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Les relations Euro-Atlantiques et la Méditerranée orientale

Euro-Atlantic Relations and the Eastern Mediterranean

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Les relations Euro-Atlantiques et la Méditerranée orientale

Joseph Joseph*

Stephanos Constantinides* *

Pendant la première moitié de 2004, le triangle Grèce, Chypre,Turquie, a encore une fois, attiré l'attention internationale alors que les politiciens et les diplomates de deux côtés de l'Atlantique ont deployé un nouvel effort afin de résoudre le problème de Chypre avant le 1er mai, date à laquelle Chypre est devenue membre de l'Union européenne. Les Chypriotes grecs et les Chypriotes turcs ainsi que la Grèce et la Turquie ont figuré parmi les protagonistes dans cet effort, mais les véritables inspirateurs de cette tentative étaient les grandes puissances. Les Etats Unis et la Grande Bretagne ont ainsi élaboré la cinquième et dernière version du Plan Kofi Annan pour « Une solution juste du problème Chypriote »[1]. Le plan a été finalisé par le Secrétaire Général des Nations unies à Bürgenstock, en Suisse, et présenté aux dirigeants de la Grèce et de la Turquie ainsi qu'aux Chypriotes Grecs et Turcs le 31 mars. En finalisant ce plan, Annan a utilisé son pouvoir discretionnaire « pour remplir les blancs » et compléter le texte sur des points sur lesquels les deux parties n'étaient pas parvenues à un accord. En réalité, ce plan n'était pas le produit d'une négociation entre les parties interessées mais reflétait plutôt la volonté de Londres et de Washington de résoudre le problème de Chypre pour répondre aux ambitions européennes de la Turquie.

Le 24 Avril, les deux communautés chypriotes ont tenu séparément et simultanément des referendums sur le plan Annan. Le peuple de Chypre devait répondre *oui* ou *non* à la question suivante :

> *Approuvez-vous l'Accord de Fondation avec toutes ses Annexes, aussi bien que la constitution de l'Etat Chypriote Grec / Chypriote Turc et les dispositions qui concernent les lois à mettre en vigueur, afin de créer un nouvel Etat pour que Chypre puisse joindre l'Union Européenne réunifiée?*[2]

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La majorité des Chypriotes grecs ont voté non et la majorité des Chypriotes turcs ont voté oui [3]. Le rejet chypriote grec du Plan Annan a deçu la communauté internationale, plus spécialement les Nations unies, l'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis qui ont essayé de convaincre tout le monde que celle-ci était la dernière occasion pour une solution qui permettrait à Chypre réunifiée de rejoindre l'Union européenne. Apparemment la majorité des Chypriotes Grecs n'étaient pas d'accord avec cette affirmation comme ils pensaient que le Plan n'était ni juste ni fonctionnel. En particulier les dispositions pour les colons Turcs, l'armée d'occupation turque, et les refugiés ont entraîné le fait que les Chypriotes grecs ont été mécontents. En fait, les Chypriotes grecs ont considéré que le Plan Annan était une tentative de la part de la Grande Bretagne et des Etats-Unis pour faciliter les aspirations européennes de la Turquie plutôt que de trouver une solution viable et juste à la question Chypriote.

Il se peut que les resultats des referendums et l'adhésion d'un Etat divisé de facto modifient certaines attitudes et politiques dans la région. Il se peut également que les Nations Unies, l'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis ajustent leurs politiques envers Chypre avant que ces entités ne s'engagent à une autre initiative pour chercher une solution au problème chypriote. Il se peut que les Chypiotes grecs perdent à cause de leur « non », un support international dont ils ont bénéficié pendant des décennies alors qu'à court terme, la Turquie et les Chypriotes Turcs vont récupérer ce support. La Grèce et la Turquie semblent être déterminées à continuer leur politique de coopération et de rapprochement qui vont servir les aspirations européennes de la Turquie. Chypre, en tant que membre de l'UE, fera face aux défis et aux opportunités qui découlent de son adhésion à l'UE. Trouver une solution au problème de Chypre et mettre fin à la division de facto de l'île sera un défi à relever non seulement pour le gouvernement de Chypre, mais aussi pour l'UE elle-même, qui devra faire face aux problèmes decoulant de la division continue de l'île[4]. La perspective de l'adhésion de la Turquie constituera un problème auquel l'UE fera face pour des années à venir. Les Etats-Unis vont continuer de considérer la Méditerranée orientale comme une région d'une importance géopolitique vitale. Naturellement, leur politique dans la région sera affectée par des réalités, perceptions, et des buts qui servent leurs intérêts régionaux et globaux. Les décideurs politiques à

Washington continueront de prendre en considération le fait que la Grèce est une « bonne vieille amie »; la Turquie, un « allié stratégique important » et Chypre, la seule île d'une importance stratégique dans le coin oriental de la Méditerranée.

Au moment où ce numéro de la revue Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies se préparait, nous avons dû faire face à un contexte qui s'élargissait et à des paramètres politiques nouveaux. Nous devons indiquer ici que les articles dans ce volume ont été rédigés avant les referendums à Chypre. Cependant nous avons inclu dans cette édition spéciale un court article de Jean Catsiapis sur les référendums. Tous les autres articles étaient complétés à la fin du mois de mars, de sorte qu'ils se fondent sur la situation qui prévalait à ce moment là. Certains articles présentent les développements majeurs qui ont conduit au Plan Annan no 5 et aux référendums tenus le 24 avril. Nous espérons que cette présentation, analyse, et interprétation des issues et politiques pourront être utiles dans la compréhension de ce qui a eu lieu dans le passé et de ce qui se produira dans l'avenir.

Kostas Ifantis analyse la position dominante des Etats Unis sur la scène politique mondiale et son objectif de former et maintenir le « nouvel ordre mondial ». Il explique que son statut de superpuissance n'est pas confiné à sa force et supériorité militaire, mais aussi se réfère à sa vitalité et preéminence économique. Il soutient que les Etats Unis essaient de prevenir l'émergeance d'une puissance globale rivale. De faite dans un proche avenir aucun pays ou bloc de pays ne semble être en mesure de défier la supremacie américaine. D'autre part, les attaques du 11 Septembre ont demontré que même des superpuissances qui semblent être non vulnérables peuvent avoir des « faiblesses innées » et être « structurellement vulnérables » parce que de groupes terroristes « peuvent profiter de l'infrastructure des sociétés, des économies, et des technologies.»

Neophytos Loïzides examine l'avénement des crises et le comportement et attitudes durant ces crises dans la Méditerranée orientale. Cet auteur examine les crises dans les relations greco-turques dans leur relation avec des pays avoisinants durant les deux dernières décennies et dresse une catégorisation de crises impliquant des minorités reliées sur le plan ethnique à travers des frontières, à côté de celles des minorités « étrangères » à l'intérieur des frontières, ou encore celles mettant en scène des pays tiers

intéressés par leurs territoires et leurs ressources. L'analyse se tourne autour des questions concernant les causes, les dynamiques et les consequences du comportement confrontationnel, de la gestion des crises et de la prise des décisions politiques.Une des conclusions de cette étude est que la mosaique complexe de facteurs domestiques internes et externes forment les développements et les attitudes et empêchent la solution des problèmes majeurs dans la région. De plus, Loizides suggère dans cet article orienté vers la politique appliquée que « l'incertitude créée par ces variables hautement fluides floues et imprevisibles devraient sonner l'alarme en vue de faire un meilleur usage du temps et des opportunités en faveur d'une solution et de la réduction de la course aux armements dans la région ».

Charalambos Konstantinides écrit sur les relations transatlantiques, leurs hauts et leurs bas depuis l'effondrement de l'Union Soviétique et la fin de la Guerre Froide. Une attention spéciale est accordée aux développements, attitudes et politiques qui ont suivi les attaques terroristes après le 11 Septembre et ont mené à la guerre contre l'Iraq en 2003. Durant la première moitié de 2003, la Grèce a assumé la présidence de l'Union européenne et s'est trouvée prise au milieu de tensions, d'une rhétorique amère et des événements qui ont ébranlé le monde. A partir de cette position, la Grèce a réussi à jouer un rôle constructif et à offrir un immense service à l'alliance transatlantique. L'auteur soutient que l'alliance transatlantique, malgré des ruptures occasionnelles, a des fondations solides qui sont basées sur l'interdépendance et des intérêts convergents.

Dimitris Tryantaphyllou explore les relations greco-turques et quelques uns des problèmes et des prospectives qu'elles présentent pour l'Europe. Il examine des changements récents dans les attitudes et les politiques sur les deux côtés de la mer Egée. Depuis 1999, la Grèce a lancé une « initiative de paix » et a suivi une politique de *rapprochement* avec la Turquie visant à réduire les tensions et à améliorer les relations entre les deux pays. Du côté turc, l'objectif d'adhésion à l'UE est devenu un pôle d'attraction derrière les politiques intérieures et extérieures d'Ankara, spécialement depuis qu'Erdogan a accédé au pouvoir. L'auteur conclut que la Grèce, en tant qu'Etat membre, est en mesure de jouer un rôle de premier plan en amenant ses pays voisins plus près de l'Europe et en influant sur les développements dans la région.

James Ker-Lindsay examine les relations turco-américaines durant et après la guerre de l'Iraq en 2003. L'échec d'Anakara dans le soutien aux opérations militaires des Etats-Unis contre le régime de Saddam a soulevé des questions sérieuses quant à la fiabilité de la Turquie et de ses relations avec la superpuissance atlantique. Au même moment, les Etats-Unis fesaient pression sur la Turquie pour introduire des reformes intérieures et aussi aider à resoudre le problème de Chypre en vue de faciliter son aspiration européenne. Ces pressions transatlantiques ont mené à des speculations sur la future relation de la Turquie avec l'Occident et les pays avoisinants comme la Russie et l'Iran. Ker-Lindsay suggère que les Etats-Unis décident, sur la base des considérations géopolitiques, de demeurer « fermément engagées avec Ankara malgré les faibles points obtenus en 2003 ».

Natalie Tocci discute les relations EU-Turquie, spécialement les défis et les options auxquels la Turquie fait face comme pays candidat. Un problème majeure consiste dans la recherche d'un consensus, chez les Turcs et les Européens sur la volonté et l'habilité de la Turquie à devenir membre de l'EU. Malgré le fait que la politique extérieure de la Turquie est caractérisée par une certaine orientation européenne, les transformations que ce pays est en train de subir créent certainement des difficultés et soulèvent des questions sur le succès d'une intégration à l'EU. Quelques uns des points controversés concernent la démocratie, les droits de l'homme, le développement économique, la question Kurde et Chypre. Tocci suggère que « des développements en Turquie, en Europe, et dans le système international plus largement vont déterminer l'évolution des relations entre l'UE et la Turquie ».

Vassilis Fouskas examine Chypre et la Méditerranée orientale à l'intérieur du contexte des considérations géopolitiques internationales et régionales. Son analyse de la question de Chypre porte sur la période antérieure à la déclaration d'indépendance de ce pays.Elle se déroule avec toile de fond les politiques des superpuissances qui s'affrontent et la période de la Guerre Froide qui a dominé la région et le monde après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. Les aspirations européennes de la Turquie, l'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE, et les politiques suivies pour le Moyen Orient forment aussi une part de l'équation des stratégies et des jeux géopolitiques dans la région. En

examinant les récents développements, Fouskas soutient qu'une solution du problème de Chypre prendra en considération le rôle de la Turquie dans la région et aussi reflétera les intérêts des Etats-Unis.

Angelos Sepos examine quelques uns des défis auxquels Chypre fera face en tant que membre de l'EU. Son hypothèse est que Chypre – en cas de solution basée sur une fédération bizonale, bicommunautaire fera face à des défis intéressants dans la formulation et l'application de sa politique européenne. Il examine quelques unes de ces diffucultés et propose la mise en œuvre des mesures comme des reformes institutionnelles et administratives afin de les affronter. Il étudie aussi le besoin de cultiver une culture politique de consensus et un environnement de coopération ente les deux communautés. Il conclut qu'il existera un besoin pour des reformes relatives « aux institutions de l'Etat aussi bien au niveau intérieur qu'au niveau de l'UE, et dans certains cas, un besoin pour l'établissement de mécanismes nouveaux ».

Claude Nicolet examine la politique de la Grande Bretagne et des Etats-Unis envers Chypre dans les années 1960 et 1970. Il reconsidère les événements à la lumière de la nouvelle documentation devenue disponible avec la déclassification des documents, spécialement aux Archives nationales des Etats Unis et de la Bibliothèque Richard M. Nixon. Son article se concentre sur le rôle de la Grande Bretagne et des Etats Unis durant les crises de Novembre 1967 et de l'été 1974. Pour l'essentiel, Nicolet voit d'un oeil critique la position ancrée dans l'histoire chypriote selon laquelle la Grande Bretagne et les Etats-Unis (spécialement les Etats-Unis) ont endossé la partition de l'île depuis son indépendance en 1960. En examinant les événements de 1974, il conclut que ceux-ci étaient « plus une conséquence des situations compliquées et des opportunités pressantes dans la région, plutôt qu'une trahison des Etats-Unis ou une conspiration ». D'autant plus que « l'Union soviétique avait signalé à Ankara qu'elle ne s'opposait pas à une intervention de sa part à Chypre ».

En préparant cette édition spéciale de la revue Etudes helléniques/ Hellenic Studies notre objectif était d'y inclure des articles portant sur une variété de sujets et d'aspects qui répondent au thème plus large des relations Euro-Atlantiques et la Medéterranée Orientale. L'emphase a été mise sur Chypre, la Grèce et la Turquie, et leurs relations avec l'Union eruopéenne et les Etats-Unis comme nous croyons que les dynamiques de ces relations fournissent des sujets qui présentent un défi du point de vue de la recherche académique. Le rôle grandissant de l'UE sur la scène politique mondiale et ses relations avec les Etats-Unis, la marche européenne de la Turquie, le rôle de la Grèce en Europe du Sud-est, l'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE, et le rôle des Etats-Unis dans la Méditerranée Orientale sont des questions du plus grand intérêt pour les universitaires et les décideurs politiques.

Nous aimerions remercier les auteurs des articles pour leur collaboration dans un débat très important et nécessaire d'être fait sur les questions plus haut mentionnées. Leur contribution est d'autant plus significative et appréciable que leurs approches sont diversifiées et nouvelles.

Cette édition spéciale d'Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies, comme les deux précédentes, sont le produit de coopération entre le Centre d'études et de recherches helléniques Canada-KEEK et la Chaire Jean Monnet en politique étrangère et sécurité européennes à l'Université de Chypre.

NOTES

1. Les versions précédentes du Planc Annan étaient présentées aux dates suivantes: la première: 11 Novembre 2002. la seconde: 10 Décembre 2002; la troisième: 26 février 2002; la quatrième: 28 mars 2004.

2. Cette question a été incluse dans le Plan Annan, Annexe IX: La création du Nouvel Etat, article 1.

3. Les résultats des deux referendums séparés étaient:
Chypriotes Grecs: « Oui » 75.83, « Non » 24.17
Chypriotes Turcs: « Oui » 64.91, « Non » 34.09.

4. Le 29 avril 2004, à la suite du rejet du Plan Annan par les Chypriotes Grecs et compte tenu de l'absence d'une solution de la question chypriote, le Conseil européen a adopté un Règlement (8208/04) reconfirmant que « l'application de l'*acquis* sur l'adhésion a de ce fait été suspendu suivant l'article no 10 (du Traité d'Adhésion) dans les parties de la République de Chypre dans lesquelles le Gouvernement de la République de Chypre n'exerce pas un contrôle effectif. » Pour ce qui est de la ligne de division, le Règlement prévoit que « étant donné que cette ligne ne constitue pas une frontière externe avec l'UE, des règles spéciales concernant la traversée des marchandises, services et des personnes ont besoin d'être établies, dont la responsabilité première revient à la République de Chypre.»

Euro-Atlantic Relations and the Eastern Mediterranean

Joseph Joseph*

Stephanos Constantinides**

During the first half of 2004, the triangle of Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, once again, attracted considerable international attention as politicians and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic made another effort to solve the Cyprus problem before May 1, when Cyprus became a full member of the European Union. The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots along with Greece and Turkey were among the protagonists in this effort, but the real movers and shakers were the big and powerful on the international political scene. The United Nations working together with the European Union and in close cooperation with the United States and Britain drafted the fifth and final version of the Kofi Annan Plan for "The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem."[1] The Plan was finalized by the UN Secretary General, in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, and presented to the leaders of Greece, Turkey, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots on March 31. In finalizing his plan, Annan used his discretion "to fill in the blanks" and complete the text on issues that the two sides failed to reach an agreement. In other words, the Plan was not exactly and fully the result of negotiation, but rather a compromise on major issues reflecting an urgency on the part of the US and Britain to settle the problem before Cyprus' accession to the EU. In reality the Plan was the product not of negotiation but rather of London and Washington's will to solve the Cyprus problem in order to suit Turkey's European ambitions.

On April 24, the two Cypriot communities held separate, simultaneous referenda on the Annan Plan. The people of Cyprus were asked to answer *yes* or *no* to the following question:

> *Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united?*[2]

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The majority of the Greek Cypriots voted *no* and the majority of the Turkish Cypriots voted *yes*.[3] The Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan disappointed the international community, especially the UN, the EU and the US which had tried to convince everyone that this was the last and best opportunity for a settlement that would allow Cyprus to join the European Union reunited. Apparently the majority of the Greek Cypriots disagreed with this assessment as they believed that the Plan was neither fair nor functional. Especially the provisions for the Turkish settlers, Turkish occupation army, and refugees made the Greek Cypriot voters particularly unhappy. In fact, the Greek Cypriots considered Annan's plan an effort on the part of Britain and the US to facilitate Turkey's European aspirations rather than a viable and just solution of the Cyprus problem. There were also serious questions about the implementation and viability of the Plan which created feelings of uncertainty and insecurity among the Greek Cypriots.

The results of the referenda and accession of a *de facto* divided island-state to the EU may change some attitudes and policies in the region. The UN, EU, and US may temporarily adjust their policies toward Cyprus before they take another initiative for its settlement. The Greek Cypriots may lose some of the international support enjoyed for decades; while, in the short run, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots will benefit politically from the Greek Cypriot no. The Turkish Cypriots may also receive economic support from Brussels. Greece and Turkey seem determined to continue their policy of cooperation and *rapprochement* which will serve Turkish European aspirations. Cyprus, as an EU member, will face the challenges and opportunities that EU membership entails. Handling the Cyprus problem and coping with the de facto division will be an interesting challenge not only for the Cypriot government, but also for the EU itself, which will have to cope with the consequences of the continuing division of the island before addressing once again the Cyprus problem.[4] The prospect of Turkey's accession will be a major EU concern for years to come. The United States will continue looking at the Eastern Mediterranean as a region of vital geopolitical importance. Naturally, its policy in the region will be affected by realities, perceptions, and goals that serve its regional and global interests. Policymaking in Washington will continue to take into account the fact that Greece is a "good old friend"; Turkey, an "important strategic partner," and Cyprus, the only island of any strategic importance in the eastern corner of Mediterranean.

As this special issue of *Hellenic Studies/Études helléniques* was being prepared, we had to face the broader context and political parameters within which Euro-Atlantic concerns and policies are being shaped in the Eastern Mediterranean. We would like to clarify, that the articles included in this volume were written and submitted before the referenda in Cyprus took place. All the articles were completed by early March, so they are based on the situation of that time. However, a short article on the referenda by Jean Catsiapis is also included. In a sense, some of the articles present the major developments that led to the Annan Plan 5 and the Cyprus referenda of April 24. We hope that the presentation, analysis, and interpretation of issues and policies can be helpful in understanding what happened in the past, but also how future developments may unfold.

Kostas Ifantis writes about the dominant position of the United States in world politics and its objective of shaping and maintaining the "new world order." He explains that superpower status is not confined to military strength and superiority, but also refers to economic vitality and prominence. He argues that the US is trying to prevent the emergence of a rival global power and in the near future no country or block of countries is likely to challenge American supremacy. On the other hand, the 9/11 attacks have shown that even a seemingly invulnerable superpower may have "innate weaknesses" and be "structurally vulnerable" because terrorist groups "can take advantage of the infrastructure that open societies, open economies, and open technologies can afford."

Neophytos Loizides looks at crisis-making and crisis behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean. He examines crises in Greek-Turkish relations and in relations with neighbouring countries during the last two decades. The subsequent discussion reflects a broad categorization of crises involving ethnically related minorities across borders, "alien" minorities within borders, and third countries over territories and resources. The analysis revolves around questions about the causes, dynamics and consequences of confrontational behavior, crisis management and policy-making. One of the author's conclusions is that a complex mosaic of domestic, external and ideational factors shape developments and attitudes and prevent the settlement of major issues in the region. Yet Loizides suggests in this policy-oriented article that "the uncertainty created by these highly fluid and

unpredictable variables should alert policymakers in making better use of time and opportunities for settlement and de-escalation in the region."

Charalambos Konstantinides writes about transatlantic relations and their ups-and-downs since the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. Special attention is paid to the developments, attitudes and policies that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks which led to the 2003 Iraq war. During the first half of 2003, Greece held the presidency of the European Union and was caught in the middle of tensions, bitter rhetoric and world-shaking events. From that position, Greece managed to play a constructive role and offer an immense service to the transatlantic alliance. The author argues that the transatlantic partnership, despite occasional rifts, has solid foundations which are based on interdependence and converging interests.

Dimitris Triantaphyllou explores Greek-Turkish relations and some of the problems and prospects they present to Europe. He looks at recent changes in attitudes and policies on both sides of the Aegean. Since 1999, Greece has launched a "peace offensive" and followed a policy of *rapprochement* with Turkey aiming at reducing tensions and improving relations between the two countries. On the Turkish side, the commitment to the goal of EU accession has become the driving force behind Ankara's domestic and external policies, especially since Erdogan came to power. The author concludes that Greece, as an EU member, is in a fine position to play a leading role in bringing its neighbouring countries closer to Europe and shaping developments in the region.

James Ker-Lindsay examines Turkish-American relations during and after the 2003 Iraq war. Ankara's failure to support US military operations against the Saddam regime raised serious questions about the reliability of Turkey and its relations with the Atlantic superpower. At the same time, the EU was putting pressure on Turkey to introduce domestic reforms and also help solve the Cyprus problem in order to facilitate its European aspirations. These transatlantic pressures led to speculations about the future relationship of Turkey with the West and neighboring countries like Russia and Iran. Ker-Lindsay suggests that the US decided, on the basis of geopolitical considerations, to remain "firmly engaged with Ankara despite the low points of 2003."

Natalie Tocci discusses EU-Turkish relations, especially the challenges and options that Turkey is facing as a candidate country. A major issue is whether there is a consensus, either in Turkey or in the EU, on the desirability, suitability and ability of Turkey to become a full member of the EU. Although Turkish foreign policy is driven by a strong European orientation, the transformations that the country is going through certainly create difficulties and raise questions about the level and success of integration with the EU that can be achieved. Some of the controversial areas are democracy, human rights, economic development, the Kurdish issue and Cyprus. Tocci suggests that "developments in Turkey, in Europe, and in the wider international system will determine the evolution of EU-Turkey relations."

Vassilis Fouskas looks at Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean within the context of broader regional and international geopolitical considerations. His analysis of the Cyprus problem goes back to the declaration of independence. It is carried out against the background of confrontational superpower politics and Cold War setting which dominated the region and the world after World War II. The European aspirations of Turkey, Cyprus's accession to the EU, and Middle Eastern politics also form part of the equation shaping geopolitics in the region. In examining recent developments, Fouskas argues that a settlement of the Cyprus issue will take into consideration the role of Turkey in the region and will also reflect the interests of the United States.

Angelos Sepos examines some of the policymaking challenges that Cyprus will face as a member of the European Union. His hypothesis is that Cyprus — in case of a settlement based on a bizonal, bicomunnal federation — will face interesting challenges in formulating and implementing its EU policy. He looks at some of those difficulties and proposes such measures as institutional and administrative reforms to counteract them. He also looks at the need to cultivate a consensual political culture and an environment of cooperation between the two communities. He concludes that there will be a need for reforms "in the institutions of the state at both the domestic and the EU level, and in some cases, there will be a need for the establishment of new mechanisms."

Claude Nicolet looks at the British and American policy towards Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s. He reconsiders events in light of new evidence made available with the declassification of documents, especially at the US National Archives and the Richard M. Nixon Library. His article focuses on the role of Britain and the US during the crises of November 1967 and the summer of 1974. In essence, Nicolet turns a critical eye on the embedded view in Cypriot history that Britain and the US (especially the latter) had endorsed the partition of the island ever since its independence in 1960. Regarding the 1974 events, he concludes they were "more a consequence of the complicated situations and opportunities in the area, rather than of US betrayal or conspiracy" especially "as the Soviet Union had obviously signaled to Ankara non-opposition to a Turkish intervention."

In preparing this special issue of *Hellenic Studies/Études helléniques* our objective was to include articles addressing a variety of issues and aspects that fit into the broader theme of Euro-Atlantic relations and the Eastern Mediterranean. The emphasis has fallen on Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, and their relations with the European Union and the United States as we believe that the dynamics of these relations provide challenging topics for scholarly exploration. The expanding role of the EU on the world scene and its relations with the United States, the European course of Turkey, the role of Greece in Southeastern Europe, the accession of Cyprus to the EU, and the role of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean are issues of great interest to scholars and policymakers.

We would like to thank the authors of the articles for their contribution in a much needed scholarly debate on the above issues. Their contribution of insight is enhanced by their diverse and innovative perspectives.

This special issue of *Hellenic Studies/Études helléniques*, as were the previous two, is the product of cooperation between the Centre of Hellenic Studies and Research Canada-KEEK and the Jean Monnet Chair in European Foreign and Security Policy at the University of Cyprus.

NOTES

1. The previous versions of the Annan Plan were presented on the following dates: first: 11 November 2002; second: 10 December 2002; third: 26 February 2003; fourth: 28 March 2004.

2. The question was included in the Annan Plan, *Annex IX: Coming into being of the New State of Affairs*, article 1.

3. The results of the two separate referenda were as follows:
Greek Cypriots: "Yes" 75.83; "No" 24.17.
Turkish Cypriots: "Yes" 64.91; "No" 34.09.

4. On April 29, 2004, following the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots and the lack of a settlement, the Council of the EU adopted a Regulation (8208/04) reconfirming that "the application of the *acquis* upon accession has therefore been suspended pursuant to Article No 10 [of the Accession Treaty] in the areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control." With regard to the dividing line, the Regulation provides that "since the abovementioned line does not constitute an external border of the EU, special rules concerning the crossing of goods, services and persons need to be established, the prime responsibility for which belongs to the Republic of Cyprus."

Inherent Unilateralism: Systemic Unipolarity and US Strategy[1]

Kostas Ifantis*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine l'intention des Etats-Unis de maintenir une écrasante supériorité globale politique et militaire ainsi que d'entreprendre toute action nécessaire afin de préserver le « nouvel ordre mondial » et prevenir l'émergence d'une puissance rivale. Comme les Etats-Unis ont encore la plus importante et la plus vigoureuse économie, leur statut de superpuissance n'est donc pas confiné à la seule dimension militaire. Dans un avenir rapproché, aucun autre pays ou conglomerat ne peut espérer défier la preéminence américaine. En même temps, cependant, comme cela a été demontré par les attaques du 11 Septembre, les Etats-Unis sont structurellement vulnérables et le coût de leur engagement global est plus élevé que ce que beaucoup d'Américains pensaient jusque là.

ABSTRACT

This article explores the American intention to maintain overwhelming global political and military superiority, and take whatever action is needed to preserve the 'new world order' and prevent the emergence of a rival power. Superpower status is by no means confined to the military dimension, as the US still has the largest and most vibrant single national economy. In the near future, no other country or combination of countries can hope to challenge American prominence. At the same time, however, as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated, the US is structurally vulnerable and the cost of its global engagement greater than many Americans thought.

Introduction

One of the very few basic facts of life in international politics is the prevalence of crises plaguing the world. Since the emergence of the state, international politics has always been dangerously competitive and ruthlessly conflictual. War and conflict should be regarded as inevitable features of international politics; security competition,'hard-wired' in the international system. States make decisions for war or peace on the basis of changes in the

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distribution of capabilities in the international system. As a result, war is always possible in the anarchical international system, because no sovereign power exists to prevent states from going to war. In the absence of world governmental agents, and in a climate of uncertainty, the international political process is shaped in a strictly competitive way. International politics is fundamentally competitive, taking place in a self-help realm. States start wars when the benefits of going to war are high and the costs and risks of doing so are low. The cost-benefit analysis depends on the distribution of power in the international system, as well as the nature of the available military power and whether it tends to favour offense over defence.

Since the Soviet Union's disappearance, international politics has been marked by one very basic fact: a gross imbalance of power in the international system. Not since Rome has one country so nearly dominated its world. US superiority is phenomenal, and its impact on the world fundamental. Today, as never before, what matters most in international politics is how (even whether) Washington acts on any given issue. Great powers are the dominant actors in international politics, extending their influence well beyond their borders, seeking to craft a global environment conducive to their security and interests. Great powers strive to gain power over their rivals and hopefully become hegemons. Once a state achieves that exalted position, it becomes a status quo power.[2] American predominance is the central feature of the current geopolitical setting. Systemic unipolarity does not make for a particularly egalitarian world, as 9/11 reminded us quite violently. Nevertheless, it is the superstructure and determines the main forces that shape the international system.

Power

The US is the only state with the capacity to try to exercise global political leadership, at least in the short term. It is unquestionably the militarily most powerful country in the contemporary system.[3] Let us not fool ourselves, though. Military power remains the existential, hence absolute, currency of power. At almost $400 billion, the 2003 American defense budget was larger than the defense budgets of the ten next biggest defense spenders worldwide.

Today, the US spends close to forty per cent of the total world defense expenditure while the $48 billion increase sought by the Pentagon for the 2003 defense budget allocation is some $14 billion more than that of the United Kingdom's budget, the world's third largest defense spender. In the fiscal year 2003, the US spent 3.5 per cent of its GDP on defense, whereas Britain spent 2.6 per cent, France 2.4 per cent and Germany 1.5 per cent.[4] The US is currently consuming the equivalent of the UK's annual defence budget every 35 days and that of France every 23 days.

The US possesses the most capable and mobile forces in the world, especially in critical areas such as airlift and sealift vehicles, which can carry forces to trouble spots around the globe. This ability to project power to different points around the globe simultaneously and largely unilaterally appears to rewrite the rules. The "War on terrorism" has accelerated the transformation of the US military into a "post-industrial" force. It is one that is lighter, faster, and more lethal. Such forces strive for battlespace omnipotence by using sophisticated and inter-linked communications, surveillance and targeting systems and the weapons to exploit them. In every sense, unilateralism is inherent in US military strength.

Furthermore, US superpower status is by no means confined to the military. The US still has the largest and most vibrant single national economy. The combination of the two, in turn, drives the political and military strategy of "engagement and enlargement", the lynchpin of US foreign and national security policy. No other country or combination of countries can hope to challenge it within a generation. The 1991 Gulf war, the 1995 and 1999 Balkan campaigns as well as the 2001 Afghanistan intervention and the Spring 2003 war against Iraq have been impressive US exhibitions of "capacity" to go to war and have demonstrated that military power is not obsolete. Although, there can be no absolute US dominance, order can be premised on the total primacy of the US in areas like the wider Middle East, where military power has always served as a major arbiter of events with implications far beyond the region.

At the same time, however, 9/11 demonstrated that the cost of US global engagement was larger than many Americans thought. Despite its overwhelming military superiority and robust economic strength, the US

turned out to be structurally vulnerable, and the primary victim of the collateral expressions of the US sponsored process of globalization. In the aftermath of 9/11 and subsequent US interventions, the United States will have to pay increasingly high costs to keep the danger at a tolerable level. The United States can no longer assume that it can wield global influence at little or no cost to itself.[5]

Echoes of the Cold War

For President George W. Bush, Clinton's foreign policy lacked coherence, clear priorities and a sense of what was important to US interests and security. From the outset, the Bush administration clearly indicated its intention to pursue unilateral strategies. This approach has been identified by many as the unifying theme throughout most of its foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, the most profound effect of 9/11 has been the re-ordering of America's international engagement coupled with the reinforcement of the administration's strident unilateralism. America's attempt to make its own international rules is the most vivid example of unilateralism. The dominant world image post-Afghanistan and post-Iraq, is that Washington can now wage war confident of quick victory, low casualties, and little domestic fallout. And because power drives intentions, US ambitions have expanded accordingly. As Kenneth Waltz has observed, "new challenges have not changed old habits (...). Fighting terrorists provided a cover that has enabled the Bush administration to do what it wanted to do anyway."[6] America's September 2002 strategic doctrine contained innovations that were bound to create a rift between the US and its allies. The adoption of "pre-emption" meant that the emphasis that had since 1947 been put on deterrence as a central element of grand strategy had thus dramatically shifted.[7]

In the Middle East, US strategy and policy are largely based on three key premises: first, the need for access to reasonably priced oil; second the need to ensure that no hostile power controls the region and its oil supplies or so intimidates other states so as to coerce supplier states into taking actions inimical to consuming nations; and third a commitment to use force if

necessary to protect and further US interests. Especially, in the case of the Iraq crisis, there are at least four sets of assumptions behind the Bush administration strategy.[8] First, 9/11 has meant that the regional *status quo* has become unacceptable. It was not lost on many in the US that the majority of the terrorists came from Saudi Arabia, a US strategic ally, where the combination of a brutal, tyrannical regime and US support for it (and for Israel) led to alienation, resentment and hatred for the US, and the West in general. Second, for the Bush team, Iraq's development of WMD poses an unacceptable threat that would make long-term peace and stability in the region impossible. Most critical here was Saddam's pursuit of nuclear weapons, which Washington believed he would have eventually gotten if he had remained in power. Third, a strong bias against the Palestinians and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as this was sponsored by the Clinton administration. The Bush team strongly believes that a settlement would only be possible if and when the Palestinians have a leadership in place that is both willing and able to fight terrorism and to make the difficult compromises inherent in any conceivable 'land for peace' deal. Fourth, most in the Bush administration believe that in the long run, peace and stability will not be possible until the region's régimes become more democratic.

The result of the US decision to intervene militarily in Asia has been to enhance American power and extend its military presence in the world. The war on terrorists has enabled the US to establish bases on Russia's southern border and to further its encirclement of China as well as Russia. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did announce that to prosecute the war against terrorism, the US will move militarily into 15 more states, if necessary.[9] The basic fact of post-9/11 international politics is that America's relations with the rest of the world are undergoing fundamental changes. The US is so powerful that those changes are affecting the international system much more drastically than the terrorist attacks themselves.

According to Nicole Gnesotto, urgency, militarization and unrestraint unilateralism do characterize the US response to the strategic challenge of international terrorism.[10] The urgency refers to the fact that the disruption of US strategic priorities was immediate and violent. As a result, the war against terrorism has become the highest priority. All other issues have thus

been relegated to secondary importance. The militarization of US response to terrorism is marked by the defense expenditure figures cited above. These figures disclose the US obsession with military technology and power. This obsession seems like forming the American reaction to terrorist threats, "so much so that this military choice sometimes appears to be its sole policy. The speeding-up of missile-defense programmes takes the place of diplomacy in the fight against nuclear proliferation; the basis for building alliances or coalitions becomes the number of divisions and other military assets that allies might be able to contribute."[11]

Intoxication with power has resulted in an enthusiastically embraced unilateralism which is quickly becoming guiding principle in Washington. In addition to the sense of heightened danger, the plausibility of the unilateral option has led to a growing emphasis on pre-emption as the main tool in US strategy. It is the replacement of the prudent policies of containment with an embrace of preventive war. This has been the most striking development and the most disturbing for America's allies. Washington seems to be unprepared to compromise either means or objectives to achieve its strategic imperative goals. In February 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, declared that from now on it would be "the mission that determines the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission."[12] What this meant was that institutions — even alliances — that did not fully share the US perception and worldview would be sidelined and replaced with "coalitions of the willing": "*ad hoc* groupings, case by case, for which these institutions would serve as a kind of pond from which the US could pick out those fish that could be, so to speak, drafted for the coalition."[13]

The concept of 'coalitions of the willing' seems to be replacing historical alliances at the core of the US global strategy. As Nicole Gnesotto has put it, "this cult of unilateralism spills over from the political sphere into that of military strategy", thus affecting America's discourse and attitudes regarding its allies. Such views reveal the current flap over unilateral versus multilateral approaches to statecraft. It is a flap that cuts to the heart of the differing worldviews between the US and Europe. Worries about American unilateralist — and military — solutions to regional problems have caused

frustration in many European capitals, while European reaction to the Iraq war has resulted in consternation in Washington. On the political level, the "either you're with us or against us" Bush doctrine has made the debate among allies with less than identical security priorities extremely difficult. This reach for bipolarity clearly echoes the early days of the Cold War.

Above all, the Bush administration's approach to the world is state-centric in the most traditional sense. It is formed by a concern with traditional conceptions of security – great powers, rogue states, proliferation of WMD. However big and powerful the US may be, states and state assets are needed to operate; hence the focus on rogue régimes and the drive to change régimes in the wider Middle East.[14]

However, the wisdom of granting the trappings of sovereignty to non-state actors such as terrorist groups by declaring that the military will wage open-ended hostilities, remain suspect. Apart from the difficulties of a liberal democracy successfully managing what seems to be a perpetual war, the Bush doctrine has yet to define the conditions for "victory". Moreover, it risks damaging the fabric of international law with its preemptive strategies and by placing different global challenges into the same category of treatment.

What we have been experiencing is a US aggressive global strategic advance with a very strong element of continuity: a global foreign policy inspired by unilateral realpolitik efforts to prevent other states from "renationalizing" their foreign and security policies, thus challenging US primacy. Such a policy of "renationalization" would destroy the reassurance and stability upon which American interests are presumed to rest. Global activism, the centrality of military power and its application, and a strong US-dominated NATO in the framework of European security and stability seem to be the fundamentals of the US post-9/11 foreign and security policy.

A precarious new world balance is emerging. The United States is preoccupied with military power, political leadership and domination of world financial markets. It had all three even before September 11, but the political class and the public were divided on whether such assets should be exploited to make the US into an informal imperial or globally hegemonic power, with all the ostensible rewards, but also the grief which history

provides to those with such ambitions. September 11 made the choice. At least the US administration believes that it did.[15]

Balancing

Although America's unilateral power and use of military force is an existential fact and as such requires no justification here, preemption is optional and difficult to justify. The Bush administration has chosen to use America's massive power for preemption in Iraq. In reality it was an attempt to preserve hegemony by using military power. As a result, US foreign policy moved away from its generally high-minded, but nevertheless interest-based roots to espouse a form of global, imperial social engineering. According to Dimitri Simes, two illusions facilitated this process: first, that international crusading can come cheap, and second, that those opposing the US are motivated by a blanket hatred for American freedom and power, rather than by self-interested disagreements with US hegemonic strategies.[16]

Imperial powers cannot escape the laws of history. One of the most salient of them is that empires generate opposition to their rule, ranging from strategic realignment among states to terrorism within them. Another is that imperial power and conduct have never been cost free and that the level of opposition to them depends on the costs that the empire is willing to shoulder. The American aspiration to freeze historical development by working to keep the world unipolar is doomed. As Charles Kupchan indicates "unipolarity is here, but it will not last."[17] No dominant country has ever been able to sustain primacy indefinitely. Except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. The principal impediment to world domination is the difficulty of projecting and sustaining power across the world's oceans onto the territory of a rival great power.[18] Furthermore, within the context of a world economy, the United States cannot obtain the outcomes it wants on trade, or financial regulation without the agreement of the European Union, Japan and others. On transnational issues, power is broadly distributed and chaotically organized among state and non-state actors.[19]

The Bush administration promotes a military agenda that aims self-confidently to master the 'contested zones'[20] because it believes that primacy depends only on vast, omni capable military power. It also believes that the US need not tolerate plausible threats to its safety from outside the American territory. These threats are to be eliminated. Insofar as pre-emptive war is perceived negatively abroad, this strategy requires a unilateral global offensive military capability. The effort to achieve such a capability will further alienate America's traditional allies, it will definitely produce balancing tendencies, it will drive the costs of sustaining US military preeminence at unacceptable levels, and it will thus create great difficulties in sustaining, improving, and expanding the global base structure the US has achieved.[21]

Inevitably, a unilateral strategy of preponderance will fail. Such a strategy does not and will not prevent the emergence of new great powers. Immense power and hegemonic strategies allow others to free-ride militarily and economically. Hegemony of the US kind facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. As a consequence, differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers. Eventually, the task will exceed America's economic, military, demographic, and political resources. While contemporary US warfare may be cheap in American lives, it is certainly not cheap in American money. An admittedly crude guess is that the broadly defined military budget, encompassing homeland security, foreign aid and other nation-building programmes, could more than double from 3.5 per cent of GDP in 2002 to as much as 8 per cent over the coming years.[22] This would mean that, after the honeymoon of the 1990s, the US people would have to pay back the cold war peace dividend. An open-ended commitment to eliminating threats to the US would simultaneously reduce private sector growth while incurring new government costs. At home, the domestic economy would once again have to fight for resources. Highly skilled labour would be particularly in demand. The US army has become more capital-intensive, as Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has gradually replaced massed ranks of infantry and requires more reliance on high quality human resource.

Meanwhile, the cost of a single-handed commitment to global security would be high, not to say open-ended. It is true that the American economy, now much larger than during the Cold War, can shoulder the necessary military burdens. If, however, we take the Iraqi crisis as a guide, Washington may find other factors offsetting superior economic fire power. In a unipolar world, the US's potential *ad hoc* coalition partners for each engagement would be in a powerful bargaining position, as the haggling with Turkey during the Iraqi crisis shows. In a world where alignment bonds are loose — and no one is more responsible than the US — the cost to the US of building a coalition increases.

With the US national debt at $7,015 trillion in February 2004,[23] should the US economy suffer a really steep downturn, the uniquely American combination of tax cuts and massive military spending would be unsustainable. The Bush administration has simultaneously been arguing that it cannot say what the Iraqi war and reconstruction will cost, but that whatever the cost is, it can afford it and $1,500 billion in tax cuts over the next decade. If, as many estimate, military and security spending take up another 2 or 3 percentage points of GDP, taxes will have to be raised sharply, domestic spending cut to politically unimaginable levels or the fiscal deficit allowed to widen to a point at which even the Bush administration will balk.[24] Whatever their thirst for security, it is unclear if the American public and Congress are truly prepared to accept an imperial role on a sustained basis, especially as we are moving away from 9/11. One of the notable things about imperial conduct is how responsive societies are to the rising costs of imperial ambitions. Once the potential cost becomes apparent, the willingness of the American people to pay for their country's imperial strategy will be tested.

Over time the effect of hegemonic pursuit is to erode the hegemon's power base and accelerate its relative decline. The very effort to maintain a hegemonic position is the surest way to undermine it. The effort to maintain dominance stimulates others to balancing counter-efforts. The balancing imperative will become more visible in the not very distant future.

In addition, such a strategy will not work because it requires the actual application of US power almost continuously. As Christopher Layne

indicates, "the leverage strategy is the hegemonic stability theory's dark side. It calls for the United States to use its military power to compel other states to give in on issue areas where America has less power."[25] It is a coercive strategy that attempts to take advantage of the asymmetries in great power capabilities that favor the US. The strong unilateral US tendencies post-9/11 have resulted in stronger reactions. Americans have always been anxious to believe that there is a new kind of empire and uniquely beneficial. Well before 9/11 Samuel Huntington argued that "a world without US primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs."[26] As a result of this belief in American exceptionalism and singular benignity, the US foreign policy and security establishment is not very good at drawing lessons from historical experience. Moreover, Washington needs to remember that others will have different perceptions. Other states react to the threat of hegemony and unchecked power, not the hegemon's identity. For example, the US should be more aware that whatever policies pursues in the Middle East, it is almost always perceived as a domineering, imperial power.

The international order objectives embedded in a strategy of preponderance reinforce others' mistrust of American preeminence. The more the US attempts to press its preferences on others and project its interests, the more likely it is that they will resist and react against overweening US power. Potential rivals include the EU, Russia, China etc. Early indications can be identified. The EU, except in the military field, has a collective weight on matters of trade and finance comparable to that of the US. Its internal development and its attempt to craft a more coherent strategy on security and defence mean that it is slowly and painfully arriving on the global stage. Regarding Russia, it is quite possible that western analysts tend to underestimate its power potential. Russia continues to possess the largest army in Europe (even if its performance is questionable), has a still oversized defence industrial base, an energy industry rapidly modernized, and an economy rich in human capital. In Asia, where the dominance of the US has been unrivaled for more than 50 years, it is now subtly but unmistakably being chipped away as Asian countries look toward China as the increasingly vital regional power. The US military presence

cannot change this fact. Although China's expected, rapid rise to economic dominance is based on questionable assumptions regarding the current size of its economy and, even more problematic China's churning economic engine, coupled with trade deals and friendly diplomacy, have transformed it from a country to be feared to a nation that beckons. Asian countries see China's growth as providing them with more opportunities. This new, more benign view of China has emerged in 2002 and 2003 as the Bush Administration has been increasingly perceived in Asia as having pressed the US campaign on terror to the exclusion of almost everything else. The United States would remain the most significant power in the region, but the inevitably competitive relationship between Washington and Beijing would have more far-reaching consequences for the region. Although, on the diplomatic front, China and the United States are enjoying a friendly phase, this cordiality helps other Asian countries deepen their contacts with China without having to choose between Washington and Beijing.[27]

The war in Iraq has been a crisis for the United States because UN members saw the prospect of an unchecked American power being tested. Indeed, what they have seen is a USA that insists on its way 'or the highway'. For many around the world, this war is viewed as a step towards seizing global energy control, or hegemonic world economic and trade domination, or to assure Israel's expansion.[28] They have seen the US as unable to provide a rationale for its Iraq policy that can convince the majority of democracies, its natural supporters. They have seen it intemperately denounce those who criticize it, and threaten serious and damaging material retaliation against the democracies that actively oppose it on the Iraq issue like France and Germany. In short, they have seen Washington demanding submission and taking steps to obtain it through force. To the rest of the world, this is not very reassuring, to put it mildly. Unchecked American global power seems to be precipitously losing its appeal.

The US cannot prevent a new balance of power from forming, but can delay its coming. Irrespective of whether the intent is benign or not, the war in Iraq has shown that the US has behaved and in ways that most of the time disturb and frighten others.[29] Until its power is brought into balance, it will likely continue to do so. Up to now, one of the reasons there has been so

little real opposition to US hegemony in most of the world is that this hegemony has been distant and indirect. The Bush administration seems to be inexorably drawn into the business of direct imperial rule.[30] America, the unilateral imperialist, is far less attractive than America, the leader of a coalition enforcing UN resolutions and preventing the organization from following the path of the ill-fated League of Nations.[31]

The more hawkish wing in the Bush administration remains convinced that Iraq will serve as a cautionary example of what can happen to other states that refuse to abandon their programs to build WMD. Public statements of a domino effect could further inflame Arab governments and fuel Iran's and North Korea's considerable insecurities. The war's lesson will be just the opposite, in other words: the best way to avoid American military action is to build a fearsome arsenal quickly, acquire a powerful physical deterrent, thus making the cost of conflict too high for Washington. Many states know that WMD are the only means by which they can hope to deter the US. Washington's policies seem to stimulate the vertical proliferation of WMD and promote their spreading. The North Korean 'dilemma' has already proven that it is too late for preemption — as it is for nonproliferation.

Conclusion

The 9/11 terrorist attacks truly broke new ground. The scale of these attacks, the destruction they caused, the relative ease with which they were organized and executed against the most powerful country in the world, made it very clear that no country would be immune; no country could anymore afford to be complacent about terrorism. Like drug traffickers, nuclear smugglers, and international crime cartels, terrorist groups take advantage of the infrastructure that open societies, open economies, and open technologies afford. Terrorist groups are more able to move people, money, and goods across international borders thanks to democratization, economic liberalization, and technological advancements. They rely on international telecommunications links to publicize their acts and political demands. While propaganda is nothing new, tools like CNN and the

Internet dramatically extend the scope of a terrorist's reach. Terrorists also take advantage of weaker or developing states to serve as base of operation for training and carrying out attacks against Western targets. As the September 11 attacks indicate, counter-state and counter-society abilities have already become more available to radical and fundamentalist groups. Overall these trends suggest that seemingly invulnerable states, however powerful and wealthy they may be, have innate weaknesses.

All these actors, probably as much as weapons of mass destruction proliferation (nuclear, chemical and biological) and their means of delivery, and human-rights abuses, pose profound challenges to efforts to build a new global order as they are more than capable of contributing to violence and other forms of coercion. Contrary to other global challenges (the communications revolution, water shortages, access to energy resources, financial flows) they call directly into question the very authority of the state, and are therefore potentially, if not openly, subversive. This multifaceted conception of security entails a multifaceted approach to security. The latter does not mean a non state-centered analysis. Rather, it means that while a state-centered analysis is capable of illuminating most facets of discord and conflict in the 1990s (for example, proxy wars and irredentism), it should acquire a multidimensional optic, beyond exclusive accounts of military power distribution.[32] This multifaceted/multidimensional security concept means that there is no rigid link between a comprehensive concept for understanding a new situation and the quality of the response. On the contrary, a broad concept – where military force and defense policy continue to occupy a central place - allows a flexible, tailored policy in which force is a major but only one of the various means employed.[33] In the final analysis, security is a politically defined concept. It is open to debate whether the widening of security might be a good or a bad political choice, but security is not intrinsically a self-contained concept, nor can it be related to military affairs only. If political priorities change, the nature and the means of security will inevitably follow and adapt to the different areas of political action.[34]

In an age of protean threats, transnational in nature, transsovereign in quality and coupled with insidious weapons of enormous destructive

capability, the only way forward is through co-operation, preparedness, vigilance and creative diplomacy. The tools to make a safer world already exist: political fora, international law, economic levers, intelligence assets, and where necessary, military power. What remains to be harnessed is a collective will to succeed, a will grounded in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Law. Rather than proving the unilateralists point, the "successes" in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate the continuing need for cooperation. US aggressive and militarized unilateralism seriously endangers the UN system. It is a claim to the sovereign right to intervene in, disarm, and carry out "regime change" in other countries, subject to no external restraint. As Kenneth Waltz has observed,

> *although democracies seldom fight democracies, they do fight at least their share of wars against others. Democracies promote war because they at times decide that the way to preserve peace is to defeat nondemocratic states and make them democratic (...) As R.H. Tawney said: 'Either war is a crusade, or it is a crime.' Crusades are frightening because crusaders go to war for what they believe to be good causes, which they define for themselves and try to impose on others. One might have hoped that Americans would have learned that they are not very good at causing democracy abroad. But, alas, if the world can be made safe for democracy only by making it democratic, then all means are permitted and to use them becomes a duty (...) That peace may prevail among democratic states is a comforting thought. The obverse of the proposition – that democracy may promote war against undemocratic regimes – is disturbing.*[35]

In its Fall 2002 national strategy statement the US stated its intention to maintain overwhelming global military superiority and take whatever action is necessary to prevent the emergence of a rival. The logic in this is open to negative or positive appreciations. The fact is that the world will remain a very dangerous place. So long as the United States retains a monopoly of muscle, some degree of unilateralism seems inevitable. But muscularity for its own sake will make it more dangerous. In terms of cost, the ability of the United States to remain engaged at an acceptable level will depend in large

part on whether it can reduce the cost by making its preeminent position more acceptable to others. Turning to the real issues that produce the real threat(s) and choosing more carefully the necessary tools may help.

NOTES

1. This article draws in part on Kostas Ifantis, "International Security Today: Understanding Change and Debating Strategy", in Kostas Ifantis (ed.), *International Security Today: Post-9/11 Threats and Regional Challenges*, a Special Issue of *The Review of International Affairs* (London: Frank Cass, forthcoming 2004).

2. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p.40.

3. The most recent account of the US military power is Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony", *International Security*, Vol.28, No.1 (2003), pp.5-46.

4. Julian Lindley-French, *Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma post-11 September*, Chaillot Papers, No.52 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2002), pp.10-11.

5. Stephen M. Walt, "Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy", *International Security*, Vol.26, No.3 (Winter 2001/02), p.59.

6. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Continuity of International Politics" in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds), *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp.348-49.

7. Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations" in Gustav Lindstrom (ed.), *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations After Iraq* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003), p.15.

8. See Philip H. Gordon, "Bush's Middle East Vision", *Survival*, Vol.45, No.1 (Spring 2003), pp.156-58.

9. Waltz, "The Continuity of International Politics", op. cit. p.350.

10. Nicole Gnesotto, "Reacting to America", *Survival*, Vol.44, No.4 (Winter 2002-03), p.99.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid*, p.100.

13. Stanley Hoffmann, "US-European Relations: past and future", *International Affairs*, Vol.79, No.5 (2003), p.1033.

14. See David Hastings Dunn, "Myths, motivations and 'misunderestimations': the Bush administration and Iraq", *International Affairs*, Vol.79, No.2 (2003), pp.282-83.

15. William Pfaff, "A Precarious Balance Emerges between America and Europe", *International Herald Tribune*, January 5-6, 2002.

16. See Dimitri K. Simes, "America's Imperial Dilemma", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No.6 (2003), p.95.

17. Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003), p.61.

18. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p.41.

19. Joseph S. Nye, "US Power and Strategy After Iraq", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No.4 (2003), p.65.

20. Posen, "Command of the Commons", op. cit. p.45.

21. *Ibid.*

22. see Alan Beattie, "A muscular foreign policy may be too costly for Americans to bear", *Financial Times*, 15 March 2003.

23. *International Herald Tribune*, February 19, 2004.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Powers Will Rise", *International Security*, Vol.17, No.4 (1993), p.35.

26. Samuel Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters", *International Security*, Vol.17, No.4, (1993), p.82.

27. "Chinese are eroding influence of the US", *International Herald Tribune*, October 18-19, 2003.

28. William Pfaff, "The Real Issue is US Power", *International Herald Tribune*, March 13, 2003.

29. Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol.25, No.1 (2000), p.28.

30. On the dilemma of sustaining an American empire see Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).

31. Joseph S. Nye, "Bombs can't do it all", *International Herald Tribune*, February 14, 2003.

32. The best example is John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol.15, No.1, (1990), pp.5-56. He argues that the demise of the Cold War order is likely to increase the chances that war and major crises will occur in Europe: 'The next decades in a Europe without superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years. This pessimistic conclusion rests on the argument that the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace' (p.6).

33. According to Politi, 'only in short-term lobbying battles is an alternative between prevention and repression seen'. See Alessandro Politi, *European Security: The New Transnational Risks*, Chaillot Papers, No.29 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 1997), p.13.

34. *Ibid*, p.14.

35. Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War", pp.11-12.

Crisis Management in the Eastern Mediterranean
(Implications for Policymakers)

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine le comportement de la Grèce et de la Turquie pendant les périodes de crise dans la Méditerranée Orientale durant les dernières deux décennies. Les crises sont définies et classifiées, et un nombre de fausses perceptions sont examinées à la lumière des expériences récentes. Trois larges catégories de crises de la politique étrangère sont analysées: Celles impliquant des minorités qui ont des liens ethniques à travers les frontières, celles avec des minorités « étrangères » à l'intérieur des frontières, et celles impliquant des tiers pays intéressés par leurs territoires et leurs ressources. L'auteur examine si les crises sont simplement provoquées par les élites, ou partiellement endossées et motivées par les masses dans les deux pays, et si le comportement greco-turc de crise reflète des rivalités ethniques de longue date, des intérêts de securité spécifiques, ou des besoins politiques et des normes domestiques. L'article s'inspire de l'expérience greco-turque durant les dernières deux décennies pour éclairer des dilemmes et des problèmes actuels auxquels font face les décideurs en matière de politique dans la région.

ABSTRACT

This article examines Greek-Turkish crisis behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past two decades. Crises are first defined and classified, after which a number of common misperceptions are then addressed in light of recent experience. Three broad categories of foreign policy crises are analyzed: 1) those involving ethnically related minorities across the border, those with 'alien' minorities within borders; 2) those with third countries involving territories and resources. The article examines whether crises are simply élite-driven or partly endorsed and motivated by mass publics in both countries, and whether Greek-Turkish crisis behaviour reflects enduring ethnic rivalries, 'genuine' security interests, or domestic political needs and norms. The article draws upon the Greek-Turkish experience of the past two decades to illuminate contemporary dilemmas and issues which policymakers face in this region.

Introduction

The Eastern Mediterranean has a rich, diverse, and highly explosive history of crisis-making. In the period 1983-2003, there were some forty

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crises involving Greece and Turkey, either with each other or a third country.[1] Three escalated close to war: twice between Greece and Turkey (1987 and 1996), and once between Turkey and Syria (1998). Within Greece and Turkey, crises are defined by a perceived threat to the basic values of a group, a limited time for response to the threat, and a heightened probability of military conflict.[2] During this period, Greek and Turkish responses to crises have been varied: from nationwide protests over the Macedonian and Kurdish issues, to mild Greek and Turkish diplomatic responses to minority issues in Albania (1989-1994) and Bulgaria (1985-1989) respectively. Today, there is no real evidence that confrontational behaviour belongs to the past as many analysts recognize a high likelihood of future crises arising from the Cyprus-EU accession process, the future of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the possible refusal of the EU to grant an explicit accession negotiation date to Turkey.[3]

External National Homeland

One can identify at least three broad categories of foreign policy issues in this area of the Mediterranean. The first contains the "external national homeland"[4] crises, which erupt when a majority in one state tries to "rescue" an ethnically related minority across the border. The ethnic group is perceived to be threatened or severely repressed. In the period 1983-2003, there were several such episodes between Greece and Albania concerning the status of the Greek minority, as well as between Turkey and Bulgaria (or Greece) over the status of the Thracian-Turkish minorities. Despite some dire predictions,[5] none of these crises led to interventions comparable to the events in the former Yugoslavia (Krajina and Bosnia) or in the former USSR (Nagorno-Karabakh or Transdniester region of Moldova). In fact, Greek and Turkish foreign policy adapted very quickly to the constraints of the new world order limiting the role of external homelands and emphasizing those of international bodies and non-governmental organizations. Despite these promising signs, however, Turkey's continuing "external homeland behavior" over the Cyprus issue has led to a number of foreign policy crises and a general impasse in the negotiations with exclusive Turkish responsibility in the 1990s.

It is important to distinguish between the needs and desires of external minorities and the overall intentions of an ethnically related state. For example, the protection of ethnic kin across the border might be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for intervening or even invading a foreign territory, unless other strategic interests are present. Nobody has declared this more openly than Turkish prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, who in 2001 acknowledged that, regardless of Turkish-Cypriot preferences, Turkey will maintain the occupation of Northern Cyprus.[6] Earlier, in 1992, Greek opinion-makers virtually invented a 300,000 strong minority in the Macedonian Republic as counterweight to ethnic Macedonian demands in Greece,[7] while more recently, in 2003, Turkish commentators inflated the number of the tiny Turcoman community to three and a half million in order to justify Turkish strategic interests in post-Saddam Iraq.[8]

Nationalizing the State

The second type of issue relates to states crisis behaviour towards internal minorities. Here, the majority sees itself as the legitimate 'owner' of the state, which, in turn, is expected to become the embodiment and defender of its distinctive character.[9] Preventing secessionism remains the cornerstone of majority nationalism, and where potentially secessionist minorities exist, majorities may mobilize to defend the integrity of the state. Yet an essential paradox here is repressionist or even eliminationist policies towards small minorities who lack any strategic importance. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, Turkish nationalism targeted the tiny urban minority of ethnic Greeks, leading to the virtual elimination of this historic Istanbul community.[10] Likewise, until very recently, Greece has denied official recognition for the remaining ethnic Macedonians in northern Greece, not to mention repatriation rights for Civil war refugees of non-Greek descent, even though no evidence has ever been found to demonstrate that they pose a threat to Greek security.[11]

Unlike smaller minorities, the Kurds pose a potential threat to Turkey's territorial integrity. Since the mid-1980s, the PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) has engaged in a violent struggle for the dismemberment of the country. Indeed, there were 35,000 casualties (mostly Kurds) in this struggle that ended only four years ago. In addition, the Kurds represent almost a fifth of

the Turkish population, with higher demographic growth than the rest of the country's population.[12] Turkish policymakers thus fear that a federated Kurdish entity in Iraq might become a model for the Kurds of Turkey in seeking their own autonomous status.[13]

Yet several classic as well as recent studies in the study of secessionist movements have indicated that oppression resulting from majority nationalism does not offer a solution to this type of acute security problems.[14] State repression not only legitimizes secessionist claims but often fuels popular demands and participation in secessionist movements. For these reasons, the current tendency worldwide is to proceed towards accommodation of national minority demands rather than confrontation.[15]

Among Greek-Cypriots there is a similar debate concerning the status of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Those who support a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan argue that a rejectionist approach towards the plan will sooner or later lead to the recognition of the "TRNC" by third countries. The rest argue that the endorsement and application of the specific plan might lead to permanent deadlocks, and eventually collapse with the international recognition of two states in Cyprus.

The truth is that in neither scenario does the 'TRNC' have a reasonable chance of receiving international recognition. The current international system does not easily allow secessionist groups to establish their own internationally recognized states unless those groups face some serious eminent threat, like Croatia in 1991. The fact that only five internationally recognized states have been born from armed conflict during the past forty years speaks eloquently to this point.[16] Among those five cases, there is no single instance of a country that has seceded violently from an inclusive democratic society and subsequently been by the international system.

There are, however, other more important reasons for the Greek-Cypriots to worry. Historical evidence illustrates that once a major population shift occurs in a 'disputed' area, groups weakened demographically are willing to make hitherto unthinkable compromises. According to Ian Lustick, both the British in Ireland and the French in Algeria had to readjust or reconsider their plans once they realized that demography was not on their side. The author concludes that this was also the major obstacle for Israel in annexing the West Bank to Israel.[17] One should consider whether the continuous flow

of Anatolian settlers to northern Cyprus might force the Greek Cypriots to make compromises in the future for what is considered to be unthinkable today.

Inter-State Disputes

The third type of crisis relates to inter-state conflicts over territory, cultural property, and resources. Disputes over tiny inhabited islets or territorial waters fueled nationalist passions and even risked a war between Greece and Turkey in 1987 and again in 1996. Similar crises over islands have been recorded in the Western Mediterranean, between Spain and Morocco (2002), and in Southeast Asia among Malaysia, China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In all cases, prestige and potential oil reserves affected policy priorities and subsequent crisis behavior. Specifically, in the case of the Aegean disputes, it is very unlikely that anticipated oil revenues would ever compensate for the defense budgets of Greece and Turkey, or lost income from tourism, not to mention trade between the two neighbours.

There are also numerous examples of crises related to territorial, water, and security threats. Syria and Turkey reached the brink of war in October 1998, after Turkey issued an ultimatum over Syria's support of the PKK and protection of its leader Abdullah Öcalan. Among other factors, this support was seen to be motivated by disputes over Hatay and the water of Euphrates River.[18] After the Turkish military sent a military ultimatum to the Syrian government in August 1988, Damascus gave in, and Öcalan left Syria for Russia; he was eventually arrested in Italy, which also refused to extradite him to Turkey, causing the outrage of hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens and a boycott of Italian products in the country. Finally, the Kurdish PKK leader was captured in Kenya, arguably with Greek assistance. Given the overwhelming nationalist mobilizations that were taking place in Turkey at the time, it would have been possible for the Turkish leadership to issue military ultimatums to any of its neighbors hosting the PKK leader. If Greece or Cyprus had decided to host Öcalan in their own territory, after the latter's request, this could have led to unprecedented consequences for peace in the region.

Another example is inter-state conflict over cultural property. The name 'Macedonia', 'Macedonians' plus the heritage and symbols of the ancient Macedonian Kingdom became issues of contention between Greece (and its northern province of Macedonia) and the Macedonian Republic (officially FYROM). In 1992, a wave of nationalist protest on the issue surprised many international observers as Greeks rallied in millions to prevent any use of the name by the neighbouring republic. In addition, to cultural property many Greeks feared that the Macedonian issue would be utilized by third countries such as Bulgaria and Turkey to advance territorial claims against Greece. Here one could witness the rise of a conspiratorial discourse in the country over the intentions of all its neighbours, including the Euro-Atlantic nexus. In fact, on many occasions, the disagreement was not whether the country was facing an international conspiracy, but what type of conspiracy it was.[19]

What was surprising is how quickly the relationship between the two countries has improved after the Interim Agreement of September 1995. This progress, especially in the area of economics, refutes many of the prophesies from the first half of the 1990s which saw the emergence of an independent Macedonian Republic as an inherent threat established and named just in order to deliberately harm Greeks and their interests.[20] This case study implies important policy lessons for Turkey in its current quest for the right policy concerning the Kurds of Northern Iraq. Turkish policymakers should not take it for granted that the emergence of a federated Kurdish entity in northern Iraq will harm the country's vital interest. Especially if Turkey succeeds in integrating northern Iraq in its own economic sphere while at the same time accommodating cultural rights for Kurds within its territory, the chances will be that Turkey will maximize its long-term security.

Civic Engagement in Ethnic Politics

The case studies above suggest that confrontational behavior is essentially dualistic, combining state policies with widespread public attitudes and actions. State policies such as the closure of ethnic Kurdish parties, the maintenance of the division in Cyprus, the enforcement of economic embargoes against neighboring countries, and the dangerous escalations in the Aegean have often been supplemented or accompanied by popular

mobilizations — street rallies, commercial boycotts, and voting for nationalist politicians or parties that promote these policies at the state level. There have also been "non-confrontational" cases, in which there was a mild civic or state response to a perceived provocation. As mentioned in the external minority crises above, Turkish policies have predominantly been non-confrontational in such cases as Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Kosovo, with the latter relying on its diplomatic and international leverage within the Euro-Atlantic nexus rather than its military strength.[21]

Mobilizing public opinion for foreign policy purposes can have multiple effects. On the one hand, a leader may make significant and credible public threats against ethnic antagonists. In mobilizing the public in this fashion, it becomes apparent that if a leader backs down, he/she will suffer what James Fearon describes as "audience costs."[22] Because these costs might affect their re-election prospects, leaders can more easily communicate a credible threat against ethnic antagonists. Moreover, a roused, nationalist-minded public could signal to ethnic antagonists a determination to fight a crisis until the end. Thus, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonis Samaras could use photographs from massive Greek Macedonian demonstrations in Thessaloniki in February 1992 to convince his European counterparts of the need to endorse the Greek position on the Macedonian issue.[23]

On the other hand, mobilizing the public for foreign policy purposes might yield adverse effects. For one thing, ethnic antagonists and third parties could 'frame' the mobilizing public as inherently intransigent and abandon any efforts for reconciliation. For another thing, once an acceptable deal for crisis escalation is reached, this might be impossible to implement, due to unrealistic public expectations. The Greek mobilizations over the Macedonian issue in 1992-1994 demonstrated these two effects, as Greek public opinion prevented an acceptable compromise on the issue of the name Macedonia, while allies of Greece concluded that the Greek side was exclusively responsible for the lack of settlement.[24] If these policy lessons are applied to the current debate in Cyprus, one should worry about the recent anti-Annan plan trend among Greek-Cypriots. Even if the political leadership manages to improve the plan, the public might fail to recognize these improvements and reject an otherwise promising deal.

Is Ethnic Antagonism Relevant?

Crises in the Eastern Mediterranean suggest that confrontational behaviour does not correspond to ethnic or religious differences, distant memories, or ancient hatreds.[25] Confrontational policies can occur in an environment with little history of conflict, while they can be avoided in places with a long history of intergroup confrontation. In Greece, the ethnic antipathy theory would indicate that confrontational policies were more likely to occur over disputes with Albanians and Turks than with ethnic Macedonians. Nonetheless, in the Greek society of the early 1990s, the Macedonian issue gained prominence, even though ethnic Macedonians share similar religious traditions with the Greeks. Further to this, ethnic Macedonians were unfamiliar to most Greeks, especially in the South, and in fact, the majority of Greeks had simply no idea of the existence of this Yugoslavian nation. More surprisingly, the official Greek Church was in the forefront of this mobilization, which indirectly de-emphasized other issues involving "Muslim" Albania and Turkey. Finally, Greece managed to break the cycle of confrontation with the Turkish minority in Thrace while the country's policy towards Albania proved to be beneficial for both the Greek economy and the newly arrived immigrants. All of the above occurred despite recent hostilities with Turkey in the Aegean and Cyprus or the fact that Greece and Albania were technically at war until 1987.

Evidence garnered from these various crises refutes the so-called "Sèvres syndrome" theory with respect to Turkey. This theory examines Turkish foreign policy through the lenses of Turkey's ongoing fear of dismemberment, as agreed upon in the Sèvres Treaty of 1920. Proponents of this theory, such as Mümtaz Soysal, argue that in Turkey, there is a collective feeling of distrust, directed towards the European powers and towards its neighbors, and that this is a determining factor in Turkish foreign policy.[26] As this theory is applicable to almost any country interacting with Turkey, it also provides a convenient, post-facto justification of Turkey's confrontational policies with any of its neighbours and western allies. However, it says nothing about variation in Turkey's crisis behaviour and particularly the large number of non-confrontational responses by Turkey in times of crises, particularly in the Balkans. For example, it explains neither the absence of confrontational nationalism in the wider Thrace in the 1990s, lost for Turkey around the time of the Sèvres treaty,[27] nor the presence of

confrontational policies against the Kurdish populations, who largely supported the Young Turks against the implementation of Sèvres.[28]

Yet what are the policy implications inherent in a refutation of the ancient/modern hatred hypothesis? In the case of the Kurds in Turkey, the fact that an uprising has taken place in the past two decades does not imply more conflict in the future, especially if the Turkish state comes to recognize the diverse nature of the country or to acknowledge the Kurdish reality in the greater Middle East. Moreover, past conflict in Cyprus does not necessarily imply new tensions if the Greek-Cypriot refugees resettle under a Turkish-Cypriot administration. Hence it is a waste of political capital for the Turkish side to focus primarily on this issue. Similarly, Greek-Cypriots should not take for granted the overwhelming popularity for a settlement among their Turkish counterparts. It might be the case that future generations of Turkish-Cypriots become unwilling to give up land and suffer major relocations of populations, especially if the Turkish north recovers from the current economic crisis. Finally, whether the Turkish settlers will be integrated into the social fabric of the Cypriot society or remain marginalized is a matter of long-term public policy rather than non-Cypriot ethnic origins. Provided that certain demographic balances in Cyprus are kept under control, it should be possible to accommodate the human rights needs of different groups on the island and create a positive human rights environment for all.[29]

National Interest versus Domestic Politics

While national interest should take precedence over domestic political concerns, there is no evidence that foreign policymaking in the Eastern Mediterranean follows precise and well-defined national goals. One of the most paradoxical aspects of confrontational behavior is the use of costly, ineffective, and self-damaging strategies by states and their dominant majorities. During the period in question, both Greek and Turkish governments have employed confrontational strategies, regardless of financial and political costs for their people: in fact, the two countries have been among the top six net importers of military equipment worldwide for the past five years.[30] In Turkey, confrontational strategies have led to the radicalization of the Kurdish minority, and the slowdown in Turkey's

strategic objective of joining the EU.[31] As the advantages of EU accession are so significant for the Turkish people, it seems odd that the country has not softened its stance on a number of foreign policy issues, as for example, human rights and Cyprus.

During the past few months there was an improvement particularly in lifting human rights prohibitions in Turkey and restrictions in free movement in Cyprus. Policymakers often rationalize Turkey's crisis behaviour at these specific moments, occasionally *post-facto*, citing a set of plausible security or interest variables such as the positive role of the EU. However, these same variables are rarely present in subsequent crises and do not explain crisis behaviour in most cases. Overall, Turkey follows neither the lead of Eastern European countries that made significant concessions to minorities in exchange for peace and stability nor that of other developing countries such as Indonesia, which ended once and for all its occupation of East Timor.[32]

Likewise, such actions as Greece's participation in dangerous escalations in the Aegean (1987, 1996) and its handling of the new Macedonian Republic (1992-1994) make little sense from the point of view of national interest. For instance, policies regarding the Macedonian issue weakened international and European support for Greece in its balancing of perceived or real threats from Turkey.[33] In the case of Macedonia, Greek leadership ignored three key pieces of advice offered at the time. First, it failed to acknowledge that recognition of a small minority on its northern frontier would have no negative effect to Greek security and would, in fact, create a bridge with another Balkan nation.[34] It subsequently dismissed evidence that the non-monopolization of the name Macedonia was the most feasible arrangement that could be made between the two countries.[35] Lastly, it paid little attention to the fact that the new Republic was a "geopolitical" gift to Greece and, more specifically, a buffer zone with potential conflict areas in the Balkans such as Kosovo. This interpretation of national interests, along with the diplomat who presented it to the ministry, was rejected first by the government and then by the public, after the diplomat's memo found its way into the daily press.[36] As this example would seem to demonstrate, it is not national interest *per se* that defines foreign policy, but rather, the ability of élites to control, frame, and utilize concepts of national interest in the public eye.

Another interesting case is Rauf Denktash's success in manipulating the Turkish political system during the past few decades. For instance, the unilateral declaration of the 'TRNC' in 1983 had nothing to do with the long-term imperialistic designs in Ankara presented at the time to explain this action. The decision to declare a new state was taken at the most unfortunate time for Turkey when there was absolutely no indication for international support and aimed to keep in power Rauf Denktash, who was facing increased opposition from the Turkish-Cypriots after the 1981 Turkish-Cypriot elections.[37] This attempt was orchestrated by military circles in Turkey that favored his presence especially during the first years of democratization in Turkey.[38] Over the past few decades, Rauf Denktash sustained Turkish support by appealing to the interests, emotions, and mentalities of special groups composed of Turkish Generals, ultra-nationalists Grey Wolves, and old-fashioned Ecevit-type Leftists. Although, he claims to do so, his policies in Cyprus do not serve the overall interest of the Turkish silent majority.

Theories on domestic politics have dominated international relations for decades,[39] but only recently they have received serious attention from policymakers in the Eastern Mediterranean. The effects of domestic factors are particularly salient during periods of government instability. The absence of a strong government favours the selection of nationalist leaders, maximizes the influence of hitherto insignificant hyper-nationalist groups, or fosters nationalist coalitions. For instance, Tansu Ciller's highly unstable coalitions, especially with the Islamists, led to a series of confrontational policies towards the Kurds, Cyprus, and Greece.[40] Moreover, government instability caused leadership struggles, for instance, the two near-war situations between Greece and Turkey in 1987 and 1996 coincided with at least one main political protagonist in each episode being in the hospital.[41]

The Macedonian controversy in Greece is another case in point which can partly be attributed to the inability of the Mitsotakis government in 1991-1993 to isolate domestic opposition within his New Democracy party. The Mitsotakis government had only a one-vote majority in a parliament of three hundred, and this allowed a single person to blackmail the government over difficult foreign policy dilemmas. The latest evidence suggests that the fear of domestic opposition forced Mitsotakis to follow the "wrong" policies over the Macedonian issue, despite his own personal reassessment of the issue in

mid-1992.[42] Fortunately, the current ND government of Konstantinos Karamanlis does not face a similar challenge, due in large part to an electoral system introduced by Mitsotakis, which has guaranteed Greece strong governments and internal stability for over a decade after the Macedonian controversy.

In Turkey, the current internal situation is more complicated. On the one hand, current prime minister, Tayyip Erdogan, remains extremely popular. On the other, his Islamic proclivities do not create a good working environment with other influential groups in the country. For one thing, the military has its own agenda and interest in preserving unity among officers committed to secularism, the unitary state (Kurdish repression), and the division of Cyprus. For another, the secular bureaucracy of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers Cyprus its own domain of expertise, dismissing the influence of an elected government headed by a person who speaks no foreign languages. Finally, Erdogan faces a number of challenges within his own party, as was demonstrated in the refusal of a significant number of parliamentarians to pass the motion allowing US troops in the country in March 2003.[43] Finally, opposition party CHP has adopted an uncompromising stand in almost every area of Turkish foreign policy.[44] For the most part, in the settlement of difficult issues, such as the Kurdish issue or Cyprus, one spoiler might be enough to prevent progress.

Framing Confrontational and Cooperative Policies

Apart from spoilers, confrontational behaviour is being maintained by norms or rather adversarial framing of issues in the public discourse. Framing is an essential component of both confrontational and cooperative crisis behaviour. It reflects conscious strategic efforts by leaders to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate policy options.[45] Generally speaking, frames determine what groups consider possible or impossible, natural or unnatural, problematic or inevitable.[46] For instance, cooperative frames emphasize opportunities for reconciliation between Greek and Turks while confrontational ones mistrust and victimization.

Framing has multiple functions one of them protecting leaders from being exposed to the public for their own policy errors and miscalculations. For instance, policymakers in Greece or Turkey would not attribute their failures to their own policies but rather to intransigent policies taken by the other side, the 'preferential' position each enjoyed in 'Western' eyes, or its powerful lobbies in the US.[47] When such interpretations are made on the basis of these three reasons, then policy change becomes very difficult. In Greece a major policy lesson was learnt when the country failed to prevail in its dispute over the young Macedonian Republic. Losing from a virtually unknown and unimportant country for the West, helped at the same time reassess the major parameters of Greek foreign policy. Greek policymakers, especially during the PM Simitis administration, attempted to delegitimize confrontational policies by pointing out to policy failures in such issues as the Macedonian and Öcalan crises.

In Turkey, a similar process of delegitimizing confrontational policies is possible even in the short-term. Erdoan seems willing and charismatic enough to reframe the Turkish foreign policy discourse. As an outsider non-Kemalist in the political system, he has no problem pointing out Ecevit's policy failures that led to Cyprus joining the EU. At the same time, his challenging past policy choices is now less risky as reformists can clearly point out erroneous choices that delayed Turkey's accession to the EU or minimized its role in post-Saddam Iraq. To project an alternative new path in Turkey's foreign policy, however, the Erdoan government must be both convinced and convincing with the message that the US will not downplay Turkey's interest in Iraq and that Europe will not renege on commitments and promises made to the country.

Conclusion

All the above constitute a complex mosaic of external, domestic, and ideational factors preventing the settlement of major issues in the Eastern Mediterranean. They also explain why issues such as Cyprus or Kurdish rights remain unresolved for decades even when incentives to reach an agreement are present for all sides in the conflict. The area surrounding Greece and Turkey is loaded with foreign policy issues and opportunities for escalation are always present. This article identified the various

manifestations, possible causal mechanisms, and intellectual paradoxes of crisis management in the Eastern Mediterranean. Many otherwise popular theories of crisis behaviour based on the presence of minorities, resource disputes, 'national interest', ethnic antipathy, and EU influence have failed to offer sufficient explanations of the whys and wherefores in Greece and Turkey. It is precisely this failure to explain the region that makes the study of crises an important topic for further discussion. While emphasizing domestic politics and norms, the article suggests that the uncertainty created by these highly fluid and unpredictable variables should alert policymakers so that they make better use of time and opportunities for settlement and de-escalation in the region. Out of all the issues mentioned, a settlement in Cyprus within the next few months should be the major priority for all sides.

NOTES

1. For a summary of 21 crises see online data at http://www.utoronto.ca/ethnicstudies/data.pdf; for the forty-case dataset, see Neophytos Loizides, "Explaining Outcomes of Conflictual Situations: A Boolean Test on Greece and Turkey (1983-2003);" paper presented at the 99th annual meeting of the *American Political Science Association*, Philadelphia, 2003; for an update on data and coding, please contact author at neophytos loizides@ksg.harvard.edu.

2. For the definition of a foreign policy crisis, see Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2000), p.3.

3. See, for instance, Henri J. Barkey and Philip H. Gordon, "Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis," *The National Interest*, no.66 (Winter 2001-2002).

4. Rogers Brubaker offers a detailed discussion of different types of nationalism (crises); see Rogers Brubaker, "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism," in John A. Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.272-307.

5. See, for instance, *The Associated Press*, "Turks protest against Bulgaria," June 25, 1989; *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, "ATA reports Northern Epirus Demonstration outside Embassy in Athens", June 9, 1994.

6. Personal communication with former Minister Ilter Turkmen, July 26, 2003; see also his personal column in the Turkish daily *Hurriyet*, September 1, 2001.

7. Regarding how many Greeks lived in Yugoslav Macedonia, *Eleftheroypia (Ios)* cites the following figures: Christides (10,000); Zoulas in daily *Kathimerini* (250,000); Vakalopoulos (200,000); Minister Tsitsikostas (300,000); Tsathas in daily *Ta Nea* (250,000); Greek General Staff (239,000); Ambassador Dountas (0). See Trimis, Psarras,& Kostopoulos, *"Ios tis Kyiakis," Eleftherotypia*, November 1, 1992, p.18.

8. Derk Kinnane Roelfsma, "Analysis: Turk MP says US spoils Kurd," *United Press International*, October 15, 2002; Karl Vick, "Iraqi Kurds' Plan For Constitution draws a Warning; Turkey fears Effort will Lead to Independent State in North," *The Washington Post*, September 27, 2002, p.18; *Agence France Presse*, "Turkey has Historical Interests in North Iraq: Defense Minister," August 22, 2002; Murat Bardaçi: "After 80 Years we noticed Kirkut," [in Turkish], *Hurriyet*, August 18, 2002.

9. Rogers Brubaker, "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism," p.277-78.

10. Alexis Alexandres, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974*, (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983).

11. For a detailed account of state repression of the (Slav) Macedonian minority in Greece, see Tasos Kostopoulos, *The Banned Language* [in Greek], second edition (Athens: Mavri Lista, 2000).

12. For details on Kurds population statistics, see David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997).

13. Cengiz Çandar, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq," in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis eds, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: (MIT Press, 2004), p.47-63.

14. See, for instance, Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Ian Lustick, Dan Miodownik and Roy J. Eidelson, "Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the *American Political Science Association*, Boston, 2002; Nicholas Sambanis and Annalisa Zinn, "The Escalation of Self-Determination Movements: From Protest to Violence, " *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Seminar*, November 17, 2003; Dou Ergil, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey," *Journal of Democracy* vol.11, no.3 (2000): p.122-135.

15. Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, and Deepak Khosla "Peace and Conflict 2001: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy" (available at CIDCM website at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/peace.htm).

16. While many observers feared that contemporary self-determination movements continue the process of state breakdown signaled by the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in fact, only four internationally recognized states were born out of armed conflicts during the last 40 years: Bangladesh (1971), Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), and Eritrea (1993). *Ibid*, p.15.

17. Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

18. Debate in Turkish Parliament on October 7, 1998.

19. Debate in Greek Parliament on February 12, 1991.

20. For instance, Helena Smith, "Legacy of Alexander: Macedonia's bid for freedom has stirred Greek nationalism," *New Statesman & Society*, vol.6, no.235, (January 15, 1993), p.15.

21. Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, *Turkey's new Geopolitics: from the Balkans to Western China*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

22. James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, vol.88, no.3 (1994), p.577-92.

23. Thodoros Skylakakis, *Over the Name of Macedonia* [in Greek], (Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1995), p.91; Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p.100-103.

24. Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question*, p.137-154.

25. On ancient hatred, see Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: a Journey through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); on primordial ethnic differences, see Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); on ethnic antipathies, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), on collective traumas, see Vamik Volkan, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in conflict* (Paul & Co Pub Consortium, 1997); on civilizational clashes, see Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

26. Mümtaz Soysal, "The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy", in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis eds, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: (MIT Press, 2004) p.37-47.

27. Western Thrace was actually lost by the Ottomans a decade earlier in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913; see Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans* (Twentieth Century), vol.2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.95-100.

28. David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996) p.102-109.

29. Neophytos Loizides and Marcos Antoniades, "Settlers, Refugees, and Immigrants: Alternative Futures for Post-Settlement Cyprus", unpublished manuscript.

30. Bjorn Hagelin et. al, "Appendix 13A, The Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons: by Recipients and Suppliers, 1998-2002," *SIPRI, Arms Transfer Database*, p.466.

31. Dou Ergil, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey," *Journal of Democracy* vol.11, no.3 (2000): p.122-135; David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997).

32. Stephen Zunes, "Indigestible Lands? Comparing the Fates of Western Sahara and East Timor," in Brendan O'Leary, Ian Lustick and Thomas Callaghy, eds. *Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.289-317.

33. It was only very recently that Greece received some support and even then, only after softening its policies towards Turkey and successfully demonstrating primary Turkish responsibility for the ongoing Greco-Turkish disputes, especially in Cyprus; see Neophytos Loizides, "Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus-EU Accession Process," *Security Dialogue*, vol.33, no.4 (2002), p.429-42.

34. Personal communication with Alexis Heraclides, November 2001.

35. Kofos, the proponent of this solution was marginalized in the ministry of Foreign Affairs; see Alexis Heraclides, *I Ellada ke o Ex Anatolon Kindynos (Greece and the Eastern Threat)* [in Greek] (Athens: Polis, 2001). p.340; see also a document circulated among the ministers of foreign affairs of the European community dated August 8, 1991 and titled "Memorandum on Yugoslav Macedonia" in Thodoros Skylakakis, *Over the Name of Macedonia* [in Greek], (Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1995), p.257-60.

36. Thodoros Skylakakis, *Over the Name of Macedonia* [in Greek] (Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1995), p.137.

37. Personal communication with Ilter Turkmen, September 14, 2003.

38. *Ibid.*

39. Jack Levy describes numerous historical cases in which the public has appeared all too eager for war, from the American Civil War to the eve of World War I in Europe, to the contemporary "identity wars;" see Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol.92, no.1, (1998), p.139-65. In some cases, this enthusiasm for war may push political leaders into adopting more aggressive and risky policies than they would have preferred. In other cases, according to Mueller, leaders will undertake risky foreign ventures or hard line foreign policies because they anticipate popular support for a victorious war. See J.E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion,* (New York: Wiley, 1973).

40. See Alkis Kourkoulas. *Imia: A Critical Analysis of the Turkish Factor [in Greek]*, (Athens: Sideris, 1997).

41. In 1987, Turgut Ozal, the Turkish PM was hospitalized in the US for a heart problem, while in 1996 the leader of the ruling PASOK, Andreas Papandreou was hospitalized in Athens for a similar problem. Even though their health problems were not a direct cause of crisis-escalation, succession games were extremely relevant.

42. Thodoros Skylakakis, *Over the Name of Macedonia* op. cit. [in Greek].

43. Saban Karda, "Turkish-American Relations in the Context of the Iraqi Crisis: Turkish Foreign Policy in Domestic Context," paper presented at the *Socrates Kokkalis 6th Annual Graduate Student Workshop*, February 6, 2004.

44. See, for instance, *BBC, Monitoring International Reports*, "Turkish Government 'Blackmails' own People over Cyprus-Opposition," February 8, 2004.

45. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings)*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.6.

46. Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p.36.

47. See Alexis Heraclides, *Greece and the Eastern Threat* [in Greek] (Athens: Polis, 2001).

The Transatlantic Accordion and the Greek Key

Charalambos Konstantinidis*

RÉSUMÉ

La gestion par les Etats-Unis de la crise créée après les événements du 11 Septembre, aussi bien que la décision d'aller en guerre en Iraq a créé une rupture avec des proportions vraisemblablement jamais vues précédemment à l'intérieur de l'alliance transatlantique. Les premiers cinq mois de 2003 ont été marqués par un échange d'une rhétorique amère, avec la Grèce, qui assumait alors la présidence de l'UE, essayant de jouer le rôle de médiateur entre les Etats-Unis, la vieille et la nouvelle Europe. Néanmoins, les fondations de cette alliance transatlantique sont beaucoup plus solides que nous le pensons souvent. Politiquement et économiquement, les Etats-Unis et l'Europe sont interdépendants à un tel dégré, qu'un partenaire quelques fois difficile est plus supportable qu'une rupture ouverte. Dans ce processus le rôle de la Grèce aurait dû être clairement défini, encore qu'il devrait respecter les réalités géopolitiques aussi bien dans la Méditerranée qu'au-delà.

ABSTRACT

America's handling of the post-September 11th crisis as well as the decision to go to war on Iraq created a rift of seemingly unprecedented proportions within the transatlantic alliance. The first five months of 2003 were marked by an exchange of bitter rhetoric, with Greece, as holder of the EU presidency, trying to mediate between America, Old Europe and New Europe. Nevertheless, the foundations of this transatlantic partnership are much more solid than we often think. Politically and economically, America and Europe are interdependent to such a degree that a sometimes difficult partnership is much more affordable than an open rift. In this whole process, the role of Greece ought to be clear-cut, yet respecting geopolitical realities both in the Mediterranean and beyond.

Introduction

Fall 2001. The world is shaken by the tragedy of New York and Washington, a tragedy due to a terrorist act of unprecedented magnitude. Hours after the three hijacked planes had crashed into the World Trade Center twin towers and the Pentagon, the French daily *Le Monde* published the front-page headline *On est tous Américains* (We are all Americans). In this spontaneous outburst of emotion, *Le Monde* undoubtedly expressed the

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horror, disdain and sympathy that most of us felt, at least in the West, as we watched in awe the collapse of the towers in front of our very eyes. The post-Cold War age of innocence had come to an abrupt end.

Nothing would ever be the same. International terrorism, previously dismissed by many as another American obsession, had made a dramatic invasion into our daily lives. As Al Qaeda appeared to represent a primitive challenge to Western liberalism, America and Europe understood that they had little choice but to stand united in front of the challenge, and struggle to defeat the enemy. Accordingly, Tony Blair called upon the world's democracies to unite to eradicate this evil; Jacques Chirac expressed the solidarity of his people to America for these "monstrous attacks" and Gerhard Schroeder spoke of an attack on the entire civilized world.[1] Suddenly, the transatlantic relationship, whose value had been questioned after the end of the Cold War, seemed to gain new meaning.

End of 2003. The Al Qaeda leadership is still at large while post-Taliban Afghanistan lies in chaos, with warlords controlling large parts of the land and the Karzai government enjoying little support beyond the walls of Kabul. The US and Britain are facing a major challenge in Iraq, where it was proved that it is much easier overthrowing a hated dictator like Saddam Hussein than restoring peace and order (not to mention building democracy in a land that never really had it). Always timely, Jean-Marie Colombani, editor of *Le Monde* and the man who had chosen the aforementioned headline, now wonders in his recently published book: "Are we all Americans?" (Tous Americains?)[2]

How did it happen that in less than two years, the transatlantic alliance reached such a nadir of cohesion, with politicians and intellectuals on both sides calling not only for an end to the relationship, but even to start preparing for a confrontation between America and Europe?[3] What lies behind the 'freedom fries' instead of French fries in the cafeteria and the "Texas cowboys" caricatures? How is it that such approaches are not only found among their traditional proponents, the European left, but emanate even from conservative governments, as in France? Is the rift permanent or can the differences be overcome, as has been the case in the past as well? And, finally, why should smaller countries, like Greece, care about this dramatic deterioration of the transatlantic relationship?

The present article seeks to address these questions, hoping to contribute to a better understanding of the current state of American-European relations and Greece's role therein. The ensuing analysis draws evidence from the history of this relationship, the ideological underpinnings of each side's foreign policy, as well as the economic realities that surround the alliance. It is only through such a framework that we can truly appreciate the complexity of this alliance and what is truly at stake in its preservation.

Our thesis is that, while America and Europe have long had markedly different approaches on several matters of foreign and social policy (which only now have become so acute), these can and have been complementary in the past. Despite several crises, what binds the two sides of the Atlantic together, like the two sidepieces of an accordion, are the same fundamental principles upon which this partnership was formalized almost sixty years ago. If we follow the analogy, Greece, like an accordion key, can help bring about more harmony in the alliance, if it coordinates its strategy with those of the other players involved.

The Historical Roots of the Transatlantic Partnership.

The relationship of America with Europe has historically been characterized by an oxymoron. For centuries, the two partners have viewed each other with profound admiration and downright contempt at the same time! Americans have always stood in awe at the grandeur of the European civilization, whose artists and philosophers undeniably shaped their own culture in its infancy, and from which they still seek inspiration. America, despite its amazing progress over the past 200 years, has never forgotten that all those elements which constituted its identity at the time of the Declaration of Independence (liberalism, individualism, entrepreneurship) have their roots in the centuries-old intellectual debates of the Europeans.

Nevertheless, at the time that the thirteen colonies were fighting to secede from the British Empire, these same principles were absent from the Old World. Indeed, America was formed out of a reaction towards the repression, misery, and turbulence that Europe represented in that period. According to the American national myth, the new country was to be a beacon of liberty, "the land of the free," where all peoples would be welcome to practice their faith, live their lives and manage their affairs by themselves, and not through

an often incompetent, belligerent and intolerant monarch. The mission of the US foreign policy, therefore, naturally became the dissemination of these principles of the European enlightenment to the four corners of the world.[4]

Even today, according to Timothy Garton Ash, for Americans the United States represents the future, while Europe represents decadence. At best, the old continent is viewed with benign indifference; at worst with total rejection.[5] This is why it is possible for Americans to flood Paris all year long, enjoying its museums and architectural wonders, and dismiss France at the same time as the shameful loser of WW II that so ungratefully antagonizes America, its liberator. Or, why the US can invest heavily in the new Brussels headquarters of NATO while downgrading the Belgians as chocolate-makers because of their opposition to the war in Iraq.[6]

For many Europeans, America has indeed been a beacon of liberty over the past two centuries. What better proof can one seek, than the fact that tens of millions of Europeans from all over the continent (Swedes, Latvians, Italians, Greeks, etc.) emigrated to the new country, hoping to pursue their own 'American dream'? During the Cold War, in particular, the Eastern European countries saw in the United States hope and a vision of how their lives could be. America's principles, as described in its constitution, were the European liberal's principles too, after all. Hope and vision is what America still represents for many peoples around the world, albeit probably not in Europe anymore.

On the other hand, there exists a wide spectrum of interpretations of European anti-Americanism, spanning all ideological viewpoints. During the Cold War, the European left saw in America a decadent, unjust society, and an imperialistic, belligerent government, which was rejected for the seemingly more benign social model of the Soviet Union. The Europeans put forth an alternative view of foreign policy, one that placed emphasis on peaceful resolution of conflicts, of exhaustive dialogue and of minimization of the perils of war, which they had so painfully experienced twice during the twentieth century.

According to some, though, the Europeans never came to terms with the fact that they had lost global hegemony to America, especially after the Cold War was over.[7] When the Red Army's troops were stationed only hours away from the major Western European capitals, America's preponderance within the Western world was indispensable to the balance of power. Back then,

Europe had to acquiesce to an American presence — but many Europeans do not feel so any more. Now, when Europeans speak of US unilateralism in world affairs, it is seen more as an act of jealousy rather than stemming from ideological conviction, since they would act the same if they were in America's place.[8]

Despite these problems, America and Europe managed to forge an alliance of impressive durability and effectiveness during the past century. They fought side by side during most of the major conflicts of the century, and they have followed similar approaches on several issues in international forums, demonstrating a remarkable identity of interests. That is not to say, of course, that there have not been major disagreements, even at the height of the Cold War.[9] Political realism, however, prevailed always, as the real enemy of the two partners was seen by both to be Moscow, not Washington or Brussels.

Indeed, the Cold War provided the stimulus for the already existing alliance between America and Europe to become deeper and institutionalized. First of all, and thanks to a brilliant political calculation, the United States funded the economic recovery of Western Europe, so that it could withstand pressure from the Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established, which formalized the commitment of the United States to defend Europe in case of Soviet aggression. Finally, America supported the creation of the European Economic Community, which it interpreted as a guarantee for Europe's economic prosperity in the long term.

This evolving interdependence however did not come about without criticism. Many in Europe felt they were surrendering their sovereignty to America since Washington would be able to dictate foreign policy choices to the Europeans, using the stick and carrot of their defense. De Gaulle's France went as far as to create its own nuclear arsenal and even its independent space exploration program exactly to preserve its freedom of action.

Others felt that Europe could find its own, middle approach to Moscow, as did Willy Brandt with his *Östpolitik*. For them, Europe did not have to follow America's anti-Communist crusade in areas like Vietnam or Latin America, which had nothing to do with European interests. On the whole however, the specter of the Soviet Union weighed heavily in Western European calculations, and thus the alliance remained generally intact from 1945 until 1989.

End of the Cold War — New Realities

The 1990's signaled the beginning of a new era both for Europe and the United States. As the Berlin Wall fell, Europe entered a period of radical transformation, a period of introspection to be exact. In what has been called the 11/9 syndrome (N.B. November 9, the date of the wall's collapse) by the Americans, Europe became preoccupied with its reunification, whose ramifications were enormous.[10] A new vision emerged, that of a continent united politically and economically which would be capable of offering peace, prosperity and security to all its citizens, from the Atlantic to the Caspian Sea. That would be the European priority from now on.

Nevertheless, the realization of that Kantian vision on a European scale (to use Kagan's terminology)[11] implied a reform of the locomotive of this whole process, the European Economic Community. After completing the common market, the EEC had little choice but to proceed to deepen economic integration and to start building the foundations of a political union, which would eventually encompass Eastern Europe as well. The EEC became the European Union, demonstrating the European's willingness to create a new pole in the international system. At the same time, preparations for the adoption of a common currency would consume most of the energies of the 15 member states for the rest of the decade.

The United States, on the other hand, became the sole superpower, professing the creation of a new world order on the ruins of the communist camp. Liberated from the constraints of the past (i.e. the continuous scrutiny of its actions by Moscow and the constant fear of reprisals), Washington was ready to take the lead in reshaping the world to its own liking, putting forth initiatives such as the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, etc. Now that the 'evil Soviet empire' had been beaten, there was hope that America could sponsor the 'enlargement' of the liberal democratic camp to the whole planet.[12]

While Washington appreciated the EU's efforts to integrate the eastern Europeans, it watched in disdain Brussel's failure to deal with the Yugoslav crisis. Low political leverage, coupled with limited military capabilities rendered the EU an untrustworthy partner for Americans.[13] The latter felt that the Europeans wanted to be a superpower on the cheap: they would rely on their prestige and economic might to make their presence felt, while

investing their money not on defense but on social policy as they had NATO (i.e. US) available for their protection. That was simply intolerable and unsustainable from a US perspective, and Washington pushed the Europeans (especially after Kosovo) to raise their military budgets and modernize their militaries.

By the end of the 1990s, the disappearance of the Soviet boogeyman had led to the loosening of the transatlantic ties and the two partner's reorientation towards other priorities. Even if there was a lot of talk about the future of the alliance in general and of NATO in particular, though, few seriously contemplated bringing it to an end. Rather, everyone spoke of NATO's transformation, of the need to redefine its objectives and *raison d'être*. Thus, a New Transatlantic Agenda was adopted (1995) for this purpose, while US-EU summits were instituted on a biennial basis. Finally, as the 'third way' of the international Center-Left brought Clinton, Blair, Schroeder and Jospin closer, it seemed that a new relationship was indeed possible.

From 9/11 to Iraq

The election of George W. Bush, though, and especially the events of September 11th, ended this momentum. Even before his (problematic) election, the Europeans appeared to reject Bush, who seemed abrasive, inexperienced in world affairs, and more interested in signing trade pacts with the rest of the Americas than assuming the burden of world leadership, as his father and Bill Clinton had done. If the anti-globalization movement had grown during the Clinton era, it surely reached its apex with the new president, quickly caricatured as the puppet of oil magnets and the military-industrial complex.

The dramatic change came with September 11 as the symbols of America's economic and military might, Manhattan and the Pentagon, the two pillars of its global hegemony, were attacked. Note that they were attacked not by intercontinental ballistic missiles, nor by a hostile power, as had been feared. Instead they were attacked by a few terrorists who had used their ingenuity against America more than any other weapon. For the first time in years, the US population realized that it was not immune to the pain all over the planet as seen happening on the television evening news. For the first time,

Americans were frightened as they realized, in the words of their President, that the oceans could no longer protect them from their enemies.[14] This constant fear, along with the need for revenge, developed into the 9/11 syndrome, which has ruled over US policymaking ever since.

The impact of this syndrome was tremendous not only on the American psyche, however, but also on the Europeans. For, while the Old Continent was quick to demonstrate its solidarity with Washington and even took the unprecedented step to activate the solidarity clause, or Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, America showed little interest in enlisting that support. The US was seeking a drastic, military solution to eliminate this danger to its citizens once and for all. However, it knew that Europe simply did not have the capacity to follow. The EU, on the other hand, was more skeptical toward an anti-terrorist crusade, arguing that terrorism was such a complex socio-economic phenomenon that simply could not be dealt with only militarily. Rather, diplomacy had to come into play.

Thus, the 9/11 and 11/9 syndromes clashed, so to speak, and progressively created an enormous rift across the Atlantic. If that was not so apparent during the Afghanistan war, where the memory of the World Trade Center (WTC) tower's collapse was still fresh and there was unanimity over the need to topple the Taliban regime, it certainly became evident in the case of Iraq. Americans accused the Europeans of hypocrisy and of living in their own Kantian bubble, for not being able to understand the immense threats of our Hobbesian world. A world in which Iraq's alleged Weapons of Massive Destruction (WMD) posed a threat not only for Washington or Israel, but also for the rest of the world.

The Europeans resurrected the Texas cowboys caricatures to accuse America of a Far West mentality, seeking bin Laden 'dead or alive'. They spoke of a new imperialist vision and of Bush having fallen prey to the appetites of neoconservative revisionists at the Pentagon and the White House.[15] These neoconservatives sought to divide the anti-war front by speaking of a 'New' and an 'Old' Europe. As the US and Britain proceeded with their plans in the face of UN opposition, it seemed obvious that these same circles in Washington were ready to go as far as to undermine the Security Council, and practically eliminate the ultimate constraint for America's plans (as if the UN had been an obstacle to US or USSR unilateralism before).[16]

Despite this immense crisis, however, the alliance did not break down. The European Union was shaken by disagreements but stood united, after all. NATO is still there, and there is already some underground discussion about its possible future role in Iraq. The US-EU summit in June 2003 started what is definitely going to be a long process of healing in the relationship. Of course, the United Nations, which was so vilified by friends and foes alike for its stance on the war, returned to the epicentre of the debate in September 2003 and again in January 2004, in the hope of finding some common ground for resolving such crises in the future.

Political Commonalities

How did it happen, then, that the transatlantic relationship held strong? What are the realities that the leadership in America and Europe cannot afford to overlook, despite the massive popular support (at least in April 2003) for a transatlantic divorce? According to our analysis, there are both political and economic aspects of the relationship that are extremely important, and which render a difficult coexistence much more desirable and sustainable, than a search for new alliances around the world.

First of all, and despite the risk of sounding redundant, it is necessary to remember that the principle of democracy and individual freedom lies at the heart of the relationship. Even in the case of Iraq, no one really disagreed that Saddam Hussein was an oppressor and that Iraqis, Kurds and others would be much better off under a truly tolerant, democratic regime. The disagreement has been over the means to achieve the goal of promoting democracy, which is indeed a very important matter. But there had been similar disagreements in the past as to whether the Vietnam War was necessary, even if it aimed to 'contain' communism? And wasn't the war on Kosovo also 'illegal'; i.e., unauthorized by the UN Security Council but still supported by the NATO countries — including France — because they approved the overall objective?

It can be argued, of course, that 'freedom' and 'democracy' are such flexible notions evoked to justify any sort of outrageous action on the part of the United States. That may be so, and perhaps the war in Iraq is a case in point, where very few people were convinced that Washington's primary concern was the establishment of a democratic polity in Baghdad. The emphasis,

therefore, should be placed in refocusing on the right objectives, rather than Europe abandoning America (and America abandoning Europe). For there is no better ally available for the promotion of the objectives of liberty and freedom for either party, while there are politicians on both sides who are honestly committed to their pursuit.[17]

Another fundamental commonality is the assessment of new threats emerging in the twenty-first century. America has long complained that Europe is absorbed by its unification and post-Cold War transformation in general. However, the shock of September 11th and the toughening of the US stance on security issues, have contributed in shifting the European's attention to threats that are indeed global in nature, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the famous paper presented by Javier Solana in June 2003, drafted to outline an EU strategy on such matters, was very close (suspiciously close for some) to similar American texts.

The protection of energy routes emanating from the Caspian Sea/Middle East region (a deeply political issue) is also of mutual concern, since these routes literally provide the fuel for Western prosperity. Naturally there is competition involved which leads to the following questions: Will it be Total, Fina, Elf or Texaco that will get the huge contracts in Iraq? Which pipeline will bring the Caspian oil more quickly and more cheaply back to Europe and the US? The answers are important because the need for energy is immense, and the transatlantic partners are well aware that given the shaky geopolitical conditions in the Middle East, they can only gain by coordinating efforts to secure their access to it.

A final major commonality is the orientation of the two partners towards the liberalization of trade on a global scale. We call this a political commonality since its implications are at least as sociopolitical as they are economic. In fact, US/EU views are strikingly similar regarding the 'qualified' liberalization of trade, one that seeks access to third world markets, but leaves their own protectionist measures, e.g., subsidies, untouched; their social cohesion, intact. And despite the occasional transatlantic trade wars over bananas or steel, which constitute only 1% of the transatlantic economy, America and Europe are most often found in the same camp, opposing the rest of the world. Their long-term prosperity, however, and hence, that of the rest of the world, lies with the liberalization

of trade which, as we will see in the next section, has created strong linkages between the two economies.

Economic Interdependence

Even if many would be quick to reject the political/strategic justification for the preservation of the transatlantic alliance, few can ignore its economic implications for both America and Europe. They are simply enormous. A transatlantic divorce could have catastrophic results not only for both partners, but also for the rest of the world, given a potential subsequent worldwide recession. It is useful, therefore, to examine the economics of the relationship, which are often overlooked or seem too obvious, without many in the alliance being truly able to grasp their significance.

The size of the transatlantic economy is more than $2.5 trillion, which is by far the largest 'regional' market in the world. Twelve million jobs in Europe and America are tied to this market, with several other millions of dependents enjoying its fruits. Indeed, these twelve million workers enjoy high wages, high labor and environmental standards, and open, largely, non-discriminatory access to each other's markets. The social implications of the transatlantic economy, therefore, are obvious at a time of growing concern, both in Europe and the United States, about employment rates.[18]

Skeptics often point to the fact that as globalization progresses, new promising markets are created in places such as Asia and Latin America. These are markets that can provide an alternative to transatlantic trade, should the latter prove to be counterproductive. There is no doubt that these markets are potentially important, but the recent crises of the 1990s demonstrated the instability of their economies, which dissuade investors from allocating capitals there. Data shows, for example, that American investment in the Netherlands was twice what it was in Mexico in recent years, and 10 times what it was in China! This unbelievable statistic demonstrates how the distance of economic potential from economic reality can affect the psychology of an investor.

As a consequence, it is safer to seek returns in the solid European markets than to gamble in areas where profits may be greater, but where neither the political environment nor the rules of the game are such that can guarantee

fair-play. America's asset base in the UK alone, for example, is roughly equivalent to the combined overseas affiliate asset base of Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East! This represents an enormous concentration of capital on EU soil, capital which of course guarantees returns to its American owners. For US companies rely on Europe for over half their total annual foreign profits because indeed, and it is only the transatlantic market that can afford the cutting-edge products of the transatlantic industry.

That is not to say, however, that the Europeans have not benefited from the dynamism of the American economy. At this moment, there is more European investment in Texas than all American investment in Japan. The manufacturing workforce of US affiliates in Germany is double the number of manufacturing workers employed by US foreign affiliates in China. And European companies account for a significant percent of all US portfolio inflows.[19]

The transatlantic economy is therefore a key factor for the economic development of the planet. When it is booming, the rest of the world enjoys the fruits of growth as well; when it falls into recession, other economies also struggle.[20] A transatlantic divorce would therefore affect the whole planet, as most economies are tied in some way to the US and EU ones through trade and their use of the dollar and the euro. Proponents of the divorce ought to think twice, then, before sacrificing so many jobs and investment for the sake of often short-sighted political calculations.

This very economic interdependence, however, has been deemed by many as a double-edged sword. According to that view, the political implications of the integration of the transatlantic economy are negative, since it permits America to preserve its economic preponderance, despite its enormous external debt. In other words, the proponents of this view feel that had it not been for Europe, the clay feet of the American giants would have cracked long ago. And if the EU wants to effectively influence American policy or even achieve a level of global influence that is greater than Washington's, it only needs to withdraw that support, and draw the carpet under the New World's feet by not offering cheap money for financing US debts.[21]

In our view, this approach is only half true. Once more, we need to keep in mind that while America borrows European capital and is, thus, able to sustain its debts, it is at the same time the locomotive of the global economy.

For better or for worse, at this conjecture, the US economy has a unique dynamism which no single economy can match. Given the structure of the international economic system, therefore, a move to undermine the American economy, would be a move against one's own economy. Not only because of the number of jobs and the amount of investment involved, but because it would doom other economies as well for quite some time. An alternative to the American locomotive is nowhere to be seen.

Some may say that it is exactly for these reasons that the transatlantic economic ties are effectively strangling the Europeans. In other words, exactly because they create the sense that American preponderance is inevitable, they should be severed. Otherwise, change in the international system will never come, or will come too slowly. We do not share that assessment. In our view, the answer to the imbalance of the transatlantic partnership is not an effort to undermine one of the poles, but to strengthen the other. The answer is that Europe today becomes more dynamic, more competitive, and more able to stand on its own feet and thus more able to demand a role in global affairs than before.

Where Does Greece Fit In?

Greece has been the very interesting case of a country caught in the midst of all these world-shaking events. "Purported hotbed of European anti-Americanism"[22] and an often difficult EU partner, Greece would seem to belong in neither of the two camps to an outside observer. Greek-American relations have never completely overcome the trauma of 1967-74, and reached a nadir in the 1980's when Andreas Papandreou held the premiership in Athens.[23] At the same time, it took about twenty years (and billions of Euros in aid) for the Greeks to realize the benefits of EU membership and acclimate to European political standards.

The optimal choice in a crisis like the one over Iraq for an ambivalent country like Greece, then, ought to be to seek a delicate balance in order to avoid its entanglement in the conflict. And indeed, many argued that this is exactly what happened during the period of the war! As Greece was holding the EU presidency during this tumultuous time, its duty was to synthesize the diverse opinions of the Union's membership and lead the transatlantic dialogue with the United States. In other words, observers said, the Greek

government was plainly lucky, as it never really had to express openly its opinion on the war in international forums as its EU counterparts did. As a result, Athens avoided a confrontation with its adamantly anti-war population, its divided EU partners, and Washington.

This is only one part of the story however, and probably the superficial one. For Greece and its foreign policy have changed substantially over the past decade, as has the perception of the country by its partners abroad. Even if popular attitudes towards the West remain volatile, the Greeks have tended to elect governments with moderate foreign policies that seek to integrate Greece in the international system and not to distinguish it for the sake of doing so. This electoral attitude has permitted Athens to skillfully maneuver between its interests and its obligations toward the different organizations in which it is a member, striving to minimize negative reactions to its initiatives and maximize the gains.

This was also the case in Iraq. In general, Greece was against the US case for a war against Iraq and sided discretely with 'Old Europe' on the subject. At the same time, though, given that the war appeared inevitable by February 2003, it also honored its alliance obligations, and supported the transportation of NATO Patriot Missiles on the Turkish border, an initiative that was eventually killed by Belgium. Athens also refrained from moving towards what proved to be an impulsive initiative; i.e., the creation of an independent European military force, envisaged by Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg, even if it was generally open to such ideas.

The Greek government was criticized not only for not taking a clear cut position against the war, but also for permitting the use of the pivotal Souda Bay naval base for the operations in Iraq. Greece certainly was not the most vocal opponent of the war (at least at the governmental level); nevertheless, even Germany and France supported the war effort, by permitting the use of their air space and offering other sorts of facilities to the Americans, despite their public declarations. In our view (and given the somewhat double-faced approach of Paris, Berlin, Brussels, and Moscow), Athens made a wise choice as it avoided a heads-on confrontation, which certainly would not have prevented the war and would have inflamed Greece's opponents in Washington.

What can Greece's role be in the future? The Iraq crisis gave Athens a golden opportunity to demonstrate its mediator skills, and most assessment on its works was very positive. Nevertheless, we are by no means arguing that somehow Greece could perpetually serve as a bridge between Europe and America. That role was possible only once (due to the EU presidency) and there are other countries that are much more qualified to do so (such as the United Kingdom). In addition, Greek anti-Americanism (justified or not) is a factor that will always play into the equation, undermining Greece's image in Washington.

At this point, however, Greece is emerging as a leading member of the bloc of middle to small-sized EU countries and can thus help shape the direction of future debates. Indeed, during the Rome summit in December 2003, Silvio Berlusconi approached Greece (along with Britain and a couple of other countries) and asked its leader to mediate a solution to the impasse in the adoption of the European constitutional convention. This was a remarkable testimony to the prestige that the country and its leadership enjoy in the EU, not only from "Old Europe" members, but also from the Atlanticist ones. At the same time, Greece has been recently ranked thirteenth among a group of twenty-one rich nations for its aid contributions to developing nations (higher even than the US and Japan) for the quality of support it has provided in the past.[24] This is an immense achievement that provides tangible evidence of the country's elevated prestige.

Finally, Greek economic progress (undoubtedly problematic and still insufficient) is undeniable, and has earned it respect among its fellow Europeans as well as the Balkan countries which are enjoying the fruits of Greek aid. As these latter countries lie on the fault line of the 'Old' and 'New' Europe, the issue of dual loyalty (EU or US?) is bound to emerge in the future. Athens, which is more responsive to the sensibilities of the Balkan peoples, can take the initiative within the EU and within NATO so that their economic progress and their security are guaranteed. In other words, it can help so that a choice between America and Europe does not have to be made in this sensitive region. Later, if Athens succeeds in such a mission, it will have offered the transatlantic alliance and, of course, the Balkan Peninsula an immense service.

Conclusion, or the Greek Key

This analysis aimed to provide an overview of the transatlantic relations, explaining their roots, the causes of frictions and the necessity of rapprochement. Without overlooking the difficulties, the justified suspicion on both sides, as well as the not-so-noble interests that have come to the fore, the article shows that there exist fundamental commonalities binding America and Europe. In the words of a prominent observer, "in a pluralistic society [like the transatlantic community of democracies] value clashes are more or less a built-in phenomenon" and therefore add to, rather than complicate, the quality of its political choices.[25] Both politics and economics, require Washington and Brussels to reconsider their strategies and take each other's sensibilities into account. For the stakes of a permanent rift are immense and can have a lasting impact on the livelihood of both Americans and Europeans.

In other words, the transatlantic relationship shares several of the qualities of that all-time classic of popular instruments, the accordion. The US and Europe represent the two poles of the same alliance, similar to the two parts of the accordion. Just like the latter, the two partners are both equally important, in their own way, for the alliance to have meaning and harmony. Just like in the accordion, the two poles of the alliance may at times come very close, but they will always preserve their distinct character. They may also distance themselves from each other – but never too much, as it is the existence of the 'other' that gives meaning to their own talent, their own power. This constant movement is, after all, essential if music is to be produced....

At this time in history, America and Europe almost tore the transatlantic accordion apart as a result of their discord over Iraq. At some point in the Spring of 2003, it seemed that we had reached a point of no return. Now however, the realities of postwar reconstruction make it necessary to reactivate the partnership and slowly bring the partners close again for the sake of normalization in the Middle East. Once more, therefore, the two parts of the accordion are coming close to bring about some tangible results. And it falls upon the different keys, including the Greek key, to ensure that the renewed collaboration will be more harmonious than ever before.

NOTES

1. Statements by leaders from all over the world can be found on the web archive on 9/11, *September11news.com* (www.september11news.com/InternationalReaction.htm).

2. Jean-Marie Colombani, *"Tous Americains?" Le Monde après 11 septembre 2001* (Paris: Fayard, 2002. *Note: This book has been translated into Greek.*

3. The anti-European view is most eloquently articulated, among others, in Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003). See also Richard Pearle and David Frum, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2003).

4. For a better understanding of the ideological basis for the mentality of a 'missionary America', refer to the anthology *Home of the Brave*, edited by Erik Bruun and Robin Getzen (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1996). For a critique, see Norman Birnbaum, "Aux racines du nationalisme americain," *Le Monde diplomatique*, October 2002.

5. Timothy Garton Ash, "Anti-Europeanism in America," *The New York Review of Books*, February 13, 2003.

6. US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher, September 2, 2003.

7. Jean Francois Revel, *L'obsession anti-americaine* (Paris: Plon, 2002).

8. Colin Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships," *Foreign Affairs*, vol.83, no.1, January/February 2004.

9. For example, one can think of the disagreements over the Vietnam War or the opposition of Henry Kissinger to Willy Brandt's Östpolitik.

10. The 9/11 and 11/9 syndrome's concept is used widely in US literature on the topic, including, for example Colin Powell's aforementioned article as well as Daniel Hamilton's "The 21st Century Requires a Global US-European Partnership," *European Affairs*, vol.4, no.2, Spring 2003.

11. See Note 3.

12. That was the doctrine of Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor during the first Clinton administration. See his speech "From Containment to Enlargement," given at the School of Advanced International Studies - Johns Hopkins University, September 21, 1993, (www.fas.org/news/usa/1993/usa-930921.htm).

13. Dogmar Skrpec, "The European and American Reactions to Kosovo: The Policy Divide Revisited in the Iraq War," *SAIS Review*, vol.23, Summer/Fall 2003.

14. Speech to Congress, September 20, 2001.

15. See, for example, Michael Klare, "Les vrais desseins de M. George Bush," *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 2002. The so-called neoconservative hawks include such prominent figures as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Pearle, Dick Cheney and John Hulsman.

16. Pearle and Frum, pp.249-250 and 271-272.

17. Colin Powell affirmed that principle in his article in *Foreign Affairs* (note 8).

18. Most of the data included in this section can be found in the excellent analysis of Joseph Quinlan, *"Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy,"* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, 2003).

19. *Ibid.*

20. Testimony of Dan Hamilton, Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS - Johns Hopkins University, to the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives, June 11, 2003.

21. An excellent analysis of this topic can be found in Kostas Vergopoulos, *Globalization: The Great Illusion* (Athens: Livanis Press, 1999), in Greek.

22. Brady Kiesling, "Open Letter to US Secretary of State Colin Powell," *The New York Times*, February 27, 2003.

23. Fouad Ajami, "The Falseness of Anti-Americanism," *Foreign Policy*, no.148, September/October 2003.

24. *Foreign Policy*, no.146, May/June 2003.

25. Dieter Dettke, "U.S. - European Differences are Many, but Manageable," *European Affairs*, vol.4, no.3, Summer/Fall 2003.

Greek-Turkish Relations: Problems and Prospects for Europe

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou*

RÉSUMÉ

La longue campagne électorale en Grèce qui s'est terminée par les élections du 7 mars 2004, a ramené la politique étrangère au premier plan. Le voisinage de la Grèce est semé d'un nombre de différents de politique étrangère qui méritent d'être examinées de près. Il est important dès que la future direction des relations greco-turques va dominer l'agenda de la politique étrangère dans les mois et les années à venir. Les relations greco -turques peuvent avoir un impact sur la recherche d'une solution du problème de Chypre et sur l'avenir de l'île qui va se joindre à l'Union Européenne en mai 2004. Les relations de la Turquie avec l'Union européenne arriveront à un point critique en décembre 2004 quand l'UE prendra une décision concernant un possible commencement des négociations d'adhésion.

ABSTRACT

The protracted electoral campaign in Greece which ended with the elections of March 7, 2004, brought foreign policy back into the limelight. Greece's neighbourhood is saddled with a number of foreign policy issues which deserve close attention. More importantly, the future direction of Greek-Turkish relations will dominate the foreign policy agenda in the months and years to come. Greek-Turkish relations may also have an impact on the search for a settlement on Cyprus and the future of the island which will join the European Union in May 2004. Turkey's relations with the European Union are also coming to a head in December 2004 when the EU is expected to make a decision about the possible commencement of accession negotiations.

The European Dimension

The story of Turkey and the European Union (EU) is akin to the myths of Sisyphus and Tantalus. Like Sisyphus, the EU is unable to carry the weight of its own ambitions because, as a concert of 15/25 states, it has lost sight of these ambitions. The same applies to Turkey, which constantly stalls its European prospects due to the burden of its domestic political and

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institutional soul-searching. Like Tantalus, the EU, as a model of peace, security and prosperity, tempts Turkey, while Turkey, with its huge market and economic potential, tempts the EU. At the same time however, questions about Turkey's identity and the free movement of its citizens within the EU keep both sides apart.

While Turkey's EU candidacy status is more clearly defined than that of its Western Balkan neighbours, there are major difficulties for political, economic and security reasons. While it goes without saying that the pre-accession process has led to a number of important legislative and constitutional changes in Turkey, e.g., civilian majority in the National Security Council (9 civilians and 5 military members), lifting of the death penalty in peacetime, possibility of radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish, enhanced freedom of expression and greater freedom for non-Muslim religious minorities, its candidacy remains a headache for itself and the EU.[1]

The signatory of an Association Agreement (the "Ankara Agreement") with the EC/EU since September 1963, Turkey formally presented its application for membership to the EC in 1987. After a Customs Union Agreement in 1995, Turkey's candidacy suffered a rebuttal at the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997, because it failed to make the list of candidates for accession. There were various reasons including its human rights record, position on Cyprus and tenuous relationship with Greece. Despite the Turkish official attitude which "combined bitterness for the rebuff with an attitude that dismissed the importance of EU membership for Turkey,"[2] the EU confirmed "Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European Union" and decided to draw up a strategy "to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field."[3]

The Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999 was a great leap forward in EU-Turkish relations as it welcomed "recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reform towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria." The Council, therefore, concluded that "Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria

as applied to the other candidate States."[4] Apart from paragraph 12 of the Helsinki Council Conclusions, which laid down the criteria for membership, Turkey is bound to paragraphs 4 and 9 (a). Paragraph 4 refers to the "principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter," while urging candidate states "to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this, they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004."[5]

The reference here obviously points to Turkey's disputes with Greece. Paragraph 9 (a) also expressed the EU's "strong support for the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring the process [a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem] to a successful conclusion." The Copenhagen European Council of 12-13 December 2002 went a step further to advance Turkey's cause by defining the parameters of the EU's future relations with Turkey. More specifically, the Conclusions of the Copenhagen Council stated that:

> *The European Council recalls its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages and the subsequent implementation measures which cover a large number of key priorities specified in the Accession Partnership . . . .*
>
> *The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.*[6]

With the adoption of a revised Accession Partnership by the Council of the EU in May 2003 that establishes the priorities Turkey should pursue in its legislative reforms and supported by increased pre-accession financial assistance, the Thessaloniki European Council of 19-20 June 2003, reaffirmed the EU's intention to take a decision on Turkey's candidacy at the December 2004 European Council.[7]

As things stand today, therefore, EU-Turkish relations will fundamentally and qualitatively change after December 2004. In this regard, both the international and the domestic contexts are equally important for Turkey. It should be remembered that the Helsinki European Council was also groundbreaking in that it formally launched the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), a necessary component of the EU's embryonic crisis management capability. ESDP became a key concern for EU-NATO relations and the subject of intensive negotiations with Turkey regarding the country's participation in decisions on EU-led operations using NATO assets.[8] Also, the Copenhagen summit confirmed Cyprus's accession to the EU by May 2004, no matter whether or not there will be a settlement on the island by that time. Since Copenhagen, the Iraq crisis has also shaken US-Turkish relations to the core, thereby simultaneously challenging Turkey's strategic dependence on the United States, and vice versa, as well as fundamentally bringing to the fore the necessity for greater strategic thinking on the part of the EU as it widens both its frontiers and its neighborhood.

The Domestic Turkish Scene vis-à-vis the EU

A series of events since 1996 (the post-modern coup of February 1997, the Izmit earthquake of August 1999 and the twin economic catastrophes of November 2000 and February 2001) have contributed to surging pro-EU sentiment. These developments led to a broad-based demand for further democratic reform and fury directed at any and all institutions – no matter how previously sacrosanct – deemed responsible for the calamities of recent years. Popular support for EU membership is new and suggests that this great goal of republican Turkey is no longer the special preserve of elites and

their "ideological obsession" with the EC/EU which was interpreted as "Turkey having made a political choice between East and West."[9] Ultimately, the push for change, the claims of a rising counter-elite to a place in the power structure, and the popularity of EU membership all point to a fundamental fact: Turkey is now ready to shake off the shackles of the 1982 military-drafted constitution as well as the mentality that framed it.[10] Yet whether the establishment that drafted or supported this constitution is willing to accept the changing domestic political balance of power and allow the "Muslim Democrats" to rule effectively remains to be seen.[11]

In other words, Turkey's European aspirations do not conform to its Kemalist political and institutional edifice: "while it remains the state ideology in Turkey it will be impossible to assess the extent to which — as its adherents maintain — Kemalism is the reason for Turkey's being [more] democratic than other Muslim countries or whether it is irrelevant, or even, as its opponents argue, an obstacle to complete democratisation."[12] Who knows what this augurs for the future. As long as Turkey does not come to terms with its domestic political and economic heritage and the necessity to undergo the necessary political and economic changes to meet the "Copenhagen criteria" and basic preconditions for truly liberal democratic societies, its relations with the EU will remain in stalemate.

It is in the context of foreign policy and in particular with regard to relations with the EU that Turkey is judged. To date the results have been mitigated by the perceived inability of the Erdogan government to promote its foreign policy initiatives, beginning with early resolution of the Cyprus issue. Here the struggle between the AKP's (Justice and Development Party) new thinking and the status quo will be paramount, as will the debate over the strategic value of the country. In Turkey's case, unlike any other candidate for accession, the geostrategic dimension shares centre stage with the Copenhagen criteria. Reconciling these factors presents a paradox and remains to be seen how that could happen, given the fact "[that] the record shows that when Turkey collects high strategic rents, its democracy is liable to suffer."[13]

This is to say that the domestic tug-of-war in Turkey between democratization and the army-dominated secular establishment could

paradoxically lead to a (last-ditch?) coup attempt in Turkey as the country's strategic importance has been reduced, given the successful conclusion of the war against Saddam Hussein.[14] According to Gareth Jenkins, "privately, the military continues to insist that, if necessary, it will not hesitate to intervene to protect secularism. This would initially be in the form of a warning but, if this was not heeded, would eventually include forcing the government from office.[15]

Nevertheless, the Erdogan government's commitment to the goal of EU membership has been impressive. Since coming to power the government has approved 4 harmonization packages (the last coming into effect August 7, 2003). A reform monitoring group, composed of the ministers of foreign affairs, justice and interior with high-level bureaucrats, was established in September 2003 with a view to ensuring effective implementation of the reforms.

The European Union

For the EU, it is primarily economic and political criteria rather than strategic prerogatives that direct its policy towards Turkey. The major obstacle seems to be Turkey's "unproductive and unstable economy, and the related threat that with accession to the EU, millions of Turks in search of jobs and higher wages would emigrate to Germany and elsewhere in Europe."[16] Turkey's sizeable population of nearly 70 million growing at a rate of 1.6 per cent annually, coupled with a low per capita income (per capita GDP is about 5,200, i.e., 22 per cent of the EU average); a large agricultural workforce (about 40 per cent of the population); large regional disparities; high inflation (the average annual consumer price inflation was 69.9 per cent during the period 1997-2001, with large fluctuations between 101 per cent year-on-year in January 1998 and 33 per cent in February 2001); low foreign investment (0.8 per cent of GDP on average during 1997-2001); a high public sector debt (35-40 per cent of GNP); and a slow rate of privatization, suggest that Turkey's structural adjustments are monumental.[17]

The EU's reluctance to admit Turkey is understandable, given the aforementioned slow progress in fulfilling the political criteria for membership and troubled relations with Greece and Cyprus. Part of the problem is the slow realization on the part of the Turkish elite that the southern enlargement of the 1980s which resulted in the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal "reflected an important shift in the EC's approach to enlargement" as it "gave priority to political considerations particularly the — desire to stabilize democracy in these countries — over economic concerns."[18]

This also led to the slow "Europeanization" of Greek-Turkish differences over the Aegean and Cyprus, which the EC/EU had to take into account. These differences slowed Turkey's European march, as Brussels has been reluctant to import into the Union bilateral differences between two NATO members and close US allies. Turkey's relations with Greece and its use of both military and diplomatic tactics in its disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus have complicated its pursuit of EU membership. For Greece, there has been a change in its foreign policy towards Turkey since 1996, moving away from confrontational and towards cooperative politics as the efficacy of confrontation has come under scrutiny.[19] In the case of Turkey, "the 'success' of confrontational politics has prevented the development of a new consensus on the consequences and costs of such policies."[20] Cyprus, for example, is joining the EU irrespective of a resolution of the island's division. The continuing violations of Greek airspace and daily dogfights with armed aircraft and Greece's decision to protest in May 2003 to the European Commission for the first time are indicative of the distinctive approaches taken by the two countries in their foreign affairs.

Finally, the issue of identity is relevant to the Turkish case. The Turks tend to insist that the EU's reluctance to begin accession negotiations with Turkey stems from a feeling among many in the Union that a predominantly Muslim state has no place in a predominantly Christian Union. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's famous interview in *Le Monde* a month before the Copenhagen European Council re-ignited the debate about what constitutes a "European" country.[21] It goes without saying that Turkey's complaints are not without a certain validity.

Hence the 'yes-but' attitude of the EU, which raises the question of whether Turkey should *ever* be admitted to the EU. By being left out of the "wider Europe" document and having its accession undefined, Turkey is left in limbo in spite of the fact that it has shared a common land and sea border with the EU since Greece's accession in 1981. With the accession of Cyprus and Bulgaria (in May 2004 and possibly 2007, respectively), Turkey will share new sea and land borders with other EU member states. We should keep in mind that

- the EU's neighbourhood is growing
- there is an ever-growing role for the EU as powerbroker in the Balkans
- the ongoing discussions for an EU special envoy for the Caucasus
- the increasing EU involvement in the Middle East peace process via the Quartet and possibly NATO
- the ongoing discussions for the formulation of an EU strategic doctrine,

EU-Turkish relations might need to be reassessed. Paradoxically this may have to be done through the strategic prism, which fundamentally will mean suggesting new approaches and addressing issues other than EU accession, while taking into account the consequences for Turkey's democratic evolution.

On the EU side, serious thinking on the development of ties with Turkey is needed. Though accession negotiations are bound to start at some stage, their eventual conclusion in a radically different post-enlargement, post-Convention, and post-IGC Union allow for optimism that Turkish membership (if that happens) need not necessarily be destabilizing for the balance of power inside the Union and its project on political union or its greater global role. What is important now is to evaluate carefully the implications of the decisions taken or not taken at Copenhagen, allow time for and give assistance to Turkey's continued transformation and assure a smoother road ahead for EU-Turkey relations.

As the only NATO member that faced real and immediate threats from a war with Iraq and its aftermath, Turkey will have to come around slowly to

a closer relationship with its European neighbors (and *vice versa*). The discordant debates at the North Atlantic Council and the National Assembly, as well as the bad press it received in the United States over its tough negotiating stance (and its rejection of the economic package the United States offered in exchange for the use of their territory), must have the Turks thinking twice about placing all their eggs in one basket. It should also awaken Europeans to the realization that a clearer strategic vision which does not write off Turkey is necessary for the EU. The Iraqi crisis demonstrated that Turkey has much more in common with the vast majority of the current 15 EU member states and their public opinion than most candidate nations. In fact a Pew Global Attitudes Project poll shows that majorities in five out of seven NATO countries surveyed support a more independent relationship with the United States on diplomatic and security affairs. Fully three-quarters in France (76 per cent) and solid majorities in Turkey (62 per cent), Spain (62 per cent), Italy (61 per cent) and Germany (57 per cent) believe that Western Europe should take a more independent approach than it has in the past. Only in the United Kingdom and the United States, narrow majorities in both countries want the partnership between the United States and Western Europe to remain as close as ever. On the other hand, the percentage of Americans favoring continued close ties with Western Europe has fallen from 62 per cent before the war to 53 per cent in the current survey.[22]

As the dust from the transatlantic disagreement over Iraq begins to settle, the EU might find itself much more willing to engage with a much more receptive Turkey on the notion of an enhanced or strategic partnership. This would not foreclose the possibility of EU membership, as shifting strategic perceptions across the Atlantic could diverge. In this regard the following questions arise:

1. Is Turkey ready for the EU?
2. Does Turkey really want to join the EU?
3. Does the EU really want Turkey to join?
4. What role should the strategic dimension have in EU-Turkish relations?

For the EU, the following options are open in addressing the above questions:

- Start a serious debate in terms of the strategic pros and cons of Turkish membership.
- Proceed steadfast with EU accession strategy.
- Reconsider strategy and find common ground based on strategic partnership.
- Consider the implications of the permanent non-membership of Turkey.
- Consider the possibility of early membership with long derogations.

The timeframe for a positive decision regarding the beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey is rapidly becoming tighter. The December 2004 "deadline" implies achieving the various benchmarks established by the revised Accession Partnership, but also a resolution of the Cyprus problem before Cyprus's formal accession on 1 May 2004. Other helpful developments would be the resolution of bilateral disputes with member states or the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on disputes before the end of 2004.

Yet there are some fundamental questions to be addressed. First, are the EU, its members and citizens willing to accept Turkey as a full member? It is not just the issue of Turkey's size (physical and demographic) and its economic and institutional weight that need to be addressed, but also the question of its European "identity." If "identity" comes up as a concern with regard to Ukraine's intentions to join the EU, how can it not come up in Turkey's case? While Germany's Chancellor, G. Schröder has said that "if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, which means democracy and rule of law are ensured, human rights are kept and minorities are appropriately protected, then accession negotiations can start, "Germany's opposition leader, A. Merkel, has ruled out membership in favor of a "special partnership".[23]

Second, there is an interesting geostrategic dimension (given Turkey's neighborhood) which paradoxically is more dangerous and problematic than the enlarged Europe's new borders, as addressed in the Wider Europe initiative.[24] If the intention is to have "a ring of well governed countries" around the EU and to extend "the zone of security around Europe," is this a feasible objective with Turkey's eastern and southern neighbors where weapons of massive destruction (WMD) and terrorism concerns proliferate? This issue raises a number of questions regarding the scope and longevity of the conceptualization of the security strategy in its present form as well as the issue of the limits of the EU.

Related to the above, two further factors merit special mention: The first has to do with the impact that the EU's new members will have on the development of a security culture. Furthermore is the issue of the EU's external actions and relations with its neighboring states. The tell-tale signs show that the newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe would be more willing to expand the EU's frontiers given the strategic rationale on their part for joining the EU. Poland's activism vis-à-vis EU-Ukrainian relations is a case in point.

The second factor has to do with the evolution of Turkish-American relations and their impact on EU-Turkish relations. In this regard, it should be noticed that in spite of the recent turbulence between Washington and Ankara, both sides are making significant efforts to strengthen their ties.

Greek-Turkish Relations

The year 2004 is important in reaching closure on certain key issues in Greece's foreign relations. It is a year of deadlines which marks the end of the so-called "Helsinki paradigm or cycle;" a set of criteria laid down at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 defining the conditions for Cyprus's accession and Turkish candidacy of the EU with immense implications for Greece. In this context, it is imperative that Greece has a clear strategy to meet the challenges and opportunities presented by the 2004 deadlines.

At Helsinki, Turkey was considered a candidate for accession. As stated above, this decision was bound to contribute to the search for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The EU also called for a resolution of any outstanding territorial disputes and other related issues with Greece or a resort to the International Court of Justice at the latest by the end of 2004. The December 2002 Copenhagen European Council also advanced Turkey's cause by stating that the EU will decide about opening accession negotiations in December 2004 provided Turkey meets these conditions.

Since 1999, Greece has pursued a "peace offensive" with Turkey, aimed at reducing tensions over the Aegean. This offensive was predicated on actively supporting Turkey's European future as a basis for advancing the cause of rapprochement between the two countries. This was a risky undertaking if considering that the two countries almost went to war as recently as 1996 when Turkey challenged Greek sovereignty over the Imia islet. But as the 2004 deadlines near what is the Greek strategy for the future? What if there is no short-term resolution of the impasse in Cyprus? How does Greece meet the challenge of rapprochement with Turkey if there is a deadlock in EU-Turkish relations? European support for Greece will be forthcoming, but only on the basis of a clear and proactive strategy emanating from Athens. This strategy must ultimately ensure the safeguarding of Greek interests. Cyprus and Turkey may have become EU concerns which can only be favorable to Greek interests, but Athens must resist all attempts to circumvent the decisions made in Helsinki and Copenhagen and should demand European backing for the resolution of all tensions on this basis. As it stands, however, Athens cannot currently provide answers to these questions or propose solutions to these issues.

Other European considerations further cloud these issues. For instance, 'big bang' enlargement has complex implications for the future of the EU, but as yet they are rather unclear. One thing is clear: the stalled EU constitutional debate, in conjunction with the current enlargement of the EU, will make potential accession negotiations with Turkey all that more contentious. In turn, will the Erdogan government in Turkey be able to maintain public support in favor of EU membership should the EU decide

in December 2004 that it is unwilling or unable to enter into negotiations? All these facts point to a degree of uncertainty which Greece must be ready to meet through a new strategy as yet unforthcoming.

In other words, Greece needs to advance in 2004 a strategy for post-2004.[25] The only viable option would be to upgrade its "peace offensive" toward Turkey with concrete proposals and commitments to address the territorial and other substantive differences in the Aegean and elsewhere. The purpose would be to assure Ankara that come what may, Athens is committed to the continued improvement of relations between the two sides.

The problem for Greece is compounded by the Cyprus conundrum. On the one hand, steadfastly supporting Cyprus's accession to the EU "liberates" Greek foreign policy and allows it to focus on the key bilateral concerns with Turkey in the knowledge that Cyprus as an EU member will be in a better position to defend its interests. On the other hand, a Greek-Cypriot "blockage" of the Annan plan would destabilize, rather than strengthen, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a development would strengthen the hands of the Eurosceptics in Turkey and could lead to a possible veto by Athens and Nicosia with regard to Turkey's future EU prospects given that Turkey's armed forces would continue to occupy the sovereign territory of an EU member state.[26] Under these circumstances, a continued Greek-Turkish rapprochement will become extremely difficult to maintain.

Conclusion

For the future of Greek-Turkish relations, the EU-Turkish and the Greek-Turkish agendas need not necessarily be compatible in the sense that the future *rapprochement* between the two sides of the Aegean need not be dependent on Turkey's EU prospects, provided that the Greek side does block a solution to the Cyprus question on the basis of the Annan plan. The stakes for Greece are certainly high. The swearing-in of a steady new government in Greece in March 2004 marks the beginning of a new era in

foreign policy where challenges and opportunities come hand in hand, and where a clear, coherent and practicable agenda is a vital necessity. The country and its foreign policy establishment need to refocus on the key issues and wider geographic region including the Balkans included to find once again the leadership Greece has shown before in working to assure that the European perspective for all its neighbours, especially Turkey, becomes a reality.

NOTES

1. European Commission, *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, SEC (2002) 1412, Brussels, 9 October 2002, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/tuen.pdf. According to the *Report*, "The decision on the candidate status of Turkey in Helsinki in 1999 has encouraged Turkey to introduce a series of fundamental reforms. A major constitutional reform was introduced in October 2001 aimed at strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and restricting the grounds for capital punishment. A new Civil Code was adopted in November 2001. Three sets of reform packages were adopted in February, March and August 2002. The death penalty has been lifted in peacetime. The state of emergency has now been lifted in two provinces in the South East and the decision has been taken to lift it in the two provinces where it still applies by the end of this year."

2. Thanos Veremis, "The Protracted Crisis," in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization* (Dulles, Va.: Brassey's, 2001), p.46.

3. *Presidency Conclusions*, Luxembourg European Council, 12 December 1997, http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LANG=1.

4. *Presidency Conclusions*, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LANG=1.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002, http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LANG=1.

7. See Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey (2003/398/EC). See also *Presidency Conclusions*, Thessaloniki European Council, 12-13 December 2003, par.38, which states that the "Accession Partnership constitutes the cornerstone of EU-Turkish relations, in particular in view of the decision to be taken by the European Council in December 2004."

8. For a substantive analysis of ESDP in connection with Turkey, see Antonio Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP," *Security Dialogue*, vol.33, no.1, March 2002, p.9-26.

9. Philip Robbins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (London: Hurst and Company, 2003), p.140.

10. See Soli Ozel, "After the Tsunami," *Journal of Democracy*, vol.14, no.2, April 2003, p.91.

11. See, for example, Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "The Electoral Victory of Reformist Islamists in Secular Turkey," *The International Spectator*, vol.37, no.4, October-December 2002, p.7-19.

12. Gareth Jenkins, "Muslim Democrats in Turkey?" *Survival*, vol.45, no.1, Spring 2003, p.61.

13. Ozel, op. cit. in note 10, p 93.

14. "Turkey and the United States: Drifting apart?" *Strategic Comments*, vol.9, no.3, May 2003.

15. Jenkins, op. cit. in note 12, p.61.

16. Michael S. Teitelbaum and Philip L. Martin, "Is Turkey Ready for Europe?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol.82, no.3, May-June 2003, p.102.

17. For economic data on Turkey, see European Commission, *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. See also F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 2003), p.54-56.

18. Larrabee and Lesser, *ibid.*, p.48-49.

19. See Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "Further Turmoil Ahead?" in Keridis and Triantaphyllou (eds.), op. cit., in note 2, p.56-79.

20. See, for example, Neophytos G. Loizidis, "Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession Process," *Security Dialogue*, vol.33, no.4, December 2002, p. 438.

21. Arnaud Leparmentier and Laurent Zecchini, "Pour ou contre l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union," *Le Monde*, 9 November 2002.

22. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, "Views of a Changing World 2003: War with Iraq Further Divides Global Publics," 3 June 2003, http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf.

23. See Honor Mahoney, "Germany supports Turkey's EU membership," 23 February 2004, eu.observer.com, http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=14574.

24. As the EU begins to consider its post-enlargement frontiers through its intention to establish a neighbourhood policy with Russia, the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) and the southern Mediterranean, it is still struggling to define its relations with the countries of the Western Balkans. The European Commission's "Wider Europe" Communication of 11 March 2003 focuses on Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the countries of the southern Mediterranean. See European Commission, "Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours," COM(2003)104 final, 11 March 2003.

25. See, for example, Theodore Couloumbis, "The Cyprus Issue and Greek-Turkish Relations: The Opportunity for 2004," (in Greek), *H Kathimerini*, 1 February 2004.

26. See, for example, Theodore Couloumbis, "Diplomatic Weariness Test for the Kostas Karamanlis Government," (in Greek), *H Kathimerini*, 14 March 2004.

Remaining Engaged: Turkish-US Relations in the Post-Iraq Era

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine la rupture dans les relations entre les États-Unis et la Turquie durant l'année 2003. Plus précisément, il explique pourquoi l'Administration Bush était prête à tolérer le comportement de la Turquie concernant l'Iraq. Essentiellement, les États-Unis avaient pardonné la Turquie, afin de limiter le danger que cette dernière ne se tourne vers de nouveaux partenaires stratégiques, par exemple la Russie et l'Iran. Cependant, la décision avait été prise par un besoin pressant de garder la Turquie impliquée dans le cadre des efforts de stabilisation de la situation en Iraq. Cependant, malgré le fait que la Turquie s'est avérée un allié non fiable aux yeux de beaucoup des décideurs de la politique américaine, elle ne pourrait cependant pas être laissée de côté, ignorée et abandonnée.

ABSTRACT

This article explores the American intention to maintain overwhelming global political and military superiority, and take whatever action is needed to preserve the 'new world order' and prevent the emergence of a rival power. Superpower status is by no means confined to the military dimension, as the US still has the largest and most vibrant single national economy. In the near future, no other country or combination of countries can hope to challenge American prominence. At the same time, however, as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated, the US is structurally vulnerable and the cost of its global engagement greater than many Americans thought.

Introduction

For fifty years, Turkey's strategic importance as the linchpin of security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean went unquestioned. Throughout the Cold War, it was a vital element in the defence of Western Europe against the Soviet threat. In the post-Cold War, the country's position as a key player in regional affairs appeared secure as its proximity to both the Caucasus and the Middle East made it a valuable strategic property in the quest to ensure

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new transit routes for energy supplies. More recently, Turkey's place at the high table of geopolitics was reconfirmed when it was seemingly drafted as a vital Muslim ally in the war on terrorism.

However, Turkey's failure to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 severely strained Ankara's relations with Washington. At the same time, Ankara's relations with the European Union appeared to be in trouble following the collapse of peace talks over the divided island of Cyprus in March 2003. As a result of the simultaneous difficulties with Europe and the United States, serious questions arose regarding Turkey's future strategic orientation. One idea that received considerable attention when raised by a senior general was that Turkey could look to establish new alliances with Russia and Iran. Although it is a surprising suggestion, and one that has received considerable attention, it is unlikely to be accepted by mainstream decisionmakers in the future. However, the fact that the options were even being suggested certainly served a useful purpose for Turkish decisionmakers. The United States, fearful of the implications of such a move and determined that Turkey should not look to new horizons, remained firmly engaged with Ankara despite the low points of 2003, which may be called a post-Cold War nadir in Turkish-US relations.

Turkey's Traditional Geostrategic Role

For half a century, Turkey has been a key strategic partner of the West, and throughout the Cold War, its value was never questioned. Quite apart from being a bulwark against Russia's long-held dream of direct access to the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey offered NATO the only direct non-Arctic entry point into the Soviet Union. Likewise, in the post-Cold War era Turkey's continuing value was quickly recognised. When in August 1990 Saddam Hussein marched into Kuwait, the Turkish Government, led by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, quickly sided with the United States and played an important role in isolating the Iraqi regime economically. Following the defeat of Iraq, Incirlik airbase in Turkey served as a vital component in the effort to protect Iraq's Kurds as part of Operation Safe Haven — a move that confirmed Turkey's strategic military value despite the fact that it did not contribute forces to the liberation campaign.

Ankara also sought to confirm its continued pre-eminence at a grander strategic level following the collapse of communism. In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Turkey was widely expected to take a lead role in Central Asia and exert hegemony over the region's Turkic-speaking republics. While this did not materialise due to the continuing relationship these countries enjoyed with Moscow, Turkey soon found itself centre stage once more. This time, however, its value was defined in terms of access to the oil rich Middle East and Caucasus regions. The discussions concerning the construction of an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan, through Georgia and then down to a southern Turkish port, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, represented a major affirmation of Turkey's vital role meeting the future energy supply needs of the United States. This was confirmed by President Clinton when he visited Turkey for a meeting of the OSCE in November 1999 and declared a new strategic partnership between the US and Turkey. Thus throughout the 1990s, "Turks and Americans found they had become more, not less important to one another than during the Cold War".[1]

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Turkey's key strategic value was yet again confirmed, if not wholly strengthened, with the Bush administration's war on terror. In an era of growing instability in the Middle East, Turkey soon came to be seen as a secure base from which the United States could operate. However, Turkey's importance surpassed the traditional geopolitical significance of territory. For the Neo-conservative establishment, which has proved to wield so much influence in Washington in the aftermath of September 11, Turkey was seen as the type of Muslim state that the US would like to see worldwide. Quite apart from the support that Ankara would provide in efforts to combat Islamic terrorism, Turkey presented the United States with a model for a country built upon an Islamic cultural tradition but nonetheless firmly allied to the West. Moreover, the fact that Turkey maintained strong relations with Israel only served to confirm the Turkish Republic's position as the embodiment of the Bush Administration's realistically attainable 'virtuous ideal' for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and a host of other Muslim states. As one observer put it, 'Turkey has, since September 2001, been transformed in practice from a strategic regional ally into a tactical facilitator of the deterritorialized 'war against terrorism'.'[2]

Turkey's Relations with the US Are Strained over Iraq

Suddenly, however, Turkey looks more isolated than it has at almost any time since the end of the Second World War. Its role as an ally has never been questioned so much in US policy circles as it is now. On March 1, 2003, as the United States made its final preparations for the invasion of Iraq, the Turkish Grand National Assembly failed to permit US forces to be stationed in the country, despite the fact that the United States had promised $15 billion in aid.[3] This was a major blow to Washington's war planning. Prior to hostilities, US Central Command had expected to be able to place up to 62,000 American troops in Turkey. Indeed, Pentagon planners had been so confident that Turkey would accept American soldiers that it had gone ahead and authorised the transportation of the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division to Turkey. This led to the unfortunate situation whereby many thousands of US forces spent weeks on ships stationed off Turkey's southern coast.[4]

Although the decision was poor, there appeared to be at least some sort of willingness to concede to Turkey's discomfort. There was less forgiveness when the Turkish Government, at the very last minute, delayed giving US aircraft access to Turkish airspace, despite a parliamentary resolution, passed on March 20, permitting US warplanes to fly over the country on combat missions.[5] The final blow, however, came when the Turkish Government decided to authorise the deployment of large numbers of Turkish forces in Northern Iraq as a means of preventing any attempts by the Iraqi Kurds to declare independence. Had this decision been acted upon, it would almost certainly have been a catalyst for longterm instability in a post-conflict Iraq.

The combined result of these moves was a severe setback to Turkish-US relations worsened by the fact that the Bush administration holds a binary conceptualisation of allegiance and alliance. The world view prevailing in Washington is built upon the notion that countries either stand with the US or against it. Turkey had certainly not stood shoulder-to-shoulder with America at the crucial moment. As the US saw it, Turkey's behaviour was unpardonable, especially when there were so many countries that had lined up to support US efforts in one way or another. The disappointment of the Bush administration was further exacerbated by the fact that several months earlier it had taken a lead in lobbying the EU for a firm date for the start of Turkish negotiations for EU membership.

Then, just as relations appeared to be stabilizing, a massive row broke out following the arrest of eleven Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq. In the weeks that followed all levels of Turkish society expressed their outrage at the manner in which the United States had treated such an important, long-standing ally. On the street, in the media, from the Presidential Palace, on the floor of the parliament, and especially by the Turkish General Staff, there were demands for an apology from the United States for treating such an important ally in such a demeaning way.[6] General Hilmi Ozkok, the Chief of the General Staff, even described the incident as being the greatest crisis of confidence between Turkey and the United States.[7] Very few people in Turkey stopped to consider that the United States may have seen Turkey's delays and prevarications, eventually resulting in obstructionism, in the run up to the conflict in Iraq as the actions of an ungrateful ally, who, after fifty years of support, had abandoned the United States at a crucial moment.

Uncertain Turkish-EU Relationship

If Turkey's relationship with the European Union were more secure, the tense relationship with the United States, while undoubtedly serious, would not have been a cause for serious concern in Washington. However, as relations with the United States have come under increasing strain, Turkey is facing a growing crisis with the European Union. Of course this crisis is of a far slower and far less obvious kind. Unlike the relationship with the United States, a relatively straightforward insofar as it is built upon a defence and security partnership, Turkey's relationship with the European Union is obviously far more complex. Unlike the relationship between the United States and Turkey, which is a standard bilateral relationship between two sovereign states, the relationship between Turkey and the European Union is in part based on bilateral relationship issues. It is also structured around a formal recognition by Europe, taken at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, that Turkey is a candidate for full EU membership.

The problem, however, is that this relationship, whether recognised by Turkey or not, is fundamentally dependent upon the Cyprus issue. While there are certainly a number of other factors (economic, political and social) shaping the relationship, that will determine whether Turkey does become a member, the most significant obstacle to Turkish accession is the continuing

division of Cyprus. While talks were continuing, things looked promising for Turkey. Indeed, in December 2002, at the Copenhagen European Council, Ankara even managed to get a commitment from the EU that a full appraisal of Turkey's application would be conducted in December 2004 with a view to opening formal membership negotiations the following year. However, the breakdown of UN-sponsored talks to reunite the divided island of Cyprus, on March 10, 2003, cast doubt on this decision. Several EU officials, including Gunter Verheugen, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, made it clear that without a solution to the Cyprus issue Turkey would almost certainly be unable to join the Union. The spokesman of the European Commission went even further and warned Turkey that when Cyprus becomes a member of the EU in May 2004, Turkey would be left in the unenviable position of being in occupation of the territory of an EU member state.[8]

Some in Ankara understood the significance of the Cyprus issue and deep division the island could create between Turkey and the EU, and therefore seemed willing to reach a settlement along the lines of the UN peace plan. However, others in the more traditional establishment, including much of the hierarchy of the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff, appeared to remain steadfastly opposed to a solution on these terms. This situation opened the way for some of the more sceptical members of the Turkish foreign policy establishment to step in and call for a full re-assessment of Turkish strategic priorities, including a re-appraisal of ties to both the United States and the European Union.

Turkey's alternative strategic options

In a speech that received wide attention when it was made in March 2002, General Tuncer Kilinc, the Secretary General of the National Security Council,[9] stated in an address delivered at the Istanbul War Academy that Turkey should seriously give some thought to the fact that it would never get European Union membership and that steps should be taken to consider other options. Specifically, the general cited the development of alliances with Russia and Iran.

Somewhat unsurprisingly, the statement caused an outcry. It was quickly dismissed by some as being little more than an expression of frustration at the way in which the European Union was perceived to be behaving towards Turkey.[10] The call also drew strong rebuttals from President Sezer, who stated that EU membership was the ultimate goal of Turkey. A similar response came from other senior political leaders, including Bulent Ecevit, the prime minister, and Mesut Yilmaz, the deputy prime minister and leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), the most pro-EU party in the coalition government. At the same time, the other senior military officials of the General Staff appeared to distance themselves from the statement. Theystressed that General Kilinc had made it clear at the outset of his speech that he was simply expressing a personal view.

Despite all of the rebuttals, it is unlikely that such a senior officer would have made the comment had it not been at least considered within the military hierarchy.[11] It was also noticeable that the general's comments were not dismissed by all of the country's politicians. For example, Sukru Sina Gurel, the extremely Euro-sceptic government spokesman and minister for Cyprus, made it clear that he also felt that other options should be explored. Similarly, Osman Durmus, the Health Minister who had come to attention by supposedly wanting to reject Greek blood donations in the aftermath of the August 1999 Izmit earthquake, and was a prominent member of the ruling MHP, greeted General Kilinc's statement with his full support and also expressed his belief that the EU had no intention of ever seeing Turkey join.[12]

Of the two choices, Russia is a much more viable choice for Turkey, should Ankara did decide to redirect its strategic relationships. Although Russia has traditionally been the main threat to Turkey, and many believe that the two countries are always likely to be strategic threats to each other, relations between Moscow and Ankara are not as bad as they might appear on the surface. Indeed, there seems to be a growing group of what have been called 'Eurasianists' in both countries who view Turkish-Russian co-operation as a natural extension of both countries failure to advance their European Union relations.[13] Now that Turkey has accepted its limited role in the Central Asian Republics, Russia has ceased to view it with quite the same degree of concern as it did in the 1990s. Turkey's limited impact in the Caucasus has also helped to reduce Russian fears.

At the same time, energy issues have grown in importance. Russia increasingly sees the value of using Turkey as a means to supply oil and gas directly to South East Europe, bypassing Ukraine and the more pro-Western Central European countries. Plentiful supplies of Russian energy also help Turkey, which suffers from chronic energy shortages. Finally, Turkey's stand on Iraq has also helped to strengthen its standing in Russian circles. It was very noticeable that in the aftermath of the failed vote in the Turkish parliament to place American troops in Turkey, Russian officials praised the 'courageous decision' taken by Turkish lawmakers.

However, one must ask why would Turkey do this? Russia may have energy, but it has precious little else that Turkey needs. It is difficult to see how Moscow could offer meaningful and valuable economic assistance to Turkey. Militarily Russia is a lesser option for Ankara as it cannot supply the hardware currently made available to Turkey by the United States. It may provide a link with Turkey's European outlook, all the more so given increasing acceptance in parts of the EU of the role that Russia could play in Europe in the future. However, a break with the EU and the US towards the building of relations with Moscow presents nowhere near as firm a validation of Turkey's European identity as Turkey gets from its direct links to the European Union. On the surface it may appear to some as an appealing proposition. Strip away the gloss, however, and the attraction is less easy to explain.

While it is possible to see a certain sort of utility in a relationship with Russia, the call for the formation of stronger relations with Iran is even harder to explain satisfactorily. Although Iran certainly offers enormous temptation in terms of helping Turkey to meet its significant energy needs, the costs of such an alliance would be extremely high politically. For a start, it is a member of the much vaunted 'Axis of Evil'. Any strategic shift along the lines presented by General Kilinc would therefore seem to mark a final, perhaps irreversible, alienation of Turkey politically from the United States. It could also mark a sea change in relations with the EU. By shifting focus towards Tehran, Ankara would simply be encouraging those within the EU who regard Turkey's European identity as suspect to claim that, in reality, Turkey should be considered a part of the Middle East. But perhaps most important, the formation of strong ties with Iran would bring into question the very foundations of the Turkish Republic. Iran is the very antithesis of

Turkey; a theocratic Shiite régime built on a strong sense of independence as opposed to Turkey's staunch secularism that was based on a strong and unwavering belief in Turkey's European orientation. A sincere strategic alliance with Iran, incorporating both political and military co-operation, would be hard to envisage.

In the minds of most observers, Turkey's only real option, therefore, is to remain closely linked to Europe or to the United States. This option is quite clearly favoured at this stage by the ruling Justice and Development Party. It is also a strategic direction supported by General Ozkok, who is widely held to be, "more supportive of democratic reform and strong ties with the United States and Europe than many of his colleagues".[14] However, ranged against General Ozkok are a number of colleagues who take a far more cautious, if not wholly sceptical, approach. In particular, Ozkok appears to be under significant pressure from various influential quarters which seem more predisposed to the statement made by General Kilinc last year. In particular, Ozkok is seen to be sandwiched between his predecessor, General Huseyin Kivrikoglu, and the land forces commander, General Aytac Yalman.[15] This lends still greater credence to the argument that the statement made by General Kilinc had in fact represented a far greater reflection of the thinking within the general staff than had been accepted at the time the speech was made.[16]

Thus, while General Kilinc may have been serious about Iran, it seems as though his thinking is still marginal within the General Staff as a whole. Rather than a statement of intent, it is perhaps better seen as a statement of alternatives. Many concluded at the time that the general's real intentions were simply to express the profound sense of frustration in Turkey about the European Union. Others took the statement as being a scare tactic designed to keep Washington firmly engaged with Turkey. However, things are changing in the world. What once may have been a move designed to generate panic and fear now looks like an alternative Turkey might want to pursue in seriousness.

The US Remained Engaged with Turkey

It is precisely the thought of a Turkey alienated from both Europe and the United States and thus attracted by other alliances that worried Washington

policymakers. Even though it is unlikely, if Turkey did move in this direction the results could be catastrophic for the United States. As one writer put it,

> *Just hypothetically: what kind of influence might a Turko-Russo-Iranian alliance have on the world? It could upset the status quo, with the potential to become a counterbalance to the US. Warm water ports, vast resources, nuclear weapons, probably the support of the Arab world as well.*

Given the uncertainties of Turkish-EU relations, US policymakers quickly balked at the thought of punishing Turkey too heavily, or in any prolonged manner. Although Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy US Secretary of Defence, in an interview on Turkish television in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, made it abundantly clear that Turkey would have to pay a price for its failure to provide the United States with the support that Washington had wanted,[18] it was always unlikely to be the case that the price to be paid would be unduly onerous. There are two reasons. First, quite apart from the longer-term geopolitical reasons for which the United States would not wish to risk alienating Turkey, there was also a more second, immediate need to keep relations with Ankara on a fairly even keel.

As the post-conflict combat death toll rose, the Bush administration became ever more concerned at the possibility that it may be left alone to manage what is certainly a harder task than many of the Pentagon planners had originally foreseen. Thus the decision by Turkey to send up to 10,000 troops to Iraq helped atone for previous diplomatic sins.[19] It did not seem to matter that such a decision is contrary to the wishes of the Iraqis. At that stage, the possibility of having Muslim troops bolster their efforts to restore order in Iraq certainly appears to many to outweigh the objections of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which voted by 24-0 to reject the stationing of Turkish troops anywhere in Iraq, let alone in the north of the country where traditional Kurdish hostility to a Turkish force was well known and understood. The United States having promised Ankara $8.5 billion in loan guarantees in return for support in Iraq,[20] despite the fact that the Turkish Government has rejected any link, seemed initially reluctant to step back and reconsider its decision. However, the extreme opposition in Iraq to the presence of Turkish forces finally led the US-led administration in Iraq to rethink matters. Quite apart from the fierce statement made by Iraqis against a Turkish presence, a bomb attack against the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad,

October 14, 2003, a few days after Turkey's decision to consider sending troops seems to have tipped the balance. Just a few days later, Prime Minister Erdogan stressed that his government's decision would be based on the wishes of the Iraqi people. At this point, the US decided to drop the idea of asking Turkish troops to participate in Iraq.[21]

Even though Turkish troops did not go to Iraq, the offer to participate in the international force was important. As Emin Sirin, a Turkish politician, neatly stated it: "We will have made our gesture to the Americans and come away without paying the price."[22] As the initial invitation to Turkey showed, those who assumed that the United States would no longer need Turkey were too hasty in their judgement. The lack of international support for US efforts to rebuild Iraq has meant that Turkey remains a lot more important than many observers had predicted at the end of the Iraq conflict. For example, Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent Turkish journalist, wrote in the days following the end of hostilities that, "The Americans don't need Turkey anymore. Turkey lost its chance to become the strong point of the United States in the region".[23] Although this may be true at some point in the future, it was not true at that time. Turkey remained important and both Washington and Ankara understood it. For as long as Iraq remains unstable and Israel remains under threat, the US needs an ally separate from the Arab world. Indeed, within months, there were already signs that the United States and Turkey were trying to rebuild their ties and that Washington was prepared to forgive Ankara for the letdown of a few months earlier, aided by some significant Turkish lobbying.[24]

At the start of 2004, Prime Minister Erdogan went to the United States and held a number of meetings with senior US officials, culminating in a direct face-to-face discussion with President Bush on January, 28. The visit came at a vital moment. Just days earlier, Erdogan had asked UN Secretary General Kofi Anan to resume his efforts to reach a settlement in Cyprus. Suddenly, Turkey's relations with Europe were looking brighter than they had done for many months. Sitting there in the Oval Office, the two leaders seemed at ease with each another. It was difficult to believe that the meeting was designed to draw a line under the most difficult periods in post-Cold War US-Turkish relations. There certainly appeared to be no animosity or acrimony. That was something that Washington could not afford. There are precious few countries in the world that Washington cannot permit to be

cast adrift, no matter how serious the sin. Turkey, along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, is one of those countries.[25]

Conclusion

As a result of its vital location, and, more recently, its secular democratic heritage, it has often seemed to observers that over the last five decades Turkey's value as a plank of Western policy has been a rare *sine qua non* of international relations. As one observer succinctly put it, 'For over fifty years since the Truman Doctrine and Turkish entry into NATO, successive US administrations had unfailingly perceived Turkey as a strategically vital ally.'[26] However, despite its previously unassailable position in Eastern Mediterranean affairs, the war in Iraq raised serious questions about Turkey's relationship with Washington. At the same time as there has been a period of reflection in Washington about Turkey's role, the tense relations that Turkey maintains with the European Union, not least because of the failure of efforts to reach a solution to the Cyprus issue, led to serious questions being asked about the future relationship Turkey will enjoy with its Western partners.

Previously in the realm of the fringe nationalists, the debate about a re-orientation of Turkey's foreign policy priorities towards the Russian and Iranian East — rather than the Turkic republics of Central — seems to have entered the mainstream. While many may have previously scorned any talk of an alliance with Russia or Iran, the fact that this idea was even suggested by a senior general has certainly given the discussion an air of legitimacy, if not respectability. However, upon closer inspection, it rapidly becomes clear that the option of building stronger military and political ties with either Moscow or Tehran has little to offer Ankara. While both countries can certainly offer Turkey a lot in terms of its ongoing energy needs, neither supplies much else of value as compared with the benefits that are available by a continued adherence to the 'West'.

This debate, which was seemingly being encouraged by Turkey's weakened relationship with Europe, appears to have prompted US policymakers to the conclusion that it will be Turkey's relationship with the United States that is likely to keep Turkey on the right course, or at least prevent it from getting

too close to undesirable forces. Moreover, the imperative of retaining good ties with Ankara in order to try to stabilise the situation in Iraq further reinforced the willingness of the Bush Administration to maintain the alliance with Turkey, despite the fact that the alliance had proved to be significantly less valuable than the United States had previously believed. In a piece written in June 2003, one analyst wrote: 'what those in Ankara ought to realize is that geostrategic location is like foreign cash: an asset if converted, a worthless burden if it is not. If Turkey wants to mend ties with America now, it ought to cash in its strategic value.'[27] In fact, there was no need to cash in at all. Ankara did not need to authorise the US to use Incirlik. It did not need to make its South East provinces a staging point for US forces to enter Iraq. It did not need to send troops into Iraq. Prime Minister Erdogan's trip to Washington in January 2004 showed that the US Administration understood that despite its bad behaviour the previous year, Turkey remains too important to cast adrift, even if it does not deliver on its strategic location. The US would simply have to tolerate an independence of thought and action that it would accept from few other countries. Geopolitical issues were more important than Turkey's geostrategic location in determining Washington's decision to remain engaged with Ankara.

NOTES

1. Mark Parris, 'Starting Over: Turkish-US Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era,' *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, April 2003.

2. Robert M. Cutler, 'Turks, Kurds and the US-Turkish relationship,' *Asia Times*, 29 July 2003.

3. The fact that the Turkish Government had requested greater financial assistance led many in the US to accuse Turkey of holding the United States to ransom. Much to the fury of the Turks, several US newspapers published cartoons depicting Turkey as being solely concerned with gaining as much money as possible out of the United States. In fact, the Turkish Government went as far as to warn the US Administration about the cartoons. *Anadolu Agency*, 7 March 2003. See also the justifications for barring the presence of US troops in Iraq that were provided by the Turkish Foreign Ministry: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ai/irak/06.htm

4. Other units reported to have been preparing to use Turkey included the 1st Cavalry Division, in the process of leaving Fort Hood, the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Armoured Division in Germany. Col. Jack Jacobs (Ret.), 'Trying to Save the Northern Front,' *MSNBC*, 6 March 2003.

5. The resolution, which passed 332-208 with 1 abstention, did not permit US aircraft to refuel in Turkish airspace or land in Turkey. *Associated Press*, 20 March 2003.

6. K. Gajendra Singh, 'Turkish-US tensions cast dark clouds,' *Asia Times*, 23 July 2003.

7. *Anadolu Agency*, 7 July 2003.

8. 'Asked whether the EU would consider part of its territory under occupation by Turkey after Cyprus' accession, Jean-Christophe Filori said: "Yes we can look at things in that way. The occupation has always been considered illegal by the international community, including the EU. Nothing changes there." ' *Cyprus Mail*, 12 March 2003.

9. General Kilinc retired from the military in August 2003. Despite speculation at the time of his speech, he was not moved from his post as Secretary-General of the National Security Council in August 2002. This has led to further speculation that his views echoed the thinking of at least some of the senior members of the General Staff.

10. 'Turkey: Frustration Mounting Over EU Demands For Reform', RFE/RL, 15 March 2002. Later in the year, the general came to attention again when he dismissed EU concerns about the level of military involvement in Turkish politics. See, 'Turkish General Brushes off EU Criticism,' *Reuters*, 11 October 2002.

11. 'A general speaks his mind,' *The Economist*, 14 March 2002.

12. Strong Criticism of Top Turkish General Towards EU Stirs Criticism', Selected News on Turkey, TUSIAD, 4-10 March 2002.

13. For an analysis see, Igor Torbakov, 'Eurasian Idea could bring together Erstwhile Enemies Turkey and Russia,' *Eurasia Insight*, Eurasianet.org, 18 March 2002.

14. 'Turk General Faces Tough Choice in Iraq,' *Washington Post*, 9 April 2003.

15. 'Turk General Faces Tough Choice in Iraq,' *Washington Post*, 9 April 2003. See also, 'Turkey, Spared a War, Still Pays a Heavy Price,' *New York Times*, 19 April 2003.

16. It is worth noting that in August 2003 the annual meeting of the Higher Military Council, which decides on promotions, retired off a number of the senior generals who were considered to be more hard-line, including General Kilinc. The prevailing analysis is that the ideology of the General Staff as a whole is more in line with the more politically liberal and pro-Western views of General Ozkok than before the reshuffle.

17. Simon Allison, 'The EU and the Turkey time bomb,' *Asian Times*, 16 October 2002.

18. K. Gajendra Singh, 'Turkish-US tensions cast dark clouds,' *Asia Times*, 23 July 2002.

19. The Turkish Grand National Assembly passed the vote with 358 in favour and 183 against.

20. Many also believed that by participating in the international force, Turkish companies will be given lucrative reconstruction contracts. Even as early as April 2003, when US anger with Turkey was at its maximum, one prominent Turkish figure engaged in the construction business said that Turkey was aiming to take up to 20% of the reconstruction projects, a figure that he calculated could well be in the order of $100 billion. This effort was also supported by Mark Parris, the former US ambassador to Turkey, who is now working as a lobbyist for a prominent US law firm, and who stated that 'the world is Turkey's oyster as far as reconstruction in Iraq are concerned.... Turkish companies are right next door, they have the experience, and they built a lot of the things that now need rebuilding.' 'Turkey prepares to push hard for reconstruction contracts,' *Financial Times*, 17 April 2003. In October, when the issue of sending Turkish troops to Iraq was brought up, the Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Faruk Lagoglu, stated that Turkish military participation in Iraq would bring major economic benefits. 'Turkey Expects To Reach Compromise With US Within Few Months', *Anadolu Agency*, 19 October 2003.

21. However, this thinking seems not to have had quite the same impact on the Defence Department where many senior officials, including Paul Wolfowitz, remained determined to see a Turkish presence in the country. 'Iraqis Force Rethink on Turkish Help,' *Guardian*, 19 October 2003.

22. 'Aftermath,' *The Economist*, 18 October 2003.

23. 'Turkey, Spared a War, Still Pays a Heavy Price,' *New York Times*, 19 April 2003.

24. 'Friends Till the End,' *Washington Post*, 3 April 2003. The article alleges that the Turkish Government pays approximately $1.8 million to a number of lobbyists.

25. The example of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist who sold nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya, but who only received a mild rebuke from President Musharraf, was another example of a case where the US was prepared to accept behaviour from a vital strategic ally that would have otherwise caused a major incident. As one analyst put it, 'The United States -- and the rest of the world -- should be glad that Pakistanis have such a progressive leader in charge of their country. Moral diplomacy, unfortunately, will not find a home there. Any involvement by Musharraf in previous exchanges of nuclear know-how is worth examining, but a continued Western alliance with Musharraf -- and his continued luck in escaping death -- may be the best that the world reasonably can hope for in the near future. Better the enemy you know than the enemy you have yet to meet.' Patrick R. Gavin, 'US alliance with Musharraf still the best course,' *Miami Herald*, 5 February 2004.

26. Bulent Aliriza, 'Seeking Redefinition: US Turkish Relations after Iraq,' Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 5 June 2003.

27. Soner Cagaptay, 'Turkey Time,' *National Review Online*, 20 June 2003.

Anchoring Turkey to the EU: Domestic- and Foreign-Policy Challenges

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RÉSUMÉ

Depuis décembre 1999 la Turquie s'est embarquée formellement dans une voie d'adhésion à l'Europe. Au delà de la rhétorique, cependant, il n'existe pas encore un consensus que ce soit chez les Turcs ou dans l'UE quant à la possibilité d'une Turquie pleinement européenne et sur la nécessaire transformation du pays que cela impliquerait. Pendant que l'orientation européenne de la Turquie va probablement persister, l'étendue de sa profondeur et les niveaux d'intégration qui s'ensuivront dans l'UE demeurent incertains. Des développements en Turquie, en Europe et dans le système international plus élargi vont déterminer l'évolution des relations de l'UE avec la Turquie. En particulier l'étendue et la vitesse du processus des reformes en Turquie et la manière avec laquelle ce pays va se comporter envers les défis de la politique étrangère à l'égard de ses voisins va affecter de façon dramatique ses relations avec l'UE dans les mois et les années à venir.

ABSTRACT

Since December 1999, Turkey has formally embarked on an EU accession path. Beyond the rhetoric, however, consensus has not yet been achieved in either Turkey or the European Union on the desirability of a fully European Turkey and on the necessary transformation of the country that this would entail. While Turkey's European orientation is likely to persist, the extent of its depth and the ensuing levels of integration in the EU remain uncertain. Developments in Turkey, Europe and the wider international system will determine the evolution of EU-Turkey relations. In particular, the extent and speed of Turkey's reform process and the manner in which Turkey will deal with the foreign policy challenges in its neighborhood will critically affect EU-Turkey relations in the months and years ahead.

Introduction

Since the foundation of the Kemalist Republic, Turkey sought to associate itself with the West; i.e., with both Europe and America. Although with the end of the Cold War, Turkey's ties with the Caucasus and Central Asia were strengthened, the dominant position in Ankara never advocated a

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turnaround in Turkey's orientation. On the contrary, Turkey presented its strategic importance to the West precisely in view of its bridging role to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Turkey's European orientation remained a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Since 1987, this had taken the form of aspiring to become a full member of the EC/EU. As of December 1999, its prospects of full membership, while remaining in an uncertain and distant future, were accepted by the European Council. Yet, scratching beneath the surface, there is no consensus either in Turkey or in the Union about the desirability of a fully European Turkey and the necessary transformation of the country that this would entail. As such, even though Turkey's European orientation is likely to persist, the extent of its depth and the ensuing levels of integration in the EU remain uncertain. Developments in Turkey, in Europe and in the wider international system will determine the evolution of EU-Turkey relations.

Beneath the Surface of Turkey-EU relations

As expressed by several Turkish analysts: "there are many Ankaras." The multi-faceted nature of the Turkish establishment became particularly evident in the aftermath of the December 1999 Helsinki European Council. Turkey's candidacy meant that it was no longer sufficient to pay lip service to the goal of membership. If Ankara was serious in its aspirations to join the Union, it had to demonstrate that it was equally committed to the Copenhagen criteria. As European demands for reform rose, the concerns and resistance against change in Ankara emerged more clearly.

Effective opposition to EU membership or rather opposition to the reform needed to attain it existed within most groups of the Turkish political system. Those resisting change included circles in the nationalist right and in the nationalist left, in both the civilian and the military establishments. Some right wing nationalists preferred to establish closer links to Turkic Eurasia than to see Turkey's full integration with Western Europe. Traditional Kemalists objected to the principles and applications of multiculturalism and multi-level governance within the EU. Others opposed the rising interference of Brussels in Turkish domestic political life and were more inclined to pursue Turkey's Western orientation through closer ties with the US.

Indeed, often spurred by the US, conservative elements within the Turkish establishment argued that Turkey should be admitted to the Union on laxer conditions given its strategic importance. For example, the MHP (National Movement Party) leader, Devlet Bahceli, argued that "we need to have a just and honorable relationship with the EU. We strongly oppose the notion that we should fulfill every demand of the EU to become a member or we have to enter the EU at any cost."[1] Turkish national pride was used as a major weapon, as Turkish Euro-sceptics accused Europhiles of displaying a "lack of confidence in the nation, the Republic, the institutions, ... everything called Turkish."[2] Turkey's alternatives to Europe were also cited. On March 6, 2002, General Tuncer Kilinç, MGK (National Security Council) Secretary General, stated that given EU demands, Turkey should start looking for alternative allies such as Russia and Iran.

The AKP (Justice and Development Party) landslide victory in the November elections tilted the balance within the party political system in favor of the pro-European reformists. The AKP refuses to define itself as a religious party; instead, it calls for greater religious freedoms. In order to carry a consistent political message, it advocates personal freedoms in other spheres as well, including in the cultural and linguistic domains. Its support for EU membership is not only viewed as an end to be attained through painful reforms. In the AKP's rhetoric, the EU anchor is portrayed also a means to attain the objectives of reform, which are as important as membership itself.[3] But while the balance within the party political spectrum tilted in favour of the reformists (the only opposition party, Deniz Baykal's CHP [Republican People's Party] also declares itself in strong support of reforms and EU membership), this is not necessarily the case yet within the wider establishment, which includes, the civilian administration, the Presidency, academia, the media, the intelligence community and the influential military.

Pro-European reformers in Turkey are weakened internally by the lack of credibility of EU policies towards Turkey. EU actors, particularly those who are conservative/Christian 'Democratic leaning', frequently indicated their reluctance to accept Turkey as a full member irrespective of its compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Religion, geography, demography, economic development as well as the legitimate concerns over democracy and human rights were cited as the impeding factors to Turkey's EU membership. One

of the most recent expressions of European exclusionism were the comments by Convention President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the run-up to the 2002 Copenhagen European Council, when he stated that Turkey had a "different culture, a different approach, a different way of life....its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population lives outside Europe, it is not a European country...in my opinion it would be the end of the EU."[4]

In several instances in the recent history of EU-Turkey relations, "Turkey-skeptics" in Europe and "Euro-skeptics" in Turkey reinforced each other in a vicious circle of antagonism and lack of reform in Turkey together with European distancing from Turkey. On the one hand, the member states were the more skeptical regarding Turkey's future in Europe, thus EU policies towards Turkey were less forthcoming. This gave greater credibility to the Turkish nationalists/conservatives, who claimed that Turkey would never be admitted to the Union and that the country should be cautious in pursuing destabilizing reforms. In other words, the more founded Turkey's mistrust of Europe was and the slower its own process of transformation. On the other hand, as conservatives in Ankara gained the upper hand in domestic and foreign policymaking, EU actors became less forthcoming towards Turkey.

On other occasions the vicious circle was broken, opening the way to virtuous interactions. When EU member states seemed more willing in providing an external anchor to Turkey; Turkish progressive forces all the stronger. In turn, the more Turkey advanced along the path of reform, and the more EU member states were inclined to advance Turkey's accession process. As noted above, not all European concerns stem from the flaws in Turkey's political system. Nevertheless, an increasingly robust process of Turkish transformation is the most powerful weapon to weaken the Turkey-skeptic voices in Western Europe. Consensus within the Union on the desirability of a new member state, particularly an important yet problematic applicant like Turkey, does not emerge overnight. It is a gradual process established and consolidated over time. Hence, the more credible is Turkey's reform movement and the more irreversible will Turkey's long and tortuous accession process become.

Virtuous Circles in the Process of Domestic Reform and Remaining Challenges

At the December 2002 European Council in Copenhagen, the fifteen member states converged on a variation of a Franco-German proposal. They agreed that if in December 2004 the European Council deems Turkey in compliance with the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, the Turkish government would be invited to begin accession negotiations "without delay." The decision was below Turkish expectations. Turkey had lobbied intensely to begin accession negotiations before the next enlargement in May 2004. The Council feared that the accession of ten new members could introduce new obstacles in Turkey's path. Yet the EU-Fifteen's concern that a commitment on Turkey upon the eve of enlargement could create tensions with the future member states was precisely why consensus was forged around a December 2004 date. This is not to say that the new members would necessarily object to Turkey's accession. Less still that the December 2004 date was a sinister European ploy to defer indefinitely Turkey's membership by relying on the resistance of the future members, as was speculated by several Turkish policymakers and opinion shapers.[5] The European Council's reasoning was rather that committing EU-25 to a decision taken shortly before by EU-15 would have sent the wrong signals to the new members on the eve of enlargement.

While below Turkish expectations, the Copenhagen decision should be considered a success following the promising path set by the 1999 Helsinki European Council and deviating from the 1997 Luxembourg Council. Indeed the Copenhagen decision was part of a virtuous circle in EU-Turkey relations. It was preceded and followed by important domestic reforms in Turkey.

The December 2002 decision was heavily influenced by the August 3rd constitutional reform package in Turkey. On August 3, 2002 the Turkish parliament, despite acute domestic political turmoil, succeeded in passing the third EU harmonization package, which abolished the death penalty in Turkey and lifted the ban on broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish (most notably Kurdish). The reforms added credibility to Turkey's requests for a date to launch accession negotiations in the run-up to the Copenhagen Council. The Copenhagen decision was then followed by the fourth and the fifth reform packages of the new AKP government in

January 2003. The reforms amended the political parties law, increased penalties for torture crimes, expanded the freedom of the press and the freedom of association, abolished restrictions on the acquisition of property by non-Muslim foundations and allowed for retrials of cases contrary to European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judgments.

In light of the Copenhagen decision and Turkish domestic reforms, the Union updated Turkey's Accession Partnership. Through it, the EU pointed out the remaining reforms necessary for full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. The Commission's proposal was adopted by the Council in March 2003.[6] The document, while praising Turkey's legislative amendments, highlighted the challenges ahead. These included the resolution of the Cyprus conflict and Turkey's border disputes (mainly in the Aegean), the ratification of the remaining international and European human rights conventions, the reform of the National Security Council, the need to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and the need to reduce regional disparities. Many recommendations concentrated on the need for effective implementation of the reforms. Effective application was called for in the fight against torture, the respect of detainee rights, the freedom of association and of all forms of non-violent expression, the respect of religious rights and the access to education and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish.

In the spring and summer of 2003 the government persisted in the legal harmonization process. In July 2003, parliament succeeded in passing the wide-ranging 6th and 7th reform packages described in the box below. Amongst the most important changes were the extension of freedoms of speech and association, the increased civilianization of the MGK and the extension of cultural, religious and linguistic rights (and most notably the use of the Kurdish language in the media and education). Finally, the AKP government passed a law granting partial amnesty to PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) militants.

Few in Brussels would dispute the fact that on paper Turkey has come a long way, indeed most of the way towards the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. The key question highlighted in Turkey's revised Accession Partnership was the manner in which the seven harmonization packages would be translated into practice. In some cases, legislative reforms suffice. Matters such as who convenes MGK meetings, how many members of the

Council are military persons, how often the Council convenes or who appoints the Secretary General are relatively clearcut changes that simply necessitated legislative reforms. The legal reforms will in themselves impact policies and practices. Yet for the effective application of most other reforms, a change in legislation is only the starting point. The fight against torture, the respect for human rights and of linguistic and cultural rights are as much a question of law as of practice. The practice depends critically on long term changes in human rights education and training both at public and at élite levels (in the police and the judiciary).

The need to concentrate on implementation has been appreciated by the Turkish authorities. Indeed, the government has established human rights boards in major towns and cities, responsible for handling human rights complaints. At the centre, a Human Rights Board has been established to monitor the compliance with the legal reforms. The Board includes representatives of several ministries and government departments.

At the domestic level, aside from the specific requirements of the Accession Partnership, key challenges remain ahead. Two such challenges concern the role of the military and the Kurdish question. As mentioned above, the seventh harmonization package transformed the MGK into an advisory body with a more circumscribed military component. The reforms certainly opened the way to a fundamental civilianization of Turkish politics. However, institutional means alone may be insufficient to circumscribe the power of the military. For example, the military remains one of the strongest economic forces in Turkey. Its economic power inevitably affects its political influence. Furthermore, it may limit to the extent to which the business community (which has proved so pivotal in furthering the reform process), reliant on contracts originating from the military, is willing to push for a full civilianization of Turkish politics.[7] Perhaps most importantly, the role of the military is a reflection of people's expectations. The intense focus of the media, academia and political elites on MGK meetings in the wake of key decisions (such as the decision to send troops to Iraq in the autumn of 2003) shows how expectations take time to change, certainly far more time than is needed to pass constitutional amendments. A reduction of the military's political influence will depend as much on a transformation of the military's assessment of its role as on that of the wider establishment and public opinion.

The harmonization laws have opened the way for a progressive engagement of the Turkish authorities with the Kurdish question. The implementation of the reforms affecting the freedom of expression and association, the right to demonstrate, the use of Kurdish in the media and in education and the increased penalties for the practice of torture will critically and positively transform the conditions of the Kurds in Turkey. In addition the lifting of the state of emergency in the south-east and the recent partial amnesty law are further steps in the right direction.

However, it remains unclear to what extent Kurdish political demands can be met without touching the taboo subject of minority rights in Turkey. The Kemalist Republic, aiming to establish a civic nation, deemed the recognition of national minorities both dangerous and discriminatory. As such, no minorities, other than those mentioned by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (the Greeks, Armenians and Jews) were acknowledged. In its attempts to tackle the Kurdish question in recent years, the Turkish establishment has been pursuing the path of economic development and human rights in the south-east. It has pursued the implementation of Article 39 of the Lausanne Treaty, which stated that "no restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings."[8] Most of the political establishment remains firmly opposed to an extension of minority rights to the non-Turkish Muslim communities and most notably to the Kurds. But to what extent can the Kurdish question be resolved in the long run exclusively through the full implementation of individual human rights? In the long term can and should the Turkish establishment persist in opposing communal rights, and perhaps more critically a decentralized form of governance?

Key domestic challenges lie ahead. Important legislative reforms have been undertaken. Yet the more long term changes which hinge upon the gradual transformation of Turkey's understanding of its identity, its governance and its national security remain ahead. The road may be long and tortuous, but the current authorities, supported by public opinion, appear to be progressing remarkably fast along it; indeed far faster than many observers expected. It remains up to the European Union to support this process of internal transformation, by providing the critical external anchor that will support the progressive domestic forces in their endeavors.

6th AND 7th REFORM PACKAGES
(July 19; July 29, 2003, respectively)

Freedom of Expression

- The penalties for media outlets in violation of the resolutions of the Supreme Board have been reduced and more clearly defined.
- Article 8 of the anti-terrorism law (propaganda against the indivisibility of the state) was abolished and transferred to the Penal Code. As such while being considered a penal crime to be handled by the judiciary, it is no longer considered a state security matter.
- Amendment of article 159 of the penal code reduces penalties for insults against the state and abolishes penalties for criticism against state institutions and policies.
- Amendments to articles 426 and 427 of the Penal Code abolish provisions allowing for the destruction of critical artistic work.

Cultural and Linguistic Rights

- Programs in languages other than Turkish can be legally transmitted on state and private media channels.
- Extension of the right to learn and use languages other than Turkish through special courses (but not as mother tongue languages).

Freedom of Association

- Extension of the rights of foundations to acquire property.
- Extension of the freedom of establishment and membership of associations.
- Extension of the right to demonstrate.

Human Rights

- Retrial of a case in the event of a contrary verdict of the ECHR.
- Crimes committed in peacetime by non-military persons will no longer be tried in military courts.
- The investigation and prosecution of torture cases is to be considered an urgent matter.

The Role of the Military

- The duties of the MGK were redefined through a narrower definition of national security (article 4).
- The MGK Secretariat General will no longer act as the implementing body of the MGK but only as its secretariat. As such its powers will no longer overlap with those of the executive.
- The MGK will meet every two months. Meetings may be convened only by the prime minister or the president and no longer also by the Chief of General Staff.
- The Secretary General of the MGK is appointed upon a proposal by the Prime Minister for a non-military appointee and with the agreement of the CGS for a military appointee.
- The MGK will no longer receive regular submissions of classified or nonclassified material from public institutions.
- Military spending will be under civilian control.

EU-Turkey Relations and Foreign Policy Challenges

Moving on to the foreign policy domain, in recent months, EU-Turkey relations have been critically affected both by the Iraq crisis and by the Cyprus conflict.

The War in Iraq

On March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament rejected the government's proposed motion to allow 62,000 American troops to be deployed on Turkish soil for a second front attack against Iraq. After weeks of uncertainty, the American troops were re-routed to Kuwait.

Many criticized the AKP government for its inexperience in handling the situation. The government's indecisiveness and its failure to invest sufficient effort to ensure a parliamentary approval of the motion could have potentially caused severe repercussions. The AKP government may have mishandled the passing of the motion. The government itself was divided between the disapproval of the public (and large segments of its own electorate) and the need to retain its strategic relationship with the US, particularly at a time when Turkey was struggling to exit a critical economic crisis. It waited for a positive signal from the military which never came and failed to persuade the reluctant parliament. However, the new government did so under extremely complex circumstances. The public was and remains strongly against an American unilateral attack on Iraq. The president (with his strong legal background) also disapproved of an unlegitimized war. The speaker of parliament Bulent Arinc resisted an attack against a Muslim neighbouring country. The military was highly ambivalent about the war primarily because of the American objections to a Turkish intervention in northern Iraq. Finally, for weeks it was unclear whether the war would have been conducted with UN legitimacy. The government understandably preferred to wait for an outcome at the Security Council.

The rejection led to a temporary setback in Turkey-US relations and initially generated new tensions on the EU-Turkey agenda. By rejecting the motion, Turkey lost the six billion-dollar war compensation package and $24 billions in cheap longterm loans. The financial compensation was lost against the backdrop of the vivid recollection of the severe economic

repercussions of the 1991 Gulf War. Most critically, the incident plunged US-Turkey relations to their lowest ebb since the 1974 arms embargo following the partition of Cyprus. In the aftermath of the rejection of the motion, tensions rose as the US administration strongly warned the Turkish establishment not to intervene in northern Iraq independently of American command. Matters worsened when in July 2003, US troops arrested a Turkish military unit in northern Iraq. EU member states also cautioned Turkey not to intervene in Iraq. Furthermore, several analysts warned that the setback US-Turkey relations within a wider context of a widening transatlantic rift could harm Turkey's EU bid by reducing American support for Turkey's accession process.

However, ensuing events gave rise to greater optimism. In the context of the Iraq crisis, the Turkish government strengthened its relations with the Arab world and Iran, without straining its relations with Israel (on the contrary in September 2003 Turkey concluded a water agreement with Israel) or hinting at a reversal in its western orientation. To date, Turkey has refrained from sending unilaterally additional troops in northern Iraq that could trigger clashes with Iraqi Kurdish forces. As a result Turkish-American relations stabilized.

Most critically, Turkey's conduct added a positive impetus to EU-Turkey relations. The fact that the Turkish government took an independent and democratic decision concerning the war, while at the same time showing restraint in northern Iraq, reverberated positively in Brussels. Indeed, the most Turkey-skeptic member states were precisely the ones which resisted a unilateral American attack in Iraq. As such, Turkey's conduct in the Iraq crisis improved its credentials in Paris and Berlin. Moreover, the motion incident abated member-state fears that Turkey would act as an American Trojan horse in the Union. It showed that Turkey was not simply an American proxy at the European periphery. Back in Turkey, a positive by-product of the Iraq crisis was that it weakened those conservative voices which argued that Turkey's strategic relationship with the US would assure Turkey's EU membership on laxer conditions.[9] Indeed, the incident did not lead to a Turkish-American rift, but, more precisely, to a re-evaluation of relations between the Turkish military and the Pentagon.[10] The push for war was driven predominantly by the American Department of Defense, which traditionally emphasized Turkey's strategic significance and enjoyed

extremely close relations with the Turkish military. The failure of the March motion may give way to an increased civilianization of Turkish-American relations. A stronger lead by the State Department may result in a greater focus on Turkish democratization in bilateral relations. As such, while American pressure at European Councils may diminish, the input of Turkey-US relations on Turkey's accession process may be far more fruitful.

Continuing instability in Iraq suggests that important challenges remain ahead. The next key decision is on the deployment of Turkish troops as part of a multi-national force in Iraq. Although the parliament approved the motion authorizing the government to deploy troops in Iraq, both establishment and public opinion remain divided. On the one hand, the prevailing feeling in Ankara is that "Turkey cannot say no again." Rejecting again American demands for Turkish support could damage irreparably the Turkish-American relationship. Furthermore, the Turkish establishment is concerned about the increasingly strong ties between the US and the Iraqi Kurds. It views with suspicion the prominent role accorded to the Kurds in the Governing Council in Baghdad. And it is aware that the strong relationship is a product of the unreserved Iraqi Kurdish support for the American war effort. Finally, Turkey feels that accepting American demands would pave its way into the lucrative Iraqi reconstruction effort.

On the other hand, the Turkish public remains firmly opposed to any Turkish involvement in collaboration with the American occupiers. Why should Turkish forces perish in support of an illegitimate and misconceived American war? Indeed Turkish troops could face serious attacks by Kurdish militants in Northern Iraq. In connection to this it should be noted that on 1 September 2003 the PKK/KADEK (Kurdish Workers Party – Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) declared an end to its unilateral cease-fire which followed the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. Allegedly, the ceasefire was broken because of Ankara's failure to reciprocate. However, its timing is certainly also linked to the government's partial amnesty law.

In order to persist with a consistent policy towards Iraq and in the light of these contrasting considerations the most fruitful course of action could be for Turkey to refrain from deploying troops on the ground unless explicitly mandated by a Security Council resolution. By doing so, Turkey would act in accordance with its own constitution, it would minimize the negative

repercussions of its intervention and it would enhance the credibility of its government in its commitment to democracy and the rule of law.

The Cyprus Conflict

Yet perhaps an even more fundamental challenge in Turkey-EU relations concerns Cyprus, particularly in view of the forthcoming accession of the island. Due to the obstacles posed in Turkey's European path by the accession of a divided island, there has been a basic overlap between hardliners on the Cyprus conflict and the nationalist and Euro-skeptic forces in Turkey. To the most conservative forces within the Turkish establishment, the EU accession process is viewed as a threat to Turkey's Cyprus policy. Furthermore, an intransigent position on Cyprus added another obstacle in Turkey's EU path, and thus dampened the momentum in favor of what some viewed as threatening domestic reforms.

At the same time, the lack of a committed EU policy towards Turkey strengthened the arguments of nationalist and Euro-skeptic forces in Ankara and Leukosia (northern Cyprus) that argued against an early settlement within the EU. Moderates and reformists in Turkey accepted that because of Turkey's own shortcomings, Cyprus's EU membership would occur prior to Turkey's. However, they could not accept that because of allegedly unchangeable features of the Turkish state and society, Cyprus would mark the borders of the united Europe, keeping Cyprus and Turkey on opposite sides of the European divide. So long as Turkey's fundamental skepticism of European intentions persisted, a settlement in Cyprus would be viewed by Ankara as "losing Cyprus" rather than sealing a win-win agreement.

As the Copenhagen Council (December 2003) came closer, the AKP government displayed a fundamental shift from earlier Administrations concerning Cyprus. It both declared openly that it did not regard a continuation of the *status quo* as a solution. In fact, it appeared willing to recognize the link between Turkey-EU relations and a Cyprus settlement. In the run-up to Copenhagen, the government effectively argued that if the European Council gave Turkey an early and firm date to begin accession negotiations, the government would support a Cyprus settlement on the basis of the comprehensive UN proposal known as the Annan Plan.

If we judge by events, the Copenhagen offer was insufficient to induce Turkey and Turkish Cypriots to sign an agreement on the December 13, 2002 and thereafter. This ultimate failure was not only caused by miscalculated Turkish bargaining tactics, but was fundamentally linked to Turkey's mistrust of Europe. Whether a deal would have been reached if Turkey had received an earlier and firmer date, or if the EU had formulated a more resolute and coherent policy towards Turkey before the European Council, will remain unknown. But what was clear was that the Turkish government considered these conditions as the minimum assurance to hedge against this prevailing mistrust. Pressure alone would be insufficient to clinch an agreement.

After the Copenhagen Council, matters continued to oscillate as the product of an ongoing battle between elements pushing for or against a settlement. Different positions and rationales were continuously aired. Those skeptical of Turkey's future in Europe persisted in their effective opposition to Cyprus' EU membership and hence the UN plan. Those in favour of Turkey's EU membership but unsatisfied with the Copenhagen decision proposed a postponement of a settlement until Turkey's EU prospects became clearer (date suggested: December 2004). Other pro-Europeans pushed for an early settlement based on the UN plan. They appreciated the difficulty of reaching an agreement following Cyprus's EU membership (May 2004) and understood that the international burden would be placed predominantly on Turkey's shoulders in the future. The most evident manifestation of this flux of ideas was the effective rift between the AKP government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

With the failure of negotiations at The Hague, for which the Turkish Cypriots were primarily blamed, conservatives in Turkey and northern Cyprus appeared to have won the day. However, The Hague meeting might have temporarily sealed the fate of the Annan plan but it did not entail the end of debate in northern Cyprus and Turkey. The Cyprus challenge remains on the table. It will have to be tackled if Turkey progresses along its path to the Union.

There are strong reasons for Turkey to pursue a settlement prior to the effective accession of Cyprus in May 2004. The scope to do so exists, as evidenced by the opening of the border point in Cyprus in April 2003 and ensuing flux of people crossing the green line. Politically, the opportunity for

change might emerge after the formation of a new Turkish-Cypriot government in January 2004, in the aftermath of the December 2003 parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus. The extent to which this opportunity will be seized depends on whether the Turkish establishment will have reached a consensus concerning an early settlement on the island, a consensus that had not yet emerged in March 2003.

The EU could certainly raise incentives in Cyprus and Turkey for an early settlement. It could do so by supporting the pro-reformist elements in the country by clarifying that if the pending reforms are indeed implemented, accession negotiations would start in early 2005. In other words, accession negotiations following the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria would not be a mere probability but a credible EU commitment.

Concerted EU voices should also clarify their position regarding the link between Turkey's accession and a Cyprus settlement. At the moment the position is ridden by a disunity of voices and underlying contradictions. On the one hand EU voices argue that a Cyprus settlement would facilitate Turkey's accession process. Yet some argue that the road to Turkey's membership passes through Nicosia.[11] On the other hand, the Turkish government embraced the logic of linkage by suggesting that if it endorsed the Annan Plan, it should be compensated with a firm date to begin accession negotiations. To this the Union replied that a Cyprus settlement is a necessary but insufficient condition for accession negotiations. This attitude in turn generated resentment in Turkey and validated the positions of Euro-skeptics, who criticized the inherent bias of the Union. Turks observed that while a settlement was not a condition for Cyprus's accession it had become a condition for Turkey.

There appears to be no clearcut way out of this dilemma other than reiterating unanimously that the Copenhagen criteria are the only necessary conditions for Turkey's accession negotiations. A Cyprus settlement would facilitate the process but is currently not a precondition. As a result, the Turkish government should not hold onto Cyprus hoping to induce a better EU decision. By doing so, Turkey would fail to win EU support for its membership drive. This would reduce the ability of EU governments to exert pressure on the Greek-Cypriot side and it would most likely end up in a situation post-May 2004 in which the Annan plan in its current form may no longer be an option.

NOTES

1. Devlet Bahceli quoted in "Bahceli Toughens on EU and Its Domestic Supporters," *Turkish Daily News*, March 4, 2002.

2. Gunduz Aktan, "New Consensus," *Turkish Daily News*, March 3, 2002.

3. Indeed, for the AKP, emerging from the succession of banned Islamic parties, greater political freedom is viewed as critical to its very survival as a political party.

4. Giscard Remarks Cause Uproar in Ankara, Brussels," *Turkish Daily News*, November 11, 2002.

5. Conversations with Turkish journalist and academic, Brussels, December 2002.

6. "Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey," *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 145/40, June 12, 2003.

7. Ziya Onis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era," *Turkish Studies*, vol.4, no.1 (Spring 2003), pp.9-34.

8. *Treaty of Lausanne* (1923), Article 39.

9. Kemal Kirisci, 'The West and Its Institutions: Losing Allies but Gaining Converts – the Case of Turkey," draft paper prepared for the conference on Geopolitical Change, the Use of Force, and New Strategic Doctrines, 12-14 September, 2003, Lansdowne Resort, Leesburg, Virginia.

10. Henri Barkey, "Turkey's Strategic Future: a US Perspective," paper presented at the European Security Forum organized by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS), Brussels, June 2003.

11. *TurkishPress.com*, January 3, 2003.

The Imprint of Dumbarton Oaks' on Cyprus

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RÉSUMÉ

Les Etats-Unis ont dominé les structures de prise de décision des Nations unies depuis la conférence de Dumbarton Oak en 1944 pendant longtemps. L'insistance de la République de Chypre pour internationaliser la question chypriote via les Nations unies avait un sens, du point de vue des intérêts des Chypriotes grecs, mais seulement durant une très brève période de la Guerre froide. L'emphase mise par le côté grec sur le facteur de l'UE dans les années 1990 a été un mouvement intelligent, mais une analyse stratégique plus poussée est nécessaire pour appréhender les nouveaux rapports de force de la vaste région du Moyen Orient de nature à influencer toute tentative de solution du problème Chypriote.

ABSTRACT

The US has dominated UN decisionmaking structures throughout most of the period following the Dumbarton Oaks conference of 1944. The insistence of the Republic of Cyprus to internationalise the problem through the UN made sense, from the point of view of Greek Cypriot interests, only during a very small period of the Cold War. The focus of the Greek side on the EU factor in the 1990s has thus been sensible, but further strategic analysis is required to ascertain how new contingencies in the greater Middle East will impact upon any solution framework.

Introduction

Historically, the Cyprus issue has been the result of incomplete national revolutions in the former Ottoman space; i.e., the Balkans and greater Middle East. Politically, the issue stems from constant and continuous interplay between agents who are both endogenous (ethnic/religious) and exogenous (Britain, US, UN, EU, Turkey, Greece). In this political and structural interposition of endogenous/exogenous factors the determining force has always remained external to Cyprus.

This article offers an interpretation of the evolution of the Cyprus issue within the context of international politics and the United Nations. Its main

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focus is the post-Cold War period, although substantial background information will be given. Also considered are the Cold War settings in relation to the Eastern Mediterranean and the greater Middle East. The article seeks primarily to explain why UN policy, at least since 1990, has been shifting its solution framework from the concept of an independent bi-zonal/bi-communal federal republic to a 'constitutional engineering', politically equalising the two communities on the island.

I will begin my narrative by shedding some light on the evolution of the UN in post-war history and the role of the US in it. In this context, I will examine briefly some fundamental conceptions of US policy makers, basically that of Dean Acheson, Franklin Roosevelt and George Kennan. I will argue that the UN was and is as American in conception and construction as Dumbarton Oaks in Georgetown itself.[1] Then I will look at some specific political and strategic conjunctures that underpinned certain Security Council resolutions in favour of the Republic of Cyprus during the period of 1960-75. Following this, I focus mainly on the 1980s and 1990s and the impact of the end of the Cold War upon the divided Republic. The central argument is that the collapse of the Soviet Union and retreat of Arab nationalism took away any effective power from the UN, thus reducing it to a mere appendage of the US. The UN was keen to legitimise an American projection of power onto strategic geo-political zones in Eurasia and elsewhere. The subsequent impact has seriously affected the framework for a solution to the Cyprus issue in that it deprived the Greek Cypriot side from strong counter-balancing forces within the UN Security Council. Although such counter-balancing forces have been sought among EU powers, such as France and Germany, the fact remains that the EU has far less power *vis-à-vis* the US than the combined force of USSR/Arab nationalism used to have during the Cold War. All in all, however, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, as well as so many other states subject to US engineering and manipulation through the UN and NATO do not seem to be able to remove the imprint of Dumbarton Oaks.

From UN to NATO

During any of America's wars, its policy-makers have always been at pains as to what to do when it is all over. Although the generic strategic intent was the same; in other words, assuring hegemony over the enemy-states as well

as the friends, the means to achieve this intent have always differed. Before and after Yalta, there had been three main powerful conceptions put forward by prominent US strategists regarding how their country could rule over the Western capitalist world and defeated enemy-states. Having guaranteed the support of their business classes for an unprecedented expansion, thus abandoning the partial isolationism of the inter-war period, Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson had kicked off a unique debate inside the Administration: how to rule over the new world order.[2]

As we know, Roosevelt's ambitious plan for post-war US supremacy was centred on a new international organisation, the United Nations.[3] Contrary to the defunct League of Nations, the UN would have to be governed by an all-powerful Directorate, the Security Council, in which the US would dominate. US-led hegemonic policies could thus be enforced through robust 'peacekeeping' upon all recalcitrant UN members. The 'real peacekeeping', as envisaged by Roosevelt, was in fact an American projection of power through the UN in order to promote and establish US national interest wherever and whenever it was under threat. Let us remember that China had not yet become Mao's republic, and Roosevelt's grand design was to include in that Directorate the demoralised regime of Chiang Kai-Shek, alongside Britain and the USSR. In that way, it was thought, Stalin could be isolated and defeated.

George F. Kennan presented an alternative scheme to Roosevelt's UN-based conception. He was convinced that the Soviet system was basically weak and that America could weaken it further and thus defeat it. This defeat would come not through the UN but through strenghtened forces surrounding the Soviet Union; i.e., first and foremost, Europe and Japan. By off-shore balancing from each end of Eurasia, Kennan and his team thought that the USSR will eventually bend. In response to objections over the options the US would have once a strong federal Europe would choose to go with the Soviets sometime in the future, Kennan replied that 'off-shore balancing' meant also utilising Britain against the consolidation of a French-German-Soviet axis.[4]

However, Dean Acheson had also come up with a different and equally powerful set of ideas. For Acheson, neither the UN nor off-shore balancing alone could guarantee an enduring establishment of US primacy in the capitalist world. Although he did never exclude them from operating when

and where useful and successful as legitimising, or promoting US policy and interests, Acheson argued that American primacy can basically be consolidated and achieved through envisaging mechanisms of *direct* control of the polities of all of the states that interest America. The notion of consolidating US hegemonic presence within the capitalist state apparatuses themselves, as well as within the oil-rich Arab Republics wherever possible, has characterised US foreign, security and defence policy from at least the Truman Doctrine (1947) to the present day. In other words, Acheson's grand design had prevailed over, without abolishing or undoing Kennan's and Roosevelt's ones.

Admittedly, the victory of Mao in China, as well as the opposition of Churchill to Roosevelt's UN schemes, had given an additional boost to Acheson's ideas.[5] Particularly powerful was his ideational concept of 'the free world' against 'oppressive communist dictatorships'. This proved an operational and functional scheme that successfully defended US liberal interests in the West, lasting at least until the fall of the Berlin Wall. The paternity of this ideational scheme belongs to Nelson Rockefeller, co-ordinator of inter-American affairs in the Administration since 1940. His main assigned task was 'to lessen the dependence of Latin America upon Europe as a market for raw materials and a source of manufactured articles, not least by acquiring British assets in the region'.[6] But it was Acheson who thematised and systematised the cleavage in a 'friend-enemy' framework, a framework that was to come back after September 11, 2001, as a 'neo-conservative invention': the 'free world' against 'terrorism'. It should be noted that, as Secretary of State, Acheson lent overwhelming support to the foundation of NATO. He saw it as the best vehicle for the US not only for the defence of Europe against the Soviet threat, but also for the establishment of a permanent form of institutionalised dependency of Western Europe upon the US.

So was the case with Turkey and Greece when they both became NATO members in the wake of their joint participation in the Korean War. Whereas, on the one hand, the aim was to extend the belt of deterrence in the Southern Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, on the other, and at the same time, the US was establishing structures of overwhelming influence and power within those two states themselves. As elsewhere, the US established both in Turkey and Greece military bases and intelligence and spying structures, whereas making sure that US military

technology was to be purchased and, if need be, used against the perceived enemy. This was a framework of dependency upon US military technology and know-how.

The concept of Achesonian primacy proved very useful for the US, particularly during and after the Suez crisis (1956), when Arab nationalism under the leadership of Nasser re-asserted itself both regionally and in the UN. The Suez crisis, as Zbigniew Brzezinski did not fail to see, was not a 'simple affair', or a 'bad time' in transatlantic relations. In essence, it was since 1956 that European policy in the Middle East began to define itself *against* America.[7] In addition, it was since the late 1950s-early 1960s that US foreign policy began considering Israel as its most favourite client state in the region, with the Europeans and the Soviets leaning toward the Arabs. Makarios's foreign policy has to be seen in this qualified international and regional context.

Makarios' Gamble

The cumbersome constitutional arrangements of 1959-60 were an extreme case of institutional engineering, the most excessive being the overwhelming powers of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President and the establishment of three 'guaranteeing powers' watching after Cyprus's sovereignty: Britain, Turkey and Greece. Thus, as well as having Britain maintaining her military bases and other facilities on the island, both *enosis* (union with Greece) and *taksim* (partition — the Turkish Cypriot claim) were enshrined, not literally but in a refined and sophisticated way, in the arrangements of 1959-60 with the blessing of all three.[8]

For Britain, maintaining her military bases and intelligence gathering facilities on the island was becoming a priority, especially after the inter-communal strife of 1963-64.[9] Two new actors began entering the Eastern Mediterranean theatre since. On the 'front stage', it is noticeable the meddling of the UN in Cypriot affairs. It happened after Makarios' refusal to accept a NATO-led presence in Cyprus, allegedly in order 'to appease the Greek and Turkish Cypriot combatants'. The UN, enforcing Security Council resolution 186 in the wake of the 1963-64 crisis, established a rotating peacekeeping force on Cyprus.[10] On the back stage, which means behind the back of Makarios, the US began replacing Britain as a key

'meddler' in Cyprus, with Acheson's secret mission in Geneva. The architect of post-war US foreign policy was assigned with the difficult task of achieving a *rapprochement* between the Greek and the Turkish governments. His aim was to find an enduring solution to the problem, which could satisfy both Greece and Turkey, thus preventing hostilities between two NATO allies over Cyprus that could have been exploited by the USSR.

Makarios damned the Americans and, to a considerable extent, the Greeks and Turks alike. He found out about the secret Greco-Turkish meetings in Geneva in 1964 under the auspices of Acheson, and castigated George Papandreou, who was keen to compromise, by offering a large military base to Turkey on Cypriot soil in return for the union of the rest of the island with Greece.[11] By that time, Makarios had become adamant in mounting support, both at home and abroad, for an independent and non-aligned Cyprus, not least because any scheme of *enosis* coming to him from NATO quarters, including Greece, in practice would have meant *taksim*.[12]

It can be argued that Makarios was far more successful on account of what we have called 'front stage' issues than on account of 'back stage' themes. Even the methodical and careful landing of a Greek division on Cyprus in 1964 was intended more to back a *coup* against him. As a result, *taksim* and *enosis* could later be negotiated with Turkey, thus there would be no need to defend the island from possible Turkish military action.[13] Overall the most successful was Makarios in his strategy in internationalising the Cyprus issue through the UN and the Arab and Soviet support he could register there. Almost instantly after the Christmas crisis of 1963-64, on 7 February 1964, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sent a remarkable letter to US President Lyndon Johnson, in which he supported the non-aligned and independent physiognomy of the Republic of Cyprus. It also directly recognised Makarios' rule and policies and gave a warning for non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic from any NATO power whatsoever. In addition, the aforementioned Resolution 186 boosted Makarios popularity in that it explicitly asked "the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus".[14] Markarios' great success came the following year. In March 1965, UN mediator, Galo Plaza, produced a text which virtually supported most of Makarios' positions. In his 66-page report, Plaza outlined majority rule for the Greek Cypriots and minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots and a new UN

guarantee for Cyprus in replacement of the illegal - from the point of view of international law and UN Charter - Treaty of Guarantee. Yet a far more powerful game was being played in the background.

For instance, in response to President Johnson's letter, which stopped a Turkish landing on Cyprus at the eleventh hour, and the American decision to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Turkey, began to warm up its relations with the USSR.[15] This alarmed the US and Israel, as a strategic *rapprochement* between Turkey and the USSR would have damaged NATO's cohesion and undermined the US strategy of primacy in the Middle East.[16] The Turkish opening to the Soviets, coupled with the international (and Soviet) disgust for the Greek dictatorship (1967-1974), undermined Makarios's non-aligned stance. By then the USSR had exchanged its pro-Greek Cypriot rhetoric for a discourse of two equal communities on the island. Makarios, however, continued to play the Arab and non-aligned card until the very end, that is, until Turkey's two advances on Cyprus (July 20 and August 14, 1974), when Turkey occupied 37 per cent of the territory of the Republic. At the same time, Makarios had to deter the implementation of conspiracies of the Greek junta seeking to overthrow him and implement *enosis*; that is, a form of partition, bilaterally negotiated with Turkey.

Perhaps most costly of all was the political stance Makarios took, along with Britain, Greece and Turkey not to assist Israel during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. The first Turkish invasion came nine months later. From 1960 to July 15, 1974, the date when the Greek junta under Ioannides attempted to achieve 'régime change' by killing him, Makarios had been gambling all along. He won again in the UN, as the Turkish-installed régime in Northern Cyprus was not recognised by the Security Council. On the other hand and in real terms, he lost nearly half of Cyprus.

The international setting and Cyprus (1974-1989)

For Greece and Cyprus, the Cold War could have ended in the summer-autumn of 1974. By letting Turkey step into Cyprus, the Soviet Union virtually resigned from earlier claims to Eastern Mediterranean influence through Makarios and his strong communist constituency. At the same time, Constantine Karamanlis' Greece was revising its defence doctrine by re-

militarising the Eastern Aegean islands in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). From 1974 onwards, Greece's main enemy was seen to be not the communist neighbours to the north, but NATO Turkey to the east. In this qualified context, there was no supportive framework for a non-aligned policy, similar to that promoted by Andreas Papandreou and Makarios in the 1960s and early 1970s. Such policies were becoming increasingly redundant, especially after the Camp David peace accords of 1979 between Israel and Egypt. At the same time, both Turkey and Israel continued to be seen by the US as its more valuable strategic allies in the Middle East. More to the point, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah in Tehran in 1979, the US began courting Turkey so as to build an extensive military infrastructure in south-eastern Turkey and thus be able to meet contingencies in the Gulf area and in Central Asia. Two consecutive defeats of the Arabs (1967 and 1973), economic recovery in the West under the neo-conservative cabinets of Thatcher and Reagan plus the peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, weakened the international regulatory powers of the UN even further.[17]

Yet, both Karamanlis's and Andreas Papandreou's cabinets in the 1970s and 1990s continued to uphold their warm relations with the Arabs and the Palestinians. Karamanlis withdrew Greece from NATO's military structure, a tactical move to appease popular discontent over Cyprus, while convincing France and other European countries to support Greece to open accession negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC). True, Greece had somewhat to find new friends and she found them in Europe and in Giscard d'Estain's France. However, all European actors, including Greece and the divided Republic of Cyprus, continued to view the UN as the sole legitimate agency that could provide a just and viable solution to the Cyprus issue. There is not a single EEC decision from this period that differs in the slightest from the rhetoric of the UN. The UN and, more pertinently, the institution of the Secretary General, could be manipulated by the US at will, particularly as far as matters of secondary international importance were concerned. One such case was the UN-sponsored high level meeting in New York in January 1985 between Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash.[18]

America's chief Middle-Eastern worries after 1979 were Iran (the establishment of Homeini's anti-American regime) and Afghanistan (the occupation of the country by the Soviets) contingencies. Keeping a watchful

eye on the Gulf region and Central Asia was a demanding task that the precarious and discreet support of Saddam's Iraq in a war against the new anti-American regime in Tehran (1980-88) could not guarantee. South-eastern Turkey held the key. The Reagan administration entrusted Richard Perle with the task of convincing the Turks to accept the establishment of a large military infrastructure in Turkish Kurdistan. The economic *quid pro quo* for the Turks was guarantees for receiving large American funding, which had to be approved by the Congress. The political *quid* was Cyprus.

The American Congress had at times given severe headaches to the Administration and Turkey, as in 1975-78, when it imposed a partial arms embargo on Turkey due to invading Cyprus by using American military equipment. The Administration had to lobby Congress annually to obtain the consensus needed to implement the delivery of economic and military aid assigned to Turkey. The years 1983-84 were particularly difficult for the Administration for, on the top of everything,[19] it had to deal with the negative implications of the unilateral declaration by Denktash of a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC) and the Left-wing Kurdish uprising in South-eastern Turkey. In the spring of 1984 the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate adopted the Pressler/Bidden amendment, according to which Turkey should be deprived of '215 million of the 715 million dollars in military grants proposed, unless she relinquished control of Varosha'.[20] However, the amendment, after huge lobbying efforts by the Administration, was defeated in October of the same year. At the same time, Perle was working to obtain UN backing to set up a meeting between the two Cypriot leaders in order to force them to work on a solution framework which was blatantly against the Greek Cypriot side. Everything would have happened under the auspices of the UN and no blame could be attributed to the US.

From 1974 onward, US diplomacy considered Cyprus as being of a secondary importance on its international priority list. But for US daunting realists, such as Henry Kissinger, the problem was solved. Whatever the case, Cyprus has proved to be a good bargaining tool for both Turkey and the US, an instrument that could be used to achieve other strategic aims for the two states. However, because no other state had officially recognised 'TRNC', all interested parties had to show good faith in finding a legal solution satisfactory to both sides. Thus, following the High Level agreements between Makarios and Denktash in 1977 American and British diplomats

viewed the framework of such a legal solution as a trade-off between territorial concessions from the Turkish side versus constitutional ones from the Greek side.[21] In 1984-85 Perle had to work within those vague constraints, and indeed he convinced Turkey to accept that the territory under Turkish control following an agreement with the Greeks could be no less than 29.9 per cent of the territory of Cyprus. The Greeks, on the other hand, had to accept a 'rotating presidency', make further concessions on the issue of refugees and also to move into a co-federal, rather than federal framework as outlined by Denktash and Makarios in 1977. As a result when Kyprianou turned down the 'Draft Framework Agreement' and blame was assigned to the Greek side. A jubilant Denktash sent a message to Ankara of how useful his 'TRNC' is in paving the way for guaranteeing American support for Turkey: the Americans began building their bases in Incirlik and Diyarbakir, the Turks received the aid they needed, whereas keeping Northern Cyprus under control. The Greeks were to take the blame for the failure of the talks.

After the Cold War: Into the Abyss

I have argued that the United Nations was founded and destined to work as an appendage of US global interests. Indeed, it has been so for most of the Cold War period, the sole partial exception being the years of the rise of Arab nationalism under the influence of Nasser. Yet, as we have seen, Achesonian doctrine did not allow the UN to become the main vehicle of projection for US hegemonic influence. NATO and other US-led intelligence, economic and spying means were envisaged and expanded US power at the core of other states in Western Europe, South-eastern Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. The collapse of the Soviet Union delivered another serious blow to the credibility of the UN as a truly and just representative body regulating international relations.

At a time when Greece and the divided Republic of Cyprus considered knocking at the door of European Communities, the UN, under the primacy of the US, was in a position to shift the boundaries of a solution framework further. As the first post-Cold War contingencies in the Gulf and the Western Balkans were making headlines all over the world, the March 1990 Security Council resolution 649 was asking the Greek Cypriot leadership to accept further concessions and go beyond the bi-zonal/bi-

communal federal concept of 1977. It defined the Cyprus problem as an 'inter-communal affair' that had to be solved between the two communities on an 'equal basis'. Moreover, 'it defined the parameters of the settlement, but remained silent on the issues of the implementation of UN resolutions, the withdrawal of Turkish forces and the Turkish settlers, the return of the refugees, the three freedoms etc.'.[22] This resolution was followed by resolution 716 (1991), which was similar in tone and spirit. These initiatives culminated in the April 1992 'Set of Ideas' of Boutros Boutros Ghali. It is interesting here to note that the report by the Secretary General, which was devastating for the Greek Cypriot side, was even including a clause which 'expanded the Turkish Cypriot veto to include the question of membership in the European Community'. However, because of France's objections who argued that such a clause interferes with the powers of the Community, the Security Council resolution 750 (1992) did not endorse that specific clause of Ghali's 'Set of Ideas'.[23]

As the global and regional balance of power was drastically changing in favour of US, Turkish and Israeli interests, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus decided to go down the European road. Four months after the adoption of resolution 649 (March 1990), the Republic of Cyprus submitted its formal application to join the Communities as a full member. At the European Council meeting in Corfu (June 1993), when Greece was holding the EU's rotating presidency, the EU took a further step, putting on an equal footing the membership of the Republic of Cyprus with that of East-Central European states. This alarmed the US (and Turkey), but they were both somewhat mollified soon after that, as a customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU began to loom large. In a masterly deal crafted between the EU, Greece and Turkey under the auspices of the US (February-March 1995), the EU went further and declared that entry negotiations with Cyprus could commence six months after the Amsterdam inter-governmental conference of 1996. At the same time Turkey signed a customs union agreement with the EU.

The EU was prepared to go this far in its relations with Turkey. Had it been left to its own devices, that is to say, without hefty lobbying on the part of the US in favour of Turkey, the EU might not have advanced its relations with Turkey beyond a customs union so quickly.[24] A clear indication we have for this is the Luxembourg summit of 1997. Commenting on that EU summit, a number of observers failed to see that the country that blocked

progress on Turkey's application was Germany, rather than Greece. As I have argued elsewhere,[25] it was basically Germany's weight that backed Cyprus's inclusion in the fast track group of candidate countries and Turkey's exclusion from any candidate group.[26]

Pushed by the US, the UN re-appeared on the Eastern Mediterranean front stage in the late 1990s, putting pressure on the two communities on the island to resume negotiations.[27] US-UN efforts for a solution to the Cyprus issue intensified after the commitment of the US to new war theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq, following the terrorist attacks on America on 11 September 2001. The 'proximity talks' led to direct negotiations between the Greek Cypriot president Glafkos Clerides and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash under the auspices of the Secretary General, Kofi Anan. The climate was improved, especially after the 'earthquake diplomacy' of late 1999, leading to a *rapprochement* between Greece and Turkey. In November 2002, Anan, taking into account all the points raised by each side in the discussions, presented a new plan to the parties. The 'solution principle of equality between the two communities' which was enshrined in resolution 649 (1990) and all crucial resolutions thereafter, did not change. The Republic of Cyprus was, once again, confronted with an Anglo-American inspired plan, presented along the lines of a 'Swiss-style' solution, proposing two 'component states' and a 'common state' under a presidency that would rotate every ten months.[28] Interestingly, it was proposed that the Treaty of Guarantee remain in force. Back in 1962, Makarios' team of lawyers had proved that this Treaty was illegal and against the very charter of the UN, an affair which, among others, led to the 1963-64 crisis.[29] In 2002, the UN Secretary General still upheld it and, apparently, any solution to the problem would have to have that Treaty annexed to it. One might argue that the Secretary General, by his actions, undermined the very legitimacy and credibility of his own institution. But the Secretary General has no independent voice and is an instrument manipulated at will by the US.

The UN is not an organisation in which equality of membership and adherence to international law come before issues of power, dominance and prevailing national interests. Quite the opposite is the truth. The collapse of communism and the retreat of Arab nationalism, the re-colonisation of Iraq and Afghanistan by Anglo-American forces were bound to produce a 'new world order' in which the US, the uncontested victor of the Cold War, could alone set the rules of the game. The others cannot but bandwagon. Yet, a

range of Eurasian powers, including France, Germany, Russia and China, opposed the second Gulf War and, contrary to what they did in the case of Kosovo (1999), refused to provide after-sales service to the US by endorsing a UN 'reconstruction' resolution. As in 1990-1992 with the Ghali 'Set of ideas', it is interesting to note that the recent Anan plan comes amidst a second crisis in he Gulf area. The setting was the same, as well as the substance of the plans, although one might argue that the second Gulf War represents a far greater gamble for the US. This time round, the agenda of Bush Jr. goes beyond stabilising US occupation of Iraq. The over-ambitious aim is the transformation of the entire Middle East according to US interests. The differences, however, had to do with Turkey's stance during the first and the second crises, as well as with Europe's embracing of Cyprus.

Turgut Ozal's Turkey was keen to assist the Americans during the first Gulf crisis, but Tayip Erdogan faced enormous opposition to do so in 2003, both from Turkish public opinion and his generals. The key issue here to understand the situation is the Kurdish question. Having enjoyed a relative autonomy since 1991 as the Americans enforced non-fly zones over the Northern and Southern Iraq, the Kurds wished to establish an independent 'micro-state' in Northern Iraq. To make it viable, they claimed control over the oil-rich regions of Mosul and Kirkuk. The Turks had fiercely opposed this throughout. They were to receive the appropriate gesture from the Americans by negotiating over the Anan plan, as well as pledges to a 6 billion dollar grant, convertible to 24 billion in long-term, low interest loan that could have helped re-finance Turkey's 145 billion state debt. But they did not receive enough concessions as far as the Kurdish question was concerned. Hence the generals' and Denktash's outright refusal of the Anan plan and the UN's decision to blame Denktash for refusing to accept it as a basis for further negotiations.

In January-February 2004, Denktash was once again cornered to negotiate on the basis of the UN blueprint and before the Republic's official entry to the EU on 1 May 2004. But at the same time, Turkey has accepted to facilitate through the US bases of Incirlik and Diyarbakir the rotation of more than 100,000 American troops stationed in Iraq. A new deal between Turkey and the US regarding the Kurdish issue may have been drafted and whose contents remain, as yet, unknown to us. The more lasting the Iraqi quagmire proves to be for the Americans, the more likely it is that they will start courting the Turks again. Cyprus will be there to be used and abused as

a bargaining chip at all times, even if a 'solution' of the type envisaged by Anan is endorsed by the ruling groups of the parties concerned.

Concluding Remarks

The UN, set up at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco some fifty years ago, was designed to be a two-tiered institution, with its general assembly a powerless body and its Security Council a powerful instrument for the application of US-led directives. Yet, even the best of designs fail to match exactly complex historical realities and social dynamics. Neither the international organisation has been that way all the time, nor has it been the only, and the main, instrument for the exercise of US power. There were periods of exception during the Cold War, which had coincided with the rise of Arab nationalism, the euphoria of anti-colonial movements in the Third World and Latin America and the USSR's strong posture in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. But then the Achesonian strategy of primacy, established and well-embedded in US departments by 1950, could sort out issues of hegemony within West European, Latin American, Middle Eastern and Asian states in perpetuity.

Makarios' calculation to internationalise the Cyprus issue in the 1960s was clever. However, he misread Arab and Soviet intentions and thought that they could run to his support in case Turkey attacked Cyprus. The end of the Cold War has turned the UN and their Secretary General into puppets manipulated by the US, particularly in cases in which the other members of the Security Council do not have especially strong vested interests. From this perspective, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have correctly adopted a strategy aiming at achieving EU membership for the Republic. This, it was thought, would please France, who wanted to extend its influence in the Mediterranean as a whole. At the same time, however, we are witnessing a linkage strategy on behalf of the EU, relating Turkey's EU membership to a prompt Cyprus solution.

The US has been on the side of Turkey throughout. As a state, which alongside Israel valued most in the greater Middle East, the US lobbied hard the EU to remove political and economic obstacles to Turkey's membership. But an interpretation of the Cyprus issue and of the UN involvement in it from 1990 to the present day on this basis alone would be certainly

insufficient. In fact, Cyprus straddles not only Turkey's EU prospects, but also Turkey's Middle Eastern and Kurdish imbroglio. The two systematic UN plans for a solution to the problem of Cyprus from 1990 to date have been coincidentally presented just after or just before the two Gulf wars. Arguably, Cyprus has been used all along and by all sides in order for them to advance their respective national 'mega' or 'micro' interests. The UN will therefore not give the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots a 'just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem'. But they will give them a solution according to the interests of the power that dominates them, that is the US. That is Dumbarton Oak's indelible imprint on Cyprus.

NOTES

1. Formally the UN was founded in San Francisco in April 1945, but all the big decisions were taken at Dumbarton Oaks, Georgetown, under the leadership and decisive influence of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

2. For this section of the article, I am mostly indebted to the discussions I have had with Peter Gowan. On how US business classes induced US political leaders to abandon America's partial isolationism; see also his 'US:UN', *New Left Review*, November-December 2003.

3. During the War, the term United Nations was used to denote those states which were allied against the axis powers. On the crucial international conjuncture 1943-45, see the seminal work by Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and the USA, 1943-45* (New York: Random House, 1968).

4. See also, John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Roosevelt, Kennan, Acheson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

5. Churchill wanted the UN to have a 'regionalised structure with a Council of the Americas, a Council of Europe and a Council of East Asia – leaving South Asia, the Middle East and Africa (that is the bulk of the British Empire) splendidly unregulated', see Cordell Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), vol.2, p.1640, quoted in Peter Gowan, op. cit.

6. Peter Gowan, *ibid.*

7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Hegemonic quicksand', *The National Interest*, no.74, Winter 2003-04, p.12.

8. The first claim was the desire of the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots (80 per cent of the total population). The second came as a result of the British policy of *divide et impera*, rather than as an innate co-sovereign tendency of the Turkish Cypriot minority (18 per cent).

9. Makarios's rule was severely constrained by the right to veto of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President. Deciding to move on and extend his powers, Makarios masterminded thirteen amendments to the constitution, the first in a series of other moves towards *enosis* (the so-called 'Akritas plan'). Interestingly, Makarios went ahead with publicising his 'thirteen points', only after having received the 'green light' by the British.

10. Among others, Suha Bolukbasi, 'The Cyprus Issue and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement between 1945-1996', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.30, 1998.

11. Makarios's biggest ally in Greece at the time was cabinet Minister Andreas Papandreou, the son of Prime Minister, George Papandreou; see in particular, State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, 1964-68*, vol XVI, Washington DC, 2002; see also Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*: The Greek Front (New York: Doubleday 1970).

12. Makarios had already thought of this possibility in 1957-58, when he saw signs from Greece that she might accept the Macmillan plan - after the name of the British PM -- which led to the Zurich-London constitutional arrangements. This is a fundamental reason, which led Makarios to adopt, already during the EOKA struggle, a non-aligned, pro-Arab and anti-Israeli policy. Yet Israel worked discreetly and persistently in order not to be excluded from Cyprus. Basically, it supported the Turkish Cypriots in their struggle against the Greek Cypriots in return for their use of veto in case Makarios refused to agree to the opening of the Israeli Embassy in Nicosia. Indeed, by February 1961 Israel, as all its Arab competitors, had its own Embassy in Cyprus. On this issue, see the perceptive article by Zach Levey, 'Israel's entry into Cyprus, 1959-1963: Diplomacy and strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol.7, September 2003.

13. Initially, Makarios agreed to the secret landing of the Greek division, although he later regretted it. Basically, one of the themes Acheson's mission discussed with Greek and Turkish officials was the toppling of Makarios by Greek mainland troops, followed by an opening of negotiations with Turkey over the portion of Cypriot land to be conceded to her for military and civilian purposes; see, State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, 1964-68*, pp.214 passim.

14. For the text of this Security Council Resolution and Khrushchev's letter to Johnson, see Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, from Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp.148-49 and 155-57.

15. For an analysis of the consequences of this Turkish leaning towards the USSR, see Vassilis Fouskas, *Zones of Conflict: US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), pp.74-5. For the letter of President Johnson to Turkish Premier Inonu, see Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, pp.158-60.

16. It is worth noting here that the Israeli-Turkish understanding, officially and publicly endorsed in 1996, goes as back as the mid-1950s; cf. in particular, Suha Bolukbasi, 'Behind the Turkish-Israeli alliance: a Turkish view', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol.XXIX, Autumn 1999, Marios Evriviades, ' The Turkish-Israeli axis: Alliances and alignments in the Middle East', *Orient*, vol.39, Autumn 1998.

17. See David Armstrong et al., *From Versailles to Maastricht; International Organisation in the 20th Century* (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.88.

18. I follow here Marios L. Evriviades, *The US and Cyprus: The Politics of Manipulation in the 1985 UN Cyprus High Level Meeting*, Occasional Research Paper no.3, Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, Athens, October 1992.

19. Tensions had increased in Poland with *Solidarnosk*; there was also the issue of deployment of SS 20 Soviet missiles in Central Europe and the American response with Pershing and Cruise; in 1983 the US invades Grenada. But most crucial of all, it was the launching of the 'star wars' project by Ronald Reagan, which finally led to the defeat of the USSR and Gorbachev's openings with the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*.

20. Marios Evriviades, *The US and Cyprus: The Politics of Manipulation in the 1985 UN Cyprus High Level Meeting*, p.8.

21. See in particular, Van Coufoudakis, 'Cyprus, the United States and the United Nations since 1960', *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, vol.3, no.2, Autumn 1994, pp.37-57.

22. *Ibid.*, p.47.

23. *Ibid.*, p.48.

24. At the Helsinki meeting of the European Council (December 1999), Turkey was offered a candidate status. At Copenhagen (December 2002), the European Council was determined to open accession negotiations with Turkey - the date for reviewing Turkey's progress was set for December 2004, on condition that she deepens the process of its political and economic reforms ('Copenhagen criteria' of 1993) and makes progress on its bilateral disputes with Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus. Technically, the Cyprus problem is not a pre-condition for Turkey's membership. Politically, however, it is.

25. See Vassilis Fouskas, *Zones of Conflict: US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East*, chapter 6: 'Eurasian gambles over Cyprus' EU prospects'.

26. Even acute analysts, such as Mehmet Ugur, fail to see the crucial role of Germany in Turkey's exclusion; see his otherwise perceptive analysis in 'Testing times in EU-Turkey relations: the road to Copenhagen and beyond', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, vol.5, August 2003, pp.165-184. To my knowledge, the sole exception I managed to pinpoint is the work by Harun Arikan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for Membership?*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp.167-77.

27. Throughout the 1990s, negotiations were on an 'on-and-off' basis. In 1996-98, tension between Greece and Turkey (the 'Imia crisis' in the Aegean, the case of transferring to Cyprus an S-300 Russian missile system, the killings of Greek Cypriots by Turkish security forces and the mob) thwarted any meaningful dialogue between the parties. All these cases of tension, however, have shown that the Cyprus issue was far from solved and that a serious and uncontrolled crisis could erupt at any moment.

28. For an analysis of the plan, see Vassilis K. Fouskas, 'Concluding remarks: the long way back', in Vassilis K. Fouskas and Heinz A. Richter (eds.), *Cyprus and Europe: the Long Way Back* (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2003), pp.205-210.

29. In short, the Treaty of Guarantee was assigning to Greece, Turkey and Britain guarantor power rights on Cyprus, which is against the very concept of state sovereignty and UN membership. For further comments on this issue, see William Mallinson, 'Reality versus morality', *Defensor Pacis*, no.7, January 2001.

EU Policy-Making in Federal Cyprus: The Challenge Ahead

Angelos Sepos*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine les défis institutionnels et communautaires auxquels Chypre, un pays nouvellement devenu membre de l'UE, sera confronté dans l'exercice de sa politique européenne. Etant donné l'importance croissante accordée à la preéminence de la politique de l'Union Européenne sur celle des Etats membres et de leurs citoyens, il existe un puissant mobile pour chaque gouvernement de coordonner sa position nationale afin de défendre ses intérêts plus efficacement à Bruxelles. Cependant, la structure institutionnelle de l'UE et la nature de la prise de décisions européennes fait de la coordination de la politique de l'UE une tâche extrêmement difficile pour tous les Etats membres.Pour les Etats qui aspirent à devenir fédéraux comme Chypre, ceci constitue un défi d'autant plus grand, compte tenu du besoin pour les deux communautés de l'île d'adopter une politique commune dans le cadre de l'UE. Cet article propose des moyens pour affronter de tels défis en examinant ce qui a été écrit sur des états fédéraux et la coordination de leur politique européenne.

ABSTRACT

This article examines the institutional and communal challenges that Cyprus will be facing when conducting its EU policy. Given the increasing salience of EU policy for Member States and their citizens, there is a powerful incentive for each government to coordinate its national position in order to pursue its interests more effectively in Brussels. However, given the institutional structure of the EU and the nature of EU decisionmaking, the coordination of EU policy will prove an extremely difficult task for all Member States. For aspiring federal states, such as Cyprus, the challenge will be all the greater as a common EU policy will need to be agreed upon by the two communities. This article proposes ways to counter such challenges by drawing upon the literature of federal states and EU policy coordination.

Introduction

Achieving successful coordination in any area of governmental activity is extremely problematic (Peters, 1998: 295), but membership in the European Union confronts governments with a set of particularly testing organizational and managerial challenges. Not only are Member States

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locked into a 'continuous policy making process of both an active and reactive nature' (Wright, 1996: 149) across a broad and expanding terrain where they interact with multiple partners in a complex institutional environment, but their action must be coordinated at and between two levels: the domestic and the European.[1] Each dimension imposes its own requirements, and has its own dynamics, and feedback between the two levels is continuous. Different constituencies put forward their demands, different sets of actors jostle for attention, and different rules must be followed. As a result, governments find themselves subject to varying, often contradictory, imperatives.

Coordination for federal states poses particular challenges. The constitutional structure of these states with the many administrative units — federal and regional governments — makes the process of reaching a common position very difficult. This is the case even when the various administrative units agree on the given EU policy. The process becomes even more difficult when there are conflicting interests between the various administrative units.

This article looks into the literature of federal states and EU policy coordination in order to provide an insight into the potential problems and challenges that federal Cyprus will be facing when coordinating and formulating its EU policy. It also proposes measures to counter those challenges, more specifically, the implementation of institutional and administrative reforms as well as the development of a culture of consensus in the conduct of its EU affairs.

The Need to Coordinate

Many believe that effective coordination on the part of governments delivers greater efficiency because it helps reduce conflicting and redundant programs. Also it ensures that scarce public resources are used more rationally for the achievement of policy goals. Furthermore, by reconciling the competing demands of actors inside and outside government or facilitating concerted action, objectives which otherwise may not be realized can be achieved (Kassim, 2001a; Peters, 1998). Yet for governments that are members of the European Union, the need to coordinate is even greater.

The wide and growing competence of the Union in important policy domains as well as the complexity of EU decision-making means that governments need to redouble their efforts for coordination. Member States play for high stakes in the EU arena and decisions taken in Brussels have tremendous consequences for them. The adoption by the EU of legislation that is consistent with existing domestic policy and practices produces positive benefits for a Member State, whereas the opposite would involve 'high transaction costs and a loss of autonomy for the public actors' (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999: 281). This means that governments must be able to respond to EU proposals with a unified and coherent voice if they are to defend their national interests effectively and reap the full benefits of EU membership. And they must do so within a complex decision-making environment that is demanding and fast-paced. They must be able to demonstrate to often sceptical publics that they are doing the best they can in EU decision-making bodies to defend issues that are of sensitive 'national interest'. In addition, coordination is required so that public and private actors can pursue effectively the resources that are available from the EU (e.g. structural and cohesion funds).

Coordination is required not only for ensuring that national interests are effectively represented in the EU, but also because of the obligations that the particular structure and decision-making mechanisms of the EU impose on Member States (Kassim, 2001a: 10). Firstly, participation in the Council of Ministers requires that governments must prepare positions at different levels and across different sectors. The increased role of the European Council as the 'constitutional architect', 'agenda – setter' and 'ultimate decisionmaker' of the EU has induced heads of state and government to develop the necessary institutional resources so that the chief executive can deal with the increased flow of business (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 1997). Similarly, the realization that intergovernmental conferences are not just treaty amendments but key events in the integration process, with a considerable political impact beyond the rather technical revisions of treaty paragraphs have induced governments to put particular emphasis on careful organization and coordination in order to rise to the occasion (Edwards and Pjipers, 1997). In addition, effective coordination on the part of national governments is required in order to meet the demands of the Council Presidency, which is held in rotation by Member States for six months. The responsibilities of the office have increased dramatically as the competencies

of the Union have expanded. The Presidency is responsible for formulating its programme many months in advance of taking up office, organizing meetings at all levels of the Council (with the assistance of the Council secretariat), achieving consensus and brokering deals in order to enact legislation, launching strategic policy initiatives, representing the Council in its relations with external delegations, as well as with other EU institutions, managing the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs, and coordinating Member State's positions in international conferences and negotiations in which the EU participates (Edwards and Wallace, 1976; Edwards, 1996). It is in this sense that the official Council guidebook states that "major deployment of the entire national administrative apparatus is required to get the Presidency up and running" (General Secretariat, 1996: 6 cited in Kassim, 2001a: 10).

These pressures stemming from EU membership create an added incentive for governments to establish efficient administrative systems that will ensure that national interests are effectively represented at the EU level. The process of coordination and formulation of EU policy, however, is an extremely difficult task.

The Difficulties of EU Policy Coordination

The European Union is an extremely complex political system, which presents distinctive difficulties for national coordinators. The difficulties of domestic coordination — fragmentation, sectoralisation and policy interdependencies — are accentuated at the EU level, given the distinctive features of the EU régime which complicates the life of national coordinators.

First, the European political order is multi-centered and multi-tiered, fluid, ambiguous and hybrid, with little precise clarification of the competencies of the Union and Member States (Olsen, 1997: 165; Wright, 1996). It is *sui generis* (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999: 15)[2]; it combines elements of an incipient federation, a supranational body, an intergovernmental bargaining arena and an international regime (Wright, 1996: 150). It is not based on a single treaty, a unitary structure, or a single dominating centre of authority and power, but rather on several treaties and

a complex three-pillar structure, organized on different principles and supranational/intergovernmental mixes (Olsen, 1997: 165). The EU system lacks unity and clarity in its institutions and procedures, and its European constitution is confused with no overall principle of organization (Wincott, 1994: 573). Moreover, there is no shared vision and project, nor a common understanding of the legitimate basis of a future Europe (Weiler, 1993). Its membership, its rules, the relationships between, and authority of, its institutions are constantly evolving (Kassim, 2001a; Wright, 1996; Olsen, 1997).

Secondly, the EU policy process is unusually open (Kassim, 2001a; Wright, 1996; Peters, 1994). Despite the Commission's monopoly over the initiation of legislation, items on the EU's policy agenda come from a variety of sources, there are a number of influential policy advocates and entrepreneurs and policy ideas are wider and more dynamic than Member States (Wright, 1996: 151). In addition, multiple actors are involved in decision-making, including the Member States, the EU institutions, other European bodies and agencies, representatives of regional and local authorities and private interest groups (Mazey & Richardson, 1999). Decisions are rarely the result of action on the part of a single actor or institution and interested parties must search for allies and create coalitions in order to influence those decisions (Kassim, 2001a: 12). Yet, in the unstable policy environment of Brussels, alliance building is unpredictable and time consuming and the cleavages that shape coalitions are often cross cutting (Wright, 1996: 152).

The Union's ambivalence touches all aspects of its institutions and is reflected in the absence of a constitutionally defined separation of powers or a tidy division of responsibilities (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999) which further complicates the task of coordination (Kassim, 2001a). More specifically, legislative power is shared by two institutions, the Council (representing the 'states') and the European Parliament (representing the 'citizens') and executive authority is spread between the Member States (collectively in the Council and individually) and the Commission (Hix, 1999). Moreover, decision-making is extremely complex with more than twenty different decision procedures (Olsen, 1997: 165) in various policy sectors and subsectors. The power of the institutions vary according to the procedures invoked, and different decision rules generate the need for

different coordination mechanisms and styles (Wright, 1996: 152). In this absence of a stable and generalized system of decisionmaking, the institution to be targeted by national coordinators differs according to the sector and the issue.

Moreover, the EU is characterized by a high degree of institutional fragmentation with the main institutions being internally differentiated, segmented and distinguished by a high level of organizational density (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999; Scharpf, 1999; Hix, 1999). The Council has multiplied its formations, its tripartite structure complicated by the addition of new bodies and tiers after Maastricht and later Amsterdam to handle the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs, and coordination has become increasingly difficult (Kassim, 2001a: 14). Also, the Commission is segmented into twenty-four directorates general, each with its own operating style, and there is permanent tension in relations between the political Commission (Commissioners and their cabinets) and the services. The European Parliament is a multiparty chamber, where partisan affiliations cut across the functional allocation of legislative scrutiny between its twenty committees. These bodies interact through a complex web of ad hoc and permanent committees, sub-committees and working groups which are largely responsible for the mass of micro level sectoral decisions and are interwoven with a set of overlapping bargaining networks (Wright, 1996: 151). This elaborate system of committees, known as 'comitology', enables 'national experts' to issue opinions on the Commission's proposed implementation measures (Hix, 1999: 41). Yet their function and status fluctuates over time. In some cases, comitology provides for a separation of powers where the legislators (the governments) can scrutinize the executive (the Commission), while in others it creates a fusion of powers where the Member States enforce their wishes on the Commission, and hence exercise both legislative and executive authority.

Finally, sectoralization is another characteristic of the EU that makes the task of coordination difficult. National coordinators have to contend with various forms of policy-making: *constituent*, in which the basic rules and principles of the system itself are under consideration; *redistributive*, in which the transfer of financial resources from some actors to others is involved; *distributive*, in which Community funds are allocated within sectors; and *regulatory*, in which the Member States agree to adopt common

regulations on the activities of public and private actors (Lowi, 1972; Wallace, 1996). These policy types are dealt with in distinct political arenas, comprised of different actors and governed by different decision rules. Furthermore, they also entail different bargaining requirements (Pollack, 1994: 96). Finally, the scope and pace of policy development vary accordingly (Kassim, 2001a; Wright, 1996).

This complex institutional environment presents significant challenges for national coordinators. A further difficulty for Member States, however, stems from the need to ensure that action taken in Brussels is acceptable at home. Often what may be desirable for domestic policy purposes may not be feasible as an objective at the European level. Some argue that constraints at one level may be transformed into opportunities at the other: 'National bargaining positions in Brussels may be reinforced by invoking "problems back home" while essential but unpalatable politics are imposed on domestic constituencies by governments which readily finger Brussels as the real culprit' (Wright, 1996: 149). The literature offers examples of both scenarios, though the coverage is decidedly in favour of the latter. In fact, 'cases of compromise or humiliating climb down may in reality outnumber instances of successful strategic action on the part of individual Member States but are less dramatic' (Kassim, 2001a: 14-15).

The Challenge for Cyprus

In order to deal with these challenges stemming from EU membership, Cyprus will need to establish new mechanisms or to adapt its structures and procedures to manage effectively its EU policy coordination. At present, EU policy-making in Cyprus is managed jointly by a number of bodies, with different roles and responsibilities (Figure 1). This institutional framework has been designed to support the coordination of Cyprus's EU accession process. The central body within this process is the Office of the Chief Negotiator, headed by former MP Takis Hadjidemetriou.[3] It is responsible for: a) the guidance and management of the accession negotiations; b) the supervision and coordination of the harmonization process; and c) keeping the House of Representatives, the private sector, the various organizations and the public at large informed on the progress of the negotiations procedure and the tasks that the accession creates. The Office works closely

with the EU departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Planning Bureau as well as with the Law Office of the Republic. The Chief Negotiator has no executive power but mainly coordinates the execution of the various tasks relating to EU accession as well as supervising and conducting the actual negotiations with the European Commission and other Member States. All major political decisions, including the approval of Cyprus's negotiating positions, are taken by the Council of Ministers. In that regard, there is a Ministerial Committee for EU Affairs presided by the President of the Republic and composed of the Chief Negotiator, the Attorney General, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, all Ministers who have a vertical competence on any one of the subjects involved in the accession process as well as the Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus. Senior officials from the departments headed by the members of the Committee also participate in the meetings. The Committee allows the ministers to be informed on all aspects of Cyprus-EU relations and exchange views on various subjects.[4]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is another major player in the national coordination of Cyprus's EU policy. Besides its general role of representing the Republic abroad and promoting the Cyprus accession bid in Brussels and the capitals of EU Member States, it also has a horizontal competence regarding EU affairs at home. It participates in the elaboration of proposals for which it provides the necessary political input.

The Planning Bureau, a largely independent body under the Ministry of Finance, is in charge of the coordination of the ministries and other public bodies. It cooperates closely with the Chief Negotiator and the ministries for the preparation and shaping of the various proposals as well as supporting the Chief Negotiator's tasks in the harmonization process. Hence it is acting more as its 'watchdog'.[5]

The Law Office of the Republic is headed by the Attorney General and comprises a division specialized in EU law. It provides the various government services with the necessary legal advice and expertise. It participates in the elaboration of all proposals and examines all the bills related to the harmonization process before they are submitted to the Council of Ministers and then to the House of Representatives for enactment.

Figure 1



Source: The Planning Bureau

The current institutional framework has been effective enough to support the coordination of the country's EU accession process. Indeed, Cyprus was the first, among the candidate countries, that successfully completed the two phases of the pre-accession strategy: the 'acquis screening' and the 'substantive negotiations'.[6] As indicated earlier, however, the demands and difficulties stemming from the participation of the state in the decision-making process of the EU will be greater and different in form, and will thus require an adjustment of those structures and even the creation of new mechanisms altogether.

More specifically, there will be a need for the creation of a central coordination committee — a Directorate for EU Affairs — which will manage interdepartmental relations in respect of EU policy. This committee should be able to organize frequent meetings with an agenda that will cover all the issues which will be dealt with in the different EU Councils. The ultimate purpose of the committee is to transmit instructions to the minister who will represent Cyprus in the given EU Councils. Such special administrative committees have been established in virtually all Member States: in France (the SGCI), Spain (the SSEU), the UK (the European Secretariat), Italy (the Department for the Coordination of European Community Policies), Portugal (the DGAC), Germany (the Tuesday Committee), Belgium (the P.11 Committee), Denmark (the special committees and the EC Committee). The representation within these committees depends on the coordinating approach of the state, i.e. centralized or decentralized. For example, in decentralized Belgium, the committee consists of representatives of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, representatives of the Minister-Presidents who head the sub-national governments, and officials from the Belgian Permanent Representation. Also present are representatives of those ministers (both federal and subnational) who are responsible for the subjects on the agenda. In centralized France, on the other hand, there are fewer participants as the subnational level has no constitutional rights of access to the country's EU decision-making process. Federal Cyprus should be expected to follow a decentralized approach, whereby, the federal and subnational governments (i.e. the governing authorities of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities) will be appropriately represented within the central coordinating committee. In this sense, the representatives of the two communities will meet under the auspices of this committee and decide on the common position that Cyprus will adopt at the EU level.

Given the importance of EU policy for the two communities, it will not be uncommon for them to disagree even at those early stages of coordination; i.e., the administrative level, on the common stance that Cyprus takes in Europe. This will require the creation of arbitration mechanisms so that such conflicting issues are resolved at a higher level, the political. Again such mechanisms exist in other Member States: Spain has an Interministerial Committee, Denmark a Foreign Policy Committee, the UK a subcommittee for European Affairs ((E) DOP), Greece an Interministerial Committee, Belgium the Interministerial Conference for Foreign Policy (ICFP) and the Concertation Committee, and Germany the Interministerial Committee of State Secretaries on European Affairs (StS) and the Cabinet Committee for European Affairs. In Belgium, for example, the ICFP Committee consists of ministers themselves, not their representatives, and if no consensus is reached, the issue is passed on to the Concertation Committee which is composed of the Prime Minister and the Minister-Presidents of the subnational authorities. If they again fail to reach a compromise, the Belgian representative is unable to take a position during deliberations and Belgium abstains during the vote in the Council. The proposed Annan Plan for a Cyprus Settlement (November 2002; revised later) does provide for an arbitration mechanism regarding EU affairs,[7] yet it might also be useful to create a formal inter-ministerial committee to arbitrate between ministries in case a settlement is not reached. At present, arbitration between ministries is conducted in a number of venues, including the Planning Bureau, the Presidential Palace or the leading ministry itself. Setting up a permanent venue, however, will give the process a more institutionalized character.

In the scenario whereby Cyprus enters the EU as a federal state, representational system that will determine the composition of national delegation in the various EU Councils will also be needed. Until 1993, federal states were allowed to be represented in the EU Councils only by representatives (ministers) of their federal government, not of their subnational units. In an important decision during the Maastricht Treaty and under the pressure of traditionally strong regions from Belgium and Germany, Member States established Article 203 TEU which enabled governments to delegate their vote in the Council to a ministerial representative of a sub-national tier of government. Since then, federal states such as Belgium, Germany, Austria and Spain have made use of this right and have created such special representation systems. Cyprus will, of course,

work out its own arrangements but it is worth noting again the experience of Belgium that has developed a representation mechanism that might also be useful for the Cyprus reality.[8]

The Belgian system is based on two principles: mixed delegation and rotation (Figure 2). Representation in the Councils of Categories I and IV is the most straightforward. These Councils deal mostly with issues that fall within the exclusive competencies of the federal state (Category I issues such as economic and financial issues in Ecofin) or within the full competencies of the subnational entities (Category IV issues such as culture and education). In the Councils of Category I, Belgium is represented only by members of the federal government, whereas in the Councils of Category IV, Belgium is represented only by members of the subnational entities. Representation in Councils of Category II and III is more complicated. In the Councils of Category II, dealing mostly with matters that belong to the competencies of the federal state but where the subnational authorities have some supplementary powers (e.g. agriculture and environment), the Belgian delegation will be headed by a member of the federal government and assisted by a member of one of the sub-national governments. In the Councils of Category III, dealing with matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the subnational entities but where the federal state has kept some supplementary powers (e.g. research and industry), the leader of the delegation is a member of one of the subnational governments and the assessor will be a member of the federal government.

The question of which of the subnational governments will represent Belgium in the Councils of Category II, III, and IV is regulated by a fairly arbitrary rotation system.

Figure 2

Representation of Belgian Authorities in the Council of Ministers

Category	Type of Council of Ministers	Examples of Council of Ministers	Example of issues	Representation
I	Exclusive federal competencies	General Affairs ECOFIN Budget Telecommunicati on Development Cooperation	'Municipal Voting' directive	Federal government
II	Shared competencies with a dominant federal share	Agriculture Internal Market Public Health Energy	'Tobacco Advertising' directive	Head of delegation is the federal government assisted by someone from the subnational entities (dependent on rotation)
III	Shared competencies with a dominant subnational share	Industry Research	Proposals concerning the restructuring of the steel industry	Head of delegation is someone from the subnational entities (dependent on rotation) assisted by someone from the federal government
IV	Exclusive subnational competencies	Education Tourism Land Use	'Television without Borders' directive	Someone from the subnational entities (dependent on rotation)

Adapted from: Kerremans & Beyers, 1997.

For every Council, it is indicated which government will be in charge for a specific period of time. At the end of every six-month rotation period there is a change in the subnational representation. This list allows Belgium's EU partners to know who will represent Belgium in that particular Council during that particular rotation (Kerremans, Beyers & Bursens, 2000: 14-15).[9]

Furthermore, individual ministries will also need to establish special EU units to coordinate European business internally, to consult other interested ministries, and to represent national interests in negotiating in Brussels. Special posts will need to be created within each ministry for officials who will be responsible for the coordination of EU affairs within the ministry as well as between other ministries. At present, while each ministry has small teams consisting of two to three officials responsible for the harmonization process, institutionalized EU units exist only in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance.[10] While the need to establish such units in all ministries has often been brought up by government officials, who cite their increasing workload in this area, the issue is stalled due to the shortage of personnel and sometimes lack of political will to make any further administrative changes before accession.[11] Yet upon accession, such units will be vital for the overall efficiency of the coordination mechanism of the state. Moreover, upon full membership there will also be a need for national ministries to adjust their personnel policies to support, for example, the recycling of officials through Brussels, look to recruit officials with appropriate language skills, and introduce special training programs. With respect to the latter, the budgeting for personnel and training to departments has not been conducive to the even development of European expertise across the Cyprus government. Figures indicate that some ministries, such as that of Finance, Agriculture, and Justice and Public Order absorb the vast majority of funds allocated for these activities.[12] This will surely need to change upon accession. Finally, in the case that Cyprus enters the EU as a federal state, it might also be useful to designate officials at the federal level who will be responsible for coordinating EU affairs between the federal and regional ministries and between these ministries and the European Commission. Again, one can take note of the examples of other federal states which have created such posts (example: the *federal correspondent* in Belgium and the *Europa-Beauftragter* in Germany).

Moreover, serious consideration should be given to the thought of establishing a post of a junior minister for European Affairs. This post has

been created in virtually all Member States though their power and status varies greatly. Some are senior civil servants, others are politicians with a rank of a Secretary-General of Ministry, others are Minister-Delegates attached to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others again are directly responsible to the Prime Minister. In most Member States, these officials have the greatest knowledge of European issues than anyone else in their governments but they do not always carry enough weight to have these issues put high on the agenda. Also, with few exceptions, European ministers do not have the authority to represent their governments at the EU level. There have recently been proposals from Gerhard Schröder to create a uniform system throughout Europe of Ministers for European Affairs who will be able to represent their country in a newly formed Council of the Union that will deal with European issues. The purpose of this post is to complement the Ministers of Foreign Affairs who may have a global vision of Europe but can no longer maintain an in-depth knowledge of European issues as their responsibilities are much broader in scope, and whose role of coordination of EU affairs is now complemented by other ministers (Finance, Economics) whose outlook is rather particular. Also, the aim of a Council of Europe Ministers is "to help prevent rows between EU governments and the Commission as it would introduce an early warning system to react to the Commission's proposals at an incipient stage" (European Observer, October 2002). While the provisions of Annan's plan foresee the creation of such a post, the present Cyprus constitution does not. In case a settlement is not reached by the time of accession, there might be a need to find other legal paths to institutionalize such a post so that the country remains in course with the administrative reforms taking place in the rest of the Member States.

The idea of establishing a special unit/secretariat of EU affairs within the Presidential Palace of Cyprus should also be explored. At present, no such unit exists and the President is supported in his role of providing the general guidelines of the state's EU policy by a small circle of officials consisting primarily of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, the Chief Negotiator, the Head of the Planning Bureau, the Attorney-General as well as a few selected advisors (not necessarily members of the government).[13] However, the whole process of EU policy-making within the Presidential Palace is quite ad hoc and no formal body or permanent staff exist. This lack of a formal administrative framework is perhaps a result of the fact that the

demands conveyed upon the President during the pre-accession process were met with these arrangements. This will surely change, however, as EU membership will require that the President be engaged in a more routinized role in EU decision-making, assembling regularly for meetings of the European Council and taking the lead in Inter-Governmental Conferences.[14] Moreover, the salience of EU policy for domestic policies will necessitate the development of an early warning system within the Presidential Palace in order to alert the administration to possible dangers, as well as crisis management mechanisms in order to ensure that politicised issues are dealt with effectively. Such mechanisms already exist in other Member States and Cyprus will most likely need to follow that pattern sooner or later.[15]

Institutional changes will also be necessary in order to enhance the role of the national parliament in the state's EU policy-making. Some steps in the right direction have already been made, more specifically, with the establishment of a special Committee for European Affairs in May 2001.[16] The purpose of this Committee is to examine EU relevant bills and regulations, whereby, by its approval, the House can apply a fast track procedure to adopt them in the plenary. Over the last year, the parliament has adopted the majority of *acquis*-related laws and regulations in this way. In addition, the House has established a European Affairs Department consisting of legal officers who have received specialized training in European law, in order to assist the members of the European Affairs Committee in their task. These measures are significant to the extent that upon accession they would achieve the following: a) that they ensure the parliament the right for early and comprehensive information about legislative proposals of the Commission debated in the Council; b) that they provide the parliamentary committees the tools to achieve an effective role in the EU decision-making phase of the Council as well as parliamentary control over decisions taken by governments. Anything less than this will surely undermine the role of the parliament in shaping the country's EU policy.

Efforts should also be made in order to include interest groups within the EU decision-making process of the state. Trade unions, trade associations, industrial lobbies, farming lobbies, employers' organizations etc., will need to be provided with formal channels of communication with the government so that their interests are incorporated to the greatest possible extent within the state's negotiating stance in Brussels. Failure to do so will

leave the government exposed and vulnerable to criticism especially upon the adoption of an EU proposal which was unpopular among these groups.

Reforms should also take place in the representative institutions of the state at the European level; i.e., the state's Permanent Representation to the EU. The importance of this body cannot be emphasized enough. It will constitute the formal link between the national capital and Brussels and will be the key institution as far as the conduct of the state's EU policy at the European level. As Wessels and Maurer observe, the Permanent Representation operates 'not only *between* Brussels and their country, but also *within* a set of EU institutions (Council Secretariat, Council substructures, other permanent representations, Commission cabinets, Directorate-Generals, European Parliament, parliamentary committees, political groups, Committee of the Regions, ECOSOC) as well as third countries and organizations' (Wessels and Maurer, 2001: 102). In that regard, the number of staff in the Permanent Representation is important but so is the spread and depth of their expertise. The ability of these Brussels-based officials to collect information, persuade negotiating partners of the merits of the national position and build coalitions will be crucial as far as advancing the interests of the state. The Cyprus government established a representative institution in the EU since the early 1970s.[17] That delegation handled both the country's bilateral relations with Belgium as well as its relations with the EU. In 2000, and in an effort to prepare the country for accession, the delegation was divided into two bodies: the Permanent Representation of Cyprus to the EU, and the Cypriot Embassy in Belgium. Since then, the Permanent Representation has been increasingly allocated with more resources to perform its functions (Figure 3). At present, nearly all ministries have attachés within the Permanent Representation in addition to two attachés from the Planning Bureau and the Legal Service of the Republic.[18] However, it is admitted by the Permanent Representation that a significant reinforcement of officials will be required in order to meet the demands of formal accession.[19] There will also be a need for a re-organization of the working methods of the body at both the domestic and EU level. For example, during membership negotiations, the mission's output was very focused. The negotiations tended to concentrate on a limited number of topics at any given time. This allowed the mission to act exclusively through its foreign service members, while those ministries already represented in the mission were restricted to providing input into the negotiations.[20]

Figure 3

Composition of the Cyprus Permanent Representation to the EU

	Number of Staff				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Ministry of Foreign Affairs*	6	6	8	11	11
Ministry Finance	1	1	1	2	2
Ministry of the Interior	0	0	1	1	1
Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance	0	0	0	1	1
Ministry of Defence	0	1	1	1	1
Ministry of Justice and Public Order	0	0	0	0	0
Ministry of Education and Culture	0	0	0	0	0
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism	2	1	1	2	2
Ministry of Health	0	0	0	0	0
Ministry of Communications and Works	0	1	1	1	1
Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment	1	1	1	3	3
The Planning Bureau	0	0	1	1	1
The Legal Service	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	10	11	15	24	24

* Including the ambassador and his deputy

Source: The Cyprus Permanent Representation to the EU.

Upon membership, however, the Permanent Representation will need to adapt to the working methods of the Council of the EU. This may require that the Permanent Representation be further enlarged, external relations be no longer monopolized by diplomats, and a flexible pattern of work-sharing be developed between the ministries in Nicosia and the Permanent Representation.

Finally, there will also be a need for a more clear definition of the role and influence of the Permanent Representation in deciding the negotiating stance of the state and participating in the structures of domestic coordination. At present, the Permanent Representation does not formally participate in the domestic coordination process and its role is mostly confined in receiving and executing the instructions from the national capital.[21] Upon membership, however, it should be considered whether officials of the Permanent Representation attend the weekly meetings of the Directorate for EU Affairs and in fact have the power to influence the negotiating stance, arbitrate between ministries, and in the case of federal Cyprus, between communities. This is a practice which is common to several Member States (e.g. UK, Sweden, Belgium, Austria) as it is believed that greater involvement in shaping their instructions increases the effectiveness of these officials when defending the common position of the state at the EU level (Kassim, 2001b; Mazey, 2001; Kerremans & Beyers, 2001; Muller: 2001).

Conclusion

The accession of Cyprus in the EU will confront the country with significant administrative and institutional challenges. Reforms will be required in the institutions of the state at both the domestic and EU level, and in some cases, there will be a need for the establishment of new mechanisms. Creating a central coordination mechanism, an arbitration committee, a representational system at the EU level, special EU units and posts within ministries, enhancing the role of the national parliament and the Permanent Representation in the domestic coordination process, as well as increasing the latter's resources at the EU level, will be some of the absolute necessary changes that will need to be implemented before or immediately after accession, if the state is to meet its responsibilities in the EU. Apart from that, it will be up to the state's law-makers whether they deem necessary at some point in the future to create new institutions such as that of the Ministry of European Affairs as well as an EU Secretariat within the Presidential Palace. Experiences from other states, however, large and small, have indicated that such institutions increase the capacity of the state to deal with the overwhelming demands of EU membership.

In the case that Cyprus enters the EU as a federal state, it will also face the challenge of reconciling the often conflicting interests of the two communities in the conduct of its EU policy. The participation of Cyprus within the EU decision-making bodies will require the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities to coordinate a common position. That position will need to be coordinated fast, and more importantly, to be coherent. A small state like Cyprus cannot afford to speak with two voices in the European Union. Its interests can only be effectively represented at the EU level when the two communities lobby for the same goal. In the EU policymaking arena of constant bargaining, lobbying and coalition building — an enterprise that one Belgian official described as an 'oriental bazaar' — a state needs to solve its internal disagreements and formulate its common position early enough so as to concentrate its efforts at the EU level where the real game is played. It needs to have a clear and coherent position, knowing exactly what its aims are at the EU level, so that it can devise a strategy and take those measures, for example, lobby and gather support from other Member States, in order to achieve those aims.

Undoubtedly, there will be conflicts of interests between the two communities on certain EU issues. Hence the importance of an institutional environment whereby these conflicts are kept to a minimum. Putting in place a coordination system that will foster consensus between the two communities is a start. Such a system will need to clearly define the competencies and jurisdictions of the federal and sub-national governments for preparing, representing and negotiating Cyprus's EU policy. It will also need to provide for consensus-building mechanisms similar to, for example, that of the *ICFP* and *Concertation Committee* in Belgium. Moreover, the federal government of Cyprus will need to act as a unifying force for both communities. There should be a conscious effort from the part of the federal government to cultivate an environment of consensus and cooperation between the two communities when it comes to dealing with EU issues. Again, the role of the Belgian federal government as a mediator between the Flemish and Francophone communities is an example to take notice.

Above all, however, the two communities will need to be politically willing to work out their differences when it comes to dealing with EU issues. There needs to be an understanding that they have much more to gain collectively from reaching consensus on EU issues rather than insisting on hardline

positions. On some issues joint-interest and self-interest will converge between the communities, on others it will not. In the issues that the two communities disagree, there will be a need for a compromise — a practice that is essential in every successful partnership. In those cases, the two communities will need to be looking at the bigger picture and be aware that, in the long run, their individual interests are better served by acting as a single, rather than two separate units, within the EU framework.

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NOTES

1. Though, as Wright observes, 'the various levels of coordination may be usefully distinguished for analytical purposes, but, in practice, they intertwine in constant fashion' (1996: 149).

2. The characterization of the EU as *sui generis* was first used by neo-functionalist theorists such as Ernst Haas (1958) and Leon Lindberg (1963).

3. Up until 2002, the office was headed by Dr. George Vassiliou, ex-President of the Republic.

4. However, since its creation in 1988, the EU Ministerial Committee has only been activated four times, once in each Presidency (Interview with Panicos Pouros, Permanent Secretary of the Planning Bureau, 7 January 2004).

5. Interview with Panicos Pouros, Permanent Secretary of the Planning Bureau, 7 January 2004.

6. The former refers to the examination in great detail of the degree to which the body of law, institutions and procedures of the candidate country comply with those of the EU, that is with the *acquis communautaire*. The latter refers to the negotiation of transitional arrangements or derogations.

7. Article 3.2 of the Cooperation Agreement on European Union Relations provides that in case of a disagreement between the subnational governments on the common position of the state, a Coordination Group will coordinate and formulate that common position. The Coordination Group will consist of a representative of each of the members of the Presidential Council in charge of Foreign Affairs and European Union Relations, and a representative of each subnational government (The Annan Plan, Draft Annex IV, Attachment II: Cooperation Agreement on European Union Relations).

8. The repeated reference to Belgium is explained by the fact that its bi-ethnic social structure (i.e. the Flemish and Francophone community – the German community is very small) and the dynamics of conflict that underpin its society (i.e. linguistic, religious and socio-economic cleavages) is closer to the Cyprus reality than any other federation. Other decentralized states such as Germany, Austria and Spain have large numbers of subnational units and do not have bi-ethnic social structures.

9. The relevance of the Belgian representation model for the Cyprus reality has been recognized by the drafters of the Annan Plan as is evident in its provisions. Echoing the Belgian representation model, the Plan foresees the following: a) on issues that exclusively or predominantly fall within the competence of the federal government ('the common state'), the United Republic of Cyprus will be represented in the EU by a representative of the federal government; b) on issues that exclusively or predominantly fall within the competence of the subnational governments (the 'component states'), the United Republic of Cyprus will be represented in the EU either by a representative of the federal government or by a representative of the subnational governments, which will be appointed by the Presidential Council upon suggestion of the Coordination Group (The Annan Plan, Draft Annex IV; Attachment II: Cooperation Agreement on European Union Relations).

10. Interview with Petros Eutyhiou, Head of EU Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 9, 2004.

11. Interview with George Georgallis, Head of EU Team in the Ministry of Interior, and Marios Papagiannis, Head of EU Team in the Ministry of Agriculture, February 10, 2004.

12. For example, for the year 2003, 663 Cypriot ministerial civil servants participated in overseas training programmes conducted through Bilateral Cooperation Agreements, the TAIEX, the Third Pillar programmes and the Twinning programmes on institution buildings. Nearly half of these participants originated from the mentioned ministries (Internal Documents of the Planning Bureau). On the same year, 669 Cypriot ministerial civil servants participated in domestic training programmes conducted by the Cyprus Academy of Public Administration with the aim of acquainting them with the EU structures and policies. Again, the mentioned ministries occupied the majority of these positions (Internal Documents of the Cyprus Academy of Public Administration).

13. Interview with Michael Attalides, former Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the EU and currently Dean of School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law of Intercollege, Cyprus, 28 December 2003.

14. In the case of a federal Cyprus, the Annan Plan foresees that the state will be represented in the European Councils and IGC's by the Ministers of European Affairs and Foreign Affairs, each of them representing one community and both of them members of the six person strong Presidential Council (The Annan Plan, Draft Annex I, Part IV; Article 26.3, Article 27.1).

15. In the UK, for example, the Prime Minister is supported by the European Secretariat, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and advisers in the Prime Minster's Office or the Number 10 Policy Unit (Bender, 1991; Bulmer & Burch, 1998). In Germany, support for the Chancellor is provided by the Chancellor's Office (Derlien, 2000: 60), and in Denmark a special committee is convened to assist the Prime Minister in preparing for European Councils and Inter-Governmental Conferences (Pedersen, 2000: 223).

16. European Commission (2002) *Regular Report on Cyprus's Progress Towards Accession* (2002), COM (2002), 700 final.

17. Titos Phanos acted as the first Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the EU.

18. In case of a federal Cyprus, it is expected that the two communities will also have their representatives within the Permanent Representation.

19. Interview with H.E. Theofilos V. Theofilou, Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the EU, 12 January 2004.

20. Interview with H.E. Theofilos V. Theofilou, Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the EU, 12 January 2004.

21. Indeed, the Ambassador meets on an ad-hoc basis with the President and the Foreign Minister and desk officers in the Permanent Representation have regular phone contacts with their correspondents in the line ministries, yet their role is confined in servicing the needs of the lead department in the capital and advancing the position agreed in interdepartmental forum.

American and British Policy towards Cyprus (1968-1974): New Conclusions in Light of New Evidence

Claude Nicolet*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine les développements survenus à Chypre durant la période critique 1968-1974. Il se concentre sur le rôle joué par la Grande Bretagne et les États-Unis dans la formation des événements sur le plan politique, diplomatique et militaire. Une attention spéciale est attribuée à la crise de novembre 1967 et de juillet- août 1974. L'auteur avance que des considérations d'intérêts plus vastes que ceux des deux pays sur l'île et dans la région, plutôt que «la traîtrise et la conspiration» ont été les facteurs déterminants de leurs positions et actions. La présentation et l'analyse des politiques et événements se fait à la lumière de la documentation qui est devenue disponible récemment suivant la déclassification des documents officiels britanniques et américains.

ABSTRACT

This article deals with developments in Cyprus during the critical period of 1968 to 1974. It focuses on the role played by Britain and the United States in shaping events on the political, diplomatic and military fields. Special attention is paid to the crises of November 1967 and July-August 1974. The author argues that broader interest considerations of the two countries on the island and in the region, rather than 'betrayal and conspiracy' were the determining factors of their positions and actions. The presentation and analysis of policies and events is carried out in the light of evidence that became available only recently following the declassification of official British and American Documents.

Introduction

In 2003 the three 'dinosaurs' of Cypriot politics, Glafkos Clerides, his successor Tassos Papadopoulos and Rauf Denktash, failed to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. In spite of the urge to solve the Cyprus issue (the island's obligations if joining the EU) the old leaders failed to yield to international pressure. Even though the United Nations had taken the lead during the attempt of late 2002-early 2003, with Secretary-General Annan himself presenting the eponymous plan, it had again been Britain, and to an

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even larger extent, the US exerting pressure behind the front row of eager diplomats. However, Cypriots, Greeks and Turks have long ceased to yield to American pressure in pursuing their interests on the island, especially as the Americans and the British have a bad reputation for diplomacy among Cypriots. Bluntly, the US is being blamed for the *de facto* partition of the island since 1974. Embedded in Cypriot history for decades, this view is difficult to revise, even though several recent authors have discovered many inconsistencies as well as illogical arguments in the predominant theories of historians covering the British and American roles in Cyprus during the first half of the 1970s.[1] On the other hand, the recent declassification of many documents at the United States National Archives as well as at the Richard M. Nixon Library calls for more thorough discussion of the topic involving all those researchers with a genuine interest in discovering just how much America and Britain really were involved in Cyprus during that period. These documents will likely also reveal how some obvious diplomatic blunders occurred in 1974.

There may be diverging views within the historiography on the Cyprus conflict; however, most nuances disappear when it comes to the role of the United States in independent Cyprus. Regarding the general US policy towards Cyprus, most people maintain that America had endorsed the partition of the island ever since its independence in 1960, and that US diplomats share among themselves a profound dislike of President and Archbishop Makarios, regarded as a Communist priest who would sooner or later transform Cyprus into a "Cuba of the Mediterranean". On British policy, not much had been known, as UK policy at the time had been perceived as generally passive and in the shadow of its mighty partner, the leader of NATO and big brother in the so-called British-American special relationship. Concerning the role of the two countries in the 1974 crisis, most people point to conspiracies mainly on the part of the Americans, with the British in tow to a lesser degree. The interesting pattern in this rationale is that the accusations include US conspiracies with Greece for the overthrow of Makarios, as well as US collusion with Turkey in its reaction to the coup.

While comprehensive documentary material is still not available on all issues, one basic contradiction to the accusations listed above appears to be confirmed with the gradual release of the files in American archives. This

contradiction is that all the alleged collusion with the unhappy events (partition plans, assassination attempts on Makarios, General Grivas' return to the island, the Greek coup and two Turkish invasions in 1974) would have implied a destabilization of the island, including the mother countries, Greece and Turkey, as well as the eastern Mediterranean region as a whole. Of course, this destabilization has long been the most profound American concern running like a thread through US diplomacy in Cyprus for the past five decades.

To start this analysis with a set of provocative statements in answer to the accusations evoked above; we argue here that, first, after the US had preferred *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) in return for some compensations to the Turks for years, it started to endorse the independence of the island as long as the Cypriots would not themselves agree to some form of partition. Second, by the end of the 1960s, US fear and hatred of Makarios had been replaced with basic annoyance at his stubbornness, coupled with sincere admiration by many politicians for his political skills and power. In general, after 1968, the US had come to regard Makarios as a nuisance. Nonetheless it also recognized him as powerful and indispensable for stabilization of the country. Third, and more significantly, neither the Americans nor the British regarded General Grivas as a viable alternative to Makarios any longer. Last, regarding both the Greek coup on July 15, 1974, and the two Turkish invasions in July and August, the Americans and the British endorsed none of these actions. Their actions during these events were marked by political failure, a lack of diplomatic means, but also a general lack of concern, rather than conspiracy or collusion. This was especially true for the American side, whose policy ultimately unwillingly encouraged both Greeks and Turks to act as they did. As for the British, the case speaks for basic political weakness at the time in the face of declining influence over the events in the region and diplomatic disagreement with the US.

This analysis will first look at the implications of the crisis of November 1967 on British and American policy, then it will trace these countries' roles during the bicommunal talks between Clerides and Denktash that started in June 1968 and ended with the crisis of 1974. The relations of the Americans with President Makarios and General Grivas will also be discussed. Finally, the events of 1974 will be analyzed, including the American and British roles

in the Greek coup and the Turkish invasions, as well as the crisis in the Anglo-American special relationship resulting from blunders in that crisis.

Early 1968 may be called a landmark in Cypriot history for several reasons. Most importantly, the most dangerous crisis in Cypriot history until then had just been resolved. It began on November 15, 1967, with a massacre near Agios Theodoros subsequent to a quarrel between Greek-Cypriot security forces and Turkish-Cypriot villagers who did not want them to patrol their area. After a credible threat by Turkey to invade Cyprus, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent his personal emissary, Cyrus Vance, on a mission that ended with an agreement which involved the withdrawal of General Grivas together with thousands of illegally infiltrated troops in return for the withdrawal of the Turkish threat. Equally important was the 365-degree turn in the Cypriot policy brought about by the crisis .

Implications of the November 1967 Crisis on British and American Policy towards Cyprus

The Americans managed the November 1967 crisis almost single-handedly, while British diplomacy remained in the background. On the one hand, British policy seemed paralyzed in the face of a massive economic crisis including the devaluation of the pound during the very same week. On the other hand, during those years, the British had rarely been quick to react with significant measures to crises in Cyprus because of a rather odd division of tasks and a lack of cooperation between the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office. Only when the most dangerous moments of the crisis had been over did the British attempt to offer the U.S. a role in the crisis management process. Regarding the follow-up diplomacy to the crisis, though, the British became as active as the Americans.

Although Britain had remained rather passive in its Cyprus diplomacy since 1964, at least it always advocated giving the Cypriots themselves a voice in discussions about the future of their country. This stemmed mostly from the island's membership in the Commonwealth. Yet the US had always brushed these suggestions aside, even during the November 1967 crisis. It was one of the severest mistakes of US policy towards Cyprus during the 1960s to have dealt only with Greece and Turkey, rather than with Cyprus.

After the crisis in late 1967, several changes came about almost simultaneously.

First the government in Cyprus must have been sobered by the Turkish threat and the American difficulty in averting a crisis. It thus signaled attempts for a détente *vis-à-vis* the Turkish-Cypriots. At the same time, the Americans were so disappointed by the lack of a Greek-Turkish agreement at the Evros summit in the early autumn and received Greek signs of military as well as political withdrawal from Cyprus. Their disappointment was such that Washington's diplomats tended to look favourably on bicommunal negotiations, as long as Turkey could somehow still be a guarantor for safeguarding Western interests during the search for a solution. Several months went by before the top level of the Department of State agreed to this. It finally did agree because it was taken by surprise by the fact that not only the UN secretary-general, but also Greece and Turkey asked for bicommunal talks.[2]

The US was thus,for the first time, willing to engage in mediation for a long-term solution rather than crisis diplomacy. Moreover, again for the first time, the US broke the taboo of bicommunal talks, after having regarded Cyprus as a NATO issue for years. Finally, Washington explicitly endorsed independence as the desired and most realistic basis for a solution for Cyprus.

While an American 'Cyprus Study Group' had brought forward clear recommendations in this sense, the British and Canadians had carried out studies which were then compared in early January 1968. The British study on the "Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute" called for an approach to the problem in three tiers.[3] The first tier proposed a general improvement of living conditions on the island, hopefully by March. The second tier would entail bicommunal constitutional talks that could last until the following year. Finally, the third tier would require the three Guarantor Powers: Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to approve the Constitution worked out by the two communities. The Canadian "Draft Working Paper on Possible Next Steps in Cyprus" had much in common with the British study, but was much more detailed and concentrated on bicommunal talks.[4] The bone of contention between the Canadians, Britons and Americans was the timing of U.S. — or combined U.S., British and Canadian — involvement. The US preferred immediate, direct involvement; the British,

for involvement at the earliest during the bicommunal talks; the Canadians clearly called for the communities to work out their own problems without outside interference.[5] A compromise was finally struck between the three countries when it was agreed that UN Secretary-General U-Thant should continue his good offices until reacing a deadend.

Roles of the US and UK in the Bicommunal Talks (1968–1974)

Although even the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had endorsed bicommunal talks by their start in June 1968, the US was not at all optimistic as to their success. From the offset, the US went about with supporting the official procedure, but considered planning for a four-sided conference between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The basic question would be when was the best moment for such a conference. In the end, it never happened.

Nevertheless, both the US and UK continued to support bicommunal talks without interfering as to their substance. They were in a dilemma, as best explained by Cyprus Country Director in the US State Department, Robert Folsom. While it was believed that in the face of deadlock American mediation could produce some new impetus, Folsom also recognized that US interference would harden the positions, since each party would believe America was on its side.[6] For this reason, the Americans, British and Canadians decided through trilateral discussions on Cyprus in mid-November 1968 to not take action until the talks reached a clear dead-end. Furthermore, they determined not to take action until the UN secretary-general would have failed with an initiative on his own.

One of the main problems of the bicommunal talks was that the two interlocutors had the same approach that they would keep until early 2003: No concessions would be made and no intermediate accords signed until a whole package agreement would be reached on all issues. Throughout 1969, concern on behalf of the Americans and the British about a lack of progress increased. It was the crisis around the first assassination attempt on President Makarios that prompted a new push in US planning. In early March 1970, Washington discussed an initiative by their ambassador in Nicosia, called "constitutional compromise proposals." They called for a compromise

between what the Turkish-Cypriots had gained through the 1960 constitution and what the Greek-Cypriots had gained through the events between 1963 and 1970.

At the time, the US always tried to make their views converge with those of the British in their Cypriot policy. However, the British told them that they would not want to interfere with the talks in any way, not even participate on an informal basis. London preferred to take a stance of so-called "positive non-involvement," that had been regarded as successful in avoiding crises for the past three years,[7] and wanted to reserve all potential outside interference to the UN secretary-general. This American initiative thus came to an end even before it had really started.

The Americans and British finally did agree to encourage that Greek-Turkish ideas be passed on to Clerides and Denktash respectively.[8] With this in mind, it was agreed that from then on the Americans would start to prod Greece to come up with constructive proposals; whereas, the British would work likewise on Turkey. The basic reason for this division of tasks was that the US was the only Western country with fairly normal diplomatic relations with the Greek junta. It could thus apply pressure; whereas, the British would help out with Turkey whose relations to America were somewhat difficult owing to unresolved problems with the sixth fleet in the Turkish ports. These well-intended attempts failed quite soon, however, because the British did not cooperate in practice. In April 1971, the Americans heard that the British had engaged in a unilateral initiative in Turkey without prior consultation. The exact purpose of this initiative remained obscure but consisted of a clear British suggestion to Ankara that the Turkish-Cypriots should be induced to show more flexibility in talks on the island. What was especially odd about the initiative was that in rejecting the US compromise proposals in March, British diplomats had claimed that they would have to retain their clear impartiality with the two Cypriot communities by all means possible. Now they clearly did the opposite. *Perfide Albion?*

That the Americans for once were much more cautious in their approach was demonstrated by their repeated warnings that Greece and Turkey should not only be pressured in providing ideas to the interlocutors, but also that they should by no means attempt to impose an agreed solution on the Cypriots. Any such solution would clearly fail. Revelations from the American archives clearly speak against those who have claimed that the

Americans had applied power politics and had attempted to impose solutions throughout the history of their engagement in Cyprus until 1974. The US had become much more reasonable and more sensitive to Cypriot realities by the 1970s than during the 1960s. In one of the rare Country Policy Statements for Cyprus, produced in June 1971, the US stated "...no Cyprus solution will be viable unless it is acceptable to the Cypriots." It went on to point out: "Failure of all previous efforts to achieve a settlement of the Cyprus problem appears to have stemmed from the fact that the proposals either did not include the Greek and Turkish Cypriots or involved them only in the final stages."[9] This insight was a big step from the insensitive approaches of the previous decade.

The decision in September 1971 to expand the talks with the inclusion of an advisor from Greece, Turkey and the United Nations was neither an American nor a British initiative. It originated in a bilateral Greek-Turkish agreement. At first the US remained non-committal. It then not only agreed, but also volunteered to apply pressure on the Greek Cypriots to accept, especially because the negotiators of both communities would still have the main say in the talks. The support was in effect an indication of growing US concern about lack of progress in the talks.

It was during the next year, 1972, that London and Washington began to disagree more often about action on Cyprus. In short, a general increase of American concern stood opposite an obvious lack of British concern. In November 1972, the difference in views culminated with silent suspicion on behalf of the US that the British were in effect well-served by the growing tension on the island. A solution to the problems would likely result in a change of the status of their Sovereign Base Areas.[10] This suspicion was repeated well into 1973. It seemed, therefore, that the well-meant Anglo-American cooperation on Cyprus policy existed only for short periods and primarily in theory. However, the increase of rather disturbing events on the island, more in relation to tension within the Greek Cypriot society than between the two communities, was primarily responsible for a general lull in US policy after the spring of 1973. The bicommunal talks remained interrupted for many months until they were resumed in June 1974, shortly before the big crisis that ended the talks altogether. Before looking at that crisis, however, it is necessary to briefly discuss the US and British roles during significant events in Cyprus other than the bicommunal talks.

America, Britain, and their Views of Makarios and Grivas

In an assassination attempt in March 1970, President Makarios's helicopter was shot while taking off from Nicosia. The wounded pilot died shortly after having succeeded in landing the damaged helicopter, but Makarios remained unharmed.[11] Regarding the culprits, Clerides in his memoirs came to the conclusion that officers around the influential Greek General, Dimitrios Ioannides, together with supporters of General Grivas and former Interior Minister Georgadjis, were responsible for the attempt. This broadly corresponded with the court rulings in the aftermath of the attempt on Makarios' life.[12]

Nevertheless, the Soviets, though not accusing the Americans directly, seemed to suspect American complicity with the Greek junta in the assassination plan.[13] Recently declassified documents reveal that the Americans had expected to be accused, as they had known about all the rumours concerning their role in Cyprus. These rumours escalated when one of the main suspects, Georgadjis, was himself assassinated only few days later. However, conspiracy theories by those authors who saw the CIA behind almost everything evil happening on the island have only been supported by the weak evidence that extremist circles in Greece had some good relations with CIA officials.[14] U.S. Ambassador David H. Popper in late March reported from Nicosia:

> *In the present situation of accusation and counter accusation, there is an almost irresistible temptation for those who wish to absolve the mainland Greeks from any involvement (...), to shift the blame either to the U.K. or to the U.S. While most informed Cypriots do not believe the 'American CIA' attempted to assassinate Makarios and did assassinate Georkadjis, there is a sizeable constituency that either accepts the U.S. devil theory or prefers to have Americans (or British) blamed instead of mainland Greeks.*[15]

The Americans had changed their attitude towards the archbishop substantially during the previous six years. In their view, Makarios was not the "Castro of the Mediterranean" any-more, as he had been during the early and mid-1960s. The formation of political parties in 1969 confirmed that the Communists, although strong, did not have the clear support of the

Archbishop. Now Makarios was seen as the obstacle to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. However, because of his authority in Cyprus, there seemed to be no way around him in reaching a settlement. Moreover, as a stable and quiet southeastern flank of NATO was the primary American goal in the region, any attempt to remove the Archbishop would clearly have been contrary to U.S. interests. In fact it was believed that it would likely have been followed by civil war including Greek and Turkish involvement. Not surprisingly, documents reveal that American diplomats were rather shocked and concerned by the attempt on Makarios' life.

Evidence that the US was actually trying to protect Makarios was produced by Laurence Stern as early as 1975.[16] In his well-known article "Bitter Lessons" Stern explained how American officials had cautioned Makarios about an assassination attempt twice, at the end of January and in late February 1970. Makarios did not take the threat seriously, but Ambassador David Popper's warning and timing of the attempt proved astonishingly prophetic. Moreover, when a US contingencies and options paper in the wake of the turmoil was being finalized, mid-April 1970, the State Department explicitly included a revealing clause about the continuing danger of a coup: "Should the US government become aware of an assassination plot against Makarios we would want to make every attempt to warn him of the threat."[17]

The British were also of the view that President Makarios constituted the best guarantee of stabilization on the island and in the wider area. The only diplomat who seemed to diverge from this view was High Commissioner Edmonds, who was promptly told to get in line with the opinion in London. Charles Wiggin of the Foreign Office's Southern European Department wrote:

> *In particular I do not share what appears to be his [Edmond's] view that we might be better off if the Archbishop were to disappear from the scene. I do not see how... we could hope for a successor who was both well disposed towards us and capable of maintaining stability in the island.*[18]

Another rather unfounded as well as illogical accusation is that the US conspired to bring exiled General George Grivas back to Cyprus in autumn 1971 and helped him fund the organization EOKA-B.[19] Instead it turns out that the Americans were concerned about his return for the same reason that

they were concerned about the assassination attempt on Makarios: regional stability was of the necessity and was likely to suffer with this development. The British agreed and were similarly concerned about a possible *coup d'état.* The US Ambassador was thus authorized by the State Department to convey to Makarios that Washington saw Grivas' return as

> *potentially disruptive and in that sense unwelcome. Should Grivas move to challenge the authority of the GOC [Government of Cyprus], which we support, we hope he will be promptly contained and removed from Cyprus. In the event of such a challenge, we would be prepared to make this view known to other governments sharing responsibility for the maintenance of stability on the island.*[20]

Makarios responded that he welcomed this assurance and might be calling Washington on its promise. He did so only few months later upon realizing that he was to be overthrown by the Greek Government in a *coup d'état*, in March 1972. At his request, Ambassador Tasca in Athens warned the Greeks about doing anything of the kind. In not uncertain terms he told them that the US was strongly against any such attempts. Documents on the occasion are still partly classified, but for Clerides the conclusion, as described in his memoirs, was clear: "[...] pressure from the US first, and then from other Governments prevented the coup planned by the military government of Greece for the 15th March 1972."[21]

While the Americans were not as convinced as the British that the Greek Government was behind the secret return of Grivas, they nevertheless pressured the Greek junta to come out publicly against Grivas' attempt in order to thwart any negotiated settlements. In this context, the US made it clear once more that it remained "opposed to any effort to impose partition and double enosis on Cyprus because it would not solve the Cyprus problem but, rather, place it in a more tragic and chaotic context."[22] The assessment would prove correct in the summer 1974.

The US and the Samson Coup in Cyprus

The change of thinking in U.S. policy towards Cyprus between the 1960s and the early 1970s demonstrates that the question of an American role in

the coup of July 15 1974 is one of whether the US had done all in its power to dissuade the Greek junta from overthrowing Makarios, rather than of whether the US conspired with the colonels.

The dispute between Makarios and the junta peaked in early July when the Archbishop demanded in a letter to the Greek President that all Greek officers serving on the island be withdrawn. By leaking this letter to the media without awaiting a Greek answer, Makarios deliberately let the proud Greek military dictatorship lose face. Nevertheless, as it seems, neither the Archbishop nor the American diplomats in the upper echelons of the State Department believed that the Greek junta would be as unwise as to stage a coup. This misjudgment seems much more probable than either US complicity or even Kissinger's later claim that "the information [regarding an impending coup] was not exactly lying on the street."[23]

There had been numerous forewarnings of a coup, of which the US had taken notice. As early as February 1974, the country directors for Cyprus, Greece and Turkey at the State Department pressured for Ambassador Tasca in Athens to issue a warning to the junta that the US would be against any effort to overthrow Makarios. However, Kissinger did not grasp the urgency and strictly instructed the Ambassador that he "make no waves."[24] In March, both the Soviets and Cypriots warned the US about an impending coup. Instead of heeding the warning, Kissinger instructed not to follow it, as it would be embarrassing to "go running into the Greeks and the Turks on the basis of a Soviet démarche," especially as it could have been that the Soviets had been "put up to it by the Cypriots."[25] A third warning came by way of a Greek journalist through Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee J. William Fulbright, in May. However, Kissinger reportedly answered that he could not intervene in Greek internal affairs.[26] The fourth warning was the most obvious, arrived at the same time and was handled most inappropriately. On June 20, Greek junta leader Ioannides informed a CIA officer in Athens that he was planning a coup against President Makarios and asked how the United States would react.[27] As a consequence, by late June the country directors for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus were finally able to convince their superiors on the seriousness of the situation in Cyprus. Instructions were eventually sent to Ambassador Tasca on June 29.[28] However, it was now Tasca who stalled, fiercely arguing that the warnings would alienate the Greek government.[29] In the defense of Tasca it must be

said that he had allegedly been kept in the dark about the CIA report of 20 June.[30] Also, he had the support of Deputy Chief of Mission Lindsay Grant in Nicosia, who similarly believed that making demarches to the Colonels while the officially declared Greek policy continued to be non-violent would be extremely harmful to U.S.-Greek relations, as it would accuse the Greek regime of duplicitous behavior.[31] Finally, Tasca and Grant clung to the assessment of the U.S. mission in Nicosia that the earliest logical date for a coup would be upon the rotation of the Greek officers in Cyprus, in September, as an excuse not to act upon the instruction.[32] By the time a re-worded, eighth version of the instructions reached Athens, Tasca was on leave. In the absence of the ambassador, the political counselor paid visits to the powerless Prime Minister and a Greek Orthodox bishop close to the junta instead of to Ioannides himself.[33]

This proves that Kissinger's claims that there was no information about an impending coup and that if there had been any it was not brought to his personal attention are wrong. The question begs to be answered: Why did the Americans not take action? Kissinger's strongest argument against the accusation that he had failed to prevent the coup is that Archbishop Makarios himself had neither asked for American help nor expressed any specific concern during Kissinger's short stopover in Cyprus in May.[34] Thus the assurance that Makarios was not concerned, together with trust in the junta's common sense and reluctance to further antagonize the colonels, made every indication contrary to the coup rumors welcome. This maybe explain why the US chose to trust one crucial misleading message by the CIA dated July 12, or three days before the coup, according to which junta leader Ioannides assured a CIA intelligence officer that the Greek government did not intend to overthrow Makarios. The State Department decisionmakers chose to ignore the mountain of evidence in favour of this one message. Not surprisingly, this has given rise to conspiracy theories among Greeks and Greek-Cypriots.[35]

The problem with most allegations that the CIA had been involved in planning the coup is that they are supported by weak evidence. It does seem odd that Ioannides' confirmation to a CIA officer of planning a coup was not conveyed to the embassy in Athens, contrary to the claim of July 12 that there would be no coup. Nevertheless, if some of the suspicious episodes will be proven correct with the further declassification of archival material, it is

likely that there will be evidence for wrongful, even conspiratorial behavior of some individual US agents, rather than of the CIA as a whole, or even the US Government.

The most obvious evidence against a CIA conspiracy is the record of the intelligence collection effort, which demonstrates that the bulk of the clandestine reports were warning about an impending coup, while only the reporting from the Athens embassy was termed as "weak."[36] Also, Stern provided information about the CIA's Athens station chief, Stacy B. Hulse, Jr., who was virtually thrown out of Ioannides' office shortly before July 15, because he had reportedly tried to discourage any thoughts of a coup in Cyprus.[37]

If it were true that the US had conspired with the junta to overthrow Makarios, Nixon and Kissinger would have needed a good reason for upsetting the fragile balance in the eastern Mediterranean. It would have to be a very good reason to let the Nixon administration embark on a dangerous adventure at the same time as the American presidency was in a deep crisis which threatened to paralyze much of the day-to-day business. In fact, the only substantial reason brought forward by those who have tried to prove an American conspiracy is the dislike of Makarios and an alleged fear of communism in Cyprus.[38] As has been demonstrated above, however, the often-heard American portrayal of Makarios as the "Castro of the Mediterranean" belonged to the Johnson rather than the Nixon era.

The most obvious, overall conclusion is that the matter was handled inadequately at the State Department. One explanation for this is that the State Department section concerned with Cyprus was not fully functioning at the time, as the Cyprus, Greece and Turkey desks were transferred on July 1 from the Near East Affairs Bureau (NEA) to the European Affairs Bureau (EUR). The result was that many mid-level officials were confronted with the new topic of Cyprus about which Assistant Secretary Wells Stabler later admitted, "very few of us at that time in EUR had a great deal of knowledge [...]."[39]

However, answers must be sought about American action during the coup itself. Assistant Secretary Hartman advised Kissinger to attempt a reversal of the coup but without sanctions. Hartman pointed out that "this is our best chance to prevent the Cyprus situation from complicating our evolving

relations with the Soviets and from becoming a cause of strife between Greece and Turkey,"[40] Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger wanted a much harsher reaction, including cutting off all military aid to Greece and withdrawing American nuclear weapons.[41] Secretary Kissinger, however, did not agree with either option. Neither did he want to jeopardize the U.S. air and sea bases in Greece, nor did he want to give up a maximum flexibility until the other countries would be committed.[42]

What Kissinger did not understand is that such an approach could not work with the allies in the eastern Mediterranean. Both Greece and Turkey had usually looked to their primary arms deliverer and NATO leader America as soon as they had themselves become uncertain as to the path to choose. The maximum flexibility that Kissinger was promoting could be but a non-committal policy that was likely to be exploited by all sides, and sent wrong signals to the parties that were desperately looking for some U.S. guidance. In general, the Kissinger approach signified a policy of procrastination in a fast-moving situation that contained all the dangers of the very escalation that the U.S. had sought to prevent for years.

With this approach Kissinger also fanned the conspiracy theories because included in the flexibility approach was the question of whether the new government in Cyprus should be recognized or whether Makarios was still regarded as the president. It is worth pointing out that allegations about US officials dealing diplomatically with coupists, which would have been just about proof for recognition of the new government, do not seem to be true. Only in one case did a US official in Nicosia meet with the new "Foreign Minister", but he pointed out very clearly in his talk with him that they were meeting on a private basis, as the Washington still regarded the Makarios government as the legitimate one. Moreover, allegations that the US only welcomed Makarios to the White House after the coup as Archbishop rather than President are clearly wrong. Kissinger announced shortly before the visit that he was receiving Makarios in his presidential and not his episcopal capacity.[43] Therefore, despite all the attempts by critics to accuse the US of preferring the new strongman Nikos Sampson rather than Makarios, the evidence points to the fact that the US did neither more nor less, than stay non-committal. Evidence for this non-committal stance can be found in a joint US State Department strategy paper of July 18 that Kissinger signed himself:

> *We view as unlikely the restoration of Makarios and we do not accept a Sampson regime. Consequently, the situation in favor of either one or the other should not be allowed to freeze, thus creating the conditions for the development of a compromise and negotiated settlement which would permit the maintenance of constitutional arrangements in Cyprus [...].*[44]

At least, albeit vaguely defined and evasive, Kissinger's policy was consistent in its overall aims. From the day of the coup the U.S. policy aimed to avoid internationalization of the conflict. However, this internationalization of the crisis could not be prevented.

The US and Britain in the Face of the Turkish Invasions

The newly established Cyprus Task Force in Washington estimated on July 17 that Turkey was likely to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus within the next two days.[45] In addition, the Task Force did not believe that Turkey would consult with the United States before undertaking military action.[46] The damage of U.S. pressure on Turkey during the crisis of June 1964 had been too severe and the Vance mission of 1967 had been too harshly criticized by the political opposition in Turkey that was now in power.

The Cyprus Task Force suggested that superiors at the State Department proceed with a "constitutional strategy," a middle course that would involve pressing Greece to accept restoration of a legitimate government in Cyprus without unnecessarily alienating her and to convince Turkey that enough was being done to make military intervention unnecessary.[47] In spite of the vagueness of this proposed course, Kissinger once again chose to proceed on his undefined path of inaction. The Secretary later presented two major justifications for this. First, "nothing could have stopped a Turkish intervention," he later told his staff. After all, they had been prevented from intervening in 1964 and 1967. In 1974 they "were given, through stupidity of the Greek Junta, a godsend," especially because they did not attack a legitimate government in Cyprus, but "a man who was internationally considered a professional thug"[48] and who was known for his brutal action against Turkish Cypriots in December 1963. As Rauf Denktash was reported to have pointedly remarked to the press, Sampson was as unacceptable to the

Turkish Cypriots as Adolf Hitler would have been to Israel.[49] Second, Kissinger wrote, in 1974, "on the verge of either impeachment or resignation, Nixon was in a very weak position either to threaten or to cajole" with a personal intervention, contrary to Johnson's strong positions in 1964 and 1967.[50] Both attempts at justification demonstrate that the US was not even seriously willing to try to stop a Turkish invasion. The fear prevailed that the risks of failure were greater than the chances of success, and that in the case of failure the damage to U.S. relations with Greece and Turkey would be too big. This was the primary reason why the U.S. action to prevent a Turkish invasion and an internationalization of the conflict remained rather low-key from the first day of the coup.

Meanwhile, the status of Guarantor Power re-involved the British Government into the Cyprus problem for the first time since the 1960s. Ever since the Government of Prime Minister Douglas-Home had conveyed to the Americans the message that the British could no longer cover their political duties in Cyprus, in late January 1964, the United States had taken the lead in guarding the Western interests in the region, and in reminding Greece and Turkey from time to time that their bilateral problems over Cyprus were negligible, contrary to the larger picture of the Cold War.

Kissinger leaves no doubt in his memoirs that the British-American cooperation in the Cyprus crisis, although it would have been more important than ever before, did have drawbacks right from the beginning.[51] First of all, Prime Minister James Callaghan, by definition of the British status, took over the leading role in what was his first exposure to foreign crisis diplomacy. In general, Kissinger rather arrogantly belittles Callaghan's stature in foreign policy, owing to the latter's preoccupation with predominantly domestic affairs prior to 1974.[52] Secondly, the Labour policy's strong anti-Greek junta stance clashed with Kissinger's wavering policy. Not only did Britain evacuate Makarios from the island shortly after his surprising survival of the coup, but it also told Greece to recall her officers attached to the Cyprus National Guard.[53] Finally, the U.S. regarded the crisis within the NATO context, whereas the UK was primarily concerned about the invasion of a Commonwealth member. The US approach thus made it less willing to antagonize either the Greek Colonels or the Turks. Callaghan himself, as he remembered in his memoirs, felt fewer inhibitions.[54]

Prime Minister Ecevit arrived in London for consultations with the British on July 17. There he confronted Britain with a request to allow Turkey to use the British bases for a military intervention to restore constitutional government. Moreover, Turkish access to the sea and the return of Makarios were repeated as further objectives. The British refused a Turkish use of their bases, however, because, as Callaghan later stated, the island needed fewer Greek troops, not more Turkish troops, and the British had already called on the Greek Government to withdraw their officers.[55] Nevertheless, to be fair, it was not Britain's refusal to cooperate with Turkey that led to the failure of the consultation, but rather the Greek Colonels' continuing refusal to comply with the British urgings, as they still regarded a Turkish invasion as unlikely.

Secretary Kissinger, meanwhile, sent his Under Secretary Joseph Sisco to London, Athens and Ankara. He was instructed to try to work out a compromise proposal that would elevate Clerides to acting president for a period of six months. After this time, an election would be held in which Makarios would be free to run. In the interval, a new communal arrangement would be negotiated between the Greek and Turkish sides. One of the basic advantages of this compromise, Kissinger believed, was that the Turkish side would not have to deal with the stubborn archbishop in the communal talks.[56] Sisco's team was convinced that Kissinger's plan would not work, as one of the members, Dillon, later recalled. However, they were unable to convince the Secretary and eventually left for Ankara rather unenthusiastically.[57]

Also, it was soon obvious that Turkey was increasingly enjoying a stronger position that would let them demand a much better deal than the one proposed by the Americans. "Up to now we have tried this your way," Ecevit told Sisco, "so please let us for once try it our way."[58] In response, the Secretary sent a strong, though somehow belated, last-minute telegram to Sisco to urge him to impress on Ecevit that "the US would take the gravest view of Turkish military moves before all diplomatic processes are exhausted."[59] However, Sisco was not able to dissuade Ecevit from a decision already taken, to initiate military operations in Cyprus.[60]

The Greek junta had not even attempted to intervene from Greece, because of military difficulties.[61] Owing to the Greek absence and the fast Turkish advance, the conquest of northern Cyprus was only halted,

therefore, when the US issued what even Kissinger called an ultimatum: if a cease-fire was not agreed to within twelve hours, the United States would remove all of its nuclear weapons from both sides of the Greek-Turkish border in Thrace.[62] Moreover, together with Britain and France the U.S. demanded that a cease-fire be followed immediately by a meeting under British auspices between the Foreign Ministers of the three Guarantor Powers.[63] Both Athens and Ankara agreed only reluctantly.

With the junta in Athens and its puppet regime in Nicosia crumbling in quick succession on July 23, Washington could finally leave behind its ambiguous policy of "maximum flexibility" and quickly recognize the new government of Constantinos Karamanlis and the interim government of Glafkos Clerides.[64]

A crisis in the British-American "special relationship"

Callaghan and Kissinger sought to save the Geneva conference that had quickly been organized after the Greek coup and to prevent a second Turkish military move, the former by chairing the conference and the latter from the sidelines and through his emissary Arthur Hartman. The Secretary later recalled that Nixon's resignation prevented a significant US role in Callaghan's efforts.[65] However, this is an insufficient excuse. Once again The US had badly underestimated the seriousness of the crisis and danger of further strife. As the Secretary later had to admit, the State Department's Cyprus Task Force was already dissolved after the first ceasefire, because the U.S. again thought that the crisis was on its way to being defused.[66] The U.S. was rather alone in this belief, as all other parties to the conflict prepared for the final showdown. This difference in assessment led to a serious dispute between Britain and the U.S., over the policy towards the island in its most challenging time, and evoked fears of a situation reminiscent of the Suez imbroglio of 1956.

When the Turkish forces broke the ceasefire at the end of July and UN forces were in danger of being attacked, the British sent some reinforcements to be placed under UN command. This, in Callaghan's view, halted the Turkish moves.[67] Furthermore, he informed the British press that some Phantom aircraft would be sent to the island, and dropped a heavy hint that British troops would be authorized to fire on Turks to stop any breach of the ceasefire.[68]

The Americans, however, had a different opinion about the situation in Cyprus. Hartman argued that there was no longer an odious regime in Athens, no illegal regime in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots were protected, and there was a strong UN resolution. These were rational arguments that should appeal to Turkish intelligence and restrain them from action, Hartman argued.[69] Kissinger states in his memoirs — wrongly it seems — that Callaghan agreed with him that a second Turkish move was not likely.[70] This is all the more surprising, as a CIA assessment of 27 July had clearly indicated that the original Turkish invasion plan had provided for a five-day assault. The ceasefire of 22 July had stopped the Turkish advance after three days of fighting, and had prevented the Turkish forces from extending their bridgehead to the city of Famagusta. Also, later reports confirmed that the ceasefire had left Turkish military leaders restive and eager to complete the operation.[71] Nevertheless, Hartman was instructed to tell Callaghan that the United States was not happy with the British approach. To President Ford, Kissinger complained that the British were "threatening military action against the Turks which is one of the stupidest things I have heard."[72] The Secretary preferred to trust his former Harvard student, Prime Minister Ecevit. He had spoken to him on the telephone, urging him to refrain from military action and making it clear that Turkey would get no support from the U.S., if they made any further advance. As a result, the Secretary claimed he had received assurances from the Turkish premier on this score with which he was content.

The fate of Cyprus was sealed. The UN forces were ready to withdraw if the Turks advanced, while the United States was not prepared to put military pressure on the Turks.[73] Clerides later recalled that Callaghan pointed out to him that the United Kingdom was no longer a superpower, that it could not afford another Suez, and that any strong-arm action could not be contemplated by the United Kingdom, except if in the context of the UN or of an American initiative.[74] Kissinger later tried to take the sting out of Callaghan's criticism by pointing at the U.S. domestic weakness, thus trying to conceal his misjudgment of Turkish intentions. "The presidential transition constrained our options [...]," he later wrote.[75] Hartman was therefore instructed to tell Callaghan that "it is out of the question to be asking a president in the first 48 hours of his administration to consider supporting military action."[76] If the U.S. domestic situation had indeed been the main constraint on military support, as Kissinger tried to point out, it

would not have explained his remark to President Ford that threatening military action against the Turks was "one of the stupidest things I have heard."[77]

Finally, Turkey issued an ultimatum that could in no way be accepted by Greeks or Greek Cypriots, and on August 14 Turkey cut the Gordian knot by seizing the territory it had been demanding. The disappointed Callaghan allegedly wrote Kissinger an angry letter accusing the Americans of "disgraceful and duplicitous behavior," as the author John Dickie claims to know.[78]

The Turkish action lasted two further days. The CIA report that Turkey's plan called for a five-day offensive to reach her goal had been accurate after all. By August 16, Turkey occupied the approximately 37 percent of the territory that it occupies to this day. It was the execution of a plan that had existed at least since 1964, as documents of the time prove.[79] Once again Greece did not even attempt to intervene, as its army was hopelessly outnumbered by the Turkish military.[80]

Conclusion: Conspiracy or Failure?

It can be concluded that the United States could not have stopped Turkey, as long as it was not prepared to alienate her even more than in 1964 and 1967. This was all the more so, since relations had already been burdened with the issue of poppy plantations in Turkey and the threat of Congress to suspend all aid because of it. Finally, as the Soviet Union had obviously signaled to Ankara non-opposition to a Turkish intervention, Kissinger had no more leverage to convince Ecevit of a potential Soviet war on Turkey, as Johnson did in June 1964. This was apart from the fact that in 1974 such a threat would have been too risky, given the strategic situation in the region. Nevertheless, Kissinger's reported remark that "Callaghan's handling of the peace talks showed the dangers of letting 'boy scouts handle negotiations'" is not appropriate.[81] If anything could have stopped the Turks, it would have been the threat, or even limited implementation, of joint British-American military action.

The events of 1974 were really more a consequence of the complicated situations and opportunities in the area, rather than of United States betrayal

or conspiracy. It is probable that once the events had been triggered with the Greek coup, all the U.S. could do was to contain the conflict and keep the overall U.S. interests in mind. This meant that while the U.S. had to ultimately satisfy Greece and Turkey, the consequences for the Cypriots themselves were not relevant to the United States. Nevertheless, accusations that Washington "did nothing to prevent either the coup or the invasion" seem unfair.[82] The U.S. simply did too little, too late. What can be criticized, therefore, is foremost Kissinger's way of making politics according to the realist school that Professor Theodore Couloumbis described as "a synthesis of considerations of power, prudence, pragmatism, amorality, and a great concern with the minimization of misfortune rather than the maximization of happiness."[83] This accurate description of the Secretary's approach to foreign policy was most vividly felt by the Cypriots, who fully had to bear the misfortune. They were simply left out of the American equation.

Kissinger's policy of *realpolitik* and maintenance or establishment of power balances indeed made it impossible to influence Greek or Turkish policy, because the US above all wanted to prevent a Greek-Turkish war. Both countries are NATO allies and a war between them would have disrupted NATO's southeastern flank. However, Kissinger's assessment that American policy was successful because it prevented the Greek-Turkish war and Soviet intrusion is a misleading attempt to gloss over the US failure in Cyprus. After all, contrary to the long-term results, the flank was seriously disrupted in the short and mid-term, even though both countries remained NATO allies. Greece temporarily withdrew from the military structure of NATO and Turkey closed all American military installations except one air base, thus imperiling US security interests, after the American Congress had imposed an arms embargo to punish Ankara for its Cyprus adventure. Thus the disruption of NATO's southeastern flank that the US had always vowed to prevent came close to reality.

As for the British, the House of Commons Select Committee in 1975 concluded: "Britain had a legal right, a moral obligation and the military capacity to intervene in Cyprus during July and August 1974."[84] The report was accepted with a four to one majority, the dissenter being the former Deputy Governor of Cyprus, Sir George Sinclair, who questioned whether British forces would have succeeded to overthrow the Sampson regime. He feared that "an armed intervention by Britain, which revived memories of

the conflict with EOKA in the 1950s might well have had the effect of swinging Greek Cypriot opinion behind rather than against Sampson."[85] Keith Kyle in his recent article in the *Cyprus Review* concludes that the British would have had to gamble, had they wanted to intervene on their own or together with the Turkish.[86] They would have had to take into account – on the one hand – the rather doubtful Turkish request to reinstall the Makarios government, shortly after the coup, which in reality seemed an attempt to prepare the legal ground for an armed intervention. On the other hand they would have had to consider the risks of more civil strife. They finally decided that they were in the first place responsible towards the British citizens living on the island in addition to the large amount of British tourists, who were surprised about the unfolding events as much as the British and American diplomats later claimed they were.

NOTES

1. See e.g. Slengesol, I. (2000) 'A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.22, No.2, pp.96–129.

2. Belcher, T.G. Embassy telegram (Embtel) Nicosia 1294, 9 February 1968: State Department Subject-Numeric File (SDSNF), 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2026, National Archives, College Park, MD (NARA). Hart, P.T. Embtel Ankara 3742, 9 February 1968: *ibid.*; Talbot, P. Embtel Athens 3507, 9 February 1968: *ibid.* For a more thorough assessment of the episode consult: Nicolet, C. (2001) *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954–1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention.* Mannheim and Möhnesee, Bibliopolis, pp.385–387.

3. The following is based on the British 'Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute', version of 19 January 1968, attached to: Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) between delegations of the U.S. and the U.K.: 'Notes on Cyprus Discussions with the British', 17 January 1968: SDSNF, 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2026, NARA.

4. See the Canadian 'Draft Working Paper on Possible Next Steps in Cyprus', 18 January 1968, attached to: Memcon between delegations of U.S., the U.K. and Canada: 'Notes on Cyprus Discussions with British and Canadians', 18 January 1968: SDSNF, 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2026, NARA.

5. Memcon between delegations of U.S., the U.K. and Canada: 'Notes on Cyprus Discussions with British and Canadians', 18 January 1968: SDSNF, 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2026, NARA, p.1.

6. Folsom, R.S. to Battle, L.D. Memorandum: 'Assuring a Cyprus Settlement', 15 April 1968: SDSNF, 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2027, NARA, p.1.

7. See Discussion between Folsom, R.S. and Rogers, W.P. Department of State telegram (Deptel) 54592 to Nicosia, 14 April 1970: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 15-5 CYP, box 2225, NARA.

8. Irwin, Deptel 192102 to Athens, 24 November 1970: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2226, NARA.

9. Memorandum: Country Policy Statement: Cyprus, 10 June 1971: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA.

10. Evidence for this suspicion can be found in: Deptel 200422 to London and Nicosia, 3 November 1972: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2229, NARA; Popper, D.H. Embtel Nicosia 2040, 4 November 1972: *ibid.*; Sohm, Embtel London 10700, 7 November 1972: *ibid.*

11. See Clerides, G. (1989) *Cyprus: My Deposition.* Vol.II. Nicosia, Alithia, pp.361–369.

12. *Ibid.*, 366–369. Coufoudakis came to a similar conclusion: Coufoudakis, V. (1976) 'U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* Vol.5, No.3, p.257. On the domestic turmoil in Cyprus during 1970, see also: Crawshaw, N. (1971) 'Subversion in Cyprus', *The World Today* Vol.27, No.1, pp.25–32.

13. See the report on Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin's call on U.S. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson on 18 March: Memorandum for the President: 'Evening Report', 18 March 1970: Lot 74D164, Entry 5049, President's Evening Reading Reports, 1964–1974, box 3, NARA, p.1.

14. See e.g. Kadritzke, N. and Wagner, W. (1976) *Im Fadenkreuz der NATO: Ermittlungen am Beispiel Cypern.* Berlin, Rotbuch Verlag, pp.66–68.

15. Popper, Embtel Nicosia 488, 31 March 1970: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2226, NARA.

16. The following is based on Stern, L. (1975) 'Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus', *Foreign Policy* No.19, pp.44–45.

17. Rogers, Deptel 56130 to Nicosia, 15 April 1970: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 1–1 CYPRUS, box 2231, NARA.

18. As quoted by: Zahariades, T. 'Secret Foreign Office Papers Release Under 30-Year Rule', *The Cyprus Weekly*, 4 January 2002.

19. Among others, Van Coufoudakis (1977) implies this in 'U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A case Study in Cold War Diplomacy' in Attalides, M.A. (ed.) *Cyprus Reviewed.* Nicosia, Tryfonos, p.126. See also: Kadritzke and Wagner. *Im Fadenkreuz der NATO*, p.72.

20. Crawford, W.R. Embtel Nicosia 1837, 9 October 1971: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA, p.2–3.

21. Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, III, p.140.

22. Irwin, Deptel 214164 to Athens and Nicosia, 25 November 1971: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA, p.3.

23. Kissinger in an informal news conference at the Department of State, 22 July 1974: *Department of State Bulletin*, 12 August 1974, p.261.

24. Stern, 'Bitter Lessons', p.48.

25. Kissinger, quoted in: 'Secretary's Staff Meeting', 22 March 1974: Lot 78D443, Entry 5177, Office of the Secretary of State: Transcripts of Secretary of State H. Kissinger's Staff Meetings 1973–1977, box 3, NARA, pp.34–35.

26. The journalist Demetracopoulos in an interview with Slengesol, in *id.*, 'A Bad Show?,' p.102. See also: Hitchens, C. (1997) *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger.* London, Verso, pp.88–89.

27. Attalides, M.A. (1979) *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics.* Edinburgh and New York, Q Press and St. Martin's Press, p.163.

28. Hartman, A. to Kissinger, Action Memorandum: 'Greek Army Coup on Cyprus', 15 July 1974: Lot 75D146, Entry 5037, Records of the Executive Secretariat – Briefing Books, 1958–76: Cyprus, 17 July, 1974, box 206, NARA, p.2; Boyatt, T.D. (2000) 'Advocacy and Dissent within the System', Speech held at the

Foreign Service Institute, 30 September 1992, in Bentley, M. and Warner, M. (eds.), *Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection.* CD-Rom. Arlington, VA, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. The instruction to Tasca is: Sisco, J.J. Deptel 141500 to Athens, 29 June 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, Richard M. Nixon (RMN) Presidential Materials Staff.

29. See Tasca, Embtel Athens 3936, 24 June 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, RMN Presidential Materials Staff, pp.3–4.

30. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.167.

31. Tasca, Embtel Athens 3936, 24 June 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, RMN Presidential Materials Staff, pp.3–4; Grant, J.P. Embtel Nicosia 1224, 27 June 1974: NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, box 592, RMN Presidential Materials Staff.

32. Tasca, Embtel Athens 4179, 1 July 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, RMN Presidential Materials Staff.

33. Boyatt, 'Advocacy and Dissent within the System'. See also: Oral History interview, Dillon, R.S. interview by Kennedy, C.S. 17 May 1990, in Bentley and Warner (eds.), *Frontline Diplomacy.*

34. Kissinger, H.A. (1999) *Years of Renewal.* New York, Simon & Schuster, p.203.

35. See e.g. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, pp.167–174.

36. Intelligence Community Staff to the Director of CIA, Memorandum: 'Post Mortem Report: An examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance before and during the Cyprus Crisis of 1974', January 1975, in *The Declassified Documents Reference System: including the declassified documents retrospective collection and the annual collection 1975.* Arlington, VA, Carrollton Press, 1977, Microform, doc.1978 8B, p.4.

37. Stern, 'Bitter Lessons', pp.50–51.

38. See e.g., Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.168.

39. Oral History interview, Stabler, W., interview by Kennedy, C.S. 1991, in Bentley and Warner (eds.), *Frontline Diplomacy.*

40. Hartman to Kissinger, Action Memorandum: 'Greek Army Coup on Cyprus', 15 July 1974: Lot 75D146, Entry 5037, Records of the Executive Secretariat – Briefing Books, 1958–76: Cyprus, 17 July, 1974, box 206, NARA.

41. Slengesol, 'A Bad Show?' pp.114–115.

42. Kissinger, 'Cyprus Critique', Secretary's Conference Room, 5 August 1974: Lot 78D443, Entry 5177, Office of the Secretary of State: Transcripts of Secretary of State H. Kissinger's Staff Meetings 1973–1977: Cyprus Critique 8/5/74, box 4, NARA, pp.6–8.

43. Hitchens, C. Extract of *The Trial of Henry Kissinger in: Guardian*, 26 February 2001.

44. Ingersoll, Deptel 156312 to Nicosia Niact, 18 July 1974: NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, box 592, RMN Presidential Materials Staff, p.3.

45. Kissinger had told the French Ambassador in Washington, on 15 July, that "Turkey would not move in the present circumstances unless enosis should be proclaimed:" Kissinger, Deptel 152972 to Ankara, 16 July 1974: Lot 75D146, Entry 5037, Records of the Executive Secretariat – Briefing Books, 1958–76: Cyprus, 17 July 1974, box 206, NARA; Cyprus Task Force to Sisco, Memorandum: 'Cyprus Analysis and Alternative Strategies', 17 July 1974: *ibid.*, p.4.

46. Cyprus Task Force to Sisco, Memorandum: 'Cyprus Analysis and Alternative Strategies', 17 July 1974: *ibid.*, p.4.

47. *Ibid.*, p.6.

48. Kissinger, 'Cyprus Critique', Secretary's Conference Room, 5 August 1974: Lot 78D443, Entry 5177, Office of the Secretary of State: Transcripts of Secretary of State H. Kissinger's Staff Meetings 1973–1977: Cyprus Critique 8/5/74, box 4, NARA, p.19.

49. According to Piller, U. (1997) *Zypern, die ungelöste Krise.* Politische Studien 5. Pfaffenweiler, Centaurus, p.61.

50. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.208.

51. *Ibid.*, p.209.

52. *Ibid.*

53. Kyle, K. (2002) 'British Policy on Cyprus 1974-2002', *The Cyprus Review* Vol.14, No.1, p.103.

54. Callaghan, J. (1987) *Time and Chance.* London, Collins, p.339.

55. *Ibid.*

56. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.216.

57. Oral History interview, Dillon, R.S.

58. Sisco, Embtel Athens 4742, 21 July 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, RMN Presidential Materials Staff, part V, 1.

59. *Ibid.*

60. According to Martin Lagasse, Soviet satellites had in the meantime monitored the Turkish military preparations. Obviously the Soviet Union did not mind a Turkish invasion, as they did not react to their intelligence information: Martin Lagasse, referred to in Richter, H.A. (1997) 'Historische Hintergründe des Zypernkonflikts', *Thetis: Mannheimer Beiträge zur Klassischen Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns* No.4 p.315.

61. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.222. The episode has also been told by Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, pp.345–346; Stoessinger, J.G. (1976) *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power.* New York, W. W. Norton, p.142.

62. Kissinger claims in his memoirs that this ultimatum was issued together with the British and French Foreign Ministers: Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.222; Callaghan in his autobiography contradicts him and recalls having been told by Kissinger over the telephone that he had issued this message to Ecevit by himself: Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p.345.

63. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.222.

64. Anderson, R. Statement to the press, 24 July 1974: *Department of State Bulletin*, 12 August 1974, p.267; Note, 24 July 1974: White House Press Releases, RMN Presidential Materials Staff. On the end of the Greek junta, see: Woodhouse, C.M. (1985) *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels.* New York, Franklin Watts, pp.156–163.

65. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.227.

66. *Ibid.*, p.226.

67. Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p.347.

68. *Ibid.*, p.351; Dickie, J. (1994) *'Special' No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality.* London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p.156.

69. As told in Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p.347.

70. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.227.

71. Research Project No. 1099: 'United States Diplomacy in the Cyprus Crisis of July 15 August 22, 1974: A Narrative Account', February 1975: Lot Files, Entry 5007, Executive Secretariat, Historical Office Research Projects, 1969–74, box 8, NARA, p.9.

72. Kissinger to Ford, Telcon, 10 August 1974: *Declassified Documents*, doc.1998 1975, p.2.

73. Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p.354.

74. Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, IV, pp.48–49.

75 Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.228.

76 *Ibid.*

77. Kissinger to President Gerald R. Ford, Telcon, 10 August 1974: *Declassified Documents*, doc.1998 1975, p.2, (see above).

78. Dickie, *'Special' No More*, p.158.

79. Turkish Prime Minister Inönü was reported to have proposed the cession of roughly 38 percent of the island to the Turkish Cypriots during the London Conference of January 1964: Hart, P.T. (1990) *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War; Cyprus: A Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965–1968.* Duke Press Policy Studies. Durham, NC, and London, Duke University Press, 1990, pp.19–20. In the autumn of 1964, the Turkish Government told UN mediator Galo Plaza that the Turkish community needed to receive 38 percent of the land to correspond to their percentage of land ownership. This demand was later significantly reduced: Memcon between a delegation of the U.S. Department of State and Galo Plaza: 'Cyprus', 9 November 1964: SDSNF, 1964–66, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2089, NARA, p.4.

80. Some extracts from the minutes of Prime Minister Karamanlis' meetings with the Chiefs of the Armed Forces are printed in: Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, IV, pp.81–83.

81. Quoted, unfortunately without reference to the source, in Panteli, S. (1984) *A New History of Cyprus: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*. London and Den Haag, East-West Publications, p.391.

82. Quotation by Joseph, J.S. (1985) *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern*. American University Studies, Series X; Political Science 6. New York, Peter Lang, p.148.

83. Couloumbis, T.A. (1983) *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*. New York, Praeger, p.83.

84. Quoted in: Kyle, 'British Policy on Cyprus 1974–2002', p.102.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*, p.103.

Chypre : le referendum du 24 avril 2004 sur le plan Annan

Jean Catsiapis*

Le secrétaire de l'ONU, Kofi Annan a présenté le 11 novembre 2002 un plan de réunification de Chypre, qui est accepté par les Chypriotes grecs, comme base de négociations mais refusé par la Turquie et les Chypriotes turcs. Ce plan prévoit que Chypre sera une République fédérale bizonale avec deux États dotés d'une large autonomie, l'un chypriote turc au nord et l'autre chypriote grec au sud avec à sa tête un exécutif composé d'un organe collectif avec une présidence tournante du type de celle de la Bosnie–Herzégovine. A vrai dire ce plan établit en réalité une confédération, qui légalise le statu quo et déroge aux règles de l'Union européenne, en particulier à celles relatives au droit de propriété et aux libertés d'établissement et de circulation. K. Annan remanie son plan sur des points mineurs une première fois lors de sa visite à Chypre du 26 au 28 février 2003 et une nouvelle fois lors d'une rencontre à la Haye entre le président de la République de Chypre, Tassos Papadopoulos et Rauf Denktash, le chef de la communauté chypriote turque. Cette rencontre débouche sur un échec en raison de l'intransigeance de celui-ci.

À la suite de la décision du Conseil national de Turquie du 23 janvier 2004 qui souhaite que la question chypriote soit réglée par une solution «qui prenne comme référence le plan Annan et tienne compte des réalités de l'île» se tient à New York, le 13 février une nouvelle réunion entre T. Papadopoulos et R. Denktash, qui acceptent de reprendre les négociations intercommunautaires et d'aboutir dans un court délai à la réunification de Chypre. Ces négociations reprennent à Nicosie le 19 février et se terminent par un nouvel échec. Une conférence se tient alors à partir du 24 mars en Suisse près de Lucerne avec la participation des premiers ministres grec et turc, du président Papadopoulos et d'une délégation chypriote turque à laquelle refuse de se joindre R. Denktash, qui débouche également sur un échec. K. Annan, décide, comme cela avait été arrêté lors de la réunion de New-York du 13 février, de reformuler lui même, les chapitres de son projet de réunification faisant l'objet de divergence entre les deux communautés.

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Il présente, le 31 mars, la cinquième version de son plan, qui est soumis à l'approbation des Chypriotes grecs et des Chypriotes turcs par un referendum fixé au 24 avril.

1. La campagne du referendum

La position des Chypriotes grecs

Chez les Chypriotes grecs domine une grande déception après la publication de la dernière version du plan de réunification de Chypre, que K. Annan présente comme «un compromis», mais qui fait la part belle aux prétentions de la Turquie ainsi que le souligne la presse internationale.[1] De fait ce dernier texte leur paraît pire que le précédent puisque par exemple la proportion de Chypriotes grecs autorisés à s'établir dans l'État fédéré chypriote turc passe de 21 à 18 % de la population totale de cette entité.

Au niveau des partis politiques le parti socialiste EDEK, en particulier son président d'honneur, Vassos Lyssaridés se prononce catégoriquement pour le «non» au referendum tout comme le chef de l'État, qui est aussi le président du parti Diko alors que les dirigeants du parti du Rassemblement démocratique (Disy), fondé par l'ancien président Glafcos Clérides recommande le vote «oui», tout comme Georges Vassiliou, lui aussi ancien président de la République de Chypre. Le parti communiste Akel, la première force politique de l'île, et dont le secrétaire général, Dimitri Christofias, est le président de la Chambre des représentants, va adopter une position, qui va évoluer au fil de la campagne électorale. Le bureau politique de l'Akel se déclare en faveur du «oui». Puis son comité central, compte tenu des sondages largement négatifs à l'égard du plan Annan, souhaite un report de la date du referendum, avançant l'argument que les Chypriotes ont besoin de temps pour lire les annexes de ce texte, composées de plus de 9000 pages. N'ayant pu obtenir ce report ni de l'ONU ni de la Turquie D. Christofias déclare que son parti se prononcera en faveur du «oui» seulement si des garanties internationales seront accordées aux Chypriotes grecs quant à l'exécution par la Turquie des obligations résultant du plan de réunification. Faute d'avoir obtenu ces garanties, l'Akel se résigne à faire voter finalement «non» à l'encontre de ce texte.

La position de la Grèce

En Grèce la question du referendum chypriote provoque des prises de position très contrastées des forces politiques: Georges Papandréou, le président du Pasok se prononce catégoriquement pour le «oui», le parti communiste KKE, à l'inverse recommande de voter contre le plan Annan, qui reflète, selon lui, les vues de l'impérialisme américain alors que le Premier ministre Costas Caramanlis déclare que ce plan comporte plus d'éléments positifs que négatifs tout en affirmant que la Grèce respectera les choix des Chypriotes et que la position du Synaspismos s'aligne sur celle adoptée par l'Akel. De son côté Mikis Théodorakis, artisan de longue date de l'amitié gréco-turque critique fortement le plan Annan, qu'approuve au contraire l'ancien ministre des affaires étrangères Théodore Pangalos, connu pour son opposition farouche à la politique chypriote d'Ankara. Le 22 avril se réunissent sous la présidence du chef de l'Etat, Costis Stéphanopoulos, les dirigeants de la Nouvelle Démocratie, du Pasok, du KKE, et du Synaspismos afin d'arrêter une position commune sur le referendum du 24 avril. Cette réunion s'est terminée sans qu'une telle position soit définie

La position des Chypriotes turcs

Rauf Denktash a fait campagne en faveur du « non », laissant même entendre qu'il abandonnerait ses fonctions si le « oui » devait l'emporter dans la partie nord de Chypre. En faveur du non se prononce l'ancien « Premier ministre » Dervis Eroglou (32,45% des voix aux élections législatives du 14 décembre 2003 en zone occupée). A l'inverse dans le camp du oui figurent le « Premier ministre » chypriote turc Mehmet Ali Talat, dirigeant du parti républicain turc, (35,71%) ainsi que le Mouvement pour la paix et de la démocratie de Mustapha Akindji (13,5%). Serdar Denktash à la tête du parti de l'unité nationale (12,6%) a une position qui évolue durant la campagne, prônant le «non» puis laissant les électeurs voter « selon leur conscience ».

La position de la Turquie

Le Premier ministre turc R. Erdogan et son parti l'AKP prend position en faveur du «oui» et se heurte ainsi à Rauf Denktash, à qui il conseille même de s'abstenir de venir en Turquie pour trouver des soutiens auprès des forces

politiques de ce pays. Parmi celles-ci il faut noter la campagne en faveur du « non » de l'ancien Premier ministre Ecevit – chef de gouvernement en 1974 lors de l'invasion de Chypre, qui en sa qualité de citoyen d'honneur de « la République turque de Chypre nord », viendra en zone occupée appuyer les adversaires du Plan Annan. L'organisation turque d'extrême droite « les loups gris » participera aussi activement à la campagne électorale des partisans du « non ».

La position de la communauté internationale

L'ONU, l'Union européenne par la voix de son commissaire à l'élargissement Gûnter Verheugen invitent instamment les Chypriotes grecs, qui selon les sondages, s'affirment hostiles à l'adoption du plan Annan, à répondre de façon positive au referendum du 24 avril. Les États-unis et la Grande Bretagne s'efforcent de faire pression sur les dirigeants chypriotes grecs pour les convaincre de faire voter leurs compatriotes en faveur du « oui »: Colin Powell, le secrétaire d'État américain, s'entretient même au téléphone avec D. Christofias afin que l'Akel accepte de se ranger dans le camp des partisans du plan Annan alors que Jack Straw, le ministre britannique des affaires étrangères menace, le 5 mars »[2] le gouvernement de Nicosie, qu'en cas de victoire du « non » dans la partie libre de Chypre, l'Union européenne (UE) ne le considérerait que comme le représentant des Chypriotes grecs.

2. Les résultats du referendum

Le 24 avril les Chypriotes grecs se prononcent à près de 76% en faveur du « non » alors que 65% des Chypriotes turcs, à l'inverse, approuvent le plan Annan. Ainsi faute d'avoir été approuvé par les deux communautés de l'île, ce texte est rejeté.

La victoire du «non» en zone libre a suscité la colère de l'ONU et l'embarras de l'UE. De fait le rejet du plan de l'ONU constitue un échec personnel pour Kofi Annan et aussi pour G. Verheugen, qui l'un et l'autre s'étaient beaucoup impliqués en faveur de la réunification de Chypre avant le 1er mai 2004 et ont été très surpris du «non» des Chypriotes grecs. En effet la procédure du referendum avait été imaginée par eux afin de contourner

l'opposition de Denktash au plan de l'ONU, qui avait en revanche la faveur de la majorité des Chypriotes turcs. Pour les experts des Nations unies et de l'UE le « oui » des Chypriotes grecs était à l'évidence acquis puisque les deux plus grands partis de la zone libre de Chypre, l'Akel et le Rassemblement démocratique s'étaient déclarés d'accord pour l'essentiel avec ce plan.

Referendum du 24 avril 2004	Nombre d'électeurs inscrits	Oui	Non
Zone libre Chypre Sud	428 587	24,17 %	75,83%
Zone occupée Chypre nord	143 186	64,9%	35,1 %

La signification du «non» des Chypriotes grecs

Les commentaires de la presse internationale sur le « non » des Chypriotes grecs ont tous été de souligner le refus de ceux–ci d'accepter la réunification de Chypre.[3] Cette interprétation du vote des Chypriotes semble erronée. En effet leur « non » a été un rejet du plan Annan et non pas un rejet de la réunification de l'île. C'est ce qui ressort d'un sondage «sortie des urnes« (exit polls) effectué le jour même du referendum et diffusé par les chaînes de télévision chypriotes : seulement 13% des Chypriotes grecs ayant voté « non » au referendum affirment s'être prononcés ainsi en raison de leur refus de cohabiter avec des Chypriotes turcs. Selon ce même sondage les partisans du « non » ont justifié leur vote pour « des raisons de sécurité »: de fait le maintien, selon les prévisions du plan Annan, de l'armée turque sur le territoire chypriote jusqu'en 2018, date à laquelle celle-ci conservera un contingent de 650 soldats avec un droit permanent d'intervention militaire d'Ankara dans les deux États fédérés de l'île, constitue une menace inacceptable pour les Chypriotes grecs. L'impossibilité pour près de la moitié des réfugies de rentrer dans leurs foyers et la légalisation de la présence au nord de Chypre de la grande majorité des colons turcs explique aussi le rejet du plan de réunification, qui réserve aussi à la Grande Bretagne des droits sur les eaux territoriales adjacentes à ses bases.

La signification du «oui» des Chypriotes turcs

L'ensemble des médias internationaux a présenté le vote des Chypriotes turcs en faveur du plan Annan comme ayant été principalement motivé par la volonté de réaliser la réunification de Chypre, le quotidien français *Le Monde* précisant même que ceux-ci redoutaient qu'après le 24 avril « la ligne verte[4] redevienne infranchissable ».[5] En fait il est évident que le vote des Chypriotes turcs s'explique avant tout, ainsi que l'indiquent de nombreuses enquêtes d'opinion, par le souhait d'intégrer l'UE. Il semble, en effet, manifeste que les habitants du nord de Chypre n'apprécient guère la diminution de leur zone de 37% à 28,5% de l'ensemble du territoire chypriote, que prévoit le plan Annan mais sont en revanche très désireux de rejoindre l'Europe grâce à cette réunification, à laquelle ils doivent se résigner. L'adhésion d'une Chypre réunifiée pensent les Chypriotes turcs devait permettre de mettre fin à leur isolement économique.

3. Les effets juridiques du referendum

Le maintien de la division de la République Chypre, qui depuis le 1er mai 2004 fait partie de l'UE entraîne cinq effets juridiques majeurs.

Premièrement les Chypriotes sont devenus des citoyens de l'UE. Ce statut concerne non seulement les Chypriotes grecs mais aussi les vingt mille Chypriotes turcs, qui ont obtenu du gouvernement de Nicosie un passeport de la République de Chypre.

Deuxièmement, les frontières extérieures de l'UE coïncident avec les limites de la République de Chypre. Ces frontières ne sont pas constituées par la ligne verte, comme différentes personnalités, dont Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, l'ont affirmé à tort.[6] En effet le traité d'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE du 16 avril 2003 prévoit que c'est le territoire entier de cette République, qui fait partie de l'Europe des 25, l'application du droit communautaire à la zone d'occupation turque étant provisoirement suspendue.

Troisièmement, la Turquie, qui depuis 1974 refuse de considérer le gouvernement de Nicosie comme celui de la République de Chypre mais seulement comme le représentant des Chypriotes grecs va devoir abandonner cette position dans la mesure où elle est associée à l'UE, dont elle veut

devenir membre. Ankara se devant de prendre en compte « l'acquis communautaire » ne pourra donc plus ignorer juridiquement Chypre. Il faut donc s'attendre à l'établissement de relations diplomatiques turco-chypriotes.

Quatrièmement l'armée turque stationnée à Chypre, dont la présence aurait été légalisée si le plan Annan avait été appliqué, demeure une armée d'occupation d'un pays devenu membre de l'UE. Il convient de rappeler, à la suite de M. Patrick Devedjian, que la France considère la Turquie comme une puissance occupante de Chypre, qui se doit d'indemniser, conformément au règlement de la Haye de 1907, ses ressortissants dont les biens ont été spoliés lors de l'invasion de Chypre de 1974.[7]

Cinquièmement l'ensemble des requêtes des Chypriotes grecs déposées devant la Cour des droits de l'homme de Strasbourg formulées contre la Turquie pour violation de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme en raison de l'invasion puis de la colonisation de Chypre par ce pays est maintenu. En effet le plan Annan prévoyait que les deux co-présidents de Chypre devaient faire savoir au secrétaire général du Conseil de l'Europe que, compte tenu des dispositions de ce plan sur l'indemnisation des Chypriotes relative à leurs propriétés, les requêtes concernant ce sujet, pendantes devant cette Cour, devaient être radiées.

4. L'après referendum

On peut analyser ici les conséquences d'ordre politique du rejet du plan Annan.

Il y a d'abord un événement, qui, annoncé par certains avant le 24 avril, ne peut se produire: la reconnaissance diplomatique de la « République turque de Chypre nord » (RTCN). En effet deux textes s'opposent à ce que l'entité chypriote turque soit reconnu sur le plan international et puisse ensuite rejoindre l'UE. Lorsque Rauf Denktash a proclamé le 15 novembre 1983 l'indépendance de la « RTCN » le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU a adopté, deux jours plus tard la résolution 541 déclarant nulle et non avenue cette indépendance. D'autre part, comme on l'a dit plus haut, le traité d'adhésion du 16 avril 2003 concerne la totalité du territoire de la République de Chypre. Il n'est donc pas possible-sauf si ce traité est modifié,

ce qui n'est pas réaliste – de faire adhérer la « RTCN » à l 'UE après en avoir reconnu diplomatiquement l'existence. A cet égard on doit préciser que le président de l'Azerbaïdjan, qui avait cru devoir indiquer que son pays reconnaîtrait le régime de Denktash si les Chypriotes grecs décidaient de rejeter le plan Annan, a déclaré après le 24 avril que ses propos avaient été mal interprêtés.

On peut prévoir pour Chypre trois lignes d'évolution dans les mois qui vont suivre le 24 avril: la fin de l'isolement économique de Chypre nord, l'élaboration d'un nouveau plan de réunification, une pression accrue sur la Turquie pour un règlement de la question chypriote.

La zone occupée de Chypre, par application du droit international, ne pouvait depuis 1974 commercer avec l'étranger puisque cette entité n'est reconnue par aucun État à part la Turquie. Une décision de la Cour des justices européennes du 5 juillet 1994 a précisé que des échanges commerciaux pouvaient cependant avoir lieu avec la « RTCN » à la condition que les exportations soient opérées au moyen de certificats délivrés par les autorités de la République de Chypre. Le refus du régime de Denktash d'accepter cette procédure a contribué à son isolement économique. Le principe de l'octroi de 259 millions d'euros aux Chypriotes turcs, dont le montant correspond à celui d'une aide prévue par l'UE pour Chypre nord après la réunification de l'île, a été décidé dès le 26 avril à Luxembourg par le Conseil des ministres des affaires étrangères. Toutefois la possibilité pour la « RTCN » de commercer suppose que ses importations et ses exportations se fassent obligatoirement à partir des ports de la République de Chypre et sous le contrôle de ses autorités. On peut donc conclure que l'isolement économique de Chypre nord va certainement cesser sans que pour autant il y ait de la part de la communauté internationale la reconnaissance diplomatique de la « RTCN ».

En ce qui concerne la division de Chypre on doit logiquement s'attendre à une relance d'initiatives de l'ONU. A cet égard on doit d'abord noter que le porte parole du ministère français des affaires étrangères dés le 25 avril a déclaré que «la France souhaite que M. Kofi Annan poursuive sa mission de bons offices pour parvenir à un règlement du problème chypriote».[8] Il faut ensuite souligner que les autorités chypriotes souhaitent une réunification rapide de l'île: D. Christofias a ainsi déclaré souhaiter qu'il fallait que la date de la réunification de Chypre ne tarde pas et le président Papadopoulos n'a

pas exclu un nouveau referendum à condition que soit modifié le plan Annan.[9] On doit enfin noter que selon un sondage VPRC publié le 8 mai par *Epicheiro*, 60,9% des Chypriotes grecs se déclarent favorables à de nouvelles négociations sur la base du plan Annan.

On peut aussi prévoir pour conclure cette analyse des évolutions prévisibles de la question chypriote depuis le 24 avril 2004 que la communauté internationale, en particulier l'UE, va faire pression jusqu'à la fin de cette année sur la Turquie pour la convaincre d'assouplir sa position sur ce problème qu'elle considère comme une cause nationale. En effet c'est au mois de décembre que l'Europe des 25 décidera si elle peut ouvrir des négociations d'adhésion avec Ankara. On peut donc imaginer que l'UE risque de retarder ou même de refuser l'ouverture de ces négociations si la position sur la question de la Turquie ne venait pas à s'assouplir. Déjà on observe que le gouvernement turc, dans un contexte européen, qui ne lui est pas favorable, s'efforce de réunir des soutiens à sa candidature à l'UE comme le prouve le voyage officiel de R. Erdogan en Grèce du 6 au 8 mai où le Premier ministre Costas Caramanlis lui a réservé un accueil chaleureux. Au total il appartient à la Turquie de prouver qu'elle partage les valeurs des États membres de l'UE. Sa contribution à la solution de la question chypriote lui en offre l'occasion. Une Chypre réunifiée où Chypriotes grecs et Chypriotes turcs vivent ensemble et non pas côte à côte facilitera le rapprochement de la Turquie avec l'UE en prouvant que chrétiens et musulmans peuvent cohabiter sans heurts et que le choc des civilisations n'est pas inévitable.

NOTES

1. *Le Figaro* du 2 avril 2004: «La victoire diplomatique d'Ankara».

2. *Philelefteros* du 5 mars 2004.

3. Voir notamment l'article du *Figaro* du 26 avril 2004: «Les Chypriotes grecs refusent massivement la réunification».

4. La ligne verte est la ligne de démarcation entre la zone occupée et la zone libre de Chypre. Fermée depuis 1974, cette ligne a été entrouverte par l'armée turque depuis le 23 avril 2003, et permet aux Chypriotes grecs et turcs de se déplacer sur l'ensemble du territoire de l'île.

5. *Le Monde* du 27 avril 2004.

6. Déclaration, le 27 avril 2004, de V. Giscard d'Estaing à la chaîne FR3 de la télévision française.

7. Patrick Devedjian, ministre du gouvernement Raffarin depuis mai 2002 est l'auteur d'un rapport d'information de l'Assemblée nationale sur Chypre alors qu'il était président du groupe d'amitié France-Chypre de cette institution.

8. Point de presse du porte-parole du Quai d'Orsay du 26 avril 2004.

9. *Philelefteros* du 9 mai 2004.

Chronologie Chypre

1er octobre 2003 - 15 mars 2004

23 octobre : Le journal chypriote turc « Kipris » publie l'information donnée par les autorités de la zone occupée relative aux naturalisations : depuis 1974 le « gouvernement chypriote turc » a accordé la naturalisation à 54 000 personnes venues de Turquie. Selon le correspondant à Nicosie de l'agence athénienne de presse il y a actuellement en zone occupée plus de 200 000 personnes dont seulement 74 000 à 80 000 personnes Chypriotes turcs.

23 novembre : Dans un entretien à Kathimerini le président Tassos Papadopoulos déclare : « Je ne crois pas que la Turquie soit prête à faire une quelconque concession en vue de son adhésion à l' Union européenne ».

2 décembre : Le Comité des ministres du Conseil de l'Europe constate que la Turquie par application d'une décision de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, a versé 1,120 million d'Euros à Titina Loïzidou , une Chypriote grecque spoliée de ses biens par l'invasion turque de 1974.

14 décembre : Elections législatives dans la zone occupée de Chypre. Le parti de l'Unité nationale (UPB) et le parti démocrate (DP), qui soutiennent le gouvernement obtiennent 25 députés. L'opposition avec le parti républicain turc (CTP) et le Mouvement pour la paix et la démocratie (DP) remportent aussi 25 sièges.

23 janvier : Le Conseil national de sécurité de Turquie déclare à propos de la question chypriote: « La Turquie réitère sa détermination politique à atteindre rapidement une solution qui prenne comme référence le plan Annan et tienne compte des réalités de l'île ».

9 février : Markos Kyprianou, ministre des finances est désigné membre de la Commission de l'Union européenne. Le nouveau commissaire prendra ses fonctions à compter du 31 octobre 2004.

13 février : Le président de Chypre Tassos Papadopoulos, et le chef de la communauté chypriote turque Rauf Denktash, décident à l'invitation de Kofi Annan, qui les a réunis à New York de reprendre les négociations intercommunautaires et d'aboutir dans un court délai à la réunification de Chypre.

19 février : Reprise à Nicosie des négociations intercommunautaires.

5 mars : Protestation du ministre chypriote des affaires étrangères, Georges Iacovou, à la suite des déclarations du 3 mars de son homologue britannique Jack Straw, qui a soutenu que si les Chypriotes grecs répondaient non au referendum sur la réunification de Chypre, l'île serait de facto divisée, et dans cette hypothèse ne représenteraient plus dans l'Union européenne que sa partie sud.

Chronologie Grèce

1er octobre 2003 - 15 mars 2004

8 octobre : La Grèce est paralysée par une série de grèves (chauffeurs de taxi, pompiers, garde- côtes).

4 novembre : Mikis Théodorakis est mis en cause par le Conseil juif central de Grèce pour avoir dit : « Nous sommes deux peuples pas comme les autres, nous et les juifs. Mais eux, ils ont le fanatisme et réussissent à s'imposer ».

17 décembre : Alexandre Giotopoulos, le principal responsable du groupe terroriste du « 17 novembre » est condamné à la prison à vie par une cour spéciale.

7 janvier : Le Premier ministre Costas Simitis annonce la tenue d'élections législatives pour le 7 mars, auxquelles il ne se présentera pas, et déclare quitter la présidence du Pasok.

8 février : Candidat unique à la présidence du Pasok, Georges Papandréou est élu par 1 011 858 citoyens grecs, comprenant non seulement les 146 000 membres de ce parti mais aussi par les sympathisants de celui-ci.

10 février : Ratification par la Chambre des députés du traité d'élargissement de l'Union européenne à dix Etats, dont Chypre. Seul le parti communiste KKE s'oppose à cette ratification.

7 mars : La Nouvelle démocratie remporte les élections législatives anticipées. Son président Costas Caramanlis, le 8 mars, est nommé Premier ministre.

Partis politiques	**élections du 9 avril 2000**		**élections du 7 mars 2004**	
Pasok	43,79 %	158 sièges	40,55 %	117 sièges
Nouvelle Démocratie	42,74 %	125 sièges	45,36 %	165 sièges
KKE (communistes)	5,52 %	11 sièges	5,90 %	12 sièges
Synaspismos (gauche)	3,20%	6 sièges	3,26 %	6 sièges
Dikki (gauche populiste)	2,69%		1,79 %	
Laos (droite nationaliste)			2,19 %	

9 mars : Prestation de serment du nouveau gouvernement

Premier ministre et Ministre de la culture
Costas Caramanlis
Ministre adjoint de la Culture
Mme Fanny Palli- Pétralia

Secrétaires d'Etat :
Georges Orphanos
Pétros Tatoulis

Ministre de l'administration publique
Procope Pavlopoulos
Secrétaires d'Etat
Thanassis Nakos
Apostolos Andréoulakos
Ministre des affaires étrangères
Pétros Moliviatis
Secrétaires d'Etat
Euripide Stylianidis
Jean Valinakis
Panayiotis Skandalakis
Ministre de l'économie nationale
Georges Alogoskoufis
Secrétaires d'Etat
Christos Folias
Pétros Doukas
Adam Rengouzas
Ministre de la défense nationale
Spilios Spiliotopoulos
Secrétaires d'Etat
Vassilis Michaloliakos
Jean Lambropoulos
Ministre du développement
Dimitri Sioufas
Secrétaires d'Etat
Jean Papathanasiou
Georges Salangoudis
Ministre de l'environnement de l'aménagement du territoire et des travaux publics
Georges Souflias
Secrétaires d'Etat
Stavros Kaloyiannis
Thémistocle Xanthopoulos
Ministre de l'éducation nationale
Mme Mariette Yiannakou
Secrétaires d'Etat
Georges Kalos
Spiros Taliadouros
Ministre des transports
Michel Liapis
Secrétaire d'Etat
Anastase Nérantzis
Ministre de l'emploi et de la protection sociale
Panos Panayiotopoulos
Secrétaires d'Etat
Yérassimos Yiakoumatos
Nicos Angelopoulos
Ministre de la santé
Nikitas Kaklamanis
Secrétaires d'Etat
Thanassis Yiannopoulos
Georges Constantopoulos
Ministre du développement agricole et de l'alimentation
Savvas Tsitouridis
Secrétaire d'Etat
Alexandre Basiakos
Ministre du tourisme
Dimitri Avramopoulos
Secrétaire d'Etat
Anastase Liaskos
Ministre de la justice
Anastase Papaligouras
Ministre de la marine marchande
Manolis Kefaloyiannis
Ministre de Macédoine et de Thrace
Nicos Tsiatsionis
Ministre de l'Egée et de la politique des îles
Aristote Pavlidis
Ministre de l'ordre public
Georges Voulgarakis
Secrétaire d'Etat
Christos Markoyiannakis
Ministre d'Etat, porte parole du gouvernement
Théodore Roussopoulos

Mme Anna Psarouda-Bénaki assure les fonctions de Président de la Chambre des députés et Stavros Dimas a été nommé Commissaire grec de l'Union européenne.

14 mars : La Grèce demande l'aide de l'OTAN pour la protection des Jeux olympiques d'Athènes d'août 2004.

Advice to Contributors

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Beyond accession

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