.

14. The Peloponnesian War has received renewed attention in recent years. Many theorists consider it analogous to the post-war East-West bipolar conflict. Cf. Fliess, passim; Halle, 262-5; Bury, 328.

15. It is interesting to note that when Thucydides was writing **The History of War in Greece**, his contemporary Sun Tzu was writing an equivalent classic, **The Art of War**, in China. Jaeger, 383; Jones, 67, 132; Kagan, 96; Halle, 261; Sinclair, 69, 106.

16. For more cynical views on power politics see: Plutarch, **Moralia**, 210b: **Lysias**, vii, 5; T. iii.82, vii,57; Plato, **Gorgias**, 483cd, 488c. Also, Casson, 98; Jarde, 258; Oliver, 134.

17. Thucydides' most pertinent thoughts on war and peace are to be found in the speeches of the Spartan plenipotentiaries to Athens in 427 (iv. 17-20), Hermocrates at the Sicilian Conference of Gela in 424 (iv.59-60), and last but not least, the infamous Melian Dialogue (v. 84-116).

18. Such comic epics as the **Batrachomuomachia** (frog-mice war) satirized in stately mock hexameter the great old heroics. On the contrary, all major engagements of the thirty year war were fought massively either at sea or close to shore, thus diverging from the traditional hoplite pitched land battles (Hanson, 341).

19. Herodotos statement, "Who could be so foolish as to chose war over peace, since in war fathers bury their sons rather than the sons burying their fathers," (i, 87), conveys the pathos and unnatural condition of war.

20. Sophocles' father was an armaments manufacturer and he himself was an Athenian envoy charged to suppress the Samian revolt of 440. So, the playwright was an imperial treasurer, as well as a diplomat, a priest and a general. Anderson,190.

21. "Ill-fated Hellas!" exclaimed Euripides, "She has the potential to become the best country on earth, but instead has become the laughing stock of the whole world." For more allusions on the evils of war see: **Hecuba**, **Troades**, **Andromache**.

22. Herodotos had Xerxes say "The trouble with Greeks is that instead of solving their problems by peaceful means, as people of the same race should, they chose to wage most reckless wars among themselves."

23. Aristophanes, **Peace**, 300, 530; **Knights**, 790ff; and Plutarch, Pericles, 28-30; Herodotos, iv,118.5, i,194, ii, 96.

24. Socrates probably fought as a hoplite in the battles of Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium where in spite of the Athenian debacle there in 424, he won fame for his gallantry even in retreat

and his humane treatment of the enemy. Although Socrates was not an unqualified pacifist, he only believed in defensive war. X, iii,13; vi,2; Plato, **Republic**, 334b; **Laws**, 944c; **Apology**, 28-9; 35-7.

25. "Who cares what is going on in far away lands," he said in the **Theatitos**, 143d, "What we should be concerned with is what happens here and now." **Apology**, 30a; **Phaedros**, 275b. Yet certain commentators (Arrian, Cicero and Diogenes Laertios) attribute to Socrates cosmopolitan and pacifist leanings (Zampaglione, 49).

26. Plato, **Crito**, 45c, 52b-54a; **Phaedo**, 99a.

27. D. L, ii, 5.24-5; Plato, **Charmides**,153a; **Lachis**,181b; **Meno**, 80b.

28. Athenian public opinion hostility or derision towards Socrates is caricatured by Aristophanes (**Clouds**,140), where the master is conducting an international "think-tank" *-phrontisterion-* of arcane learning. See also, X. **Memorabilia**, ii. 60; iv, 15-6. Also Jaspers,19; Popper,184-7; Thompson, 175; Wolin, 69; Wright, 467.

29. "Our condition is by no means past remedy." (X. G, v,18).

30. Socrates detested the sophistic amoral theory of power politics. On the contrary, obedience to the law and loyalty to the state is the greatest source of power and the best guarantee of peace. Santayana, 282.

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Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy during The Peloponnesian War[1]

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet essai se penche sur la contribution de Thucydide au domaine de la stratégie. Les écrits de Thucydide sont les premiers de l'histoire à décrire une théorie complète de la stratégie. Comme étude de cas, l'auteur examine la stratégie d'Athènes employée sous la gouverne de Périclès durant la première partie de la Guerre du Péloponnèse. La stratégie de Périclès était une stratégie typique de l'épuisement, dont le but était de dissuader l'ennemi (Sparte) dans ses tentatives continuelles de renverser le *statu quo* existant. L'auteur avance que cette stratégie était excellente et qu'elle assurait de ce fait le succès athénien dans la lutte. Ce n'est que lorsque cette stratégie fut abandonnée qu'Athènes fut défaite.

De plus, cet essai affirme que la stratégie de l'épuisement de Périclès est à l'origine a) "de la méthode de guerre britannique" et b) de la stratégie américaine durant la Guerre Froide. Enfin, cet essai affirme que la stratégie de l'épuisement verra son utilisation accrue au cours des prochaines décennies.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this essay is to present Thucydides' contribution to the study of strategy. It is in Thucydides' text that we find for the first time in history an outline of a complete theory of grand strategy. As a case study, the essay examines the grand strategy that Athens, under Pericles' direction, employed during the first phase of the Peloponnesian War. The Periclean grand stategy was a typical strategy of exhaustion, whose aim was to dissuade the enemy (Sparta) from continuing his attempt to overthrow the existing *status quo*. The essay argues that the Periclean grand strategy was an excellent strategic design, which ensured Athenian success in the struggle. Athens was defeated only when it abandonned this grand strategy; in fact, the departure from the Periclean grand strategy was the very reason for the Athenian defeat.

Furthermore, this essay claims that the Periclean strategy of exhaustion contained the seeds of a) "the British way of warfare", and b) the American Grand Strategy during the Cold War. Last, it argues that in the coming decades the employment of the strategy of exhaustion is bound to become more popular.

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Introduction

It is well-known that outstanding classical treatises in each particular field provide a standard of evaluation for all other field-related works and serve as a cornerstone upon which new theories can be developed. As far as the study of strategy is concerned, Michael Handel has claimed that strategists are fortunate to have access to two enduring classical texts: Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and Clausewitz's *On War*.[2] However, another classical masterpiece needs to be added in this short list, namely Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to present Thucydides' contribution to the study of strategy.

Undoubtedly, Thucydides stands out prominently as both a great historian and the forefather of the discipline of International Relations. For instance, Robert Gilpin has enquired in earnest whether contemporary scholars of international relations actually know anything about state behavior that was unknown to Thucydides.[3] What has been relatively ignored is that in Thucydides' text we find for the first time in history an outline of a complete theory of grand strategy, a full-fledged theory of how states produce security for themselves. Thucydide's theory incorporates the economic, diplomatic, military, technological, demographic, psychological and other factors upon which a state's security depends in various ways. It is highly interesting that Thucydides did not confine his analysis to traditional strategies which lay stress on the military dimension. He also took into account grand strategies which emphasize dimensions other than the military one, pointing out that they may well provide states with a path to victory.

In this respect, Thucydides may be argued to have anticipated the insights offered by the famous German historian Hans Delbrück. Delbrück outlined two basic forms of strategy, calling them respectively the strategy of annihilation (*Niederwerfungsstrategie*) and the strategy of exhaustion (*Ermattungsstrategie*) respectively.[4] Whereas the aim of the strategy of annihilation is the decisive battle (*Vernichtungsschlacht*), the strategy of exhaustion employs the battle as but one of a variety of means, such as territorial occupation, destruction of crops, blockade, etc. The strategy of exhaustion is neither a variation of the strategy of annihilation, nor inferior to it. Such a strategy can often be the only way for a state to achieve its political aims. The strategy of annihilation has been traditionnaly associated with Clausewitz. His growing influence

(as well as that of whatever passed for Clausewitzian thought) since the second half of the nineteenth century meant that the Germans and the Europeans in general focused primarily on the strategy of annihilation, and comparatively neglected the strategy of exhaustion.[5]

Although Delbrück referred to military strategies, as opposed to grand strategies, his distinction between a strategy of annihilation and a strategy of exhaustion may be of great use in the study of grand strategies. One must also note that in Delbrück's time the term "grand strategy" was used in a much more restrictive sense than at present, that is, as covering merely the overall war policy of a state. However, nowadays the term "grand strategy" is used to encompass all available means (military, economic, diplomatic, etc.) that a state is able to use in order to achieve its long-term political objectives in the face of actual or potential conflict.[6] In a grand strategy of annihilation, the state depends chiefly on military strategy; all other strategies, economic, diplomatic, etc. are essentially subservient to it. On the other hand, a grand strategy of exhaustion makes simultaneous use of all possible means so as to achieve the aims set by state policy.

Returning to Thucydides, in his text both these grand strategies may be seen at work; i.e., while Sparta employed a grand strategy of annihilation, Athens resorted to a grand strategy of exhaustion. The present essay will make use of the strategy that Athens, under Pericles' direction, employed against Sparta during the first years of the Peloponnesian War in order to outline the typical characteristics of such a grand strategy of exhaustion.[7]

To summarize, Thucydides produced the first comprehensive theory of grand strategy in history. This article attempts to highlight his contribution to strategic theory, using as a case study the grand strategy of exhaustion that Pericles conceived and implemented on behalf of Athens.

I. A Framework for Analysing Grand Strategy

Althouth the concept of grand strategy has already been touched upon, it stands in need of further elaboration prior to the examination of the grand strategy adopted by Athens in the beginning of the Peloponnesian War under Pericles' direction.

To begin with, we need to clarify the essence of grand strategy and outline some of its characteristics. Essentially, grand strategy is a state's theory about how it can "cause" security for itself. Indeed, how states choose to produce security for themselves is the very core of grand strategy, and their success in doing so is the crucial test of any particular grand strategy. Ideally, grand strategy must include an explanation of why this security-producing theory is expected to work in a given security environment. Grand strategy can be understood as a state's response to specific threats to its security; a grand strategy must identify potential threats and devise political and other remedies for them. Grand strategy should be viewed as a politico-military means-ends chain in which military capabilities are connected with military strategies in turn connected with political objectives. In theory, grand strategies exploit the advantages that the state possesses and aim at minimizing those of the opponent. Mentioning the existence of an opponent brings us to a very important point: grand strategy (and strategy in general) never exists in a vacuum;[8] it is always addressed against one or more opponents, who, in turn, formulate their own strategy. A central aspect of grand strategy is the establishment of priorities. Priorities must be established among both threats and remedies because in an anarchical international environment the number of possible threats is great and resources to meet them are bound to be scarce.[9]

An elaborate treatment of the concept of grand strategy has been given by Sir Basil Liddell Hart. According to him:

> [T]he role of grand strategy -higher strategy- is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations towards the attainment of the political object of the war -the goal defined by fundamental policy. Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources -for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy -which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will.[10]

This is an excellent description of the various means employed by grand strategy. However, the current usage of the term is not confined to the description of war situations. It is widely accepted

that strategy in general, and grand strategy in particular, covers activities performed in peacetime as well. Strategy is also conducted in the context of potential as well as actual conflict.[11] It is for this reason that grand strategy has been defined as the use of all the available means that a state is able to use in order to achieve its long-term political objectives in the face of actual or potential conflict.

A successful planning at the level of grand strategy needs to address the following four dimensions[12] (see Table 1):

1. Assessment of the international environment, so as to identify potential or actual threats to national security, as well as the various constraints and opportunities for the implementation of the grand strategy that may be present in this environment. Clearly then, the crucial test for a grand strategy in this dimension is international fitness.

2. Identification of the ends that the grand strategy is to pursue, in view of the means available, plus the aforementioned threats, constraints, and opportunities. In view of the ever-present scarcity of resources, there are certain limits to the ends pursued. On the one hand, as it has already been mentioned, priorities must be established among the various aims. On the other, one must make sure that the aims set do not exceed the means available. This is the phenomenon of overextension, on which more will follow. The avoidance of overextension is one important indicator of the performance of a grand strategy in this dimension.

3. Allocation of resources so as to achieve the objectives outlined by grand strategy. The means have to be tailored to the ends so as to avoid both wasting scarce resources and marshalling inadequate resources for the tasks ahead. Thus, the avoidance of redundancy or inadequacy of means is the critical test that a grand strategy has to meet in this dimension.

4. Shaping the "image" of the grand strategy both at the domestic and the international level, so that: (a) the society actively supports the grand strategy of the state; (b) all the parts of the state structure work toward the same purpose; (c) the grand strategy of the state is internationally viewed as legitimate. In other words, to be successful in this dimension, a grand strategy has to be accepted both at home and abroad.

Table 1: Planning of Grand Strategy



II. Periclean Grand Strategy

Let us now turn to the analysis of the grand strategy that Athens followed during the first years of the Peloponnesian war. Since this grand strategy was conceived by Pericles, who also supervised its implementation, it will be called "Periclean grand strategy." The four dimensions of grand strategic planning mentioned above will constitute the conceptual framework with which this grand strategy will be analyzed.

1. Assessment of the International Environment

1.1. The Greek City-State System: Power Distribution and Future Trends

The Greek city-state system[13] in terms of modern international relations theory has been commonly described as "bipolar", its two poles being Sparta and Athens.[14] Of course, everything depends on where one sets the boundaries of the system. For instance, the vast Persian Empire with its ample resources obviously influenced the scene.[15] Still, if the system is confined to mainland Greece or the Greek world in general, then it makes

much sense to talk about a bipolar system, with Sparta and Athens as the respective poles, and this is certainly how contemporaries viewed the situation. According to W.R. Connor, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, three additional actors of importance in the distribution of power existed: Thebes, Magna Graecia (the Greek colonies of Southern Italy and Sicily), and Corcyra.[16] Although these actors tried to exploit the conflict between Sparta and Athens to their own advantage, they ended up siding with the central protagonists of the conflict. Hence the distribution of power was essentially bipolar. On the other hand, one should always keep in mind that the relative position of Sparta and Athens *vis-à-vis* the other Greek states did not remotely resemble that of the United States and the Soviet Union *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world during the Cold War.[17]

Apart from the static analysis of power distribution in the Greek city-state system, the dynamic one, namely the identification of the various trends in the distribution of power, is of crucial importance as well. Thucydides' famous explanation of the cause of the Peloponnesian War is that "what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."[18] Thucydides' statement reveals that Athens, the emerging power, was growing in strength at a faster rate than Sparta, the traditional hegemon in Greece. This indeed sounds plausible, since Athens had founded an extensive empire based on naval strength and maritime trade, whereas Sparta remained an agrarian economy.

Thucydides goes at some length to document the rise of Athenian power in the interval of roughly fifty years between the end of the Persian Wars and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.[19] To start with, the poverty of the Attic soil coupled with demographic pressures forced the Athenians to turn to the sea, to become a seafaring nation. Thus, as early as the time of the Persian invasion, Athens possessed a powerful navy. Its naval power enabled Athens to assume the lead in pushing Persia out of the Greek coastal cities of Asia Minor. In the process, however, the Athenians also established a progressively firmer control over their allies and the Athenian Empire was born, which gradually proved to be a tremendous source of wealth for Athens. Tributes from the allies, imperial mines, and increased commercial activity enabled the growth of the economic power of the Athenian metropolis.[20] This wealth sustained the efficiency of the Athenian

navy, ensuring the preservation of the Empire and thus bringing more money home, that would once again augment the naval power of Athens. Thucydides put it succintly:

> Because of this reluctance of theirs [the allies-turned-subjects] to face military service, most of them, to avoid serving abroad, had assessments made by which, instead of producing ships, they were to pay a corresponding sum of money. The result was that the Athenian navy grew strong at their expense, and when they revolted they always found themselves inadequately armed and inexperienced in war.[21]

It was a self-perpetuating system that was producing spiralling gains for Athens, unthought-of by an agrarian economy.[22] The obvious difference in wealth that this brought about, would eventually become apparent. Fully cognizant of the economic power of Athens, Pericles, while analyzing the balance of power to his fellow citizens, provided them with an extensive account of the economic resources of Athens -ample resources indeed.[23] Moreover, Pericles confined his account to state funds, and did not mention the immense private wealth that was amassed in the city. With trade and allied revenues continually increasing this wealth, it was evident that the Athenian power would soon reach frightening proportions. Since economic power constitutes the enabling force behind military power and especially naval power,[24] the picture that emerged for the opponents of Athens was a highly alarming one.

In view of these developments, Donald Kagan's claim that the "Athenian power did not grow between 445 and 435"[25] is hard to understand. Relative economic power is an extremely important dimension of state power.[26] Even in the absence of territorial acquisitions, changes in the economic power of states over time may bring about profound shifts in the balance of power. Thucydides shows a remarkable grasp of the link between wealth and power. In this respect, he must be regarded as the originator of a long Realist tradition that paid due attention to the economic sources of national power.[28]

1.2. Athens and Sparta: the Bilateral Balance

Up to this point of the essay, it has been clearly demonstrated that Sparta and Athens were the two strongest states of ancient Greece and that the future trends in the distribution of power were clearly in favour of Athens. What, however, was the

correlation of forces between the two combatants at the time of the outbreak of the war? It seems that Athens was at worst vulnerable to Sparta and its allies and at best superior to them. Three elements of Athenian power accounted for this assessment: the navy, the financial power, and the alliance/empire. This was both stressed by Pericles and acknowledged by the Spartan king Archidamus. It is worth quoting both of them at length. Pericles, trying to persuade the Athenians that they did not need to fear the outcome of a war against the Peloponnesians, stated the following:

> Now, as to the war and to the resources available to each side I should like you to listen to a detailed comparison and to realize that we are not the weaker party. The Peloponnesians cultivate their own land themselves; they have no financial resources either as individuals or as states; then they have no experience of fighting overseas, nor of any fighting that lasts a long time, since the wars that fight against each other are, because of their poverty, short affairs. Such people are incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending out an army, when that means absence from their own land, expense from their own funds and, apart from this, when we have control of the sea. And wars are paid of by the possession of reserves rather than by a sudden increase in taxation. [...] In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies could stand up to all the rest of Hellas, but they cannot fight a war against a power unlike themselves. [...] But this is the main point: they will be handicapped by lack of money and delayed by the time they will have to take in procuring it. But in war opportunity waits for no man. [...] And as for seamanship, they will find that a difficult lesson to learn. [...] Seamanship, just like anything else, is an art. It is not something that can be picked up and studied in one's spare time; indeed it allows one no spare time for anything else. [...] If they invade our country by land, we will invade theirs by sea, and it will turn out that the destruction of a part of the Peloponnese will be worse for them than the destruction of the whole of Attica would be for us. For they can get no more land without fighting for it, while we have plenty of land both in the islands and on the continent. Sea-power is of enormous importance.[29]

Pericles' speech reveals his confidence in the outcome of the war. The economic and naval power of Athens ensured that it would not lose, save through blunders of its own making.[30] Peloponnesian land power was largely irrelevant against a sea power, while lack of economic resources would impede operations.

This was no empty boasting on Pericles' part. A surprisingly similar picture emerged at the other side of the hill. Shortly before the speech of Pericles just quoted, the Spartan king Archidamus had made an identical outline of Athenian power, in an attempt to dissuade his compatriots from voting in favour of war with Athens. According to him:

> When we are engaged with Peloponnesians and neighbours, the forces on both sides are of the same type, and we can strike rapidly where we wish to strike. With Athens it is different. Here we shall be engaged with people who live far off, people also who have the widest experience of the sea and who are extremely well equipped in all other directions, very wealthy both as individuals and as a state, with ships and cavalry and hoplites, with a population bigger than that of any other place in Hellas, and then, too, with numbers of allies who pay tribute to them. How, then, can we irresponsibly start a war with such a people? What have we to rely upon if we rush into it unprepared? Our navy? It is inferior to theirs, and if we are to give proper attention to it and build it up to their strength, that will take time. Or are we relying on our wealth? Here we are at an even greater disadvantage: we have no public funds, and it is no easy matter to secure contributions from private sources. Perhaps there is ground for confidence in the superiority which we have in heavy infantry and in actual numbers, assets which will enable us to invade and devastate their land. Athens, however, controls plenty of land outside Attica and can import what she wants by sea. And if we try to make her allies revolt from her, we shall have to support them with a fleet, since most of them are on the islands. What sort of war, then, are we going to fight? [31]

The strategic deadlock is apparent in Spartan strategy. To put it differently, in a contest between a lion and a shark, the lion cannot force a decision, since it cannot reach the sources of the shark's strength.

Thus, the net assessment of the relative balance of power indicated that the situation was not unfavourable to Athens, to say the least. The famous motto "we have the ships, we have the men, we have the money too" could well have been uttered by the Athenians, twenty five centuries before it was coined by the British jingoists.[32]

2. Policy Objectives

2.1. Policy Objectives and Grand Strategic Designs

Setting the political objectives is the next important step in the formulation of a grand strategy. For Athens, these objectives were simply the maintenance of the *status quo*. The existence of the Empire guaranteed the prosperity and power of Athens, both in absolute terms and in comparison to the other Greek states. Moreover, the Thirty Years" Peace, concluded in 445 B.C. after a period of hostilities between Athens and Sparta (and their respective allies), acknowledged the equal status of these two powers. It was perfectly satisfactory for the Athenians to be placed on an equal footing with what had traditionally been the leading Greek state.[33] This does not necessarily mean that Athens did not aim at achieving primacy in Greece. In fact, having in mind the fast rates of growth of the Athenian power, one may well argue that a *status quo* policy on behalf of Athens was the best vehicle for establishing Athenian hegemony over the Greek world. Simply put, Athens merely had to wait and let the law of uneven growth to work in its favour.[34] The differential rates of growth would eventually produce big shifts in the balance of power.

In view of the above, it is clear why Sparta did not have any particular reason to be happy with the *status quo*. Consequently, it resorted to preventive war in order to dissolve the Athenian Empire and thus cripple the Athenian power. Earlier on, Sparta had revealed its intentions by presenting the Athenians with an ultimatum: as war was approaching, a Spartan embassy informed the Athenians that "Sparta wants peace. Peace is still possible if you will give the Hellenes their freedom."[35] This amounts to saying that the Spartan aims were unlimited, since acceptance of the Spartan ultimatum would clearly lead to the dissolution of the Athenian Empire. Since the Spartans could not hope to achieve their aims by peaceful means, they had clearly decided to launch war.

An important point emerges here. Thucydides' analysis of the Spartan motives and their relation to the outbreak of the war makes it evident that he was fully cognizant of the relation between war and politics. Obviously, for Thucydides the Peloponnesian War was an act of force on behalf of Sparta to compel Athens to comply with its will. Sparta's political objectives

could not be attained by peaceful measures, therefore, to use Clausewitzian terms, war came as the continuation of policy by other means. Bernard Brodie has stated that the idea expressed in this famous dictum by Clausewitz must really be an old one.[36] It would seem that the first detailed expression of this idea is to be found in Thucydides.[37]

The grand strategies of the two competing states were shaped by their respective political objectives. Athens, the *status quo* power, formed a defensive grand strategy whose aim was to dissuade the opponent from attempting to change the *status quo*. This would be achieved by convincing the enemy that Athens was unbeatable militarily and that it possessed ample resources to continue the struggle long after the opponent himself would be exhausted. In other words, Athens formulated a grand strategy of exhaustion, in which non-military dimensions such as economic strength played a crucial role.[38]

On the other hand, Sparta, the revisionist power, resorted to an offensive, more "Clausewitzian" grand strategy, centered around the Spartan military might. Initially the Spartans attempted to persuade the Athenians to make concessions under the threat of military defeat (viz. coercive diplomacy). Following the failure of forceful persuasion, they resorted to actual warfare in which they attempted to secure victory through a decisive land battle.

Sparta and Athens with their grand strategic designs fit remarkably with the ideal types of what Liddell Hart has named the acquisitive and the conservative state respectively.

According to Liddell Hart:

> The acquisitive State, inherently unsatisfied, needs to gain victory in order to gain its object -and must therefore court greater risks in the attempt. The conservative State can achieve its object by merely inducing the aggressor to drop his attempt at conquest -by convincing him that "the game is not worth the candle". Its victory is, in a real sense, attained by foiling the other side's bid for victory.[39]

In other words, Athens did not have to beat Sparta in military terms. If the Spartans were made to abandon their quest for overthrowing the Athenian Empire, this would signify the victory of the Athenian grand strategy. It is amazing that Liddell Hart's analysis, perceptive though it is, has in fact added nothing novel to the one produced by Thucydides twenty five centuries earlier.

Apart from anticipating Liddell Hart, Thucydides may be said to operate at the same wave length as his near contemporary, Sun Tzu. Simply put, instead of defeating the might of Sparta, Athens chose to foil the Spartan plan for victory - what Sun Tzu has called the highest form of strategy.[40]

To recapitulate, Athens was satisfied with the *status quo*, whereas Sparta was bent on overthrowing it. Consequently, Athens formulated a grand strategy of exhaustion, whose aim was to make Sparta acknowledge the futility of trying to change the *status quo*, while the latter formulated a strategy of annihilation, trying to force a land battle where its powerful infantry would prove decisive.

2.2. Athenian Grand Strategy: Two Underlying Philosophies

An underlying philosophy of the Athenian grand strategy was rejection of appeasement. Pericles insisted on securing equal status between Athens and Sparta. Any unilateral Athenian concessions, no matter how trivial they might seem in the first place, would erode this status. Thus, immediately before the outbreak of the war, the Spartans stated that peace could be preserved, provided the Athenians revoked the famous Megarian Decree, which excluded the citizens of Megara from the ports of the Athenian Alliance and the market of Attica.[41] Even in this relatively minor issue, Pericles was not prepared to make unilateral concessions. For him, this Spartan request was nothing but a test of the Athenians' will and determination. If Athens backed down on that issue, then Sparta was sure to come up with further demands.

As Pericles himself put it:

> I am against making any concessions to the Peloponnesians. [...] It was evident before that Sparta was plotting against us, and now it is even more evident. [...] They come to us with a proclamation that we must give the Hellenes their freedom. Let none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megarian decree. [...] For you this trifle is both the assurance and the proof of your determination. If you give in, you will immediately be confronted with some greater demand, since they will think that you only gave way on this point through fear. But if you take a firm stand you will make it clear to them that they have to treat you properly as equals. [...] When one's equals, before resorting to arbitration, make claims on their neighbours and put those claims in the form of commands, it would still be slavish to give in to them, however big or however small such claims may be.[42]

Consequently, Pericles asked the Spartans to give a *quid pro quo* for the revocation of the Megarian Decree, namely that they would abandon their xenophobic institutions that were hampering the presence and the trading activities of Athenians and their allies in Spartan territory.[43] These terms were rejected by the Spartans and war became inevitable. Rather than submit to coercive demands, Pericles chose war.

This is as good an analysis of the dangers of appeasement as any in modern literature. The lessons that the Western democracies had to learn painfully while dealing with Hitler in the 1930s[44] had already been mastered by Thucydides. Of course, this does not conclude the discussion about appeasement. Appeasement has negative connotations in the West because of Munich, but sometimes it can actually be a very useful instrument. The Byzantines, for example, often resorted to appeasement in order to close secondary fronts and deal with the primary threat undisturbed.[45] However, when a state, especially a hegemonic power, is utilizing appeasement, it runs two risks. First, that its behavior may invite further demands and challenges by its adversary. Second, that it may be perceived as a sign of weakness by the hegemon's allies and thus jeopardize the hegemonic rule. It was precisely for these reasons that Pericles rejected appeasing the Peloponnesians.[46]

Another underlying philosophy of Pericles' strategy was avoidance of overextension. Pericles advised that Athens should not try to expand its dominions. War with a third party during the period of competition with the principal adversary ought to be avoided.[47] The fact that Pericles rejected further territorial aggrandizement is a clear evidence that he had grasped what has now become common knowledge, namely that the collapse of great powers is brought about by overextension.[48] Under this process, a state sets objectives and undertakes commitments beyond the means available to it. Consequently, the costs it incurs in pursuing these objectives and sustaining these commitments are greater than the benefits it extracts from its endeavors (e.g. a costly war in a far-off place that produces little in return) and in the long run its power is sapped.

The international situation prior to the outbreak of war, the political objectives of Athens and Sparta, and the grand strategic plans these objectives generated, have already been examined. Let us now turn our attention to the means employed by the grand strategy of Athens under Pericles' direction.

3. The Means of Periclean Grand Strategy

Periclean grand strategy made use of a variety of means. Apart from the traditional military means, it employed economic, diplomatic, technological, and psychological ones. The particular combination of these means (policy mix) was governed by the following principles:

a. Balance the power of the enemy.

b. Exploit competitive advantages and minimize those of the enemy.

c. Deter the enemy by denial of his success and by the skillful use of retaliation.

d. Erode the international power base of the enemy.

e. Shape the domestic environment of the adversary to your own benefit.

3.1. Balance the Power of the Enemy

The first principle of Periclean grand strategy was typical balancing of the power of Sparta and its allies. Balancing can be done either by utilizing power from abroad (external balancing), and/or by mobilizing and exploiting domestic resources (internal balancing).[49] External balancing is chiefly done through alliances.[50] Athens drew upon the collective resources of its free allies, Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra. These allies provided ships in wartime.[51] For instance, Thucydides mentions that in the first year of the war, the expedition around Peloponnese by an Athenian fleet consisting of 100 ships was assisted by a powerful squadron of 50 ships from Corcyra.[52]

As far as internal balancing is concerned, it has already been demonstrated that Athens was drawing support from its empire. If the free allies provided Athens with ships, the subordinate ones or, as Thucydides put it, "cities in the tribute-paying class"[53] supported Athens financially and provided a pool of trained sailors in addition to those possessed by Athens itself.[54]

Apart from imperial resources, Athenian internal balancing drew upon resources of Athens proper. Thus, the Athenians created a financial and naval reserve to be used only in extreme emergency:

> They also decided to set aside and keep intact a special fund of 1000 talents from the money in the Acropolis. The expenses of the war were to be paid out of other funds, and the death penalty was laid down for anyone who should suggest or should put to the vote any proposal for using this money in any other way except to defend the city in the case of their enemies coming to attack them with a fleet by sea. To go with this money they set aside a special fleet of 100 triremes, the best ones of each year, with their captains. These, too, were only to be used in the same way as the money and to meet the same danger, if it should ever arise.[55]

One cannot fail grasping the link between wealth and power, in this case naval power. The decision to create this "iron reserve" is important for it suggests that the Athenians had begun mobilization for a long war and wanted to hedge against the possibility of serious depletion of their reserves.[56]

Finally, Pericles also paid attention to the constant training of the Athenians in maritime affairs, which provided the city with a big number of sailors, whose mastery of their craft was superior to that of their enemies.[57]

In sum, balancing in the Periclean grand strategy consisted basically of the mobilization and deployment of Athenian wealth and manpower together with those of the "free allies" and the imperial subjects for the purpose of achieving the goals of policy in wartime.[58]

3.2. Exploit Your Competitive Advantages and Minimize Those of the Enemy

A second principle of Pericles' grand strategy was the exploitation of the competitive advantages of Athens and the respective minimization of those of Sparta. One such advantage was provided by the existence of a comprehensive urban fortification complex, namely the walls around Athens. The Athenians started rebuilding the walls of their city after the Persian invaders withdrew. The Spartans tried to preclude the rebuilding, coming up with an ingenious arms control proposal, namely the demolition of the walls of every city outside Peloponnese, Athens included.

> When the Spartans heard of what was going on they sent an embassy to Athens. This was partly because they themselves did not like the idea of Athens or any other city being fortified. [...] The Spartans proposed that not only should

> Athens refrain from building her own fortifications, but that she should join them in pulling down all the fortifications which still existed in cities outside the Peloponnese. In making this suggestion to the Athenians they concealed their real meaning and their real fears. The idea was, they said, that if there was another Persian invasion, the Persians would have no strong base from which to operate, such as they had in Thebes, and that the Peloponnese was capable of serving the needs of everyone, both as a place of refuge and as a place from which to attack.[59]

The Athenians, under the direction of Themistocles, procrastinated in replying to the Spartan suggestion, until the wall had reached sufficient height.[60]

These walls were to have a catalytic impact on the relations between Athens and Sparta in general and the conduct of the Peloponnesian War in particular, by neutralizing the advantage that the Spartans derived from their highly trained land forces. As Josiah Ober has correctly observed: "Pericles' strategy radically altered the use of force in Greek international relations. The physical obstacle represented by stone and brick fortifications effectively stymied the deployment of military force by human agents who lacked the technological means to overcome the obstacle."[61] Essentially, these walls made Athens an island, which was indeed what Pericles himself suggested:

> Suppose we were an island, would we not be absolutely secure from attack? As it is we must try to think of ourselves as islanders.[62]

This brings us to the second competitive advantage of Athens that the Periclean grand strategy put in good use, namely the navy.[63] In essence, Pericles suggested that, instead of fighting a pitched battle with the Spartan infantry, the Athenians should use their navy for making commando raids on enemy territory. Thus, they would make the war costlier for the Spartans without suffering serious casualties themselves. We have already seen Pericles (and Archidamus) stressing the importance of the Athenian navy in the forthcoming war. At a later instance, Pericles gave his fellow citizens a more general account of the essence of seapower, that has retained its validity throughout history:

> Now, what you think is that your empire consists simply of your allies: but I have something else to tell you. The world before our eyes can be divided to two parts, the land and the sea, each of which is valuable and useful to man. Of the

> whole of one of these parts you are in control -not only of the area at present in your power, but elsewhere too, if you want to go further. With your navy as it is today there is no power on earth -not the King of Persia nor any people under the sun- which can stop you from sailing where you wish.[64]

Interesting analogies may be drawn with later eras. For instance, one may easily argue that the maritime strategy of Athens is a direct predecessor of the similar strategy that was to offer so many benefits to Great Britain.[65] Paul Kennedy has given the following definition of naval mastery:

> a situation in which a country has so developed its maritime strength that it is superior to any rival power, and that its predominance is or could be exerted far outside its home waters, with the result that it is extremely difficult for other, lesser states to undertake maritime operations or trade without at least its tacit consent.[66]

Great Britain enjoyed such a happy situation from the end of the seventeenth century until the end of World War I. Athens was certainly in such a situation from the end of the Persian Wars until the destruction of its fleet at Aegospotami in 405 B.C. The only problem with the Athenian maritime strategy was that the financial costs were appreciable.[67] This was the necessary result of relying on a form of warfare (naval) that made greater demands on resources compared to the traditional one (land). Still, Athens showed that it could well sustain the relevant cost.

3.3. Deter the Enemy by Denial of his Success and by the Skillful Use of Retaliation

The third principle of the Periclean grand strategy envisaged the use of what in modern terminology has been called "deterrence". Athenian deterrence had two dimensions. The first was what would nowadays be called "deterrence by denial". The formidable walls of Athens plus the easy supply of the city by sea ensured that Athens would not be conquered, no matter how powerful Sparta and its allies were on land. In the meantime the Athenians would avoid decisive battle with the enemy, irrespective of how much damage it might cause by its invasion of Attica -what was later called "Fabian strategy".[68] Pericles argued that it would be suicidal for the Athenians to leave their walls and offer battle on land against the invading Peloponnesians. To start with, the

Spartans and their allies were more numerous.[69] In addition, the Spartan infantry was a highly trained force, by far the best in Greece. Simply put, the Peloponnesians were invincible (or, as Sphacteria revealed, near-invincible) on land, a point that Pericles repeatedly emphasized.[70] Even if by a miracle the Athenians managed to win a land battle, the war would still not be over; the following year would once again feature a Peloponnesian invasion. If, on the other hand, the land battle had the most likely outcome, that is, an Athenian defeat, Athens would lose both the war and the empire at a stroke, since it would be unable to retain control of its allies. In Pericles' words:

> We must abandon our land and our houses, and safeguard the sea and the city. We must not, through anger at losing land and homes, join battle with the greatly superior forces of the Peloponnesians. If we won a victory, we should still have to fight them again in just the same numbers, and if we suffered a defeat, we should at the same time lose our allies, on whom our strength depends, since they will immediately revolt if we are left with insufficient troops to send against them. What we should lament is not the loss of houses or of land, but the loss of men's lives. Men come first; the rest is the fruit of their labour.[71]

In Pericles' strategy, the distinction between denial and defense was a clear-cut one. Defense is directed against the enemy's hostile actions. Pericles objected to it and suggested a strategy addressing Sparta's aims -its motivation in undertaking offensive action. Defense seeks to prevent harm to one's self; denial seeks to prevent enemy gains. While these two strategies are frequently similar, they are not synonymous.[72]

Pericles' rationale may look sound nowadays, but one has to understand that it ran counter to the prevailing Greek ethos from Homer onwards, namely the glory of war.[73] To suggest that nothing should be done, as the Spartans were destroying the land outside the city walls, leaves one open to accusations of cowardice. Of course this accusation was far more potent in Ancient Greece than in our era. In this respect, the post-heroic strategy suggested by Pericles was an extremely difficult one. However, Pericles stuck to his strategy, for he sincerely believed that it was the only one that could bring victory - to avoid the critical battle and let time work to the detriment of the adversary. In the meantime, the Athenian navy would keep the Empire together, thus enabling Athens to continue the war indefinitely, precisely as Pericles (and Archidamus) envisaged, in contrast to those in Sparta who were thinking in terms of a short war.[74]

There is an interesting psychological aspect in the deterrence by denial as encountered in Periclean grand strategy. Since the avoidance of battle implicitly consented to the destruction of the Attic mainland, it constitutes an interesting variation of the "scorched earth policy" that is generally construed as an indication of determination to continue the struggle without sparing any sacrifices.[75]

The second dimension of Athenian deterrence, namely "deterrence by retaliation", is a more familiar one. As Pericles had made clear, any Peloponnesian invasion of Attica would provoke reprisal raids on the Peloponnesian coast by the Athenian navy. This was of particular importance to the credibility of the Athenian deterrence, since it carried the threat of imposing potentially substantial costs on Sparta and its allies. Such a threat was lacking in the case of pure defense behind the walls, although the walls were impregnable, such a defense implied no costs for the invading Peloponnesians. This is precisely what Liddell Hart had in mind when he rejected static defense as a military strategy for conservative states and instead stated that economy of force and deterrent effect are best combined in the defensive-offensive method, based on high mobility that carries the power of quick riposte.[76]

As to the retaliatory dimension of Athenian deterrence, it is interesting that retaliation was of moderate proportions at the beginning of the war. Indeed, the level of retaliation has led to accusations of feebleness and lack of strategic purpose that persist to this day. Actually, retaliation was progressively escalating. Thus, in the second year of the war, Pericles, in what was an important organizational innovation, transferred about 300 cavalry to Peloponnese by sea on special horse-transports. "These horsemen had virtually free rein for the Spartans possessed no mounted force to impede them."[77] This escalation increased the danger for Sparta's social order, since it encouraged a revolt of the restless slave population. If Sparta did not comply with the Athenian wishes and keep on with the war, retaliation was bound to escalate to a further point.

In this respect, the capture and fortification of Pylos and subsequent Spartan defeat at Sphacteria in 425 B.C., far from constituting deviations from the Periclean grand strategy,[78] were in fact its logical corollary. The progressive escalation threw the Spartans

out of balance and induced them to commit the blunder of sending a force to the small island of Sphacteria. This presented the Athenians with a golden opportunity that they were quick to exploit by blockading and then capturing the Spartan force. As Pericles himself had stated: "In war opportunity waits for no man".[79]

One might ask why retaliation would ever compel Sparta to yield when the city had not been deterred by the threat of retaliation in the first place. Pericles, however, was determined to demonstrate to the Spartans that the marginal benefits of their aggression were bound to decline over time, whereas the marginal costs of retaliation were bound to increase over time. This is precisely what Pylos and Sphacteria made evident; Sparta could not defeat Athens, while suffering mounting costs in the war. As a result, the Spartans sued for peace -a clear victory for the Periclean strategy.[80]

3.4. Erode the International Power Base of the Enemy

Another principle of the Periclean grand strategy was the erosion of the international power base of the enemy. This was principally achieved through the use of economic warfare and intimidation. Regarding economic warfare, the Athenian navy, apart from raiding the coast of Peloponnese, hampered the trading activities of the Peloponnesians. This was particularly damaging for such states as Corinth and Megara, which depended considerably on maritime trade.[81] Thus, the Peloponnesians were forced to cope with the means provided by the agricultural sector of their economies, in other words with financial means inferior to those possessed by Athens.[82] Furthermore, the international power base of Sparta was weakened by intimidating both its actual and potential allies. Among the various instances of this policy, the most famous one occurred after Pericles' death, namely the Melian Dialogue. Even neutrals that were leaning towards Sparta had to be intimidated in disproportion to what they were doing.[83]

3.5. Shape the Domestic Environment of the Adversary to Your Own Benefit

Finally, another principle of the Periclean grand strategy was that Athens should try to shape the domestic environment of Sparta in a way compatible with the Athenian interests. For this to happen, Athens needed to address the enemy psychologically. Pericles intended to convince the Spartans that war against Athens was futile; even though they might ravage Attica at will, it would become evident to them that they could not force a decision, while in the meantime the Peloponnesian coasts would lie at the mercy of the Athenian navy.[84] This situation would eventually bring about a shift in the domestic balance of power in Sparta; moderate leaders would emerge, who would understand that the war did not make any sense, and they would sue for peace. This was actually how the two opponents reached peace after the tenth year of the war, when king Pleistoanax, a supporter of peace, became the principal figure in Sparta.[85] In terms of modern strategic theory, this attempt of Pericles to influence the domestic balance of power in Sparta by the controlled use of Athenian offensive forces constitutes an example of environment-shaping strategy. Such a strategy enables a state to cope with the reality that its decisions affect the environment. Environmental shaping entails using power to help create security conditions such that render fighting in order to protect one's interests unnecessary.[86]

These were the principles that governed the policy mix of the various means (military, economic, diplomatic, technological and psychological) employed by the Periclean grand strategy in order to attain Athens' political objectives. Thus, a pretty clear outline of the Periclean grand strategy emerges. Aiming at the maintenance of the *status quo*, Periclean grand strategy attempted to dissuade the opponent through a strategy of exhaustion. In military terms, this grand strategy rested upon the deterrent effect that powerful fortifications and naval commando raids would have on the enemy (see Table 2). It now remains to deal with the important dimension of legitimacy, both domestic and international.

Table 2: The Grand Strategies of Athens and Sparta

	ATHENS	SPARTA
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES	Limited aims Maintenance of the *status quo* Preservation of the Athenian Empire	Unlimited aims Change of the *status quo* Dissolution of the Athenian Empire
GRAND STRATEGY	Dissuasion by exhaustion	Persuasion by threatened or actual military annihilation
MILITARY STRATEGY	Deterrence by denial and retaliation	Offense, decisive land battle

4. The Issue of Legitimacy

It is important that the grand strategy of a state must be viewed as legitimate, especially domestically, but also internationally. The American experience in Vietnam should suffice to prove this point; the loss of domestic legitimacy exercised a crippling effect on American grand strategy. How, then, did Pericles cope with the problem of ensuring domestic legitimacy for his grand strategy?

4.1. Domestic Legitimacy

The Periclean grand strategy was inherently unpopular. The fact that Pericles actually managed to persuade the Athenian public to stick to an unpopular policy speaks volumes of his talent as a statesman. It is precisely for this reason that Hans Delbrück has called Pericles one of the greatest statesmen and military leaders in history.[87] Still, even Pericles himself did not find it easy. The Athenians, who had felt that moving behind the walls and thus abandoning their property to the mercy of the enemy was difficult enough, were shattered to see this property being destroyed in front of their eyes:

> Their land was being laid waste in front of their very eyes - a thing that the young men had never seen happen and that the old men had seen only at the time of the Persian invasion. Naturally enough, therefore, they felt outraged by this and wanted, especially the young, to march out and stop it.[88]

Pericles became a convenient scapegoat and a fine was imposed on him -a charasteristic example of the erratic decision-making of the Athenian polity.[89] Nevertheless, the Athenians remained true to the strategy devised by Pericles and did not seriously depart from it until long after his death.[90] Therefore, to put the matter differently, domestic legitimacy is a *conditio sine qua non* for the success of a grand strategy. All strategies, all strategic designs will collapse unless there is domestic legitimacy, and this is particularly true for democracies. In this respect, Pericles' Epitaph, his speech in memoriam of those that fell dead during the first year of the war, deserves special attention. This speech is a tribute to the "Athenian way of life", aiming to persuade the Athenians to rally round the war effort of their city.[91]

The question of domestic legitimacy also included another dimension in the Athenian grand strategy. This was the effort to undermine the domestic power base of Sparta by attempts to foment a revolt of the helots, the indigenous population that the Spartans had enslaved when they first arrived at the Southern Peloponnese. The raids of the Athenian navy were providing the helots with excellent opportunities to wreak havoc on their Spartan masters and the possibility of achieving liberation.[92]

4.2. International Legitimacy

International legitimacy can also be helpful. To be sure, under conditions of international anarchy; i.e., in the absence of a supreme authority that will regulate the interstate antagonism, relations between states are fundamentally conflictual.[93] Consequently, one cannot expect much good will from the international environment. Nevertheless, if the grand strategy of a state is regarded internationally as legitimate, this might at least spare that state some potential enemies and thus enable it to economize on its resources.

Unfortunately for Periclean Athens, things were not promising in this respect. What had begun as the Athenian Alliance, directed against the Persian threat, had turned into the Athenian Empire which, as demonstrated earlier, served primarily as a source of revenue for Athens. All legitimacy had evaporated, and the coercive power of the Athenian navy was the sole factor responsible for holding the alliance together. The Athenians were fully cognizant of this fact. Athenian ambassadors that had visited Sparta shortly before the outbreak of the war had no trouble acknowledging that the Athenians faced "immoderate hostility from the Hellenes -especially so far as our empire is concerned."[94] Pericles himself went as far as calling the Athenian Empire a tyranny, yet a tyranny that it would be unsafe to abandon:

> You cannot continue to enjoy the privileges unless you also shoulder the burdens of empire. And do not imagine that what we are fighting for is simply the question of freedom or slavery: there is also involved the loss of our empire and the dangers arising from the hatred which we have incurred in administering it. Nor is it any longer possible for you to give up this empire. [...] Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.[95]

What was a weakness for Athens, constituted a strength for Sparta. The Spartans presented themselves as the liberators of the Greeks from Athenian oppression, thus gaining considerable support. According to Thucydides:

> People's feelings were generally very much on the side of the Spartans, especially as they proclaimed that their aim was the liberation of Hellas. States and individuals alike were enthusiastic to support them in every possible way, both in speech and in action.[96]

This point concludes the examination of the Periclean grand strategy. A more or less complete idea of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each side (see Table 3), as well as the way in which Athens tried to exploit its strengths and minimize the impact of its weaknesses, has been gained. Let us now make an attempt to evaluate the Periclean grand strategy.

Table 3: Athens and Sparta: Relative Strengths And Weaknesses

ATHENIAN STRENGTHS	**SPARTAN STRENGTHS**
Naval Mastery	Powerful Land Forces
Economic Strength	International Legitimacy
Overseas Empire	Low-Cost Strategy
Impregnable Fortifications	
ATHENIAN WEAKNESSES	**SPARTAN WEAKNESSES**
Weak Land Forces	Weak Naval Forces
Lack of International Legitimacy	Limited Financial Resources
High-Cost Strategy	Danger of Internal Revolt
Erratic Decision-making	Difficulty for Long and Distant Campaigns

III. Evaluation of Periclean Grand Strategy

Grand strategy, the theory of a state about how to produce its own security, is tested against political outcomes (viz. survival and well-being of the state). It is well-known that Athens lost the Peloponnesian War. How should we then rate the Periclean grand strategy outlined above? Was it a failure? The literature is divided. We have already cited Delbrück's statement about Pericles' being one of the greatest generals in history. On the other hand, some analysts have called the Periclean strategy "a form of wishful thinking that failed"[97] and have stated that "as a strategist he [Pericles] was a failure, and deserves a share of the blame for Athens' great defeat".[98] Clearly, a more detailed evaluation of the Periclean grand strategy needs to be made.

1. Evaluating Grand Strategies: Four Criteria

There are four criteria that are used for evaluating grand strategies.[99]

The first is the external fit criterion, namely the degree to which a grand strategy fits in with the international environment.

The second criterion is the relation between means and ends. This has to do with the traditional problem of how to avoid overextension, viz. pursue aims beyond one's capabilities, while at the same time finding the best use of the available means -as we have seen above, this is a very important criterion of grand strategy.

The third criterion is the criterion of efficiency. This brings us to the issue of cost-benefit assessment. Each of the different alternatives of strategic depth to victory.

The fourth and most difficult criterion is internal coherence, namely that one pillar or one means of the grand strategy does not hamper the function of another.

2. Periclean Grand Strategy According to the Four Criteria

Undoubtedly the Periclean grand strategy did remarkably well according to these criteria. To start with, it fitted properly in with the international environment. The territorial and political *status quo* was perfectly satisfactory for Athens, while at the same time the Athenian power was continually growing. Consequently, Athens had no need for an offensive strategy; after all, it had already alienated many states and there was no reason to increase its considerable list of enemies.[100] If anything, with the Aegean Sea being solidly in Athenian hands, the targets of an offensive strategy could only be directed towards the mainland, and that meant dealing with the Spartan infantry. Rather than doing this, the Athenians chose a competitive strategy, a strategy where their strengths were applied over the enemy's weaknesses (viz. naval raids directed against the delicate Spartan domestic structure). Pericles explicitly analyzed the comparative strengths and weaknesses of either side (see Table 3) and prepared a strategy to exploit them in favor of Athens.

As to the relation between means and ends, the Periclean grand strategy scored well, too. Firstly, none of the available means was neglected; in other words, the strategy was total. It is striking that, although Athens was in the midst of a great war, the military element did not dominate its grand strategy. Apart from military strategy, the Athenian grand strategy featured economic strategy, diplomacy, psychological pressure, and domestic legitimacy. Second, overextension was carefully avoided; the resources of Athens were certainly considerable, but not unlimited. Pericles

correctly understood the link between economic resources and political ends in two ways: "First, not by downplaying but by accurately emphasizing the great expense at war; and second by implying that such expense was not unanticipated and that Athens had ample funds to meet it".[101]

Now, it is obvious that under the leadership of Alcibiades the Athenians abandoned the Periclean principle to balance means and ends in order to avoid overextension.[102] The outcome was the costly Sicilian expedition, that aimed at extending Athenian control to the remote and populous lands of Sicily (and even beyond), and ended in an unmitigated disaster for Athens.[103] This expedition changed the whole course of the war and, according to Thucydides, this great departure from the Periclean grand strategy was the very reason for the Athenian defeat.[104]

Regarding the criterion of efficiency, one can see that the Periclean strategy once again performed well. Without suffering undue casualties, the Athenians were able to beat off the challenge of the Peloponnesians (as well as some of their own allies) and retain their empire in Greece, at least until the disaster in Sicily. The destruction of Attica was a mere trifle in comparison. Only in financial terms were the costs appreciable. However, this was part and parcel with the capital-intensive maritime strategy that Athens had been following since the days of Themistocles, in contrast to the labor-intensive continental strategy of Sparta. Moreover, Athenian resources were equal to the task of sustaining the war effort.

Finally, the Periclean grand strategy had no difficulty at all to meet the criterion of internal coherence. All the components of this grand strategy reinforced each other and none of them hampered the influence of the other. For instance, the military dimension (naval commando raids) was never allowed to interfere with the diplomatic one (tacit bargaining with the enemy).

A grand strategy that scores so well according to these criteria can be expected to score well when put to test, as in the case of the Periclean grand strategy. All the components of this grand strategy created a grand total which was victory through exhaustion of the enemy. After ten years of war, the Spartans admitted they had had enough, and abandoned their bid for victory. In fact, Athens could have achieved even more. According to Arther Ferrill:

> In the first six years of the war (431-426) Periclean strategy had worked to Athens' advantage. To be sure, Platea had fallen to Thebes and Sparta, and Attica had been at the mercy of the Spartan army, while the plague took a heavy toll; but around Corcyra and the Corinthian Gulf Athens had held its own and inflicted losses on the Peloponnesians. [...] Athens remained strong, and the Spartans seemed unable to use their land power effectively against the naval giant.[105]

Then, in 425 B.C. there came the astonishing Athenian success in Sphacteria. Had the Athenians been more astute in exploiting it, they would have emerged victorious. "In the first six years Periclean strategy had very nearly worked, but the Athenians refused to negotiate."[106] Still, even the Peace of Nikias in 421 B.C. can be regarded as favorable to Athens.[107] Athens retained its profitable empire and discouraged further adventures on behalf of the Spartans, until Alcibiades hit upon the Sicilian expedition.

3. Critiques of Periclean Grand Strategy

Last, we must examine the specific criticisms directed against the Periclean grand strategy. The grand strategy of Pericles has been chiefly criticized on four accounts:[108] first, that by rejecting even minor concessions to the Peloponnesians, Periclean grand strategy brought about war; in other words, it was a high-cost strategy. Second, that the strategy was unforeseen by the enemy; hence it lacked credibility and, consequently, its deterrent value was low (i.e. it provoked war thus a high-cost strategy again). Third, it was too feeble to exploit any opportunities and increase the cost the enemy had to bear (misuse of available means). In the end, the strategy depended on Pericles for its execution and thus was bound to be abandoned after his death (in fact, this criticism does not question the soundness of the strategy itself). Let us deal with each of these criticisms in turn.

As far as the first criticism is concerned, namely that Pericles' rejection of appeasement (viz. refusal to revoke the Megarian Decree) brought about the Peloponnesian war,[109] it should be noted that it is unjustified to put all blame on Pericles. The international situation at the time was very tense, and no one can say with confidence that the war could have been avoided, one way or another. David Baldwin presents a more balanced view:

> Although Pericles' action failed to deter war, the probability of war was fairly great to begin with; and perhaps nothing he could have done would have avoided it. Given the tense and complex situation, the imposition of economic sanctions may well have been the policy option with the highest probability of success -even though it was very low. Taking into consideration the difficulty of the task, the policy alternatives available, and the complexity of the situation, it seems as plausible to say that the Peloponnesian War occurred despite Pericles' prudent -perhaps even ingenious- attempt to head it off via the Megarian Decree as it does to say that the decree "precipitated" the war.[110]

In addition, the Spartan refusal to give the *quid pro quo* asked by Pericles is an indication that Pericles' assessment of the true nature of the Spartan request may have been correct. It seems that Sparta had unlimited objectives, and was essentially impossible to appease; had the Athenians backed down in the face of the Spartan demand, they would probably had faced more pressure from Sparta in the future.

With regard to the second criticism, namely that the Periclean grand strategy was unforeseen by the enemy and thus could not deter him, we have seen that the avoidance of battle, a core principle of the Periclean strategy, was in sharp contrast to the prevailing Greek ethos of the era. Donald Kagan has made much of the contrast between the prescriptions of Periclean strategy on the one hand and the Greek culture on the other, arguing that this contrast made it unlikely in the eyes of the enemy that the Athenians would actually follow such a strategy. Consequently, this strategy, though reasonable, lacked credibility as a deterrent.[111]

Nevertheless, Kagan has overstated his case. To start with, Archidamus had thought it improbable that the Athenians would become "slaves of their own land";[112] Spartan policy makers, therefore, had no difficulty in anticipating that the Athenians would avoid battle. In addition, there had been an even more striking instance in the past where the Athenians had behaved similarly: in 480 B.C., during the Persian invasion, not only did the Athenians avoid battle with the Persians, but in fact they abandoned their very city and continued the war with their navy. It is true that the Periclean grand strategy was a difficult one both to imagine and to implement. However, this is a long way from

saying that it was completely unanticipated by the enemy and therefore of limited deterrent value. Furthermore, the strategy of avoiding battle in Attica was never seriously questioned, even after the death of Pericles. Clearly, it had been endorsed by the Athenians, precisely as Archidamus had predicted.

In order to counter the third criticism, namely that the Periclean grand strategy was too feeble to exploit any opportunities and increase the cost the enemy had to bear,[113] one needs to elaborate upon the deterrent dimension of the Periclean grand strategy, which, for all its importance, has often been improperly understood. Deterrence is a form of coercion that attempts to influence the enemy's behavior in a manner conducive to the interests of the coercer.[114] Coercion involves affecting the relative attractiveness of the various courses of action open to an opponent. This is precisely what the Athenians under Pericles did: they manipulated the threat of negative sanctions (retaliation) that Athens could impose on Sparta. The threat of retaliation is the threat to inflict pain unrelated to the non-desirable activity of the opponent, until the opponent complies.[115] Recall Pericles:

> If they invade our country by land, we will invade theirs by sea, and it will turn out that the destruction of a part of the Peloponnese will be worse for them than the destruction of the whole of Attica would be for us.[116]

Pericles' strategy threatened Sparta with the certain prospect of *higher pain* in the event of Spartan invasion. The administration of this pain, however, was not a "once-and-for-all action"; instead, it was part of an ongoing bargaining process.

This explains Athenian moderation in inflicting damage during the first year of the war and its escalation thereafter.[117] In modern strategic jargon, Pericles was using a strategy of graduated escalation in administering pain as a bargaining tool.[118]

Obviously, badly designed, impulsive retaliation (e.g. massive raids and immediate occupation of outposts, as various critics of Pericles have suggested) might have had the exact reverse impact: removing the Spartan leadership from a cool and rational calculation of marginal costs and benefits to an impulsive conduct permeated by revanchism. As an author otherwise critical of Pericles admits:

> The offensive actions were deliberately unimpressive, for they were intended only as evidence that an extended war would be damaging to the Peloponnesians. To engage in

> offensive actions which were more vigorous would, in fact, conflict with the plan. Offensive actions, while unable to bring about victory, might enrage the enemy.[119]

As to the fourth criticism, namely that the Periclean grand strategy depended solely on Pericles for its execution,[120] one must recall that Athenian reliance on fortifications and naval power existed long before Pericles.[121] It was Themistocles who started it all. In formulating his grand strategy, Pericles built upon past experience and took into account the geopolitical realities [structural imperatives]. Consequently, it is wrong to attribute this particular element of Athenian strategy solely to his influence and thus reach the conclusion that with Pericles gone this strategy would necessarily be abandoned. In contemporary parlance, Athens' maritime strategy was a core strategy, viz. a state strategy consisting of all elements of policy that remain constant regardless of the international environment in which the state finds itself.[122]

All in all, the Periclean grand strategy cannot be blamed for the outbreak of the war; it was not at all unforeseen, and consequently constituted a sound deterrence strategy; it presented the enemy with escalating retaliation as a part of a bargaining process, and therefore it was neither feeble nor lacking in purpose; finally, to a large extent it reflected structural imperatives that were present with or without Pericles.

4. Why Athens lost

In evaluating the Periclean grand strategy, it might not be superfluous to quote the opinion of Thucydides, who must have certainly been in a position to judge accurately. Thucydides asserted that Athens lost the war because it abandoned the strategy devised by Pericles. He went on to say that had Athens kept following that strategy, it could have beaten the Peloponnesians.

> Pericles had said that Athens would be victorious if she bided her time and took care of her navy, if she avoided trying to add to the empire during the course of the war, and if she did nothing to risk the safety of the city itself. But his successors did the exact opposite. [...] So overwhelmingly great were the resources which Pericles had in mind at the time when he prophesied an easy victory for Athens over the Peloponnesians alone.[123]

Colin Gray has summarized the anatomy of the Athenian failure in the Peloponnesian War as follows:

> For Sparta to succeed, Athens had to be weakened by plague, had to suffer irreparable losses in men and prestige in the expedition to Sicily (415-413 B.C.) and, having effected a partial recovery from these calamities, then had to commit major errors in lack of vigilance in the naval campaign for control of the Dardanelles. No less important, massive financial subsidies from Persia were required for Sparta to acquire the naval power that it needed.[124]

Persia, of course, did not dare to subsidize the Spartan naval buildup against Athens before the Athenians ruined themselves through overextension in Sicily.

It is therefore clear that the Athenians lost the war only when they dramatically reversed the Periclean grand strategy that explicitly disdained further conquests. Pericles had not only outlined a theory of victory to his fellow citizens, but had also laid down to them the conditions under which his grand strategy was not expected to work:

> I could give you many other reasons why you should feel confident in ultimate victory, if only you will make up your minds not to add to the empire while the war is in progress, and not to go out of your way to involve yourselves in new perils. What I fear is not the enemy's strategy, but our own mistakes.[125]

The fact that the Athenians chose to bring about these very conditions is definitely not Pericles' fault.

We have seen that in Thucydides' opinion the Periclean grand strategy would have brought victory to Athens if meticulously followed. This is an important tribute to the author of this strategy, Pericles, who not only devised it, but made sure that it was followed, if less than wholeheartedly, by the Athenian public. Hans Delbrück has stated that Pericles deserves a position "not simply among the great statesmen, but also among the great military leaders of world history";[126] this article is in complete agreement with this view.

Epilogue

This essay set out to highlight Thucydides' contribution to the study of strategy. The case study it employed was the grand strategy of exhaustion that Athens implemented under the

direction of Pericles in the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. From this analysis, Thucydides' text emerged as a classic. To start with, it contains the first detailed presentation of a theory of grand strategy.[127] Furthermore, it illustrates graphically how grand strategies are formulated and put to the test. In addition, a great number of central concepts of modern strategic theory have been superbly analyzed in Thucydides' text. To a great extent, contemporary analysts have made no significant contribution to Thucydides' treatment of these concepts. To paraphrase Gilpin, it is doubtful whether modern strategists know anything about strategy that was unknown to Thucydides. True, technology has been profoundly transformed since Thucydides' time. Still, "there is a certain logic of hostility, a dilemma about security that goes with interstate politics in a self-help system. Alliances, balances of power, and choices in policy between war and appeasement have remained similar over the millenia."[128] Thucydides was as well cognizant of this logic as any modern analyst.

However, Thucydides has been comparatively neglected as a strategist. In all probability, this is due to his tremendous success as a historian and international relations analyst. Still, this is unfair. To be sure, perceptive scholars and policy-makers have long ago appreciated Thucydides' qualities as a strategist and his continued relevance to the field.[129] Thankfully, this appreciation is growing, but there is still a lot to be done.

This paper has illustrated that the strategy of exhaustion played a prominent part in Thucydides' analysis. Prior to finishing, a few remarks about this strategy should be made. To start with, this strategy has a glorious past: it can plausibly be argued that the Periclean grand strategy of exhaustion contained the seeds of what was later called "the British way of warfare", which was said to entail the blockade of continental ports, distant maritime operations directed against the colonies and the overseas trade of the rival continental powers, subsidies to allies, symbolic ground forces commitment to the continent, and peripheral raiding around the continental littoral to exploit the flexibility of seapower for surprise maneuver.[130]

Yet, the strategy of exhaustion has been relatively neglected in the last two centuries. The strategy that dominated western strategic thinking from the end of the Napoleonic Wars till the end of the Second World War was the strategy of annihilation, viz. the pursuit of victory through decisive battle. The advent of the

nuclear weapons, however, made the strategy of annihilation increasingly unattractive. Since 1945, although the employment of war as an instrument of policy has not dissapeared, it has been greatly restricted, especially among nuclear powers. In other words, it was no longer possible to regard a nuclear war as a means to achieve political aims,[131] since neither side could avoid devastation. With the current state of technology, this is, to some extent, also true for a protracted conventional war.[132] However, the pursuit of victory was not abandoned. Instead, it led to the rediscovery of the strategy of exhaustion. The American grand strategy *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union during the Cold War constituted a typical example of such a strategy. In fact, there are quite a few similarities between the grand strategy of exhaustion that Pericles suggested to the Athenians in order to deal with the Spartans, and the conduct of the United States of America toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In fact, it was through the successful application of the strategy of exhaustion that the United States managed to win the Cold War.

The Cold War is not the only contemporary instance of employment of the strategy of exhaustion. A cursory examination of the strategy followed by the US and its NATO allies in Bosnia will suffice to prove this point; economic warfare, diplomatic isolation, and other means of grand strategy were used in order to bring about the exhaustion of the adversary.[133]

In the coming decades, the employment of the strategy of exhaustion is bound to become more popular. In fact, as the cost of the application of military force increases, and the sensitivity of Western societies to casualties grows, the pursuit of victory is possible mainly through the strategy of exhaustion. Technological trends (viz. "the revolution in military technology") based on the ability to collect, transmit, and intercept information, as well as deliver firepower against any target anywhere, facilitate the military dimension of this strategy, in the same way as the technological developments in Ancient Greece (viz. the triremes) made naval raids an important pillar of the Periclean grand strategy. This post-Clausewitzian, post-heroic warfare, has its origins in the Periclean grand strategy.[134]

NOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented in a conference on "War in a Changing World" organized by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 5-7 November 1996. I would like to thank Constantinos Koliopoulos for his most helpful comments and criticism.

2. Michael Handel, **Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought,** London: Frank Cass, 1992, p. 1.

3. Robert Gilpin, **War and Change in World Politics**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 227.

4. Hans Delbrück, **History of the Art of War** (4 Vols.), Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975-1985. See also Gordon A. Craig, "Delbrück: The Military Historian", pp. 326-353 in Peter Paret (ed.), **Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age**, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986.

5. See Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz", pp. 27-44 in Carl von Clausewitz, **On War** [edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret], Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.

6. On the evolution of the terms "strategy" and "grand strategy"cf. Antoine Henry de Jomini, **The Art of War**, quoted in Gerard Chaliand (ed.), **The Art of War in World History**, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994, pp. 738; Basil Liddell Hart, **Strategy**, 2nd rev. ed., London: Meridian, 1991, pp. 321-322; André Beaufre, **Introduction to Strategy**, London: Faber and Faber, 1965; Edward Luttwak, **Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace**, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987; Haralambos Papasotiriou, **Byzantine Grand Strategy**, Ph.D. Diss., Stanford University, 1991, pp. 1-39. For an interesting discussion of the various levels of strategy in the context of strategic surprise see Constantinos Koliopoulos, **Understanding Strategic Surprise: An Inquiry into the Phenomenon of Strategic Surprise**, Ph.D Thesis, Lancaster University, 1996, pp. 9, 83-85.

7. Among others, J.F.C. Fuller has stated that "Pericles relied upon the strategy of exhaustion"; **A Military History of the Western World, Vol. 1: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto**, New York: Da Capo Press, 1954, p. 57. As it will be seen at a later point of this essay, the Athenians were eventually to

depart from the strategy devised by Pericles. For an analysis of the various strategies that the city of Athens adopted during the Peloponnesian War see Donald Kagan, "Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War", pp. 24-55 in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds.), **The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

8. Strategy implies an opponent, a conflict, a competition, a situation where somebody is trying to achieve a goal against somebody else.

9.This section draws heavily on Barry Posen, **The Sources of Military Doctrine**, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 13.

10. Basil Liddell Hart, **Strategy**, p. 322.

11. Luttwak, **Strategy**, pp. 4-5.

12. See, among others, Paul Kennedy, "Grand Strategies in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition", pp. 1-7 in Paul Kennedy (ed.), **Grand Strategies in War and Peace**, New York: Yale University Press, 1991; Papasotiriou, **Byzantine Grand Strategy**.

13. In fact, the term "city-state system" is not totally accurate, since both city-states and bigger entities, such as the various kingdoms in Epirus and Macedonia comprised ancient Greece. For an analysis of the politics in the Greek city-state system see Raphael Sealey, **A History of the Greek City States**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

14. See, for example, Peter J. Fliess, **Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity**, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966.

15. One might be tempted to find other additional poles of the system, such as the powerful Odrysian state, situated in Thrace and described with admiration by Thucydides. See Thucydides, **History of the Peloponnesian War**, [transl. by Rex Warner], London: Penguin, 1972, B 95-101.

16. W.R. Connor, "Polarization in Thucydides", in Richard Ned Lebow and Barry Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry from Thucydides to the Nuclear Age**, Boulder: Westview, 1991, pp. 54-57.

17. See the discussion in Carlo M. Santoro, "Bipolarity and War: What Makes the Difference?" in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry from Thucydides to the Nuclear Age**, pp. 71-86. Thucydides' narrative suggests several historical parallels to the current reader. On the utility and pitfalls of historical comparisons see Ernest R. May, **The Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy**, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973; Richard E. Meastand and Ernest R. May, **Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers**, New York: Free Press, 1986. See also Michael Howard, **The Lessons of History**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, pp. 6-20.

18. Thucydides, **History**, A 23.

19. Thucydides, **History**, A 89-117.

20. This is a very interesting illustration of what today is called "security dilemma", namely the situation that arises when the measures that increase the security of a state decrease the security of others. Thus, the Persian threat prompted the Athenians to establish their empire ("fear of Persia was our chief motive"; Thucydides, **History**, A 75). The empire provided security to Athens, but soon proved to be a threat to Sparta and its allies. For an analysis of the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma", **World Politics**, 30, January 1978, pp. 167-214. For the Athenian Empire see Russell Meiggs, **The Athenian Empire**, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, pp. 23-151.

21. Thucydides, **History**, A 99. Similarly, Pericles stated that the strength of Athens was derived by allied payments; Thucydides, **History**, B 13. The British East India Company used a similar scheme: the Company forced the native Indian states to contribute money which it then used to raise sepoy troops, thus perpetuating both the financial drain of its opponents and its military supremacy in the Indian subcontinent; see Bruce P. Lenman, "The Transition to European Military Ascendancy in India, 1600-1800," pp. 100-130 in John A. Lynn (ed.), **Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas and Institutions of Warfare**, 1445-1871, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990.

22. For the dynamics behind the growth of Athenian power see Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", in R.I. Rotberg and T.K. Rabb (eds.) **The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars,** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 21-23, and Michael Doyle, **Empires**, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986. Michael Doyle states that "slave agriculture, imperial tribute and imperial mine produced monetary supremacy, which again produced commercial superiority, which in turn, through a stimulation of shipping, produced naval superiority, which in turn sustained the empire. And the empire generated the slaves, the tribute and the mines"; **Empires**, p. 63. This passage shows remarkably well the dynamic inherent in the elements of Athenian power. Still, one must point out that it overvalues the role of slave agriculture as a source of Athenian power. Furthermore, naval superiority was the generator rather than the outcome of the acquisition of the Empire and its concomitant wealth. See table below:



23. Thucydides describes Pericles' account as follows: "Apart from all other sources of revenue, the average yearly contribution from the allies to Athens amounted to 600 talents, then there still remained in the Acropolis a sum of 6000 talents of coined silver. This reserve fund, at its maximum, had been 9700 talents. It had been drawn on to pay for the Propylea and other public buildings, and for Potidea. In addition to this, there was the uncoined gold and silver in offerings made either by individuals or by the state; there were the sacred vessels and furniture used in the processions and in the games; there were the spoils taken from the Persians, and other resources of one kind or another, all of which would amount to no less than 500 talents. To this he [Pericles] added the money in the other temples which might be used and which came to a considerable sum, and said that, if they were ever really reduced to absolute extremities, they could even use the gold on the statue of Athene herself. There was, he informed them, a weight of forty talents of pure gold on this statue, all of which

was removable. [...] Thus he reassured them about their financial position"; Thucydides, **History**, B 13.

24. This truth is captured by Archidamus' statement that "war is not so much a matter of armaments as of the money which makes armaments effective"; Thucydides, **History**, A 83.

25. Donald Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War,** Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, pp. 345-374. For an excellent response see G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War**, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. Richard Ned Lebow has taken the intermediate position between Kagan and his critics, arguing that "Athens had increased its power under Pericles and had largely recovered from the disasters of the 440s, but in 433 its power and reputation were still not what they had been in 450"; Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides, Power Transition Theory and the Causes of War" in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, pp. 158-159.

26. Economic performance that determines a state's power and military success is always to be measured on a relative and not on an absolute basis. The crucial factor that seems to elude Kagan and his followers, is to be doing better, even if only a little better, than one's rivals. Over the long run, this asymetry will be reflected in the balance of power. This insight is utilized, among others, by Paul Kennedy in his classic volume **The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000**, New York: Random House, 1987.

27. See, among others, Lisa Kallet-Marx, **Money, Expense and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1-5.24**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

28. See, among others, Robert Gilpin, **The Political Economy of International Relations**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987; Edward Mead Earle, "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power", pp. 217-261 in Peter Paret (ed.), **Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age**, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986; Alfred Thayer Mahan, **The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783**, London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1892; *idem.*, **The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812**, (2 Vols.), London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1893; E. H. Carr, **The 20 Years' Crisis, 1919-1939** (2nd edn., 1946), London: Papermac, 1995 (reprint); Robert G.

Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), **Neorealism and its Critics**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 308-313. In view of this huge amount of perceptive Realist analysis of the importance of economic factors, dating back since the days of Thucydides, it is amazing that Political Realism has been accused of having ignored the economic dimensions of international relations. See Gilpin, **The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism**, pp. 308-313.

29. Thucydides, **History**, A 141-143.

30. Thucydides, **History**, A 144.

31. Thucydides, **History**, A 80-81.

32. Jingoism was the sentiment of vulgar chauvinism that appeared in turn-of-the-century Great Britain in response to the German challenge; see Paul Kennedy, **The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914**, London: Allen and Unwin, 1980.

33. Kagan, **Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War**, p. 30.

34. Thucydides, **History**, A 141-142, B 13. For an analysis of the law of uneven growth see Robert Gilpin, **War and Change in World Politics** and *idem.*, **The Theory of Hegemonic War**.

35. Thucydides, **History**, A 139.

36. Bernard Brodie, **War and Politics**, London: Cassell, 1973, p. 1.

37. According to Doyne Dawson: "The most original contribution of the Greeks to military thought was their self-conscious development of the concept of *raison d'État*: They perceived warfare as a rational and utilitarian instrument of politics... **The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World,** Boulder: Westview, 1996, p. 79.

Furthermore in Thucydides one can find the origins of "expected utility theory". See, for instance the following analysis: "That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to everyone that it would be tedious to develop it. No one is forced to engage it by ignorance, or kept out of it by fear, if he fancies there is anything to be gained by it. To the former the gain appears greater than the danger, while the latter would rather stand the risk than put up with an immediate sacrifice", Thucydides, **History** D 59.

38. See Delbrück, **History of the Art of War**, Vol. 1, pp. 135-143.

39. Liddell Hart, **Strategy**, p. 355.

40. Sun Tzu, "The Art of War", in Thomas R. Phillips (ed.), **Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics**, London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1994, Ch. 3, par. 3, p. 13.

41. Thucydides, **History**, A 139.

42. Thucydides, **History**, A 140-141.

43. Thucydides, **History**, A 144.

44. Hitler said to his commander-in-chief shortly before the Polish campaign: "Our enemies are little worms; I saw them at Munich"; Chester Wilmot, **The Struggle for Europe**, New York: Carol and Graf, 1952, p. 21. This statement demonstrates how decision makers use past behavior to predict future irresolution. For an analysis of this point see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, "Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure" in **International Crisis**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 187. Also, Fred Charles Iklé, **How Nations Negotiate**, New York: Harper and Row, 1964, p. 82.

45. See Papasotiriou, **Byzantine Grand Strategy**. For other instances of successful use of appeasement see Peter Karsten, "Response to Threat Perception: Accommodation as a Special Case", pp. 120-163 in Klaus Knorr (ed.), **Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems**, Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1976.

46. In all probability, it was for the same reasons that the Americans rejected appeasement as a strategy toward the Soviet Union after the Second World War.

47. Thucydides, **History**, A 144, B 65.

48. For a classic analysis of this process see Paul Kennedy, **The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers**.

49. See Kenneth Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 168.

50. There is also a second dimension of external balancing, which is essentially to manipulate the international balance of power. A common ploy in this manipulation is to follow the saying "the enemy of the enemy is a friend." The Athenians had repeatedly resorted to this ploy by flirting with Argos, a powerful city in the

Peloponnese and a constant rival of Sparta. Unfortunately for Pericles, he lacked the possibility of a "continental strategy" in order to apply peripheral pressure on Sparta, since the Thirty Years' Treaty of 451 B.C. between Argos and Sparta prohibited Argos from coming into play before 421 B.C. Following that date, though, Athens could once again play the "Argive card". For the conflict between Sparta and Argos that errupted in Peloponnesus after the expiration of the Thirty Years' Treaty and the Athenian role therein see Thucydides, **History**, E 42-82. The Athenian relation with Argos is strongly reminiscent of the similar American relation with China during the Cold War.

51. Thucydides, **History**, B 8, where he gives a detailed description of the allies of both Sparta and Athens, plus the status of the various Athenian allies, i.e. free or tributary states.

52. Thucydides, **History**, B 25.

53. Thucydides, **History**, B 9.

54. Thucydides, **History**, A 143.

55. Thucydides, **History**, B 24.

56. See Kallet-Marx, **Money, Expense and Naval Power**, pp. 110-111.

57. Thucydides, **History**, A 142-143.

58. For a similar approach adopted by Great Britain in the first part of the twentieth century see Michael Howard, **Grand Strategy: Official History of the Second World War**, Vol. 4, London: HMSO, 1973, p. 1.

59.Thucydides, **History**, A 90.

60. Thucydides, **History**, A 90-91.

61. Josiah Ober, "National Ideology and Strategic Defense of the Population, from Athens to Star Wars", in Richard Ned Lebow and Barry Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry from Thucydides to Nuclear Age**, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 254. One may discern here a similarity between the Athenian fortifications and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), which was intended to neutralize Soviet strength. The similarity is even more striking if one considers that the Soviets reacted in the same way as the Spartans had done, i.e. coming up with arms control proposals.

62. Thucydides, **History**, A 143.

63. For a description of the qualities of the trireme, the standard warship in the Mediterranean at that time, see Chester G. Starr, "The Athenian Century", in Robert Cowley (ed.), **Experience of War**, New York-London: Norton, 1992, p. 4.

64. Thucydides, **History**, B 62.

65. For the classical analysis of the maritime grand strategy of Great Britain see Mahan, **The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783** and *idem.*, **The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812**. Also, Basil Liddell Hart, **The British Way in Warfare**, London, 1932. For a modern scholar drawing the same comparison between Athens and Great Britain see Chester G. Starr, **The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History**, pp. 40-41.

66. Paul Kennedy, **The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery**, London: Fontana, 1991, p. 11.

67. Donald Kagan puts the estimate at 2000 talents a year -an enormous sum by Greek standards; see **The Archidamian War**, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990 (reprint), pp. 36-40.

68. This term refers to the strategy adopted by Fabius, dictator of Rome, against Hannibal after the latter's victory at Lake Trasimene in 218 B.C. This strategy entailed avoidance of battle and the wearing down of the Carthaginian strength by "military pin-pricks"; see Liddell Hart, **Strategy**, pp. 26-27. Liddell Hart correctly perceived that both the Periclean and Fabian strategies were actually designs at the grand strategic level: "The Periclean plan was a grand strategy with the aim of gradually draining the enemy's endurance in order to convince him that he could not gain a decision"; **Strategy**, p. 10.

69. Thucydides, **History**, A 143.

70. Thucydides, **History**, A 141.

71. Thucydides, **History**, A 143.

72. See Thomas Schelling, **Arms and Influence**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 1-34. Also, Glenn H. Snyder, **Deterrence and Defense**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

73. Cf. Victor Hanson, **The Western Way of War**, New York, 1989, p. 32.

74. For the long war assumption in Periclean strategy see Thucydides, **History**, A 141. For the Spartans' view that the war would be completed successfully within a few years cf. Thucydides, **History**, E 14.

75. Cf. Pericles' statement to his compatriots: "And if I thought I could persuade you to do it, I would urge you to go out and lay waste your property with your own hands and show the Peloponnesians that it is not for the sake of this that you are likely to give in to them"; Thucydides, **History**, A 143. The fact that he could not persuade them to actually do it should not be taken as an indication of the failure of his strategy, as some analysts have thought; cf. Donald Kagan, **On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace**, New York: Doubleday, 1995 p. 65. Pericles' statement was a rhetorical scheme, intended to show to the Athenians that the decision they had actually taken, namely to abandon their land to the mercy of the enemy, was a necessary one.

76. Liddell Hart, **Strategy**, p. 355.

77. This overseas deployment marked a first for the Athenians: For the first time in history, their hippeis and mounts sailed on horse transports; Leslie J. Worley, **Hippeis: The Cavalry of Ancient Greece,** Boulder: Westview, 1994, pp. 87-88. This is an extremely interesting development, since the Athenian force comprising navy, horse transports, and mounted archers, essentially marks the origins of the combined arms operations. After the Athenian seizure of Cythera, an island located just south of Laconia, in 424 B.C., the Spartans were forced to raise a unit of 400 mounted archers; Thucydides, **History**, D 55. See also Oliver Lyman Spaulding and Hoffman Nickerson, **Ancient and Medieval Warfare**, New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1993, p. 57.

78. This view is advanced by Donald Kagan; **Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War**, pp. 41-47.

79. Thucydides, **History**, A 142.

80. For an alternative view see Donald Kagan; **Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War**, pp. 46-47.

81. For a discussion of the economic dimension of grand strategy in the Peloponnesian war see David A. Baldwin, **Economic Statecraft**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

82. Thucydides, **History**, A 141-142, B 13. This might be conceived

as a distant ancestor of the economic and technological denial that the West resorted to in order to isolate and weaken the Soviets during the Cold War.

83. The Melian dialogue took place during the 16th year of the war (416 B.C.). It is covered in Thucydides, **History**, E 84-113. To the question of the Melians: "So you would not agree to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side?", the Athenians gave the characteristic reply: "No; because it is not so much your hostility that injures us; it is rather the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects would regard that as a sign of weakness in us, whereas your hatred is evidence of our power"; Thucydides, **History**, E 94-95.

84. Thucydides, **History**, A 141-142.

85. Thucydides, **History**, E 16-17.

86. See Benjamin Schwarz, "Strategic Interdependence: Learning to Behave like a Great Power" pp. 79-98 in Norman Levin (ed.), **Prisms and Policy: U.S. Security Strategy After the Cold War**, Santa Monica: RAND, 1994. Also, Paul Bracken, Strategic Planning for National Security: Lessons from Business Experience, **RAND Note**, N-3005-DAG/USDP, February 1990, pp. 12-17.

87. Delbrück, **History of the Art of War**, Vol. 1, p. 137.

88. Thucydides, **History**, B 21. The problem of the Periclean grand strategy was that it depended on loyalty to the city-state taking precedence over individual household and family loyalties; see Lin Foxhall, "Farming and Fighting in Ancient Greece", in John Rich and Graham Shipley (eds.), **War and Society in the Greek World**, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 142.

89. Thucydides, **History**, B 21, B 65.

90. Pericles died two years and six months after the start of the war; Thucydides, **History**, B 65.

91. Thucydides, **History**, B 35-46. A characteristic part of the speech goes as follows: "I declare that our city is an education to Greece, and I declare that in my opinion each single one of our citizens, in all the manifold aspect of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own person, and do this, moreover, with exceptional grace and exceptional versatility. And to show that this is no empty boasting for the present occasion, but real tangible fact, you have only to consider the power which our city possesses and which has been won by those very qualities

which I have mentioned. Athens, alone of the states we know, comes to her testing time in a greatness that surpasses what was imagined of her. [...] Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now. [...] This, then, is the kind of city for which these men, who could not bear the thought of losing her, nobly fought and nobly died"; Thucydides, **History**, B 41. It is interesting to note that during the First World War placecards on London buses displayed extracts from Pericles' *Epitaph*, intended to remind the British public of the values for which they were fighting; see Paul Millett, "Warfare, economy and democracy in classical Athens", in Rich and Shipley, **War and Society in the Greek World**, p. 179.

92. Thucydides, **History**, B 25. The Athenian capture of Pylos was even more helpful in this respect; see Thucydides, **History**, D 3, D 41. See also Josiah Ober, "Classical Greek Times", in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman (eds.), **The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World**, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994, p. 22. There is an interesting parallel between the assistance that Athens offered to the helots and the huge campaign of psychological operations that the West had launched toward the nations of the Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

93. See Waltz, **Man, the State, and War,** New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

94. Thucydides, **History**, A 75.

95. Thucydides, **History**, B 63.

96. Thucydides, **History**, B 8.

97. Kagan, **Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War**, p. 54.

98. Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober, **The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists**, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, p. 47.

99. See the analysis in Papasotiriou, **Byzantine Grand Strategy**, pp. 34-37.

100. Kagan, for instance, has claimed that "the cult of the defensive dissuaded the Athenians from taking the measures needed for victory". For the various destabilizing side-effects of offensive strategies see Stephen Van Evera, **Causes of War**, Ph.D. Diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1984. For a detailed analysis of

the problems associated with "the cult of the Offensive" see *idem*, "The cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War", **International Security**, 9 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107 and Posen, **The Sources of Military Doctrine**, pp.16-24.

101. Kallet-Marx, **Money, Expense and Naval Power**, p. 203.

102. See, among others, Steven Forde: "The Ambition to Rule: Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism" in **Thucydides**, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.

103. Alcibiades himself, after treasonably going to Sparta, gave the Spartans the following account of the Athenian war aims: We sailed to Sicily to conquer first, if possible, the Sicilians, and after them the Hellenes in Italy; next we intended to attack the Carthaginian empire and Carthage itself. Finally, if all or most of these plans were successful, we were going to make our assault on the Peloponnese, bringing with us all the additional Hellenic forces which we should have acquired in the west and hiring as mercenaries great numbers of native troops [...]. In addition to our existing fleet we should have built many more triremes, since Italy is rich in timber and with all of them we should have blockaded the coast of the Peloponnese, while at the same time our army would be operating on land against your cities, taking some by assault, and others by siege. In this way we hoped that the war would easily be brought to a successful conclusion and after that we should be the masters of the entire Hellenic world; Thucydides, **History**, F 90. This grand design (viz. rule over the entire Hellenic world) is as an amazing departure from the original Periclean war aims (viz. maintenance of the *status quo*) as it is chimerical. An analysis of the Sicilian expedition is outside the scope of this essay, but even a cursory look at the speech of Alcibiades by which he convinced the Athenians to authorize the expedition reveals a frivolous attitude and a gross underestimation of the enemy on Alcibiades' part; see Thucydides, **History**, F 16-18. For an analysis see Jacqueline de Romilly, **Alcibiades**, Athens: To Asti, 1995, pp. 85-104 [in Greek].

104. Thucydides, **History**, B 65.

105. Arther Ferrill, **The Origins of War from the Stone Age to Alexander the Great**, London: Thames and Hudson, 1985, p. 127.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

107. As Starr has put it: "...the Spartans acquisced in a peace treaty that led to massive discontent and defection of their allies, whose grounds of complaint against Athens were almost ignored in the treaty. Athens had done as well, or better, than could have been expected. The Aegean Empire was intact; in western waters its power had risen; the Peloponnesian League had been shaken"; Starr, **The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History**, p. 43.

108. See among others Kagan, **The Archidamian War**; Strauss and Ober, **The Anatomy of Error**; Angelos Vlahos, **Comments on Thucydides History**, Athens: Estia, 1992, [in Greek].

109. For a critical discussion of Pericles' decision see Richard Ned Lebow, **Thucydides, Power Transition Theory and the Causes of War**, pp. 147-156. Also, Barry Strauss, "Of Balances, Bandwagons and Ancient Greeks" in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, pp. 203-204.

110. David Baldwin, **Economic Statecraft**, p. 154.

111. Kagan, **On the Origins of War**, p. 64.

112. Thucydides, **History**, A 81.

113. For exponents of the feebleness theory see Angelos Vlahos, **Comments on Thucydides History,** pp. 401-405, as well as the sources cited in Donald Kagan, **The Archidamian War**, pp. 28-29.

114. See Schelling, **Arms and Influence**.

115. See *ibid.*; also, Stephen Cimbala, **Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War**, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.

116. Thucydides, **History**, A 143.

117. This also explains why Pericles refrained from creating a fort on Spartan territory; this measure was reserved for the future. It also shows the fallacy of Donald Kagan's statement that "we may therefore disregard the construction of a fortress on the Peloponnese as part of the offensive element of the Periclean strategy"; **The Archidamian War**, p. 28.

118. See Alexander L. George, **Some Thoughts on Graduated Escalation RM-4844-IR**, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 196.

119. Kagan, **The Archidamian War**, p. 41. For an excellent response to the critique of feebleness similar to that of the present essay, see Delbrück, **History of the Art of War**, Vol. 1, p. 140.

120. See Kagan, **On the Origins of War**, p. 65.

121. See W. Robert Connor, **Thucydides**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 50.

122. See Bracken, **Strategic Planning for National Security**, pp. 14-15.

123. Thucydides, **History**, B 65.

124. Colin Gray, **The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War**, New York: Free Press, 1992, p. 7.

125. Thucydides, **History**, A 144.

126. Delbrück, **History of the Art of War**, Vol. 1, p. 137.

127. This is recognized, among others, by André Corvisier and John Childs, "Planning/Plans", in André Corvisier (ed.), **A Dictionary of Military History**, London: Blackwell, 1994, p. 654 and Doyne Dawson, **The Origins of Western Warfare**, Boulder: Westview, 1996.

128. Joseph S. Nye, **Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History**, New York: Harper Collins, 1993, p. 1.

129. Witness the insertion of Thucydides' **History** in the syllabus of the U.S. Naval War College by Admiral Stansfield Turner in August 1972. "For many students, that was an unknown book about an apparently irrelevant war by an author with an unpronouncable name. Yet to Turner it was the essence of his approach, "the best example of how you could use historical case studies to teach contemporary or strategic problems"; Harry Summers, **On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War**, New York: Dell, 1992, pp. 78-79.

130. See Liddell Hart, **The British Way in Warfare**. For a critical presentation of the so-called British way of warfare see Colin Gray, "History for Strategists" in Geoffrey Till (ed.), **Seapower: Theory and Practice**, Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994, pp. 23-25.

131. It goes without saying, of course, that the manipulation of the threat to resort to nuclear war is used as an instrument of policy (i.e. nuclear deterrence, compellance).

132. In theory, however, it is still possible to achieve a swift decisive victory in a conventional war and, therefore, avoid the huge damage associated with a protracted conventional war; see John

M. Mearsheimer, **Conventional Deterrence**, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 1-66.

133. Air strikes were but one component of that strategy. Prior to these strikes, the power of the Bosnian Serbs had been eroded by economic warfare, while in the meantime they had been diplomatically isolated. In addition, the U.S. helped manipulate the local balance of power, both through arms supplies to Croatia and through engineering the alliance between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Last, but not least, the U.S. also took good care to rally domestic support for its policies in Bosnia. With all these elements at work, the exhaustion of the opponent was ensured, and, following that, the application of limited military force of an exemplary character was enough to make the Bosnian Serbs submit to the terms imposed by the U.S. and NATO.

134. A similar argument has been advanced by Edward Luttwak, who has argued in favor of a post-heroic concept of war, laying stress on such means as economic embargoes, blockades and air strikes in an attempt to minimize casualties, even at the expense of a swift decision that involves potentially higher casualty rates; Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare", **Foreign Affairs,** 74, 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 109-122. Luttwak mistakenly attributes this concept to the Romans; actually, the Periclean grand strategy is the ideal type of post-heroic warfare. An analogy may *inter alia* be drawn between the way in which the Athenians were using their navy and the discussion that is nowadays taking place regarding the utilization of such long range weapons as the bomber aircraft in order to manipulate the cost on the other side without suffering casualties ourselves.

Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War: Causes, Pretexts and Realist Traditions

Deborah A. Boucoyannis*

RÉSUMÉ

L'article suivant jette la lumière sur l'appropriation de Thucydide par les Réalistes aux niveaux de la justice et de l'éthique. L'analyse de l'auteur révèle à quel point les "vraies causes" méritent d'être examinées judicieusement et ne peuvent se baser sur le discours des acteurs, y compris Thucydide. Une relecture de sa relation des événements nous incite à réfléchir sur le lien entre les apparences et "ce qui s'est passé vraiment" au lieu de se limiter à ce qui a été dit ou non dit.

ABSTRACT

The following article explores the appropriation of Thucydides by the Realists, especially in terms of justice and morality. The analysis suggests that the discernment of "true causes" requires careful examination and cannot be based on pronouncements by actors, of which Thucydides himself was one. His account, read carefully, pushes one to think more deeply about the relation of appearances to "what actually happened", and not just to what was, or was not, said.

Introduction

"The truest explanation", Thucydides tells us of the Peloponnesian War, "although it has been the least often advanced, I believe to have been the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war."[1]

This statement, more than any other, has justified the placement of Thucydides at the head of the realist tradition, and his continuing relevance for the examination of the dynamics of international politics.[2] So what does this realism include? First, a focus on power considerations, as opposed to the mealy-mouthed

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invocations of justice and morality by the protagonists. Second, realism is distinguished by its attention to what *really* happened, as opposed to what people merely thought: the author signals that he, at least, is not one to fall prey to perceptions. He will go beneath the surface, to the truth. He will provide us with an astute account of the *real* causes, over and against the justifications of the actors involved.

Thucydides strongly emphasises that his own diagnosis of causes went almost unnoticed by the participants. He claims they were mislead by pretexts. The author suggests that the speeches inciting action were guided by questions of morality, justice, vengeance. Power imbalances and the fear they generated were the real causes, but Thucydides claims this knowledge as his own insight, hidden from the view of participants. Yet, in fact, when we look at the speeches that Thucydides chooses to reconstruct for the benefit of his readers, the fear caused by the rise of power of either Sparta or Athens is in fact the *primary one* advanced by the speakers, with a few exceptions. What we find is that, at every point where the interested parties are attempting to convince Sparta (or Athens for that matter) to attack the enemy, the main argument presented is the rise of the opposing power. This rise must be prevented before the opponent acquires a comparative advantage. Fear is consistently invoked, contrary to what the author has told us. Perhaps, then, we might find Thucydides' correction of commonly-held views in what he says when speaking in his own voice, when he is providing us with his own observations on events. Yet again, this does not happen. Rather, it is in the descriptive parts of the account that Thucydides gives us most of the evidence to support the thesis defended in this paper; i.e., that the Corinthians instigated the war.

The hypothesis is the following: Thucydides' famous statement is clearly negated by the evidence the author himself provides on the outbreak of the war on both the levels that it operates. First, he claims that his insight was both hidden and true. His focus on power merely iterates the persistent claims of the minor allies aimed at engaging the two major cities into war. Second, analysis shows that Sparta's fear of Athens was not at the root of systemic instability. Instead it was the Corinthians and the minor allies that pushed Sparta into war. This is what Thucydides' own account shows. Corinthian responsibility has been highlighted before.[3] It has not gained full acceptance, however, as the true, or most significant, causal factor. Rather, the strength of the Athenian

empire and its threatening capacity are seen as ultimately supporting the realist reading of power imbalance generating war. Parts of the analysis, especially the "Pentecontaetia" (I.1-19) are taken to show that, overall, Athenian power was on the rise.[4] True as that may be, one would want to see in Thucydides a successful integration of this factor, Athenian power, into the events surrounding the outbreak of conflict. One would, in other words, want a sustained analysis that showed that decisions made and actions taken were in fact the result of *such* power considerations. What emerges from the account, however, is that Athenian actions are responses to threat, and not independent evidence of power maximisation. Since the actions of participants are presented as the result of other motives, such as particular interests of minor allies, the historian has not proved his thesis. Since, moreover, fear is found to be the main argument advanced by those pleading for war, there is a double discrepancy between what Thucydides says and what he shows.

In sum, the hypothesis seeks to restate the argument for Corinthian instigation of war. It was minor allies, rather than the two main states in the bipolar system of the Greek world, that engaged in power politics and tipped the system into conflict. Sparta is shown by Thucydides to be singularly uninterested in the activities of the Athenians; it is the Corinthians who persist in bringing the matter to their attention. If the argument is restated in a deductive manner, we start with the statements that the author proffers and show the inconsistencies, even contradictions, they involve. They cannot, therefore, be accepted at face value. Instead, the evidence is presented within the narrative itself which leaves Corinth on centre stage.

Some Realist Objections

There are some obvious objections to be made here.

(1) We mentioned that the Spartans were relatively slow in perceiving the Athenian threat, and they only came to be mobilised after persistent pressure by their allies. However, one could still argue that this does not affect the validity of the realist interpretation. Athens *was* a threat, and however Sparta came to grasp this fact, the point is that the latter city reacted correctly, with or without external intervention. The allies, viz Corinth, were not, in such a view, self-interested *agents-provocateurs*, but good realists

who perceived danger and acted in time to thwart it. Yet the following argument maintains that Thucydides failed to show us that the Corinthians were acting because they considered Athens as a threat. Vengeance and honour were at the source of Conrinthian actions, and this is not *Realpolitik*, as Thucydides tells us in his own account of events. When we turn to what the actors say, then fear is invoked. In other words, just the opposite of what the author asserts. No arguments have been provided to support the view that Corinth or Sparta was seriously threatened by Athens, as will be seen in the analysis of developments.

(2) One could still insist that the above conclusion misses the point. All the rhetoric about vengeance and justice could merely be obfuscations. Even if it is Corinth that is the motor of events, it is still power that is fuelling things. We are, after all, talking about the two foremost naval powers of the Greek world, and competition was rife between them. Even if we admit this, however, we are one remove away from our opening statement, Thucydides' verdict. It is Corinth, and not the second pole of the bipolar system, namely Sparta, which was threatened by the rise of Athens. Such a conclusion has important implications for the dynamics of bipolar systems and the propensity of peripheral powers to embroil the main poles in the system. It undercuts the logic developed about the stability of bipolarity in such works as Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*.

(3) The conclusion so far seems to be that it was Corinth who responded to the Athenian rise. At which point the question becomes, was there really a rise in the power of Athens? What evidence do we have for this? What does Thucydides tell us in this regard? One should resist the temptation to make assumptions which resolve these problems, but which are unsupported by the text. We have no other evidence that Athenian power was rising except the authorial pronouncement in the introduction. In my analysis of the fifty years prior to the conflict I show that the evidence on Athenian power is mixed, and that Athens had suffered serious setbacks, as opposed to her unobstructed dominance in the earlier period of the empire. Concrete evidence about how changes prior to the war affected Corinth is not provided. It is argued below that little in the book warrants the view that Corinth was threatened by the rise of Athens. We cannot therefore say that, whatever the motives of the actors, they did act correctly in the end because Athens was a threat. We only think this

because Thucydides told us so, and one of the purposes of this paper is to show that he does not support this with facts. It is a contention, repeated often enough by minor allies.

(4) Yet again, the above argument can meet with a valid objection. Just because Thucydides does not give us sufficient evidence about Athenian aggrandizement in his account, this does not mean that such a power imbalance did not occur. Perhaps the evidence was so obvious to the eyes of contemporaries that Thucydides did not feel compelled to relate it. Upon consideration, the point does not hold water for two reasons. Thucydides' argument was that contemporaries seemed oblivious to the true cause of war. His task was to direct attention to the dynamics of power. If Athens was truly rising, the author's burden lay in conveying this point in no uncertain terms. Yet, as is shown in the first section on the fifty years before the outbreak of the war, this evidence is not forthcoming. Moreover, the historical record itself, as it has been reconstructed in recent historical and archaeological research, does not support the claim of an increase in Athenian power.

(5) The implication of the above argument is that Athens was not really rising. Spartan allies only claimed she was! This leads to another plausible objection to our line of argument: the war may have been the result of misperception. Sparta may have misperceived Athenian intentions and engaged in preventive war under the influence of the Corinthians. The whole war, in this view, would be a "mistake", and though not strictly a case for realist theory, it could be accommodated within the framework of perception theory, a refinement of realism.[5] But this view is equally problematic. Misperception cannot be claimed for the instigators, the Corinthians. Their actions were not the result of mistaken estimations of the adversary, but the purposeful pursual of goals of a non military-strategic nature, as I show in my analysis. And if Sparta had acted without Corinthian propaganda, if she had not have "misperceived" Athenian intentions without allied persistence, it is the interference of the latter, and not misperception, that is at the root of the war.

(6) It might be claimed that the Athenians acted under the misperception that the Spartans were ready to attack them. This is the argument put to them by the Corcyreans to enlist their help. Is this then a case of the security dilemma?[6] Is it action taken in order to increase one's security that inadvertently threatens other

states, causing a spiral unwanted by all? Did Athens misconstrue the actions of the other side, take actions in defence, which then triggered Spartan action? But, for this scenario to hold, the first state in the chain must be taking measures of defensive character. Corinthian actions, which elicit Athenian reaction and are thus at the beginning of the chain, are not, however, motivated by a desire for defence either against the Athenians or the Corcyreans, who draw them into action. There was no threat to Corinth posed by Corcyra. It is, on the contrary, and as shown here, Corinthian overreaction, and not objective threat or its misperception, that motivated the city's actions.

The Aim of the Analysis

The above objections correspond to two broad categories of realist argumentation: neo-realism and the refining theory of perceptions. Our analysis of the Peloponnesian War is not meant as a refutation, emendation or qualification of either. It concerns simply the empirical application of these theories to what is considered a quintessential case study of the effects of changes in the distribution of power. States do respond to shifts in capabilities, they do respond to threats and they do misperceive them. They also abuse power, as the Melian dialogue shows, so eloquently and dramatically. Our question, however, is, is this what caused the war? Our answer: no. The implications of such an insight are primarily practical: it focuses attention on the need to ascertain the conditions under which theories explain real events. One cannot falsify realism, since it obviously captures an aspect of the dynamic of international relations. One can be more rigorous in asserting its relevance to particular events, however, which is, ultimately, its fundamental purpose. Or else one risks accepting justifications of actors, in other words, ideology, as explanations. This is precisely what realism is meant to reject.[7]

The Plan of the Argument

The paper has three sections:

(I) The first section covers the period prior to the outbreak of war, which Thucydides recounts in order to show "how Athens came to be in the position to gain such strength". We argue that the evidence about Athenian power is in fact mixed. There had

been previous moments when Athenian power was incontestably greater. By 432 B.C., Athens had suffered enough losses to suggest that her power was not necessarily on the rise, as it was when the city assumed the leadership of the Hellenic cities. In fact, there is little evidence of any particular event in the period preceding the outbreak of conflict which could justify the perception of threat on the Spartan side.

(II) The second section reveals what determined the Athenian decision to go to war. The paper proceeds by examining, first, the Athenian decision to support Corcyra against Corinth, and second, the events at Poteidea, where again Athens sought to pre-empt a Corinthian-led rebellion.

(III) The third section focuses on the Spartan deliberations over entering into war against Athens, after intensive pleas by the Corinthians and other allies to do so. In each section it is shown how fear was in fact omnipresent in the discussions of the actors involved, and how the Corinthians were instrumental in bringing it to the fore. What do these inconsistencies imply and how do they affect Thucydides' narrative? It is these questions which will be addressed after the analysis of the main events in the outbreak of the war. No systematic interpretation of the motives of Thucydides in adopting such an approach will be undertaken, assuming, in any case, that the discrepancy was not unintentional. Rather, it will be taken for granted, following recent literature on the topic, that the work is a unified whole and that discrepancies are not attributable to a different dating of the passages in question.[8] What will be examined is the *effect* that this paradox entails and the impact it has exercised in subsequent interpretations perusing the work as a classic statement of the realist doctrine of international politics.

I. The Pentecontaetia

According to this argument, the war cannot be seen as the result of the change in the balance of power between the two poles in the system, since one pole, Sparta, was clearly unconcerned about the matter.[9] Equally, if not more important, is the fact that a change in the balance of power is hard to discern in the evidence provided. This issue is examined in the following section.

The main evidence in support of the argument of the rise of Athens is contained in the account of the *Pentecontaetia*, the period of about fifty years prior to the outbreak of the war, 479-435.[10]

Again, the evidence provided therein is mixed. First, we see that Athens had suffered serious defeats by the time of the outbreak of the war. Her invincibility and power were thus much compromised. Logically, Sparta should have been more relaxed at this point in time, as opposed to previous periods of Athenian ascendancy. Yet, even at times when Athens was dominant, not only did Sparta not demur, she actively encouraged her future rival. It was Sparta who conceded the leadership of the Hellenic league to Athens, after the Persian wars. After this, the Athenians embarked on an ambitious program of subjugation of Greek cities, during the 470s and 60s. Yet that did not prevent the Spartans from calling on the Athenians to help them with the slave revolt at Ithome, as allies. One would hardly invite an enemy to assist in the pacification of domestic strife. True, the Spartans ended up sending the Athenians off, as they apparently became distrustful of Athenian presence. They became threatened by the ideological difference of the Athenians, and their "novelties"; this had nothing to do with the rise of Athens: if that had been so, they would never had called on them in the first place.[11]

There had been a number of confrontations between the two alliances in the period between the end of the Persian wars in the 470s and the Thirty Years Truce signed in 446/5 BC. War broke out thirteen years later, in 432. Yet, neither the period before the Truce of 445, nor that before the outbreak of war in 432, saw any rise in the power of Athens. On the contrary, as has been argued elsewhere[12], these were times which demonstrated the limitations of Athenian power. Thucydides claims that the Spartans decided on war because the "point was finally reached when Athenian strength attained a peak plain for all to see and the Athenians began to encroach upon Sparta's allies." At this point Sparta decided "to employ all her energies in attacking, and, if possible, destroying the power of Athens." (I.118).

There is no doubt that Athens had abused the trust that the League had invested in it and that relations with many Greek cities had deteriorated. Athens had successfully turned the Delian league into the Athenian empire. This was symbolised by the transfer of the treasure from Delos to Athens, probably by 454/3.[13] But in the next decade, Athens suffered a series of blows that resulted in the retrenchment of her continental empire. The expedition to Egypt, in the late 450s, was an unmitigated disaster. The battle of Koroneia, in 447, marked her eviction from central Greece. In the following years, there came a series of defections,

by Megara, Euboia, Samos, Byzantium and elsewhere. Though Euboia was recovered, Athens did not manage to consolidate her empire on land: she even faced an invasion of Attica by the Spartans (446), which was only averted by a last minute arrangement, possibly including bribery. The message was clear to the Athenians, and they signed the Truce. In so far as the bilateral relations with Sparta were concerned, Thucydides tells us that Athens, upon conclusion of the peace, returned the territories it had previously taken from the Peloponnesians, namely Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaea (I.115). Sparta should have been quite content in her evaluation of the threat posed by Athens to the city's own sphere of influence.

So what about the intervening period, between the peace and the outbreak of the war? Is there evidence of Athenian expansionism? Kagan has persuasively shown that the events usually invoked in this respect do not stand up to scrutiny. There are two developments which have drawn attention, Athenian activities in the west; i.e., southern Italy, and the Samian rebellion. Yet, as Kagan points out, had Athens been interested in expanding her control westwards, she would have taken action in certain crucial events, and she did not. When factional strife broke out in Thurii, a city with colonists from many Greek cities, including Athens and Sparta, and the Athenian colonists failed to predominate, Athens did not intervene. Her actions in the Samian rebellion, on the other hand, were not intended to extend her empire, but to consolidate it, as it was threatened by successive secessions.[14]

What about Corinth? It was in the years prior to the war that the enmity of the Corinthians towards the Athenians developed. The reason appears not of great consequence. It was the erection of a wall at the border with Megara, around 460, which prevented Corinth from pursuing her raids in the territory of her neighbour. Yet, when the revolt of Samos broke out in 440, it was Corinth that prevented Sparta, and her allies, from going to the aid of the Samian rebels. It is hard to claim, therefore, that Corinthian hostility to Athens was long-standing, as Thucydides suggests (I.103). In the following section, the causes of the rising hostility between the two naval powers are considered with the conclusion that they are short-term causes; i.e., the Corinthians were prevented by the Athenians from establishing their control over the western colonies. War followed from the Corinthian goal of delimiting Athenian balancing efforts.

II. The Athenian Decision

The first exchange between Athens and Sparta in the account is that of 432. The war had not officially started. Two events that were central for the outbreak of war had taken place; these will be analysed below. In one, Athens assisted Corcyra against an attack from Corinth.[15] The other is the conflict at Poteidea, in Macedonia. Poteidea was an Athenian colony. The Corinthians attempted to foster rebellion there, and Athens tried to pre-empt the loss of her colony. There had occurred, in other words, by the time of the first exchange between the two cities, events which had polarised Athens and Corinth. But it is Sparta that undertook to tackle Athens and Sparta had been prompted by the Corinthians. When the Spartan envoys came to speak, the prospect of war was clearly on the horizon. Heightened Spartan fear does not appear to have been the argument used by the envoys in order to convince the Athenians to make concessions, however. We cannot know for sure, though, since Thucydides does not reconstruct the speeches made by the Spartans at the Athenian Assembly in 432. It seems that in this context, the "truest cause" of power imbalances was indeed absent from discussion. The usual pretexts were advanced, before clearly demanding the independence of the Hellenes. Yet, it is hard to see what impact such contention would have had were it invoked: the Athenians were highly unlikely to forego their assets merely because the Spartans were fearful of them.

i. The Dispute over Corcyra

This, however, does not mean that the Athenians were necessarily unaware of the true motives of the Spartans.[16] It certainly did not mean, as Thucydides implies, that the argument of fear had not been aired in public. Rather it weighed heavily on the deliberations of each side. Two embassies, from Corinth and Corcyra, had already made speeches to the Athenians. In the speeches, the envoys presented arguments why Athens should, or should not, assist Corinth against Corcyra, respectively. The Corcyreans pleaded with Athens to intervene in their favour against the Corinthians; their request had been predicated on the claim of the imminence of war (I.33 &36.1). War was threatened due to the asserted Spartan fear of the rise of Athens. Did the Corcyreans provide any evidence of this fear? They did not, and it is not clear from Thucydides' account where they could find it in

any case. The author later informs us that the Spartans were so unconcerned with the rise of Athens, that every time the Corinthians would try to persuade them to take action, they would summarily dismiss them (I.68.2). Nor is any evidence of the rise of the Athenians given in the first place.

Instead, the Corcyreans started talking about the rise of the Corinthians instead, and it is they who were claimed to be aiming at aggrandizement. The conquest of the Corcyrean fleet would be the first step before an attack on Athens, the Corcyreans argued.[17] The justification for war, as far as the Corcyreans were concerned, was on the basis of pre-emptive strategy[18] [I. 33.4]. There were three major navies in Hellas, those of Athens, Corinth and Corcyra, and if Athens allowed Corinth to annex the latter, Athens would be unable to hold her own.

The Corinthians posed a counter-argument, though in many ways they were saying much the same thing: war was only a step away. If the step was taken, and Athens allied with Corcyra, Corinth would be turned from a potential to an actual enemy. Though true in itself, the significant point is that Corinth only required one action, taken in a defensive mode, to justify an aggressive policy for herself. If so little was needed to turn the second naval power of Hellas against Athens, if the Athenian assistance to a colony outside her sphere of interest was adequate to bring about war[19], Athens was surely right to take whatever defensive measure she thought fit. And so pre-empt she did. This would seem to support a realist, "objective" interpretation of causes. The crucial qualification, of course, is that it is fear felt by *the Athenians* which is here causally relevant. Moreover, opinion about the war was mixed, and hence the fact that it prevailed was far from necessary. Thucydides tells us that at the first vote the Athenians inclined towards the Corinthians [i.e. against war], but "the second day they changed their minds in favour of the Corcyreans" (I.34.1-2).

Looking into the foundations of the argument, however, we note a conspicuous *uncertainty* about material causes. What we need to know is what turned Corinth into a potential enemy of Athens. Thucydides should surely provide us with a hard-nosed explanation of Corinthian enmity. We are provided with two suggestions. One is advanced by the Corinthians themselves, the other by the Corcyreans. Corinthians attacked Corcyra, because, they said, although a colony, she refused to give Corinth due

honours in religious events (I.41.1). The Corcyreans claimed instead that there was a Corinthian plan to undermine Athenian power; if the Corinthians were allowed to subjugate Corcyra, they would possess a navy greater than the Athenian and would use it against the Greek leader.

Accepting any of these arguments poses its own problems. Both sides have strong interests to dissemble the truth. It is the Corcyreans who are invoking the "strategic argument". Given, however, their obvious interest in enlisting Athenian help, we should be sceptical about the argument's validity. The Corinthians, on the other hand, insist that it was honour that motivated them. Yet this sounds like the kind of argument that Thucydides has warned us against. If this was a front for an aggressive policy we should surely have additional evidence. Indeed, we do: Corinthian actions at Megara and Poteidea and her persistent attempts to engage the Spartans against Athens. One should observe that in Corcyra, Athens was a latecomer. We cannot assume that Corinthian agitation was merely a response to Athenian actions; instead, it was a cause, rather than an effect. In sum, the two competing explanations are an accusation and a self-justification in turn. Given external evidence of Corinthian obstreperousness, the Corcyreans are closer to the truth. It was Corinthian aggressive policies that lay at the root of instability and crisis. Her aim was to establish control in western Greece; only Athens stood in the way of the maximisation of her power.

From the above, it can at least be claimed that the Athenians were acting on the basis of sound principles of statecraft, if in their decision to enter war they were in fact seeking to address the Corinthian threat. Such a view departs from most understandings of the causes of the war. As we shall see, Sparta came to be drawn in only after the persistent demands of the Corinthians and nowhere do we find compelling evidence that her interests were the ones threatened. The conclusion so far remains in the realm of power politics. But there has been a crucial qualification. Thucydides' claim, and most realist formulations, are predicated on the objectivity of power imperatives: if Athenian power rose, Sparta had to respond. But here it is Corinth that is responding, and the rise of Athens is far from proven.

ii. The Events at Poteidea

Immediately after the Athenians defeated the Corinthian navy, in alliance with the Corcyreans, "the events over Poteidea led to war". These events further exacerbated the "differences between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians"(I.56.1). But what caused the events at Poteidea, an Athenian ally, though a colony of Corinth? Certainly, Athens was concerned that Corinth might seek revenge. But why did the enmity of the two cities have to transport itself to such a remote theatre? Reading closely we find that when Athens turned to Poteidea, in the north of Greece, the Corinthians were not there yet, nor had they taken any action. Rather, it was Perdikkas, king of Macedon, who was persistently trying to "bring about war between Athens and the Peloponnesians" (I.57.4). On this occasion, Sparta refused the invitation, as it did at the numerous attempts by the Corinthians to drag it into conflict. Next Perdikkas approached Corinth, and then also the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans. These actions alarmed Athens, and, for preemptive purposes, a fleet was sent to Poteidea to prevent a revolt: "For they were afraid that the Poteideans, persuaded by Perdikkas and the Corinthians, would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in Thrace to revolt with them." (I.56.2)

Prudent defensive action was undertaken by Athens, creating the vivid impression again that fear was a prime motive in Athens' actions as well, and not just Sparta's. This, one should note, was a juncture which was crucial in generating the moment after which war did, in fact, become unavoidable. Two clauses, however, show that it was not the imperatives of competition with Corinth that drove developments. One is that Thucydides tells us that action on Poteidea was decided immediately after the battle at Corcyra (I.57.1). How did the Athenians know that Corinthian revenge, assuming it would come, would strike at the colonies of Macedonia? Was this pure political acumen and successful judgement? In fact, another clause, at I.59.2, may lead to a different explanation of Athenian action: we are told that it was troubles in Macedonia which were the initial aim of the expedition. There was, therefore, an independent origin to the Athenian decision. The question at this point is whether the effect of the decision was unintended, in that it sent a wrong signal to the already alarmed Corinthians. If that is so, events from Poteidea onwards can be explained as a clear case of the security dilemma.

This is, in fact, what is at first sight suggested by the account. Moreover, all parties may be seen to be motivated by reasonable, realist concerns. Macedonian actions are amenable to a realist explanation, though they are not at the centre of events. Perdikkas is keen to cause war between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians because the former had sided with his brother Philip: side-tracking Athens could conceivably help reinforce his own position in Macedonia. Corinth became active on the issue *after* Poteidea had revolted and *after* the Athenians had sent their ships to the region. When it came to putting together a force, it was under Aristus, son of Adeimantus, "who had always been on friendly terms with the Poteideans". It was "chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers"(I.60.2). Corinthian action on Poteidea was therefore a response to Athenian initiative. And the chief motive of Corinthian action? Awareness of the danger of Athenian action and of the possibility that it would extend against them (I.60.1).

It is instances like these which seem to buttress the overall interpretation of Thucydides as an analyst in the realist tradition. Yet, this is perhaps misleading. What had prodded Athenian action? The catalyst for it was the knowledge that Corinth was harbouring plans of vengeance against her. And these plans were not based on fear. The first cause of war, and the ground for Corinthian enmity, was that the Athenians "had fought with the Corcyreans against them in time of truce"(I.55.2). Her enmity, that Athens had initially feared, stemmed from a desire to take vengeance on the Athenians, for having helped the Corcyreans (I.56.2). The previous conflict between the two cities, regarding the Megarian border, in 462BC, had long been forgotten. By 440 BC, Corinth was sufficiently well predisposed towards Athens. When the Samian revolt broke out, it was Corinth that prevented the interference of the Peloponnesian league. Passions, not interests, are the prime movers, or at least Thucydides offers us little to suggest an alternative. And of passions it is honour and justice, and not fear, which is at stake.[20]

It has been argued so far that Athenian actions in Poteidea were clearly defensive in character. Athens feared the machinations of her enemies. Not just of the Macedonian king, but, especially, of the Corinthians. And the reason we are given for Corinthian enmity was the unwelcome intervention of the Athenians in favour of the Corcyreans. Corinth was not concerned with a rise in Athenian power, it was annoyed that Athens prevented Corinth from

having her way in the Ionian sea. This prevented Corinth from acquiring hegemony in western Greece and from building up a navy which would have surpassed the Athenian one. The possibility of Corinth subduing Corcyra would mean that her naval predominance would come to an end and Athens would be threatened. Action was necessary.

In conclusion, Athens was not over-reacting, and these events were not mere pretexts. If that is so, we cannot see them as evidence of a policy of aggression and wanton expansion; nor can we accept the main claim of the book of eventual Spartan reaction as caused through fear. But if Athens' policy was not expansionary but defensive and pre-emptive,[21] then it is Spartan action that appears aggressive and expansionary. This is, in fact, a compelling argument. It has taken two forms. G.E.M. de Ste Croix has supported the view of Spartan foreign policy as relentlessly aggressive from the time of the first Peloponnesian war, which Thucydides does not deal with much.[22] An alternative, and more nuanced, view is that of Anton Powell, who argues that Sparta only attacked when the opportunity arose, when, that is, Athens was weak. Far from the rise of Athens, then, it is the city's temporary weakness that elicits a Spartan offensive.

III. The Spartan Deliberations

The Corinthians maintain the initiative in the account. The siege of Poteidea caused unquiet, so they summoned the allies to Lacedaemon. They claimed that the Athenians had broken the truce and were "wronging the Peloponnesus".[23] They were joined by the Aeginitans, who "took a leading part in fomenting the war"(I.67.1-2). It was only after this intense "lobbying" that the Spartans called the rest of the allies, including the Megarians. The latter presented many grievances, chiefly their exclusion from Athenian ports. "Lastly the Corinthians, after they had first allowed the others to exasperate the Lacedaemonians, spoke as follows...". What followed showed clearly that not only had the Corinthians on numerous previous occasions attempted to co-opt the Spartans in their various quibbles with Athens, but that the Spartans were so unconcerned about the rise of Athenian power (I.69.5), that they sent the envoys off, accusing them of pursuing their own private interest (I.68.2).[24] The Corinthians accused the Spartans of only taking an interest at an advanced stage of the

dispute, after all the allies had expressed their grievances. This made it most suitable for them to speak last, as they "ha[d] the gravest accusations to bring". But what are these? Not enslavement, because it is not the Corinthians who have been enslaved (the wrongs referred to have already occurred and are not as yet projected to the future).[25] Could the greatest crimes only be that they have been "insulted by the Athenians, [and] abandoned by you [the Spartans]"(I.68.2)?

The Corinthians claimed that Athens was surely preparing for war against them, but when they came to offer evidence on Athenian intentions of war, the crucial (and only) arguments invoked were two. One was the purloining of Corcyra, which we know that the Athenians pursued on second thoughts and only because they believed the war "would have to be faced". The second was the besieging of Poteidea, which, as analyzed, was a pre-emptive, and not offensive, move, against Corinthian and Macedonian interference. Thucydides did not give us anything that would suggest that an offensive intent was prevalent in Athens apart from the claims of the Corcyreans [I.56]. The author expects us to believe that the Spartans somehow decided on war on their own accord, that they were uninfluenced by what the allies said. Certainly, allied complaints were not enough to spur Spartans into action -witness the many failed attempts of the Corinthians. But then we need to be able to point to some objective change in the distribution of power that would motivate the Spartans at this moment. Yet the only evidence we have of movement in the system relates to Athenian intervention in the two Corinthian colonies. But this is exactly what the allies have been talking about. If there had been an external factor, over and above the statements of the Corinthians that was influencing Spartan decisions, Thucydides is strangely silent about it.

Is this again a case of a security dilemma? Were the actions of Athens, undertaken for defensive reasons, perceived as offensive in intent, thus eliciting a response, based on fear, by her adversary? Were reactions to Athenian moves then reasonable and justifiable, from the perspective of *Realpolitik*? Seemingly not since the main reason for this derives from the crucial distinction between who we take the adversary to be. We must, of course, take seriously the claim that Spartan fear lay at the roots of the war. Yet the only party that can reasonably be held to have reacted to Athenian moves were the Corinthians. As mentioned above, the Spartans had overall been so unconcerned with

for what is present? But with a view to what shall be hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task at hand..." In this speech, they admitted that they are stirring up war, but considered it just because they had been wronged and had suffered crimes by the Athenians. These were not specified, however, other than the hatred caused by Megarian decree (I.121). The Corinthians were at pains to assert, like Pericles (I.140) that the fighting is not over mere boundary lines (I.102.2). If war was not entered into, again as argued by Pericles (I.151), slavery would surely follow. The parallels between the two speeches are striking. Pericles has to twice repeat that the issue of the Megarian decree was far from a trivial matter. This is good evidence that some people, at least, did in fact consider it as such. Rather he strove to convince the Assembly that "this trifling thing involves nothing less than the vindication and proof of your political conviction." (!)

The Corinthian speech was however more persuasive, for modern realist readers at least. The interjection of prudent maxims adds *gravitas* to the claims: in I.124 the action was defended as being in the common interest, which is the surest policy for individuals and states to follow. If they did not defend the Poteideans, the rest of Hellas will soon suffer the same fate [124, 1-2]. This, of course, would certainly be true, and prudent, pre-emptive action would be necessary, *provided* that Athens had been shown to have an expansionary policy, of which Poteidea was only the first step. We have seen that this was far from true: Athens was there to put down Perdikkas and prevent the loss of tributaries, not the acquisition of new ones. The latter problem would never have arisen without the fear of Corinthian *vengeance*, hardly what a realist, rational actor would be expected to indulge in. The reasons for which this cannot be seen as an example of a security dilemma have already been argued. The first state must be acting in self-defence, but Corinth was trying to maximise her control over her colonies.

The Corinthians urged the allies to recognize that they were now facing the inevitable [120, 2]. The opening of the speech was predicated on pre-emptive logic: if action is not taken now, the consequences will be beyond control. The case, they argued, was strategically favourable for the Spartans. They admitted that it was mainly the cities that lie on the trade routes that fear Athens' power [120.2], but if the cities in the interior did not act then, "the danger may possibly some day reach them". In the Warner translation of the text, the possible has become certain: "it will not be long before the danger spreads"[27], the Corinthians are made to say.

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The Athenian embassy which by chance happened to be in Sparta, replied to the first Corinthian speech with a totally unsolicited justification of the Athenian empire. This has caused much perplexity in commentaries, some of which have even doubted the plausibility of the speech.[28] Thucydides himself asserted that it was not the aim of the Athenians to be provocative, but rather to counsel the Spartans caution (I.71.1). (Athenian deliberations on the issue were initiated the previous year, during the dispute over Corcyra.) Clifford Orwin has correctly identified fear as the main theme of the speech, but he claims that Athenian emphasis on this point was a miscalculation: they were hoping on the deterrent effect of their disquisition on the justice of the Athenian power and the role that fear played in its construction. What is not noticed, in this, as in other accounts, is the discrepancy between Thucydides' statement concerning the final Spartan decision and the author's *own* previous account. The vote for war, he tells us, prevailed "not so much because [the Spartans] were persuaded by the influence of the speeches of the allies, as by fear of the Athenians, lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater part of Hellas was already subject to them"(I.88).

Yet when one looks a few pages back at what it was that the allies were saying, *at least the allies that we the readers have heard*, it is *exactly* the problem of the rise of Athenian power and the need for pre-emptive action that the Corinthians expounded. What was the point of the excursion on Athenian character other than to buttress the impression of an imperialist, expansionary power? In fact, Thucydides recapitulates in a nutshell the argument that the Corinthians so strenuously were trying to put forth, and which was reiterated in the allied congress at Sparta in more direct form.

Even if we want to accept the claim that the speeches had no effect, we still need the objective change that accounts for the turn-around of Spartan policy. And, as mentioned, the only such change that may be discerned is Athenian interference in Corinthian affairs, which was meant for defensive purposes.

It is not necessary to ascertain the purpose of the author here. The effect upon the reader is clearly the creation of a solid impression of the objectiveness of fear, which Athenian arrogance shows to be fully justifiable. The Athenian speech played an effective rhetorical role in underlining the validity of the claims made by the Corinthians, in presenting Athenian expansionism as a

dangerous and unrelenting menace. Should the Spartans have been left with any doubt that the power of Athens constituted a threat, the envoys managed to totally dispel it, or so it seems. The point is whether it is not the Spartans who are, in fact, the targets of impressions, but the readers themselves. Authorial interventions discretely bias the account. They lean heavily towards Thucydides' own causal statement, even though he admits that other factors were in play. Contrary to his assertion at I.88, where fear is the motive prior to the speeches of the Spartans, he asserts that "the opinions of the majority tended to the same conclusion, namely that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they must go to war without delay"(I.79.2).[29] How is it that after the speeches of Archidamus and Sthenelaides, none of which play on the notion of fear, the final decision is asserted to be based on fear?[30] Could the Spartans, famous for their slowness and conservatism, change opinion after one speech, and, moreover, be *uninfluenced* by the Corinthians, who were harping on the same tune? Why does Thucydides draw such a false distinction? Fear seems to weigh heavily on the mind of the reader, and it is Thucydides' narrative which accounts for that. In fact, one reason that has been suggested refers to the explicit threat levelled by the Corinthians, that unless the Spartans act now, they will seek another alliance (I.71.4).[31]

Though this factor went almost unnoticed in the discussions, it is worthwhile to examine its importance. This is perhaps a cause of Spartan mobilisation which fits Thucydides' bill: though least heard in debates, the threat of Corinthian defection may have been the only fear that could goad the Spartans into action. It has been argued repeatedly here that Athens cannot be seen to be rising. If however Corinth departed from the Peloponnesian alliance, then Sparta would be seriously weakened. If that is so, it was clearly not considerations of the rise of Athens that motivated Sparta, but a threat to the internal balance of the league, which was issued by the Corinthians as a tool of coercion in order to fulfil her rather feeble objectives.

Such a view would allow us to refine the hypothesis mentioned at the end of the previous section, by Powell. It was not merely Spartan opportunism that determined the outbreak of the war. In any case, such an explanation does not differ radically from that of de Ste Croix, who posits Spartan expansionism and aggression as the independent variable. It merely gives us the *timing* of Spartan action. Sparta, in this view, harboured hostile and power

maximising intentions, but given Athenian superiority, could only act on them at time of Athenian weakness. But such a view cannot account for why Sparta repeatedly sent Corinthians away and refused to engage Athens, even at a time we know Athens to be weak, comparatively. The hypothesis defended here about the threat of Corinthian defection, which would radically alter Sparta's strength at sea, can accommodate both aspects of the situation. We cannot, of course, know for sure that Corinth had not threatened defection in the past, as we do not have evidence on these instances. But it is the only hypothesis that is not contradicted by the evidence that Thucydides gives us.

In such a case, it would be Archidamus who came closer to an adequate description of the dynamics of the situation: he warned against attacking a strong enemy, by cause of being "egged on by the complaints of our allies"(I.82.5). "For complaints, indeed, whether brought by states, or by individuals, may possibly be adjusted; but when a whole confederacy, for the sake of individual interests undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, it is not easy to end it with honour."[I.77,6]. For Thucydides, Archidamus was sagacious and prudent, but he tempers these appraisals by inserting that he was only reputed as such (I.79.2).

Sthenelaides then took centre stage: he claimed boldly that they should not put off avenging the wrongs of their allies, which a few lines further down, and without explanation, in a move that replicates that of the Corinthians, became wrongs against Sparta herself. The topic did not require much consideration. He advised the Lacedaemonians to vote in a way that befits Sparta, and not to allow the Athenians to become greater (I.86.5). The final argument was moral: they should stand by their allies and avenge the wrong-doer; a moral injunction serves as a finishing statement. As the Appella decisions were issued by shouting, and Sthenelaides could not determine which opinion was loudest, "wishing to make the assembly more eager for war" by a clear demonstration of their sentiment, he called a second vote, a rather curious incident [87,2]. A large majority thought the Athenians had broken the treaty but wanted to consult with the rest of the allies as to whether they should go to war.

IV. Conclusion

Thucydides seems to have failed to provide adequate justification for his claims at the nodal points of the developments which led to the war. All we are allowed to say on this basis is not that the war happened because of Spartan fear of the rise of Athens, but because of the Corinthian and allied instigations. These cannot be claimed to be responding to an Athenian threat, as I have argued. There has not been a convincing presentation of how Athens was actually threatening other states. And, moreover, the state that was reacting to Athens was Corinth, not Sparta. The question then arises as to whether this is an illustration of realist theory -which in its prescriptive and descriptive form, claims superiority on the basis of its prudence and its attention to objective material forces which threaten the security of states. If one applies the same standards to determine whether a war should have happened according to the dictates of prudence, it is not clear that the Peloponnesian war illustrates realist principles. Given that it is changes in distribution of power and the threat of one state acquiring hegemony that provides a realist cause for war, then the Peloponnesian war does not provide us with such a cause. To subsume this case under the theoretical umbrella of realism would mean accepting dubious motives as adequate to launch a systemic war. But this would imply that realist theory changes premises depending on whether it is descriptive or prescriptive. If the prescriptive dicta are abandoned in the evaluation of past events, then the theory is tantamount to asserting that wars happen because they happen. If, in other words, we accept Corinth's motives as realist, the definition of realism is stretched beyond recognition. The theoretical purchase of realism would thus disappear.

The point is not necessarily that wars are the result of failures of subjective reason; indeed, Hermocrates' statement, that war is not the product of ignorance, nor is it deterred by fear, but will happen "if [one] thinks he will get some advantage from it"(IV,59) is as true as all the *Realpolitik* maxims that guide policy. Nor is the point that rises in power do not generate fear and cause war. It is, rather, that Thucydides' account is a careful construction which however fails to corroborate its own claims. Whatever "insights" into human nature are offered, perfectly true in themselves as they may be, they fail to account for the actions that *he* is describing. The question is not whether wars do happen in the way the author describes, it is whether *this* war did so. As a case

study it should corroborate the theory, and as argued, it does not. Rather, the author has placed overwhelming weight on the *justifications* of actors, or rather instigators, themselves, instead of evaluating the "true" causes. What this analysis has aimed to suggest is that the discernment of "true causes" requires careful examination and cannot be based on pronouncements by actors, of which Thucydides himself was one. His account, read carefully, pushes one to think more deeply about the relation of appearances to "what actually happened", and not just to what was, or was not, said.

ENDNOTES

1.Thucydides, **History of the Peloponnesian War**, transl. C.F. Smith, Loeb Class Library, 1991,I.23.6.

2. Thucydides has formed the fountainhead of the most influential statements of realism, cf. Robert Gilpin, **War and Change in World Politics**, New York, 1981, M.W. Doyle, **Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism**, W.W. Norton & Co., 1997, pp. 49-92, Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the study of World Politics", **Neorealism and its critics**, ed. R.O. Keohane, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p.6.

3. C.f. Donald Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, Cornell, 1969, pp. 369-72.

4. C.f. Donald Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, Cornell, 1969, pp. 369-372.

5. R. Jervis, **Perception and Misperception in International Politics**, Princeton University Press, 1976.

6. The Security Dilemma results from the fact that actions taken in order to enhance the security of a state will increase its capabilities and thus inadvertently increase its threatening power vis-a-vis its neighbours. The rationale received a classic formulation by R. Jervis, "Co-operation under the Security Dilemma", **World Politics**, 31, 2, January 1978.

7. This point is insightfully made by Jack Snyder, in his analysis of the myth of security through expansion in pre-war Germany and Japan, in **Myths of Empire**, Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1991.

8. Cf. Jacqueline de Romilly, **Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism**, tr. Philip Thody, Oxford, 1963.

9. Gilpin draws attention to this discrepancy, in his **War and Change in World Politics**, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 90.

10. Thucydides, **History**, I.89-117.

11. Thucydides gives a clear explanation of Spartan change of heart. The Spartans invited the Athenians in the first place due to their reputation for siege operations. But once the operation was not unsuccessful, the Spartans "grew afraid of the enterprise and the unorthodoxy of the Athenians; they reflected too that they were of a different nationality and feared that, if they stayed on in the Peloponnese, they might listen to the people in Ithome and become the sponsors of some revolutionary policy." It was the ideological threat to domestic institutions which threatened the Spartans, not the power of Athens; I.102, Warner translation.

12. Anton Powell, **Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 BC**, Routledge, 1988, pp. 59-135; Kagan, *op.cit.*, pp. 75-203.

13. Powell, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

14. Kagan, *op.cit.*,154-179.

15. Corcyra is an island in North-Western Greece, and had been a colony of Corinth.

16. Both in the case of the Athenian aid being rejected at the Helot revolt at Ithome and in the Spartan demand that the Athenians do not pursue the building of the long walls, Athenians were well aware of the true motives in Spartan actions.

17. We are obviously here not dealing with unit-states, but with alliances, where the rise in the power of one ally (Corinth) is an automatic addition to the strength, and threatening capacity, of another (Sparta).

18. "To forestall their schemes rather than to counteract them."

19. Though Corcyra was the third naval force in Greece, it fell outside the sphere of interest of both Athenians and Corinth. Corinthian engagement in Epidamnus could hardly be seen as reflecting vital interests of the city. Motives for undertaking the expeditions are not presented by Thucydides as anything other than emotive. In fact, as subsequent Corinthian argumentation to

the Spartans shows, it was Athenian expansion around the mainland of Greece and the Peloponnese which constituted the real problem.

20. So far my account seems to suggest that most of the weight of "responsibility"rests on the shoulders of the Corinthians, with the Athenians emerging as mere reactors. Yet, the Macedonian expedition indicates that the matter is not that simple: Athenians were surely taking initiatives. Moreover, the Poteideans would perhaps have never ended up in Corinth had the Athenians not dismissed their embassy seeking an agreement (I.58.1). They would consequently have not incited the Spartans and Corinthians in taking up the cause of their colony in Potidea, which Thucydides asserts they did as a response to pleas from the region and would presumably not have done so without them. Athenians could have prevented escalation by more temperate treatment of the embassy. This, however, does not undermine my argument. What is needed is the weighing of the causal relevance of these points in the decision-making of the Corinthians, and there, I argue, it is not fear that was principally motivating, but considerations of honour. The point is further supported by the fact that at no further point was Corinth really threatened by Athens.

21. One would have to engage in a thorough historical examination of the period in order to show that the Thucydidean claim of the rise of the power of Athens is problematic in the least, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. For a convincing, though not unproblematic, argument of this kind cf. Donald Kagan, *op.cit.*, esp. his chapters on "The First Peloponnesian War"and "The Years of Peace", pp. 75-202; and also pp. 357-8, with reference to an early formulation of the same position by E.Meyer, **Forschungen zur alten Geschichte**, II, Hale, 1899.

22. G.E.M. de Ste Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, Cornell**, 1972.

23. How the siege of a revolting Athenian colony was "wronging the Peloponnesus" is, of course, another matter.

24. The Spartan reluctance to enter wars, especially at a distance, was primarily due to the fear of a revolt of the Helots; c.f. Kagan, *op.cit.*, p.26, also referring back to Georg Busolt, **Die Lakedaimonier und Ihre Bundesgenossen**, Leipzig, 1878, for an early elaboration of the argument.

25. See below, the analysis of I.69.2-5, where this argument is made.

26. The obvious exception is the promise that the magistrates of the Lacedaemonians gave to the Poteideans, that they would invade Attica if the Athenians attacked their city (I.58.1). But the Athenians did attack, and as the ensuing account will attempt to show, Spartan deliberation had to go through many stages in order to arrive at the decision to fulfill the promise.

27. Thucydides, **History of the Peloponnesian War**, trans.. Rex Warner, Penguin, 1972, p. 104.

28. Cf. Clifford Orwin, **The Humanity of Thucydides**, Princeton University Press, 1994, n.31, p. 44.

29. This was, of course, wrong, as the Spartans themselves came to acknowledge later. The question is then, why did the Spartans mislead themselves into thinking so, and whether this was the final consideration in choosing war.

30. Though, of course, Sthenelaides' last phrase, "And do not allow the Athenians to become greater"(I.86.5) returns to our theme, but does not seem adequate to account for the change in opinion.

31. G.E.M. de Ste Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War**, Cornell, p. 59-60. Though as de Ste Croix notes, the most likely alternative for Corinth would have been Argos, which had concluded a 30 Years Peace with Sparta in 451/50. This peace agreement was still strong. There was, in other words, not much that Corinth could actually do, except "bandwagon" with Athens. That seems highly unlikely, though.

The Impact of Thucydides on Postwar Realist Thinking and Its Critique

Despina A. Taxiarchi*

> *It will be enough for me however, if these words of mine are judged useful words by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last forever.*[1]
>
> *Thucydides, I.22*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article traite de l'influence qu'a exercée la vision de la guerre et des relations inter-étatiques de Thucydide sur les théoriciens de l'École de pensée réaliste. Bien que Thucydide fut un réaliste dans l'acceptation moderne du terme, le catégoriser dans l'une ou l'autre des sous-écoles du Réalisme s'avèrerait simpliste et trompeur. En effet, une étude poussée des ses analyses met à jour une approche réaliste complexe qui ne fait qu'ajouter à l'héritage que nous a légué ce grand historien et théoricien.

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how Thucydides' understanding of war and interstate relations has infuenced the theorists of the Realist school of thought. It argues that although Thucydides was a Realist himself in the modern use of the term, it seems quite simplistic and therefore misleading to seek to classify the great historian's thinking in one or the other variant of Realism. Instead, a more thorough reading of his analysis reveals a rather complicated Realistic approach which only adds to his legacy as a historian and a theorist who can offer timeless insights into contemporary power politics.

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Introduction

Very few would doubt that time has rewarded Thucydides in fulfilling his ambitious purpose of producing a classic work. Indeed, his *History of the Peloponnesian War* has long occupied a prominent position among scholars and statesmen who invoke its unconditional and timeless relevance to successive periods of world history. Especially during the Cold War, international relations theorists and, in particular, the realists went so far as to identify Thucydides as the "Founding Father of Realism", claiming that one could glean numerous insights from *The Peloponnesian War* which could prove valuable in the understanding of contemporary interstate politics. Indeed, Robert Gilpin, a prominent representative of the Realist school of thought, characteristically notes that "one must inquire whether or not twentieth-century students of international relations know anything that Thucydides and his fifth-century BC compatriots did not know about the behavior of states... Ultimately, international politics can be still characterized as it was by Thucydides."[2]

Whether this view is correct or not may be argued; however, Thucydides' tremendous impact on postwar Realist thinking remains undisputed.

The aim of this study is to examine the major themes and theories developed by the Realists which in their view were first tackled in *The Peloponnesian War*. These themes will be approached not exclusively from the Realists' point of view but also from that of scholars -both contemporary IR theorists and classicists- who are neither self-identified nor identifiable as belonging to the Realist school of thought. This article highlights the most controversial points in the debate on so-called "Thucydidean Realism" and explores (a) how much of a Realist Thucydides was and what he has to offer contemporary international relations; (b) what this discussion and the variety of approaches to Thucydides' perspective tell us about the risks that every scholar aspiring to appeal to Thucydides' thinking must face in order to establish his or her own theories and prove that their applicability may be traced back twenty-four centuries.

I. Hegemonic Wars and Thucydides' "Great War"

One of the most fervent supporters of the classical character of Thucydides' work is Gilpin, who has based his theory almost entirely on Thucydides. In fact, Gilpin has credited Thucydides as

the first to introduce the theory of hegemonic war,[3] epitomized in the concept that "the dynamic of international relations is provided by the asymmetrical growth among states".[4]

According to Thucydides' theory, at an initial stage the international system is relatively stable due to the hierarchical ordering of the states as defined by the distribution of power among them. Yet since human beings are driven by three fundamental passions: *interest, pride* and *fear*, they always aim to advance their own interests and increase their power and wealth. As a consequence, it is highly possible for a minor state to increase its power disproportionately and seek to challenge the supremacy of the dominant state. This process leads to a severe disequilibrium in the international system.[5] If the hegemonic power, in turn, fails to preserve the existing distribution of capabilities in the system, it is most likely that the crisis will precipitate a hegemonic war. The outcome of such a war will be the redistribution of power among the political actors and the creation of a new international order in which the victorious power will extend its new hegemony.[6]

Thucydides' contribution to the contemporary analysis of war, according to Gilpin, lies in his attempt to demonstrate that "great wars were recurrent phenomena with characteristic manifestations. A great or hegemonic war, like a disease, displays discernible symptoms and follows an inevitable course."[7] Symptoms of a hegemonic war could be synopsized as follows:

•involves an open conflict between the leading power(s) of an international system, the rising challenger(s), other major states and most minor states

•is caused by substantial changes in the political, strategic and economic sphere and certainly threatens to transform the *status quo* of the existing international structure (the basic issues at stake: What will be the nature of the international system? and Who will govern the new system?)

•because of the vast scope of the actors involved, it is an unlimited conflict, in terms of the eventual means used, its intensity and duration.[8]

Does the Peloponnesian War really fit into this theoretical model? Undoubtedly, the Peloponnesian War was a great war in the sense that -as Thucydides notes- it "was the greatest disturbance in the history of the Hellenes, affecting also a large part of

the non-Hellenic world, and indeed, the whole of mankind".[9] More importantly, the aim of this war was not limited. Thucydides claims it was about "hegemony over Hellas."[10] Indeed, when the war broke out between Athens and Sparta, in 431 BC, it soon took the form of a struggle for leadership of the new structure which would emerge in the international system of the Greek world. Sparta was the uncontested hegemonic power until the end of the Persian Wars (480 B.C). However, in the fifty years which followed the defeat of the Persian Empire, Athens increased its power and gradually built up its own empire which threatened to change the existing hierarchy of power. Each of the two rivals sought to reorder other city-states to its own alliance system, thus polarizing the Greek world between two opposing blocs: the Delian League (led by Athens) and the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta).[11] Hence, the whole of Hellas became entangled in a war, whose conclusion would determine the new hegemon and the new hierarchy of power in the system.

Although it seems that during the second half of the fifth century the necessary conditions for the outbreak of a hegemonic war in Hellas came into existence, not all contemporary theorists subscribe with the view that Thucydides' "Great War" should be classified as a hegemonic war. Donald Kagan, for instance, argues that the great Peloponnesian War was not the type of war that, for all its costs, creates a new order that permits general peace for a generation or more. Indeed, the peace treaty of 404 BC, which marked the conclusion of the war, reflected only temporarily the dominant position of Sparta. The Spartans failed to maintain their hegemonic position in the international system, since they eventually proved inadequate and inferior to the requirements of their new imperial position.[12] In the same vein, Mark Kauppi stresses that not only Sparta's dominance was short but even during that period, Sparta showed no willingness to behave as the hegemonic power over the rest of the Greek world. Its major concern was rather how to "thumb down the helots than expand its empire."[13] Also Gilpin himself questions Thucydides' perception that Sparta was the hegemon of the time and Athens the emerging power which challenged the former's supremacy.[14] In his view, when the war started, Athens was no longer just a rising power, but it had already taken over the hegemonic position from Sparta.[15]

Nevertheless and despite any objections to the association of the Peloponnesian War with the model of the "War for Hegemony",

several scholars seem to recognize that the Neorealists -including Gilpin- use the term "hegemony" in an identical way with that of Thucydides. Even this approach, however, is not without its critics. Daniel Garst, for instance, believes that this is a superficial resemblance. Although he admits that both Neorealists and Thucydides understand the term "hegemony" as leadership, he stresses that in Neorealism the concept of hegemony lacks the moral dimension which played a central role in Thucydides' analysis. In Garst's view, the greatest mistake the Neorealists make in their analysis of the great historian's thinking, is that they try to approach his understanding about hegemony and hegemonic war *out of historical context*, since they link these concepts with systemic imperatives which regulate the behavior of states. By contrast, Garst notes, "Thucydides reminds us that power and hegemony are above all bound to the existence of political and social structures and the inter-subjective conventions associated with them."[16]. This argument, although not strong enough to make by itself the case that the structuralist approach of Thucydides' reading is not sufficient, touches at the core of the problem that most contemporary theorists faced in their attempt to give an objective account of Thucydides' analysis. In fact, as it will be demonstrated clearer further below Thucydides was too complicated to be strictly classified in one or the other variant of Realism.

II. Causal Explanation of Wars and Power Transition Theories

While Robert Gilpin has explicitly applied his theory on Hegemonic War to The Peloponnesian War, other contemporary Realists focusing on the causal explanation of wars and power transition theories have equally claimed to trace their intellectual lineage to Thucydides.

a. Causes of War

Thucydides is credited as the first to make the distinction between underlying and immediate causes. Indeed, although students of *The Peloponnesian War* invariably quote Thucydides' famous explanation at I.23, that the war was spurred by the growth of the Athenian power and the fear this caused to Sparta, a more thorough insight of his work indicates that the Greek historian was very careful in distinguishing between grounds for complaints (*αιτίαι και διαφοραί*), accusations (*εγκλήματα*), precipitants (*προφάσεις*) and the truest precipitant of war (*η αληθέστατη*

πρόφασις).[17]

In his discussion on the origins of the "Great War", Thucydides proceeds to an analysis -very familiar to the Realist approach- of the factors which prompted the shift of the distribution of power among the Greek city-states and eventually led to the outbreak of the war.[18] Thus, he traces three important determinants which -in his view- explained the transformation of Athens into an imperial power: First, it was its geographic position, demographic pressure and poor economic resources which prompted Athens to turn to commerce. Second, it was the Athenian superiority of naval power which offered great opportunities for the expansion of commerce and subsequently the establishment of the whole Hellas as the hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, there were significant technical innovations of naval power as well as other "technological" developments -such as fortification techniques- which favored the growth of the Athenian power. Third, it was the Persian Wars and the new strategic environment their conclusion created, as Athens emerged victorious, while Sparta adopted a rather isolationist policy. This factor coupled with the coming into power in Athens of a wealthy commercial class, eager to expand its economic interests, gave a further boost to the growth of Athens.[19]

The synthesis of all the above parameters caused a shift in the balance of power between the two powerful countries and the forging of two rival camps: These factors, according to Thucydides, are the *underlying* causes of the war, as opposed to the *immediate* causes, such as the dispute over Epidamnus, Corcyra and Potidea.[20] Still, none of them can be convincingly credited as the cause which made the war inevitable. For sure, on the eve of the outbreak of the hostilities, although both sides seemed fully aware of the potential disastrous implications of the imminent war, they appeared equally determined of waging it.[21] Was it out of patriotism or overreaction? Thucydides believes that the reason which eventually made the war inevitable was *fear*. The Athenians feared that if they allowed Corinth -Sparta's ally- to take control of Corcyra's navy, they would weaken their position in the Greek system. The Spartans, in turn, feared that the Athenians would tip the balance of power against Sparta. In short, both political actors were caught in -what the Realists term- a characteristic case of a *security dilemma*.[22] The lack of hierarchy of authority among the city-states had created lack of mutual trust

which, in turn, had forced each actor to function in a *self-help* system for its own security. The security dilemma in this case is that although the two sides may have not initially wished war, the self-help system -which encourages independent actions- made states to be suspicious of each other and therefore to presume the worst intentions for the other.[23] In this framework, as Thucydides puts it: "when tremendous dangers are involved, no one can be blamed for looking at his own interest,"[24] and of course the option of war becomes more than likely.

In any case, the fact that the Greek historian in his approach of the Peloponnesian War focuses on the anarchic conditions prevailing in the international system of the time and the reactions of states to potential changes of the existing balance of power, leaves no doubt that Thucydides in his analysis acts as an original Realist by proceeding to what in the IR terminology is called a "system-level explanation".[25]

Yet, without trying to undermine the value of this view, I suggest that this is only one aspect -although very important- of Thucydide's perspective. His explanation of the causes of the Peloponnesian War would remain incomplete if we ignored the equally great emphasis the Greek historian placed on the function of "second image" factors operating at the domestic level, and more specifically, the nature or character of the society. Indeed, as Kauppi rightly points out, Thucydides in his narrative illustrates how the democratic regime and the experience of the Persian Wars transformed the Athenians into a daring and outward-looking society, which in turn functioned as a driving force in the forging of an imperialist foreign policy. This unique character exhibited by the Athenians which made them restless and more ambitious in ever expanding their borders and acquiring power, further exacerbated the threat perceptions of Athens' neighbors and rivals.[26] Thus, on the one hand, there was Athens, a *polis* with a democratic regime and a free, daring, and cosmopolitan behavior, while on the other hand, there was Sparta which was oligarchic, conservative, isolationist and primarily interested in preserving its domestic *status quo*.[27]

b. Power Transition Theories and the Peloponnesian War

According to Thucydides, the element of "fear-of-Athens" did not exist in Sparta throughout the whole period of the rising of

the Athenian power. Indeed, the Spartans remained inactive as long as they perceived that the Athenian growth did not constitute a threat to their national interests. It was only when the "Athenian strength attained a peak plain for all to see and the Athenians began to encroach upon Sparta's allies... that Sparta felt the position to be no longer tolerable", and decided to go to war.[28]

This concept of Thucydides that significant changes in the distribution of capabilities among the Greek city-states were directly related to the increase of the possibility of war, made the Realists to consider him as the first " power transition theorist". According to power transition theorists, when a radical change of the distribution of capabilities occurs in the international system, hegemonic powers seek to preserve their own position, even if they need to resort to war. In other words, any rising power which challenges the supremacy of the dominant power is bound to face a rigid opposition.[29]

Yet, not all power transition theorists approach the same way the conditions leading to a change of the system. One could at least identify two major variants: The first variant focuses on the rise and the fall of the states in economic, political and military terms[30] and the second, on the relationship between change in power capabilities and the initiation of war.[31] Between the two approaches, the latter seems to be closer to Thucydides' perception of ancient Greek system. This approach is also shared by A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler who argue that the more the power of a state grows, the greater the probability of war is.[32] In other words, war is most likely when the power capabilities of the rising state approach those of the hegemonic state. At that point, the weaker state decides to go to war in order to change the *status quo* of the system in its favor.[33]

Charles Doran and Wes Parsons advance another argument maintaining that states trace a power transition cycle which starts with their rise and closes with their fall. What is innovative in their theory is the assumption that a state might initiate a war -apart from the top- at three other points of the cycle: the ascendance, the maturation and the decline. This is because at these four points a dramatic change occurs in the balance of power among the states of the system, although it is believed that the possibility of war is greater when the state is at its ascendance or at its decline.[34] Kauppi, by contrast, holds that the Peloponnesian War

represents one of the most characteristic examples of war which erupted when the dominant power was on the top of its power cycle, that is, when it realized that it was already loosing out its power.[35] At this point, the declining power -which has still the military superiority- opts to launch a *preventive war* in order to destroy the challenging power. This was the case with Sparta. When its statesmen faced the dilemma "to decline or to fight" they chose the latter.[36] A different explanation regarding the timing of the initiation of the Peloponnesian War comes from Doran who believes that the Peloponnesian War belongs to the cases in which the eruption of a war is the result of the existing tension between the hegemonic power and its challengers. In such cases, because of the tense atmosphere, the possibility for over-reaction and miscalculation is great.[37]

Yet, as it happens with most attempts made by contemporary IR theorists to draw analogies from Thucydides' work, the applicability of power transition theories to *The Peloponnesian War* does not go unchallenged. Lebow, for instance, points to the fact that there is no agreement among power transition theorists either about the causes prompting such dramatic changes in the system, or about the timing of the onset of war.[38] Also, according to power transition theorists, it is presumed that war starts when a state approaches or threatens to surpass the power of the hegemon. Although the outbreak of war does not always coincide with the timing of the power change, it is expected that the gap between these two elements is as narrow as possible. Yet the war between Athens and Sparta broke out much later than the period in which the Athenian power saw its decline or when it was in its ascendance again.[39]

Doran points to another "flaw" in the case of the Peloponnesian War: According to power transition theorists, statesmen are assumed to have a good understanding of potential changes in the distribution of capabilities and react accordingly. Yet, the Greek example points to the contrary. Although Athens had already become a hegemonic power of the Greek world some forty years before the start of the "Great War", Sparta did nothing to prevent it or to change its new position. Moreover, when the war eventually erupted, it became apparent that neither the Spartans had a good understanding of the relative power between the two rival blocs when they proclaimed war, nor the Athenians had a good grasp of the military power of Sicily, when they decided the expedition in 413 B.C.[40]

III. The Peloponnesian War and the Cold War: A Recurrent Story?

a. Similarities and Differences

For several theorists belonging to the Realist school of thought, Thucydides' work has also been the source of inspiration in their understanding of the Cold War system, as they claim to discern numerous similarities in the hegemonic rivalry between Sparta and Athens, on the one hand, and the United States and the former Soviet Union, on the other. Between the two cases, the Realists identify a recurrent pattern: there are two allies who defeat a common enemy in a devastating war. In the fifth century B.C, Sparta and Athens fought together against Persian imperialism. In the twentieth century, the United States allied with the Soviet Union during World War II to halt German aggression. With the end of these great wars, the former allies turn against each other. When Athens and Sparta did not feel threatened anymore by Persia, they both started suspecting one another as the potential power to take the leadership of the rest of Hellas.[41] By the same token, George Kennan -the influential American policy-maker during the Cold War- in his famous "X" article, in 1947, urged the United States to adopt a policy of containment towards the Soviet Union, so as to prevent the latter from taking under control the industrial and military resources of the defeated Germany.[42]

In geopolitical terms, it could be argued that the leading powers had adopted a hegemonic attitude towards the other states of the system. Athens became the dominant power of an empire (*αρχή*) whose member-states experienced an indiscriminate interference from the part of Athens with their domestic and foreign affairs. On the other hand, Sparta became the leader of a hegemonic alliance (*συμμαχία*) which was rather loose, thus leaving enough autonomy to its members.[43] Similarly, in the aftermath of World War II, as the US and the Soviet Union emerged as the sole dominant powers of the international system, they formed two antagonistic alliances thus dividing the system into two camps.

Another common characteristic between the two dyads is that very often crises, which emerged in the periphery of the two

alliances, functioned as another territory of indirect confrontation between the two leading powers, thus bringing them very close to a direct military encounter. This was the case -for instance- in Epidamnus, Corcyra and Potidea in ancient Hellas, and in Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan during the Cold War. Also, it is interesting to note how the alliance leaders of both periods in question, failed -in most cases- to tackle efficiently sub-regional crises when they decided to intervene militarily, as it occurred with the Athenian expedition to Sicily, the American intervention in Vietnam or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[44] Finally, in political and ideological terms, there is the proclivity to associate Athens with the US as the sea powers with liberal and democratic regimes, and Sparta with the USSR as the land powers with oligarchic and authoritarian regimes.[45]

If, however, contemporary IR scholars can trace these similarities between the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War, the *dis*-similarities appear much more striking and perhaps more significant. Joseph Nye dismisses categorically all these "patently shallow historical analogies" which tend to present USA in the place of ancient Athens and the Soviet Union in that of Sparta. He points to the fact that it was not only Sparta or its equivalent Soviet Union which were "slave states", but also classical Athens was a slave-holding state torn by domestic upheavals. Furthermore -contrary to the Cold War- it was "oligarchic" Sparta which eventually won and not "democratic" Athens.[46]

Also, according to Gilpin, one of the most glaring differences between the two wars is that while the Athens-Sparta rivalry represented a clearly bipolar structure, the American-Soviet confrontation appeared in the last decade of the Cold War to have been replaced by a rising multipolar system.[47] In addition to this, it should be reminded that the Cold War ended without being ever fought, while the Peloponnesian War was a real long-lasted and disastrous war. This is attributed to the fact that the American-Soviet antagonism was primarily based on nuclear deterrence, a factor which eventually prevented the two rivals from any direct confrontation.[48] On the contrary, in the fifth-century Greek system, there was no such powerful weapon to function as an efficient deterrent of war. As Carlo Santoro rightly points out referring to the ancient Greek case, "war was always a feasible choice because the values at stake were not the physical survival of the society, but only the distribution of power and

wealth".[49]

Moreover, because of the irretrievable character that the use of nuclear weapons could have had on the international system, the two Cold War superpowers adopted an attitude entirely opposite to that of Athens and Sparta: that is, they refrained from interfering with the sphere of influence of each other. With scant exceptions, they avoided any form of direct offensive action and, instead, they chose to comply with the *status quo* as agreed in Yalta, in 1945. Moreover, they refrained from exerting pressure on neutral states in order to compel them to side with one or the other bloc. Weaker states also -contrary to the example of ancient Corinth which incited the Peloponnesian War- avoided to provoke a superpower confrontation.[50]

b. Democracies *vs* Authoritarian Regimes

Similar analogies between the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War have been also drawn *vis-à-vis* the role of the ideology and the nature of the regime of the protagonists of the two historical periods. This time the comparison regards the "democratic" dyad of Athens-US *versus* the "authoritarian" one of Sparta-USSR. Against this argument, Philip Sabin warns that despite the strategic similarities between the two periods, one can discern "important ideological and constitutional differences" between the type of the Athenian democracy and that of the American. More specifically, ancient Athens was a rather radical democracy, since -due to the small size of the city- it was feasible for the citizens to vote directly, whereas nowadays people can only be represented by parliamentary systems.[51] In the same vein, Matthew Evangelista notes that not only Athens, but also Sparta should be considered democratic, given that both city-states applied the same practice in their decision-making process: there was a real debate held in an assembly and followed by public vote.[52]

Again, it appears that this very element of democracy sometimes functioned at the expense of the national interest of the states and although external factors did exert a restrictive role on the policy-makers of each state, they did not always determine their decisions.[53] Thucydides, in his narrative, has repeatedly noted how precarious and sometimes unforseeable was the outcome of open debates -which were the blueprint of their democratic regime- since competent public speakers and politicians could eas-

ily shift or even manipulate public opinion.[54] It is precisely this important remark that makes some scholars to assert that Thucydides very often moves from the "second-image" analysis based on state character, to a "first-image" explanation based on human nature, whereby the individuals and especially the elite personalities at the time are considered as the prime initiators of certain collective actions with implications to world politics. This phenomenon is particularly evident in democratic Athens, where the spiritedness and individualism of its citizens give free rein to an imprudent pursuit of power with often disastrous effects for the city-state itself, culminating on the eventual fall of Athens after the Sicilian expedition.[55]

In autocratic states, by contrast, argues Evangelista, decision-making was much a rather straight forward process, since the authoritarian character of the regime tended to stifle the debate and consequently limit the range of options and initiatives.[56]

There is also the argument -favored by the theorists of the Liberal school of thought- that states with a democratic regime are inclined to adopt a more peaceful policy among themselves than authoritarian states.[57] Yet, as the Realists have rightly pointed out, the classical Athens case demonstrates rather the opposite. In fact, not only it did not show a pacific tendency towards the other *poleis*-states, but it still represents a good illustration of how belligerent and aggressive democracies can be. In a number of instances, one can deduce the Athenian assertiveness and expansionism of its empire starting with the Megarian Decree[58] and culminating with the expedition to Sicily in 413 B.C. Needless to say that Athens used the same "non-democratic" methods by treating its allies in the Delian League rather as subject peoples, than as equal members of an alliance.[59] As Pericles himself reminds to the Athenian public:

> Do not imagine that what we are fighting for is simply the question of freedom or slavery: there is also involved the loss of our empire and the danger arising from the hatred which we have incurred in administering it...
>
> Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.[60]

These words are illustrative of Thucydides' thesis that not only democratic societies do not necessarily have pacifying effects on the international system, but -to the contrary- they demonstrate a

peculiar dynamism which finds expression in the nurture of expansionist and imperialistic aspirations. In this context, Thucydides deserves to be credited as the first theorist to note the imperialist as opposed to the pacifist character of democratic regimes.[61]

In the same vein, John Lewis Gaddis comparing the democratic US and the oligarchic Soviet Union, suggested that the democratic structure of domestic politics of the US, in essence, prevented the country from pursuing a more conciliatory policy towards the Soviets; whereas the autocratic nature of the Soviet regime -due to lack of pluralism- could have moved more freely into appeasing the tension, if it had wished so.[62]

IV. Alliances and Balance of Power: In Search for Stability

The Peloponnesian War and the international relations system of the time also served contemporary Realists as a point of reference for another debate on the nature of the balance of power and the role of the alliances in retaining the stability in the system. The basic assumption of this debate is that due to the absence of a central and overriding authority, states tend to join their capabilities by forming alliances in order to better protect themselves against the threat of another power. Alliances, in turn, aim at preventing the ascendance of a hegemonic power and thus preserving the balance of power in the system.[63] At this point, the debate focuses on two issues: (a) Do *all* states resort to the formation of alliances in order to cope with the threat of a rising hegemon? (b) Which of the types of balance of power is more likely to lead to war, bipolarism or multipolarism?

Again, Thucydides' *History* of the "Great War" seems to offer valuable responses in the analysis of states' behavior. As a first remark it could be argued that the vast majority of alliance formation cases in Classical Greece were originated from the need of certain *poleis* to balance against some other *polis* seeking hegemony. In 432 B.C., for instance, Corcyra sought to align with Athens in order to protect itself against the threatening power of Corinth.[64] For similar motives, in 420 B.C., the Argives sought to balance against Sparta, by forging an alliance with Athens.[65]

Yet "balancing" against a potential aggressor was not the sole mode of action for the *poleis*. In some cases, the *poleis*-states

demonstrated a preference of "bandwagoning" instead of "balancing". According to the bandwagoning theory, states may choose to "climb on the bandwagon" of a rising challenger, thus enforcing the latter's already increasing power at the expense of the existing balance of power.[66] This phenomenon is particularly characteristic in small weak states, which -given their vulnerability to external threats- are more inclined to align with a rising power in the hope that major actors will act as a security umbrella for them.[67] A good illustration of "bandwagoning" in fifth-century Greece, is when in the aftermath of the Sicilian disaster, several *poleis* -and particularly those which until then had adopted a neutral stance toward the War- rushed to join the revolt which had broken up amongst the Delian League allies against Athens. For those states -given that Athens' defeat was imminent- to climb on the rebels' "bandwagon" meant that the end of the Great War would find them on the side of the winners.[68]

Overall, although IR theorists admit that states have no standard preference towards the one or the other system, it is agreed that in the majority of cases -including the Peloponnesian War era- states tend to "balance" rather than "bandwagon".[69] Surprisingly -and much to the disappointment of those scholars who emphasize on the striking similarities between the two historical periods- during the Cold War, American policy-makers appeared to be rather concerned with the "bandwagoning" phenomenon than with "balancing". This particularity is primarily attributed to structural reasons and to a lesser extent to cultural ones: The nuclear deterrent which made the war less probable, coupled with the "treaty obligations" which bounded the U.S. in its conduct of foreign policy, made the American policy-makers to place much more emphasis on the psychological factor of negotiation and credibility, than on the actual use of force as the Ancient Greeks did. These structural and cultural constraints however which allayed the possibility of the use of force, put more strain on the American leaders as they feared that if the U.S. lost its credibility as the leading power of the Western bloc, their allies might defect by climbing on the communist "wagon".[70]

An equally important issue which has long been debated amongst the IR scholars relates to the question of the grade of stability and security that bipolar and multipolar systems can bring about. Here again, the Realists suggest that by comparing the two

characteristic examples of hegemonic rivalry (Athens *vs* Sparta and US *vs* USSR), one can gain a better insight on this particular theme. The opinions, however, are not converging as to whether a bipolar or a multipolar political structure preserves the stability of the international system better.[71]

Kenneth Waltz is among those scholars who argue in favor of bipolarism. According to his theory, the less the number of the poles is, the less likely it is for the actors to miscalculate and go to war. This is because in a bipolar system, the dominant position of the two superpowers functions as a deterrent against offensive actions and allows a strict control over their respective subsystems.[72] In contrast to this conception is that of David Singer and Karl Deutsch who contend that multipolar power systems are more conducive to international stability. This thesis is based on the argument that the more the poles are (a) the less the share of the attention is that any state can devote to any other and (b) the more complex the interaction among the states is. Moreover, because of the high level of uncertainty in a multipolar system, decision makers tend to be more cautious and therefore, the possibility for an accentuation of tensions becomes less likely.[73]

How do these theories fit into the two historical models? In order to proceed to the examination of the applicability of the above theories, Realists have put into scrutiny a very basic assumption: Was the fifth century B.C. Greece a bipolar system divided into two blocs? If yes, then what conclusions could be drawn about the relation between bipolarity and war-proneness? Undoubtedly, the ancient Greek world was partitioned into two spheres of influence whose major opponents were the leading powers of two respective alliances: The Lacedaemonian League, on the one hand, which functioned as a loose web of bilateral alliances between *poleis* and it was led by Sparta and the Delian League, on the other hand, which was structured rather as "an imperial confederation" whose metropolis (Athens) constituted the supreme economic, military and political power in the alliance.[74]

The apparent similarities between this bipolar structure of the ancient Greek system and that of the Cold War era led several scholars to the logical question: If bipolarism was the system which dragged the two rivals into the Peloponnesian War, then why did the same system have a deterrent effect during the Cold War era, thus preventing the two superpowers from going to war? As Santoro explains, a bipolar system is an inherently unsta-

ble system to the extent that the outbreak of war becomes inevitable. Nevertheless, as it was mentioned earlier on, the factor which made the difference between the two historical cases, is that the Cold War central actors possessed the nuclear weapon. Given that the destructive power of this weapon could not guarantee the victory to either of the two rivals, it was used as an effective tool for deterring the outbreak of a global war. By contrast, the deterrent value of the conventional force which ancient Greece possessed, was very limited since the use of such a force would only lead to the redistribution of capabilities. Consequently, the concept of war in those cases was not just a realistic option but often the preferred one in order for each state to either maintain or change the existing balance of power so as to achieve a more favorable distribution of capabilities.[75]

Yet, this picture of fifth century B.C. Greece as a clearly bipolar structure is not fully shared by all theorists. In fact, it is argued that although Thucydides himself in the beginning of his narrative presents the whole Greece as being divided into two camps, he later explains that the ancient Greek world was rather multipolar, as several sizeable city-states -such as Thebes and Corcyra- preferred to move between the two alliances, depending on their interests, rather than play with the rules of bipolarism.[76]

In the same vein, Frank Wyman uses the historic period at the onset of the Peloponnesian War as a characteristic example of his theory on power multipolarity. More specifically, he contends that in a system which is power multipolar, warfare is of higher magnitude, if it occurs, compared with a power bipolar system. This is because in a multipolar system, the big powers are not self-reliant; therefore, any member of their coalition which creates a serious crisis could drag the big power and consequently the whole alliance into a war. That was the case, in Wyman's view, when, in the dispute between Corcyra and Corinth, Athens felt compelled to defend the former and Sparta the latter.[77]

Finally, a more conciliatory and perhaps more convincing approach in the definition of the structure of the ancient Greek world comes from some scholars who talk about a "bi-multipolar" or a "quasi-bipolar" system which was characterized by the dominance of the two relatively stronger powers, but there were also other minor actors who could influence the interaction among the states. Underlying this argument there is a very simple syllogism: If one accepts that classical Greece was a bipolar system,

one would expect that both Athens and Sparta would not be affected by the defection of their allies. But that was not the case, since none of the two rivals was powerful enough to afford defections. On the other hand, if one accepts the option of the multipolar system, one would expect a continuous shift of alliances in order to adjust to changes in relative power. Again that was not the case, as both protagonists were too powerful to be balanced by any peripheral changes in alliances. What eventually happened in the Greek example is a good illustration - according to Doyle- of how quasi-bipolar systems function by combining the flaws of both systems: On the one hand, the fear which was caused in Athens and Sparta by the prospect of defection of Corinth and Corcyra undoubtedly worked as a precipitant in bringing the two superpowers into war. On the other hand, both cities were not powerful enough to tilt the balance of the two major actors in the system.[78]

V. Instead of Conclusion: Understanding Thucydidean Realism

It is certainly not an easy task to understand and interpret the work and the thinking of a historian and theorist who lived almost two and a half millennia ago. But it is much more difficult and ambitious an endeavor to demonstrate how and to which extent Thucydides' work offers "timeless insights into the contemporary international politics" as the Realists claim.

The first conclusion drawn from this essay, is that despite any differentiations or criticisms coming from various scholars, I think most of them would agree that Thucydides *was* a Realist, in the sense that he embraced -at least- four fundamental assumptions of political Realism: First, that the state is the principal actor in the international system representing the key unit of analysis, regardless of whether the use of the term refers to the *poleis*-states of the ancient Greek world system or the modern type of states. Second, that the state acts as an integrated unitary actor with one policy. Third, that the state behaves in a rational way, and therefore understandable for any external observer. Fourth, that national security is the most important factor in world politics and therefore the state always aims at acquiring power.

What is also inarguable is that Thucydides had a huge impact on policy-makers and theorists of Realism especially during the Cold

War era, given that the structure of the international world of that period hinted in many aspects at the way the ancient Greek interstate relations functioned. However, as the comparison between the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War clearly demonstrates, students of Thucydides' *opus*, very often caught by the axiom of "Thucydides' relevance" did not avoid the trap of selectively quoting his judgements, in order to apply theories or practices deriving from a different historical context to the reality of their time and *viceversa*.[79] Thus, the favourite method of various scholars of introducing "historical relativism", instead of illuminating their analysis, often led them to serious misperceptions based on the presumably "striking similarities" between the two historical periods.[80]

This mistake of "selective reading" has also tempted several theorists to classify the Greek historian in one or the other variant of Realism. This is particularly characteristic in the case of Neorealists who -by using Thucydides' famous explanation of the "truest cause"- claim that Thucydides proceeds to a purely structuralist analysis. Yet, as it was discussed in this paper, a more careful reading of his *History*, proves that Thucydides, apart from his direct method of explaining the various developments, also tried indirectly to look into events by placing them in multiple levels of analysis -the international system, the domestic factors, and the role of the individual. Having this in mind, Doyle rightly notes that "paternity suits tend to be messy, for each version of Realism can identify its views in Thucydides' *History*".[81]

This remark leads us to the core issue in the study of the Greek historian's work: What type of a Realist was Thucydides? Does his approach constitute a special variant in Realism? To be sure, Thucydides believed, just as the Realists do, that *poleis*-states because of the anarchic nature of the international system are in a constant state of war in their attempt to improve their security and increase their relative power. Yet, although he placed special emphasis on the analysis of the predominance of the poleis-states as the key units in the ancient Greek world system, he did not think that states were the only actors in it. On the other hand, his explanation that human beings are driven by three fundamental passions -interest, pride and fear- made quite clear that state behavior -in his view- was not always determined by structural factors. Indeed, Thucydides dedicated a significant part in his narrative to explain how human nature and individuals -especially the leading personalities- affected the conduct of international

affairs. Of course he never went as far as to suggest that the individual alone could independently shape the international system and the existing balance of power. Finally, Thucydides gave similar credence to the national character of the state and domestic considerations, as a factor which could influence a state's proclivity to war or peace. Democratic and imperialistic Athens *vs* the oligarchic and hegemonic Sparta was the perfect dyad for Thucydides to analyze the shaping of states' foreign policy.

Having set the framework of the complexity of Thucydides theory, it becomes quite obvious that, despite the admittedly prominent position of the structural level of the Greek historians' analysis, every single approach which tends to overemphasize this type of analysis by entirely ignoring or diminishing the importance of the other factors -examined above- is bound to remain incomplete and perhaps misleading, as none of them could stand alone - according to "Thucydidean Realism"- to adequately explain international relations.

Concluding, it appears that Thucydides has inarguably valuable insights to offer on the concept of war and the pursuit of power, the origins of hegemonic war, the forming of alliances and the political behavior of democracies *vs* authoritarian states. To this end, the Peloponnesian War can be most rewarding in the understanding of the Cold War era as well as on whether bipolarism or multipolarism is the system which can better preserve peace and stability. Finally, it is fascinating to realize how Thucydides understood and explained the implications of the shift in power capabilities in the international system, the balance of power system and the conditions under which the various transitions of power took place in the fifth-century B.C. Greek world. More importantly, however, it is most intriguing to discover at the same time, how relevant these theories of his are in contemporary world politics.

In this framework, IR specialists have an important contribution to make by understanding Thucydides, as there are numerous lessons to be drawn that could assist in understanding international relations. But on two conditions: it is important to bear in mind that Thucydides' ideas and interpretations reflected the values, inclinations and theories of his own time which are, understandably, different from those of nowadays. Therefore, students of *The Peloponnesian War* should beware of "reading" Thucydides within the context of his political culture and historical circumstances. On the other hand, it should be noted that his

approach of international politics could only be understood if it was read as a whole, whereby all three Waltzian images -as analyzed in his treatise- would be taken into account. This is perhaps the only way to rightly appreciate and benefit from what Martin Wight called "one of the supreme books" ever written on power politics.[82]

NOTES

1. Thucydides, **The History of the Peloponnesian War**, translated by Rex Warner, introduction by M.I Finley, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954, I.22, p. 48.

2. Robert Gilpin, **War and Change in World Politics**, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 227-228.

3. The term "hegemonic war" or "war of hegemony" was coined by Raymond Aron in order to describe the great wars of the twentieth century. See: Raymond Aron, "War and Industrial Society", in Leon Branson and George W. Goethals (eds.), **War - Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology**, N.Y., London: BasicBooks, Inc.,1964, p. 359.

4. Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", **Journal of Interdisciplinary History**, XVIII:4, (Spring 1988), "The Theory of Hegemonic War", p. 591.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 601.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 595 and Mark V. Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory and the Peloponnesian War" in Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss (eds.) **Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age**, Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 101-124. See also Aron, "War and Industrial Society", *ibid.*, p. 359.

7. Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", *ibid.*, pp. 594-595.

8. Robert Gilpin, **War and Change**, p.199. An important element to be added is that all major powers of the system and the majority of the minor ones tend to eventually join with one or another of the conflicting camps. Some characteristic examples of this type of war, are -apart from the Peloponnesian War- the Second Punic War, the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the wars of Louis XIV (1667-1713), the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic (1792-1814), and finally World War I and II. See Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid.*,

p.108

9. Thucydides, *ibid.*, I.1, p.35.

10. Robert Gilpin, **War and Change**, *ibid.*, p. 198. Gilpin believes that Thucydides considered the total of the Greek city-states as a relatively autonomous system and the stakes at war very high. See, for example, Pericles' speech to the Athenians before the outbreak of the war: "Let none of you think that we should be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megarian decree; (...) but if we do go to war , let there be no kind of suspicion in your hearts that the war was over a small matter...", (Thucydides, I.140, p. 119).

11. Gilpin, **War and Change**, *ibid.*, p. 199.

12. Donald Kagan, **The Fall of the Athenian Empire**, Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univerity Press, 1987, pp. 284-285.

13. Mark. V. Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid.*, pp.109-110.

14. Thucydides, I.23, p. 49. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War and Cold War", in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*

15. As it will be discussed further below, this is because, while Athens continued to grow following the end of the Persian Wars, Sparta fearing on one hand a domestic revolt by the subjugated helots, and on the other of being landlocked, failed to take advantage of the new opportunities for wealth and power and fell behind. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War and Cold War", in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, p.34.

16. See Daniel Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism", **International Studies Quarterly**, 33, 1989, pp. 22-25.

17. Thucydides, I.23. Also see Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and Causes of War", in Lebow and Strauss, (eds.) **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 125-165.

18. Gilpin, "Theory of Hegemonic War", *ibid.*, p. 597.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 597-599.

20. These disputes between minor city-states are considered by Thucydides only as the precipitants of the war but certainly not the substantial and true causes. See, Thucydides, I, 24-65, pp. 49-72.

21. Thudydides, I.78, pp. 81-82.

22. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., **Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History**, New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1993, pp. 8-16.

23. See also Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, **International Relations Theory**, NY: MacMillan Publ., 1993., pp. 47-50.

24. Thucydides, I.75, pp. 79-80.

25. Viotti and Kauppi, **International Relations**, *ibid.*, p. 49. A characteristic example of this approach is the passage which shows how Spartans felt insecure about the Athenian decision to rebuild their own fortifications following the end of the Persian Wars: "When the Spartans heard what was going on, they sent an embassy to Athens. This was partly because they themselves did not like the idea of Athens or any other city being fortified, but chiefly because they were urged on by their allies who were alarmed both by the sudden growth of Athenian sea-power and by the daring which the Athenians had shown in the war against the Persians." See Thucydides, I.89-90, pp. 87-89.

26. Mark V. Kauppi, "Thucydides: Character and Capabilities", in Benjamin Franckel (ed.), **Roots of Realism**, London: Frank Cass & Co., 1996, pp. 142-143.

27. Throughout his narrative, Thucydides takes the opportunity to highlight these differences often by appraising the uniqueness and superiority of the Athenians compared to the Spartans. See for instance, the speech by the Corinthians (I.70-71) and Pericles' *Funeral Oration* (II.35-46). The latter, in fact constitutes a eulogy of the institutions of Athenian society, such as: equality before the law, commerce, individual freedom in the way of living and education and finally the democratic policy-making processes. See: William T. Bluhm, "Causal Theory in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War", **Political Studies**, Vol. X, No.1, 1962, pp.15-35. Also, Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid.*, pp.103-105, and Gilpin, "Theory of Hegemonic War", *ibid.*, pp. 599.

28. Thucydides, I.118, p. 103.

29. George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", **Compartive Studies of Society and History**, 20, April 1978, pp. 214-235 and Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power", **The American Political**

Science Review, 74, December 1960, pp. 947-965.

30. In the first group Kauppi lists: G. Modelski, W. Thompson, I. Wallerstein,C. Chase-Dunn, etc. See Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid*, p. 105.

31. In the second group are included: Robert Gilpin, A.F.K. Organski and Charles F. Doran. See again Kauppi, *ibid.*

32. A.F.K. Organski, **World Politics**, New York: Knopf, 1967, 2nd ed., pp. 202-203.; A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler, **The War Ledger**, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980, Ch. 1 and 3.

33. *Ibid*, see also pp. 21-23. Lebow is skeptical about this view. He argues that there is also the possibility that the weaker state might either choose to wait until it becomes stronger than the dominant power, or it will attempt to change the *status quo* by peaceful means. See: Lebow, "Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and Causes of War", in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, pp. 135-137.

34. Doran and Parsons, "War and the Cycle", *ibid.*, pp. 949-952.

35. Kauppi, *ibid.*, pp. 106-107.

36. Gilpin, **War and Change**, *ibid.*, p.191.

37. Doran, "War and Power Dynamics: Economic Underpinnings", **International Studies Quarterly**, 27, December 1983, pp. 419-443.

38. Lebow, "Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and Causes of War", *ibid.*, pp. 136-137.

39. Lebow, *ibid.*, pp.139-140.

40. *Ibid*, pp. 139-141. These remarks, however, are conflicting with Thucydides' view that people were essentially rational beings and could therefore learn from their mistakes and avoid ill-fated decisions in the future. Although he himself could not deny, as Kauppi notes, "that there were cognitive limitations on rational decision-making and the problem of translating intentions into desired outcomes." See Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid.*, pp.112-119.

41. Robert Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War", *ibid.*, pp. 31-50. See John Lewis Gaddis, "Introduction: The Evolution of Containment", in John Lewis Gaddis and Terry L. Deibel, **Containing the Soviet Union**, London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, p. 1.

42. George Kennan (X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", **Foreign**

Affairs, 25 July 1947, pp. 566-582.

43. Donald Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969.

44. Carlo M. Santoro, "Bipolarity and War: What makes the Difference?", in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

45. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War", *ibid.*; also Philip G. Sabin, "Athens, the U.S, and Democratic Characteristics" in **Foreign Policy**, *ibid*, pp. 235-250, and Santoro, "Bipolarity and War" pp. 271-86, *ibid.*

46. Nye, **Understanding International Conflicts**, *ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

47. The Peloponnesian War escalated into a long and destructive war within the limited boundaries of the then perceived Hellenic territory, whereas the Cold War seemed to be spread out in a more global context and the military and economic power equally allocated in more than two rival powers. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War", *ibid.* As far as it concerns the debate over whether the two historical examples functioned as a bipolar or a multipolar system, it will be discussed at a later stage of this paper.

48. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is perhaps the most illustrative example of the restraining role nuclear weapons played between the two superpowers.

49. Santoro, "Bipolarity and War", *ibid.*

50. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War", *ibid.*, pp.46-48. Gilpin also suggests that the ideological factor may have played some positive role in the Cold War, as each side seemed convinced about the superiority and the correctness of its own ideology -capitalism and liberalism in the United States, communism and marxism in the Soviet Union- which made each superpower believe that it would eventually prevail over the other. Therefore, neither of the two protagonists really exerted any pressure towards open confrontation in order to claim victory. In the Peloponnesian War this was not the case, since ideology -in the sense it is used here- never really played a significant role.

51. Sabin, "Athens, the United States", *ibid.*, pp. 235-250.

52. Matthew Evangelista, "Democracies, Authoritarian States, and International Conflict", in Lebow and Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic**

Rivalry, *ibid.*, pp. 213-234.

53. Evangelista, "Democracies", *ibid.*, pp. 216-217.

54. See, for example, Thucydides' relevant passage on the dilemma Pericles faced when he decided not to send troops out to fight against Archidamus: "Pericles was convinced about the rightness of his own views about not going out to battle, but he saw that for the moment the Athenians were being led astray by their angry feelings. So he summoned no assembly or special meeting of the people, fearing that any general discussion would result in wrong decisions, made under the influence of anger rather than of reason", (Thucydides, II.22, pp. 138-139).

55. See, Ashley J. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory", in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), **Roots of Realism**, *ibid.*, pp. 3-25.

56. An illustration of this argument could be the case of Stalin in the Soviet Union who muffled any form of open dialogue. See Evangelista, *ibid.* pp. 215-218.

57. This argument is based on the premise that the democratic ethos embedded in republican states prevents them from adopting an aggressive foreign policy. Consequently, the greater the number of republican regimes, the better the prospects for international peace.

58. G.E.M. de Ste.Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War**, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 225-289.

59. By the same token, a contemporary IR scholar would find it difficult to draw any parallels between the fifth century B.C. Athenian Confederacy and the Cold War North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). On the contrary, it is rather the Spartan alliance -with its looser structure and the independence its members enjoyed- that should be associated with NATO, and the Athenian Alliance with the Warsaw Pact, than the opposite. See Sabin, "Athens, the United States", *ibid.*, p. 237-241.

60. Thucydides, II.63, p. 161.

61. Kauppi, "Thucydides: Character and Capabilities", *ibid.*, pp. 142-143 and 161-168.

62. John Lewis Gaddis, **The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

63. Viotti and Kauppi, **International Relations Theory**, *ibid.*, pp.

35-83.

64. Thucydides, I.31

65. Thucydides, V.44.

66. Barry S. Strauss, "Of Balances, Bandwagons, and Ancient Greeks", in Lebow and Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 189-210.

67. On the formation of alliances and the bandwagoning theory see: Stephen M. Walt, **The Origins of Alliances**, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987. Also, by the same author: "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power", **International Security**, 9:4 (Spring 1985); Ropert L. Rothstein, **Alliances and Small Powers**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968; Michael Handel, **Weak States in the International System**, London: Frank Kass, 1981; Robert Jervis, "Systems Theory and Diplomatic History", in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), **Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy**, New York: Free Press, 1979.

68. Thucydides, VIII.2

69. See Stephen M. Walt, **The Origins of Alliances**, *ibid*, p. 263. Also by the same author see: "Alliance Formation" *ibid.*, pp.3-43. Of course, there is a middle position which identifies both tendencies as a practice in contemporary interstate relations. See: Debora Welch Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?", in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (eds.), **Dominos and Bandwagons: Strategic Belief and Superpower Competition in the Eurasian Rimland**, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

70. George Kennan, one of the most influential American policy-makers during the Cold War, had characteristically warned that: "One of the vital facts to be borne in mind about the international communist movement in the parts of Europe which are not yet under Soviet military and police control is the pronounced "bandwagon" character which that movement bears....Those who hope to survive [...] in the coming days will be those who had the forsight to climb on the bandwagon when it was still the movement of the future." Cited in Strauss, "Of Balances", *ibid.*, p.189.

71. Santoro, "Bipolarity", *ibid.*, pp. 71-86.

72. Kenneth Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979; also, see Waltz, **Foreign Policy and**

Democratic Politics, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967.

73. F. Wyman, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Threat of War," in A.N. Sabrosky (ed.), **Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict**, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 116-117. See also K.W. Deutsch and J.D. Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", **World Politics**, 6, 1964, pp. 390-406.

74. Santoro, "Bipolarity", *ibid.*, pp. 76-77. See also Kagan, **The Outbreak**, *ibid.*, Doyle, **Empires**, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986 and W.R Connor, **Thucydides**, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

75. Santoro, *ibid.*

76. See Kagan "The Outbreak", *ibid.*, and Frank Wayman, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Threat of War", in Alan Ned Lebrosky (ed.), **Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict**,Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1985; W. R. Connor, "Polarization in Thucydides", in Lebow and Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 53-69

77. Wayman, "Bipolaity", *ibid.*

78. Michael W. Doyle, **Ways of War and Peace**, London, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, pp. 49-92. Also see Kauppi, "Contemporary" *ibid.* and Deutsch and Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems", *ibid.*

79. See Michael W. Doyle, "Thucydides: A Realist?", in Lebow & Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.* pp. 169-188. An earlier version of this chapter is Michael W. Doyle, "Thucydidean Realism", **Review of International Studies**, No.16, July 1990, pp. 223-237.

80. See W.G. Forrest, "Theory and Practice", in Lebow and Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 23-30.

81. Doyle, **Ways of War and Peace**, *ibid*, p. 91.

82. Martin Wight, **Power Politics**, London: RIIA and New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978, p. 24.

La pathologie de la guerre et la pédagogie de la paix chez Thucydide

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ABSTRACT

In ancient Greece, war was considered a standard situation, that was occasionally interrupted by peace. On one hand the following may be considered as aspects of the phenomenon of war: a) the manifestations of violence between rival groups and b) the armed conflicts between organized states, while forms of this phenomenon, according to Thucydides would be: a) dissension and b) fighting. On the other hand we could reflect on the phenomenon of peace as: a) the status of harmony, order, equilibrium and of calm between different socio-political forces, b) the status of tranquility and serenity in all sorts of human activities and c)the prosperity and the happiness of individuals, social groups and states. According to the historian, war seems to be a malady of human nature for which he tries to find the origin and the symptoms. Hence history is not viewed as a simple lesson of morality but rather as a practical and scientific one, a diachronical study of human psychology. Therefore, the amelioration of human mentality, thought and behavior depends mainly on the development and education of human beings.

RÉSUMÉ

Dans la Grèce antique, la guerre était considérée comme une situation normale, interrompue de temps à autre par un temps "mort": la paix. On peut considérer comme aspects du phénomène de la guerre : a) les manifestations de violence entre groupes rivaux, b) les luttes entre États organisés. D'après Thucydide les formes de ce phénomène sont : a) la dissension et b) la guerre. A l'opposé, on peut considérer comme aspects de la paix: a) l'état d'harmonie, d'ordre, d'équilibre et de calme des différentes puissances socio-politiques de toute espèce, b) l'état de tranquillité et de sérénité dans le spectrum des rapports humains et c) le bien-être et le bonheur autant des individus, des groupes sociaux ou des États. Pour l'historien, la guerre semble être une maladie dont il essaie de dépister l'origine et les symptômes dans le comportement et la nature de l'homme. L'histoire selon Thucydide ne constitue pas seulement une simple leçon de morale, mais plutôt un enseignement pratique et scientifique, une étude diachronique de la psychologie humaine. L'amélioration de la mentalité, de la pensée et du comportement de l'homme passent donc par la formation et le développement de la raison et de l'esprit.

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Introduction

L'idée de la paix -en tant que fin de l'éducation- n'a jamais cessé d'intéresser l'homme. Or, jamais les hommes n'ont acquis de paix durable et véritable. Plus spécialement dans la Grèce des cités-États, la guerre était considérée comme une fonction normale de l'état des choses, une situation interrompue de temps à autre par un temps "mort": la paix. Cette dernière, selon Bruno Keil, était une interruption de la guerre sur la base d'un accord, alors que la guerre n'était pas une interruption de l'état de paix.[1] Nous pourrions considérer comme aspects du phénomène de la guerre : a) les manifestations de violence entre groupes rivaux, b) les luttes entre États organisés. Et comme formes de ce phénomène, d'après Thucydide et Platon: a) la dissension et b) la guerre. La dissension (comme division ou discorde intestine) est associée à la notion de "*oikeion*" (intimité) et de "*xyggenes*" (parenté), tandis que la guerre est considérée comme quelque chose de "*allotrion*" (étranger) et "*othneion*" (qui concerne les autres).[2]

A l'opposé, nous pourrions considérer comme aspects de la paix: a) l'état d'harmonie, d'ordre, d'équilibre et de calme des différentes puissances socio-politiques de toute espèce, b) l'état de tranquillité et de sérénité dans toutes les sortes de rapports humains et c) le bien-être et le bonheur chez des individus ainsi que dans des groupes sociaux ou des États.[3]

"La guerre, un rude maître"

Après avoir examiné un assez grand nombre de passages de l'*Histoire* de Thucydide, il s'avère que l'historien considère que la dissension autant que la guerre:

a. sont des nécessités douloureuses inséparables de la nature humaine dans laquelle domine aussi une certaine part de haine;

b. sont des maux terribles qui causent la violence et le désordre politique;

c. sont destructives ("*phteirein tas poleis*"/ ruiner les cités), nuisibles et dangereuses;

d. incitent aux passions et sont des causes de tensions et de situations fiévreuses dans tout organisme d'État, et

e. ne pourraient être considérées que par manque d'expérience comme utiles et exemptes de dangers ("*agathon kai asphales nomisanta*"/ on a cru la guerre bonne et sûre).[4]

Pourtant, dans deux cas, l'historien semble justifier la guerre:

a. quand il s'agit de se secouer d'une domination étrangère,

b. pour l'honneur et la dignité de l'État, quand l'exigence, quelle qu'elle soit, s'impose par la force, et ne peut pas se résoudre par l'intermédiaire de la justice.[5]

Les véritables mobiles de tout conflit devront être localisés dans la psychologie des individus et des groupes sociaux ou États. Pour prendre un exemple, dans le cas de l'hégémonie athénienne, l'important, ce n'est pas cette hégémonie athénienne proprement dite, mais les sentiments qui en découlent et le désir de domination qui d'une part fait naître dans l'esprit du peuple athénien, le sentiment de l'impérialisme -qui est aussi interprété comme le résultat de la "*polypragmosynès*" (l'ingérence indiscrète) des Athéniens- et d'autre part crée chez les Spartiates la frustration et la peur. Ainsi la guerre et la dissension sont considérées comme des réactions psychologiques et sont en relation avec la nature humaine.[6]

Cependant Thucydide semble reconnaître que, sur le plan humain, le principe de l'évolution n'est pas assuré par le combat, mais par la cohabitation pacifique ("*xynallagè*") et que les guerres, et généralement les conflits armés, sont le résultat de la formation sociale, qu'il interprète au moyen de trois termes principalement:

a. "*to xympheron*" (l'intérêt) comme mobile de l'activité humaine, qui peut signifier aussi la réalisation de quelque but objectif,

b. la "*pleonexia*" (convoitise) qui est considérée comme synonyme de la "*polypragmosynè*" (l'ingérence indiscrète)

c. la "*philotimia*" (l'amour-propre).

L'"intérêt" est, en fait, économique et sert un État bien précis, par exemple l'État athénien. Ainsi les oppositions dans les relations entre États, aboutissant à l'aigreur et à l'intransigeance, détruisent la société et sa civilisation. Le principe de l'intérêt est totalement opposé au principe de la justice et du bien. L'intérêt individuel et propre à un parti ("*hetairia*"/ hétairie, "*xynodoi*"/ réunions) semble, de même, être compris et interprété par l'historien comme un produit de la formation sociale. Au cours de la guerre du Péloponnèse, les conflits entre États et les conflits internes ont été décisifs pour l'évolution du comportement humain. Les vaincus étaient anéantis et les vainqueurs étaient provisoirement satisfaits, dans la mesure où ils étaient possédés par le terrible sentiment de la convoitise et de l'amour-propre qui étaient une incitation à une activité téméraire.[7]

L'expression "*biaios didaskalos o polemos*" (la guerre, un rude maître),[8] occupe une place centrale dans l'*Histoire* de Thucydide et semble montrer que l'historien s'oppose aux opinions de son temps en ce qui concerne le droit du plus fort et l'usage de la violence.[9] Les hommes, "poussés de tout temps par un élan naturel irrésistible, dominent partout où leur puissance l'emporte".[10] A ce principe du plus fort, que l'historien reconnaît aussi dans l'activité politique des Athéniens, sont dus la cruauté de la guerre, l'affaiblissement des valeurs morales et l'exaltation des passions humaines. La guerre est un dominateur, qui utilise la violence et enseigne la violence, "le rude maître d'une rude école" ou "*a violent teacher and a teacher of violence*".[11]

Donc en décrivant l'horreur de la guerre -il percevait le récit comme une sorte de réflexion et de théorie, une observation du monde à travers une dialectique fondée sur les faits[12]- Thucydide a réussi, sans la citer, à parler de la paix. Malheureusement constate l'historien, c'est seulement quand ils subissent des malheurs que les hommes commencent à réfléchir.[13]

"Paix, le plus grand bien pour l'homme"

Dans l'*Histoire* de Thucydide, la paix est présentée comme suit:

a. c'est un genre temporaire de répit imposé par des raisons économiques, politiques et psychologiques;

b. elle est étroitement associée aux termes "*spondai*" (traité) et "*xymbasè*" (pacte) qui désignent la garantie religieuse d'un engagement réciproque, ou l'accord accompagné de conventions, ou d'obligations et

c. elle constitue une halte à l'intérieur du fonctionnement normal de la guerre.[14]

Voici comment l'historien considère la paix:

1. C'est le plus grand bien pour l'homme ("*ariston einai eirènè*"/ la paix est ce qu'il y a de meilleur").[15]

2. C'est l'unique moyen pour mettre fin à la guerre et à toutes les sortes de différends- le discours du Syracusain Hermocrate, adressé aux représentants des villes de Sicile au sujet des moyens d'éviter la guerre, montre la démystification de la nécessité et de la toute-puissance de la guerre pour régler les différends en contractant la paix.[16]

3. C'est l'unique moyen capable d'assurer des gloires et des honneurs sans danger et bien d'autres avantages, selon les termes de l'historien.

4. C'est la seule situation permettant aux institutions d'État d'être préservées et de rester immuables.

5. C'est elle qui promeut l'amitié entre hommes et entre États.

6. C'est quelque chose qui peut être assuré non pas avec la force, mais avec la magnanimité (*"prokalesamenôn charisamenois te mallon è biasamenôn"*) dans la mesure où la paix correspond à une résistance égale entre voisins.[17]

Cependant, selon l'historien, les hommes vivent dans des situations alternées: "tantôt ils constatent la paix, et tantôt ils font la guerre",[18] et cette alternance est très importante, personne ne peut le méconnaître. Tout ce que les représentants de Corinthe proposent aux leurs, quand ils leur montrent le comportement de tous ceux qui sont victimes d'injustice, est caractéristique: "c'est pour cette raison qu'ils ne doivent pas hésiter à remplacer la paix par la guerre. Car il est normal que les hommes raisonnables restent tranquilles du moment qu'ils ne doivent pas être victimes d'injustice, et que les hommes courageux, du moment qu'ils sont victimes d'injustice, préfèrent la guerre au lieu de la paix, et reviennent à cette dernière dès qu'ils ont obtenu satisfaction que procure la tranquillité de la paix".[19]

En lisant l'*Histoire* de Thucydide, nous pouvons nous rendre compte que le règlement non-violent des différends est celui qui véritablement préserve la justice, la liberté et la démocratie.[20] Certes, pour Thucydide le problème de la paix n'est pas simple, car nombreux sont les obstacles et les facteurs suspensifs (spécialement la nature humaine) qui pourraient détourner de cet effort. Cependant, l'approche fataliste et philosophico-religieuse de la paix ne donne aucun résultat. La recherche de ses causes dans la nature de l'homme pourrait peut-être aider à éviter la violence.

La pathologie de la guerre

Le mobile fondamental de l'historien, même si inconscient, est de placer sous nos yeux l'image de la catastrophe, de la chute morale et de la noire perspective auxquelles conduit la guerre, et plus spécialement la discorde intestine.[21] Ainsi, dans de nombreux passages de l'*Histoire,* les auditeurs et les lecteurs de l'ouvrage

deviennent témoins de passions politiques. Mais là où ces images acquièrent leur plus forte intensité et montrent à quel paroxysme de haine peuvent arriver les passions humaines, c'est dans le récit de la guerre civile à Corcyre.[22] Prenant pour prétexte les cruautés qui se sont manifestées dans cette île en 427 av. J.-C., l'historien, dans les chapitres 81, 82, 83 et 84 de son troisième livre, est amené à faire des remarques générales au sujet des conséquences morales de la guerre du Péloponnèse et de chaque guerre en général: ce morceau, et plus particulièrement les chapitres 82 et 83, a reçu l'appellation de "pathologie de la guerre",[23] étant donné que c'est là qu'il est montré comment les hommes peuvent se comporter quand éclate une guerre.[24] Ce morceau, malgré les problèmes de langue[25] qu'il présente, est riche en remarques d'ordre psychologique (voir l'Annexe).[26] Le texte, formulé sur un ton personnel -fait qui montre aussi l'importance des remarques de l'historien, puisque cela arrive rarement dans son *Histoire* - a pour but de présenter:

a. Les conséquences terribles de la violence politique dans toute la Grèce; l'historien dessine l'abrutissement que provoque la guerre, ainsi que les tensions politiques que provoquent les passions; il insiste sur le fait que la guerre donne naissance à la violence, et la violence au désordre politique, et il stigmatise les querelles politiques à l'occasion du récit des conséquences de la guerre civile à Corcyre -sujet sur lequel il revient aussi d'une façon un peu différente dans le dialogue des Athéniens et des habitants de Mélos dans le cinquième livre de son *Histoire* ,[27] où il expose des cas d'arrogance et de cynisme des puissants à l'égard des faibles.[28]

b. Le renversement des principes admis du bon ordre dans des périodes de trouble et de maladie (peste), la lutte entre la violence et la logique, l'utilitarisme inhumain ainsi que la mutation totale des valeurs.[29]

c. Les altérations de la conformation psychologique des hommes et les mauvais côtés de la nature humaine qui se libèrent des restrictions et des répressions créées par la religion, la conscience et le bon sens.[30]

d. La perte du courage et du sang-froid, l'affaiblissement de l'esprit, l'ébranlement de la confiance, la perte du respect des lois et généralement la dissolution des mœurs ou, comme le dirait Connor, "*the dissolution of human basis of morality*".[31]

e. Le changement dans la façon d'utiliser les notions à cause de l'emportement et de la mutation des critères de morale sous le pouvoir contraignant du besoin en période de guerre et de maladies; les

mots perdent leur sens habituel et objectif et la guerre devient plus puissante que la raison (*"kreisson logou"*). La violence altère non seulement le psychisme, mais aussi le langage des hommes.[32]

Dans les chapitres 82 et 83, la dégradation des mots qui révèle essentiellement une hypocrisie triomphante au moyen d'une syntaxe antithétique qui est très chère à Thucydide,[33] est très caractéristique et instructive, quand ces mots sont comparés avec le sens véritable qu'ils ont en période de paix. La signification habituelle et essentiellement objective que les mots ont (*"axiôsis"*) se transforme en une interprétation subjective et d'une certaine façon arbitraire (*"dikaiôsis"*) en période de guerre, où la logique humaine fait son possible pour justifier le nouveau contenu sémantique que les mots acquièrent par rapport aux choses, mais à travers le prisme d'une motivation plus personnelle, justification à l'égard de soi-même, comme l'a nommée Huart (voir le Tableau I).[34]

Tableau I

pendant la paix			*pendant la guerre*	
Les vertus admises depuis toujours	**Leur déformation**		**Les vertus admises depuis toujours**	**Leur déformation**
tèn eiôthyian axiôsin (la signification objective habituelle des mots)		était remplacée	*tè dikaiôsei* (par la signification subjective et arbitraire)	
	tolma alogistos (l'audace déraisonnable)	fut considérée comme	*andreia philetairos* (vaillance et dévouement au parti)	
mellèsis promèthès (la circonspection devant l'avenir)		fut considérée comme		*deilia euprepès* (lâcheté bienséante)
to *sôphron* (la sagesse)		fut considérée comme		*tou anandrou proschèma* (apparence de lâcheté)

to pros apan xyneton (le bon sens en toute chose)		fut considéré comme		*epi pan argon* (lenteur en toute chose)
	to emplèctôs oxy (les décisions impulsives et hâtives)	ont été ajoutées	*andros moira* (à la vertu mâle)	
asphaleia to epibouleusthai (la réflexion prudente et l'investigation)		fut considérée comme		*apotropès prophasis eulogos* (prètexte bienséant pour la fuite)
	o chalepainôn (celui qui critique toute chose)	fut considéré comme	*pistos aei* (homme de confiance)	
o antilegôn autô (le contradicteur)			*hypoptos* (suspect)	
	epibouleusas tis tychôn (le destructeur)	fut considéré comme	*xynestos* (intelligent)	
	hyponoèsas (le soupçonneux)	fut considéré comme	*eti deinoteros* (encore plus intelligent)	
probouleusas opôs mèden autôn deèsei (celui qui est prévoyant sans être nécessairement destructeur et soupçonneux)		fut considéré comme		*tès te hetairias dialytès kai tous enantious ekpeplègmenos* (celui qui cause la rupture dans le parti et qui est rempli de panique par les adversaires)
	o phtasas ton mellonta kakon ti dran (celui qui arrivait à temps pour empêcher l'autre de faire quelque chose de mal)		*epèneito* (recevait des louanges	

	o epikeleusas ton mè dianooumeon (celui qui entraînait vers le mal un autre qui n'y avait pas pensé auparavant)		*epèneito* (recevait des louanges)	
to *xyggenes* (les membres de la parenté)		devenaient		*ou hetairikou allotriôteron ... dia to etoimoteron einai aprophasistôs tolman* (plus étrangers que les compagnons de parti ... puisque les compagnons politiques étaient plus disposés à oser tout sans la moindre hésitation)
ou meta tôn keimenôn nomôn ôphelia ai toiautai xynodoi (les partis ne sont pas organisés pour rechercher l'intérêt de tous par des moyens légaux)		devenaient		*alla para tous kathestôtas pleonexia* (mais à l'encontre des lois pour satisfaire des desseins personnels)
tas es sphas autous pisteis ou tô theiô nomô mallon (la confiance entre eux... et non dans la loi divine)		se renforçait		*è tô koinè ti paranomèsai* (dans la perpétration en commun des crimes)

ta te apo tôn enantiôn kalôs legomena... ou gennaiotèti (les propositions raisonnables des adversaires... non par sentiment de confiance sincère)		étaient acceptées		*ergôn phylakè, ei prouchoien* (seulement si eux-mêmes devaient avoir le dessus, pour se mettre à l'abri)
è auton mè propathein (que le fait de prévenir le mal)				*antitimôrisasthai tina* (la vengeance exercée sur l'adversaire)
kai orkoi ei pou ara genointo xynallagès (si dans quelque circonstance il arrivait que soient échangés des serments de réconciliation)				*en tô autika pros to aporon ekaterô didomenoi ischyon ouk echontôn allothen dynamin* (les serments avaient une puissance provisoire, puisque les deux personnes les prêtaient parce qu'elles n'avaient rien d'autre à quoi se raccrocher)
	oi polloi kakourgoi ontes (les malfaiteurs)	on les appelle plus facilement	*dexioi* (habiles)	
	è amatheis (les ignorants)	on les appelle plus facilement	*agathoi* (hommes de bien)	

D'après le classement cité plus haut des vertus admises depuis toujours et de leur déformation[35] -dans lequel Edmunds remarque le caractère spartiate et oligarchique de la morale de Thucydide- apparaît clairement le remplacement de la pensée et de la recherche des causes par une réflexion mensongère et une hypocrisie qui conduisent à l'activité violente et à la suppression de la générosité et de la justice.[36]

Donc chez Thucydide, sans bien sûr que soit méconnu le principe de la contrainte historique comme facteur créateur de l'histoire,[37] la convoitise et l'amour-propre -avec les dimensions principalement politiques que leur a données A. Fuks[38]- pourraient être considérés comme les causes les plus profondes du trouble et de l'absence de morale qui peuvent surgir dans les sociétés humaines; comme les responsables de toute injustice et de tout acte de violence, qui avec l'"ingérence indiscrète" et l'esprit d'impérialisme constituent "*alèthestatèn prophasin*" (le prétexte le plus véritable) de la guerre et vont à l'encontre de l'"*apragmosynè*" (le fait de rester étranger aux affaires), de la politique anti-impérialiste ignorant la convoitise, de la "*sôphrosynè*" (sagesse) et de l'"*hèsychia*".[39]

Discussion

Dans le cadre des objectifs pédagogiques et didactiques de l'*Histoire*, Thucydide considère son œuvre comme "*ktèma es aiei*" (un monument éternel), un moyen qui pourra transmettre aux hommes des connaissances politiques d'une valeur stable, les aider à reconnaître des règles et des forces qui sont contenues dans les événements historiques, les activer sur le plan politique dans toute situation politique correspondante, leur faire rechercher les valeurs générales derrière ce qui est personnel, unique et ne peut se répéter, dans un esprit de réconciliation et d'aversion pour la guerre.[40]

Par ailleurs le principe de la défense face à l'offensive occupe une place spéciale dans l'*Histoire* et constituait un principe de base admis par tous les Grecs.[41] L'*Histoire* de Thucydide "constitue principalement une étude basée sur des preuves visant à dégager des lois générales de l'évolution historique, et beaucoup moins un récit ayant pour objectif de conserver le souvenir d'événements du passé... ce qu'il faut pour former les générations suivantes, pour prévenir des fautes et pour guider la volonté politique. On n'a pas besoin d'une étude approfondie pour découvrir le message diachronique de l'historien: il se pose lui-même dès le début comme un penseur qui

recherche les paramètres constants et découvre les structures les plus profondes de l'activité historique de l'homme...".[42] Ainsi c'est à juste titre que le récit de la guerre du Péloponnèse par l'historien pourrait être considéré, ainsi que le propose P.Huart, comme un monument éternel sur la nature humaine,[43] l'histoire didactique du comportement des hommes, d'après Sinclair.[44]

C'est la nature humaine qui au fond reste toujours la même, et c'est pourquoi nous devrons analyser ses fondements psychologiques. Pour Thucydide, l'histoire comme science ne se borne pas à inventorier et présenter les événements, mais elle explique et recherche leurs causes dans la nature de l'homme. C'est dans cette nature que nous devrons localiser aussi la cause de la guerre ou toute déformation des valeurs.

L'histoire, selon Finley, est scientifique et utile, telle qu'elle est rapportée par Thucydide; car d'une part dans les événements historiques se trouvent des forces qui semblent être inhérentes à la nature humaine, et comme telles, nous pouvons les étudier comme quelque chose de permanent et de stable, et d'autre part les générations actuelles et futures trouveront dans le passé historique des renseignements sur les forces qui influencent leur propre époque. En recherchant les causes de la guerre et de la violence, Thucydide nous rappelle les auteurs d'écrits médicaux, quand ils essaient de localiser les causes d'une maladie.[45] Selon Cochrane, l'originalité de Thucydide est d'essayer d'adopter les principes et les méthodes de la médecine pour étudier sa société; la sémiologie et le pronostic qui concernent les maladies humaines suivent la sémiologie et le pronostic de la nature humaine.[46] Pour l'historien, la guerre semble être une maladie dont il essaie de dépister l'origine et les symptômes dans le comportement et la nature de l'homme. Ainsi, il part du cas précis qu'est la guerre pour aboutir au général et à l'abstrait, c'est-à-dire aux principes qui gouvernent l'homme et l'histoire. L'histoire peut constituer un enseignement pratique et en même temps scientifique -et non une simple leçon de morale, dans la mesure où le respect des droits constitue une condition de base pour le bien-être du corps politique- une œuvre utile et profitable, une étude diachronique de la psychologie humaine.[47]

Cependant l'historien suggère tout de même que le changement et l'amélioration du comportement humain est possible: "tant que la nature humaine restera même". D'après Sinclair: "Bien qu'il n'entreprenne pas de transformer la nature humaine, Thucydide

est loin de penser que rien n'est impossible pour améliorer la société. Il n'y a pas de nécessité inéluctable qui conduise le destin de l'homme... l'idée que l'on puisse rester inerte par désespoir ou par confiance aveugle dans la providence divine, était loin de la pensée de Thucydide." Il n'aurait jamais écrit son "*ktèma es aiei*" (monument éternel) pour un avenir si terne.[48] Donc l'amélioration de la mentalité des hommes, de leur pensée et de leur comportement devra peut-être s'appuyer sur leur formation et leur éducation, car c'est seulement ainsi que les générations suivantes pourront prendre conscience de la réalité qui les entoure et la redéterminer de façon à prendre des décisions convenables. Avec le développement de la raison et de l'esprit (la raison et l'esprit débarrassés de la force oppressive du besoin sont valables seulement en période de paix), nous pouvons espérer cette amélioration et ce changement.

Selon A.Croiset, les principaux facteurs de l'histoire sont la "*synesis*" (le bon sens) et la "*gnôsis*" (le savoir), notions qui dominent dans l'oeuvre de l'historien et jouent un rôle capital dans les événements politiques. "Ce qui a de l'importance, c'est la particularité du citoyen, et la formation des citoyens est ce qui joue le rôle le plus important... les citoyens doivent être éduqués, et non pas simplement être domptés. Et même au cours de la guerre ce qui a une signification, c'est le caractère, puisque c'est de lui plus que de l'entraînement que dépend le courage".[50] Donc c'est seulement avec la formation et le développement que nous pouvons attendre un résultat positif, étant donné que les mobiles véritables du conflit sont étroitement liés à la psychologie des individus, des groupes sociaux et des nations.

Ce qui est remarquable dans l'histoire de Thucydide, c'est qu'il s'adresse à un public auquel il essaie de transmettre quelques messages non comme des nouvelles agréables et des contes, mais comme des constatations scientifiques objectives au sujet des doutes, des limites, des tentations et des attentes de l'homme.

Il apparaît donc clairement que l'historien déteste autant la guerre que toute forme de violence entraînant non seulement la dégradation des notions, mais aussi celle des mœurs. La démystification du caractère nécessaire et de la toute-puissance de la guerre pour résoudre quelques différends que ce soit à un niveau individuel ou socio-politique, est au fond un thème de formation et d'éducation. Son œuvre contient l'espoir d'un changement de conceptions et d'idées, de manière de penser et de comportement

face à la guerre, et la prise de conscience de la nécessité de la paix. Les circonstances d'après-guerre dans de nombreux pays du monde, aujourd'hui encore, montrent et confirment la perspicacité et la pensée antipolémique que Thucydide a érigée en philosophie. L'historien met particulièrement l'accent sur la nécessité d'un changement du comportement de l'homme, de façon à assurer que le développement d'une conscience politique responsable ("*mellésis promèthès*") et d'une attitude critique ("*to pros apan xyneton*") en face des conflits guerriers, de la prévention des brutalités ("*antitimôrèsasthai*") qui ont pour origine principale des mobiles politiques et économiques ("*xympheron*/ l'intérêt, "*pleonexia*"/ la convoitise), en face de l'importance de la confiance dans les rapports humains ("*pisteis*"); en face de l'entretien d'une attitude positive à l'égard de la prévention de tout acte de méchanceté ("*mè propathein*").

La concurrence illégitime entre les États -et cela, l'historien le sait bien- donne naissance à une série de violences, à des ravages matériels, à des dissensions et à une dissolution des institutions démocratiques, c'est alors justement que les criminels deviennent des héros et les arrivistes des chefs. L'*Histoire* de Thucydide nous révèle d'une façon crue toutes les dégradations qui ont lieu en temps de guerre:

a. la violation du droit d'État et de la morale;

b. la violence collective;

c. la cruauté de la nature de l'homme;

d. les mobiles intéressés de l'activité humaine;

e. la vanité humaine;

f. la tyrannie, et

g. l'hypocrisie,

situations qui semblent être quelque peu maîtrisées en période de paix.

Conclusion

Alors, dans ce contexte, la théorie de Thucydide au sujet de "la pathologie de la guerre" ne semble pas perdre de son actualité: elle propose une formation conforme à la nature humaine pour la vie et une pédagogie au sujet de la paix. Comme il l'explique lui-même, la plus grande erreur politique est de considérer la guerre

et la domination comme une raison d'existence et le but exclusif d'un État. Ainsi, si l'homme a une nette préférence pour la manière de vivre pacifique et aisée, seule la paix lui donne l'occasion de cultiver ses vertus politiques et morales. En conséquence, cette pédagogie devra premièrement adopter pour principes de base l'amélioration de la mentalité des hommes, de leur pensée et de leur comportement, et par la suite chercher à cultiver les actes qui pourraient assurer l'état d'harmonie, d'ordre, d'équilibre et de calme des différentes puissances socio-politiques de toute espèce, l'état de tranquillité dans toutes les sortes de rapports humains et, enfin, le bonheur chez les individus ainsi que dans des états.

Comme nous avons vu, Thucydide est opposé à la politique de la force et de l'esprit militaire dans la formation des hommes. Dans une période de guerre et d'attaques venant de l'extérieur, il devient le défenseur d'une pédagogie de la paix qui s'appuiera sur la formation de la mentalité de l'homme; d'une pédagogie conformément à laquelle la paix est considérée comme le point culminant de la liberté sociale et de l'esprit humain et procure l'occasion de cultiver la vertu morale et les occupations intellectuelles: "En période de paix et quand règne la prospérité, les États comme les individus ont de meilleures façons de penser, car ils ne tombent pas dans des besoins pressants; alors que la guerre, faisant disparaître peu à peu les facilités de la vie quotidienne, devient un maître de violence et adapte les dispositions de la plupart des hommes à la situation du moment".[51]

Le dialogue et la discussion sont pour l'historien les maîtres et les professeurs de l'action politique, spécialement dans les démocraties, où chaque citoyen peut participer à la réflexion politique. La croyance dans la nécessité et à la toute-puissance du dialogue peut résoudre pacifiquement n'importe quel différend qui peut survenir: "*logoi pragmatôn didaskaloi*" (les dialogues enseignent les choses)[52] ou, comme dirait Périclès, "*peri ôn epicheirèsomen eklogizesthai*" (réfléchir au sujet de ce que nous allons entreprendre).[53]

NOTES

1. J. de Romilly, "Guerre et paix entre Cités", J.-P. Vernant (sous la direction de), **Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne**, La Haye, Mouton & Co., 1968, trad. en grec, Athènes, 1981, pp. 215-216.

2. J.-P. Vernant, *op.cit.*, pp. 9-12.

3. Cf. I. Markantoni, **Éducation de la paix**, Athènes, 1977, p. 7.

4. Thucydide, I.80, III. 82.2, IV. 61.1; cf. de même: Fr. Chatelet, **La naissance de l'Histoire. La formation de la pensée historienne en Grèce**, Paris, Union Générale d'Editions, 1974, trad. en grec, Athènes, Smili, 1992, p. 173 et 216; A. Lesky, **A History of Greek Literature**, translated by James Willis and Cornelis de Heer, New York, Crowell, 1966, trad. en grec, Thessaloniki, Frères Kyriakidi, 1981, pp. 643-644; M.I. Finley, **Aspects of Antiquity**, USA, Penguin Books, Chatto and Windus, 1977, pp. 58-59; M.A. Barnard, **Stasis in Thucydides, Narrative and Analysis of Factionalism in the *Polis***, Diss. Univ. of North Carolina, 1980.

5. Thucydide, I.141; St. Stergiou, **Les pensées de Thucydide sur l'éducation et l'État**, Athènes G.S. Blessa, 1950, pp. 70-71.

6. J. de Romilly, **Thucydide et l'impérialisme Athénien**, Paris, Belles-Lettres, 1947, id., "La crainte dans l'œuvre de Thucydide", **Classica et Mediaevalia** 17, 1956, 119-127, V. Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne: a Study in Greek Politics", **Journal of Hellenic Studies** 64, 1947, 47-53, H.T. Wadegery, "Ησυχία and απραγμοσύνη", **Journal of Hellenic Studies** 52, 1932, 224; J. Alleson considère que l'ingérence indiscrète ne constitue pas [a] "national characteristic of fifth-century Athenians"; J. Allison, "Thucydides and Πολυπραγμοσύνη", **American Journal of Ancient History** 4,1,1979,157. Cf. aussi: Thucydide, I.23.6, I.88.1, P. Huart, **Le Vocabulaire de l'analyse psychologique dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide**, Paris, Librairie C. Klicksieck, 1968, pp. 3-4, L.E. Lord, "Thucydides and the World War", **Martin Classical Lectures**, vol. XII, Harvard, 1945, p. 79, Th.S.Tzannetatou, "Thucydide et le principe de la défense face à l'offensive", Athènes 58, 1954, 213, A.G. Woodhead, **Thucydides On the Nature of Power**, Cambridge, 1970, p. 103 et sv; W.R. Connor, Thucydides, Princeton, University Press, 1984, p. 102.

7. Th. S. Tzannetatos, *op.cit.*, p. 206, V. Ehrenberg, *op.cit.*, pp. 49-50, T.A. Sinclair, **Histoire de la pensée politique grecque**, Paris, Payot, 1953, trad. en Grec, Athènes, B. Papazisis, tome I, 1969, p. 159, L. Manolopoulos, **Dissension-révolution-manie du changement-mouvement. Contribution dans la recherche de la terminologie politique des Grecs**, Thessalonique, éd. Vanias, 1991, p. 85.

8.Thucydide, III.82.2.

9. W.R. Connor, *op.cit.*, p. 14, A. Georgopapadakos, **Morceaux choisis de Thucydide**, Thessalonique, 1974, p. 268.

10. Thucydide, V.105.2.

11. Cf. L.E. Lord, *op.cit.*, p. 77, Th. S. Tzannetatos, *op.cit.*, p. 212, J. de Romilly, *op.cit.*, 1981, p. 224, P. Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 103, H.W. Gomme, **A Historical Commentary on Thucydides**, Tome II, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956, p. 373, W.R. Connor, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

12. I. Meyerson, "Le temps, la mémoire, l'histoire", **Journal de Psychologie**, 1956, 340.

13. Thucydide, I.78.3.

14. J.de Romilly, *op.cit.*, p. 216 et 220; cf. aussi Thucydide, IV.1.2, 15, V. 5.2, 18.9.

15. Thucydide, IV.62.2.

16. Thucydide, IV.61.8: "donc avec la réconciliation réciproque nous mettrons fin à la guerre, nous en éviterons une nouvelle et nous résoudrons facilement nos différends au moyen de la paix".

17. Thucydide, IV.71, IV.19, 20.3, 62.2, 92.4.

18. Thucydide, I. 71, IV.19, 20.3, 62.2, 92.4.

19. Thucydide, I.120.3.

20. Thucydide, IV.18-19; St. Stergiou, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

21. Cf. St. Stefanou, "Introduction", **Histoire de Thucydide**, trad. E.K. Venizelos, Libr. "Hestias", sans date, p. viii.

22. Thucydide, III. 69-81. Cette guerre a été caractérisée par A. Fuks, comme "political strike in its causes and motivation" et elle est en relation avec les chefs politiques et les partis politiques. Cf. A.Fuks, "Thucydides and the stasis in Corcyra: Thuc., III. 82.3 *versus* (Thuc.) III, 84", **American Journal of Philology**, 92,1971, 48-55. Cf. aussi: L. Manolopoulos, *op.cit.*, pp. 62-66, J.E.Bruce, "The Corcyraean civil war of 427", **Phoenix**, 25, 1971, 108-117.

23. W. Jaeger, Paideia. **La formation de l'homme grec**, Paris, TEL/ Gallimard, 1988, p. 455.

24. En tout cas il est intéressant, d'après J.H. Finley, de mettre en parallèle tout ce que Thucydide rapporte ici avec tout ce qui est mentionné dans une lettre de Lincoln, quand il décrivait lui aussi l'explosion de violence qui avait lieu dans l'État du Missouri, cf. J. H. Finley Jr., **Thucydides**, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1963, trad. en grec, Athènes, Papadimas, 1988, p. 188, note 46.

25. D'après Dionysios d'Halikarnasse, le passage III.81 a été caractérisé comme "*sophôs te kai syntomôs kai dynatôs*" (écrit clairement, brièvement et puissamment), alors que ce qui est rapporté dans III. 82 l'a été comme "*skolia kai dysparakolouthèta*" (d'une manière tortueuse et difficile à suivre), cf. P.Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

26. Notre traduction.

27. Thucydide, V.84-116.

28. J. de Romilly, **Problèmes de la démocratie grecque**, Paris, Agora, Herman, 1986, pp. 136-139, J.H.Finley, *op.cit.*, p.185-186, W. Connor, *op.cit.*, p. 99, Th. Tzannetatos, *op.cit.*, pp. 209-212.

29. P. Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 8, W. Jaeger, *op.cit.*, p. 455, A.M. Croiset, **Histoire de la littérature grecque**, t. VI, Paris, E. de Boccard, 1921, pp. 124-125. L'historien présente d'une part les symptômes de la maladie contagieuse, et d'autre part les conséquences morales que celle-ci entraîne, cf. P. Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 7-8, J.H. Finley, *op.cit.*, pp. 191-192, W. Connor, *op.cit.*, pp. 99-100.

30. Cf. A.Lesky, *op.cit.*, pp. 643-644, et St. Stergiou, *op.cit.*, pp. 75-76.

31. W. Connor, *op.cit.*, pp. 99-100, P.Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 34, T. Sinclair, p. 159 et St. Stergiou, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

32. P. Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 317.

33. A.M. Croiset, *op.cit.*, p. 317.

34. P. Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 249, 454; J. Hogan considère que le mot "*axiôsis*" se réfère, ainsi que le mot "*eiôthyian*" "*to the customary use of words to assess worth to praise and blame*"; J.T.Hogan, "The Αξίωσης of words at Thucydides III.82.4", **Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies**, 21, 2, 1980, 142.

35. On trouve un classement semblable chez L. Edmunds, "Thucydides ethics as reflected in the description of stasis (III.82.83)", **Harvard Studies in Classical Philology**, 79, 1975, 77.

36. Cf. L. Edmunds, *op.cit.*, p. 74 et 82; H. Lloyd-Jones, **The Justice of Zeus**, Berkley, 1971, pp. 137-144, 205-206 et 68; J.L.Creed, "Moral values in Thucydides' time", **The Classical Quarterly**, 13, 2, 1973, 229.

37. Cf. W. Jaeger, *op.cit.*, p. 439, Th. Tzanettakos, *op.cit.*, pp. 203-206.

38. A. Fuks, *op.cit.*, p. 52 et sv.

39. Cf. V. Ehrenberg, *op.cit.*, p. 51 et sv.; P. Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 385 et sv.; J. Z. Allison exprime un point de vue différent:: il admet que la notion de "polypragmosynè" (ingérence indiscrète) ne reflète aucune "serious political position", cf. J.W. Allison, *op.cit.*, p. 157. De même, J.H.Finley, "Euripides and Thucydides", **Harvard Studies in Classical Philology**, 49, 1939, 45 et sv.

40. Cf. A. Lesky, *op.cit.*, p. 660; E.M. Soulis, "Comment Thucydide comprend l'utilité de son histoire", **Neohelliniki Paideia**, 20, 1990, 53-58.

41. Cf. K.D.Stergiopoulou, "Les responsables de la guerre au cours de l'Antiquité", **Platon** 4(1952)70.

42. Fr. Chatelet, *op.cit.*, p. 161.

43. P.Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 507.

44. T.A. Sinclair, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

45. W. Jaeger, *op.cit.*, p. 448, J.H.Finley, *op.cit.*, p. 77-78.

46. Ch. N. Cochrane, **Thucydides and the Science of History**, Oxford University Press, 1929, p. 15, 26, (reprint in New York, Russell & Russell, 1965), P. Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 7, note 4.

47. P. Huart, *op.cit.*, p. 5-8; M.I.Finley, *op.cit.*, p. 56, E.M. Soulis, *op.cit.*, A.M. Croiset, *op.cit.*, p. 113-114, 125, W.R.Connor, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

48. T. A. Sinclair, *op.cit.*, p. 160.

49. A.M. Croiset, *op.cit.*, p. 123-124.

50. T.A. Sinclair, *op.cit.*, p. 143, Fr. Chatelet, *op.cit.*, pp. 158-159 et p. 216.

51. Thucydide, III.82.2 (cf. aussi l'Annexe).

52. Thucydide, III.42.2.

53. Thucydide, II.40.3.

ANNEXE

Thucydide, III. 81-84: "La pathologie de la guerre" (82-83).

81. "A la suite de cela, les Péloponnésiens, dès la tombée de la nuit, se mirent en route en toute hâte, pour retourner chez eux en naviguant à faible distance de la côte, et après avoir tiré et déplacé les navires par l'isthme de Leucade, pour ne pas être vus, continuèrent, en tournant autour de l'île, la navigation du retour. Les Corcyréens, de leur côté, s'étant rendu compte de l'approche de la flotte athénienne et du départ de la flotte ennemie, amenèrent à l'intérieur de la ville les Messéniens qui jusqu'alors étaient restés à l'extérieur, et, ayant donné l'ordre de faire déplacer les navires, qu'ils avaient armés, autour de la ville (partant du port d'Alkinoos) pour les ancrer dans le port Hyllaïkos, commencèrent pendant ce déplacement naval en question, à massacrer tout adversaire qui leur tombait entre les mains. En outre, après l'arrivée des navires dans le port Hyllaïkos, faisant débarquer tous ceux qu'ils avaient convaincus d'y embarquer, ils les mirent à mort. Ils vinrent aussi au temple d'Héra, et après avoir convaincu une cinquantaine des suppliants qui s'y trouvaient, de se soumettre à un jugement, ils les condamnèrent tous à mort. La plupart des suppliants, tous ceux qui n'avaient pas accepté d'être jugés, voyant ce qui se passait, commencèrent à s'entretuer à l'intérieur même du temple. Certains se pendaient aux arbres et d'autres se suicidaient, chacun comme il pouvait. D'ailleurs pendant toute la semaine où Eurymédon resta là avec ses soixante navires, les Corcyréens continuaient de massacrer tous ceux de leurs concitoyens qu'ils considéraient comme leurs ennemis, et, même s'ils affirmaient qu'ils poursuivaient seulement ceux qui voulaient renverser le régime démocratique, en réalité certains furent massacrés pour satisfaire des passions personnelles, et d'autres, qui avaient prêté de l'argent, par leurs débiteurs. On pouvait voir la mort sous toutes ses formes. Il n'a manqué aucune des atrocités qui sont habituelles dans de telles circonstances, et il y en eut même de pires. En effet des pères massacraient leurs enfants, et des suppliants étaient arrachés aux temples et massacrés à proximité. Certains même moururent à l'intérieur du temple de Dionysos, dont les portes avaient été obstruées par un mur."

82. "Voilà à quelles cruautés en arriva la guerre civile, et celle-ci parut plus atroce car c'était la toute première; on peut dire que par la suite tout le monde grec a été troublé, car dans chaque cité il y avait des différends entre les chefs des démocrates qui

réclamaient qu'on appelle à l'aide les Athéniens, et les oligarques qui appelaient les Lacédémoniens. Il est vrai qu'en temps de paix, ils n'avaient ni prétexte pour les faire venir, ni envie de le faire, mais maintenant que c'était la guerre et que l'occasion était donnée à chacun des partis politiques rivaux d'avoir des alliés de l'extérieur pour faire du tort à leurs adversaires et en même temps d'acquérir par là-même de la puissance, c'était facile pour tous ceux qui voulaient renverser le régime de faire appel aux interventions. Et alors il s'abattit sur les cités, du fait des guerres civiles, de nombreux malheurs, qui ont lieu et auront toujours lieu tant que la nature de l'homme restera la même, plus sauvagement ou plus faiblement et sous une forme différente, selon tous les changements des circonstances. En période de paix et quand règne la prospérité, les états comme les individus ont de meilleures façons de penser, car ils ne tombent pas dans des besoins pressants; alors que la guerre, faisant disparaître peu à peu les facilités de la vie quotidienne, devient un maître de violence et adapte les dispositions de la plupart des hommes à la situation du moment. La guerre civile a donc commencé dans les cités, et celles qui avaient quelque peu tardé, apprenant tout ce qui s'était passé ailleurs, faisaient preuve d'une grande ingéniosité en matière d'attaques sournoises et de représailles inouïes. Les hommes allèrent jusqu'à changer le sens habituel qu'avaient les mots pour les différentes actions, comme cela leur plaisait. C'est ainsi que la témérité irréfléchie fut considérée comme de la bravoure par amour pour les compagnons de parti, la réserve prudente comme de la lâcheté sous de belles apparences, la sagesse comme une mauvaise excuse de la poltronnerie, et la prudence en toute chose comme inertie devant toute chose; l'emportement enragé fut compté vertu virile, mais bien réfléchir aux choses pour être sûr, comme un bon prétexte pour échapper au danger. Quiconque s'indignait et critiquait tout le monde et toute chose était toujours considéré comme digne de confiance, tandis que quiconque lui opposait des objections devenait suspect. Si quelqu'un complotait contre un autre et réussissait, il était considéré comme intelligent, et encore plus intelligent s'il soupçonnait le complot; mais si un homme veillait à ne pas avoir besoin du tout de ces choses, on considérait qu'il désagrégeait le parti et qu'il avait été terrorisé par les adversaires. En peu de mots, quiconque prenait de court celui qui songeait à faire du mal recevait des louanges; de même que celui qui poussait au mal un autre qui n'avait pas pensé à le faire. Même les membres de la parenté devenaient plus étrangers que les compagnons de parti, puisque ceux qui partageaient les mêmes

idées étaient plus disposés à tout oser sans hésitation; car les partis de ce genre ne se sont pas créés pour rechercher le profit de leurs membres conformément aux lois en vigueur, mais pour satisfaire leur convoitise à l'encontre des prescriptions de ces lois. Et la confiance entre eux, ils la fondaient moins sur la loi divine que sur la complicité dans les infractions, ils les acceptaient, si eux-mêmes étaient plus forts, non par grandeur d'âme, mais pour se mettre à l'abri d'activités offensives. Chacun considérait comme plus important de se venger de quelqu'un qui lui faisait du tort que de tâcher auparavant lui-même de ne pas subir ce tort. Si parfois ils échangeaient entre eux des serments de réconciliation, comme ils les prêtaient des deux côtés pour surmonter quelque difficulté du moment, ils y restaient fidèles seulement tant qu'ils n'avaient aucun autre soutien ailleurs; mais dès que l'occasion se présentait, le premier qui arrivait à prendre de l'audace, s'il voyait son adversaire sans protection, se vengeait de lui avec une plus grande satisfaction, du fait qu'il faisait confiance aux serments, que s'il le frappait ouvertement, car il prenait en compte la sécurité, mais, de plus, le fait qu'en ayant le dessus par la tromperie il gagnait un prix d'intelligence. La plupart des hommes tolèrent plus facilement d'être caractérisés comme habiles, s'ils sont malfaiteurs, que d'être caractérisés comme idiots, s'ils sont honnêtes, et ils ont honte de l'un alors qu'ils sont fiers de l'autre. Ce qui cause tout cela, c'est la soif de dominer par convoitise et ambition; et à partir de ces deux sentiments, c'est aussi l'ardeur passionnée de chaque partie à avoir le dessus, quand commençaient les litiges. Car tous ceux qui, dans les différentes cités, devenaient chefs des deux partis politiques en alléguant de beaux mots d'ordre, comme d'un côté le gouvernement sensé des meilleurs, servaient en paroles les intérêts de l'État, alors qu'en fait c'était eux-mêmes qui profitaient personnellement; et comme ils luttaient par tous les moyens pour avoir le dessus l'un sur l'autre, ils osèrent les choses les plus terribles et recherchèrent des représailles encore plus grandes, en les imposant non pas au niveau de ce qui était permis par la justice et l'intérêt de l'État, mais en leur donnant comme limite ce qui chaque fois, selon eux, pourrait satisfaire leur parti; et ils étaient prêts, soit au moyen de la poursuite injuste de leurs adversaires soit au moyen de la prise du pouvoir par la force, à assouvir leurs ambitions du moment. Ainsi aucun des deux partis ne se souciait d'observer les règles de la piété, et ceux qui entendaient les plus grandes louanges étaient ceux à qui il arrivait de cacher des actions odieuses sous de belles paroles. Les citoyens qui restaient neutres étaient anéantis par les deux partis, soit parce qu'ils ne luttaient pas auprès d'eux soit par jalousie, parce qu'ils auraient survécu."

83. "Ainsi donc, à cause de la guerre civile, toutes les sortes de méchanceté ont régné dans le monde grec, et les manières simples et innocentes, dont la noblesse de cœur est si proche, furent ridiculisées et disparurent, tandis que se dresser les uns contre les autres et ne plus se faire confiance l'un à l'autre furent des phénomènes qui prirent de grandes proportions; car il n'y avait ni promesses solides ni serments redoutables qui puissent faire disparaître la méfiance, et quand ils étaient plus forts que leurs adversaires, calculant combien chaque garantie était incertaine, ils songeaient tous à ne pas subir de tort de la part de ceux qui leur étaient opposés, loin de pouvoir leur accorder leur confiance. Et la plupart du temps, ceux qui l'emportaient sur les autres étaient les plus inférieurs sur le plan spirituel; car à force de craindre leurs propres manques et l'intelligence de leurs adversaires, de peur d'être vaincus pour cette raison dans la discussion, mais aussi de peur que les autres, en raison de leur souplesse d'esprit, ne parviennent à complôter contre eux, ils multipliaient les méfaits avec audace. Et les intelligents, par mépris à l'égard de leurs adversaires, puisqu'ils pensaient qu'ils se rendraient compte à temps de leurs complots, et qu'il n'était pas nécessaire de prévenir par l'intelligence, ne se tenaient pas sur leurs gardes et se perdaient davantage."

84. "C'est à Corcyre, donc, que furent commises pour la première fois la plupart de ces iniquités et spécialement toutes sortes de vengeances, que les hommes, soumis à un pouvoir plutôt tyrannique que sensé, pouvaient commettre contre leurs dirigeants, qui leur fournissaient déjà l'occasion de la contre-vengeance ou des mesures injustes, auxquelles pouvaient avoir recours les hommes qui voulaient se sortir de leur indigence habituelle et qui enviaient avec passion les biens d'autrui avant tout ou d'autres délits, qui se trouvaient commis d'une façon cruelle et impitoyable contre des hommes de la même classe sociale par des hommes qui étaient entraînés non pas par la convoitise, mais surtout par le débordement de la passion. Au point où en arrivèrent les choses, la vie de la cité fut profondément bouleversée, et la nature humaine, qui, même sous l'emprise des lois, est habituellement encline à l'injustice, une fois placée au-dessus des lois, se réjouissait, prouvant que ses passions n'étaient plus contenues, et qu'elles étaient plus puissantes que les lois et hostiles à toute suprématie. Car, autrement, si l'envie n'exerçait pas une influence désastreuse, personne ne souhaitait de préférence la vengeance au lieu de la piété et la convoitise au lieu

de la justice. Les hommes, cependant, quand il s'agit pour eux de se venger d'autres hommes, commettent la faute d'abolir auparavant les principes du droit naturel, qui sont en vigueur dans de telles circonstances, et sur lesquels chacun fonde l'espoir de son propre salut, en cas d'échec. Et de cette façon, ils se privent eux-mêmes de la protection de ces principes au cas où, si jamais ils se trouvaient en danger, ils en auraient besoin".

The Theory of Foreign Policy In Pericles' "Funeral Oration"

Yannis Philippoussis*

RÉSUMÉ

On considère souvent l'Oraison funèbre prononcée par Périclès comme le texte par excellence sur l'idéal démocratique. Cependant, on ne l'a jamais considéré comme étant un texte qui prononce une théorie de politique extérieure et des relations internationales. Pourtant, Périclès a été impliqué dans la politique d'Athènes pendant une grande partie du IVème siècle av. J-C, et surtout pendant cette période importante de l'histoire athénienne qui couvre son hégémonie et son âge d'or mais qui, encore plus, s'avère une période décisive entre les deux grandes guerres. S'il est toujours important de connaître les politiques domestiques ou etrangères d'un politicien, il est encore plus fondamental de savoir les principes théoriques qu'il a employés et appliqués afin de mieux comprende la raison du dirigisme de sa politique concrète. Or, Périclès semble avoir donné précisément ces principes dans ce discours, même s'il l'a fait d'une facon épigrammatique et cryptique. En outre, il essaie de défendre la valeur et la pertinence de ces principes en les opposant non seulement aux principes des Spartiates, ce qui est d'ailleurs évident, mais aussi à ceux des Sophistes dont les principes allaient prédominer après sa mort.

Le discours de Périclès, en faisant partie intégrale du texte de Thucydide et, mis en rapport avec le commencement de la guerre du Péloponnèse, acquiert une valeur exceptionnelle.

ABSTRACT

The Periclean *Epitaphios* has long been considered as one of the most important texts in defense of the ideal of Democracy and Freedom; it has never been considered, however, as a document in which Pericles's theory of foreign policy is given. If Pericles had been in office for a large part of the 4th c. BC (during the Athenian hegemony and the Golden age and especially as it relates to the period of the "cold war" between the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars), it is important to know not only his domestic and foreign policies but also the principles which guided him in his public relations and his foreign accords. It seems that the *Funeral Oration* gives a good account of his guiding principles. In his epigrammatic style, Pericles seems to have intended to give a clear indication of these principles and, in his cryptic way, he tries to defend their value and relevance by juxtaposing them to both the obvious Spartan principles and the not so obvious Sophistic ones which, as he had seen, would guide the Athenian domestic and foreign affairs after his death.

Integral part of Thucydides's text, and indeed an extremely significant one as it relates to the beginnings of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles's speech becomes today as relevant as the historian's chronicles.

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1. As an Athenian politician in office for more than 30 years, besides having been involved in trade dealings and treaty negotiations with non-Greek nations (e.g. the Persian) as well as with other Greek City-States within or without the Athenian Confederation and Alliance (e.g. the Aegean Islands and the Corcyrean or the Spartan)(cf. I, 31 ff), Pericles had also been, more specifically, instrumental in both the preparation and expansion of the Peloponnesian War. It is rather inconceivable that Pericles, in his long tenure in government, did not meet the Spartan or other ambassadorial emissaries and declare, in his *Realpolitik*, his government's decisions. As a *stratêgos*, both in its military and in its political sense (as well as in the implied decision-making powers), he must have been often implicated in strategic decisions in the diplomatic sense as well. One can find, in Thucydides' accounts, Pericles' military expertise and strategies and can notice his political skills and policies; one can confirm and document, that is, his military and political brinkmanship which contributed in his continuous re-election to office. The question arises, therefore, as to which were his theoretical principles in his foreign as well as in his domestic policies and in his diplomatic strategies in regard to interstate and international relations.

Since, at least according to Plutarch, Pericles has not left any text[1], all our judgment on the question of his politics and his policies has to rely on external sources and, in this particular case, on Thucydides' meticulous chronicles. As to whether we can find in Pericles' speeches, as the strict historiographer recounts them, any explicit and clear answer to the question of Pericles' foreign policies and international relations, answer which would satisfy today's research for empirical evidence and documented corroboration, may prove to be a difficult and insatiable task. It seems, however, that, in a textual hermeneutical analysis of the "Funeral Oration", we may find some hints of the Periclean guiding principles and diplomatic strategies relating to his foreign policies and relations. These guiding principles are not only those on which he, as a long-lasting and active politician, apparently based his own policies, but also are those which he seems to propose, as an old and experienced statesman, to others. Since it is obvious that there are no policies without politics and no politics without polity and politeiological principles -the understanding of which is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the scientific study of specific state policies and relations- the purpose of this article is, precisely, an attempt to exude Pericles' principles on which he based

-in his *Machtpolitik*- his politics and policies as far as his domestic and foreign affairs are concerned and his strategies in interstate and international relations. These principles may be extracted from the defense of his socio-political philosophy as he juxtaposes and contrasts it to both the Spartan type of society and the Sophistic kind of democracy.

2. As it is known, Pericles's *Epitaphios* ("Funeral Oration") has survived as part of Thucydides' detailed historical account of the Peloponnesian War.[2] Pericles, as Thucydides claims, delivered his "Funeral Oration" in 429 BC as a *eulogy*, according to the "annual custom"[3], for the Fallen Soldiers in the first years of the War (432-429). In his speech, besides praising the soldiers, Pericles praises, obviously, the Athenian Democracy and Freedom for which the soldiers gave their lives. As it is a "praise" (*enkômion*) for Democracy and Freedom, the *Epitaphios* is also, however, their "funeral eulogy" (*epikêdios*) since, with the Sophists -at least in Pericles's perspective the Solonian democracy would turn into an anarchic ochlocracy (mob-rule) and freedom into a lawless liberality (permissiveness). This had also been Socrates' and, later, Plato's philosophical position -as well as their critique and lamentation- in the *Republic*. This Sophistic "democracy", along with the *political*system altogether, ended finally in 317 BC. It is interesting to notice, however, that, as part of his praise of the Athenian democratic society[4], Pericles raises the question of inter-state and international as well as inter-citizen and inter-personal relations, relations which Thucydides discusses also, as part of his own interest on the subject, in the rest of his voluminous work[5].

Not having been a philosophical thinker by profession, Pericles, as a practicing politician of long standing, simply describes, in one simple and brief paragraph on democracy, an already existing societal reality and political state; and he describes them both, not unexpectedly, in the manner he perceived them existing in the Athens of his time as well as in the way he would have like them to be in the future. The society and the state he describes are those which had been in existence since Solon first prescribed them in his philosophical *hypothêkas* and *elegeia*, then founded them in his constitutional *politeia* and finally established them in his political *nomothesia*, more than150 years earlier, in 585 BC.[6] In this brief paragraph (II, 40) of the Oration, Pericles succeeds in giving, in a synoptic but clear way , all the Solonian principles of

the "communitarian" Democratic Ideal and, at the same time, in opposing them to both the existing Spartan society under the "communistic" principles of Lycurgus's legalistic codification and the upcoming Athenian society under the "communal" principles of the Sophists' libertarian philosophy.[8] It is interesting to notice that, diplomatic for the spirits of the times or, perhaps, respectful of the sacredness of the occasion, Pericles not only does not mention the Sophists by name, his political adversaries in Athens, but not even the Spartans, their common military enemies. Yet, both are clearly implied in the context of the text which is taken, by the expert statesman, as a pretext to present his military and diplomatic theory as well as his social, political and economic philosophy.[9]

3. In the last part of this paragraph (ll. 5-12, p.276), the Thucydidean Pericles declares that:

> Και τα ες αρετήν ενηντιώμεθα τοις πολλοίς ου γαρ πάσχοντες ευ, αλλά δρώντες κτώμεθα τους φίλους. Βεβαιότερος δε ο δράσας την χάριν, ώστε οφειλομένην δι΄ευνοίας ω δέδωκε σώζειν ο δ΄άντοφείλων αμβλύτερος, ειδώς ουκ ες χάριν, άλλ΄ές οφείλημα την αρετήν αποδώσων. Και μόνοι ου του ξυμφέροντος μάλλον λογισμώ η της ελευθερίας τω πιστώ αδεώς τινα ωφελούμεν.
>
> Again, in what concerns questions of excellence there is a great contrast between us and most other people. We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving good from them. This makes our friendship all the more reliable, since we want to keep alive the gratitude of those who are in our debt by showing continued good will to them; whereas the feelings of one who owes us something lack the same enthusiasm, since he knows that, when he repays our kindness, it will be more like paying back a debt than giving something with gratitude. We are unique in this. When we do kindness to others, we do not do them out of any calculations of profit or loss: we do them without afterthought, but in the confidence of our freedom.

What is the meaning of this text and which are its implications and their alternatives? Although a dense and cryptic text, Pericles seems to be, in the choice of his words, quite clear as far as his intentions, his references and his goals are concerned.

This speech is certainly a Funeral Oration and not, of course, a Policy Statement. Yet when Pericles raises -and this, especially, in the middle of a Funeral Oration- the question of "friends" and the way of making "friends", one may wonder about the meaning and the significance of this term *philous* and the implication of its discussion in this particular funeral speech, in case one considers that it had been delivered and that, even more, was meant only for a domestic consumption. The term *philous* and the manner by which, as he claims, the Athenians of his time make friends are, therefore, revealing: he tries apparently to set the principles on the basis of which good relations are established and that these friendly relations are not only established within the City limits among the citizens themselves but also beyond the City limits with other states and nations. And they are revealing at least two things: his statesman's concern for the substantiality and the reliability of a foreign policy and the importance and the authenticity of the guiding principles of this foreign policy.

4. After having presented, in his conception of *philosophy* and *philocally* at the beginning of the paragraph, the Athenian position on the question of truth and beauty[10], the question Pericles raises now, at the end of the same paragraph, is that of goodness in a rather obvious reference to *philanthropy*.[11] The *praxis*, along with the *theôria* and the *poiêsis*, is, in Pericles' description -and, consequently, philosophical perspective quintessential for his good society. The logical, the aesthetical and the ethical sides of being -the prism of the traditional Greek "excellence" (*aretê*) through which everything had to be considered and examined- are, thus, all present in Pericles' text. The *sophon* (or *orthon* or *alêthes*) *kai kalokagathon* (that is to say Science, Fine Arts and Politics which had been considered that far, at least since Solon's time, the cornerstone of the Athenian society) is, evidently, the central point of the entire paragraph. Whether it is presented, in this paragraph, only as a defensive attempt of his educational and ornamental policies -of which he has often been accused for having spent in vain, as a superfluous megalomaniac, the economic blood of the Athenians and of the Athenian allied or client states- it may be argued *ad infinitum*; yet Science, Fine Arts and Politics had been precisely the three that Pericles had entertained and honored in Athens during his tenure, since the 450s, and for which history has bestowed on this period a lasting glorious golden classical wreath.

Thus, on the basis of this prism, if the immediately preceding part of the paragraph (ll.8, p. 275 to5, p.276) deals with the importance of the "words" and their relation to the proper and true democratic discussion, this last cited part on *aretê* (ll.5-12, p.276) is on the importance of "deeds" and their relation to the proper and true communitarian activity. Words and deeds, discussion and action, according to Pericles, are bound together: "we Athenians, he says, in our own persons take our decisions on policy and submit them to proper discussions, for we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds"[12]. This statement is, obviously, in clear reference and opposition both to the Sophistic rhetorical "words" which had been debated without any concern for their content nor for their consequences[13] and to the Spartan military "deeds" which had been performed without any previous public examination and discussion.[14] Thus, Pericles, in order to make this point clearer, continues with emphasis: "the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences [and, of course, this implies the causes as well] have been properly discussed".[15] The Athenians, in Pericles' view, not only know what they do, but they do it only after knowing well why they do it; so he reinforces this by adding that "the man who can most truly be accounted brave is he who knows best the meaning of what is sweet in life and of what is terrible, -and then goes out undeterred to meet what is to come" which seems to be a clear reference to the present war and the praised soldiers: that is to say, the Athenians are conscious of both the meaning and the reason why they fight in this war, so "they go out undeterred to meet what is to come", to meet even death as the Fallen Soldiers have proven. These soldiers did not fight simply because they had been commanded by their "kings" as the Spartan ones do, nor because they are flattered by their "politicians" as the Sophist ones do. True bravery, strength and power, individual and societal[16], are the result of knowledge (*gignôskontes*, in a rather direct reference to the Spartans), but also the result of a solid knowledge (*saphestata*, in a possible reference to the Sophists[17]). This is clearly in juxtaposition to the alternative possibilities, on the one hand, of relying only on words in "rhetorical empty discussions" of individual opinions based on flattery and self-appraisal, a fact which creates a political correctness; or, on the other hand, of relying only on deeds in "fearful sluggish bravery" of authoritarian commands based on collective ignorance, a fact which creates a state of blind obedience. The words (in a clear reference to the

Sophists) must be followed by deeds and the deeds (in an obvious reference to the Spartans) must be the result of thoughtful discussion: the words are supposed to be actually ("factually") *supported* and the deeds must be freely ("reelly")[18] *thought*. A community (and a truly democratic one, for that matter) is, for Pericles as it had been for Solon before him and for Socrates during his own time and Plato after him, the consequence of proper communication amongst its members which proper communication itself finds its aetiology only in the true communion of thought of the members, essential elements of a communitarian society.

5. Thus, after he elaborated on the notion and the conditions of the *truly* democratic verbal discussion, Pericles elaborates, then, on the ethical relational action. Having elaborated already on the notion and the conditions of true Democracy (i.e. the consciousness of one's self and the responsibility for one's affairs), he discusses, right after, the notion and the conditions of Freedom, the two principles for which the fallen soldiers gave their life. In this last part of the paragraph, he discusses the relationships and the relations of the Athenians both with one another and with other states and nations. On the basis and the fulfilment of those conditions he insisted already as necessary for these relations: with one another as conscious and responsible persons as well as participating and active citizens; with other states and nations as a free and open community as well as a sovereign and friendly state. The public ethical relations expand, then, from the inner-City-State of Athens (on the infra-national level) to the inter-City-States of the Greek world (on the national level) and, by implied extension, to the inter-Nation-States of the World (on the international level).

In his "*tois pollois*" and "*philous*", Pericles seems to imply the rest of mankind as well. On the one hand, with "*tois pollois*" (i.e. not few), he does not seem, in any way, intentionally or not, to delimit the range. That he refers primarily to the Spartans and to the Sophists is rather clear, but in dealing with "others", with whom one wants to establish good friendship and trade, the conditions Pericles poses are evidently the same whoever these "others" may be. Yet, on the other hand, the use of the term "*tois pollois*" (i.e. not all) shows, also, that Pericles does not want to exclude any other peoples from the rest of mankind who may

have the same notion or the same principles of "friendship"; he sees that it is possible that there be others who would feel the same way as his own Athenians do. The term "*tois pollois*" may refer, therefore, to the "crowds" ("*hoi polloi*") of a Sophistic society (cf. the notion of "ochlocracy", as opposed to true "democracy", in Plato's critique of *tois pollois*, *ochlos* and *plêthos* in the *Republic*); it may refer to the other Greek City-States (including, certainly, the Spartans); it may refer as well to all the non-Greek peoples and cultures. It is rather obvious, from the terms he uses (i.e. *tois pollois* and *philous*) and their context, that Pericles refers to both the Sophists and the Spartans and, apparently, to the World as well. So, in this regard, Pericles states that, when it comes to the question of "excellence" (*aretê*)[19], "there is a great contrast between the [present] Athenians and most other people" (*enêntiômetha tois pollois*).

6. What, then, is this difference in regard to "excellence" that Pericles refers to? The Athenian "excellence", as it is presented in the text, relies, at first, on the fact that the people of Pericles' contemporary Athens are, indeed, personally active and participant "citizens" rather than passive and re-presented "residents". Hence, the emphasis on *drasis* (a repeated term in *drôntes* and *drasas*) is not of secondary significance, since it seems that it not only refers to the dramatic aspect of the ethical agent but also to the existential drama of the free person, both references being the antithesis to the Sophistic passive individual anonymity and political multitudinous representation[20] as they are, obviously, the antithesis to the Spartan passivity in the individual evaporation and political massive assimilation.[21] And the fundamental aspect of this is that, in Pericles' view, it is in this active and dramatic way that the Athenians acquire friends. So, in this way, one may understand Pericles' juxtaposition and contrast, first, of friendship to calculation and, second, of freedom to obligation, the first with an explicit reference to the Sophists and an implicit one to the Spartans and the second with an overt reference to the Spartans and a covert one to the Sophists.

In his contrast of friendship to calculation, Pericles' conception of friendship is rather clear since his list of its essential characteristics is self-revealing: the contrast of kindness to profit, of giving to receiving, of conferring to taking, of gratitude to debt, of good will to bad feeling, of charity to self-interest, of generosity to

afterthought, of benevolence to gain[22], the list reveals a society whose characteristics go against the Sophistic egocentric atomism and hedonistic utilitarianism: in Pericles' view, true friendship is without ulterior motives, either of political gain or of economic return; it is not based on self-love and self-interest.[23] Friendship is not, therefore, individualistic selfishness, but personalistic selflessness; it is not ego-centric, but allo-centric; it is a kindness out of the civic-mindedness of the actively participant citizens in the *polis* as a interpersonal human entity which is the opposite of a circumstantial individualistic residential cohabitation of consumers in an *asty* as a geographical territorial entity. True friendship is not a narcissistic and *idio*-syncratic self-love in the unidentifiable "sameness" and "contiguousness" of corporeal atoms of the Sophistic hedonistic materialism, but brotherly-love in the identifiable "equality" and "neighbourliness" of real friends. The term *philous* (*philia*) is implying here ethical and cultural polish and politeness of the "political"agent (*polités*) as member of the *polis*. Thus, "friends", in this Periclean conception, are not the erotic "lovers" of Sophistic hedonism, but the aretetic "lovers" implied in the "lovers" of Wisdom, Beauty and Goodness, i.e. in the logical, aesthetical and ethical dimensions of the human being, dimensions which become the three fundamental "values" as evaluative criteria in his axiology of that which leads finally to that axiocratic society he tries to describe. So the principle which guides both the actions and the relations of the Athenian people, as Pericles at least sees it, is that outward friendship which is the foundation of the "fellowship" necessary for a true community of people, community such that characterizes Pericles' Athenian community which, naturally, goes beyond both the singular "communal" living of inward self-centered individuals and the simple "communistic" living of an inward holistic social entity.[24] The essential characteristics of friendship and the conditions of its possibility are, therefore, denoting that the kind of society Pericles describes is neither the collectivistic and corporative Spartan society nor the upcoming individualistic and capitalist one of the Sophists. To the view that competition or confrontation produces excellence in every sphere of human activity, Pericles seems to propose (as Solon did before him and Socrates and Plato after) the alternative that the source and cause of excellence is the cooperative community spirit.

7. It is also and equally important to notice here that, according to Pericles, if the Athenians do good, this is done not only in a friendly way, but also in a free disposition. This friendship, which is without ulterior motives of profit and calculations, is also without any superior force of commandment or obligation; it is a friendship developed and contracted intentionally and voluntarily based on freedom. In this case, neither the force of a utilitarian profit-in-mind nor the force of a totalitarian master-mind dictate true friendship and, in this sense, friendship is the manifestation of freedom since true friends are free. Is this freedom taken here in the social or societal sense? One may notice that this freedom is not juxtaposed and opposed primarily -or only- to a social "slavery", but, instead, to the lack of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. The notion of Freedom in this Periclean conception is, mainly then, a personal and existential freedom. Civil "liberties", which refer to an individual's access to political enfranchisements and societal permissions were, of course, absent in the Spartan politically authoritarian society; but civic "liberalities" (*eleutheriotês*), on the other hand, which give a licence to anarchic actions and ethical permissiveness, was characteristic of the Sophistic gnoseologically doxastic and ethically relativistic philosophy.

Thucydides' own observations, to this effect, are revelatory (II, 52-55, esp. 53): "Athens owed to the plague the beginnings of a state of lawlessness...and pleasure...". This confirms both the strength of Sophism at this time and Pericles' perspicacity in this speech. Of course, the plague was the occasion, but the cause of this societal and social radical change was the Sophistic philosophy. This occasion made the Athenians accept Sophism readily and, consequently, Pericles was blamed for everything, not only for the war, but also for the plague (cf. II, 59). Pericles' open reaction to the Sophistic principles did not take long to come (cf. II, 60).

Yet, in the way he brings up, in the Funeral Oration, the possibility of friendship as the result of "freedom" (*eleutheria*: "not by calculation of profit, but by trust in our freedom", he states)[25], Pericles obviously refers to one's own "self-mastery" since, he continues, "each single one of our citizens, in the manifold aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own person"[26] (is it not significant, one may ask, that he does not say "the rightful lord and owner" either "of another person" or "of other people"?); and emphatically adding, in this regard, that each single one is able to "do this, moreover, with exceptional

grace and exceptional versatility", i.e. gracefully accepting, if need be, even defeat or death in the war as did those soldiers he praises now (and this notion of "grace" is also revelatory since it is thrice repeated here).[27] Pericles' notion of freedom implies, then, a self-mastery based on self-consciousness and self-knowledge (*autognôsia*)[28] and, as such, it reveals the dignity and the integrity[29] as well as the discipline and the respect of the truly free person for both his own and the other's self. Freedom, therefore, as self-mastery, is self-responsibility in one's own personal "ability to respond critically" for his own actions which are the result of human interactions, a point which Pericles clarifies later in the same speech.[30] The action (*drasis*) brings, of course, a reaction (*antidrasis*) as the result of human interaction; but, in this Periclean view, *drasis* is clearly the opposite of both *apodrasis* (escape) and *adraneia* (inaction), in reference, again, to the two respective alternative World Views he rejects, *apodrasis* and *adraneia* in view especially of both the present military operations and the possible diplomatic relations. Free, therefore, are those who know who they are and what they do and, thus, they know the reason and the cause of why they act; free are those who, because of their self-mastery, are not slaves -primarily and fundamentally- to themselves and to their whims, a fact which -secondly and consequentially- enables and empowers them so that they be not slaves, socially and politically, to their leaders and to others.

The slavery to oneself and to one's own whims can easily be referred, in Pericles' perspective, to the Sophists' gnoseologically subjectivistic "opinion" (*doxa*) which includes the individual preconceptions and prejudices (a result of narrow-mindedness instead of civic-mindedness) as well as to their politically relativistic "persuasion" (*peithô*) which includes the crowd's self-righteousness and self-rectitude (a result of rhetorical flattery instead of critical reasoning). The slavery to leaders and to others, in a further analysis, presupposes the absence of self-consciousness and self-identity which absence often reduces or eliminates any resistence which brings, finally, political impotence and submission to tyranny. Solon had already raised this point and Plato would say, in his *Republic*, that the first eventually leads to the latter.[31] It does not matter whether the leaders and the others are political or military leaders or, even, landowners; whether they are generals or commanders or, simply, work superiors; whether they are an impersonal and anonymous aggregative "crowd" or a congregative "mass" or, still, another political state. The master-slave

relation (whether dominion or domination and, thus, submission or subjugation) is, in this Periclean sense (as it is also in Plato's *Republic*), primarily and fundamentally, a question of consciousness and it becomes, consequentially, a social and political relation.[32]

What Pericles seems to say, therefore, is that friends are free and close to each other while enemies are slavish and closed to each other. That is the reason why only friends can freely and openly discuss with one another in a truly democratic way in the *Bouleuterion* or the *Agora* and they are, as a consequence, "gracefully and flexibly" open, within the same principle, to one another's views and relations; enemies only fight since they are closed to each other's views and relations, either in their individual ego-centric or in their collective ethno-centric shelledselves.[33] For Pericles, an open society is a society which is personalistic and communitarian. An individualistic society, like that which the Sophists proposed -and were soon- to establish in Athens, is indeed a closed society since the individual, by fact and by definition as self-centered and self-interested, is closed unto his own selfish shell.[34] For a society composed of egocentric individuals not even a trade treaty is easily possible (because of the mercantile competition), let alone a peace treaty[35] (because of the military self-righteousness): in its aggressive competitiveness, such a society is a closed society just as much as a collectivistic society, like that of the Spartans. What Pericles seems to say, therefore, is that treaties (whether peace or trade treaties) must be ratified and signed by the "consenting people" (the true *demos*) who are supposed to be both self-conscious and well-informed -otherwise these treaties simply remain "paper treaties"- and moderation must be not only in words but also in deeds. The true leader leads the people without either herding them as an impulsive crowd or dictating to them as an unthoughtful mass.[36]

8. If this interpretation of Pericles' terms and text is correct and if this is indeed his meaning, then the implications -and their alternatives- are rather clearly exuded: first that Pericles' society is an ethical one and, second, it is an open one. On this basis, Pericles' proposed principles to resolve conflicts (whether military or diplomatic) or to establish relations (whether interpersonal or international) become more or less transparent.

First, in Pericles' description, one may notice an implied striking distinction between the ethical aspect of his society and the moralistic society of the Spartans as well as the amoralistic one of the Sophists. As all the Periclean Athenians -"each and every one", he says, (*kath'hekaston*)- think critically, discuss publicly and decide responsibly before they consensually accept a code of ethics or enact a societal law as the "lawmakers" themselves, then they are not like the Spartans whose "edicts and decrees" come from far and above as traditional *mores* (moral) since the remote legislation of the ancestral "Lawgiver" Lycurgus; nor are they like the upcoming Sophists whose "acceptances and agreements" are circumstantial egoistic concurrences (amoral) of individual subjective opinions. The Athenian Solon was not a Lawgiver (like Lycurgus or Moses), but a lawmaker. Even his *Politeia* (the constitutional social contract) had been constantly and openly reviewed and revised (cf. Cleisthenes etc.) and his *Nomothesia* had been changed often and radically until 429 BC as the Athenians were enacting new legislation they considered appropriate according to their historical situations and circumstances (cf. Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*). Unlike moral and amoral ones, ethical decisions are the result of truly human reason and philosophical deliberation which form and mold the *ethos* of the personal character: moral decisions are the result of collective divinatory tradition and obedience while the amoral ones are the result of individual persuasive opinion and credulity; moral decisions are monarchic or oligarchic and amoral ones are polyarchic or anarchic while ethical decisions are supposed, at least, to be truly demarchic.

Within these notions of friendship and freedom, the Athenians, according to Pericles, were not, therefore, indifferent towards their fellow-human-beings; they were neither collectively pathetic nor individualy apathetic: they were, instead, sympathetic in sharing and caring.[37] This seems to be, or to indicate, a meaning of philadelphic and philanthropic characteristics to his conception of "excellence" (*aretê*), an aretology which differs fundamentally from both alternative societies, the sophomoric hedonism and the moralistic conformism. Certainly, according to Pericles, this philanthropic aretetic *ethos* which characterizes his Athenians should not be taken to imply nor to denote political, military or diplomatic weakness. He stated at the beginning of the paragraph that to devote oneself to education and the pure sciences (*philosophoumen*) does not imply softness; nor to develop cre-

ativity and the fine arts (*philokaloumen*) implies extravagance. At the end of the same paragraph he adds that to be sympathetic to, and care for, others should not, therefore, be taken as a sign of political, military or diplomatic impotence. Yet, what distinguishes the *ethos* of the human character is indicative of one's relations towards others; and the Periclean *ethos* is indicative of his Athenians and their human relations. Instead of the competitive attitude of the sophistically influenced Athenians and the confrontational attitude of the Spartans, Pericles proposes a compassionate attitude which leads to negotiations rather than military operations in conflict resolutions.

If Pericles' juxtaposition of his Athenians with the Spartans is obvious, his emphasis nevertheless of the difference between *his* Athenians of the "Funeral Oration" (before the plague) and the Athenians of his "Plague Speech" (during and after the plague) is, in this case -as Pericles points out in the later speech- striking and relevant in understanding his policy position in the earlier speech. On this point, one may only refer to II, 61, and especially when he makes the remark, towards the end, on the "arrogant" and "those who, through lack of ethical fibre, fail to live up to the reputation which is *theirs already*" in which remark one may notice his observation that the Solonian democracy had changed to an amoral expediency and an anarchic ochlocracy.

The Peloponnesian War has always been considered as a war between the warring parties of Athens and Sparta. Yet the fundamental point which must be taken into account when considering this war is that Athens had not been one and the same in its 25-year duration. While the Spartan guiding principles remained the same throughout the length of the war, the Athenian ones did not and so did not their relations and their policies. The change after Pericles' death is not, therefore, only a simple change of government, but, instead, a radical change in philosophical principles and, consequently, in societal and state relational attitudes and policies. Thus, this fundamental change can be noticed, after Pericles' death, not only in Athenian societal attitudes as the previous case shows (II, 61), but also in Athenian state behavior and policy. One significant and characteristic example -which would suffice- is the "Melian Dialogue" in 416 BC (V, 84-116) with "the massacre of the male population". To some objections regarding historical accuracy, one may point out that it is not so much whether this event took place in the way Thucydides records it or not; or whether it is Thucydides' own

reflections, views and words or not.[38] What is important to notice, in this case, is the predominance of the principles which, this time, are those of "self-interest" and "profit", of "expediency" and "efficiency",[39] those principles precisely which Pericles seems to have rejected in his *Funeral Oration*. One may only compare the Athenian attitude in the emissaries imposing their will and compelling submission[40] with the Melian replies on the principles of moderation and friendship.[41]

This Periclean ethical friendship as "love-of-other", benevolent and giving as it must be, implies, in its freedom and justice, an openness and fairness to all "others" without any distinctions or restrictions. The friendship, if indeed true, implicitly extends, then, not only to one's fellow citizens within his own society but also to other societies outside it. In using constantly and consistently the verbal plural (first person plural), Pericles implies that this free friendship is not practiced only within their own City-State limits in an inter-personal level, but also out of their own City-State. The implication of Inter-City-State relations (inter-political, with the Spartans in this particular instance) and Inter-Nation-State relations (inter-ethnic, which may easily be taken to include, in this case, the Persians, for example)[42] is rather clear. The Athenian *philia* and *euergesia* to which Pericles refers cannot be open only to "allied" or "client" states, as it may be easily assumed. In the manner and the terminology of the presentation of his conception of friendship, by referring to the egocentric and utilitarian Sophists, Pericles raises the question of inter-personal and inter-citizen relations and he stresses the guiding principles of openness and civic-mindedness which must be present; by referring to the ethnocentric and militaristic Spartans, he raises the question of inter-state and inter-national relations and he stresses again the principles of openness and good-neighborliness. Of course, the fact that, in his speech, Pericles addresses the Athenians and talks to them about friendship (and its essential characteristics) implies that he describes the existence of -and proposes the possibilities and conditions for- inter-personal and inter-citizen relations; the fact that he refers to the Spartans implies inter-state and even inter-national relations. Thus, Pericles describes both the way Athenians act, react and interact amongst themselves as persons and as citizens as well as how they act, react and interact, as a community and as a state, with other states and nations in their political treaties and economic trades. These relations extend, obviously in this case, to trade treaties, cultural treaties and -why not- peace treaties.

That Athens lost the war was, no doubt, because, as Thucydides says, she abandoned Pericles's policy and strategy. Yet a further, and more fundamental, question is why did Athens abandon this Periclean policy and strategy, an answer which Thucydides does not explicitly provide. Yet, stating it at the moment and in the way he does, in that crucial paragraph 65 of Bk II, and in his contrast of the private profit and the flattering politicians who succeeded Pericles and the crowds who were leading, Thucydides gives implicitly the answer himself. The answer may be found, then, in her abandonment of his foundational political principles with the acceptance -and subsequent predominance- of the Sophistic individualistic utilitarian philosophy. The shift of polity was due to the ideological differences. The resulting political infighting divided the Athenians, brought social anarchy and consequently weakened their military position. The Plague, as an unpredictable natural disaster which could not have been easily under human control, certainly contributed to the ultimate Athenian defeat by its great economic as well as human losses; but the ideological differences appear to have been the fundamental aetiological factor. The Sicilian expedition, almost fifteen years later, would suffice as an example (VI, 1 ff). It is certain that there are questions of policy, strategy and military operation regarding this expedition. Yet, even if they had been victorious, the question still remains as to why did the Athenians of that time undertake this expedition in the first place: would the Athenians of the earlier period have undertaken it under the leadership of Pericles? And if not, would it have been solely on the basis of a specific circumstantial strategic decision on the possibility of success? Would the "calculative" principle have come into consideration? That this expedition was viewing the conquest not only of the Sicilian and Italic Greek City-states but also of Carthage and the Carthagenians (VI, 90) is a rather clear indication that the expansionist policy of the politicians of that time was guided, first, by the antagonistic and confrontational politics of the power of the stronger ("might is right" as Callicles and Thrasymachus would defend later in the Platonic *Gorgias* and *Republic*) rather than the Periclean conciliatory politics; and, second, by the "panhellenic" and "cosmopolitical" policies of the Sophists (introduced by the rhetoricians who, as migrants, had arrived in Athens after the 450s, especially from Sicily) rather than the "political"(i.e. of the "*polis*") policies which Pericles describes in his speech.

9. The very fact that -and especially the way in which- Pericles talks about friendship and openness of his society and his state (in his respective terms "Athenians" and "Athens") by addressing the Athenians and, of course, by referring to the Spartans, at this early moment in the history of the war, would easily allow a not too far-fetched interpretation that, in his terminology and its usage, he extends hands for peace and friendly relations with the military enemy. Does Pericles invite the Spartans to a Peace treaty from a standpoint of weakness? Would that invitation be because Athens had been already, in the summer of that same year, under siege by the Spartans? This conclusion is reasonable and possible, but since the War was, at this time, only in its first years, it is also reasonable to consider that the Athenians would have had confidently thought that they had a good chance of winning it; indeed, on the basis of the Athenian naval strength Pericles seems to be here rather certain of the favourable outcome. Obviously Pericles, at this time, did not know the length of the war nor its outcome 25 years later nor, of course, the upcoming devastating plague of which he himself would be a victim.

The question of "weakness" may, secondly, be considered from the point of internal -and ally- opposition: one may be tempted to compare, for example, Pericles' situation with that of the Spartan king Pleistoanax and his eventual exile (II, 21) because, in his case, the Acharnians and many others, within the Athenian state, were, as Thucydides relates, "furious with Pericles and paid no attention at all to the advice which he had given them previously"(II, 21), despite the fact that "Pericles was convinced of the righteousness of his own views about not going out to battle" (II, 22); and, furthermore, the Sophists' official political opposition and their strong following in the Athenian society, following which became clear during the plague and after Pericles' death.[43] This conclusion also seems to be reasonable and possible, but, if during the summer Athens was under siege, in autumn things changed considerably, as Thucydides says, and "Athens was then at the height of her power and had not yet suffered from the plague" (II, 31). Indeed, it is "[i]n the same winter" that Pericles, because of his strength, "was chosen to make the speech" (II, 34). When he delivered his *Funeral Oration*, Pericles spoke, therefore, rather from a position of strength.

A peaceful society, as Pericles describes his to have been, should not even, by implication as well as by principle, look for a simple truce.[44] That he had advised the Athenians to go to war against the Spartans is true and Pericles seems to readily admit it with the justification, however, that this advice was given, as he says,

because of the Spartan "ultimatum" (e.g. I, 139 ff) and because the war "was forced upon" them. Thus, the Athenians, he adds, must "resist those who started it" (I, 144): the Athenians, in Pericles' consideration, should "not give in"(I, 140) and should not show they are "the weaker party" (I, 141).[45] His proposal that the Athenians should not be the ones "to start a war"(I, 144) is, therefore, a clear confirmation of his principles; and his insistence on "arbitration"and "peaceful negotiations" (which the Spartans, apparently, never wanted, cf. I, 140) as well as on his "willing to reach a settlement through a treaty"(I, 145) is an even stronger confirmation.

Of course, Pericles insisted, at the beginning of this paragraph, that being involved in the Sciences and Arts does not make the Athenians soft and lax, implying apparently both a reference to the innuendo of "softness"in the battlefield and a warning to a possibly anticipated abandonment of military undertakings out of weakness.[46] In the same vein and sense, again, at the end of the paragraph, he makes the point that being friendly and open to people does not make the Athenians gullible and lenient in the diplomatic field either. Yet, having set the ethical and political principles for individual and social public relations and having implied the principles of economic and ambassadorial relations, the Periclean strategy and diplomacy indicates, in this way, a major and significantly different approach to inter-state and international relations and opens, also, to new and momentous philadelphic and philanthropic horizons.[47]

One may easily suspect, of course, whether it is here a question of "honest friendship" or, possibly, a question of "ulterior motives", especially if the Athenian relations with their allies be questioned within the purported "imperialistic" Athenian hegemony.[48] The question is whether Pericles is indeed critical or rather hypocritical. Yet, if one suspects this question, one may also suspect Pericles' possible answer which would, perhaps, be that if the others are friends in word and deed, not only would they seek the honesty of friendship in one's conscious deeds but they would also show it in their own conscious deeds: if it be true that what count are the responded deeds and that one be accountable in "doing and doing good to others", then Pericles' answer would be that it is only in the reciprocation of consented deeds that one would see the end-result. In Pericles' own "conclusion"[49], this democratic freedom and this diplomatic disposition are the essence of the educational "lesson" (*paideusin*) (II,41) that the Athenians can give to the rest of the Greeks and, by extension again, to the rest of mankind.[50]

10. The purpose of this article is a textual exegesis and its hermeneutical analysis in order to exude its meaning and its implications. The question of the historical accuracy of the speech and the historical application of its content during the Periclean tenure in office (and the purported Athenian imperialistic hegemony) are beyond the scope of this article. Hence, whether this Oration was indeed historically delivered by Pericles himself at the time Thucydides claims it to have been or whether it was literally delivered in those very same words as the historiographer records it or, furthermore, whether it was simply attributed to him by Thucydides himself, is not the essential point here. Pursuing this objection even further, it is also secondary as to whether this Oration was written and delivered personally by Pericles or was it instead (as the Platonic Socrates would ironically have it in the *Menexenus*), by Aspasia or, for that matter, by any other rhetorician or logographer.

Even if one objects, moreover, that this speech does not give us an accurate historical account of the Athenian society or the Athenian democracy or the Athenian relations with their Greek or non-Greek neighbours (whether friends and allies or enemies and rivals) still this is a matter of historical interpretation (and very controversial indeed) which is not directly relevant to the purpose of this article. The Periclean "Golden Age" has had its critics, both affirmative and negative, with powerful arguments on both sides. One may, however, be tempted to contrast this period to -and compare it with- the Victorian Era of a strong British Empire and the predominance of its puritan morality and customs; and yet one may recall the slavery and the child labour of last century in the British industries and factories. Another may be tempted to juxtapose it -and oppose it- to the strong American Empire and its insistence on the defence of human liberty and rights; yet one may be reminded of the slavery and the black labour not only after the emancipation in the 1860s and '70s, but also after the recent 1960s and '70s. The question may be asked as to whether there are any societies or civilizations, including the Biblical, which can claim innocence in political actions or immunity from any social imperfections, and especially in regard to military operations and diplomatic relations. A synchronic comparison as well as a diachronic may be, in this regard, revelatory.

The fact still remains that the content of the speech leaves a specific and clear picture of the political and social context and situation of the Athenian society as Pericles, at least, saw it in that

historical period and, at the same time, sends a specific message of intent that the expressive literary art of the text communicates succinctly as well as beautifully. There is no question, it seems, that, as a rhetorical and a literary work, the *Epitaphios* is a work of art and a masterpiece; that, as a philosophical and political message, it is a message which may, very well, be heeded and may, courageously, be tested and applied in our own troubled times. Presenting alternative principles of political, social and economic philosophy to that of the Spartans and the Sophists, and the implied philosophical principles of diplomatic, strategic and public relations, Pericles sends to posterity a concrete message of fundamental importance. Today, theories of international conflict resolutions and of international public relations abound and proliferate; within his philosophical principles of the Democratic Ideal, Pericles offers his own theory. Can any one of our contemporary theories resolve the existing and long-lasting international conflicts (of which there are many crucial ones around the world) and prepare for more effectively peaceful international relations? As Thucydides's text in general becomes, lately, more and more relevant documentation on military and diplomatic information, the Periclean conflict theory may also be possibly one to consider. For Thucydides, it seems, both this text and its message must have made a lot of historical and philosophical sense, otherwise he would certainly have referred to it, in his own critical historiographical methodology (cf. I, 20-21 ff), in a completely different way; and, especially if Thucydides, as Plutarch says, was not that favourable to Pericles, he might have only mentioned this speech in a footnote or, at the most, *in passim*.[51]

NOTES

1. **Bioi, Periklês**, 8,7.

2. **Peloponnesian War**, Book II, ##34-46. The original Greek (and the references to it) comes from I. Bekker's edition, 1821 (with some modifications in the punctuation): **Epitaphios**, pp 267-286. If not otherwise indicated, the translation is that of Rex Warner (1954) in the Penguin Edition (with some modifications at times), Penguin Books, London, 1972, pp. 143-151.

3. *Ibid.* #34. An annual and ancient "custom" for the Athenians which has been revived in our own times (since 1918) as a commemorative annual affair (Remembrance Day, November 11).

4. Cf. #37, ll. 4-5: *dia to mê es oligous all'es pleionas oikein, dêmokratia keklêtai.* "Political", as it is implied in this speech and used in this article, is in the sense of a system based on the size and the level of the *Polis*, within the Greek Infra-Nation State system, a system which was replaced by Alexander's "Nation-State", the *Panhellênion*, uniting all the Greeks as a nation in the 330s BC, and the subsequent Supra-Nation-State system, the *Pancosmion* or *Cosmopolis*, uniting many Asiatic and African nations in the 320s BC. Implied in this speech is also the Spartan view of the completely homogeneous Nation-State ("ethno-political") and the Sophistic fully heterogeneous Intra-Nation-State ("cosmo-political") (cf. below). One may raise, at this point, the question of the Athenian Hegemonic "Imperialism" of the Periclean "Golden Era", but it can be argued that this was neither ethno-centric nor cosmo-centric in the above sense, but a Confederacy.

5. On Thucydides' views on these Relations, cf. the articles in this issue of **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, and more specifically P. Arnopoulos' "Theory and Praxis of War and Peace in Thucydides's Era (450-400)".

6. Cf. Plutarch, **Solon**, 3; Aristotle, **Athenian Constitution**, 7,1.

7. "Laconically" one may be tempted to say, despite the fact that he is a *de facto* committed Attic Greek in the content of his speech as well as in his Attic background. Both philosophically and tribally as well as geographically, the Attic philosophy during the Socratic period merges and transcends, on the central mainland, the endmost Ionian and Dorian lines of philosophic thought of the Pre-Socratic period which includes the Sophistic Philosophy; i.e. merges and transcends the empiricistic, materialistic and atomistic philosophy of Asia Minor (Milesian and Ephesian; cf. Sophistic here) and the rationalistic, formalistic and holistic philosophy of South Italy (Pythagorean and Eleatic; cf. Spartan here).

8. The detailed analysis and interpretation of the textual passages and the textual proof of these aspects are not within the scope of this limited article; they need their own elaborate analytic discussion.

9. He mentions, of course, the Spartans in # 39, ll.13 ff (p.273), and, losing his patience perhaps, he directly attacks the Sophistic attitude of the Athenians in his Speech during the plague in #60 (telling them in #61: "you changed", i.e. principles, "not me"). Thucydides himself elaborates on their newly acquired hedonistic principles in #53. Both S. and S. are present, therefore, in his mind and in his speech.

10. A defence, certainly, of the Athenian intellectual and artistic concern and economic expense. Pericles' instrumentality, in the 30 years he had been in governmental office, for the advancement of both Pure Sciences and Fine Arts, for the pursuit of both scientific research and artistic beautification, had been under critique by the Sophists of his time.

11. *Ibid.* Pericles litteraly and explicitly uses the terms "philosophy" and "philocally" in *philosophoumen* and *philokaloumen*; he does not, however, use any of the terms "philanthropy" or "philagathy", *agathoergia* or *agathopoiia*. Yet it is obviously implied - as the spirit of the text shows- in the specific terminology he uses to express the ethical aspect of his contemporary Athenian society.

12. On the relation of words and action, cf. also I, 144.

13. Obviously because of their philosophy. On this point, besides Plato's many **Dialogues**, cf. also Aristophanes' **Clouds**.

14. "Discussion" rather than "debate". A "debate" is based on the Sophistic *logomachia*, while a "discussion" is based on the Solonian and Socratic *autognôsia*. Even the term "debate" corresponds to the Greek *logomachia* and denotes the "battle" of "words" (de -beat, battle; cf. the French *battre*). The term "discussion", on the other hand, implies conscious and knowledgeable reasoning and argumentation by "shaking" the evidence "through" the intervention of the interlocutors (dis -quash; cf. the Latin *quatere*). Cf. Pericles' sterms: *krinomen... orthôs ta pragmata... an... dikaiôs kritheien... saphestata gignôskontes*, a clear reference to both the Sophistic "debate" (in staying only on the level of words) and the Spartan complete absence of discussion.

15. Cf. Pericles's Speech in I, 140-144 always "giving reasons" for any of his proposals (e.g. 144: "I could give you many other reasons why you should..."). Cf. Socrates's dictum: "An unexamined life is not worth living" (implied human life in a human way : *anthrôpô* (**Apology** 38a: *o de anexetastos bios ou biôtos anthrôpô*).

16. *Kratistoi d' an tên psychên* may very well refer to both the individual bravery (cf. the notions of *tolman* and *thrasos* before in relation to the *psychê*) and to the societal power (cf. the notion of *kratos* implicit in the *kratistoi*). Cf. *amathia*.

17. Cf. earlier the *politikôn epimeleia* and the *ta politika mê endeôs gnônai*.

18. This is not only playing with the words and the letters. Any act is a fact as "done"; and any fact is an act with the human intervention (with obvious ethical implications) (e.g the splitting of the atom and the splitting of the cell in the natural state and the human action; or miscarriage and abortion). In the same way, any free decision (and choice) is an existentially mental "reeling" (human ability to think and to respond); and this existential freedom precedes (and founds) the civil liberties. This is, perhaps, what Pericles tries to emphasize in this relation of words and deeds. On freedom, cf. below.

19. The translation of the Classical Greek term *aretê* with the term "virtue" is completely wrong. The Classical Greek sense is in relation to the Ancient Greek ethics of "excellence": an attempt to become what one is capable of being, as opposed to the *hamartia* (in the ancient Greek sense of not doing anything to excel) and to *hubris* (in the sense of exceeding one's own limits; cf. *mêden agan*). The term "virtue" has nothing to do with this Greek meaning since it refers either (originally) to the Roman morality of "manliness" and "virility" for which the Greeks had the term *andreia* (i.e. *versus* "cowardice" or "pusillanimity") or (later) to the Christian morality of "righteousness" and "rectitude" which implies a disobedience to a preordained divine commandment (i.e. *versus* "sin" or "contumaciousness").

20. It is only a "multitude" (in the sense of "crowd or mob") of individuals who can be "represented" since they are impersonal and anonymous and, consequently, can be replaceable.

21. In the "mass" (in the sense of "flock or herd") there is a complete assimilation and the individuality is lost.

22. Compare also the terms in B. Jowett's translation in Claredon Press, Oxford, 1900, pp 126-135. Cf. *aretên legei nun tên philian kai euergesian* - Scholiast.

23. Cf. Pericles' terms *drôntes, charin, eunoias, eleutherias*; and *paschontes, opheilêma, xympherontos, logismô*, etc. Compare here the view of Adam Smith, **An Inquiry Into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations**, 1776, especially Bk I, ch. II "Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour".

24. Pericles' notion of *polis* is not that of a "state" in the Hegelian sense (despite the misleading translations) (cf. Note 36 below), but that of a people with the sense of community manifested in the civic-mindedness.

25. Warner's translation of *eleutheria* here (p. 147) as "free liberality" is not only confusing and misleading but completely wrong.

26. Cf. also #63 on "freedom and slavery" and, in a careful reading, the same implication.

27. Cf. *"...o drasas tên charin....ouk es charin...., meta charitôn..."*

28. Cf. the Solonian *gnôthi seauton* and the Socratic clarification of it by the addition of *en oida oti ouden oida*.

29. On Pericles' dignity and integrity, cf. II, 65 (cf. the contrast, in the same passage, to his Sophist successors: private ambition, private profit, flattery etc) and compare it with II, 13 (on his property so that there are no suspicions). Cf. Pericles's view in I, 143 that human beings come first and then houses and land which are "the fruit of their labour".

30. Cf. #43, ll. 12 ff p.281: *eudaimon to eleutheron . to de eleutheron to eupsuchon krinantes...* The notions of *eudaimon* and of *krinantes* here are important in the understanding of what is *eleutheron* and *eupsuchon*.

31. **Rep.** 555b-576b.

32. Because of apparent semantic and, perhaps, ennoiological similarities, it may be remarked that this notion of "master-slave relation" should not be taken in the Hegelian sense, nor the notions of "state" (cf., for instance, Warner's translation of *polis* and *politika*, especially in # 60 as well as in # 40) (cf. Note 25 above). Pericles' philosophy (or Socrates' and Plato's, for that matter) has nothing to do with that of Hegel's which is Eleatic with Stoic and Neoplatonic elements. On Hegel's notion, cf. his **The Phenomenology of the Spirit**, B, IV, A and B, i.e. B: "Self-Consciousness", IV: "The Truth of the Certitude of Oneself", A: "Independence and dependence of Self-Consciousness; Dominion and Servitude" and B: "Freedom of Self-Consciousness; Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness" (cf. English. Translation of J.B. Baillie, **Phenomenology of Mind**, Harcourt Publications, New York, 1967, pp.241-267). Cf. also Hegel's **Philosophical Propaedeutics**, Course II: "Phenomenology of the Spirit and Logic" , ## 22-39: "Self-Consciousness", and especially ## 29-37: "Mastery and Servitude".

33. Karl Popper's Society (**The Open Society And Its Enemies**, 2 vol., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1945), as an individualistic and libertarian one, despite his own claim, is necessarily, therefore, a closed society.

34. For Karl Popper to claim the possibility of an Open society on an individualistic and libertarian foundation (*ibid.*) not only is a contradiction in terms, but even more is an indication of Popper's understanding of the reality of " individual sovereignty" and "libertarian openness" .

35. This may be one of the possible reasons for the length of the war after Pericles' death, the intransigence of the warring parties. Obviously one objection may rightly be that it was during Pericles' tenure that the war started. Yet, without any intention to defend Pericles, one may, nevertheless, see that the reasons for the starting of a war may very well be out of one society's -or its leader's- hands and control, in the case of a direct attack or of an involuntary defensive involvement. On this point, our contemporary WWII may be used, as one example, on the side of the Allies; besides, the Persian Wars for the Ancient Greeks may be another example.

36. One may refer, as examples, to the recent Middle-East and Northern Irish Peace attempts and their final ratification; one may also wonder about the final European Union etc. We may recall, as a case in point, the Ferrara-Florence Union of Christian Churches in 1439 which remained *de facto* a "paper union".

37. Cf. the II.1-4, p.275, on "wealth" and "poverty". See # 51 on the caring of one another during the plague and compare it with # 52 ff and # 61("you have changed [i.e principles]... Yet you must remember that you are citizens of a great city..., condemned are those who, through lack of moral fibre, fail to live up to the reputation which has been theirs already"[principles]). On political apathy, cf. his critique in II, 63.

38. Cf., for instance, Penguin ed., *op.cit.*, appendix 3, pp.614-616.

39. One may easily find numerous strikingly similar examples today of democratic superpowers guided, in their foreign affairs and relations, by the same principles and attitude.

40. Cf. V, 87, 89, 93, 95, 105, 107.

41. Cf. V, 90, 94, 98,106.

42. Cf. II, 65 and 67 on Persia and the Spartan attempts to establish an alliance against the Athenians.

43. Cf. his "Plague Speech" and Thucydides' observations; cf. notes 26 and 39-40 above.

44. And this vision of the lasting peace is despite the fact that -it must be noted again with the risk of repetition- the war is only in its first year and that Pericles could not foresee, nor did he live to see, how long and devastating one it would be for all.

45. Cf. the reference to the parallel of the Persian invasion. One may compare the position of, and its justification by, the Allies during WWII.

46. Cf. the importance of knowing the reasons why one fights, which is the characteristic of Pericles's Athenians.

47. Compare the Spartan ambassadorial belligerent attitudes and dispositions (intransigent and confrontational) in, e.g., I, 139 ff.

48. To be noticed in II, 39 that Pericles claims: "the Athenians fight their own battles by themselves", as opposed to the Lacedaimonians who "bring also their allies".

49. *xunelôn te legô* (#41, ll.13, p. 276 and ff).

50. An interesting question one may ask is whether mankind, especially today, has retained, in its constitutions and institutions, the Solonian-Periclean (and, in this case, Socratic-Platonic) theories and practices of Democracy and Freedom (and, consequently, of Diplomacy and Policies) or rather the Sophistic ones.

51. Cf. **Bioi**, 8,5; 9,1; 14,1-3 etc.

En guise d'épilogue

Penser Thucydide, penser le monde

Stephanos Constantinides*

I. De l'actualité de Thucydide

Thucydide dans son récit de la guerre du Péloponnèse nous présente un système interétatique essentiellement hellénique, c'est à dire composé des États-cités grecs, mais qui s'élargit à un système international plus étendu avec la présence de la Perse et de quelques autres peuples non grecs.[1]

Penser Thucydide, penser le monde à un moment de grandes incertitudes, est évidemment pertinent d'autant plus que, comme le mentionne Jacqueline de Romilly, l'influence de l'historien grec "révèle des ressemblances sans cesse renouvelées avec une actualité qui elle-même change constamment".[2] En fait, Thucydide reste actuel sur plusieurs aspects au plan politique: fonctionnement des institutions, en particulier de la démocratie, rapports de l'individu et de l'État, rapport des forces à l'intérieur d'une société, psychologie politique, théorie des relations internationales, stratégie, nature du système interétatique et international, conceptualisation du politique, etc.

II. De la rigueur

L'influence des sophistes est manifeste chez Thucydide. Comme eux l'historien rejette tout ce qui est basé sur la mythologie et la religion pour expliquer les phénomènes politiques et la nature des relations interétatiques. Comme eux, il introduit la rationalité, élément essentiel pour penser le monde de son temps. Cependant

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il ne reste pas prisonnier du relativisme sophiste. Sa pensée, sa vision a un caractère dynamique. Son esprit critique, son positivisme, sa rigueur, reflètent ce goût nouveau de l'analyse scientifique qui gagne l'Athènes de Périclès "en pleine effervescence intellectuelle".[3]

III. De l'analogie

L'actualité de Thucydide est sans conteste. Les problèmes politiques d'aujourd'hui ne sont pas sans analogie avec le monde décrit par l'historien grec. Il y aura toujours quelqu'un pour suggerer l'analogie de l'impérialisme athénien avec celui des Américains, pour soulever la question du fonctionnement de la démocratie moderne par analogie avec l'expérience athénienne, alors que Sparte a longtemps été comparée à l'ex-Union Soviétique. La bipolarité du système international après la Seconde Guerre mondiale a été observée toujours par analogie à la bipolarité Athènes-Sparte, l'usage brutal de la force et les questions ethiques en période de guerre n'ont pas non plus échappé à la comparaison.[4]

IV. De la guerre

La guerre demeure le thème essentiel du récit de Thucydide. Tout le reste est accessoire mais non sans importance. Thucydide retient tout ce qui lui semble necessaire pour la compréhension du déroulement de la guerre. Mais la guerre, est, pour se rappeler la formule célèbre de Clausewitz, la continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens. Penser Thucydide c'est penser le destin tragique de l'homme d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. Car en décrivant la guerre du Peloponnèse, Thucydide décrit simultanément toutes les guerres qui l'ont depuis suivie.

V. Du système international

Le système international est déjà une réalité dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide, mais une réalité bien spécifique. C'est un système intercités, un système interhellène, avec tous les attributs dont les États souverains disposent. Les cités ont de plus la même langue et la même culture. Le système s'élargit par moments, avec l'entrée en scène de la Perse et de quelques cités ou peuples non grecs. Il

s'élargit encore par l'action semi-autonome de certains des satrapes de l'Empire Perse. Si à cela on ajoute le rôle de certaines personnalités comme celle d'Alcibiade -à certains moments de la guerre - par exemple à la tête de l'Empire Athénien ou contre elle comme conseiller de ses ennemis, ainsi que celui des exilés nous arrivons à un système international qui n'est pas très loin du notre, exception faite essentiellement de sa planétarisation et de ses caractéristiques contemporaines attribuables essentiellement au progrès technique.

Pour le reste, la logique du système thucydidien est la logique implacable de tout système international qui dégage quelques principes de base pour celui qui veut "voir clair dans les événements passés et dans ceux qui, à l'avenir, en vertu du caractère humain qui est le leur, présenteront des similitudes ou des analogies, qu'alors, on les juge utiles".[5]

Ainsi, le concept de l'impérialisme, concept maître pour la comprehension de la guerre du Peloponnèse, va réapparaître ensuite à travers toutes les péripéties de l'humanité et à l'époque contemporaine avec les impérialismes européens et américain. De même que le concept de la balance du pouvoir, celui de la stratégie (illustré par des desseins exceptionnels tels ceux de Periclès, d'Alcibiade ou de Lysandre) ou celui de la puissance qui dans l'analyse de Thucydide nous conduisent à saisir aussi notre propre réalité.

Le concept de bipolarité, en particulier, a toujours intrigué les analystes de Thucydide. Certains voient dans le système thucydidien une bipolarité implacable alors que d'autres nuancent une telle affirmation. Sans doute faudrait-il faire la distinction entre le système interétatique hellène et le système international de l'époque. Si on se limite au système interhellène, le pouvoir est principalement partagé entre Sparte et Athènes, même si l'on ne peut négliger la présence de Thèbes, des colonies grecques de Sicile et d'Italie du Sud, de Corcyre, de Corinthe, etc. C'est hors du monde grec que le problème se complique, en particulier avec la présence de la Perse. Ainsi pendant les guerres médiques, le concept de bipolarité s'applique différemment, à savoir, Grecs-non Grecs (barbares). Or, pendant la guerre du Péloponnèse, la Perse joue un rôle d'arbitre entre Athènes et Sparte. Et la victoire finale de Sparte doit beaucoup au soutien financier de la Perse.

Ainsi le système est en définitive bipolaire quand on se limite au seul monde grec, mais devient plutôt multipolaire dès qu'on en sort.

VI. De la logique de la puissance

Rien n'illustre mieux la logique de la puissance et du dessein impérial que le fameux dialogue entre Athéniens et Miliens. Aux arguments légalistes et moraux des Miliens -les arguments des faibles- les Athéniens répondent par le bulldozer de la force et de l'arrogance du plus fort: "Nous estimons, en effet, que du côté divin comme aussi du côté humain (pour le premier, c'est une opinion, pour le second une certitude) une loi de nature fait que toujours, si l'on est le plus fort, on commande; ce n'est pas nous qui avons posé ce principe ou qui avons été les premiers à appliquer ce qu'il énoncait: il existait avant nous et existera pour toujours après nous, et c'est seulement notre tour de l'appliquer, en sachant qu'aussi bien vous ou d'autres, placés à la tête de la même puissance que nous, vous feriez de même".[6]

Ce réalisme implacable n'est pas un trait de l'époque. C'est un trait des relations internationales de tout temps. Le droit international, les droits de l'homme, les tribunaux internationaux, toutes ces bonnes intentions cachent mal ce même réalisme qui gouverne les relations internationales d'aujourd'hui.

On peut par exemple démoniser *ad vitam aeternam* Sadam Hussein et frapper l'Irak sans merci -faire semblant même de protéger les Kurdes Irakiens- alors qu'on fait semblant de ne pas voir les massacres perpetrés par la Turquie le grand allié de l'Occident contre ce même peuple. William Clinton ou tout autre président américain pourrait *mutatis mutandis* reprendre le même raisonnement aujourd'hui que les Athéniens à l'époque. Une loi de la nature fait que toujours si l'on est le plus fort, on commande. Ah! certes, on ne serait pas aussi cruel aujourd'hui. Les temps ont quand même évolué; on doit au moins enrober ce réalisme avec quelques grands principes, lui donner un verni de droit et d'éthique. Mais au fond on sait toujours pourquoi les Américains ne frappent pas les Russes quand ils massacrent les Tchechènes ou les Turcs quand ils massacrent les Kurdes et pourquoi par contre ils s'obstinent à affamer les Irakiens.

Certes il faut reconnaître que les progrès technologiques qui permettent de prendre connaissance rapidement de ce qui se passe aujourd'hui dans le monde imposent quelques limites à cette

facon d'agir ne serait-ce qu'à cause de la mobilisation d'une certaine opinion publique. Mais pour le reste l'Empire -athénien ou américain- est toujours là avec son dessein impérial et sa logique de commander le reste du monde.

VII. De la stratégie

Les jeux diplomatico-stratégiques occupent une place importante dans la fine analyse de Thucydide. Deux personnages s'illustrent dans ces jeux du côté athénien: Périclès avec une stratégie équilibrée et Alcibiade avec une stratégie ambitieuse qui conduira Athènes à sa perte. En fait ce n'est sans doute pas la stratégie ambitieuse d'Alcibiade avec la désastreuse expédition en Sicile qui a conduit à la perte d'Athènes, mais le fait que cette stratégie ait été mal conduite, d'une part en raison de l'instabilité politique interne de la Cité et d'autre part à cause du personnage .

Le fait de relever Alcibiade (l'âme de cette stratégie) de ses fonctions de stratège, et de donner le commandement à Nicias a été en soi un desastre.

Du côté de Sparte, Lysandre, celui-là même qui a eu raison d'Athènes en rompant avec la tradition Lacédemonienne, se hissa en stratège naval exceptionnel sachant manier stratégie et tactique avec les jeux diplomatiques et les alliances avec la Perse. Il n'en demeure pas moins que la stratégie innovatrice de Lysandre n'a pas reçu l'attention qu'elle méritait si on la compare à la stratégie conservatrice qui prévalait jusqu'alors à Sparte.

Mais les jeux diplomatico-stratégiques ne se limitent pas aux statures des personnalités. Tout au long de la guerre les alliances se font et se refont tant à l'intérieur du camp helléne qu'à l'extérieur avec la Perse.

Il y a beaucoup à apprendre d'une étude approfondie de la stratégie suivie par les deux camps pendant la guerre du Peloponnèse. En effet Thucydide ne décrit pas seulement les jeux diplomatico-stratégiques de la guerre du Peloponnèse, il décrit aussi *mutantis mutandis* les jeux diplomatico-stratégiques de la Première Guerre mondiale, de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et même de la guerre froide. C'est pourquoi Thibaudet et Toynbee ont comparé la guerre de 1914-1918 à celle du Péloponnèse alors que Raymond Aron se réfère à Thucydide dans ses analyses de la configuration bipolaire de la guerre froide.[7] D'autre part dans ces jeux

diplomatico-stratégiques, l'importance de la puissance maritime est mise en valeur par rapport à la puissance terrestre. Même Sparte, puissance terrestre par excellence, finira par se doter d'une flotte et grâce à cette flotte, et au génie de Lysandre ainsi qu'aux erreurs des Athéniens sortira vainqueur de la guerre.

Les recherches sur Thucydide n'ont pas manqué de mettre en relief cet élément stratégique majeur avec les ressemblances d'autres époques et le rôle de la mer dans la construction des empires plus contemporains, tels la Grande-Bretagne ou même l'Empire américain.

VIII. De l'empire

La nature de tout empire est par la force des choses impériale et conquérante. Thucydide nous le montre bien dans son récit de la guerre du Péloponnèse. Si Périclès avait réussi dans une stratégie équilibrée à contenir l'impérialisme athénien "dans certaines limites"[8], Alcibiade dans ce que Jacqueline de Romilly appelle "le grand dessein"[9], va pousser cet impérialisme à l'extrême. Il voulut étendre l'Empire non seulement sur l'ensemble des Grecs mais plus ou moins sur l'ensemble des peuples autour de la Méditerranée en soumettant les cités de Sicile, de l'Italie et même Carthage: "Nous sommes partis pour la Sicile, d'abord, si nous le pouvions, afin de soumettre les Siciliens et après eux les Italiens à leur tour; ensuite, afin de faire une tentative contre l'empire carthaginois et Carthage elle-même. Que ce projet réussît, soit complètement, soit même en majeure partie, nous nous attaquions alors au Péloponnèse, ramenant d'abord en totalité les forces grecques que nous nous étions adjointes là-bas, puis de nombreux barbares que nous prenions à notre solde, Ibères et autres, reconnus comme étant, parmi les barbares de là-bas, les plus belliqueux, enfin des trières que nous construisions en quantité en plus des nôtres, grâce au bois abondant d'Italie. Avec elles, nous tenions le Péloponnèse assiégé de toutes parts; en même temps, les forces d'infanterie y faisaient des poussées sur terre, et nous emportions ses villes de force, ou bien dressions contre elles des fortifications: nous espérions donc, dans la guerre, le réduire aisément, et après cela, étendre notre empire à la Grèce tout entière".[10]

Ce qu'on admire dans ce dessein, c'est la stratégie majestueuse. Et même si l'expédition de Sicile fut un désastre, son succès n'était pas impossible. Comme le note Jacqueline de Romilly "ce rêve n'é-

tait pas impossible" mais "rien ne se passa comme il aurait fallu".[11] Pour qu'une stratégie de cette envergure et de cette audace soit à nouveau pensée et mise en application il faudra attendre un siècle et Alexandre le Grand.

IX. De l'économie

Une question qui revient à propos des analyses de Thucydide est celle du rôle joué par l'économie pendant la guerre du Péloponnèse. L'impérialisme athénien était-il d'une autre nature qu'économique, comme semble l'affirmer Jacqueline de Romilly?[12] Rien n'est aussi certain. D'ailleurs, faisant référence au "grand dessein" d'Alcibiade pour la conquête de Sicile le même auteur note: "Une ville comme Athènes, maîtresse de la mer, pouvait d'autant moins se désintéresser de ces querelles que l'île était alors la plus grande productrice de blé du monde grec".[13] On n'est pas loin des intérêts d'un certain empire contemporain et de ses considérations cette fois non pas pour le blé mais pour le pétrole dans le cas de l'expédition américaine contre l'Irak.

Thucydide lui-même fait des références directes ou indirectes à plusieurs reprises aux intérêts économiques en jeu pendant la guerre du Peloponnèse. Parlant par exemple de la première expédition athénienne contre la Sicile en 427 av. J. C. il dira que les Athéniens "voulaient que le Péloponnèse ne reçut pas du blé de là-bas". [14]

Raymond Aron dans son traité momumental *Paix et Guerre* considère que "l'impérialisme d'Athènes ou de Rome prêterait davantage à une interprétation économique". D'après le même auteur "la puissance militaire d'Athènes était fondée sur les mines, le commerce, la flotte, l'empire". Par conséquent "ses splendeurs et ses fêtes" résultaient du mercantilisme tout comme sa résistance et son efficacité pendant la guerre.[15] L'argent de ce mercantilisme constituait donc le nerf de la guerre. D'ailleurs tout comme dans la défaite d'Athènes plus tard l'aide financière de la Perse qui a armé Sparte n'est pas à négliger.

Une exégèse des récits de Thucydide est sans doute nécessaire pour en parler. Tout de même il est clair que l'Attique par son économie agraire ne pouvait suffir pour faire d'Athènes une grande puissance, tout comme les ressources des îles Britanniques ne suffisaient pas à nourrir l'Empire britannique.

En fait Athènes est un Empire marchand comme l'ont été Venise et les autres villes italiennes après la Renaissance ou la Hollande et la Grande Bretagne peu après.

X. Conclusion

Thucydide reste moderne et actuel, capable de raisonner à travers ses récits sur ce qui se passe dans notre monde. Sa vision des choses et son raisonnement dépassent son temps et les évènements particuliers de la guerre du Péloponnèse. Il faut souligner cependant qu'il n'a été que superficiellement étudié par les sociologues des relations internationales et les sociologues du politique en général. Contrairement aux historiens et surtout aux philologues qui ont fait un travail remarquable sur lui, les sociologues -avec quelques exceptions qui ne font que confirmer la règle- le citent ça et là, sans plus. Et pourtant, il faut se rappeller que si Hobbes au dix-septième siècle ne l'a pas cité, il l'a par contre traduit en anglais, ce qui siginifie qu'il l'a étudié de façon approfondie et sans doute l'horreur de la guerre du Péloponnèse a été pour quelque chose dans sa vision du Léviathan.

Plus récemment cependant, on assiste à un certain renouveau des études "thucydidiennes". La fin de la guerre froide, les conflits régionaux qui déchirent le monde, l'incapacité de l'empire d'imposer la paix américaine malgré sa victoire sur l'adversaire sont des données qui justifient ce retour à l'historien et à ses analyses pour mieux comprendre le monde.

Penser Thucydide, penser le monde avec lui pour mieux le comprendre à un moment de troubles et d'incertitudes.

NOTES

1. Il faudrait signaler que le système interétatique hellène comme tel, n'est pas composé seulement des États-Cités mais aussi des royaumes qui couvrent des étendues plus larges qu'une cité. C'est le cas, par exemple, des Grecs de l'Épire et de Macédoine qui, contrairement aux Grecs du Sud connaissent des régimes monarchiques.

2. Thucydide, **Histoire de la guerre du Péloponnèse**, Introduction de J. de Romilly, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1990, p.166.

3. *Ibid*, p.165.

4. *Ibid*, p. 165; Raymond Aron, **Paix et Guerre, Paris**, Calman-Lévy, 1962, p. 147 et suiv.

5. Thucydide, I, 22, 4.

6. Thucydide, V, 105, 2.

7. Raymond Aron, *op.cit.*, p. 147-153.

8. Jacqueline de Romilly, **Alcibiade**, Paris, Éditions de Fallois, 1995, pp. 83-84.

9. *Ibid*, p.77 et suivantes.

10. Thucydide, VI, 90, 2-3.

11. Jacqueline de Romilly, **Alcibiade**, *op.cit.*, p. 97.

12. *Ibid*, p.80.

13. *Ibid*, p.80.

14. Thucydide, Livre III, 86-88.

15. R. Aron, *op.cit.*, p. 261.

CHRONOLOGIE-CHYPRE

(1er avril - 30 novembre 1998)

24 avril: Dimitri Reppas, porte parole du gouvernement grec déclare que la Grèce est opposée à la suggestion d'une conférence quadripartite sur la question chypriote (Grèce, Turquie, Chypriotes grecs, Chypriotes turcs).

4 mai: Visite de l'émissaire américain Richard Holbrooke à Nicosie. Celui-ci dit avoir demandé aux Chypriotes turcs de cesser de s'opposer aux négotiations entre Chypre et l'Union européenne et déplore l'attitude de l'UE à l'égard de la Turquie.

26 juin: Le Président Stéphanopoulos réaffirme devant la Chambre des représentants de la République de Chypre l'engagement de la Grèce de renforcer sa coopération militaire avec Nicosie tant que dureront les menaces turques.

4 juillet: Diego Cordovez, envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général de l'ONU, n'a pas réussi à relancer les pourparlers intercommunautaires interrompus depuis août 1997 à l'issue d'une visite de trois jours à Nicosie.

7 juillet: Le Chancelier V. Klima déclare que la présidence autrichienne a demandé à Sir David Hannay de prolonger de six mois sa mission visant à faciliter un réglement à Chypre.

31 août: Le chef de la communauté chypriote turque, R. Denktash propose la Conféderation de deux États souverains comme futur statut de Chypre. Le Président Cléridès rejette cette proposition qui est contraire à la Résolution 1179 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU du 29 juin 1998 affirmant que le réglement de la question chypriote ne peut être fondé que sur un État avec souveraineté unique et citoyenneté unique.

5 septembre: Le Parlement européen adopte une résolution par 198 voix pour, 179 contre et 15 abstentions invitant la Turquie à contribuer à la reprise du dialogue intercommunautaire à Chypre et à promouvoir la démilitarisation de l'île impliquant le départ des forces armées turques.

5 Octobre: Les délégations de la France et de l'Italie au Conseil des affaires générales de l'UE déclarent que l'adhésion de Chypre ne doit pas être considérée comme automatique. Commentant cette déclaration, le ministre T. Pangalos dit "qu'il est regrettable et immoral que la division de l''île soit considérée comme un obstacle à son adhésion."

5 novembre: Le ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères de Grèce, G. Papandréou déclare que si le réglement de la question de Chypre est une condition préalable à la poursuite et à l'intensification des négotiations d'adhésion de Chypre, Athènes émettrait une réserve générale sur l'ensemble du processus d'élargissement de l'UE.

7 novembre: Arrestation à Chypre de deux espions israéliens soupconnés de travailler pour le compte de la Turquie.

9 novembre: Déclaration conjointe de la France, de l'Allemagne, de l'Italie et des Pays-Bas rappelant que l'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE doit bénéficier à toutes les communautés et contribuer à la paix civile et à la réconciliation.

10 novembre: Ouverture au niveau ministériel des négotiations d'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE. Les ministres des affaires étrangères des 15 constatent que cinq dossiers sur sept que comprend la première phase de négotiations sont déjà bouclés.

CHRONOLOGIE-GRÈCE
(1er avril - 30 novembre 1998)

9 avril: Décès de Mgr Seraphim Archevêque d'Athènes et chef de l'Église orthodoxe de Grèce.

23 avril: Décès à l'âge de 91 ans de Constantin Caramanlis, Premier ministre de 1955 à 1963 puis de 1974 à 1980 et Président de la République de 1980 à 1985 puis de 1990 à 1995.

27 avril: Veto de la Grèce à une reprise de l'aide financière à la Turquie prévue par l'accord d'union douanière avec l'Union européenne et d'un montant de 375 millions d'Ecus.

29 avril: Protestation de l'Ambassadeur de France à Athènes à la suite de propos désobligeants du Ministre Théodore Pangalos à l'égard du Président Chirac jugé trop complaisant envers la Turquie.

9 mai: Élection par le Saint Synode de Mgr Christodoulos, évêque de Volos en remplacement de Mgr Séraphim aux fonctions d'Archevêque d'Athènes et de chefde l'Église orthodoxe de Grèce.

19-21 juin: Conférence gréco-allemande sur la question des réparations au Centre culturel européen de Delphes. L'Allemagne est invitée à accorder des réparations financières pour les dommages causés par elle à la Grèce pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

24 juillet: Protestation à Washington de la Maison Blanche à la suite des déclarations du Ministre Pangalos qualifiant de mensonge grossier la promesse électorale du Président Clinton de résoudre la question chypriote.

7 août: Arrestation d'un touriste francais pour incendie volontaire. 120 000 hectares de forêt ont été ravagés pendant l'été 1998 par des incendies d'origine criminelle.

26 août: Le Parlement grec adopte une loi prévoyant la participation 4 jours par an de tous les Grecs, hommes et femmes à la protection civile du pays.

23 septembre: 11 violations de l'espace aérien grec au nord des îles de Chios et Mytilène commises juste à la fin de manoeuvres des forces armées grecques par 6 escadrilles comprenant au total 14 avions militaires turcs.

11 et 18 octobre: Élections municipales et départementales. Échec relatif pour le PASOK. Dimitri Avramopoulos (Nouvelle Démocratie) est réélu maire d'Athènes dès le 11 octobre avec 58% des voix. Le PASOK ne remporte la majorité que dans 24 circonscriptions départementales sur 50 alors qu'aux élections de 1994 il était en tête dans 35 de ces circonscriptions.

29 octobre: Remaniement ministériel. Départ de S. Tzoumakas, ministre de l'agriculture et de G. Romaios, ministre de l'ordre public. Entrée au gouvernement de G. Magriotis, nouveau ministre de la Macédoine et de la Thrace et de G. Anomeritis, nouveau ministre de l'agriculture. P. Petsalnikos ministre de la Macédoine et de la Thrace devient ministre de l'ordre public, K. Yitonas ministre de la santé est nommé ministre aurprès du Premier ministre et L. Papadimas, Secrétaire d'État auprès du Premier ministre est promu ministre de la santé.

3 novembre: Le Premier ministre, Costas Simitis obtient un vote de confiance de la Chambre des députés avec 163 voix sur 300.

Livres reçus / Books received

Les Grecs Pontiques, Diaspora, identité, territoires (ouvrage collectif sous la direction de Michel Bruneau), Paris, Ed. CNRS, 1998.

Paris Arnopoulos, *Cosmopolitics, Public Policy of Outer Space*, Toronto, Guernica Editions, 1998.

Security Dilemmas in Eurasia (Edited by Constantine Arvanitopoulos), Athens, Nireus Editions, 1998.

Les relations internationales avec la fin de la guerre froide (ouvrage collectif sous la direction de Nikos Lioussis - Sotiris Dalis) Athènes, Éditions Papazisis, 1999 (en grec).

Activités académiques/Academic Activities

Congrès sur l'éducation hellénophone de la diaspora

Le directeur du Centre de recherches helléniques-Canada (KEEK), Dr Stephanos Constantinides, et les Drs Yannis Philipoussis et Peter Chimbos, membres du Conseil d'administration du Centre ont représenté le Centre de recherches helléniques-Canada (KEEK) au congrès organisé à Rethymnon (Crète) par le Centre d'Études migratoires et interculturelles-EDIAMME du département de pédagogie de l'université de Crète (26-28 juin 1998). Les trois ont fait des communications sur les questions d'éducation hellénophone au Canada.

Par la suite, ils ont participé à une rencontre dans le cadre du programme *Paideia Omogenon* pendant laquelle on a discuté du progrès du programme dans les différents pays où il s'applique.

Un deuxième congrès sur le même sujet a eu lieu à Athènes du 29 au 30 octobre 1998. Ce congrès a été organisé par l'Institut d'études stratégiques et de développement-ISTAME Andréas Papandréou auquel a pris part le directeur du KEEK, Dr Stephanos Constantinides.

Troisième Congrès international des instituts de recherche sur l'hellénisme

Le Troisième Congrès international des instituts de recherche sur l'hellénisme aura lieu à Montréal du 28 au 31 mai 1999. Le Congrès est organisé par le KEEK qui exerce actuellement la présidence du Comité coordinateur des instituts de recherche sur l'hellénisme. Y participeront des universitaires et des chercheurs venant de divers pays. Le Congrès s'articulera autour du thème "L'hellénisme à l'aube de l'an 2000."

Lancement du vol.5, numéro 2 d'*Études helléniques/ Hellenic Studies*

Lors du lancement du vol. 5, no. 2, le 5 juin, l'ambassadeur de la Grèce au Canada, Son exc. M. J-A. Thomoglou, a donné une conférence sur "La politique étrangère grecque".

Conference on Hellenic Education for Greeks Abroad

The Director of the Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research-Canada (KEEK), Dr Stephanos Constantinides, and Drs Yannis Philippoussis and Peter Chimbos, members of the Board of Directors, represented KEEK at the Conference organized in Rethymnon (Crete) by the Centre for Migratory and Inter-cultural Studies (EDIAMME) of the Department of Education of the University of Crete (June 26-28, 1998). All three presented papers on questions of Hellenophone Education in Canada.

After the Conference, they participated in the Meetings on the Program *Paideia Omogenon*. The purpose of these Meetings was to discuss the progress of the program in the different countries in which it applies.

In October (29-30), 1998, a second Conference on the same subject took place in Athens. This Conference was organized by the Institute of Strategic Studies and Development Andreas Papandreou (ISTAME). The Director of KEEK, Dr Stephanos Constantinides, participated in this Conference.

Third International Conference of the Research Institutes on Hellenism

The Third International Conference of the Research Institutes on Hellenism will take place in Montreal, May 28-31, 1999. The Conference is organized by KEEK which holds the Presidency of the Coordinating Committee of the Research Institutes on Hellenism. Academics and researchers coming from different countries will take part in this Conference which will be on the main theme of "Hellenism in the Twenty-First Century".

Launching of Vol.5, No2 of *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*

On June 5, at the launching of Vol.5, No 2, the Ambassador of Greece, His Exc. J.A. Thomoglou, gave a lecture on the "Greek Foreign Policy".

ΣΕΕΙΕ '99

KEEK

ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΕΡΕΥΝΗΤΙΚΩΝ ΙΔΡΥΜΑΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ
ΠΡΟΕΔΡΙΑ
COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF RESEARCH INSTITUTES OF HELLENISM
PRESIDENCY

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF HELLENIC RESEARCH INSTITUTES

Hellenism in the Twenty-First Century

Montreal, Quebec, Canada

The Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research-Canada (KEEK) proudly announces the Third International Conference of Hellenic Research Institutes to be held in Montreal, May 28-31, 1999.

KEEK is the current chair of the Coordinating Committee of the Hellenic Research Institutes (SEEIE) and organizer of the Conference. The SEEIE is comprised of 11 Research Institutes (six in Greece, one in Cyprus and four in the Diaspora).

The main theme of the Conference, Hellenism in the Twenty-First Century, will include three specific thematic issues:

1. International relations of Greece (with reference to Cyprus and to the Greek Diaspora);

2. Modernization: Greece in the 21st century (politics, economy, administration, education, culture, etc);

3. Migration, education, multiculturalism, inter-cultural relations etc (Greece, Cyprus, Diaspora).

Researchers from around the world will be attending. In order to prepare for this important Conference, the organizing Committee is already active. Your help, however, is most welcome.

If you would like to present a paper in your field of study, please send proposed topic and abstract ASAP to Dr. Yannis Philippoussis, Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research, CP 48571, 1495 Van Horne, Outremont, QC, Canada, H2V 4T3 or Tel. (514) 276-7333; Fax (514) 495-3072 or E-mail: jphilippoussis@linkstar.ca

Paris Arnopoulos, *Conference President*
Stephanos Constantinides, *Centre Director and SEEIE president*
Yannis Philippoussis, *Program Chairman*

Advice to Contributors

Three copies of all manuscripts, typewritten on computer, double-spaced should be submitted on paper and disk. Manuscripts should follow the APA Manual, or the MLA Style Sheet or be consistent with practice in the discipline of each particular author.

The *Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research - Canada*, the Editor and Editorial Board of *Hellenic Studies* take no responsibility for the opinions or data presented by contributors to the journal.

Manuscripts, published or unpublished, are not returned.

Avis aux collaborateurs

Les textes doivent être soumis en trois exemplaires dactylographiés à l'ordinateur à double interligne et conformément à la présentation en usage sur papier et sur disquette.

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