

ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

**L'Union européenne
et la Méditerranée orientale
CHYPRE - GRÈCE - TURQUIE**
Du sommet d'Helsinki au sommet de Nice

**The European Union and
Eastern Mediterranean
CYPRUS - GREECE - TURKEY**
From the Summit of Helsinki to the Summit of Nice

Edited by / sous la direction de
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Jean Catsiapis

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ÉTUDES HELLÉNIQUES / HELLENIC STUDIES

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L'UNION EUROPÉENNE ET LA MÉDITERRANÉE ORIENTALE CHYPRE - GRÈCE - TURQUIE DU SOMMET D'HELSINKI AU SOMMET DE NICE

Stephanos Constantinides*

Après le Conseil européen d'Helsinki des 10 et 11 décembre 1999, qui a admis le principe de la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union européenne, le triangle Grèce, Turquie, Union européenne est en pleine effervescence. La Turquie en particulier se trouve à la croisée des chemins et traverse une période critique de son histoire. Soit elle choisit la démocratisation de son régime ce qui inclut la mise en place d'un Etat de droit qui respecte les droits de l'Homme, la normalisation de ses relations avec ses voisins – en particulier la Grèce et Chypre – avec, dans ce cas, l'espoir d'accéder à l'Union européenne; soit elle garde son régime actuel et mène une politique néo-ottomane¹ avec de nombreuses conséquences sur son propre avenir et la stabilité de la région.

La dynamique qui a été créée après le Conseil européen d'Helsinki conduit l'Union européenne de suivre de près l'évolution intérieure de la Turquie ainsi que sa politique envers Chypre et la Grèce. D'autre part le débat sur la vocation européenne de ce pays est toujours ouvert sous l'œil attentif des Américains qui veulent à tout prix l'ancrer à l'Europe. Mais l'évolution de choses est très lente car les structures décisionnelles en Turquie sont soumises aux militaires qui ne veulent pas dementeler le pouvoir autoritaire dont ils sont les maîtres. Par ailleurs le rapport de forces entre l'establishment Kemaliste, les Islamistes et l'élite pro-européenne est confus.

Dans ce contexte l'avenir européen de la Turquie est incertain et par là même l'évolution des relations greco-turques est imprévisible.

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Dans le dernier numéro des *Études helléniques/ Hellenic Studies* nous avons tenté de cerner les problèmes qui découlent de cette dynamique européenne créée par la décision du Conseil européen d'Helsinki. Dans ce numéro nous continuons la réflexion engagée dans ce cadre avec une série d'articles qui visent à mieux comprendre la nouvelle donne et saisir les enjeux qui en découlent.

Le Patriarche œcuménique Bartholomée est non seulement favorable à la vocation européenne de la Turquie mais souhaite aussi que la candidature de Chypre à l'UE favorise une solution pacifique de la question Chypriote. Le Patriarche espère également que l'amélioration des relations greco-turques soit durable dans l'intérêt de deux pays.

Jean Catsiapis examine la question de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne à Chypre et à la Turquie durant l'année 2000. Il constate que si la candidature de Chypre a progressé de façon satisfaisante, en revanche celle de la Turquie a connu des difficultés, qui en retardent le processus. Depuis le Conseil européen d'Helsinki Chypre a conclu 17 dossiers sur 29 de l'acquis communautaire. L'auteur considère que Chypre doit logiquement faire partie du groupe d'Etats, qui dès la fin de 2002 auront terminé les négociations d'adhésion et pourront intégrer l'UE en 2003, étant entendu que la question politique – s'il n'y a pas jusque là une solution à la question Chypriote – ne peut constituer un obstacle à l'acceptation de sa candidature. Par contre la Turquie « avance à reculons vers l'Europe » faisant face à des difficultés structurelles et politiques dans la voie de la démocratisation et du respect de droits de l'homme. La grave crise politique, économique et financière qui a secoué ce pays durant l'année 2000 et au début de 2001 semble repousser pour longtemps ses perspectives d'appartenance à l'Europe communautaire.

Samim Akgonul examine la situation des minorités musulmane turcophone en Grèce et celle de la minorité grecque en Turquie. Depuis son déracinement – en particulier lors des événements violents de septembre 1955 – la minorité grecque de la Turquie est passée de 110 000 personnes en 1923 à 3000 aujourd'hui. Par contre la communauté musulmane turcophone de 120 000 personnes est restée stable. Samim Akgönül souligne la précarité de leur sort, qui dépend essentiellement des relations

entre Athènes et Ankara. L'actuelle période de détente est de nature à conforter la situation des Grecs vivant en Turquie, qui sont en voie de disparition. L'auteur de l'article pense que la réouverture de l'École théologique de Halki, fermée en 1971 par la Turquie serait un geste de bonne volonté de celle-ci, qui pourrait ainsi répondre aux « avancées » déjà enregistrées en faveur de la minorité turcophone de Grèce.

Dimitris Droutsas et Panayotis Tsakonas analysent les relations difficiles de la Turquie avec l'Union européenne de l'accord d'Association de 1963 jusqu'à la période de l'après Helsinki. Ils discutent aussi les relations greco-turques de l'après guerre froide et l'impact de la question chypriote sur la vocation européenne de la Turquie. Ils mettent en particulier l'accent sur le Partenariat d'adhésion et le Programme national relatif à l'acquis de l'UE. Les auteurs concluent que les choix de la Turquie sont maintenant limités en ce qui concerne la question chypriote et les relations greco-turques étant donné que la solution de ces problèmes est liée à sa marche vers l'Europe, soit qu'elle abandonne sa politique intransigeante sur ces questions et contribue de façon positive à leur solution, ou qu'elle adopte une politique qui cherche à renverser les règles européennes du jeu imposées par le Partenariat d'adhésion. La Grèce aussi doit être – selon les auteurs – consciente des risques associés à cette période de transition et élaborer des stratégies avec l'Union européenne pour s'attaquer aux problèmes auxquels la Turquie fait face. La Turquie doit enfin comprendre qu'en adoptant une position constructive dans le domaine des relations bilatérales et de la question Chypriote elle aura le soutien et l'accompagnement de la Grèce dans sa voie européenne.

Fotini Bellou pense que l'amélioration des relations entre la Grèce et la Turquie a renforcé la position stratégique de deux pays. Par ailleurs la décision de la Grèce de ne pas bloquer la candidature turque à l'Union européenne lors du Conseil européen d'Helsinki a servi non seulement les intérêts grecs et turcs mais a aussi fait avancer les objectifs de sécurité de l'U.E. C'est pourquoi elle avance la thèse selon laquelle les relations greco-turques et leur degré de rapprochement s'inscrivent dans un nouveau contexte, celui du dessein européen de sécurité. Elle constate cependant que des priorités différentes de deux

voisins au sujet de la candidature turque à l'U.E. peuvent affecter le processus de paix en cours actuellement.

Aristote Tziampiris, traitant de la question Chypriote, constate les effets positifs du Conseil européen d'Helsinki sur la marche européenne de la République de Chypre. L'auteur avance que c'est probablement la première fois depuis 1974 que le temps joue en faveur du côté grec. Cela est dû, selon lui, au fait qu'Helsinki garantit presque l'adhésion éventuelle de Chypre à l'Union européenne. Et cette adhésion pourrait jouer le rôle de catalyseur pour une solution, même si cela peut avoir lieu littéralement à minuit moins cinq. Dans ce sens, conclut-il, Helsinki représente probablement le début de la fin du problème Chypriote.

Kosta Gouliamos esquisse un cadre nouveau basé sur le rôle géopolitique de Chypre dans la région méditerranéenne en mettant l'accent sur le risque pour la Grèce de perdre toute influence en Méditerranée orientale aux dépens de sa propre sécurité.

Ainsi donc le triangle Grèce, Turquie, Union européenne s'anime dans un effort d'enterrer des problèmes qui durent depuis plus d'un demi-siècle. Du côté grec on a beaucoup investi dans ce pari de la voie européenne de la Turquie. Le révisionnisme en matière de politique extérieure grecque pratiqué depuis déjà quelques années a été renforcé depuis le Conseil européen d'Helsinki en décembre 1999. Cette politique critiquée fortement par ceux qui craignent que la Grèce avance dans cette voie sans rien recevoir de la Turquie est présentée par Costas Simitis et son Ministre des Affaires étrangères George Papandreou comme la voie qui permet au pays de sortir de son isolement européen et faire progresser l'adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne. Un pari risqué pour ceux qui pensent que cette politique n'a produit jusqu'à maintenant aucun effet positif ni sur la question chypriote ni sur le différend greco-turc en mer Egée. Au contraire on constate que malgré la politique grecque d'ouverture la Turquie n'a pas bougé d'un iota de sa politique agressive à Chypre et n'a pas évolué dans ses revendications en mer Egée considérées du côté grec comme tout à fait inacceptables.

Du côté turc la démocratisation piétine et comme le montre le Programme national relatif à l'acquis de l'UE en réponse au Partenariat pour l'adhésion la résistance au changement reste considérable. Il est donc clair que sur la voie européenne de la Turquie se dressent des forces intérieures importantes avec en tête le puissant establishment militaire qui ne veut pas perdre son influence et le contrôle du pouvoir. En ce sens ces forces rejoignent une opinion publique hostile ainsi que des forces politiques importantes des pays composant l'UE. Au demeurant, la plupart des forces politiques européennes favorables à la voie européenne de la Turquie situent son destin dans le cadre d'une Europe à plusieurs vitesses et dans un avenir assez lointain. Ce qui signifie en pratique que la Turquie pourrait être intégrée à la périphérie européenne avec un statut qui lui accorderait la plupart des avantages des pays membres mais sans la possibilité d'une libre circulation des personnes à l'intérieur du sanctuaire européen à proprement parler. L'armée turque, avec tous ses privilèges, serait aussi favorable à un tel statut européen pour la Turquie qui ne toucherait pas à ses intérêts et à sa mainmise sur la vie politique du pays.

C'est donc, comme nous l'écrivions dans le précédent numéro d'*Études helléniques/ Hellenic Studies*, dans ce contexte que se précise le scénario néo-ottoman d'une Turquie à mi-chemin entre l'Europe et sa situation actuelle. Dans le modèle néo-ottoman, la démocratisation serait limitée et ne mènerait pas au démantèlement du régime actuel, c'est-à-dire à l'abolition du rôle politique de l'armée. La Turquie serait liée à l'Europe par un statut particulier sans pour autant bénéficier d'un accès direct au club européen. Le modèle néo-ottoman tiendrait compte des intérêts américains, des positions européennes et des intérêts du bloc au pouvoir en Turquie.

Depuis quelques années déjà, un compromis historique entre les forces politiques et socio-économiques kemalistes, pro-européennes et islamistes se dessine sur le plan intérieur. Ce compromis serait ainsi en mesure d'assurer la survie d'un tel modèle.

Néanmoins, le modèle néo-ottoman, favorable par nature à cette politique expansionniste, tout en permettant à la Turquie de jouer un rôle hégémonique dans la région, ne permettrait pas de résoudre le contentieux gréco-turc ni de trouver une solution équitable au problème de Chypre. Et sans doute ce modèle, s'il continue à s'appliquer, va agir aux dépens de la démocratisation de la société turque et du respect des droits de l'Homme. Il est évident qu'un tel scénario ne servira ni les intérêts du peuple turc ni ceux de la stabilité de la région. Seule une démocratisation profonde accompagnée d'un règlement du contentieux avec la Grèce permettrait à la Turquie d'envisager sérieusement son avenir européen.

NOTES

1. Sur le concept d'une politique néo-ottomane voir : Stephanos Constantinides et Jean Catsiapis, « L'Union européenne et la Méditerranée orientale », in **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, vol. 8, no 2, Automne 2000.

The European Union and Eastern Mediterranean after Helsinki

CYPRUS - GREECE - TURKEY

From the Helsinki Summit to the Nice Summit

Stephanos Constantinides*

Ever since the decision at the Helsinki meeting of the European Council (December 10-11, 1999) to admit the principle of Turkey's candidacy for membership in the European Union, the Greece-Turkey-EU triangle has simmered with expectation. Yet it is Turkey that finds itself at a crossroads historically and at a difficult time in its history. With hopes of meeting EU requirements, Turkey either democratizes its régime; i.e., creation of a judicial state that respects human rights and normalized relationships with its neighbours, notably Greece and Cyprus or the Turkish state retains its current régime and carries out a neo-Ottoman¹ policy with the inherent consequences on the country's own future and the stability of the region.

The dynamics created after Helsinki have forced the EU to follow Turkey's internal developments closely, including Turkish policy on Greece and Cyprus. The debate over Turkey's European vocation among EU members is still open and watchfully observed by the Americans who want to anchor Turkey to Europe at all costs. However change comes slowly in Turkey where decision-making infrastructures involve the military who do not want to dismantle the authority which they already exercise. Indeed, the balance of power between the Kemalist establishment, the Islamists and the pro-European élite is not clear.

Given this context, Turkey's European future remains uncertain, as does the development of Greek-Turkish relations.

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In the previous issue of *Études hellénique/Hellenic Studies*, we adumbrated the problems stemming from the European dynamic created after Helsinki. We continue our reflection herein with a series of articles that seek to shed light on the new situation and the stakes involved.

The Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholomew, is not only favourable towards Turkey's European vocation but wants Cyprus' EU candidacy to promote a peaceful solution to the Cyprus issue. The Patriarch hopes for a lasting improvement in Greco-Turkish relations which would be in the best interests of both countries.

Jean Catsiapis considers the issue of EU enlargement to include Cyprus and Turkey as it evolved during the year 2000. He observes how the Cypriot candidacy progressed satisfactorily whereas the Turkish candidacy experienced problems thus slowing down the process. Since Helsinki, Cyprus has closed 17 out of 29 files on the *aquis communautaire*. The author believes that Cyprus must logically be part of the group of states which at the end of 2002 will have finished membership negotiations and could join the EU in 2003, given that the political issue, e.g. no solution to the Cyprus question, cannot block the acceptance of the island's candidacy. On the other hand, Turkey is dragging its feet because of structural and political problems encountered in terms of human rights issues and the democratization process. The serious political, economic and financial crises that rocked Turkey in 2000 and early 2001 will seemingly delay the country's chances of belonging to the European community.

Samim Akgönül examines the experience of both the Turkish-speaking Muslim minorities in Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey. The Greek minority of 110,000 in Turkey (1923), has decreased to today's 3,000 souls with the majority having left after the violent events of September 1955. However the Turkish-speaking Muslim community of 120,000 in Greece has remained stable. Samim Akgonul stresses that their fate is rather precarious since it depends essentially on relations between Athens and Ankara. The current détente tends to comfort Greeks living in Turkey, the 'endangered species', so to speak. The author thinks that reopening the theological

school of Halki, closed in 1978 by Turkey, would be a goodwill gesture that might correspond somewhat to the 'advances' which already benefit the Turkish-speaking minority in Greece.

Dimitris Droutsas and Panayotis Tsakonas analyze Turkey's difficult relations with the European Union from the signing of the association agreement in 1963 up to the post-Helsinki period. The authors discuss Greek-Turkish relations right after the Cold War and the impact of the Cyprus issue on Turkey's European vocation. They stress the 'accession partnership' and the National Program concerning EU *acquis*. Droutsas and Tsakonas conclude that Turkey's choices are not limited with regard to Cyprus as well as Turkish-Greek relations, given that Turkey's progress towards European Union membership hinges on the solutions to these problems. Turkey must either abandon its intransigent policy in these areas and work to solve these problems or it must adopt a policy that overturns the European rules imposed by the 'accession partnership'. According to the authors, Greece must also be aware of the risks associated with this transitional period and must draft strategies with the EU in an effort to attack the problems that Turkey faces. Turkey must also be aware that it will gain Greek support in its European vocation if it adopts a constructive position in terms of bilateral relations and the Cyprus issue.

Fotini Bellou thinks that improved Greco-Turkish relations have reinforced the strategic position of both countries. Indeed, Greece's decision to not block Turkey's candidacy at Helsinki served Greek and Turkish interests and also promoted EU security objectives. Hence she suggests that relations as well as the degree of *rapprochement* between the two countries may be considered to be in a new context, one of European security. Bellou observes that the different priorities of the two neighbours in terms of Turkey's candidacy may affect the current peace process.

Aristote Tziampiris' article treats the Cyprus issue. He describes the positive effects that the Helsinki summit had on the Cypriot European Union membership bid. The author suggests that this may be the first time since 1974 that time is on the Greeks' side. In fact he believes that this positive development is due to the fact that

Helsinki almost guarantees eventual Cypriot membership and that belonging to the EU will serve as a catalyst in the search for a solution, even at the eleventh hour. He thus concludes that Helsinki likely represents the end of the Cyprus problem.

Kosta Gouliamos outlines a new framework based on the geopolitical role Cyprus plays in the Mediterranean. He stresses that Greece risks losing all influence in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of its own security.

Overall, the triangle of Greece, Turkey and the European Union is active in trying to bury the problems of the last fifty years. On the Greek side, a heavy wager has been placed on Turkey's European vocation. Revisionism in Greek foreign policy matters, as practised in recent years, has been reinforced since the Helsinki 1999 summit. Criticised by those who fear that Greece is moving ahead on this track with nothing in return from Turkey, this policy represents the position of the Prime minister Costas Simitis and his foreign affairs minister, George Papandreou who believe this as the only way that will break Turkey out of its isolation and will advance the Cypriot EU membership position. Those who feel that this policy has generated no positive results in terms of the Cyprus issue or the Aegean Sea dispute consider the wager a risky one. On the other hand, despite the Greek policy of opening up, Turkey has not moved one iota in its aggressive position toward Cyprus and has not evolved in terms of its claims in the Aegean, which the Greeks consider completely inadmissible.

On the Turkish side, democratization remains stalled and there is considerable resistance to change, as seen in the National Program on *acquis* which the European Union set up as part of the 'accession partnership'. It is therefore quite apparent that Turkey's European vocation is maintained by major internal forces, first and foremost, the military establishment that does not want to lose its influence and control over the party in power. In this respect, these forces correspond to hostile public opinion and major political forces among EU countries. Even most of the European political forces in favour of Turkey's membership consider the country's fate within a 'tiered' European Union in a far-off future. Overall this means that Turkey

could be integrated on the European periphery with a status allowing it most of the advantages of member-countries but without the possibility of free circulation of its citizens within the European 'sanctuary'. The Turkish army, with all its privileges, would also support this type of European status for Turkey in order to protect the military's interests and controlling grasp on the country's political life.

As we wrote in the previous issue of *Étude helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, it is within this context that the neo-Ottoman scenario of a Turkey halfway between Europe and the current state unfolds. In the neo-Ottoman model, democratization would be limited and would not cause the dismantling of the current regime; i.e., the army's powerful political role. Turkey would be linked to Europe through a special status agreement without, however, benefitting from direct access to the European club. The neo-Ottoman model would take into account European positions, American interests and the interests of the bloc in power in Turkey.

For a few years now, a historical compromise among representatives of the Kemalist political and socio-economic forces, the pro-European and the Islamist forces has been taking shape inside Turkey. This compromise would effectively ensure the survival of the neo-Ottoman model.

Nevertheless, the neo-Ottoman model, favourable to this expansionist policy while still enabling Turkey to play a hegemonic role in the region, does not allow for any resolution of the Greco-Turkish contentions nor for any equitable solution to the Cyprus problem. This model, if it continues to be applied, will operate at the expense of Turkey's democratization and respect of human rights. Obviously this scenario would not serve the interests of the Turkish people or the stability of the region. Only extensive democratization, along with solutions to Turkish-Greek disputes, would enable Turkey to consider its European future seriously.

NOTES

1. For more details on the neo-Ottoman policy, see: Stephanos Constantinides and Jean Catsiapis, "The European Union and Eastern Mediterranean after Helsinki" in *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, vol. 8, no 2, Autumn 2000.

ETUDES HELLENIQUES

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**L'Union européenne
et la Méditerranée orientale
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L'après-Conseil européen d'Helsinki**

**The European Union and
Eastern Mediterranean after Helsinki
CYPRUS - GREECE - TURKEY**

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ENTRETIEN AVEC SA SAINTETÉ LE PATRIARCHE ŒCUMÉNIQUE BARTHOLOMÉE 1^{er}

Sa Sainteté le Patriarche œcuménique, Bartholomée 1^{er} a succédé le 22 octobre 1991 à Dimitrios 1^{er} après avoir été élu à Constantinople par le Saint Synode. Primat d'honneur de la chrétienté orthodoxe, le deux cent-soixante dixième Patriarche de l'Église d'Orient maintient la foi orthodoxe à Constantinople, en Turquie musulmane, soumise depuis plusieurs années aux pressions d'un intégrisme intransigeant. Bartholomée 1^{er} s'efforce d'entretenir des relations cordiales avec les dirigeants politiques de la Turquie, dont il approuve la candidature d'adhésion à L'Union européenne.

*Élu à la tête des Églises orthodoxes au moment même où s'est effondré le communisme en Europe centrale et dans les États de l'ex-URSS, il s'est fixé la mission d'assurer le renouveau de l'orthodoxie partout où cette religion a été persécutée. Bartholomée 1^{er}, favorable à la réconciliation de tous les chrétiens, dialogue avec Rome, où, le 29 juin 1995, il a lancé avec le Pape Jean Paul II un appel à la réunification des Églises. Ses réflexions sur les questions morales sont d'une étonnante modernité, puisqu'à la différence du chef de l'Église catholique, il refuse toute intrusion dans l'intimité des couples, pardonnant aux divorcés et recommandant une protection pour lutter contre le sida. Il résume ainsi la sagesse de l'orthodoxie « L'union sans séparation et sans confusion du divin et de l'humain ».**

Cet entretien a été réalisé par Jean Catsiapis

Q.: Le Conseil européen d'Helsinki a admis le principe de la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union européenne. Que pensez-vous de cette décision ?

R.: Nous appuyons chaleureusement l'orientation européenne de la Turquie parce que cela sera au bénéfice de nous tous.

* **La vérité vous rendra libre**, Entretiens avec le Patriarche de Constantinople, Bartholomée 1^{er} par Olivier Clément, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer et J. C. Lattès, 1996.

Q : Le Conseil européen d'Helsinki a confirmé la candidature de la République de Chypre où vivent des Grecs orthodoxes et des Turcs musulmans. Estimez vous que cette candidature est de nature à favoriser la paix à Chypre et le rapprochement entre le Christianisme et l'Islam ?

R.: Nous souhaitons de tout notre cœur que cela aide à la solution pacifique du problème chypriote. Pour ce qui est du rapprochement entre le Christianisme et l'Islam, nous devons préciser que par là nous entendons le rapprochement entre des Chrétiens et des Musulmans en tant que personnes et en tant que sociétés. Le rapprochement, la coopération et la coexistence pacifique des Chrétiens et des Musulmans aident bien sûr à la disparition de certains préjugés et contribuent à la paix, qui est pour tous un cadeau de Dieu.

Q.: Des pays dont la population est en majorité orthodoxe comme la Bulgarie et la Roumanie souhaitent dans l'avenir faire partie de l'Union européenne. Quelle doit être selon vous la place de l'Orthodoxie au sein de l'Europe ?

R.: L'Église Orthodoxe n'a pas été soumise à la rationalisation de la foi et à la laïcisation. Elle conserve la jouvence originelle de la lumière devant l'énergie sensible de Dieu. L'Europe qui est à la recherche de son enfance a besoin de cette jouvence éternelle durable de l'Eglise Orthodoxe. Et nous croyons que malgré et en dépit des persécutions de l'Église par les régimes communistes et malgré la conquête de la façon de vivre et de penser de l'occident, survit encore la jeunesse de la Foi Orthodoxe régénérée de ses cendres qui peut contribuer à la régénération de l'Europe.

Q.: Depuis le tremblement du 17 août 1999, qui a durement frappé le peuple turc les relations entre la Turquie et la Grèce sont en voie d'amélioration. Pensez vous que cette amélioration sera durable ?

R.: Nous souhaitons de tout notre cœur que cette amélioration soit stabilisée et nous croyons que cette stabilité des bonnes relations est la seule voie possible et bienfaisante pour les deux pays.

- Q.: Quelle est aujourd'hui la situation des chrétiens en Turquie ? Quels sont les rapports actuels du Patriarcat œcuménique avec le gouvernement turc ? Peut-on espérer la réouverture de la Faculté Théologique de Halki ?
- R.: En Turquie après l'échange des populations et les événements historiques ultérieurs bien connus sont demeurés relativement peu de chrétiens orthodoxes qui jouissent de droits égaux. Il existe certains problèmes comme la fermeture de la Faculté Théologique de Halki et l'administration des institutions communautaires grecques orthodoxes de bienfaisance pour la solution desquels nous avons soumis des demandes au Gouvernement Turc.
- Q.: La presse des pays occidentaux a condamné l'action des Serbes en Bosnie et au Kosovo et des Russes en Tchétchénie et pose la question : « Faut-il avoir peur des Orthodoxes ? ». Qu'avez vous à répondre à cette question ?
- R.: Tous les Serbes ni tous les Russes n'agissent sur la base des vœux de Dieu, comme ceux-ci sont enseignés dans le cadre de l'Église Orthodoxe. Ils vivent encore dans des pays où à l'époque communiste on poursuivait la Foi Orthodoxe, les croyants orthodoxes et l'Église Orthodoxe. Donc il n'est pas du tout correct d'assimiler les agissements des dirigeants de Russie et de la Serbie à ceux de l'Église Orthodoxe, comme si elle en était l'instigatrice. Sa Sainteté le Patriarche de Serbie Pavel a par exemple à maintes reprises exprimé l'opposition de l'Église Orthodoxe de Serbie à des persécutions racistes et religieuses, quelques soient les auteurs de celles-ci. Par conséquent personne ne doit avoir peur du Christianisme Orthodoxe de l'amour, du pardon et de la réconciliation. Celui qui est en désaccord envers quelques agissements politiques des peuples ou d'États, qui se nomment orthodoxes, doit discerner que ces agissements ne proviennent pas de la part de l'Église Orthodoxe qui s'y trouve et ne doit pas en rendre responsable celle-ci mais les imputer à leurs auteurs.

Q.: Où en est aujourd'hui le dialogue entre Orthodoxes et Catholiques ? A-t-on progressé sur la voie de l'unité des chrétiens ?

R.: Il y a quelques difficultés, spécialement pour ce qui est de la question des Uniates mais également sur d'autres sujets. Nous souhaitons et nous travaillons pour que la vérité prédomine.

Q.: Dans de nombreux pays se sont développées de nombreuses sectes religieuses, qui menacent l'influence des grandes religions. Comment expliquez vous ce phénomène? Estimez vous que certaines de ces sectes sont dangereuses, notamment pour les jeunes ?

R.: Sans doute les croyances et religions catastrophiques, qui annihilent la personne et sa liberté et influencent de façon négative le jugement, sont dangereuses pour les jeunes et provoquent un prosélytisme irrévocable. Elles constituent une menace non pas pour les grandes religions, mais pour des personnes influençables, qui sont transformées en robots sans volonté et sans liberté.

La Revue *Études Helléniques* tient à rappeler qu'elle a, en 1996, déjà eu l'honneur de publier un entretien avec Sa Sainteté le Patriarche œcuménique Batholomée 1^{er}.

Interview with His Holiness, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I

This exclusive interview with the Ecumenical Patriarch was carried out by Jean Catsiapis on behalf of *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*. This is the second time that the journal has been honoured by an interview with His Holiness.

His Holiness, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I took over from Dimitrios I on October 22, 1991, after being elected by the Holy Synod in Constantinople. Honourable Primate of Orthodox Christians, the 260th Patriarch of the Eastern Church maintains the Orthodox faith in Constantinople, Turkey, a country which has been under unrelenting pressure from Muslim fundamentalists over the past few years. Bartholomew I strives to uphold cordial relations with the Turkish political leaders and approves of the country's EU candidacy.

*Bartholomew I was elected head of the Orthodox Churches precisely as Communism was falling in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Given the situation, he made his mission one of Orthodox renewal wherever this Church had been persecuted. Favourable to the reconciliation of all Christians, Bartholomew I has been in regular dialogue with Rome. In fact, on June 29, 1995, the Ecumenical Patriarch and Pope John-Paul II issued an appeal for the reunification of the Christian Churches. The Patriarch's reflections on moral issues are surprisingly modern for unlike the head of the Catholic Church, Bartholomew I does not intrude upon the privacy of the couple, thus he pardons divorced Christians and recommends safe sex to prevent the spread of AIDS. One could say that he embodies the wisdom of Orthodoxy; in other words, "union without separation and without confusion of the divine and the human." **

Q. The European Council in Helsinki has accepted the principle of Turkey's EU candidacy. What do you think of this decision?

* *La vérité vous rendra libre*, Entretiens avec le Patriarche de Constantinople, Bartholomée 1^{er} par Olivier Clément, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer et J. C. Lattès, 1996.

- R. We warmly support Turkey's European orientation for it will benefit all of us.
- Q. The European Council in Helsinki has confirmed the candidacy of the Republic of Cyprus, where both Orthodox Greeks and Muslim Turks live. Do you think this candidacy will promote peace in Cyprus and bring Christians and Muslims closer together?
- R. With all our heart, we hope that this will help lead to a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. By *rapprochement* between Christians and Muslims, we mean *rapprochement* between Christians and Muslims as individuals and as societies. Rapprochement, cooperation and the peaceful coexistence of both groups naturally will help erase certain prejudices and will contribute to peace, which is a gift from God to all of us.
- Q. Populations that are primarily Orthodox, like Bulgarians and Roumanians, wish to join the European Union in the future. What do you think the role of Orthodoxy will be in Europe?
- R. The role of Orthodoxy was not subject to the rationalization of faith and secularization. It has maintained the original youthfulness of light before the palpable energy of the Lord. A Europe that seeks its childhood needs this 'eternal youth' that the Orthodox Church provides. We believe that despite persecution from Communist régimes and despite the modern ways of thinking and living introduced from the West, the youthfulness of the Orthodox faith has survived and is being reborn from its ashes and can contribute to the regeneration of Europe.
- Q. Since the earthquake that devastated part of Turkey on August 17, 1999, relations between the Turkish and Greek peoples have been improving. Do you think that this improvement will last?
- R. With all our heart, we hope that the improved relations stabilize and we believe that the stability of these relations is the only possible and salutary path for both countries to take.

- Q. What is the current situation of Christians living in Turkey? What relationship does the Ecumenical Patriarch have with the Turkish Government? Can we expect the theological school of Halki to reopen?
- R. After the population exchanges and well-known historical events, relatively few Orthodox Christians enjoying equal rights remained in Turkey. There have been problems, such as the closing of the Halki seminary and the administration of Greek Orthodox community institutions and charities. We have already presented claims to the Turkish Government in these matters.
- Q. The Western media condemned the Serbian action taken in Bosnia and in Kosovo as well as that of the Russians in Chechnia. They ask: Should we be afraid of the Orthodox? What reply do you have for them?
- R. Neither all Russians nor all Serbs are acting in accordance with the wishes of God, as taught in the Orthodox Church. They are living in former Communist countries where the Orthodox faithful and their Church were persecuted. It is not at all correct to connect the actions of Russian and Serbian leaders with those of the Orthodox Church, as if the Church had instigated fighting. His Holiness, Patriarch of Serbia, Pavel, has repeatedly expressed the Church's opposition to racist and religious persecution, regardless of those involved. No one should be afraid of the Orthodox Christianity of love, forgiveness and reconciliation. Anyone who disagrees with the political actions of a people or state called Orthodox must realize that these are not the actions of the Church. Responsibility for such actions should not be imputed to the Church, but rather to those who take such actions.
- Q. At what stage are we in terms of dialogue between Catholic and Orthodox Christians? Has there been progress made towards Christian unity?

- R. There are some difficulties, especially with regards to the Uniates but also on other topics. We have hope and continue to work so that the truth will prevail.
- Q. In several countries religious sects have developed and threaten the influence of major religions. How can you explain this phenomenon? Do you consider some sects dangerous, especially for young people?
- R. Religions and beliefs based on catastrophes that destroy the individual and his/her freedom and have a negative influence on his/her judgement are pernicious to youth and create irrevocable proselytism. These beliefs or religions are not a threat to the great religions but they are a threat to impressionable people who become like robots, without freedom or free will.

LA QUESTION DE L'ÉLARGISSEMENT DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE À CHYPRE ET À LA TURQUIE DURANT L'ANNÉE 2000

Jean CATSIAPIS*

ABSTRACT

Cyprus' EU candidacy has progressed satisfactorily since the Helsinki meeting of the European Council largely because Cyprus has already completed 17 of 29 files related to *acquis communautaire*. Logically Cyprus will be among the candidates that will have finished membership negotiations by the end of the year 2002 and will be able to join the EU in 2003. This logic stands since lack of a solution to the Cypriot question can not be considered as an obstacle to the island's candidacy. Meanwhile Turkey is dragging its feet along the road to EU membership. Given the serious political, economic and financial crises that shook the country in 2000 and early 2001, Turkey's prospects for joining the EU seem more and more distant than before.

RÉSUMÉ

Le processus de la candidature de Chypre à l'UE a progressé de façon satisfaisante depuis le Conseil européen d'Helsinki puisque ce pays a déjà conclu 17 dossiers sur 29 de l'acquis communautaire. Chypre doit logiquement faire partie du groupe d'États, qui dès la fin de 2002 auront terminé les négociations d'adhésion et pourront intégrer l'UE en 2003, étant entendu que le non règlement de la question chypriote ne peut constituer un obstacle à l'acceptation de sa candidature. La Turquie, en revanche « avance à reculons vers l'Europe ». La grave crise politique, économique et financière qui a secoué ce pays durant l'année 2000 et au début de 2001 semble repousser pour longtemps ses perspectives d'appartenance à l'Europe communautaire.

Après le Conseil européen d'Helsinki des 10 et 11 décembre 1999 qui, d'une part, se félicite de l'état d'avancement des négociations d'adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne et, d'autre part, admet le principe de la candidature de la Turquie à cette organisation, il y a eu au cours de l'année 2000 différentes initiatives pour préciser les con-

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ditions de la future participation de ces deux États à l'édification d'une Europe élargie. Si la candidature de Chypre a progressé de façon satisfaisante, en revanche celle de la Turquie a connu des difficultés, qui en retardent le processus. Le Conseil européen de Nice, qui s'est tenu du 7 au 11 décembre a entrepris une réforme des actuelles institutions communautaires de façon à faciliter l'élargissement futur de l'UE, qui pourrait concerner, fin 2002, ceux des États candidats dont les négociations d'adhésion seraient alors terminées.

1. La progression satisfaisante de la candidature de Chypre

La candidature de la République de Chypre à l'adhésion à l'Union européenne a été présentée par le gouvernement de Nicosie le 4 juillet 1990. Les négociations ont commencé le 31 mars 1998 et se sont poursuivies depuis cette date à un rythme soutenu. Le refus des Chypriotes turcs de faire partie de la composition de la délégation chargée de défendre à Bruxelles la candidature de la République de Chypre n'a pas eu pour effet de retarder l'examen de celle-ci. À la fin de l'année 2000, 17 des 29 chapitres de l'acquis communautaire, ont été réglés par Chypre, plaçant ce pays en tête des États candidats à l'adhésion quant à l'avancement des négociations avec la Commission de Bruxelles.

C'est ainsi que le 20 mars 2000 a été adopté par le Conseil de l'UE un Partenariat pour l'adhésion avec Chypre. Tout au long de l'année 2000 les autorités européennes ont suivi et encouragé les différentes négociations, qui ont eu lieu entre les communautés chypriote grecque et chypriote turque. Ces négociations ont été vouées à l'échec en raison de la volonté évidente d'Ankara de maintenir sans solution la question chypriote. Cette intransigeance de la Turquie s'est aussi manifestée à l'égard de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, qui a condamné cet État pour sa violation des droits des Chypriotes. De son côté le Parlement européen a affirmé son soutien à une adhésion rapide de Chypre à l'UE.

Le Partenariat d'adhésion

Chypre comme chaque Etat candidat à l'adhésion s'est vu proposer un Partenariat pour l'adhésion et a adopté en septembre, en réponse à cette proposition, un premier Programme national d'adoption de l'acquis (PNAA).

Le Partenariat pour l'adhésion de Chypre a notamment pour objectif d'inscrire dans un cadre unique les domaines prioritaires que ce pays se doit de poursuivre en vue de son intégration dans l'Europe communautaire.

Parmi les priorités à court terme il y a les critères politiques et économiques. Si la Commission¹ apprécie les efforts de Chypre pour trouver une solution à sa division, elle porte en revanche un jugement plus réservé sur les résultats réalisés par ce pays dans le domaine économique :

« Chypre a une économie de marché viable et devrait être en mesure de faire face à la pression concurrentielle et aux forces du marché à l'intérieur de l'Union. Des progrès sont accomplis dans les domaines de la libéralisation et des réformes structurelles. Toutefois, la stabilité macro-économique s'est affaiblie récemment et le niveau et l'orientation actuels de la politique budgétaire ne sont pas supportables à moyen terme. »

Cependant les autorités de Bruxelles considèrent très positivement la politique menée par Nicosie pour aligner ou commencer à aligner sa législation sur les normes européennes en particulier dans le domaine fiscal, de l'agriculture, de la pêche, des transports, de l'environnement et de la justice.

En ce qui concerne les priorités à moyen terme le gouvernement chypriote a déjà, en matière de libre circulation des capitaux, levé certaines restrictions aux investissements de l'étranger et à l'étranger. Il a, par ailleurs, mis en place un programme de subvention des investissements en vue de promouvoir l'utilisation d'énergie provenant de sources renouvelables. S'agissant des affaires sociales les

autorités chypriotes ont élaboré des travaux préparatoires pour l'élaboration d'un Plan d'action nationale pour l'emploi, conformément aux lignes directrices communautaires pour l'emploi.

Associée à l'Europe communautaire depuis 1973, Chypre a signé avec Bruxelles quatre protocoles financiers entre 1978 et 1999. Le montant global de l'aide de pré-adhésion mise à la disposition de ce pays pour la période 2000-2004 doit s'élever à 57 millions d'Euros.

Au total Chypre a accompli des avancées considérables dans sa marche d'harmonisation avec l'acquis communautaire ainsi que l'ont souligné le 5 décembre 2000 à Bruxelles M. Hubert Védrine, Ministre français des affaires étrangères et Président du Conseil de l'UE et M. Gunter Verheugen, commissaire européen chargé de l'élargissement de l'UE², celui-ci estimant que les négociations d'adhésion de ce pays devraient logiquement se terminer fin 2002.

De fait la République de Chypre se présente de façon très favorable sur le plan économique avec un PIB en croissance de l'ordre de 4% et un marché du travail proche du plein emploi. Elle devrait ainsi, comme l'a indiqué son ministre de l'Économie, M. Takis Cléridès, le 1^{er} février 2001³ pouvoir satisfaire aux critères de Maastricht et entrer dans la zone euro.

L'UE et les négociations inter-communautaires

Fin décembre 1999 sous l'égide de l'ONU s'est tenu le premier tour des pourparlers indirects entre le Président Cléridès et R. Denktash, le chef de la communauté chypriote turque. Quatre autres tours ont eu lieu au cours de l'année 2000 (le second du 31 janvier au 8 février, le troisième du 5 au 12 juillet, puis du 24 juillet au 4 août, le quatrième du 12 au 26 septembre et le cinquième du 1^{er} au 10 novembre). Ces négociations ont porté sur plusieurs questions principales dont la solution est indispensable pour le règlement du problème chypriote : la répartition des fonctions et des pouvoirs, la sécurité future, la question territoriale, les réfugiés et les propriétés. La France, qui a présidé l'UE au cours du second semestre 2000 a apporté son soutien à ces pour-

parlers indirects par une déclaration du 31 octobre⁴ à la veille de leur cinquième tour :

« L'Union européenne considère que le statu quo à Chypre est inacceptable et soutient les efforts déployés par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies en vue de parvenir à un règlement négocié, global, juste et durable, qui soit conforme aux résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.

Elle appelle les deux communautés à mener, pendant cette session, des discussions substantielles et à contribuer activement à un règlement ».

Malgré l'optimisme du Président Cléridés, qui à l'issue de ce cinquième tour a déclaré que « ce tour des pourparlers a été meilleur que les précédents » il semble qu'aucune solution à la question chypriote ne soit encore envisageable en raison de l'attitude de la Turquie, qui persiste à ne pas vouloir de réelle solution à la question chypriote. À vrai dire les propositions turques d'un statut de confédération pour Chypre masque à peine la volonté d'Ankara de vouloir obtenir la consécration de la division de l'île avec deux Etats séparés, l'un chypriote turc, entièrement soumis à son armée d'occupation et l'autre chypriote grec, sous la menace constante d'une intervention de celle-ci.

Au demeurant, la Turquie, au cours de l'année 2000 n'a eu de cesse de durcir sa présence à Chypre, en provoquant l'hostilité de la communauté chypriote turque et les craintes du gouvernement de Nicosie d'une extension de la zone d'occupation tout en entravant l'action des forces de l'ONU en territoire chypriote.

Le journal chypriote turc « Avrupa », très critique envers les autorités d'occupation et le gouvernement de la « République turque de Chypre Nord » a été ainsi condamné fin 1999 pour diffamation à une lourde amende à la suite d'une plainte de R. Denkatsh et a été dépossédé en mai 2000 de ses biens, saisis en raison de son impossibilité de payer celle-ci. L'arrestation de plusieurs journalistes de « Avrupa » ainsi que le mécontentement dû à la faillite de plusieurs banques implantées par la Turquie provoquant l'écroulement de « pyramides financières » a

entraîné au cours de l'été de violentes manifestations contre la Turquie et le régime de Denktash dans la partie occupée de Chypre. Une grève générale de protestation contre le régime d'occupation a eu lieu en octobre à l'appel de quarante organisations chypriotes turques. Et le 30 janvier 2001 l'Union des Enseignants chypriotes turcs (KTOS) a exprimé son opposition aux mesures d'oppression imposées par Ankara soulignant que les Chypriotes turcs « ne veulent pas devenir les esclaves de la Turquie »⁵.

La Turquie, outre le maintien de sa politique d'occupation de type très répressif au nord de Chypre s'est employé, à pratiquer un harcèlement militaire tant à l'égard des forces de l'ONU en territoire chypriote (FNUCHYP) qu'envers la population vivant dans la partie libre de ce territoire. C'est en effet pour manifester leur mécontentement à l'égard de la procédure retenue pour enregistrer les positions des parties et des États intéressés sur le renouvellement du mandat de la FNUCHYP que les forces turques d'occupation ont, le 30 juin, d'une part, pris des mesures de représailles à l'égard de cette force de paix en limitant sa liberté de déplacement et, d'autre part, encerclé le village grec de Strovilia dans la zone tampon, soumis depuis cette date à leur contrôle. Force est de reconnaître que ces provocations de l'armée turque envers l'ONU et le gouvernement chypriote, qui ont le but évident de durcir le régime de fer de la zone d'occupation – dont Ankara souhaite l'extension – n'ont pas été sanctionnées par la communauté internationale. Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies s'est, en effet, contenté dans sa résolution 1331 du 13 décembre 2000 de demander « instamment à la partie chypriote et aux forces turques de rapporter les restrictions imposées le 30 juin 2000 aux opérations de la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre et de rétablir le statu quo ante militaire à Strovilia ».

Minées par les actions militaires turques à Chypre les négociations inter communautaires, dont les résultats sont importants pour l'adhésion de ce pays à l'Union européenne sont donc à la merci du gouvernement d'Ankara. Alors même que selon un sondage plus de 90% des Chypriotes turcs sont en faveur de l'adhésion à l'UE⁶, l'intransigeance de la Turquie empêche la communauté qu'elle est venue pro-

téger - à l'en croire, par son intervention militaire de l'été 1974 - de participer au processus de la construction européenne. Et s'il est vrai que le Conseil européen d'Helsinki n'a pas fait du règlement politique de la question chypriote une condition préalable à l'adhésion de la République de Chypre, il est certain que l'échec, qui semble perpétuel, des négociations intercommunautaires est de nature à retarder ou même bloquer l'intégration de ce pays dans la famille des nations européennes.

La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme et la question chypriote

L'Union européenne repose sur différents fondements, en particulier sur le respect des droits de l'homme. C'est ainsi que seuls des États démocratiques peuvent adhérer à l'UE, qui, au cours de l'année 2000, a élaboré une Charte des droits fondamentaux dont l'adoption est intervenue au Conseil européen de Nice. Le gouvernement de Nicosie mais aussi le peuple chypriote ont continué, durant cette même année à manifester leur attachement au respect des droits de l'homme. Il convient ici d'évoquer l'examen par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme du quatrième recours inter-étatique de Chypre contre la Turquie ainsi que l'affaire Loïzidou.

C'est le 21 septembre 2000 que la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme a examiné à Strasbourg la quatrième requête de la République de Chypre contre la Turquie sur les conséquences de l'invasion de 1974. Dans cette dernière plainte le gouvernement chypriote accuse Ankara d'une longue série de violations de la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme, allant des cas de torture à la disparition de plus de 1 600 personnes, au déplacement forcé de 210 000 personnes et à la spoliation des biens de milliers de Chypriotes. Il dénonce aussi les conditions de vie discriminatoires imposées aux Chypriotes grecs restés dans la partie occupée de l'île : privation de traitement médical d'urgence, refus de l'enseignement secondaire pour les enfants, impossibilité de l'exercice du droit d'élire les députés du Parlement chypriote, surveillance policière du courrier venant de la partie libre de Chypre. La décision de la Cour sur cette plainte n'interviendra qu'ultérieurement après plusieurs mois de délibéré.

Mme Titina Loïzidou, chypriote grecque réfugiée grecque de Kyrénia, a obtenu de la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme un arrêt rendu le 28 juillet 1998, qui condamne la Turquie à lui verser une somme équivalent à 3 500 000 francs français à titre de dommages et intérêts, au motif que l'armée de ce pays l'avait forcée à quitter sa propriété et empêcher d'y avoir accès et d'en jouir en violation des articles 1 du protocole, 1 et 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme. Depuis sa condamnation la Turquie se refuse obstinément à exécuter l'arrêt la concernant. Le Comité des ministres du Conseil de l'Europe a adopté, le 6 octobre 1999, une première résolution intérimaire invitant Ankara à se conformer à l'arrêt de la Cour de Strasbourg, et une seconde résolution le 24 juillet 2000, restée elle aussi sans aucun effet. Ce refus d'un Etat membre du Conseil de l'Europe de se conformer à une décision de justice rendue par une juridiction internationale est sans précédent. Il est donc difficile de croire à la volonté de la Turquie de se conformer au respect du droit et des résolutions des autorités européennes communautaires ou non communautaires.

Le Parlement européen et la candidature de Chypre

Le Parlement européen est, sans doute l'institution de l'UE, qui est la plus favorable à l'adhésion de Chypre. Il faut ainsi citer sa décision du 4 octobre 2000, qui approuve par 483 voix pour, 12 contre et 33 abstentions le rapport de Jacques Poos sur la candidature de ce pays. Considérant que la République de Chypre « est seule habilitée à représenter l'ensemble de l'île » le Parlement européen observe que cet État « a accompli des progrès considérables sur les plans économique et politique malgré 26 années d'occupation de la partie la plus riche de son territoire par la Turquie ». Il admet aussi que « Chypre peut dès lors envisager de devenir rapidement membre de l'UE et que « toute objection dressée contre cette adhésion en raison de la situation particulière de l'île ne serait ni politiquement ni moralement défendable ». En d'autres termes les parlementaires européens estiment qu'il serait injuste de rejeter la candidature de Chypre parce que, victime de l'a-

gression turque de 1974, cet Etat présente une division. À cet égard de nombreux observateurs font remarquer que l'Allemagne bien que divisée a pu faire partie des membres fondateurs de l'Europe communautaire créée par le traité de Rome du 25 mars 1957, la réunification de cet Etat ayant permis en 1990 d'y intégrer la partie de son territoire soumis jusqu'à cette année-ci à un régime communiste.

Dans sa résolution du 4 octobre 2000 le Parlement européen insiste aussi sur les éléments positifs pour les Européens de l'adhésion de Chypre en notant « la contribution importante que Chypre pourra apporter à la PESC (Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune) » et en estimant que « l'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE renforcera l'importance de cette dernière en Méditerranée orientale, ce qui contribuera à accroître la sécurité dans la région ».

Le 15 novembre 2000 le Parlement européen sur la base du rapport de Philippe Morillon s'est prononcé sur la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE, en encourageant le gouvernement de ce pays à intensifier ses efforts de démocratisation mais en lui demandant aussi de retirer « ses troupes d'occupation » du nord de Chypre et de participer, sans conditions préalables, à la création d'un climat propice aux pourparlers entre les communautés grecque et turque. Ainsi est clairement démontré par ces deux résolutions du Parlement européen que si l'adhésion de Chypre ne doit pas dépendre de la solution préalable de la question chypriote, en revanche la candidature de la Turquie est soumise pour l'ouverture des négociations de ce pays avec l'UE à une série de conditions politiques comprenant le retrait de son armée du territoire chypriote.

2. Le lent processus de la candidature de la Turquie

L'acceptation du principe de la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE par le Conseil européen d'Helsinki n'a pas entraîné dans ce pays les effets positifs que l'on pouvait attendre. Au cours de l'année 2000 la proposition au gouvernement turc par Bruxelles de la conclusion d'un Partenariat d'adhésion a été élaborée dans des conditions difficiles. En

effet les autorités politiques de Turquie ont été confrontées à de nombreux problèmes dus en particulier à la place prépondérante dans les structures décisionnelles de ce pays de l'armée dans, qui, n'entend faire aucune concession pour permettre l'ouverture de négociations d'adhésion avec l'UE. La question des droits de l'homme, la résurgence de la reconnaissance du génocide arménien de 1915 ainsi que la crise politique et financière, qui a secoué la Turquie ont sapé les relations du gouvernement d'Ankara avec les autorités communautaires européennes et certains pays membres de l'UE.

Le Partenariat d'adhésion

C'est sous la présidence française, c'est à dire durant le second semestre 2000 qu'a été mis au point le Partenariat pour l'adhésion proposé à la Turquie. La France désireuse de bien préparer ce pays aux enjeux posés par sa candidature a multiplié les occasions pour lui faire comprendre les réformes de structures à entreprendre en vue de son adhésion. Elle a notamment organisé à Istanbul le 30 septembre un colloque auquel ont participé de nombreux chefs décideurs turcs aussi bien dans le domaine politique qu'économique⁷.

Le 8 novembre a été rendue publique par la Commission de Bruxelles une proposition de décision du Conseil « concernant les objectifs intermédiaires et conditions du Partenariat pour l'adhésion de la République de Turquie ». Ce texte, qui constitue un guide permettant à la Turquie de se conformer aux critères d'adhésion à l'Union comprend des objectifs, des principes et des priorités.

Le Partenariat pour l'adhésion proposé à la Turquie a pour objectif principal d'inscrire dans un cadre unique les domaines d'action prioritaires en vue de son adhésion à l'UE, les moyens financiers disponibles pour l'aider à mettre en œuvre ces priorités et les conditions applicables à cette aide. Sur la base de ce Partenariat pour l'adhésion la Turquie a été ainsi invitée à présenter avant la fin de l'année 2000 un Programme national d'adoption de l'acquis (PNAA).

Parmi les principes que doit respecter la Turquie il y a, rappelle le texte du Partenariat pour l'adhésion, qui se réfère aux conclusions du Conseil européen d'Helsinki celui « du règlement pacifique des litiges, conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies », qui doit conduire ce pays à porter ses litiges devant la Cour internationale de justice, au plus tard avant la fin de 2004.

Les priorités énoncées dans la proposition du Partenariat présentée à Ankara par Bruxelles comprend d'une part les critères politiques et d'autre part les critères économiques. Au rang des critères politiques il y a « un soutien ferme accordé dans le contexte du dialogue politique aux efforts déployés par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies pour faire aboutir le processus visant à trouver une solution globale au problème chypriote ». Cette référence à une solution du problème chypriote a entraîné une vive réaction de la Turquie, qui a considéré qu'une telle solution ne pouvait constituer une condition à remplir pour adhérer à l'UE. Le gouvernement grec, de son côté a indiqué qu'il n'accepterait pas le texte du Partenariat pour l'adhésion de la Turquie, si ce paragraphe sur la question de Chypre était supprimé. Finalement le compromis, qui a été trouvé a consisté à maintenir le paragraphe en question mais en remplaçant le titre « critères politiques » par celui de « dialogue politique renforcé et critères politiques ». La Turquie a ainsi pu considérer que le règlement de la question de Chypre n'était qu'un élément de dialogue politique et non plus un préalable à son adhésion.

On conçoit ainsi facilement les ambiguïtés du texte du Partenariat pour l'adhésion de la Turquie dont la version définitive a été adoptée, le 8 mars 2001, par le Conseil de l'UE .

La crise politique et financière

Le système politique de la Turquie est affecté de façon quasi permanente de dysfonctionnements, qui obèrent sa politique étrangère et ses initiatives diplomatiques. La vie politique intérieure de ce pays des dernières décennies est en effet perturbée souvent par les interventions

de l'armée et parfois par l'émergence de partis islamiques, phénomènes inconnus des États appartenant à l'UE. Au cours de l'année 2000 la Turquie a connu nombre de péripéties politiques, qui ont eu pour effet de discréditer ses efforts affichés de modernisation et d'eupéanisation. En outre les graves problèmes d'ordre économique et financier, qui sont apparus à la fin de cette année-ci ont indéniablement fragilisé sa candidature d'adhésion à l'UE.

Le 16 mai Ahmet Necdet Sezer, président de la Cour Constitutionnelle succède aux fonctions de chef de l'État à S. Demirel en promettant de renforcer « l'État de droit et la démocratie ». La désignation par les parlementaires de ce juriste, considéré comme favorable à l'Europe, et dont la popularité va être grande, n'a pas toutefois eu de conséquences très positives sur la vie politique turque. En effet, le nouveau Président va se heurter rapidement au Premier ministre B. Ecevit en refusant le 8 puis le 21 août d'approuver un décret licenciant des centaines de fonctionnaires liés à des organisations islamiques. Le gouvernement envisage alors de réduire les pouvoirs du chef de l'État, qui après avoir refusé de promulguer une loi d'amnistie se résout enfin à accepter, en décembre, un projet d'amnistie partielle.

Outre une crispation des rapports entre le Président et le gouvernement la fin de l'année 2000 a été marquée par le déclenchement d'une grande crise financière. C'est ainsi que le FMI, qui en décembre 1999 avait accordé à la Turquie un accord de stand-by de 4 milliards de dollars sur une période de trois ans, a été de nouveau sollicité, en décembre 2000, par Ankara pour lui permettre de faire face à une crise financière d'importance majeure*. Cette crise a été déclenchée par la décision du gouvernement Ecevit de mise sous tutelle de onze banques, qui va entraîner une chute vertigineuse de la Bourse et la fuite, hors du pays, en quelques jours de 6 milliards de dollars. Le FMI a finalement promis un crédit de 10 milliards de dollars pour faire face à une crise financière, qui connaîtra un rebondissement au début de 2001.

La question des droits de l'Homme

Les menaces sur les droits de l'homme n'ont pas diminué en Turquie depuis le Conseil européen d'Helsinki alors qu'on aurait pu imaginer

que les autorités d'Ankara, fortes de la reconnaissance par l'UE du droit de leur pays à faire acte de candidature auraient entrepris sans tarder les réformes constitutionnelles indispensables pour parvenir à un système de garantie des libertés publiques fondamentales comparables à celui des États membres de l'Europe des Quinze. Certes, il y a eu débat dans les milieux politiques turcs pour amender la Constitution afin d'instituer :

- l'abolition de la peine de mort
- l'attribution de droits culturels au peuple kurde
- le règlement du problème de Chypre
- la diminution du pouvoir du Conseil national de sécurité (MGK), organe décisionnel composé de militaires et de civils.

Mais les généraux turcs, défavorables, dans leur majorité, à une intégration de leur pays dans l'Europe communautaire, moyennant leur effacement de la vie politique ont réussi, jusqu'à présent, à empêcher tout progrès en matière de droits de l'homme. Ils ont même en novembre 2000 essayé de discréditer des journalistes, qui ne suivaient pas la ligne politique officielle en ce qui concerne la question kurde ; un mémorandum militaire secret, rendu public, décrivant « une offensive psychologique » visant à « diminuer le respect et la confiance du public » à l'égard de journalistes considérés par l'armée comme trop favorables à la cause kurde.

Le gouvernement turc a, lui-même, eu l'occasion devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, le 21 novembre 2000, de défendre une curieuse conception des droits de l'homme à propos de l'affaire Öcalan. Öcalan, est le chef indépendantiste kurde du PKK, condamné à mort, le 29 juin 1999, par la Cour de sûreté d'Ankara, après avoir été enlevé à Nairobi par des membres des forces turques de sécurité. Devant les juges de Strasbourg, les avocats d'Ankara ont justifié l'enlèvement d'Öcalan en invoquant « la coopération entre deux États souverains » et les conditions de son procès en indiquant que des circonstances particulières méritent un traitement d'exception car « une législation normale peut être insuffisante pour combattre le terrorisme »⁹.

Le sursis à l'exécution d'Öcalan dans l'attente de la décision de la Cour de Strasbourg ne suffit pas à considérer que les autorités poli-

tiques turques sont désireuses de modifier leur politique en matière des droits de l'homme comme l'atteste son attitude à l'égard des détenus dans les prisons.

Le sort lamentable des détenus dans les prisons de Turquie a été dénoncé depuis longtemps par de nombreuses organisations humanitaires turques et étrangères. Le Partenariat pour l'adhésion de la Turquie demande d'ailleurs à cet État « d'ajuster les conditions de détention en prison aux règles minimales des Nations Unies ». En décembre 2000 le gouvernement Ecevit a décidé par « l'opération retour à la vie » de réorganiser le système carcéral afin de vider des prisons surpeuplées, qui, en raison du nombre de leurs détenus, échappaient au contrôle de l'administration. Au delà de l'objectif proclamé d'alléger les effectifs des établissements pénitentiaires le véritable but de la réforme mise en œuvre par le ministre de la Justice Hikmet Sami Turk était d'éviter le regroupement de prisonniers politiques, propice à une mainmise d'organisations d'extrême gauche. Nombre de détenus ont donc refusé d'être dispersés et ont entamé une grève de la faim. Le gouvernement Ecevit a alors décidé pour empêcher que « les terroristes » comprennent « qu'ils ne pouvaient pas résister contre l'État »¹⁰ de donner l'assaut dans 20 prisons, en particulier à Umraniye (Istanbul) et Canakkale (Dardanelles) où de nombreux détenus s'étaient barricadés.

Le bilan officiel de l'opération menée contre les détenus en grève de la faim a été très lourd : 27 morts et des dizaines de blessés¹¹. À Istanbul l'Association des droits de l'homme a recueilli les témoignages de détenus affirmant que les policiers les avaient brûlés après les avoir arrosés d'un liquide¹². En France, en Grande Bretagne et aux Pays bas notamment il y a eu des manifestations de protestation contre ces violences de la police turque. La réaction de la Commission de Bruxelles à ces événements a été très modérée, se bornant à faire part de sa « préoccupation ». Le fait est, cependant, que l'assaut sanglant mené contre les détenus de Turquie est contraire à tous les principes politiques et éthiques communs aux pays de l'UE.

La reconnaissance du génocide arménien de 1915

La population arménienne de l'Empire ottoman a été victime en 1915 d'un génocide, qui a été constitué par l'extermination d'un million et demi de personnes. Ces massacres d'Arméniens correspondent en effet à l'acte de génocide défini par la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide signée à Paris le 9 décembre 1948 et entrée en vigueur le 12 janvier 1951. Les survivants du génocide de 1915 se sont réfugiés dans de nombreux pays d'Europe dont la France, la Grèce et Chypre.

La communauté arménienne de France, qui regroupe environ quatre cent mille personnes a depuis longtemps réclamé que son pays d'accueil reconnaisse officiellement le génocide de 1915, que les assemblées parlementaires de plusieurs pays avaient déjà formellement reconnu : le Parlement grec, le Sénat belge, le Parlement italien, la Douma russe. Le fait est que les Présidents Mitterrand et Chirac, tout en s'engageant par des promesses électorales auprès du Comité de défense de la cause arménienne de faire aboutir la reconnaissance du génocide, ont ensuite, pour ne pas déplaire à la Turquie, oublié les engagements pris durant la campagne précédant leur élection.

C'est finalement grâce à l'initiative de Jack Lang, alors Président de la Commission des affaires étrangères de l'Assemblée nationale que les parlementaires français ont entamé le processus, qui va aboutir à la reconnaissance par la France du génocide arménien de 1915. C'est à l'unanimité que le 29 mai 1998 les députés ont voté une proposition de loi sur la reconnaissance de ce génocide. Le gouvernement Jospin a tenu à ne pas prendre position dans cette affaire, refusant même de faire inscrire à l'ordre du jour du Sénat, le texte de l'Assemblée nationale, empêchant ainsi que celui-ci puisse être adopté comme loi de la République. Pendant deux ans le gouvernement français ainsi que le Président Chirac ont même déconseillé aux sénateurs de se prononcer. La majorité sénatoriale, qui est de droite, a ainsi à plusieurs reprises décidé qu'il n'y avait pas urgence à examiner le texte voté par les députés.

À l'automne 2000 le sénateur-maire de Marseille Jean Claude Gaudin, où vivent environ quatre vingt mille Arméniens, inquiet à

l'approche des élections municipales de mars 2001, de l'impact qu'aurait dans sa ville l'hostilité du Sénat envers la cause arménienne, prend alors la décision de déposer une proposition de loi comprenant les mêmes dispositions que celles du texte voté par l'Assemblée nationale le 29 mai 1998. Le Président Chirac et le gouvernement Jospin ont alors estimé qu'il était inutile de mener un combat d'arrière garde et ont fait savoir aux sénateurs qu'ils étaient entièrement libres de se prononcer sur la proposition de loi de Jean Claude Gaudin adoptée le 8 novembre 2000 par 160 voix contre 40, l'ensemble de la gauche ayant voté pour ce texte ainsi que quelques dizaines de sénateurs de droite dont 20 membres du RPR sur 99. Pour minimiser la portée de ce vote, qui devait être encore suivi d'un autre scrutin à l'Assemblée nationale pour que la loi soit définitive la Présidence de la République et le Premier ministre dans un communiqué commun ont affirmé que le texte adopté par le Sénat « ne constitue pas une appréciation de la Turquie aujourd'hui » et que « la France souhaite continuer à entretenir et développer avec la Turquie des relations de coopération étroite dans tous les domaines »¹³.

La réaction de la Turquie au vote du Sénat français a été vive, le ministère turc des affaires étrangères estimant que « cette décision revient à distordre fâcheusement les réalités historiques et à calomnier une nation entière par des allégations dénuées de tout fondement »¹⁴. Toutefois, le gouvernement n'a pas souhaité alors envenimer ses relations avec la France, qui alors assumait la présidence de l'Union européenne. Il faut toutefois noter que le match de football France-Turquie, une rencontre amicale sans enjeu, qui a eu lieu à Istanbul, le 15 novembre, s'est déroulé dans un climat tendu, le joueur français Youri Djorkaeff, d'origine arménienne ayant dû renoncer à participer à ce match en raison de menaces reçues par lui¹⁵.

C'est seulement après le vote le 18 janvier 2001 par l'Assemblée nationale française de la proposition de loi de Jean Claude Gaudin, adoptée à nouveau à l'unanimité et de façon définitive qu'Ankara a décidé d'appliquer une politique de représailles contre la France : annulation de plusieurs contrats d'armement, exclusion de deux firmes françaises d'un appel d'offres public pour l'exportation de

315 000 tonnes de blé, décision de débaptiser des rues d'Ankara portant les noms de Paris, de Gaulle et Strasbourg¹⁶. D'autre part selon les services secrets français l'arrivée sur les côtes du Var d'un bateau avec 910 réfugiés kurdes en février dernier n'a pu avoir lieu qu'avec la complicité des autorités turques désireuses d'envoyer « un signal fort » au gouvernement français après la promulgation de la loi sur la reconnaissance du génocide arménien¹⁷.

Cette attitude du gouvernement turc s'explique par la crainte que d'autres Parlements ne reconnaissent à leur tour le génocide arménien de 1915 et remettent en cause la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE. À cet égard il faut rappeler que le Parlement européen dès le 18 juin 1987 a adopté une résolution subordonnant l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'Europe communautaire à la reconnaissance de ce génocide et a réitéré son soutien à la cause arménienne en approuvant le 15 novembre 2000, par 234 voix contre 213 et 93 abstentions un amendement présenté par le député grec Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos invitant le gouvernement turc et la Grande Assemblée de Turquie à reconnaître publiquement le génocide de 1915.

Il semble certain que la Turquie, en toute hypothèse, devra reconsidérer sa position sur la question arménienne si elle souhaite vraiment adhérer un jour à l'UE. Déjà en Turquie de nombreux intellectuels, à la suite du vote du Parlement français estiment qu'il convient d'abandonner « un pathos nationaliste de repli » et « ne pas nier la douleur arménienne »¹⁸.

3. Le Conseil européen de Nice (7-11 décembre 2000)

Les conclusions du Conseil européen

Le Conseil européen de Nice a été essentiellement consacré à la réforme des institutions de l'Europe communautaire, préalable nécessaire à tout nouvel élargissement. Ce n'est donc qu'accessoirement que les chefs d'État et de gouvernement de l'Europe des Quinze ont débattu de l'élargissement de l'UE, qui, toutefois, a « une portée his-

torique » ainsi qu'il est indiqué dans les conclusions de la présidence française¹⁹.

Les résultats du Conseil européen de Nice ont été considérés par beaucoup d'observateurs comme trop modestes au point que des partisans de la construction européenne en arrivent à souhaiter la non ratification du traité, qui y a été signé. Ceux-ci estiment notamment que la règle de l'unanimité a été maintenue sur des points essentiels, qui permettrait, par exemple, comme le souligne le professeur Grosser, à Chypre d'annuler tout accord en matière de répartition des aides²⁰. Le fait est que la Conférence Intergouvernementale (CIG), qui au sein de l'UE, devait préparer la réforme institutionnelle s'est enlisée pendant de nombreux mois et que la présidence française pour éviter un échec qu'auraient pu provoquer, les petits pays, a dû céder à certaines de leurs exigences.

Le point, qui a entraîné le plus de débats à Nice a porté sur la composition de la Commission. Cet organe, dont le rôle est considérable, comporte actuellement 20 membres, chaque Etat de l'UE y disposant d'un membre, et les États les plus importants comme la France et l'Allemagne, de deux. Pour éviter que cette commission n'ait, à la suite de l'élargissement, une composition pléthorique, une proposition émanant des grands pays prévoyait l'abandon de la règle selon laquelle tout État membre de l'UE y soit représentée. Finalement il a été décidé à Nice que lorsque l'UE passerait de 15 à 27 membres (le cas de la Turquie n'étant pas pris en compte) la commission passerait de 20 à 27 membres, chaque État, y compris les plus importants, y aurait un représentant. On observe donc que les grands États ont accepté de faire le sacrifice d'un commissaire. Il a été toutefois prévu qu'ultérieurement le nombre global des membres de la Commission serait réexaminé.

Pour tenir compte de l'élargissement de l'UE en préservant le droit des petits pays, sans toutefois leur permettre de bloquer les institutions le traité de Nice a prévu que trois majorités seraient nécessaires au sein du Conseil pour qu'une décision soit adoptée. La décision prise doit ainsi obtenir 73,4% des voix (le nombre total des voix actuellement de

237 passera à 345, Chypre en disposant de 4), 50% du nombre des pays et 62% du nombre total des populations de l'UE. Il faut enfin indiquer que le nombre des membres du Parlement européen va passer de 626 à 728, Chypre étant représentée par 6 députés.

S'agissant des perspectives d'élargissement il faut dire que Chypre a pris l'initiative de réunir à Limassol fin novembre les douze États candidats, qui ont exprimé le souhait que le processus d'adhésion soit terminé fin 2002 afin que les pays prêts puissent rejoindre l'UE dès le 1^{er} janvier 2003²¹. Ce souhait que le Président Cléridès a eu l'occasion de formuler lors de sa participation à Nice au Sommet de la Conférence européenne, qui a précédé les travaux du Conseil européen, a été effectivement pris en compte. Le Conseil européen a, en effet, considéré que :

« la réforme institutionnelle permettra à l'Union, conformément à l'objectif arrêté par le Conseil européen à Helsinki, d'être en mesure d'accueillir, à partir de la fin de 2002, les nouveaux États membres, qui seront prêts, dans l'espoir qu'ils puissent participer à la prochaine élection au Parlement européen »²².

De son côté la Turquie a manifesté son mécontentement car son cas a été, à Nice, dissocié de celui des douze autres pays candidats, qui, eux ont déjà entamé des négociations avec l'UE²³. La présidence française dans ses conclusions se borne à déclarer accueillir « favorablement les progrès accomplis dans la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de préadhésion pour la Turquie et se réjouit de l'accord sur le règlement-cadre et sur le Partenariat d'adhésion au Conseil du 4 décembre 2000 ». Il convient de remarquer que la présidence suédoise de l'UE pour la période janvier-juin 2001, semble plus réservée à l'égard de la candidature de la Turquie en précisant dans son programme rendu public le 14 décembre :

« Les relations de l'UE avec la Turquie en tant que pays candidat et les efforts de celle-ci pour satisfaire aux critères d'adhésion fixés à Copenhague continueront de retenir l'attention. Les questions liées aux droits de l'Homme sont primordiales. La Suède poursuivra durant sa présidence l'action pour la mise en œuvre des divers aspects de la stratégie de pré-adhésion de la Turquie »²⁴.

Les suites du Conseil européen

La République de Chypre a assumé dans la sérénité les suites du Conseil européen de Nice. De nombreuses personnalités étrangères ont été ainsi amenées à confirmer les fortes chances de ce pays d'adhérer prochainement à l'UE. Le Premier ministre irlandais Bertie Ahern, en visite officielle à Chypre du 9 au 10 janvier a qualifié « d'impresionnants » les progrès accomplis par ce pays dans ses négociations d'adhésion avec l'UE et le commissaire européen à l'élargissement, Gunter Vergeugen dans une conférence de presse à Bruxelles, le 16 janvier, a exclu la possibilité pour le régime illégal d'occupation de tenir des négociations d'adhésion à l'UE séparément à celles menées par le gouvernement légal de l'île²⁵. Les élections législatives prévues, le 27 mai, devraient confirmer la volonté du peuple chypriote de s'intégrer dans l'UE.

La Turquie, à l'inverse de Chypre, connaît depuis le Conseil européen de Nice une série de problèmes, qui l'enfoncent, chaque jour de plus en plus, dans une situation de faillite²⁶. Il y a, d'une part, la poursuite de la grève de la faim des détenus, entraînant déjà au 16 avril la mort de treize d'entre eux²⁷ et, d'autre part, une nouvelle crise économique et financière, causée notamment par les dissensions entre le chef de l'État et le Premier ministre. La dévaluation de la livre de près de 30%, le 22 février, l'annonce de licenciements massifs et la récession prévisible de l'économie de 3% en 2001, année au cours de laquelle l'inflation devrait atteindre plus de 50% ont provoqué des manifestations de rue à la fois contre le gouvernement Ecevit et le FMI. Enfin la présentation, le 19 mars, par Ankara de son Programme national relatif à l'acquis de l'UE, un document confus de 1000 pages, en réponse au Partenariat pour l'adhésion, laisse à penser que le gouvernement turc « résiste à la tentation du changement » pour reprendre l'expression d'un commentateur du quotidien *le Monde*²⁸ et n'est pas en mesure de satisfaire avant longtemps aux critères politiques et économiques, que tout État doit remplir pour devenir membre de l'UE.

On peut donc conclure, d'une part, que l'adhésion de la République de Chypre à l'UE devrait dans un délai de deux à trois ans devenir une

réalité pour peu que ce pays ne se voit pas opposer, malgré tous les engagements pris à son égard, que l'absence de règlement de la question chypriote constitue un obstacle à l'acceptation de sa candidature et, d'autre part, que la Turquie, incapable d'opérer les changements structurels nécessaires donne actuellement l'impression à beaucoup d'avancer « à reculons vers l'Europe ».

NOTES

1. **Rapport régulier 2000** de la Commission sur les progrès réalisés par Chypre sur la voie de l'adhésion, Bruxelles, 8 novembre 2000. Et **Document de stratégie pour l'adhésion**, Bruxelles, 8 novembre, 2000.
2. **Nouvelles de Chypre**, décembre 2000, n°109
3. **Nouvelles de Chypre**, février 2001, n°111
4. **Nouvelles de Chypre**, novembre 2000, n°108
5. **Nouvelles de Chypre**, février 2001, n°111
6. Voir le Rapport cité à la note 1
7. Ce colloque a été organisé conjointement par le Comité France Turquie et l'Ambassade de France en Turquie. Y ont participé du côté français Mme Catherine Lalumière, député européen, M. Eric Rouleau, ancien Ambassadeur de France en Turquie et M. Alexandre Adler, Directeur du **Courrier International**
8. **Le Monde** du 7 décembre 2000
9. **Libération** du 22 novembre 2000
10. **Libération** du 21 décembre 2000
11. **Le Monde** des 24-25 décembre 2000
12. **Libération** du 22 décembre 2000
13. **Libération** du 9 novembre 2000
14. **Libération** du 9 novembre 2000
15. **Libération** du 15 novembre 2000
16. **Libération** et **Le Monde** du 1^{er} février 2001

17. **Canard enchaîné** du 20 février 2001
18. Le quotidien turc **Radikal** a publié un article de l'universitaire Ahmet Insel, intitulé « Ne nions pas la douleur arménienne » reproduit dans **Libération** du 5 février 2001
19. **Annexe 1. Conseil européen de Nice (7-11 décembre 2000) Conclusions de la Présidence française** (extraits)
20. **La Croix** du 20 décembre 2000
21. **Le Monde** du 30 novembre 2000
22. **Annexe 1**
23. **Le Monde** du 13 décembre 2000
24. **Annexe 2 Programme de la Présidence suédoise (janvier-juin 2001)**. Stockholm 14 décembre 2000 (extraits)
25. **Nouvelles de Chypre**, janvier 2001, n°110
26. Voir le dossier intitulé « la faillite turque » dans **Libération** du 16 avril 2001
27. **Le Monde** du 17 avril 2001
28. Voir l'article de Marie Jégo, « La Turquie résiste à la tentation du changement », **Le Monde** du 4 avril 2001

Annexe 1.

Conseil européen de Nice (7-11 décembre 2000) Conclusions de la Présidence française (extraits)

II. Élargissement

4. Le Conseil européen réaffirme la portée historique du processus d'élargissement de l'Union européenne et la priorité politique qu'il attache à sa réussite. Il se félicite de l'intensification des négociations d'adhésion avec les pays candidats, ce qui a permis de réaliser de très importants progrès, notamment pendant les derniers mois.

5. Le Conseil européen considère que le moment est maintenant venu de donner un nouvel élan à ce processus. Il fait siennes les conclusions du Conseil « Affaires générales » du 4 décembre 2000 sur la stratégie proposée par la Commission. Il note avec satisfaction que le principe de différenciation, fondé sur les principes propres de chaque pays candidat, ainsi que la possibilité de rattrapage, sont réaffirmés dans les conclusions du Conseil. La feuille de route pour les 18 mois à venir facilitera la poursuite des négociations en ayant à l'esprit que les pays les mieux préparés conservent la possibilité d'avancer plus vite.

6. Le Conseil européen considère que cette stratégie, conjointement avec la conclusion de la Conférence intergouvernementale sur la réforme institutionnelle, permettra à l'Union, conformément à l'objectif arrêté par le Conseil européen à Helsinki, d'être en mesure d'accueillir, à partir de la fin de 2002, les nouveaux États membres qui seront prêts, dans l'espoir qu'ils puissent participer à la prochaine élection au Parlement européen. Le Conseil européen évaluera en 2001, à Göteborg, les progrès réalisés dans l'application de cette nouvelle stratégie, en vue de donner les orientations nécessaires pour mener ce processus à bonne fin.

9. Le Conseil européen accueille favorablement les progrès accomplis dans la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de pré-adhésion pour la Turquie et se réjouit de l'accord sur le règlement-cadre et sur le Partenariat d'adhésion au Conseil du 4 décembre 2000. Il souligne l'importance de ce document pour le rapprochement entre l'Union et la Turquie dans la voie ouverte pour les conclusions du Conseil européen d'Helsinki. La Turquie est invitée à présenter rapidement son programme social d'adoption de l'acquis et à le fonder sur le Partenariat d'adhésion.

Annexe 2.

Programme de la Présidence suédoise (janvier-juin 2001)

Stockholm 14 décembre 2000 (extraits)

Une Union élargie

L'élargissement de l'Union européenne est une mission historique. Il s'agit essentiellement de consolider les bases de la paix, de la liberté, de la démocratie et du bien-être en Europe. Contribuer à la réussite de cet élargissement est la première priorité de la présidence suédoise.

Durant la présidence suédoise, le processus d'élargissement entrera dans une nouvelle phase de négociations concrètes, y compris dans des domaines difficiles. L'objectif est de chercher à ouvrir la voie à une avancée politique. Cela suppose notamment que l'on s'efforce de clore provisoirement le plus grand nombre possible de chapitres de négociation avec tous les pays. Pour les pays les plus avancés dans les négociations, cela concerne aussi quelques-uns des chapitres les plus difficiles. Pour les pays, qui ont entamé les négociations en 2000, l'intention est de chercher à ouvrir autant ces chapitres que possible. L'objectif est de faire en sorte que les plus avancés de ces pays aient engagé des négociations dans tous les domaines dans les premiers mois de 2001, ainsi que le prévoient les conclusions du sommet de Feira.

Les négociations seront menées suivant les principes définis lors des sommets d'Helsinki et de Nice.

Les relations de l'UE avec la Turquie en tant que pays candidat et les efforts de celle-ci pour satisfaire aux critères d'adhésion fixés à Copenhague continueront de retenir l'attention. Les questions liées aux droits de l'Homme sont primordiales. La Suède poursuivra durant sa présidence l'action pour la mise en œuvre des divers aspects de la stratégie de pré-adhésion de la Turquie.

La détente gréco-turque et les minorités

Samim Akgönül

ABSTRACT

The rights of the Greek-speaking minority in Turkey (3,000) and the Turkish-speaking Muslim minority in Western Thrace (120,000) have not always been respected. Both minorities have experienced legal and political problems, as well as cultural difficulties with the majority population which has either no knowledge or inaccurate perceptions of the minority.

The current period of détente between Athens and Ankara must enable the minorities to improve their situation without forgetting the possibility of the opposite occurring due to potential bilateral friction.

RÉSUMÉ

La minorité grecque de Turquie, qui compte 3000 personnes et les musulmans turcophones de la Thrace occidentale, au nombre de 120 000 constituent deux minorités dont les droits ne sont pas toujours respectés. Ces deux minorités ont des problèmes juridiques et politiques mais aussi des problèmes relationnels avec la population majoritaire dus en grande partie aux perceptions et à la méconnaissance. L'actuelle période de détente entre Athènes et Ankara doit permettre l'amélioration de leur sort sans que ne soit toutefois exclue une aggravation de leur situation, qui serait provoquée par une friction bilatérale toujours possible.

Suite à la présentation d'un projet de loi à la *Vouli* reconnaissant le 14 septembre comme « jour de commémoration du génocide des Grecs d'Asie mineure », un quotidien turc¹ titrait en première page « *Rumlar Huzursuz* » (les *Rums* sont inquiets²). Les quelques milliers de Grecs vivant en Turquie aujourd'hui mais aussi et surtout le Patriarcat de Phanar savent qu'à tout moment le climat de relations chaleureuses qui existe entre la Turquie et la Grèce depuis deux ans³ peut s'interrompre et ils peuvent être à nouveau les acteurs involontaires d'une friction bilatérale. « En face » les Turcs de Grèce sont également conscients de la fragilité de leur situation malgré quelques

pas timides en vue d'une amélioration de leur situation. En effet, les deux minorités, en dépit d'une vision idéaliste qui les montre comme un pont entre les deux États, ont été au contraire les otages et ont été considérées soit comme « cinquièmes colonnes » soit comme moyens de pression face au pays adverse et ce notamment dans l'affaire chypriote⁴. On peut multiplier les exemples d'actualité : la réaction la plus virulente à la loi reconnaissant le génocide arménien dans l'assemblée française est venue de la communauté arménienne de Turquie dont un communiqué déclarait : « *L'endroit où on peut discuter des problèmes des Arméniens de Turquie est le parlement turc et non le parlement français* »⁵. La communauté juive de Turquie avait réagi vivement il y a quelques années lorsque quelques travaux historiques mettaient en lumière que le sort de Juifs de Turquie n'avait pas été très enviable pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, contrairement à ce qu'affirmait l'élite minoritaire à travers la « Fondation de 500 ans »⁶. Ainsi, les minoritaires en Turquie, mais aussi ailleurs, n'aiment pas être mis en avant, de peur de représailles, d'être utilisés comme moyens de pression ou boucs émissaires.

Il est normal dans ces conditions que les deux minorités réciproques qui se trouvent en Turquie et en Grèce aspirent plus que quiconque à des relations bilatérales apaisées, pour vivre dans un climat propice à leur développement, tant intellectuel qu'économique, mais aussi pour une vie quotidienne tranquille. Depuis les débuts de ces deux minorités, les notables des Turco-musulmans de Thrace occidentale et des Grecs d'Istanbul, d'Imvros et de Tenedos (Gökçeada et Bozcaada), ont toujours réclamé un rôle de pont entre les deux pays. Ainsi les membres des minorités se sentent en droit d'attendre des ouvertures vers leurs problèmes lors des périodes de rapprochement. A notre avis ce sentiment des minoritaires consistant à considérer les États dont ils sont ressortissants « redevables » envers leur communauté possède trois raisons structurelles et conjoncturelles.

Premièrement il faut préciser que pendant les périodes de crise, ceux qui souffrent directement et matériellement sont les minoritaires. Lorsque la tension d'État à l'État monte, dûe par exemple au problème chypriote ou aux conflits égéens, les autres citoyens restent spectateurs

alors que les Grecs de Turquie et les Turcs de Grèce se retrouvent à chaque fois sur le devant de la scène bien malgré eux et deviennent objet de « sanctions », de « mesures préventives », un moyen de pression. Bien évidemment, au creux de la vague, lors des périodes où les relations sont plus cordiales, ils s'estiment légitimement en droit d'attendre des avancées dans les domaines qui les touchent.

Deuxièmement, les questions minoritaires sont paradoxalement les plus faciles à régler pour les États en question. Non seulement parce que les problèmes égéens (plateau continental, eaux territoriales, *Flight Information Region*, (dé)militarisation des îles égéennes, etc.) ou le conflit chypriote sont plus sclérosés, plus techniques, demandant des changements d'orientations politiques radicales et une mobilisation politique importante, mais de plus parce que les minoritaires en question sont des ressortissants des deux pays sensés les protéger. En dernière analyse, lorsqu'un des deux États permet l'amélioration de la situation d'une minorité, il ne fait que remplir son devoir premier, c'est-à-dire œuvrer pour le bien-être de ses propres citoyens.

Et finalement, historiquement nous pouvons constater que lors des détente précédentes les « gestes » les plus porteurs, symboliquement les plus forts et enfin les plus fructueux ont été faits en faveur des minoritaires. Certes, beaucoup d'engagements ont été pris sur les questions sclérosées déjà citées, beaucoup de déclarations ont été données, beaucoup de conférences de presse communes ont été accordées mais en fin de compte les actes véritables, porteurs dans la longue durée n'ont concerné en règle générale que des minorités. Les exemples sont multiples :

C'est durant le rapprochement gréco-turc de la fin des années 1920 et du début des années 1930 qu'une série d'accords a été signée entre la Turquie et la Grèce dont celui qui permettait la libre circulation et la libre installation des ressortissants des deux pays dans le pays d'en face. Grâce à cet accord de 1930, signé par Eleftherios Venizelos et Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, de milliers de Grecs qui avaient été échangés en 1923⁷ ont pu revenir à Istanbul.

Pendant un autre rapprochement important, celui des années 1950 où la Grèce et la Turquie sont devenues enfin alliées dans le cadre de

l'OTAN, il y a eu des avancées considérables dans la situation des Turcs de Thrace, notamment l'ouverture de la première école secondaire de la minorité, le Lycée Celal Bayar, du nom du Président de la République turque qui a visité la région. Par ailleurs, c'est toujours dans les années 1950 que la minorité a été officiellement appelée « turque » au lieu de « musulmane ». Cette identification, redevenue « musulmane » avec l'envenimement des relations bilatérales, est toujours réclamée par l'élite minoritaire⁸. En 1952 « un accord culturel » a été signé entre les deux pays qui a permis l'épanouissement des écoles minoritaires grecques en Turquie et les écoles minoritaires turques en Grèce⁹.

Un troisième exemple concerne le rapprochement éphémère amorcé vers la fin des années 1980 entre Turgut Özal et Andreas Papandreou après que les deux leaders se soient entretenus dans la ville suisse de Davos. Pendant ce que désormais on appelle « l'esprit de Davos » quelques améliorations non négligeables ont été effectuées en faveur des Grecs de Turquie, l'une très directe : le blocus imposé aux biens des Grecs expulsés en 1964 pendant la crise chypriote¹⁰ a été enlevé, et une autre plus indirecte : le visa pour les ressortissants grecs a été supprimé.

Ces exemples concernant les trois périodes de rapprochement précédentes nous démontrent que pendant la détente (relative) actuelle on peut s'attendre à des « gestes » concernant les deux minorités dans les deux pays. Ces deux minorités ont un certain nombre de problèmes qui nous semblent loin d'être insurmontables.

Il faut préciser que d'ores et déjà quelques pas, certes symboliques mais non sans conséquences pratiques, ont été faits en faveur des Turcs de Grèce. Il est vrai que les deux faits suivants surviennent peu avant les tremblements de terre qui vont couronner le processus de rapprochement mais à eux seuls ils sont témoins d'une volonté de relations apaisées.

Premièrement, on peut mentionner la reconnaissance de la « turcité » de la minorité par un responsable politique, et non pas des moindres, le

Ministre des Affaires étrangères Giorgios Papandréou. Jusqu'à récemment la Grèce refusait (et officiellement refuse toujours) cette appellation de « minorité turque » en arguant que ni la « convention d'échange » ni le traité de Lausanne ne mentionnent cette turcité en les qualifiant de « musulmans ». De plus, selon les autorités grecques cette qualification « turque » serait inadéquate dans la mesure où les quelque 120 000 membres de la minorité seraient linguistiquement divisés en trois groupes distincts : les Turcs, les Pomaks et les Gitans¹¹.

Une deuxième avancée aux conséquences plus réelles et immédiates, a été la suppression de l'article 19 du code de la nationalité. En effet, jusqu'à récemment l'article 19 du code de la nationalité promulgué en 1955 constituait un des problèmes les plus graves de la minorité. Cet article était le suivant¹² :

« Si une personne d'origine non-grecque quitte le pays sans intention de revenir, elle peut être déclarée comme ayant perdu sa citoyenneté. Cette décision peut également être appliquée aux personnes d'origine non-grecque qui sont nées et domiciliées à l'étranger. Les enfants mineurs peuvent être déclarés comme ayant perdu leur citoyenneté si les deux parents ou celui qui est en vie a déjà perdu la sienne. Le Ministère de l'Intérieur décide sur ce sujet en accord avec le conseil national. ». Comme il est clair il s'agissait d'un article discriminatoire, fondé sur des critères raciaux et ethniques qui était de surcroît une violation de la Constitution grecque de 1975 elle-même¹³. Il était d'autant plus dangereux qu'aucune précision n'était donnée sur les critères selon lesquels le Ministère décidait que la personne avait quitté le pays sans intention de revenir. Sur le plan international l'article 19 a été dénoncé pour la première fois en 1990, date à laquelle les pertes de citoyenneté devenaient monnaie courante pour les Turcs qui voyageaient en Turquie, par le rapport des droits de l'homme du Département d'État des États-Unis. D'autres instances internationales ont suivi cet exemple, comme le Parlement européen en 1993¹⁴. Compte tenu de ces pressions, en janvier 1998 les autorités grecques, à l'initiative de Giorgios Papandréou, ont supprimé cet article sans toutefois proposer d'effet rétroactif. Néanmoins, dans les faits, depuis le rapprochement gréco-turc de 1999, les tribunaux grecs acceptent les requêtes individuelles des

heimatlos pour obtenir à nouveau la citoyenneté grecque et une grande partie de ces requêtes semble aboutir¹⁵. Si la suppression de l'article 19 est antérieure à la détente gréco-turque, l'attitude souple des tribunaux en est un fruit.

Ces avancées concernant les Turcs de Grèce en appellent d'autres. La minorité musulmane de Thrace occidentale a un certain nombre de problèmes qui attendent d'être résolus dans la période actuelle de détente. Si on met de côté la question de la reconnaissance identitaire qui est un problème d'ordre psychologique¹⁶ le problème principal dont l'élite minoritaire demande le règlement est celui des Muftis.

En effet, compte tenu du caractère religieux (*de jure*) de la communauté et compte tenu de l'article 42 du traité de Lausanne, la minorité musulmane de Thrace occidentale a un certain nombre de droits juridiques religieux dont celui de posséder des muftis pour la gestion de la juridiction familiale et personnelle. Deux textes internationaux sont l'objet de polémiques concernant les pouvoirs et les prérogatives des muftis de la communauté musulmane de Grèce : le traité d'Athènes signé juste après les Guerres balkaniques et le traité de Lausanne signé juste après la guerre gréco-turque (*Mikriasiatikí Katastrophi*, la catastrophe d'Asie mineure pour les Grecs, *Kurtulus Savası* – la guerre d'indépendance pour les Turcs). Ni le traité de Sèvres signé entre le pouvoir ottoman et les puissances vainqueurs de la Première Guerre Mondiale en 1920, ni même celui de Lausanne ne mentionnent clairement le rôle des Muftis. C'est le traité d'Athènes de 1913 qui est le plus explicite en la matière. Notamment, son protocole n° 3 qui mentionne l'élection d'un Mufti en chef ainsi que de trois Muftis. Le Mufti en chef ainsi que le Mufti d'Alexandropolis prévus par ce protocole n'ont jamais existé mais les deux autres Muftis, ceux de Komotini et de Xanthi ont fonctionné. Néanmoins, les détenteurs de ce titre ont été toujours nommés par le pouvoir central. Il faut préciser qu'aucun de ces textes internationaux n'explicite clairement le mode d'élection des Muftis en se contentant, pour celui de 1913, d'établir une procédure calquée sur celle de l'élection du Patriarche de Phanar.

C'est à la fin des années 1980, avec les décès des deux Muftis de Komotini et de Xanthi, qui avaient été eux aussi nommés par Athènes, qu'a été relancée la polémique concernant le mode de désignation de ces hauts dignitaires musulmans chargés également de gérer la juridiction familiale de la minorité. L'élite minoritaire a refusé de reconnaître les deux nouveaux muftis nommés, organisant clandestinement des élections dans les mosquées et en élisant deux autres¹⁷. Bien entendu ces deux muftis élus n'ont jamais été reconnus par le pouvoir et pire ont été condamnés à plusieurs reprises à des peines d'emprisonnement pour avoir usurpé un titre officiel. Ces condamnations ont valu à la Grèce d'être condamnée à son tour par la Cour européenne des Droits de l'Homme pour avoir violé le droit de la liberté de religion¹⁸. Actuellement quatre muftis « cohabitent », deux à Komotini et deux à Xanthi qui ne se reconnaissent pas.

Il est évident qu'avec un peu de bonne volonté et en appliquant les normes du Conseil de l'Europe en matière des minorités nationales, l'affaire des Muftis peut trouver une issue acceptable pour les trois parties, c'est-à-dire la minorité, Athènes et Ankara.

Une autre série de problèmes dont la résolution est demandée par les minoritaires dans le cadre du rapprochement gréco-turc concerne l'éducation. Signalons dès à présent les aspects où nous connaissons des améliorations depuis deux ans. Le premier concerne le nettoyage des livres scolaires du « discours de haine » face au peuple d'en face. Depuis les entrevues entre les techniciens des deux pays, cette question est à l'ordre du jour et la question de l'image des Grecs dans les livres scolaires turcs ainsi que l'image des Turcs dans les livres scolaires grecs s'améliore sensiblement¹⁹. Dans ce domaine, il faut signaler deux actions officielles concernant les livres scolaires. Alors qu'en Turquie une réforme des livres d'histoire est en cours pour y supprimer le « discours de haine » décrié par les observateurs internes et externes²⁰ envers les Grecs, en Grèce l'Université d'Athènes travaille actuellement sous la direction d'Anna Frangoudakis sur un projet européen de préparation de livres primaires spéciaux pour les écoles minoritaires en Thrace. Plus particulièrement il faut signaler des avancées dans ce domaine directement dus au rapprochement gréco-turc actuel : à la

suite des initiatives des Ministres des Affaires étrangères des deux pays il y a eu des initiatives officielles. Une coopération entre les deux Ministères de l'Éducation nationale semble s'amorcer²¹. Le sujet des livres scolaires nous semble d'une importance capitale non seulement pour la méconnaissance de la jeunesse des deux côtés, mais en plus pour les étudiants minoritaires qui dépendent de ces livres.

Mais le problème principal concernant l'éducation en général et les livres scolaires en particulier, reste en suspens. Comme la Turquie pour la minorité orthodoxe, la Grèce non plus n'a jamais accepté la minorité musulmane comme faisant partie intégrante de sa nation. Avec une telle vision des deux côtés, la réciprocité a toujours rimé avec représailles. L'exemple le plus typique est celui justement de la question des livres scolaires : les deux pays refusent de distribuer des livres aux écoles minoritaires grecques en Turquie, et turques en Grèce, tant qu'en face les livres n'ont pas été distribués selon le principe de réciprocité. À partir de ce moment-là un cercle vicieux et absurde commence : la Grèce ne donnant pas de quoi s'instruire à ses citoyens, pour punir la Turquie, qui fait de même pour les siens. Il est évident qu'avec le climat actuel des relations gréco-turques la réciprocité pourrait devenir une notion positive pour l'ensemble des questions minoritaires, mais en particulier pour les questions relevant de l'éducation minoritaire comme les livres, mais aussi comme les enseignants. Nous allons revenir sur cette question des enseignants qui affecte surtout les Grecs de Turquie.

Voici brièvement des améliorations que les Turcs de Grèce s'estiment en droit d'attendre dans le cadre du rapprochement gréco-turc. Avant de passer aux aspirations des Grecs de Turquie, il faut signaler que les Turcs de Grèce ont d'autres problèmes mineurs dont une partie est en voie d'amélioration, également depuis le rapprochement gréco-turc. Ces problèmes secondaires concernent en particulier les domaines matériels comme l'obtention de permis de construire, l'achat et la vente de terres, etc.

La volonté de servir de pont entre les deux pays présente dans l'esprit des Turcs de Grèce l'est également chez les Grecs de Turquie²².

Bien que beaucoup moins nombreux²³, donc moins visibles par rapport à la minorité musulmane de Grèce, les Grecs de Turquie aspirent aussi à l'amélioration de leur situation par le règlement d'un certain nombre de problèmes. Ils estiment que le climat actuel est propice au règlement de ces problèmes²⁴.

Dès à présent il faut signaler que parmi les gestes que la Turquie pourrait faire en « faveur » de la Grèce face à la levée du veto de cette dernière dans l'acceptation de la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union européenne au sommet d'Helsinki, il existe une mesure susceptible de profiter à la minorité grecque d'Istanbul : il s'agit de l'autorisation de la réouverture de l'École théologique de Halki (Heybeliada). Cette école est une des institutions les plus importantes et vitales de la minorité, du moins indispensable pour la survie du Patriarcat. L'école a été fondée au début du 19^e siècle pour former le personnel religieux du Patriarcat et pour dispenser un enseignement théologique orthodoxe unificateur face aux courants nationalistes dans le monde orthodoxe. L'inauguration de l'école date de 1844. Entre 1844 et 1919 l'enseignement se composait de 4 années au collège suivies de 3 années d'éducation théologique. De 1919 à 1923 l'enseignement se concentrait sur la théologie durant 5 ans, de 1923 à 1951 on revient au système originel en rouvrant le collège, et finalement de 1951 à 1971 l'enseignement est de 4 ans de lycée suivis de 3 ans de théologie. L'École théologique de Halki est sous l'administration directe du Patriarcat. Le directeur de l'école est choisi parmi les Métropolitites. Tout au long de son fonctionnement l'école a accueilli des étudiants de Turquie mais aussi des Églises étrangères comme celle d'Angleterre ou encore d'Éthiopie.

Dans le cadre de l'interdiction des universités et académies privées en 1971, l'École théologique de Halki a été fermée. Durant les 127 années où l'école était en activité, 930 théologiens et cadres religieux y ont étudié. 343 de ces diplômés sont devenus des évêques dont 12 ont été élus Patriarche²⁵. Ces chiffres confirment l'importance de cette institution tant au niveau administratif que religieux et psychologique. Certes, il existe actuellement une école théologique à Boston, mais elle est très loin de satisfaire les besoins du Patriarcat. Les gouvernements

turcs, pour leur part, donnent à la fois des signes d'espoir pour une réouverture éventuelle²⁶ et demandent en même temps des contreparties en Thrace occidentale²⁷.

Le rapprochement effectué entre le « lobby » grec des États-Unis et les milieux liés à Fethullah Gülen, personnalité très contestée, est un exemple des initiatives pour la réouverture de cette école. Se présentant comme le leader d'un islam moderne et modéré à la turque, cet ancien imam de mosquée est actuellement à la tête d'un empire financier (et éducatif via les écoles privées à travers le monde et notamment en Asie centrale). Gülen est l'ami de l'actuel Patriarche orthodoxe de Phanar, Vartholoméos. Il milite avec ses journaux et chaînes télévisées pour un rapprochement gréco-turc en général, pour la liberté religieuse en Turquie pour les orthodoxes en particulier, et notamment pour la réouverture de l'école théologique de Halki-Heybeliada. Revendication intéressée : l'ouverture de cette école, selon lui, pourra permettre aux musulmans de fonder des écoles religieuses privées²⁸.

Dans le cadre du rapprochement actuel, parmi les « gestes » que la Turquie pourrait faire, on a évoqué à plusieurs reprises la réouverture de cette école. Il semblerait que cette réouverture soit revenue à l'ordre du jour durant la visite du Premier ministre turc Bülent Ecevit aux États-Unis²⁹. Il faut tout de même signaler quelques problèmes. Premièrement la Turquie semble se tromper en croyant que la réouverture de l'École théologique de Heybeliada ferait plaisir à la Grèce. C'est sans connaître les rivalités intestines qui existent entre l'Église autonome de Grèce et le Patriarcat de Phanar tant sur le plan matériel qu'administratif.

Ainsi il faut prendre en compte cette volonté de rouvrir l'école théologique de Halki mais tant que cette réouverture n'est pas effective, il peut à tout moment y avoir un revirement. Il ne faut pas oublier que cette réouverture avait déjà été envisagée en 1996 à l'époque du gouvernement Mesut Yilmaz mais le projet avait été oublié par la suite. Néanmoins, si cette réouverture se réalise comme prévu, on peut effectivement s'attendre à une nouvelle donne sur la question des minorités. Car jusqu'à aujourd'hui, le principe de réciprocité a fonctionné d'une façon néfaste et il n'y a aucune raison pour penser que

cette fois-ci cela ne fonctionne pas positivement. En effet, la Grèce peut répondre par un geste pour les Turcs de Thrace en permettant les élections des Muftis par exemple.

D'un autre côté ce « geste » n'enchanté pas tout à fait les minoritaires non plus. En effet malgré le regard extérieur unificateur et réducteur, les membres de la minorité ne considèrent pas le Patriarcat et tout ce qui dépend de lui comme des institutions minoritaires. Selon plusieurs membres que nous avons interviewés³⁰, l'ouverture de l'École théologique de Halki ne concerne que la survie du Patriarcat et non la minorité. Nos interlocuteurs avaient peur qu'une telle autorisation bloque d'autres avancées dans des domaines touchant plus directement la minorité.

Ces domaines sont nombreux. Trois viennent à l'esprit immédiatement, l'un étant abstrait et les deux autres plus concrets. Premièrement, les autorités turques doivent profiter de cette période de rapprochement pour trouver immédiatement des mesures adéquates afin de stopper l'hémorragie qui affecte la minorité grecque d'Istanbul, témoins du passé glorieux de la ville. En effet la minorité ne compte plus désormais que quelques milliers de membres. À défaut de statistiques officielles, (en Turquie pendant les recensements les questions de langue et de confession ne sont plus posées depuis 1965), les chiffres varient selon la nature de la population qu'on prend en compte et selon les instances qui délivrent ces estimations. Selon les sources patriarcales, les Grecs orthodoxes d'Istanbul proprement dits seraient de l'ordre de 3000. À ce chiffre il faut ajouter les Grecs-orthodoxes d'Imvros et de Tenedos (Gökçeada et Bozcaada, deux îles situées à l'embouchure du détroit des Dardanelles) qui seraient en voie d'extinction, quelques dizaines de familles. Et enfin, objet de polémique, on peut prendre en compte les orthodoxes arabophones d'Antioche qui émigrent de plus en plus vers Istanbul et qui tentent d'intégrer la minorité étant donné qu'ils sont officiellement considérés comme de religion grecque-orthodoxe. Cet apport est contesté par les notables de la minorité qui dénoncent une dilution du caractère grec proprement dit de la communauté via notamment les écoles minoritaires obligées d'accepter les enfants arabophones pour maintenir leurs effectifs.

Étant donné qu'un retour de ceux qui sont partis semble difficilement réalisable, les efforts émanant des instances officielles, des organisations non gouvernementales, et de l'ensemble de la société civile doivent se concentrer sur le maintien de la population actuelle et sur son accroissement par voie naturelle. Ceci n'est possible que par la création des conditions psychologiques nécessaires à l'émancipation de la communauté, notamment via la sensibilisation de l'opinion publique au fait que l'extinction de la communauté grecque de Turquie n'est pas une « bonne chose ». D'ores et déjà, nous pouvons affirmer qu'à plusieurs niveaux cette sensibilisation est amorcée notamment par la publication d'ouvrages académiques, par les colloques et conférences sur la question des minorités en Turquie mais aussi par des reportages et émissions dans les médias de masse. Cette voie, teintée de nostalgie, permettra dans un avenir proche d'installer un climat de confiance qui empêchera les jeunes de la minorité de quitter le pays pour la Grèce ou d'autres pays occidentaux. En revanche, cette amélioration de l'opinion publique à l'égard de la minorité n'est pas visible à l'égard du Patriarcat de Phanar, toujours objet d'attaques tant physiques que verbales à travers la presse populiste. Le débat qui existe sur l'œcuménisme, sur les prérogatives et sur le statut de cette institution doit être traité, à notre avis, à part au lieu d'être dans le débat général sur les minorités nationales.

Le maintien de la minorité grecque de Turquie passe également par une série de mesures concrètes en vue de l'amélioration des conditions d'existence tant au niveau individuel que communautaire. Sur le plan individuel, il faut certainement assurer l'égalité effective de tous les citoyens turcs face à la loi, pour permettre *de facto* l'accès aux minoritaires à la fonction publique ainsi qu'aux charges politiques. Actuellement, bien qu'il soit impossible de le démontrer, les membres des trois minorités semblent ne pas pouvoir accéder aux différentes charges et fonctions publiques, ni faire une carrière militaire et ce à deux exceptions près : l'éducation - dans le primaire et même à l'Université il existe des minoritaires qui enseignent en tant que fonctionnaires de l'État turc - et la politique - à la fois au niveau local et national un certain nombre de minoritaires ont représenté, non pas

leur communauté, mais leur circonscription géographique, dans le passé et aujourd'hui.

Il faut ajouter à ces mesures celles plus pratiques. Actuellement la minorité grecque de Turquie souffre de deux problèmes principaux, concernant l'éducation et les fondations pieuses.

La question des écoles est assez complexe. Car dans tous les domaines de l'enseignement des problèmes entremêlés existent. Manque d'élèves, manque d'enseignants, manque de livres et de qualité de ceux qui existent, qualité de l'enseignement, cohabitation des cadres enseignants grecs avec des enseignants turcs, etc³¹. Dans une plus large mesure ce sont des problèmes nés de l'application restreinte du principe de réciprocité avec les écoles de Thrace occidentale. Cette réciprocité qui devrait être caduque depuis longtemps vu la disparité phénoménale entre le nombre des Grecs de Turquie et celui des Turcs de Grèce existe toujours et est appliquée dans les deux pays en défaveur de l'éducation minoritaire notamment quand il s'agit de la distribution des livres scolaires, et de la nomination des enseignants.

Parmi ces problèmes, le manque d'élèves est peut-être le plus important. Car non seulement la minorité est aujourd'hui très petite mais en plus les enfants y occupent une part minime à cause des problèmes de mariage et d'émigration. Ce qui fait que la plupart des écoles sont menacées de fermeture. Celles qui fonctionnent sont obligées de regrouper plusieurs classes d'âge avec parfois les enfants arabophones (des orthodoxes d'Antioche arabophones). Cette situation diminue considérablement la qualité de l'enseignement et l'élite minoritaire hésite à mettre le peu d'enfants qu'elle a dans les écoles minoritaires secondaires³². Parmi les écoles secondaires, les trois les plus importantes qui fonctionnent actuellement sont le Lycée patriarcal de Phanar, le Lycée Zographeion pour garçons de Péra, et le Lycée Zappeion pour filles de Péra. Les écoles primaires sont multiples et fonctionnent en grande partie grâce à l'apport des enfants des orthodoxes arabophones qui composent dans certaines écoles jusqu'à la moitié des élèves³³. La question de l'éducation minoritaire grecque est extrêmement vaste et peut faire l'objet d'un article à part entière.

Le deuxième problème concerne les biens minoritaires en général et les biens gérés par les fondations pieuses (*les vakıfs*) en particulier. Il s'agit là d'une autre question source de multiples litiges entre la minorité et les autorités turques. Le sujet continue à influencer les relations gréco-turques en grande partie à cause des Grecs d'Istanbul émigrés de gré ou de force. Lorsqu'on parle des biens minoritaires il faut faire la distinction entre les biens individuels et les biens communautaires, autrement dit les biens appartenant aux fondations. La question des biens individuels concerne surtout les biens immobiliers des expulsés de 1964, 'bloqués' à l'époque par le gouvernement turc. La Turquie espérait un adoucissement de la position de la Grèce sur la question chypriote pour 'rendre' ces biens à leurs propriétaires. En quelque sorte, les biens des Grecs (de nationalité grecque) étaient tenus en otage par les autorités turques³⁴. Cet adoucissement ne venant pas, ces biens sont restés sous le contrôle des curateurs désignés par les autorités turques. Ces curateurs, des avocats pour la plupart, géraient ces biens immobiliers et leur revenus. Les biens qui n'étaient pas réclamés au bout de dix ans sont passés sous la propriété du Trésor public. Actuellement les Grecs de nationalité grecque ont beaucoup de mal à faire valoir leurs droits sur ces biens et intentent des actions en justice à travers une avocate grecque d'Istanbul, Mme Elpida Frangopoulos³⁵. Un des procès intentés contre la République turque concernant ces biens et la jouissance des revenus de ces biens suit actuellement sa procédure à la Cour européenne des Droits de l'Homme à Strasbourg³⁶.

Dans le domaine de la situation des 'biens des Grecs' il y a eu deux faits marquants après 1964. De 1964 à 1974 la situation a été littéralement gelée. C'est en 1974 avec le paroxysme du contentieux chypriote que de nouvelles restrictions sont venues s'ajouter à celles existantes. Désormais les Grecs de Turquie ne pouvaient vendre leurs biens qu'avec l'accord d'Ankara. Par ailleurs concernant les biens des fondations, une confiscation a été appliquée sur tous les biens 'hors de la liste'. Il s'agit des biens que les *vakıfs* avaient obtenus, par l'achat ou par légation, après 1936. En 1936, le gouvernement de l'époque avait demandé à tous les *vakıfs* de présenter une liste de leurs biens immo-

biliers (loi n° 2762). En 1974, tous les biens immobiliers ne se trouvant pas sur ces listes ont été confisqués. Selon M. Dimitri Karayani, président de la Fondation de l'Hôpital de Balıklı, à ce jour 135 biens immobiliers sous propriété de l'hôpital ont été confisqués par le gouvernement turc ainsi que 360 contrats de locations³⁷.

Une amélioration de la situation des biens immobiliers a commencé avec le Sommet de Davos entre le Premier ministre turc de l'époque Turgut Özal et son homologue grec Andréas Papandréou en 1988. En libéral convaincu, Turgut Özal croyait que le développement économique entre les deux pays allait régler les problèmes politiques. Pour obtenir le soutien de la Grèce dans le processus d'intégration turque dans la Communauté européenne, Turgut Özal fait abolir le décret de 1964 qui gelait les biens immobiliers des Grecs expulsés sans qu'il y ait une contrepartie en Thrace³⁸. Ainsi la voie de la vente et surtout de l'héritage s'ouvrait aux Grecs d'Istanbul vivant à Athènes ainsi qu'à leurs descendants. Selon les enfants des Grecs d'Istanbul à Athènes il y eut, de 1988 à 1991, une petite ruée des agents immobiliers istanbuliotes venus les voir pour leur acheter leurs biens³⁹. C'est à partir de 1991 que la vente et l'héritage de ces biens se compliquent à nouveau et l'application devient plus politique que juridique, l'attitude de la Turquie étant indexée à la situation des Turcs de Thrace. Une fois de plus le concept pervers de réciprocité remplit son rôle depuis cette date. On estime qu'actuellement la moitié des Grecs d'Istanbul vivant en Grèce ont porté l'affaire de la jouissance de leurs biens dans les tribunaux turcs.

Conclusion

Les relations gréco-turques n'ont jamais été faciles mais elles n'ont pas toujours été conflictuelles non plus. Elles ne sont tout simplement ni linéaires ni prédéterminées. On peut dire que deux types de problèmes existent pour que ces relations entrent dans une phase d'apaisement durable et irréversible. Premièrement, il s'agit des différends d'États à État les plus connus étant le problème de Chypre et ceux

relatifs à la Mer Egée. Ces derniers peuvent être résolus, à notre avis, à court terme avec de la bonne volonté, du courage politique et certainement avec la mise en avant d'une série d'intérêts communs. Le deuxième type de problèmes est plus compliqué, plus entremêlé et aussi plus abstrait. Il s'agit de la méconnaissance entre les deux peuples, des sentiments contradictoires entre amour et haine, des préjugés et stéréotypes véhiculés par des supports écrits et visuels, mais aussi par un folklore oral teinté d'héroïsme. C'est cette dernière série de problèmes qui demande une attention particulière sans pour autant négliger les efforts en vue du règlement des problèmes plus techniques et politiques. Entre les Grecs et les Turcs il y a des problèmes de perception mais ces problèmes ne sont pas les seules causes des crises successives.

Les minorités réciproques entrent curieusement dans les deux catégories. Pour les deux minorités existe un certain nombre de problèmes juridiques et politiques, mais aussi des problèmes relationnels avec la population majoritaire dûs en grande partie aux perceptions et à la méconnaissance. C'est ainsi que les deux États peuvent saisir l'occasion de cette période de détente pour se pencher sur les problèmes des minorités réciproques et peuvent, de cette manière, régler l'une des questions historiques du conflit gréco-turc tout en œuvrant pour le rapprochement entre les deux peuples, nécessaire pour toute entreprise politique d'envergure. Les deux peuples ont donné un signal fort qui démontrait qu'ils aspiraient à la bonne entente lors des récents tremblements de terre qui ont secoué les deux pays.

NOTES

1. **Cumhuriyet**, 11.02.2001

2. Pour une commodité d'écriture et de compréhension nous utiliserons le terme 'grec' pour désigner les membres de la minorité grecque de Turquie. Or, il faut préciser qu'en turc, comme en grec d'ailleurs, il existe une distinction entre un Grec de Grèce (Yunan ou Yunanlı en turc, dérivé d'Ionien ; *Ellinas*, Hellène en grec) et un Grec de Turquie, considéré comme descendant des Byzantins (Rum en turc,

le terme est utilisé pour tous les Grecs en dehors de la Grèce comme Chypre ou Caucase ; *Romios*, en grec le deux étant la déformation de Romain). Il faut préciser que cette distinction est faite par la plupart des membres de la minorité qu'ils soient toujours en Turquie ou en Grèce.

3. Pour plus de détails sur cette « détente » voir Akgönül Samim, « Les périodes de détentes politiques dans les relations gréco-turques » in **Études helléniques**, 8 (2), 2000, p. 107-152.

4. Pour plus de détails sur cette question voir Akgönül Samim, « Chypre et les minorités gréco-turques : une chronique de prise d'otage » in **Cahiers de Gremmo**, 2001, à paraître.

5. **Agos**, ayant des positions assez radicales dans la défense des droits des Arméniens de Turquie, 14.02.2001, bien entendu cette déclaration a été largement reprise et commentée par la presse turque, **Cumhuriyet**, 01.02.2001.

6. Voir par exemple *Salom*, l'hebdomadaire très consensuel des Juifs de Turquie, 12.03.2000.

7. En janvier 1923, six mois avant le traité de Lausanne proprement dit, les deux pays ont signé une « convention d'échange de population » selon l'article premier de cette convention :

« Il sera procédé dès le 1^{er} mai 1923 à l'échange obligatoire des ressortissants turcs de religion grecque orthodoxe établis sur les territoires turcs et des ressortissants grecs de religion musulmane établis sur les territoires grecs.

Ces personnes ne pourront venir se rétablir en Turquie ou, respectivement, en Grèce, sans l'autorisation du Gouvernement turc ou, respectivement du Gouvernement hellénique. »

Par l'article deux de la même convention deux communautés avaient été exemptées de cet échange, les deux communautés qui vont former les minorités qui nous occupent dans cet article :

« Ne seront pas compris dans l'échange prévu à l'Article premier:

a) les habitants grecs de Constantinople;

b) les habitants musulmans de la Thrace occidentale.

Seront considérés comme habitants grecs de Constantinople tous les Grecs déjà établis avant le 30 octobre 1918 dans les circonscriptions

de la préfecture de la ville de Constantinople, telles qu'elles sont délimitées par la loi de 1912.

Seront considérés comme habitants musulmans de la Thrace occidentale tous les musulmans établis dans la région à l'Est de la ligne - frontière établie en 1913 par le Traité de Bucarest. »

Comme cela est visible les critères pour être considéré comme « établi » et ne pas être échangé étaient assez stricts et une commission mixte veilla à la bonne application de ces critères. C'est ainsi que beaucoup de familles notamment d'Istanbul ont été séparées comme beaucoup d'associations commerciales. L'accord de 1930 a permis, sept ans après l'échange, à un retour tant attendu par les échangés et par les « établis ».

8. Pour plus de détails sur l'amélioration du sort des musulmans de Grèce pendant les années 1950 voir Akgönül Samim, **Une communauté, deux États : la minorité turco-musulmane de Thrace occidentale**, Istanbul : Isis, 1999, p. 47-60.

9. *Idem*, p. 48-51.

10. Sur ce point voir Demir Hülya, **Akar Rıdvan, Istanbul'un son sürgünleri**, Istanbul : İletişim, 1994, et Alexandris Alexis, **The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations. 1918-1974**, Athènes : Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992 p. 280-297.

11. Voir par exemple Zengin E. **Oi Mousoulmanoï tis Thrakis Les musulmans de Thrace**, Thessalonique : Institut des études balkaniques, 1994.

12. Akgönül Samim, « L'émigration des musulmans de Thrace occidentale » in **Mésogeios**, 3, 1999, p. 38-39.

13. Helsinki Watch Report, **Destroying Ethnic Identity: the Turks of Greece**, New York, 1990, p.11.

14. PE 202.357/fin., 27.01.1993.

15. Voir par exemple la liste publiée dans **Gündem**, 06.02.2001.

16. Quoique d'ordre sécuritaire également. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui les autorités grecques refusaient l'appellation turque de la minorité en partie parce qu'elles avaient peur des revendications territoriales de la Turquie dans la région. Avec le rétablissement de la confiance entre les deux pays et avec l'amointrissement de l'importance des frontières

internes de l'Union européenne au cas où la Turquie réussirait à l'intégrer, cette question de la reconnaissance identitaire peut trouver sa solution.

17. Pour plus de détails sur la question des Muftis en Thrace occidentale voir Akgönül Samim, « Religious institutions of the Muslem Minority of Grece » in Actes de colloque « **Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union** », Leiden, 14-16 décembre 2000, Leiden, Peeters, à paraître.

18. Voir par exemple l'affaire Serif contre la Grèce n° requête : 00038178/97, 14/12/1999, ou alors Agga contre la Grèce, n° requête : 00037439/97, 25/01/2000, les arrêtés sont disponibles sur le site Internet de la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme, <http://www.echr.coe.int>.

19. L'image de l'autre dans les livres scolaires est un sujet profondément traité dans les relations gréco-turques. Pour une approche générale nous signalerons trois ouvrages :

Tarih Egitimi ve Tarihte « öteki » Sorunu (L'enseignement de l'Histoire et le problème de l'autre dans l'Histoire), Actes du 2^e Congrès international d'Histoire, 8-10 juin 1995, Istanbul, Istanbul : Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998.

Özbaran Salih (éd.), **Tarih öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları** (L'enseignement de l'Histoire et les livres scolaires), Le symposium de Buca 29 septembre-01 octobre 1994, Buca, Istanbul : Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995.

Copeaux Etienne, **Espaces et temps de la nation turque. Analyse d'une historiographie nationaliste**, Paris : CNRS éditions, 1997.

Concernant plus particulièrement l'image des Grecs et des Turcs on peut conseiller, entre autres, les travaux suivants:

Kurgan Selçuk, « Yunanistan'daki okul kitapları ve Türklerle ilgili metinler » (Les livres scolaires en Grèce et les textes concernant les Turcs) in **Türk Kültürü**, 1978-1979, 17, p. 283-390.

Akgönül Samim, « Qui est un Grec pour un Turc » in **Asien, Afriken und Latinamerika** 2001, sous presse.

Stathis Penelope, « Yunan ve Türk Tarih Kitaplarında 'Ben' ve 'Öteki' imgeleri » (les images de 'moi' et de 'l'autre' dans les livres scolaires

d'histoire turcs et grecs) in **Tarih Eğitimi ve Tarihte « öteki » Sorunu** (L'enseignement de l'Histoire et le problème de l'autre dans l'Histoire), Actes du 2^e Congrès international d'Histoire, 8-10 juin 1995, Istanbul, Istanbul : Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998, p. 125-133. Millas Herkül, « Türk Ders Kitaplarında Yunanlılar : Bütünleştirici bir yaklaşım » (Les Grecs dans les livres scolaires turcs : une approche globalisante) in **Tarih Eğitimi ve Tarihte « öteki » Sorunu** (Enseignement d'Histoire et le problème de l'autre dans l'Histoire), Actes du 2^e Congrès international d'Histoire, 8-10 juin 1995, Istanbul, Istanbul : Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998, p. 254-265.

20. Notamment par le Conseil de l'Europe.

21. **Cumhuriyet**, 26.09.1999, **To Vima**, 30.09.1999.

22. Voir par exemple l'ho, 24.09.1999.

23. Actuellement le nombre des musulmans de Thrace occidentale est estimé à 120 000 personnes approximativement alors que les Grecs de Turquie sont de l'ordre de 3000 personnes.

24. l'ho 01.02.2000.

25. Benlisoy Yorgo, Macar Elçin, **Fener Patrikhanesi**, Ankara : Ayraç, 1997, p. 67.

26. L'entrevue entre Vartholoméos et Mesut Yılmaz, le Premier ministre de l'époque en juillet 1997, et le rapprochement entre le Patriarcat et Fetullah Gülen, dit Fetullah Hoca, leader d'un courant islamiste modéré.

27. Bilge Suat, « The Fener Greek Patriarchate » in **Perceptions**, mars-mai 1998, p. 37.

28. Voir par exemple l'éditorial d'Akif Aydın, « İrtica Okulları » (les écoles d'intégrisme) dans **Yeni Safak**, 29.10.1999.

29. **Cumhuriyet**, 19.10.1999, article de Leyla Tavsangolu, « Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Türkiye'nin önünü açar » (l'école théologique de Halki ouvrira l'horizon de la Turquie).

30. Interviews effectués en mars 1999 à Istanbul.

31. Voir par exemple, Pyrsas 12.02.1999.

32. Interview de Dimitri Frangopoulos, ancien directeur du Lycée grec Zographeion.

33. **Idem.**

34. H. Demir, R. Akar, **op. cit.**, p. 159.

35. **Diaspora Newsletter** sur le site Internet.

36. Procès Ekaterini Apostolidi et autres contre la Turquie.

37. Entretien avec Dimitri Karayani.

38. S. Akgönül, **op. cit.**, p. 97-99.

39. Entretien avec Yorgo Isaakidis, président de l'Association des Constantinopolitains.

40. Dans cette orientation bibliographique se trouvent uniquement les travaux déjà cités dans l'article.

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Turkey's 'Road Map' to the European Union

Implications for Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Issue

Dimitris P. Droutsas and Panayotis J. Tsakonas*

RÉSUMÉ

Suite à un bref historique de l'évolution des relations turbulentes entre l'Union européenne et la Turquie, à partir de l'accord d'association d'Ankara (1963) jusqu'au Conseil d'Europe à Helsinki, cet article traite des relations de la période allant de la guerre froide jusqu'à la question chypriote. L'article met l'accent sur deux dimensions des relations entre l'UE et le pays candidat, notamment le Partenariat et le Programme national pour l'adoption de l'acquis (NPAA). Les auteurs évaluent l'impact des relations européennes sur les relations turco-grecques et la question chypriote et en tire des conclusions pertinentes.

ABSTRACT

The article begins with a historical overview of the evolution of turbulent relations between the EU and Turkey, from the Ankara Agreement of Association (1963) up to the Helsinki summit of the European Council. The authors focus on how post-Cold War Greek-Turkish relations have evolved by tracing developments and events, especially the Cyprus question. Particular emphasis is paid to two key areas of Turkey's relations with the EU, namely the Accession Partnership and Turkey's National Program for the Adoption of the Aquis (NPAA). The article concludes with an assessment of the impact of the EU-Turkey relationship on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue.

The European Council's Summit Meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 was a turning point in Turkey's path to the European Union. The Helsinki Meeting managed to eliminate the 'phantom of exclusion' by granting Turkey a formal status of Candidate State for acces-

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sion to the EU, while it also eased the turbulent relations with the EU, dating back to the early 1960's. The granting of candidate status has also entailed Turkey's entrance into a pre-accession strategy which, in turn, asked that certain political conditions be fulfilled in order for accession negotiations to commence. More importantly, Turkey's eligibility after the Helsinki European Council is conditional on the resolution of two issues, namely its 'border conflict' with an EU-Member State; i.e., Greece, and the Cyprus issue.

In Helsinki, Greece, by insisting on a real – instead of a virtual or *sui generis* – candidacy for Turkey, aimed at the engagement of Turkey in an 'Accession Partnership' with the EU – a "road map" to Europe. This partnership would put Turkey under the constant screening and monitoring process of certain EU mechanisms and procedures allowing for certain structural changes to take place in Turkey, in order that the *acquis communautaire* be fully endorsed. This "Europeanisation" of Turkish politics and society is expected – by Greek decision-makers – to eventually lead to the abandonment by the Turkish élite of its current rusty aggressive behaviour and to the adoption of policies based less on geopolitical instruments of statecraft and more on international law and agreements.

EU-Turkey Relations: From Association to Candidacy

Turkey's relations with the EU date back to 1963, when it became the second Mediterranean country after Greece¹ to sign an Association Agreement – the so-called "Ankara Agreement" – with the European Community.² These agreements were based on Article 238 of the EEC-Treaty, of unlimited duration and stipulating eventual – though not automatic – membership to the Community.³ Of course, both the Community and Turkey were aware at the time that the road opened by the "Ankara Agreement" would be rising and long.⁴

The Athens and Ankara Agreements, signed when Europe was in the midst of the Cold War, were considered desirable as a means of strengthening economic and social conditions of two key NATO

members occupying a pivotal role in the southern flank of the Alliance and at the head of the Dardanelles. The agreements were also a means by which the Community could find some form of equilibrium between Greece and Turkey and also assert its international personality, mainly its ability to conclude international agreements as a bloc with third countries.⁵ It was, therefore, in the Mediterranean that the Community was able to affirm its international character initially and thus gain recognition as a new entity in the international system.

The end of the Cold War diminished Turkey's traditional importance for the West, though strong arguments can still be made about its strategic value *vis-à-vis* the turbulent Middle East and Central Asia – not to mention the importance of supporting and upholding the Turkish secular state as a model for the newly independent Moslem states of Central Asia.

Turkey launched its application for membership to the Community on 14 April 1987; the *Commission's* – rejecting – *Opinion* on Turkey's application came out at the end of 1989.⁶ The reasons which the EU put forward for refusing Turkey's application were routinely linked to Turkey's low level of economic development, its rapidly growing population (with the added consideration that, were it to become a member of the Union, Turkey could before too long become one of its most populous countries) and the impact that such a large underdeveloped, mainly agrarian country, would have on the Community's structural funds, agricultural policy and budget – not to mention internal migration.⁷

The treatment of Turkey by the EU is symptomatic of its changing international priorities, not least of which are those in the Mediterranean region. Since the late sixties and early seventies, the Community had regarded the Mediterranean as a zone of instability whose problems could spill over into Europe itself. While military threats and overall strategic balance in the region might have been countered by the presence of the American Sixth Fleet, the Community was using economic statecraft, especially discriminatory trading preferences, under the aegis of its Global Mediterranean

Policy,⁸ to enhance stability in the region, essentially by trying to alleviate the non-military threats.⁹ The accession of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) to the Community consolidated the new democratic process that had begun in each of these countries. In the late eighties, at the time of Turkey's application, no such prerogatives existed which would have motivated the Community to include Turkey in its fold. Moreover, the focus of the EU had shifted markedly to internal consolidation, while externally it became preoccupied with two main issues: the successful consolidation of Western European integration by linking the EFTA countries with the Union through the European Economic Area (EEA) and events in Central and Eastern Europe. Then came the negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the start of European Economic and Monetary Union followed by accession negotiations with the EFTA group and the conclusion of 'Europe Agreements' with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These events also negatively affected the applications for accession to the EU of Cyprus and Malta.

Moreover, the emerging problems and priorities in the Mediterranean region, to which the EU was admittedly rather slow to react – population growth, migratory pressures on Europe, terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism – lessened Turkey's attractiveness. The perception being that Turkey could possibly aggravate rather than diminish some, if not all of these pressures. Turkish intransigence regarding Cyprus and its dismal human rights record¹⁰ did not help either. Lurking under the surface was the cultural question; namely, although Turkey has Western institutions of government and a legal system established by Kemal Atatürk, it is an Islamic country.¹¹ Ironically, when in the seventies the international environment was potentially favourable towards Turkey, the latter was rather lukewarm to the idea of membership,¹² while Greece successfully pressed for membership.

The application for membership to the Community submitted by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on 3 July 1990 made the Community's stance over Turkey's application more demanding. At the 1990 Dublin European Council the Community declared that

future relations with Turkey would depend on Ankara adopting a more cooperative stance on the Cyprus issue. Not until 6 March 1995 did it become possible for the EU to complete negotiations for a Customs Union Agreement¹³ with Turkey. It was at this point that the General Affairs Council of the EU – under persistent pressure from the Greek government – ‘bartered’ the lifting of the Greek veto against a commitment to start accession negotiations with Cyprus (and Malta) six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.¹⁴

Although the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 “*confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union*”, it did not grant Turkey the status of Candidate State for accession to the EU and did not include Turkey in the pre-accession strategy developed for Candidate States, thus allowing ten former communist states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) to move ahead of Turkey in line. Instead, the European Council, in order to justify the fact that Turkey’s application was treated separately, called on the Commission to develop a ‘European Strategy for Turkey’ with the aim of assisting it with further reforms, and invited Turkey to the ‘European Conference’¹⁵. To make things worse, the eleventh officially recognized Candidate State was the Republic of Cyprus, which – along with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia – was to begin actual accession negotiations.

The effects of the decisions made in Luxembourg not only upset longstanding expectations in Turkey; but they also created a psychological barrier between the EU and that country, which took the form of a genuinely angry response by the latter, namely the suspension of all of its political relations with the EU (except from the Customs Union).¹⁶ The one-to-one meetings, which followed between Turkey and the Commission, focused primarily on the payment of EU-funds and the financial compensation due to Turkey as part of the 1995 Customs Union Agreement.¹⁷

Finally, the Cardiff European Council in June 1998 was considered an attempt on the part of the EU to bring Turkey closer to meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Cardiff thus managed to pave the way for the EU's approach to Turkey's candidacy to be readdressed by adopting the position that the Commission's "Progress Report on Turkey" was in effect a document on preparation for Turkish accession.¹⁸ Furthermore, the need to carry forward the "European strategy for Turkey" was stressed, including the tabling of any proposals necessary for its effective implementation.

The Helsinki European Council of 10 and 11 December 1999 has managed to eliminate the phantom of exclusion by stating that "*Turkey is a candidate country destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate countries*".¹⁹ However, the granting of formal status of Candidate State for accession to the EU has also entailed Turkey's entrance into a pre-accession strategy²⁰ to stimulate and support its reforms, which in turn asks for certain political conditions to be fulfilled *in order for accession negotiations to start*²¹ (our emphasis).

The various joint EU-Turkey institutions started re-functioning after the Helsinki decisions.²² The most important of these institutions is the EC-Turkey Association Council, which met on 11 April 2000 for the first time in three years and was chaired by Turkey. It adopted two important political decisions, one on the establishment of eight sub-committees of the Association Committee and the other on the opening of negotiations for an agreement aiming at the liberalization of services and the mutual opening of procurement markets between the EU and Turkey. The sub-committees of the Association Committee fulfilled a two-fold task: "*prepare a process of analytical examination of the acquis*", as requested by the Helsinki European Council, with a view to intensifying the harmonization of Turkey's legislation with the Community's rules and regulations and monitor the implementation of the Accession Partnership priorities.

The Evolution of Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Issue

During the post-Cold War era, relations between Greece and Turkey remained tense while the two NATO allies maintained an extremely high level of defense expenditures compared to other NATO members. The 1990s witnessed a number of bilateral crises:

- 1) the declaration of the Joint Defense Doctrine between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus;
- 2) the October 1994 declaration of a *casus belli* over the possible extension of Greek territorial waters by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, which then became official policy through a Resolution of the Turkish National Assembly;
- 3) the Imia crisis which brought the two countries to the brink of war. Scarcely a month after the signing of the Madrid Agreement in July 1997, which at first seemed to constitute a major positive development in the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations, Greece observed a “negative list” of Turkish responses. The responses included Prime Minister Yilmaz’s statement that the principles of international law cannot be applied to the Aegean Sea, the “Joining” or “Integration Agreement” concluded between Turkey and the occupied areas of Cyprus, and the challenge to Greek sovereignty over more than one hundred islands and islets in the Aegean Sea, including the island of Gavdos, south of Crete.

On the other hand, Turkey remained very anxious because of Cyprus’ purchase and planned deployment of the Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile system. Decisions taken in the Luxembourg and Cardiff European Councils, held in January and June 1998 respectively, further burdened the already tense and fragile Greek-Turkish security agenda, as the postponement of Turkey’s accession negotiations remained linked to Greece’s deliberate policy of keeping the doors of the EU closed. The picture further deteriorated with the capture of the leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, at the Nairobi airport in February 1999, after a brief stay in

the Greek ambassadorial residence in Kenya. For most high officials and analysts in Turkey, the Greek involvement in the Ocalan issue was a clear indication, if not proof, of Greece's plans for Turkey's dismemberment (in the general context of the so-called "Sevres Syndrome", which allegedly is haunting some Turkish policy-makers).

This dark picture started changing during the Kosovo conflict, when the two governments reached an understanding that an improvement of relations was necessary. Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, and his Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem, prepared the ground for an official *rapprochement* that was greatly facilitated by two unexpected events: the catastrophic earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999, respectively. The swift Greek reaction to the Turkish tragedy changed the mood spectacularly and led to a similar Turkish reaction after the Athens earthquake. Both countries, either through official channels or through private initiative, rallied to the side of each other dispatching medical supplies, equipment and rescue teams to alleviate the plight of earthquake-torn Greeks and Turks. A *rapprochement* between the two countries followed in the summer of 1999, which led to a number of bilateral agreements on issues characterized as 'low politics'. In January and February 2000, Foreign Ministers Papandreou and Cem visited each other's capitals and signed a total of nine bilateral agreements on 'low politics' or 'low confrontation' issues. These agreements concerned tourism, culture, the environment, trade and commerce, multilateral cooperation (especially with regard to the Black Sea and Southeast Europe regions), organized crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Those low-politics agreements are perceived by both countries as a very positive development and constitute a good basis for building a solid bilateral relationship.

However, progress on the more substantive issues touching the core of bilateral problems (high-politics) will be neither automatic nor easy. Although both sides, with the encouragement of the EU, NATO and the USA, have appeared willing to discuss, in principle at least, various Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and conflict resolution proposals, there is strong "inertial" opposition, especially in Ankara.

Given that the Helsinki European Council set a particular timetable, within which both the Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue should be addressed, both countries agreed to create the necessary conditions for successfully addressing more sensitive 'high politics' issues at a later stage. With the aim of creating the necessary conditions, the two countries decided to work together towards the advancement of a 'limited' or 'transparent' security regime²³ that could form the basis for a stable and less dangerous relationship. This régime would aim at the regularization of the two states' action with regard to a specific 'issue area'. In this case, the areas is arms control, which may concern the agreement between the opponents on the adoption of specific measures that would eliminate the possibility of 'surprise attack' and promote stability (crisis stability) through the prevention of war caused inadvertently by miscalculations and/or accidents (accidental war).

By introducing a dialogue on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) the two countries laid the foundations for the establishment of such a 'limited' or 'transparent' security régime in the area of arms control. The Greek-Turkish CBM process dates back to January 2000, when the Turkish side submitted a set of exclusively military CBMs that could be concluded and implemented by the two countries. The Greek side responded favourably to some of the Turkish proposals, while it insisted that the agenda – in line with the broader definition of security in the post-Cold War era – should not be limited to certain military CBMs, but could include certain environmental CBMs. Indeed, after three official meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Greece and Turkey have managed to agree on three particular categories of CBMs to be discussed in the months to come. More specifically, the two countries have agreed to discuss a series of measures included in the following three categories: (a) Confidence-Building Measures within the framework of the Papoulias-Yilmaz Memorandum of Understanding (Athens, 27 May 1988), (b) Measures of Tension Reduction, and (c) Measures of Good Neighbourliness.²⁴ The measures included in the first category were agreed to be discussed within the framework of NATO²⁵ by the two states' Permanent Representatives in Brussels, while measures included

in the other two categories are being discussed by the Political Directors of the two states' Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

The de-coupling of the Aegean and Cyprus issues might be possible, at least to a certain extent and in terms of implementing agreed CBMs, although the situation in the Aegean has a direct impact on the situation in Cyprus, and vice-versa. It is thus unlikely that fundamental progress towards a comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement will be achieved without a just and mutually acceptable solution of the prickly Cyprus problem. To this end, a 'European' solution for the two communities on the island would probably be the optimal solution.²⁶

It is also worth noting that the two meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey on January 19-22 and on February 5-6 2000, in Ankara and Athens respectively, have given further impetus to bilateral relations, by producing ideas that have resulted in successful cooperation between the two countries. One of those initiatives was the setting up of a joint Task Force entrusted with the study and realisation of Greek-Turkish cooperation on matters pertaining to the *acquis communautaire*. The Task Force has met six times so far.²⁷ After an initial stage of exploratory nature that helped define the main areas of potential cooperation, the Task Force has focused its activity on paving the way for seminars of technical assistance regarding the transfer of know-how on various issues of interest concerning the *acquis communautaire* to the Turkish side.²⁸ These seminars are not based on the 'teacher and pupil scheme', but are intended to bring the two sides together, in studying each other's practices and sharing Greece's experience in dealing with the various aspects of the *acquis*. The results the Task Force has achieved so far contribute to the positive development of relations between the two countries, as they are tangible and irreversible, thereby enhancing considerably mutual understanding and trust between the two administrations.

With regard to the Cyprus issue, the most recent development has been the launching of proximity talks. Following the statement of the G-8 meeting on 20 June 1999²⁹ calling for comprehensive negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1250/99 (29 June 1999). The Resolution

requested that the Secretary-General, in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, invite the leaders of the two sides to comprehensive negotiations under the auspices of the UN. These negotiations should be conducted in respect of the following principles: (a) no preconditions, (b) all issues on the table, (c) commitment to continue to negotiate in good faith until a settlement is reached, and (d) full consideration of relevant UN Resolutions and Treaties.³⁰ On November 13, 1999, Kofi Anan, announced that his invitation for proximity talks to start on 3 December 1999 in New York had been accepted by President Glafkos Clerides and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. The date chosen for the start of the proximity talks certainly contributed to the positive climate in view of the important decisions to be taken on Turkey's status as Candidate State for accession to the EU at the Helsinki European Council a few days later.

Right from the beginning, it was made clear that the proximity talks were to be seen as the start of an extended process. So far, the two sides have witnessed five rounds of proximity talks.³¹ The procedure chosen by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Alvaro De Soto, was designed to avoid the transfer of positions and proposals from the one side to the other, and present orally his own ideas for discussion and comment and separately, to both sides. His objective was always to draft a comprehensive paper for negotiation. Ideas were put on the table on the four core issues: territory, property, security and constitution. The talks were characterized by time-consuming mediation efforts to keep them alive, rather than by real and substantial progress. Two incidents overshadowed the talks. First, lengthy discussions on a controversial "Addendum" to the Secretary General's Report on the occasion of the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period, which referred to the position of the "Turkish-Cypriot authorities" for the first time. The "Addendum" was finally withdrawn. In reaction to the withdrawal of this Addendum, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership imposed measures against UNFICYP. These measures include limitations to the movement of UNFICYP across the buffer zone. Further, the UN is now obliged to insure all its vehicles with

Turkish-Cypriot insurance companies and to allow the Turkish-Cypriots to collect fees for the water, electricity and other services consumed by UN camps in the occupied areas. Second, Turkish troops advanced 300 meters at one point in the buffer zone, where a village, named Strovilia, with a small number of Greek-Cypriot families as well as a UN entry post were located and are now enclosed by Turkish military forces. Both actions have given rise to a series of protests, including protests from the UN Secretary General who demanded that the *status quo* be reinstated.

At the conclusion of the fifth – and so far last – round of the proximity talks, the UN Secretary General put forward a series of ‘oral remarks’, outlining his views on the continuation of the process as well as on the issues under negotiation. A new element can be identified in the considerations on the settlement of the Cyprus issue: the compatibility of the comprehensive solution to be found with the *acquis communautaire* and the opportunity of Cypriot accession to the EU. Finally, on 24 November 2000, while discussions reached their peak on the references on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue in Turkey’s Accession Partnership, Denktash declared that he did not intend to continue proximity talks, returning to the position he had previously held that recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot entity as an independent state was a precondition to be fulfilled before entering into talks.

Implications of Turkey’s ‘Road Map’ on Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Issue

The “Accession Partnership” is undoubtedly the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy.³² More specifically, Turkey’s Accession Partnership³³ sets out, in a single framework, the priority areas, as defined in the analysis of the situation in Turkey, on which preparations for accession must concentrate in view of the political and economic criteria and the obligations incumbent upon a EU-Member State as defined by the European Council. It also indicates

the financial resources for assisting Turkey to implement the priorities identified during the pre-accession period.³⁴ The priorities and intermediate objectives for political, economic and legal/administrative reforms within Turkey's accession preparations are divided into two groups, namely short-term and medium-term,³⁵ and touch upon Turkey's 'internal' as well as 'external' front.

Internally, Turkey is asked to proceed to the democratization of Turkish politics and the transformation of its 'anocratic' régime into a fully-fledged western democracy. Turkey's, as all candidate states', eventual EU-membership involves at a minimum the 'conscious surrender' of parts of state sovereignty to a supranational organization, if not the complete rethinking of the state's role and the re-conceptualization of the 'national interest'. The reforms that Turkey is asked to promote are mainly related to three broad areas, namely the Kurdish issue – and by implication human rights issues – the role of the military in Turkish politics and certain economic and administrative adjustments for harmonizing the state's internal structures to certain European standards.³⁶ It can well be argued that such reforms in Turkey's 'internal front' constitute a small revolution.

Externally, Turkey's eligibility after the Helsinki European Council is conditional on the resolution of two issues, namely its border conflict with an EU-member state, specifically Greece³⁷ and the Cyprus issue. It is beyond the scope of this article to exercise the various – especially legal – interpretations, used in the domestic political debate in both Greece and Turkey the day-after the Helsinki European Council for defining Turkey's obligations that are conditional upon resolution of tensions on the Greek-Turkish front. For the purposes of this article, we stick instead to the implications stemming from the much clearer political message of the EU to Turkey concerning Greek-Turkish relations as well as the Cyprus issue.

With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, Helsinki made clear to Turkey that the country has four years – until 2004 – at its disposal for a resolution of the conflict with neighbouring Greece to be achieved before the rather critical review that would assess Turkey's

path towards the EU takes place.³⁸ After welcoming the launch of the proximity talks on the Cyprus issue under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, the Helsinki European Council reiterated that a political settlement of the Cyprus problem would facilitate Cyprus' accession to the EU, but would not be a precondition for accession. At the same time, the European Council stressed ambiguously that all relevant factors would be taken into account for the final decision on accession.³⁹ Nevertheless, the Heads of States and Governments of the EU-15 have sent a clear message to Turkey that the division of Cyprus must be ended by the date of the next EU-enlargement at the latest. After that date, even a divided Cyprus will become member of the Union. In that sense, Turkey, which illegally occupies the northern part of the island, can no longer 'block' the accession of Cyprus to the EU.

Thus, the Helsinki European Council constitutes both an alert and an incentive for Turkey that there is a light at the end of the tunnel and Turkey must, therefore, successfully address current issues, which cause instability into a particular part of the Union.

The decisions taken at the Helsinki European Council concerning Turkey's so-called external front have been included in Turkey's Accession Partnership – Turkey's actual road map to Europe. The formulations finally drafted were the result of strong diplomatic efforts by both sides and may be considered characteristic of what could be termed this new era in Greek-Turkish relations introduced by rapprochement between the two countries.

From the outset, the Greek government made clear to its EU-partners that it expected both issues of special Greek interest (Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue) to be included in Turkey's Accession Partnership.⁴⁰ Once the assenting opinion of the EU-15 on this principle was assured, the remaining non-linguistic question was not *whether*, but *where* to put these provisions in Turkey's Accession Partnership document.

The draft was prepared by the Commission and took into consideration Turkey's interests. A reference both to Greek-Turkish relations

and to the Cyprus issue, based on the wording used in the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, was put only in the chapter regarding the “Principles” of the Accession Partnership. From a legal point of view this chapter does not bear the same binding nature as the chapter containing the “Priorities and Intermediate Objectives” does, thus leaving Turkey much greater room for manoeuvre. Greece’s demand was that provisions on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue be included in the short- and medium-term priorities of the Accession Partnership.⁴¹ This demand was partially fulfilled at the meeting of the Commission’s College adopting the draft proposal of Turkey’s Accession Partnership, November 8, 2000. Besides the reference to Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue in the above-mentioned chapter, the Cyprus issue was also included in the “Short-Term Priorities” which Turkey had been called upon to meet.

Greece’s insistence that the Council⁴² for Greek-Turkish relations be included in the “Medium-Term Priorities” of Turkey’s Accession Partnership led to intense Turkish reactions and the visit of high-ranking Turkish officials to the capitals of the EU-Member States which Turkey considered key players in the Accession Partnership decision-making process.⁴³ A compromise solution at the political level was finally agreed upon at the General Affairs Council of December 4, 2000 – the last Council meeting before the Nice European Council. This compromise foresaw the inclusion of both the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations in the “Short-Term” and “Medium-Term Priorities” respectively, but under the heading “Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria”.⁴⁴ In this manner, the Greek demand of including both issues in the “Priorities” of Turkey’s Accession Partnership was met, while Turkey’s sensitivities were assuaged by giving continuation to the ‘constructive ambiguity’ of the wording chosen at the Helsinki European Council.

Community assistance for financing projects through the pre-accession instruments for Turkey is conditional on respect by Turkey of its commitments under the Association Agreement, Customs Union and related decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council. Thus, further steps towards satisfying the so-called Copenhagen criteria and, in par-

ticular, progress in meeting the specific priorities of the Accession Partnership in the year 2001 need to be taken. Most important, Turkey's failure to respect these general conditions could lead to a decision by the Council on the suspension of financial assistance.⁴⁵

Finally, the implementation of the Accession Partnership is monitored within the framework of the Association Agreement; i.e., in the appropriate sub-committee of the Association Committee, and through the competent Council bodies, to which the Commission must report regularly.

In order to prepare for membership, the Accession Partnership calls upon Turkey to prepare on the basis of the Accession Partnership a National Program for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA). Although this program must be compatible with the priorities established in the Accession Partnership setting out a timetable for achieving them, it is not an integral part of the Accession Partnership.

With considerable delay, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey finally adopted the NPAA on 19 March 2001.⁴⁶ Turkey's NPAA is aimed at the objectives of "*further strengthening Turkey's pluralistic, participatory and democratic structure on human rights and rule of law, which are principles that have already been adopted by Turkey*", moreover of "*a more efficient implementation of Turkey's economic program which will enable Turkey to adapt rapidly to the Copenhagen economic criteria*", and finally of "*Turkey's rapid adaptation to the criteria achieved by the EU member states in every field*".⁴⁷ Turkey's National Program foresees reform-oriented political, economic, social and institutional changes. With its political characteristics as well as its economic, social and institutional contents, the NPAA "*provides for a very intensive adaptation and legislation process*." Expressing its desire "*to put into effect the necessary measures and laws rapidly*" the Turkish government expects, by completing this transformation process, both to "*achieve its aim to be a member of the European Union and acquire a stronger and more active position in the international arena*."⁴⁸ The reaction of the EU to the content of Turkey's NPAA, however, was far more cautious.⁴⁹

Concerning the issues which are related to Turkey's external front, namely Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, Turkey's NPAA refers to them solely in its "Introduction", and by using quite vague language. More specifically, by stressing that Turkey will continue to develop its relations with neighbouring countries on the basis of a peace-seeking foreign policy, it is also stated that Turkey "*will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue; supports the efforts of the UN Secretary General, in the context of his good-offices mission aiming at a mutually acceptable settlement with a view to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities on the island*". It could be argued that a certain amount of consistency is lacking, if Turkey's NPAA is to be compared with the priorities set in Turkey's Accession Partnership. However, it should be remembered that the parameters of EU-Turkey relations were laid down by a commonly accepted document, namely Turkey's Accession Partnership, and that Turkey's progress will be evaluated on the basis of Turkey's implementation of all the priorities and the fulfilment of the criteria set in this document.

One may convincingly argue that the Helsinki European Council did not manage to produce tangible results with regard to the resolution of either the Greek-Turkish conflict or the Cyprus problem. It should be stressed, however, that attainment of tangible results was not on the Helsinki agenda. The latter, by renewing Turkey's European, should be viewed and assessed as a long-term enterprise that aims at making Turkey entering, like Greece did in the past, a 'virtuous circle' of democratization as well as the community of well-established democracies.

However, the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy for Turkey initiated by the Helsinki European Council, namely the Accession Partnership, has instead managed to 'Europeanize' both Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue. Indeed, Turkey's Accession Partnership, by calling on the fulfilment of certain short-term and medium-term priorities, has set a particular timetable within which both the Aegean and Cyprus issues should be addressed and

dealt with. The key element of Turkey's path to the EU has thus enmeshed both the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations within the context of the Union, where Greece enjoys a comparative advantage *vis-à-vis* an aspiring EU-member state (Turkey), while both issues are closely linked to Turkey's European accession path.

By implication, Turkey's Accession Partnership has also managed to enmesh Turkey in the European integration system, where the European norms of behavior and certain European-style rules of the game must be followed by Turkey. That was, in fact, the rationale behind Greece's concession to granting Turkey the status of Candidate State for accession to the EU. By pushing Turkey deeper into the European integration process, Greece aimed to link Turkey's state; i.e., its elite's interests, to certain international (read *European*) ways of behaving. 'Socialization' from this realist perspective is the process of reconciling the individual aspirations of states' – especially revolutionary states' – to generally accepted standards.⁵⁰

It should be stressed, however, that Turkey's entering into European integration is expected to exert a certain amount of pressure, especially on that country's domestic front. Indeed, by strengthening the democratization process, pressure will be put on Turkey's civil-military establishment for more rational allocation of the country's economic resources. Additionally, the democratization process would mean that the military falls under civilian control and that democratic processes and benefits are enjoyed by the members of the state as a whole. The deepening of the democratization process and the ability of a broader political participation of an electorate, currently more or less indifferent and/or incapable of reacting to the commands of the military bureaucracy, would intensify the pressure exerted on the Turkish foreign policy elite to redefine the strategic priorities of the country towards a more rational distribution of the country's assets. It seems that this fragile and painstaking 'democratization process' can become the driving force for the appearance of a certain amount of turbulence in Turkey's domestic politics. 'Problematic democratization' is highly likely to provide, in turn, a rather fertile ground for the rise of militant radicalism, the reactivation of Turkey's Sevres Syndrome and the

adoption of a more regionally based role by Turkey. Such developments could affect Turkey's foreign policy behavior by leading to the adoption of diversionary, if not aggressive, strategies *vis-à-vis* its neighboring Greece and on the Cyprus issue.⁵¹

Given that both the Aegean and Cyprus issues have been enmeshed within the context of the European Union while both issues are closely linked to Turkey's European accession path, it seems that Turkey's choices are now limited to the following: 1) Turkey will either take a sincere – although painstaking – effort to abandon its intransigent position on both the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations and contribute productively to their resolution 2) or Turkey will instead adopt a policy aiming at the reversal of certain European-style rules of the game which are now being imposed by its Accession Partnership and should be followed by Turkey.

Greece should be aware of the risks involved in this fragile transitional period and the elaborate strategies, which, along with the European Union, will successfully tackle Turkey's domestic as well as 'European' pressures. Turkey should also be aware that its decision to adopt a positive and productive stance to the resolution of both the Cyprus issue and bilateral relations with Greece will undoubtedly be backed by Greece's positive – if not enthusiastic – support of its path towards Europe. The fact that it was Greece which expressed concern about Turkey's 'exclusion'⁵² during last December's Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union in Nice is but a clear case in point.

NOTES

1. Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Greece (signed on 9 July 1961 in Athens), OJ No. 26, 18 February 1963, p. 294.
2. Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (signed on 12 September 1963 in Ankara), OJ No. 217, 29 December 1964, pp. 3685 and 3705.

3. Article 28 of the EC-Turkey Association Agreement specified that: "As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community."
4. For background to EU-Turkey relations, see Selim Ilkin, "A History of Turkey's Association with the European Community" in Ahmet Geoffrey Evin and Denton (eds.), **Turkey and the European Community** (Leske and Budrich, Opladen, 1990).
5. Roderick Pace, "The Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: From the Treaties to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" in Peter Xuereb and Roderick Pace (eds.), **Economic and Legal Reform in Malta** (Malta University Press, Malta, 1995), p. 398.
6. Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community, SEC(89) 2290 final/2, 20 December 1989.
7. Ibid (point 8).
8. For background to the Mediterranean Policy of the EU, see Dimitri P. Droutsas, "The EU and the Mediterranean: The Cypriot Application for Full Membership in the Regional Context" in Heinz-Jürgen Axt and Hansjörg Brey (eds.), **Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?**, (Südosteuropa Aktuell 23, Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, München, 1997), pp. 100-124.
9. Of course, it remains a moot point as to how relevant the Mediterranean Policy of the EU has been in maintaining regional stability, compare Roderick Pace, "The Domestic and International Politics of the Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Union", **The European Union Review** (Vol. 3, No. 1, 1998), pp. 80-84.
10. Human rights have always played an important role in the Union's dealings with the Mediterranean associates. The Association

Agreement with Greece had been frozen after the colonels' coup in 1967, while Spain's request for an Association Agreement was rebuffed pending substantial progress in democratization. Human rights were a frequent bone of contention between the EU and Turkey following the intervention of the Turkish military in the political affairs of the country. Besides, the respect for human rights is now a binding feature of the "Europe Agreements" and the new "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreements".

Given this emphasis, when the European Parliament's statutory approval was sought for the EC-Turkey Customs Union Agreement and the Financial Protocol in December 1995, Turkey's human rights record came under attack, with the leader of the Socialist group stating most emphatically that the majority of her group were voting in favor of ratification "in sorrow, with heavy hearts and without enthusiasm", compare Pauline Green (European Socialists), Debates of the European Parliament, OJ Annex No. 4-472, 13 December 1995, p. 144.

11. John Redmont, **The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta?**, (Dartmouth, 1993), p. 45.

12. The disenchantment with the whole relationship was clear, when the Turkish Foreign Minister said in 1974 that his country did not share Greece's urgency in joining the Community. Relations with the Community were worsened by the 1974 invasion of Cyprus. Further difficulties in this relationship were introduced by the intervention of the Turkish military in domestic politics and the general deterioration in the human rights situation.

13. Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union, OJ L 35, 13 February 1996, p. 1. The Customs Union entered into its final phase on 31 December 1995.

14. The statement of the General Affairs Council can be found in the Bulletin of the European Union 3/1995, p. 80. This commitment was

reaffirmed by the Cannes European Council in June 1995 (point A/I/1) and by the Madrid European Council in December 1995 (point A/III/A): “The European Council reiterates that the accession negotiations with Malta and Cyprus will commence, on the basis of the Commission proposals, six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, and will take its results into account.”

15. “The European Council decided to set up a European Conference which will bring together the Member States of the European Union and the European States aspiring to accede to it and share its values and internal and external objectives.”, Luxembourg European Council Conclusions (paragraph 4).

16. The Luxembourg European Council not only reinforced Turkey’s “syndrome of exclusion”, but it also questioned the country’s European orientation, see Pia Christina Wood, “Europe and Turkey: A Relationship Under Fire”, **Mediterranean Quarterly** (Vol. 34, no. 1, January-March 1999), p. 110.

17. The Customs Union Agreement was accompanied by a financial aid package made up of ECU 375 million in budgetary aid and ECU 750 million in EIB loans. However, following the events of January 1996 around Imia island in the Aegean, this aid was blocked at the insistence of Greece. See Gulnur Aybet, “Turkey and European Institutions”, **The International Spectator** (Vol. 34, no. 1, January-March 1999), pp. 107-108.

18. “In the case of Turkey, [the Commission’s regular] reports will be based on Article 28 of the Association Agreement and the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council.”, Cardiff European Council Conclusions (paragraph 64), (see also footnote 3). Compare also Bill Park, “Turkey’s European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki – to Ankara?”, (Paper presented at the 41st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, 14-18 March 2000), p. 4.

19. Helsinki European Council Conclusions (paragraph 12).

20. This pre-accession strategy contains the following elements:

- enhanced political dialogue with emphasis on progress towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession, in particular as regards human rights, border disputes and Cyprus;
- the preparation of the analytical examination of the *acquis communautaire*;
- the establishment by the Commission of a “Regular Report” covering the relevant chapters of the *acquis communautaire*;
- the adoption of a single framework for coordinating all sources of EU financial assistance for pre-accession, including a legal base for the Accession Partnership;
- the opening of Community programmes and agencies for Turkey;
- the extension of the EC-Turkey Customs Union in the fields of services and public procurement;
- the use of the technical assistance offered by TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office).

21. “Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.”, Helsinki European Council Conclusions (paragraph 4).

The Copenhagen criteria are the following: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (political criteria), existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (economic criteria).

22. For details on the meetings held of these joint institutions in the year 2000, see “2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”.

23. See Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, “Limited Collective Security,” **Foreign Policy** (Vol. 80, Fall 1990), pp. 77-96 and Condoleeza Rice, “SALT and the Search for a Security Regime,” in Alexander George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, (eds.), **U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons**

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 301-3. On limited security regimes between adversaries, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," **Journal of Social Issues** (Vol. 43, 1987), pp. 56-63.

24. More specifically, the first category entitled **Measures for Confidence Building within the framework of the Papoulias-Yilmaz Memorandum of Understanding (Athens, 27 May 1988)** included the following five measures: (1) The Turkish Armed Forces are prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, to reduce to the possible extent the number, size and scope of their exercises in the high seas of the Aegean; (2) All Turkish military aircraft flying in the international airspace of the Aegean will, on a reciprocal basis, operate their identification devices called IFF/SIF; (3) Interim Combined Air Operation Center (ICAOC) in Eskisehir will be operational and ready for communication and exchange of information with ICAOC in Larissa/Greece on a reciprocal basis on flights conducted by the parties in the international airspace of the Aegean; (4) Turkish and Greek military aircraft could fly disarmed over the Aegean; (5) Notification, in the framework of the Exercise Planning Conference of NATO, yet on a bilateral basis, of the time schedule of national exercises for the following year, to avoid possible overlapping. The second category, entitled **Tension Reduction Measures** included the following nine measures: (1) Turkish and Greek military forces could conduct a joint military exercise and/or a Pfp exercise in the Aegean or in the Mediterranean Sea; (2) In addition to naval visits scheduled for NATO exercises, Turkish and Greek Navy vessels could pay mutual port visits; (3) Invitations could be extended by both sides to attend national exercises; (4) Observation trial flights could be conducted on a reciprocal basis in the context of the Open Skies Agreement; (5) Establishment of direct communication channels between the Turkish and Greek Coast Guard Commanders; (6) Establish regular contact between the two Chiefs of Joint Staffs; (7) Implementation/extension of Papoulias-Yilmaz Agreements (e.g. prolongation of the summer moratorium); (8) Transformation of the triangular communication line between Athens-Brussels-Ankara into a hotline between Athens

and Ankara at Foreign Ministers level and, eventually, between Prime Ministers; and (9) Participation of Greek and Turkish Armed Forces in peace operations in the Balkans, as well as further intensification of the Greek-Turkish co-operation in the framework of the existing Multinational Peace-keeping Force Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE). The third category entitled **Measures of Good Neighborliness** includes the following three measures: (1) Exchange of ratification instruments for four Protocols and an agreement concerning the border area of Evros, which were signed by Greece and Turkey between 1969 and 1971; (2) Implementation of the 1963 Protocol concerning hydraulic work on the basin of the river Evros; and (3) Cooperation on the prevention of pollution on river Evros (Maritsa) by establishing a regime of sustainable environmental development of river Evros. At a later stage, the Bulgarian side can be invited to participate in the project.

25. In the context of NATO's new command structure, two military exercises have already taken place in the Alliance's southern region with chief-participants Greece and Turkey. During the "Dynamic Mix" exercise, Turkish troops (wearing a NATO hat) landed on Greek soil, and the whole exercise was conducted very smoothly. NATO exercise "Destined Glory", which took place in Turkey a few months later, caused, instead, a mini-crisis in bilateral relations, when Turkish objections to the agreed scenario forced the Greek contingent to leave the exercise.

26. See Douglas Frantz, "Cyprus Limits Greece-Turkey Warming", **International Herald Tribune** (December 19, 2000).

27. The meetings took place on the following dates and places: 28 February 2000 in Ankara; 17 April 2000 in Athens; 2 June 2000 in Istanbul; 25 September 2000 in Athens; 18 December 2000 in Antalya; 6 April 2001 in Ankara.

28. The seminars scheduled by the Task Force so far cover fields such as economy, customs, banking, electronic signature, agriculture, environment, justice and police cooperation, university cooperation, cooperation on youth projects.

29. U.N. document S/1999/711, annex.

30. UNSC Resolution 1250/99 (point 7).

31. The rounds took place on the following dates and places: 3-14 December 1999 in New York; 31 January-8 February 2000 in Geneva; 5-12 July and 24 July-4 August 2000 in Geneva; 12-26 September 2000 in New York; 1-10 November 2000 in Geneva.

32. Compare the Luxembourg European Council Conclusions (paragraphs 14-16).

33. Council Decision 2001/235/EC of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, OJ L 85, 24 March 2001, p. 13.

34. The Accession Partnership indicates the priority areas for Turkey's membership preparations. In its introductory part, the Accession Partnership clearly states that "Turkey will nevertheless have to address all issues identified in the Regular Report". Furthermore, it is also important that Turkey fulfills the commitments of legislative approximation and implementation of the *acquis communautaire* in accordance with the commitments made under the Association Agreement, Customs Union and related decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council. Finally, it is recalled that incorporation of the *acquis communautaire* into legislation is not in itself sufficient, but it will also be necessary to ensure that it is actually applied to the same standards as those, which apply within the EU.

35. Short-term priorities have been selected on the basis that it is realistic to expect that Turkey can complete or take them substantially forward by the end of the year 2001. The priorities listed under the medium-term are expected to take more than one year to complete although work on them should, wherever possible, also begin during the year 2001.

36. For an analysis of the necessary reforms identified by the Accession Partnership in Turkey's internal front, see Panayotis Tsakonas and

Dimitri Conostas, "Turkey's Democratization and International Stability after Helsinki", **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies** (Vol. 8, no. 2, Autumn 2000), pp. 153-188.

37. Greece's official position is that there is only one issue between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean that should be dealt with; i.e., the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean.

38. Paragraph 4 of the Helsinki European Council Conclusions states: "[...] the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004."

39. Paragraph 9a of the Helsinki European Council Conclusions reads as follows: "The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion."

Paragraph 9b of the Helsinki European Council Conclusions reads as follows: "The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors."

40. To this end, a 'tour des capitales' was undertaken by officials of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

41. For both issues, Greece could refer to precedent cases contained in the Accession Partnerships of other Candidate States. With regard to the Cyprus issue, the Accession Partnership of Cyprus includes a specific reference in the "Short-Term Priorities": "Maximize efforts to support a settlement [of the Cyprus problem] under the auspices of the UN." With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, an analog provision can be found in the "Medium-Term Priorities" of the Accession Partnership of Slovenia: "Continue efforts to resolve outstanding border issues with Croatia".

42. In principle, the Council adopts the Accession Partnership acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. As a consequence, no Member State has alone the ability to block this decision. For being competent to adopt the very first Accession Partnership of a Candidate State, the Council needs a legal basis, which is provided by a Regulation requiring unanimity for its adoption (Council Regulation (EC) No. 390/2001 of 26 February 2001 on assistance to Turkey in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of an Accession Partnership, OJ L 58, 28 February 2001, p. 1). Without the consent of Greece to this Regulation, the Council could not proceed to the adoption of Turkey's Accession Partnership. Any future amendments of Turkey's Accession Partnership will be decided by the Council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.

43. As a characteristic example of the "new era" in Greek-Turkish relations, one may refer to the fact that Athens was included in the Turkish "tour des capitales". The visit paid by Turkey's Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Faruk Logoglu, to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs on 30 November 2000.

44. The provision on the Cyprus issue in the "Short-Term Priorities" reads as follows: "In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, strongly support the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, as referred in the point 9(a) of the Helsinki conclusions."

The provision on Greek-Turkish relations in the “Medium-Term Priorities” reads as follows: “In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, under the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues, as referred in the point 4 of the Helsinki conclusions.”

45. The Council will decide acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.

46. The Accession Partnership called upon Turkey to adopt the NPAA “before the end of the year [2000]”. Turkey referred to the delay of the EU in formally adopting the legal basis for the Accession Partnership – the Council had to wait for the (non-binding) Opinion of the European Parliament to be submitted. The economic crisis, which shook Turkey in the beginning of 2001, did not ease the intense discussions in the Turkish interior on the necessary reforms either.

47. Press statement of the (Turkish) Council of Ministers regarding the National Programme, Ankara 19 March 2001.

48. **Ibid.**

49. Günther Verheugen, the Commissioner responsible for enlargement, described the package of proposed reforms as “an important landmark in Turkey’s preparation for EU-membership and the first stage in a far reaching programme of political reform” and as “a starting point for the fundamental transformation of Turkey into a modern democracy”, **Financial Times**, 27 March 2001.

50. It is interesting that classical realists, such as Henry Kissinger, argue that the construction of stable international orders is dependent upon the successful linkage of state interests to international legitimising principles. See Henry Kissinger, **A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22** (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1957). In international relations literature, socialisation has been studied by realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist scholars. See – among others – Kenneth Waltz,

Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979), pp. 74-77, 127-128; John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis" in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), **Neorealism and Its Critics** (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 141-148; Henrik Spruyt, "Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order", **International Organization** (Vol. 48, no. 4, 1994), pp. 527-557; and Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", **International Organization** (Vol. 46, no. 2, 1992), pp. 391-426.

51. For a detailed analysis of this argument, see Panayotis Tsakonas and Dimitri Conostas, **Turkey's Democratization and International Stability after Helsinki**, op. cit., pp. 153-188.

52. The working hypothesis of the EU, when discussing the necessary institutional changes in view of enlargement, did not take into account Turkey's candidature for accession.

New Strategic Questions in European Security and the Aegean Neighbours

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RÉSUMÉ

L'amélioration des relations entre la Grèce et la Turquie a été bien accueillie et a renforcé les positions stratégiques des deux pays. La décision de la Grèce de ne pas bloquer la candidature turque à l'Union européenne lors du Conseil européen d'Helsinki (10-11 décembre 1999) a servi non seulement les intérêts grecs et turcs mais a aussi fait avancer les objectifs de sécurité de l'U.E. C'est pourquoi cet article avance la thèse selon laquelle les relations greco-turques et le degré de rapprochement s'inscrivent dans un nouveau contexte, celui du dessein européen de sécurité. Cependant des priorités différentes de deux voisins au sujet de la candidature turque à l'U.E. peuvent affecter le processus de paix en cours actuellement.

ABSTRACT

Improvement in the relations of the two Aegean neighbours has been widely appreciated and has strengthened the strategic positions of both Greece and Turkey. In addition, Greece's stance in the Helsinki European Council (December 10-11, 1999), not to veto Turkey's inclusion in the group of candidate member-states to the European Union (EU) has served not only Greek and Turkish interests, but also has advanced the evolving security objectives of the EU. For this reason, as will be argued in this paper, Greek-Turkish relations and the degree of further *rapprochement* are becoming gradually intertwined with the new European security architecture. However, different priorities in the rationale of the two Aegean neighbours regarding the salience of Turkey's inclusion in the group of EU candidate members, may affect the eventual outcome of the currently unfolding step-by-step peace process.

The Greek strategic priority to encourage Turkey in its European vocation appears in juxtaposition with Turkey's internal debate regarding the wisdom of the commitments required as an EU candidate and its strategic emphasis on removing all prospects for potential marginalization from the evolving context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, Ankara's strong interest in not

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allowing its voice to be marginalized in the context of the ESDP might offer an additional incentive for Turkey to commit fully to its European vocation.

This analysis begins with an examination of the elements that fostered Greek-Turkish rapprochement in which Greece's stance at Helsinki played a role of central importance. An examination of the difference in emphasis regarding the importance of Turkey's being upgraded as an EU candidate member, as viewed by the two sides of the Aegean will follow. Analysis will conclude with a discussion of the EU's ongoing efforts to establish an ESDP, a fact which has substantially affected Turkey's EU-related priorities.

The Greek-Turkish *Rapprochement*

Relations between the two Aegean neighbours have certainly been improved by the concatenation of events that have taken place since early summer 1999. In the summer of 1999, the newly appointed Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou,¹ inaugurated a new approach of reconciliation towards Turkey by investing in an already good relationship with his Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem.² It should be noted, however, that this followed a previously difficult marked by the Imia crisis in January 1996, whereby Turkey for the first time contested Greek sovereignty over territory in the Aegean thus bringing the two countries very close to a military confrontation.³ Relations deteriorated further in early 1999 during the Ocalan affair in which Turkey accused Greece of being a 'terrorist nation', providing shelter to leaders of Turkish terrorist groups (the Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK).⁴ A Greek response to the unfounded allegations ensued along with a change to the leadership of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The moderate stance of the new Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, despite some domestic criticisms of being too keen to proceed to concessions of questionable value,⁵ facilitated the opening

of a window of opportunity aiming at fostering mutual understanding. This understanding could make decision-makers evaluate reality under a different light. Thus, in late June 1999, Papandreou, in response to suggestions by his Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem, proposed the development of a co-operative scheme with Turkey which would touch on 'low politics' such as the economy, trade, tourism, environment, organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal refugee smuggling. The initiation of bureaucratic preparations in this direction was enhanced, a few weeks later, by the earthquakes that hit both countries. The devastating experience that Turkey and Greece shared, in mid-August and early September respectively, brought the two countries closer. As Couloumbis and Veremis advocate, the earthquakes "have taught us [Greece and Turkey] that our peoples are capable of sharing in each other's grief."⁶

The natural disaster not only manifested the importance of co-operation in relief and assistance/rescue operations but more importantly also created a genuine atmosphere of sympathy and solidarity on both sides of the Aegean. As it has been noted, "neither side (media, politicians, intellectuals, *et. al*) questioned the sincerity and the motives of the other as rescue squads side by side worked feverishly to pull to safety persons trapped in the rubble of collapsed buildings."⁷ The prevailing perception of compassion, rather than suspicion, partly strengthened Papandreou's hand and bolstered his conciliatory approach. In this light, at the 54th Session of the UN's General Assembly on September 22, 1999 Papandreou acknowledged the importance of Greece's role in "lead[ing] the process of Turkey's accession into the EU".⁸ As will be elaborated below, the strategy that Athens started to pursue involved what Couloumbis describes as a shift from *conditional sanctions* to a strategy of *conditional rewards*.⁹

In addition to developments which directly touched the two countries, regional issues in 1999 had also created a perception of mutual interest between Greece and Turkey. The Kosovo crisis (spring) had fostered a new dynamic manifesting the salience of restraint and co-operation against instability in the region. Specifically, the interests of the two Aegean neighbours converged, perhaps for different reasons,¹⁰

around the need of rejecting fears, voiced mainly by Washington, that the Kosovo crisis would have a spill-over effect thus triggering a crisis among two NATO allies.¹¹ The circumspect approach Greece and Turkey adopted towards the crisis was aimed at remaining helpful but not actively involved thus not compounding the problem. This approach signaled the strategic preference of both countries towards rational and pragmatic behaviour in order to project themselves as reliable regional players.

Finally, the decision by the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 to accord Turkey EU candidate status, a decision which Greece did not oppose, marked the point at which a greater chance for further reconciliation between the two Aegean neighbours was revealed. The healthy climate was further cultivated through the signing of nine agreements by Papandreou and Cem in Ankara and Athens on January 20, and February 4, 2000, respectively. These agreements focused on the series of issues of 'low politics' on which both countries had been working since summer 1999 and which they had been deliberating since 1996.¹²

The first group of agreements, signed in Ankara, provided for co-operation schemes regarding, promotion and protection of investments, tourism, technology and science, environmental issues and co-operation against crime (terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration). The remaining four agreements were signed on 4 February in Athens providing for co-operation on economic matters, customs regulations, cultural issues, and maritime transport. It is worth noting that Papandreou's official visit to Ankara in January was the first visit made by a Greek foreign minister in 37 years.¹³ The positive public opinion of both countries was also reflected by Ismail Cem's visit to Athens.¹⁴ As Hikmet Cetin, a former Turkish foreign minister, rightly commented, "The content of these agreements is not so important... What's important is that people in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus now see that the two governments can deal with each other in a positive way."¹⁵

There should be no doubt that improvement in Greek Turkish relations was appreciated by the countries' fellow NATO allies as well as

by the foreign media. The improved climate certainly enhanced the image of both countries.¹⁶ Perhaps one of the most crucial indications of the improvement in the relations of the two countries was their close co-operation in May 2000 in NATO's multinational military exercise *Dynamic Mix 2000* (20 May-10 June) which took place in Greece, Italy and Turkey under the command of the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), James Ellis Jr. (USN). For the first time since 1972, in this NATO exercise, Turkish jets agreed to submit flight plans before entering the Greek FIR to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Larissa. This was a positive development insofar as Turkish military aircraft previously had hardly respected the Athens FIR.¹⁷ In addition, as commented by *Financial Times*, "The participation of Turkish marines in a multinational wargames 'invasion' of the Greek coast ... was dramatic evidence of the recent *rapprochement* between the two neighbouring countries."¹⁸

It should also be noted that although both countries have resorted to conciliatory rhetoric, in practice, Greece's unilateral reconciliation initiative to welcome Turkey as a candidate EU member in line with all other candidate members, was not followed by a similar gesture from Ankara. As Kupchan and Lesser have advocated, "Greeks justifiably feel that the ball is now in Turkey's court and that it is time for Ankara to reciprocate with a substantial gesture."¹⁹ As the authors argue, Ankara had at least three principal carrots to consider offering Athens: a pledge by the Turkish political leadership that it will work on withdrawing the *casus belli* resolution by the Turkish Parliament;²⁰ an agreement to reopen the Orthodox theological seminary in Halki, (Instabul), — of symbolic importance for Athens — and finally, a public statement by Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, making it clear that Turkey is committed to *rapprochement* and therefore will resolve its disputes with Greece through strictly diplomatic means.²¹ In reality, rhetorical utterances by the Turkish political leadership have hardly been accompanied by substantive reciprocity.²²

At times, various initiatives have been suggested by senior analysts aiming to promote further the reconciliation process between the two

countries. For example, it has been proposed that both countries should commit themselves to moving forward on the issue of delineation of the continental shelf through a joint appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ), following a brief and specified period of bilateral negotiations.²³ In addition, a thorn could be removed with regard to Cyprus, if the region of Varossia in Famagusta would become a 'safe area' under the protection of the United Nations (UN) and financial assistance by the EU while permitting a number of displaced Greek-Cypriots to return to their homes and properties and work in developing the area for the benefit of all Cypriots.²⁴ Although such initiatives would have proved conducive to further reconciliation, they require political will by both countries and certainly a departure from (a Turkish) reticence to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ and any gesture, however beneficial, regarding Cyprus.

Indeed, one could argue that although several 'low politics' initiatives have been launched (including also several co-operative programs involving NGOs and public opinion leaders) which aim to strengthen ties between the two countries, fundamental differences remain.²⁵ For this reason, there is a concern, shared not only by Greeks and Turks but also by foreign officials as to how long this improved atmosphere can survive and how much it can be promoted further. Insofar as Greece's stance to promote Turkey's EU vocation seems to be the initiative that culminated in the improvement of the relations of the two countries. An examination of the importance that both countries attribute to Turkey's European perspective is certainly important. This is not to argue that this parameter will exclusively define the level of resilience in their *rapprochement*. However, it provides a key guideline between fulfilled expectations and undertaken commitments.

Greek-Turkish Rationales at Helsinki and Beyond

For Athens, the understanding behind this shift in position, as was soon elaborated by Papandreou, was that it was in the interest of Greece for Turkey to be accorded the status of a candidate for mem-

bership to the European Union (EU). It could induce a set of new developments regarding Turkey's behaviour that could serve Greek interests in several respects, the most important of which would be the 'Europeanization' of Turkey. More specifically, the Helsinki decision created a framework within which Turkish-EU relations would be based. Turkey would be henceforth called upon to undertake the commitment to move towards a European vocation and would be urged to meet gradually its responsibilities at all levels.²⁶

At the international level and from a Greek perspective, largely based on the key premises of democratic theory,²⁷ as long as Turkey begins to commit to the practice of European principles and rules of action, it would likely abandon its diplomatic tactic of threatening war against its neighbours. Instead, Turkey would be encouraged to resort to less forceful modes of diplomacy. Indeed, in the Presidency Conclusions at Helsinki, the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter is particularly stressed while the candidate members are urged to abide by this provision in order to solve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues.²⁸

Perhaps the most crucial development that Helsinki 'offered' Athens is the reality that henceforth Turkey's behaviour would be systematically assessed by the EU authorities according to the principles of democracy, international law and good neighbourly relations. Essentially, it would be expected that by definition the EU would have the responsibility of monitoring Turkey's behaviour and progress, as this would be applied to all candidate members so as to abide by the Copenhagen criteria.²⁹ The latter meant that Turkey's political leadership would be obliged to demonstrate in practice that particular initiatives would be launched in the direction of reforming the institutions and behaviour of the country as to reflect: a) stability of democratic institutions, rule of law, protection of minorities; b) existence of a functioning market economy and the ability to be competitive in the single European market; c) ability to comply with the obligations of membership, including membership of the political, economic and monetary union. In addition, Turkey would be expected to demon-

trate that it is has set up the administrative machinery needed to ensure that European law can be effectively transposed into national law.³⁰

The process of having the EU monitoring and assessing Turkey's Europeanization has been formulated by the establishment of Turkey's Accession Partnership Accord (announced last November). Certainly, the Accord would identify, hopefully in detail, the elements that would define the 'road map' towards Turkey's Europeanisation and for this reason it is regarded as a key document defining the country's relations with the EU and its members.³¹

In addition, Turkey's EU candidacy will outline a new path within the country revealing also the need for substantial internal reforms. Turkish elites are aware that there are specific 'prerequisites such as full democratization, civilian control of the military, and the respect of human rights' to which Ankara needs to demonstrate its commitment.³² For Athens, a genuinely Europeanized Turkey will be a less serious security concern. This is the cardinal rationale behind Greece's stance in promoting Turkey's EU candidacy and European perspective in general. For Athens this is a strategic priority. Namely, to see Turkey in the process of economic and political Europeanization, which in turn will substantiate and multiply reliable practices of regional co-operation. Accordingly, prospects for the use of force would be eliminated. However, it is also acknowledged that this would be a long process. Until then, it seems more plausible that Athens will evaluate its future behaviour in a fashion conducive to Ankara's meeting European commitments by preferring small steps and initiatives towards further *rapprochement*. In the view of Papandreou, as expressed in January 2000,

"We want to move forward in the quickest way possible to solve all issues that divide us. But I would suggest that we proceed with the same caution and sensitivity that we have had in the last two months. Now we have to build on this again with caution, but also with new optimism and dynamism."³³

This new dynamic regarding Greek-Turkish relations as well as Turkey's inclusion in the group of EU candidate members creates a positive image for Turkey internationally. Turkey's candidate status has a twofold effect which interests Athens very much. First, as Larrabee notes, it "weakens the hand of Islamists" who advocate that since the country is unwelcome in Europe, its salvation lies in closer ties to the Islamic world.³⁴ Secondly, Turkey's EU candidate status strengthens its position and therefore facilitates more positive international behaviour. This rationale can be applied to Turkey's behaviour toward Cyprus's accession to the EU as well as toward resolving the Cyprus problem. These issues are more likely to be seen through the lenses of Turkey's inclusion in the group of candidate EU members.³⁵ Indeed, as Gordon has put it,

"Anyone who has followed these issues over the years [Greek-Turkish relations regarding Cyprus and the Aegean] knows how difficult they would be to resolve. But they should also know that, as long as Turkey feels ostracized by Europe and has a hostile relationship with Greece, these problems will never be resolved..."³⁶

Thus, the strategy of *conditional rewards* in all likelihood facilitates a better climate and a win-win relationship for both countries. This means that Greece by taking the initiative to promote the upgrading of Turkey's international status also benefits by the strong prospect of the latter's internal transformation.

Certainly, Greece's stance in Helsinki had additional benefits for Athens. It strengthened its position within the EU. It removed the tarnished image of Athens as the lone European voice against Turkey's accession to the EU. In fact, it is the EU bureaucracy that has now undertaken the responsibility to assess Turkey's progress according to the Copenhagen criteria thus transferring in a sense to the EU the hitherto practice of Athens to remind its EU partners of Turkey's behaviour domestically and especially in the region. Consequently, Athens can concentrate more effectively on its economic interests in light of its accession to the European Monetary Union (EMU) and

advocate its concerns within the framework of the general EU policy towards Turkey.

Although the entire Greek political élite (and public) share the same view regarding the salience of Turkey's European perspective, this sentiment is not consistently shared by all segments of the political élite in Turkey. For Ankara, the Helsinki decision was regarded as an important and long awaited move by Europe.³⁷ It might not be surprising that an Instanbul-based newspaper regarded the Helsinki decision, as "the most important event since the founding of [the Turkish] state."³⁸ However, other influential voices have painted a blurred picture as to the willingness of the country, and mainly its leadership, to assume fully the task of conforming to the principles and rules that come with a EU candidacy and, at a later stage, with accession.

As has been commented by Turkish analysts, the debate among the Turkish political elite regarding the real responsibilities that the country is called to undertake as an EU candidate, demonstrates the existence of two different patterns of thought which seem to create serious ambiguities regarding the process of Turkey's European vocation.³⁹ As Kahraman observes, "The EU is willing to further assist Turkey's economic reform and its adoption of the EU legislative program, but it is up to Turkey alone to improve its standards of democracy and human rights."⁴⁰ Regular reports by the European Commission in 1998 and 1999 on Turkey's progress towards accession, note the discrepancy between Ankara's aspiration to join the EU and its ability to meet the relevant obligations.⁴¹

One could argue that even after Helsinki and, on several occasions, even the Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, while arguing that his country would do whatever it takes for full EU membership, is highly skeptical of what he regards as the EU "plan to put [Turkey] under harsher pressure than before."⁴² Against this background, if the rationale of Turkey's political leadership behind its predilection to be an EU candidate is to be delineated, this twofold domestic perspective should not be ignored.

According to the pro-EU perspective, shared by a large portion of the business and the new middle-class élite, Turkey's EU candidacy will bring with it the fundamental changes necessary for society's welfare while the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions could bring some rationality to the political structures of the country including a more transparent administration.⁴³ A growing number of ordinary citizens find themselves in favour of real effort towards Turkey's joining the EU, in the belief that EU authorities and regulations would, in a way, monitor the effectiveness of what they regard as rather incompetent leadership which must not only provide for the people but also offer basic freedoms.⁴⁴ A similar sentiment is shared by minority groups, including the Kurds. It is reportedly argued that the latter "started to become very pro-European when they saw how much moral support they could get for their cause in Europe and how much good work some of the European Commission projects were doing for their people and their region."⁴⁵

On the other hand, the hard-line nationalist parties, such as the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which is a member of the coalition government with Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP), oppose any concessions to the EU while their approach calls for keeping the EU 'at arms' length'.⁴⁶ More ambivalent appears to be the position of the Turkish military, which holds a large stake in the Turkish economy and political structures. The power of the military has been so starkly intertwined with the Turkish political and economic establishment of the country as to make the Turkish Deputy Prime-Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, comment that "the military cannot be directly challenged; it can only be addressed with the hopes it will listen and take note."⁴⁷

The military establishment considers the expansion of Islamic institutions and secessionist movements as threats to the country's security and unity and secular orientation. Although the military appears to support the pro-European camp, at the same time it is quite intransigent *vis-à-vis* political and economic reforms that could unleash civic forces which would challenge its influence (in fact, its primacy, in the National Security Council).

From the military perspective, "Turkey should participate fully in the European Security and Defence Identity; to become integrated with and influential in Europe; and maintain its access to sophisticated weapons."⁴⁸ One could argue that while it remains uncertain which of the variables is of particular value in the perception of the military, the second objective finds itself quite at odds with the often expressed position (by the military and the conservatives) that the maintenance of strict laws on freedom of expression and political activity is essential in order to protect the unity of the state and its secular character.⁴⁹ In reality, this position puts the Ankara government at odds not only with its obligations to meet the Copenhagen criteria but, more importantly, to work seriously in this direction. As Yilmaz has reportedly argued, "Certain circles tend to believe Europe took its Helsinki (candidacy) decision with the aim of splitting Turkey. We must persuade these people the opposite is true."⁵⁰ Indeed, there exists a strong need for an effort by the government to convince the Turkish skeptics that the Helsinki decisions rather than challenging the unity of the Turkish state, call for freedoms and societal changes that promote the country's development and unity.⁵¹

One element that the military considers of profound importance refers to Turkey's role within the ESDP. Fears of Turkey's potential exclusion or even marginalization from the decisionmaking processes in a potential EU-led military operation have led Turkish officials to focus heavily on the evolving ESDP process. The Turkish advocacy and fervent interest regarding developments in the context of ESDP is indicative of the importance Ankara attributes to the military aspect of its European vocation. Certainly the discussion that follows does not exhaust the elements related to the ESDP or the gamut of issues surrounding the Turkish perspective. Rather, it aims to present Ankara's main arguments with regard to its role in European Security and delineate the importance to Turkish security and defense concerns.

Strategic Questions in the New European Security Architecture

The determination by the EU to develop a meaningful European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), as was announced in the Franco-German summit in St. Malo (December 1998) and substantiated later by consecutive EU Councils, has prompted various concerns and questions, especially from non EU members which have a stake in European security.⁵² In Cologne (June 1999), it was declared that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”⁵³ In Helsinki (December 1999), it was announced that the EU plans to develop an EU military force, 60,000-men strong, by 2003, with deployment capability of 60 days and the ability to remain in theatre for at least one year, in order to conduct military and non-military crisis management operations (peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, policing and conflict prevention), known as the ‘Petersberg tasks’.⁵⁴ In Lisbon (March 2000) and later in Feira (June 2000), it became evident that several initiatives were debated so as to help the EU establish both the institutions that would strengthen the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) and the mechanisms of collaboration among EU and non-EU members, as well as with NATO.

Strong concerns regarding the NATO relationship have been expressed by NATO members which are not EU members, including Turkey. The latter has voiced serious reservations regarding the mechanisms leading to a CESDP, especially after Helsinki and Feira. For several decades, one of Ankara’s key strategic objectives has been to sustain itself as a key player in European Security through its NATO membership. Ankara has henceforth detected that the role of NATO might not remain decisive at all times and especially in cases when an EU-led crisis management operation would be launched in the future without NATO participation and thus without decision making input by NATO members. Moreover, the gradual incorporation of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU structures is regarded

by Turkey as a very negative contingency insofar as Turkey loses its status as an observer, which was offering Ankara full information on all ongoing developments in WEU. As the Turkish ambassador to NATO, Onur Oymen, recently put it, "Nothing is done in the WEU without our knowledge. We are there, at the table, when issues are discussed... EU wants to reduce that role to mere consultations with non-EU members."⁵⁵

From the Turkish perspective, the role currently planned for non-EU members of NATO and candidate EU members is certainly less than the prerogatives Ankara enjoyed within the WEU. As proposed by the Feira Conclusions, this role would be reduced to mere consultation and especially "when the subject matter requires it."⁵⁶ Consequently, Ankara perceives its role as becoming largely marginalized by the inability of non-EU NATO members to participate in strategic planning for action in a potential EU-led operation. The offering of some space for participation only in military contingency planning at the phase of an ongoing operation (operational phase) appears no less exasperating for Ankara.

In addition, Turkey advocates that a potentially unsuccessful EU-led operation in the future that would ultimately threaten the security of the EU members (and thus some NATO members), would by default involve article 5 of the NATO Treaty calling all NATO members to provide for a common defence. This would involve Turkey, hypothetically, into a military operation in which it would have had no prior strategic input. Turkey's reaction regarding such unfavourable contingencies has been so fervent that it has threatened to even veto NATO assets being used in a future EU-led operation, if the ambiguity regarding its standing in the European security structures has not been fully contemplated and decided.

Turkish efforts to defend the country's position have taken a particular urgency recently in light of the Capability Commitment Conference that will take place in the context of the EU in November 2000. The conference is expected to elaborate the way in which EU and non-EU members will participate in future EU operations and decision making organs within the ESDP. One could argue that

Ankara's security concerns have understandable merit even if at certain points they have been largely exaggerated. However, the Helsinki decision to grant Turkey EU candidate status was not entirely unrelated to these Turkish fears of exclusion. In reality, Helsinki may prove to be a key element for Turkey inducing it to take into account, on the one hand, its military aspirations in the context of ESDP and, on the other hand, its obligations according to the Copenhagen criteria.

However, recent developments have indicated that Ankara is trying to project a hard-line stance towards its EU candidacy. Specifically, in the wake of the Nice Summit (December 2000) when Turkey became particularly outspoken against the Common European Foreign and Security Policy and the inability of non- EU members to participate in the decisionmaking process in the case of an EU-led peacekeeping mission. In fact, the EU has taken all steps possible not to discriminate against Turkey following an attitude similar to other EU candidates. In early February, the European Parliament approved Turkey's Framework Agreement with the European Union that provides the legal basis for the Accession Partnership document launched by the European Council last November. This evolution also means that some Euro 177 million from the EU budget would be transferred to Turkey on an annual basis in order to augment the country's harmonization process.⁵⁷ Financial assistance regarding the harmonization process would be launched as soon as Turkey follows up the process and presents its National Program, involving the steps and measures to which it will commit itself in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria.

Turkey's substantial delays to submit its National Program to the EU (pending mid-March) indicate its difficulty in attaining domestic consensus. Segments in the coalition government, especially the MHP, demand that certain aspects of the Framework Agreement be stripped out of the document, lest they harm the country's unity.⁵⁸ One could easily conclude, therefore, that if the government considers to undertake serious steps in the direction of meeting its immediate obligations as an EU candidate, it is highly likely to meet a full-scale political crisis that could even lead to the fall of the coalition government. The

EU has offered Turkey all leeway at its disposal in order to facilitate the country's reforms. It is Turkey's turn to demonstrate its willingness to move forward.

At this stage, Ankara presents a hard line position towards the EU, especially regarding its exclusion from decision-making in the context of ESDP. The military has been particularly sensitive to the prospect of losing its prerogatives and power. According to the military perspective, as long as the EU considers Turkey a strategically located country for EU interests, then the European Commission should accept the country's differing circumstances and particularities and thus make concessions that could encourage Ankara (read: the military) to move forward with membership in the EU.⁵⁹ Indeed, even for Turkish analysts, the perspective that is promoted by the military and to which the coalition government appears hesitant to challenge, indicates a very dangerous path for the country. As it has been argued, "Turkey, rather than reciprocating in kind, however, has remained not only unbudged, but added even further demands."⁶⁰ It is one thing for Turkey to work on fulfilling the criteria for full EU membership and to ask for help in the process — or perhaps some understanding from the EU. It is quite another to demand understanding and concessions without Turkey having first demonstrated substantive steps in the direction outlined by the Copenhagen criteria.

In addition, the domestic political crisis of the past few weeks between president Ahmet Necdet Sezer and prime minister Bulent Ecevit,⁶¹ has undermined confidence that a stable government will deal with the serious economic problems of the country. Admittedly this compounds European concerns regarding the ability of the Turkish government to proceed with the much needed economic and other reforms that could bring Ankara closer to meeting the Copenhagen criteria.⁶²

The pending decision from the Turkish political and military leadership to marry in practice the two aspects that define its relations with the EU — aspirations fulfilled *versus* obligations undertaken — would certainly determine the pattern of relations among Turkey, the EU and

Greece. In short, it would be difficult for the EU to ignore the voice of a Turkey that has taken serious steps in meeting the Copenhagen criteria. In effect, further Greek-Turkish *rapprochement* would be enhanced considerably by the level of commitment that Turkey would be willing to undertake in order to substantiate its European vocation. Indeed, Greece's eastern neighbour has great interest in doing so.

NOTES

1. The Ocalan affair led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, (and a number of other ministers).

2. Jurgen Reuter, **Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations: Developments Before and After the EU-Summit in Helsinki**, Occasional Paper 00.01, ELIAMEP: Athens, 2000, p. 1.

3. An insightful analysis on the issue is given by Thanos Veremis, 'Crisis in the Aegean', **Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1996, pp. 19-32. An enumeration of the issues bewildering Greek-Turkish relations since 1973 is given in <http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/bilateral/relations.htm>.

4. In 1 April 1999, the Turkish Representative to the UN, Murat Sungar, officially complained to the UN Human Rights Commission, that Greece deserves to be included to the group of terrorist states because it allegedly supported the PKK terrorist organization. See, '1999 Highlights of Relations with Europe', **Briefing**, 11 January 2000, Issue 1275, p. 34.

5. Interview of George Papandreou, "Why they Attack Me", **Ethnos**, 14 November 1999. (in Greek)

6. Theodore Couloumbis and Thanos Veremis, 'Greek Foreign Policy in a Post-Helsinki Setting', **Athens News**, 18 January 2000.

7. Theodore Couloumbis, 'Dealing with Greek-Turkish Tension', **Athens News**, 6 October 1999.

8. Statement by George Papandreou, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, **54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly**,

General Debate, New York, 22 September 1999, p. 8 (Distributed by the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations).

9. Couloumbis, 'Dealing with Greek-Turkish Tension', **op.cit.**

10. As it has been argued, fears of setting a precedence on the Kurdish issue partly played a role in Turkey favouring, as other NATO members, Yugoslavia's territorial integrity while supporting increased political autonomy — but not independence — for Kosovo. See, Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian Lesser and Stephen Larrabee, **The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan**, RAND, 2000, p. 18. For Athens, a challenge to the principle regarding the inviolability of borders would have created a serious precedent of instability in the region. See, www.mfa.gr/foreign/a3en.htm

11. In the view of President Clinton, the Kosovo crisis "will likely reignite the historical animosities, including those that can embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, even Turkey. These divisions still have the potential to make the next century a truly violent one for that part of the world...". See, **Press Conference** by the President, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 19 March 1999, (4:01 P.M. EST).

12. The resumption of the dialogue between the two countries on a number of bilateral issues (i.e. economic affairs, trade, etc) had been already part of a proposal by Prime Minister Simitis in April 1996 during his visit in Washington aiming to promote a 'step-by-step' policy stance 'as a means to better relations between the two countries.' See, www.mfa.gr/foreign/bilateral/relations.htm.

13. "Relations Warming Between Former Enemies Greece and Turkey", **CNN**, 21 January 2000, www.cnn.com/2000/world/01/21/greece.turkey/index.html.

14. "Ankara extends Warm Welcome to Papandreou", **Turkish Daily News**, 21 January 2000; Stephen Kinzer, "As Relations Warm, Greece and Turkey Sign Series of Accords", **The New York Times**, 21 January 2000.

15. Cited in Kinzer, **Ibid.**

16. Amberin Zaman, "New Agreements Enhance Greek-Turkish Ties"; **Washington Post**, 21 January 2000; Leyla Boulton, "Greece-Turkey: Entente Between Old Foes Starts Small", **Financial Times**, 20 January 2000.

17. Leonidas Blaveris, "Dynamic Mix 2000", **Strategy**, June 2000, (in Greek).

18. Leyla Boulton and Kerin Hope, "Greece and Turkey Edge Closer", **Financial Times**, 5 June 2000.

19. Harles A. Kupchan and Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey Can Strengthen its Ties With Greece", **International Herald Tribune**, 11 February 2000.

20. To be applied if Greece were to decide to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles.

21. **Ibid.**

22. This is the point at which Greek senior analysts base their criticism to the Greek tactics which should have been conciliatory yet more demanding thus avoiding to allow Ankara to get substantial gains without the latter offering anything in return. See Yiannis Valinakis, "The Helsinki Decisions and EU-Turkey Relations" in T.Couloumbis and T. Dokos eds, **Yearbook 2000. Greek-Turkish Relations 1999-2000**, ELIAMEP, Athens, 2000, p. 95 (in Greek).

23. Theodore Couloumbis, "Greek-Turkish Relations: Back to the Future", **Kathimerini**, 1 October 2000.

24. **Ibid.**

25. For insightful analysis for the deterioration of the Greek-Turkish relations after the end of the Cold War see, Van Coufoudakis, "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. Implications of the American Response", **Hellenic Studies**, Vol.4, No.2, 1996, pp. 167-187.

26. Interview of George Papandreou in the daily, "Only with Rewards Turkey in Europe", **Ta Nea**, 27 September 1999. (in Greek)

27. The assumption that democratic states do not go to war is based on the premise that economic interests and interdependence appear as strong incentives for states to avoid militant behaviour. Literature on this subject is quite extensive. Indicative works include: Francis Fukuyama, **The End of History and the Last Man**, (New York: Free Press, 1992); John G. Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International Cooperation", **American Political Science Review**, Vol. 66, pp. 349-367; Bruce Russett, **Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World**, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); G. John Ikenberry, "Why Export Democracy?" **The Washington Quarterly**, Vol. 22, No.2, Spring 1999, pp 56-65.

28. Article 4, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999. On this issue, and with particular reference to the Aegean disputes, senior Greek experts have argued that in reality the reference to the UN Charter, rather than the respect of international law and treaties, as it was mentioned in previous EU documents, constitutes a shift that favours a commitment to negotiations rather than a respect to the legal *status quo*, as it is determined by existing international treaties. See, Yiannis Valinakis, "The Helsinki Decisions and EU-Turkey Relations" **op. cit.**, p. 99.

29. See, The Copenhagen European Council and the 'Copenhagen Criteria', 8 June 1993, www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/wip/copennhagen.htm.

30. **Ibid.**

31. Ankara aims the document not to have any references to relations with Greece, the Aegean neighbours and the Cyprus problem and has pressured for a particular wording that would avoid any references to Kurdish minorities. On the other hand, EU officials have made clear that in the Accord the requirement for Turkey to abolish the death penalty would appear as a priority. See, Selcuk Gultasli, "Ankara

Wants EU Accession Partnership Accord to be Forward Looking”, **Turkish Daily News**, 15 September 2000; Nazlan Ertan, “Turkey Bargains for Membership Negotiations with the EU”, **Briefing**, Issue 1315, 23 October 2000, pp.14-15.

32. “Compass set on European Norms”, **Briefing**, Issue 1275, 11 January 2000, p. 33.

33. Cited in Kinzer, “As Relations Warm,” **op.cit.**,

34. F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges”, in Z. Khalilzad et al, **op.cit.**, p. 21.

35. With regard to Cyprus, the Helsinki decisions provided that a prior political settlement does not constitute a precondition for Cyprus accession to the EU, while at that time, the Council will take account all relevant factors. Although the latter notice might raise potential obstacles in the future, as some analysts have argued, the general position of the EU towards Cyprus accession was considered a positive element regarding Cyprus’ accession to the EU. For the questions raised on this issue see Valinakis, **op.cit.**

36. Philip H. Gordon, “Post-Helsinki: Turkey, Greece, and the European Union”, **The Strategic Regional Report**, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 16.

37. Sevilay Elgun Kahraman, “Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement”, **Turkish Studies**, Vol. 1, No.1, Spring 2000, pp. 1-20.

38. Cited in Stephen Kinzer, “Turks Debate Human Rights and Links With Europe”, **The New York Times**, 23 March 2000.

39. For a particularly informative account of this debate see, “Mutual Understanding’, or ‘Mutual Avoidance’ of Sticky Issues?... or the Tale of Haider, Hizbullah, and Human Rights”, **Briefing**, Issue 1279, 7 February 2000, pp. 13-17.

40. Sevilay Elgun Kahraman, “Rethinking Turkey-European Union...”, **op.cit.**, p. 13.

41. "Enlarging the EU: Regular Report from the Commission on Progress Towards Accession: Turkey," COM (98) 700 Final, 4 November 1998; and '1999 Annual Report From the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession', COM (99), 13 October 1999, p. 15.

42. Kemal Ilter, "Prime Minister Hosts EU Ambassadors", **Turkish Daily News**, 23 March 2000. Prime Minister Ecevit is quoted in Stephen Kinzer, "Turks Debate Human Rights ..." **op. cit.**

43. Certainly, this does not imply that some wealthy businessmen are not among the leading figures in Islamic politics and institutions.

44. "Mutual Understanding..." **op.cit.**, pp.14-15.

45. **Ibid.**

46. Certainly, differences among the two coalition parties are evident as it was the case regarding the abolition of the death penalty. For example, when Ecevit advocated that the latter strains Turkey's relations with the EU and should be removed, MHP's leader Devlet Bahçeli pressed both Ecevit and Yılmaz to declare the primacy of the Turkish interests on this issue. **Ibid.**, p. 17; and Ian Lesser, 'Changes on the Turkish Domestic Scene and their Foreign Policy Implications', in Z. Khalilzad et al, **The Future of Turkish-Western Relations...**, **op.cit.**, p. 9.

47. "Turkey Makes some Gestures to Europe, Comes up With a Good Plan, and Scores a Brilliant Victory it Probably isn't Aware of as Yet", **Briefing**, Issue 1286, 3 April 2000, p. 12.

48. **Ibid.**

49. Reuters, "Turkish Army Wary over European Future", CNN, 12 September 2000. <http://www.cnn.com/2000/world/europe/09/12/austria.sanctions.reut/index.html>.

50. Quoted in **Ibid.**

51. **Ibid.**

52. For indicative literature on this issue see, Antonio Missiroli, **CFSP, Defence and Flexibility**, Challot Papers, No. 38, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, February 2000; Francois Heisbourg, **European Defence: Making it Work**, Challot Papers, No. 42, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, September 2000; Francois Heisbourg, "European Defence Takes a Leap Forward", *NATO Review*, Vol. 48, No.1, Summer 2000, pp. 8-11; and Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: 'Separable but not Separate'," *NATO Review*, Vol. 48, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 12-15.

53. Annex D, article1, European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Presidency Conclusions: Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999.

54. Annex E, article 28, II. Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999.

55 Quoted in Nazlan Ertan, "Ankara Uneasy with EU's Defense Plans", **Briefing**, Issue 1313, 9 October 2000, p. 15.

56. For the Feira provisions see, Annex I, part II: C.

57. See, "Is ball in Turkey's court, only to be snatched by MHP?", **Briefing**, Issue 1331, 19 February 2001, p. 14.

58. The MHP insists *inter alia* that cultural and language rights be excluded from the programme, that the death penalty should be lifted 'conditionally' while Turkey should proceed slowly towards fulfilling the two United Nations agreements on Human Rights it signed last November. See, **Ibid.**

59. The military perspective is presented in "EU Debate Flares Again, Military Expresses its 'fears'," **Briefing**, Issue 1326, 15 January 2001, pp. 11-13.

60. **Ibid.**, p. 12.

61. President Sezer's initiative to urge Bulent Ecevit to launch a more firm stance against corruption in government caused a serious political crisis as long as publicity over the issue unveiled the disparity between the two leaders. It must be noted however that public appeal to president Sezer's stance is rising while a growing business sector appear to support the president's cause. See "Sezer's Public Stock Rises Once More", **Briefing**, Issue 1332, 26 February 2001, p. 11.

62. See, Simon Tisdall, "Political Fallout over Reform Threatens to Bury Chances of Joining the EU", *The Guardian*, 23 February 2001.

Towards an Endgame for the Cyprus Issue? Cyprus in the Aftermath of the Helsinki European Council

Aristotle Tziampiris*

RÉSUMÉ

Chypre est au premier plan de la politique internationale depuis un demi siècle. Bien que le cours des événements n'ait pas été positif dans l'ensemble pour le côté grec, les relations de Chypre avec l'Union européenne ont eu un succès plus considérable. Ces relations ont atteint un nouveau sommet en décembre 1999 à la réunion du Conseil européen d'Helsinki. Cet article analyse la signification potentielle, les problèmes possibles et les récents développements reliés aux décisions d'Helsinki.

Il a été soutenu que pour la première fois depuis 1974, le temps serait du côté grec. On peut attribuer cette situation au fait qu'en n'insistant pas à la solution préalable de son problème politique Helsinki garantit d'une façon l'adhésion éventuelle de Chypre à l'Union européenne.

ABSTRACT

Cyprus has been on the forefront of international politics for almost half a century. Although overall the course of developments has not been positive for the Greek side, Cyprus' relations with the European Union have been considerably more successful. These relations reached a new plateau at the December 1999 Helsinki meeting of the European Council. This article analyzes the potential significance, possible problems and recent developments linked to the Helsinki decisions.

It is argued that for the first time since 1974, time is on the Greek side. This situation due is to the fact that Helsinki almost guarantees Cyprus' eventual EU membership by not insisting on the prior solution of its political problem.

The European extension of the Cyprus problem is undoubtedly the most complex and intricate, not least because it supplies the only possible ground for a solution.

Christopher Hitchens.¹

A. Cyprus and the European Union

Cyprus has been on the forefront of international relations for almost half a century, often occupying the attention and efforts of

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some of the world's most powerful states and politicians.² Overall, the course of developments has not been positive for the Greek side.³ Originally pursuing *enosis* (union) with Greece, independence had to be accepted, followed by the occupation of 37% of the island by Turkish forces. One area though, in which Greek actions have been met with considerable success, is that of Cyprus' relations with the European Union. These relations reached a new plateau at the December 1999 Helsinki meeting of the European Council, and this may prove the catalyst for the resolution of the Cyprus Issue. It will be the purpose of this essay to analyze the potential significance, possible problems and recent developments that are linked to the Helsinki decisions.

The official relations between the then European Economic Community (EEC) and Cyprus began in December 1972, with the signing of an Association Agreement. Given the traumatic and momentous events that took place in 1974, its full implementation was considerably delayed. The second stage of the Association Agreement was eventually signed in October 1987, despite the still unresolved political problem of the island.⁴ This was correctly viewed by the Cyprus government as a positive development, and in a sense it constituted a precursor of the Helsinki conclusions.

The application for accession was submitted on 4 July 1990, and represented a turning point in the Cyprus Issue. For at least three decades, the Greek side had pursued a strategy that had primarily relied upon the United Nations (UN). The application to join the Community introduced a major new actor, as well as a source of hope for the eventual ending of the island's political problem.

The responses of Turkey and of the self-styled 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' were entirely negative, and have essentially remained unaltered until today.⁵ Both emphasized that membership was not possible prior to Turkey's own Community accession and to the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash even went a step further, suggesting that his breakaway republic would be annexed by Turkey.⁶

The election of Glafkos Clerides as President of Cyprus on 14 February 1993 proved a positive development for his country's relations with the EU.⁷ Clerides viewed the prospect of Union membership as a potential catalyst: the process of accession would wield pressure on the Turkish side, allow for a partial alternative to the seemingly endless UN-sponsored negotiations, and provide Cyprus with new possibilities, challenges, and guarantees.⁸

However, Clerides soon met with disappointment. On 30 June 1993, the Commission submitted its opinion (*avis*) concerning Cyprus' application for membership.⁹ Using diplomatic and careful language, it concluded that:

"The Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership and that *as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer*, the Community is ready to start the process with Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession".¹⁰

In other words, the Commission offered a 'mixed' recommendation, acknowledging the possibility of accession, but linking such an event to the solution of the island's political situation. In doing so, it made evident the fundamental problem that was to be overcome at Helsinki.

The conclusions of the Council of Ministers of 6 March 1995 revitalized Cyprus' application process, "reaffirm[ing] the suitability of Cyprus for accession to the European Union and confirm[ing] the European Union's will to incorporate Cyprus in the next stage of its enlargement."¹¹ This major breakthrough followed Greece's decision not to veto the signing of a Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU. Thus, a principle that was also applied at Helsinki seems to have been informally established: Greek cooperation and positive contribution on Turkey's relations with the EU was 'rewarded' with progress in the accession process of Cyprus.

B. The Helsinki Conclusions

The meeting of the European Council took place at Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999, and reached a series of conclusions on various issues.¹² Of particular importance were the decisions that directly affected Greece and Turkey.¹³ More specifically, Greece abandoned its long-standing veto, allowing Turkey to become a candidate for membership in the EU. A controversial and risky move, it has the potential of altering the dynamics of Greek-Turkish relations by 'Europeanizing' them. In the words of Greece's Foreign Minister George Papandreou:

"With the Helsinki decision, Turkey enters into a framework of supervision and obligations and will be audited by the European Union. It is the European Union itself that from now on requests meaningful and in-depth progress with Turkey. It is also the European Union that is bound to supervise and audit this course."¹⁴

As a 'reward' to Greece for agreeing to lift the veto, it was also decided that if the dispute over the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf was not resolved through negotiations by 2004, Turkey would accept arbitration by the International Court of Justice (it is widely believed by Greeks that their country's legal case on this issue is particularly strong).¹⁵

An ever more significant 'reward' though, concerned Cyprus' relationship with the European Union. Thus, The European Council note[d] with satisfaction the substantive work undertaken and progress which has been achieved in accession negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

(a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.

(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. *If no set-*

*tlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.*¹⁶

These decisions were received favorably by the governments in Athens and Nicosia. Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis declared his 'complete satisfaction.'¹⁷ In a revealing statement, he also asserted the primacy of the Greek side's European approach: "*The central point of our strategy is the accession process of Cyprus. I leave aside the solving of the Cyprus Problem. We must ensure Cyprus' accession. The path of solving the Cyprus Problem is parallel.*"¹⁸

Cyprus' Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides clearly welcomed the Helsinki conclusions,¹⁹ while President Clerides expressed his satisfaction.²⁰ He added that:

"Despite the fact that [the Helsinki Summit] provides that the solution of the Cyprus problem is not a precondition to the accession of Cyprus to the EU, I wish to emphasize that I will spare no effort to find an agreed, just, viable and workable solution compatible with the *acquis communautaire* and the code of human rights. The invitation to the Turkish Cypriot community to participate in the delegation negotiating Cyprus accession to the EU is still open."²¹

On the other side, Turkey's Prime Minister expressed his intense disapproval:

"We consider that it is extremely objectionable to create the impression that the accession process of the Greek Cypriot administration to the EU...would be pursued even if the talks on the Cyprus issue do not yield a result. Turkey's position on this matter is well-known. This position will remain unchanged²²...the fact that there are two separate states on the island cannot be changed in any way...we can't accept any preconditions on Cyprus and Greece."²³

Denktash, condemned and attacked what had taken place at Helsinki:

“Without a comprehensive settlement, we find it wrong, unjust and unacceptable to keep the EU membership door open to the Greek Cypriot side under the name of Cyprus.

We continue to strongly oppose, on the basis of law and international agreement, the process conducted by the EU with the Greek Cypriot side, under the title of “Cyprus,” which is one of the two parties in the island, in contravention of all norms of justice and realities.”²⁴

The explanation for these furious reactions requires a discussion of the significance and implications of the Helsinki conclusions, to which we will turn next.

C. The Significance of the Helsinki Conclusions

The decisions reached at Helsinki have significant consequences for both the Greek and Turkish sides, as well as the EU. For Cyprus, Helsinki represents a major breakthrough, since by disassociating its accession to the EU with the solution of its political problem, the island is almost guaranteed eventual membership. Helsinki also reduces — but does not eliminate — Turkey’s military pressure on the island. It now becomes more difficult for any serious military action to be undertaken by the EU-candidate Turkey. Also, threats that the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus might be annexed lose potency and credibility. It is not in the interest of Turkey to annex, since such a course of action would be tantamount to an abandonment of its efforts to join the European Union.

Furthermore, it should be clarified that despite any rhetorical statements, Helsinki nullifies in practice Turkey’s previous position that Cyprus could not join the Union prior to its own accession. Finally, by making membership prospects probable in the foreseeable future, Helsinki should provide the impetus and justification for significant and ultimately beneficial economic reforms. It therefore seems that “the [immediate] priority will be to reduce fiscal deficit through raising revenues, but the question of reducing growth in spending also has to be addressed.”²⁵

For Greece, Helsinki effectively alters its strategy over Cyprus, since this issue is now Europeanized to a considerable degree. Greece can thus now rely upon the EU to evaluate, condemn and possibly deter military actions in the island. Turkish moves considered unacceptable to the EU may prove detrimental to the country's accession.

At another level, it should be explained that the Helsinki conclusions reflect once again the close interrelation between Greece's prevailing aspirations and beliefs, and the way it deals with Cyprus. Greece now "seeks to escape from being a Balkan country dependent on America, and to become a respected member of the [EU]."²⁶ Hence, the irredentism and nationalism of previous decades has now been replaced by a Cyprus strategy that is more European, more low key, and less confrontational.

Concerning the Turkish side, the consequences of Helsinki regarding Cyprus are negative overall. Although Turkey's official position on the island's fate has remained unaltered, the conclusions of the European Council have fatally wounded its Cyprus strategy. According to Professor Thanos Veremis:

"Turkey considered Cyprus as conquered booty since 1974, and did not intend to allow any novelty that would put in doubt her control, not only over the occupied north but also in the independent south. The Turks were disposed to be engaged in the endless pantomime of bi-communal talks on the basis of the Makarios-Denktaş agreements for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, as long as nothing threatened the inertia of occupation. Their long-term goal had been the consolidation of the regime that existed on the ground, until they eventually succeeded in getting the Turkish-Cypriot [self-declared republic] recognized. Cyprus' application for EU membership [especially after Helsinki] radically altered these circumstances."²⁷

Given the fact that Turkey also desires EU membership, it becomes extremely difficult to effectively attempt to delay or cancel Cyprus' eventual accession.

For Denktaş, Helsinki means that "it will be more difficult...to justify his boycott of accession talks being conducted by the Greek

Cypriots on behalf of the whole island.”²⁸ Even more importantly, the breakaway republic is now faced with the real possibility of Cyprus joining the EU, while itself remains isolated and non-recognized. Confronted with an EU-member Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriots would have to compromise their demands and positions, in order to reach an agreement with the Greek-Cypriot side — for at that point only such an agreement with Cyprus would allow them to join the Union.

Also, if only Cyprus joins, according to Turkish Cypriot jurist Necati Munir Ertekin

“...EU rules would...mean that the Turkish Cypriots would lose [through the European Court] any protection that might negotiate against being swamped in Northern Cyprus by Greek Cypriots.”²⁹

Finally, as regards the Union, Helsinki means that the EU will expand to include a country located in a crucial and strategically important part of the East Mediterranean, close to Middle Eastern oil routes and supply centers.³⁰ The security implications may prove of significance, especially if some of the more ambitious plans for the creation of an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) materialize. It should be noted that Cyprus’ Ministry of Defense is currently drafting plans on how to provide extensive assistance in the implementation of CFSP decisions, and particularly to the planned rapid-reaction force that is to consist of some 50-60,000 military personnel.³¹

Also, the EU’s prestige will be greatly enhanced in the areas of diplomacy and foreign policy, if Cyprus’ accession becomes a catalyst for resolving the island’s political problem. Should this be the case, the Union will have succeeded on an issue which has defeated the better efforts of the United Nations, as well as those of numerous politicians.

Based on all of the above, it becomes evident that Helsinki constitutes a positive development for Cyprus and the EU, a considerable challenge and opportunity for Greece, and a loss of influence and means of persuasion for the Turkish side as regards Cyprus. Thanks to Helsinki, it can be concluded that for perhaps the first time since 1974, time is probably on the Greek side.

D. Problematic Aspects of the Helsinki Conclusions

Casting some doubt upon the favorable implications of Helsinki for Cyprus, is the fact that the conclusions actually state that prior to the decision endorsing accession, "the Council will take account of all relevant factors." An indication of how the Turkish side might interpret this phrase is given by a paper on this topic produced by Andrew Mango and posted on Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site.³² The relevant factors are considered to the existing situation on the island, the high probability that ethnic conflicts lead to the seemingly permanent fragmentation of previously multi-ethnic states, and that Turkish-Cypriots simply do not support, at least for now, a federal system of government for Cyprus. Further relevant factors are the non-existence of a Cypriot nation, and that no bloodshed has taken place in Cyprus since 1974.³³ The end result of this analysis is a plea for the substantial delay in Cyprus' accession, and in effect the negation of the Helsinki conclusions. However, Mango's arguments lack balance, objectivity and relevance to such a degree that it is highly unlikely that they can produce their intended results.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the so-called relevant factors clause is intentionally ambiguous and could thus be interpreted at the appropriate moment in a variety of ways. For example, it has been argued that it could be construed to mean that:

"If the Greek-Cypriot side is considered not to have been sufficiently cooperative on the political problem of the island... then the disassociation of the political issue from accession, might be considered not in effect."³⁴

If approached realistically and in good-will, the 'relevant factors' will probably refer to the situation existing on the island prior to accession (level of tensions, possibility of hostilities, etc.), as well as to the quality and intensity of the efforts that will have taken place by the parties concerned.³⁵ In this sense, it could perhaps delay Cyprus' accession, but only if the Greek side is overwhelmingly viewed as responsible for blocking and sabotaging all attempts of solving the Cyprus Problem. Given the recent diplomatic record and Greece's ability to block the

accession of other states to the EU, such a scenario, although certainly not impossible, must be judged somewhat unlikely.

Another recent negative development for Cyprus is related to the 16 December 1999 resolution that was submitted and subsequently approved by the Dutch Parliament. It noted that:

“In Cyprus peace between the Greek and Turkish communities is maintained only because of the presence of the UN’s peacekeeping force.

[The Parliament thus] believes that it is undesirable for the stability of the EU the accession of a country as a member state where a peace-keeping force is stationed and continues its activities.”³⁶

This resolution does not amount to an annulment of the Helsinki conclusions. However, it does suggest ways in which Cyprus’ accession can be complicated and perhaps even delayed.

Finally, the post-Helsinki celebrations concerning Cyprus’ eventual accession must be tempered by the fact that the Union’s enlargement is being postponed. It seems increasingly likely that new members will not be accepted until 2005 or 2006, allowing for a sufficiently large time-frame for negotiations, and possibly various other developments that could adversely affect the resolution of the Cyprus Issue.³⁷

E. After Helsinki

The Helsinki conclusions acknowledged the series of ‘proximity’ talks that began on 4 December 1999 under the auspices of the UN between Clerides and Denktash.³⁸ They represented a very serious effort on behalf of the UN.³⁹ However, because Helsinki was probably overall positive for Cyprus, (which as previously explained has time on its side now), there ensued a rise in Turkish aggressive actions, rhetoric and intransigence. The result has been the gradual undermining and eventual suspension of the indirect talks.

On the eve of the of the third round that was to begin on 5 July in Geneva, Turkish troops moved some 300 meters into the Strovilia village near Famagusta, setting a check-point and occupying the place.⁴⁰ The Strovilia area represents a gray zone between the self-declared 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' and the sovereign territory belonging to the nearby British military base. Its eight inhabitants enjoyed a special status, not being under the direct and total jurisdiction of the government of Cyprus. However, the Turkish military move changed this situation, and perhaps more importantly, upset the territorial *status quo* for the first time since 1974.⁴¹

The Presidency of the EU (held by France) condemned the Strovilia episode, judging it "a bad measure at a bad time" and insisting that "at Strovilia the *status quo* must return."⁴² UN Secretary General Kofi Annan incorporated a similar message in a letter that he eventually sent to the Security Council.⁴³ Interestingly enough, however, the reaction of the Greek government was rather measured and restrained, despite the clear and unambiguous Turkish provocation.⁴⁴ This reaction stemmed from a decision that the raising of tensions and rhetoric would undermine the 'proximity' talks and ultimately support Denktash's argument that it was impossible for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to co-exist peacefully. Furthermore, Cyprus' economy and accession prospects would also be damaged by an extreme Greek reaction.⁴⁵

Given the Strovilia-related reactions, some have suggested that Athens did not remain fully committed to helping Nicosia. Characteristically, the former President of Cyprus and currently Speaker of Parliament, Spyros Kyprianou, claimed in an interview that Cyprus was being sacrificed by Greece in the pursuit of better relations with Turkey, under American guidance.⁴⁶ However, such concerns seem to ultimately be misplaced. What experienced politicians like Kyprianou are probably sensing, is that Greece has Europeanized its relations with Turkey, as well as to an extent its strategy for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. Greece is not abandoning Cyprus, but also trying to help it through the EU — something that requires an appreciation of the existence of certain constraints to actions and rhetoric that were not necessarily present during previous years, when a more 'independent' and unilateral strategy was being pursued.

After the Strovilia episode, an article by Turkey's Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in the Italian newspaper *La Stampa* added insult to injury, since it was perceived by the Greeks as further (albeit rhetorical) provocation. Its tone was unfriendly, and the references to the existence of various minorities in Greece came as an unwelcome surprise.⁴⁷ Concerning the substance of Cem's remarks on Cyprus, they revealed that Turkey's position remained firm and unaltered: in favor of a loose confederation and opposed to Cyprus' accession. However, despite the harsh language, this ought not to have come as a complete surprise to the Greek side, given the Turkish post-Helsinki statements that were previously presented.

Meanwhile, the third round of 'proximity' talks ended disappointingly for Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriots concluded that the UN Secretary-General's representative, Alvaro de Soto, was rather unsympathetic to their concerns and willing to discuss a series of issues and possibilities deemed totally unacceptable. Most importantly, it appears that de Soto also entertained the possibility of discussing a solution on the basis of confederation — something that is anathema to the Government of Cyprus.⁴⁸ Of course, it must be stressed that adding this option on the agenda does not mean that is being officially endorsed by the UN. Furthermore, there is no guarantee of any final agreement on confederation. Nevertheless, this development was indicative of the fact that the negotiations were not going particularly well for Clerides.

The fourth round of 'proximity' talks began on 12 September 2000. Cyprus' President felt that his negotiating power was being undermined by Simitis' public insistence that negotiations ought to be pursued by Cyprus regardless of whether many of Denktash's positions were deemed unacceptable.⁴⁹ A further blow came from Kofi Annan who stated the following:

"...I believe that the time has come to move forward. From the [proximity] talks I have noticed that both parties share the common desire to succeed through negotiations, *in which each party represents its own side and no other, as politically equal*, [in achieving] a compre-

hensive settlement that should enshrine a new partnership on which to build a better future in peace, security and prosperity on a united island. In this spirit...I reached the conclusion that *the equal status of the parties in a united Cyprus* must and should be recognized explicitly in the comprehensive settlement, which will embody the results of the detailed negotiations required to translate this concept into clear and practical provisions.”⁵⁰

This was considered to be perilously close to the UN recognizing the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ or espousing a position in favour of an eventual settlement on the basis of confederation. Particularly alarming was also the fact that Annan made no reference to any UN Security Council resolutions. A furious Clerides threatened to abstain from further talks, and Greek diplomacy was energized in an attempt to secure a favourable clarification of the General-Secretary’s statement. Eventually, some verbal explanations were offered by Annan during a long private meeting with Clerides, and were judged to be sufficient.⁵¹ However the mood had soured and the round ended in failure with some (temporary) recriminations amongst the Greek side.⁵²

The fifth round of ‘proximity’ talks demonstrated the hardening of the Turkish side on the Cyprus Issue. More specifically, with the full backing of Turkey, Denktash decided to walk out, declaring that the whole process was merely a “waste of time.”⁵³ The Turkish-Cypriot leader claimed that there should have been no agenda and no references to UN Security Council resolutions, and condemned the “UN’s attitude [that] accepted the Greek-Cypriot government as Cyprus’ only legal government.”⁵⁴

Perhaps though, the Turkish resolve to abandon the UN-sponsored negotiations represented (at least to some extent), a response to the ‘Turkish Accession Partnership’ document. It was prepared by the EU Commission and linked Turkey’s accession with the resolution of the Cyprus Issue by recommending that Turkey:

Support strongly in the context of the political dialogue the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to a successful conclusion.⁵⁵

The Turkish government was displeased with this statement, and declared that "Turkey...has always kept the Cyprus issue separate from EU candidacy [sic]." ⁵⁶ Denktash's subsequent stance at the UN probably provided an apt illustration of this attitude.

Furthermore, it emerged in late November 2000 that the Turkish government was discussing the scenario of integrating the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' as the country's 82nd province. Apparently the planning efforts (presented at a Cabinet meeting) were at an advanced stage and involved the coordination of several Ministries. ⁵⁷ However, it must be noted that only 8% of Turkish-Cypriots appear to be in favor of integration with Turkey. ⁵⁸

It should also be stressed that preparing for a specific possibility is not tantamount to its adoption or implementation. Nevertheless, in conjunction with Denktash's position (he has so-far resisted pressure to attend the sixth round of 'proximity' talks), it can be concluded that the Turkish side has pursued a tough diplomatic stance, probably in an attempt to maximize concessions in most fronts prior to Cyprus' likely EU accession.

Even if the 'proximity' talks do not resume, some form of further negotiations will eventually take place. It can also be expected that immense pressure will be exercised on the Cypriot government to make substantial concessions. However, a 'cornered' Cyprus on the eve of accession does not necessarily have to accept a diplomatically humiliating situation. It might decide to accept membership, end attempts for a negotiated settlement, and forego its claims over the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,' while probably also withholding its recognition. In such a scenario, Cyprus accepts permanent partition, enters the EU, and abandons the breakaway republic with areas like Strovilia under its control, but with no prospects of accession, politically and economically weak. Of course, such a scenario is not very probable, and unlike the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, does not represent the best possible solution for the Greek-Cypriots. Nevertheless, it can be contemplated and perhaps implemented, because of the near-certain membership decided at Helsinki.

Helsinki does not represent the end of the Cyprus Issue. As accession nears, pressure will continue to increase by the Turkish side in order to get the best possible deal prior to Cyprus joining the Union. The possible conclusion of the UN-sponsored 'proximity' talks, Greek-Turkish relations and Turkey's relationship with the EU, as well as domestic politics in all of the states involved, will certainly influence developments. The fact remains, though, that the Helsinki conclusions have permanently altered the dynamics of the diplomacy surrounding Cyprus. Accession may indeed prove the catalyst for a solution, even if this takes place literally at the 'eleventh hour.' In this sense, Helsinki probably represents the beginning of the end of the Cyprus Issue.

NOTES

1. Hitchens Christopher, **Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger**, (Verso, London, 1998), p. x.
2. For some of the more recent and important studies that deal in considerable detail with the history and diplomatic record of the Cyprus Issue, see Hatzivasiliou Evanthis, **Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-1958**, (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1997); Holland Robert, **Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959**, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998); O'Malley Brendan and Craig Ian, **The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion**, (I. B. Tauris, London 1999); Rizas Sotiris, **Union, Division, Independence: The United States and Great Britain in Search of a Solution to the Cyprus Problem 1963-1967**, (Vivliorama, Athens, 2000) [in Greek]; and Stefanidis Yiannis, **Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem**, (C. Hurst and Co, London, 1999). It should also be mentioned that the final volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs includes his previously promised and much anticipated account on Cyprus. See Kissinger Henry, *Years of Renewal*, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1999), pp. 192-239.
3. See Couloumbis Theodoros, **The Cyprus Issue: Mistakes, Lessons and Prospects**, (I. Sideris, Athens, 1996) [in Greek].

4. See Theophanous Andreas, "The European Union and the Cyprus Issue," in Yalouridis Christos and Tsakonas Petros eds., **Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War**, (I. Sideris, Athens, 1999), pp. 396-7 [in Greek].
5. The so-called 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' was unilaterally declared in 1983. It has only been recognized by North Korea and Turkey, the latter having some 30,000 troops stationed there.
6. See Hitchens, *op. cit.*, p. xi.
7. Clerides was re-elected in 1998.
8. See Theophanous Andreas, **Cyprus in the European Union and the New International Environment: Challenges and Prospects**, (I. Sideris, Athens, 2000), p. 169 [in Greek]. A connection between accession to the EU and a solution to the Cyprus Issue was not always evident. For example, it is noteworthy that in the seminal study of Greek-Turkish relations by Ambassador Theodoropoulos, the chapter on Cyprus includes no reference to the then EEC. See Theodoropoulos Vyron, **The Turks and We**, (Fitrakis, Athens, 1988), pp. 251-65, [in Greek]).
9. The Commission's opinion was endorsed by the Council of Ministers on 4 October 1993.
10. InternetSite: http://www.pio.gov.cy/docs/euro/european_union/commission/commission19930630.htm; emphasis added.
11. For the relevant paragraphs of the conclusion of the Council of Ministers meeting of 6 March 1995 see Internet Site: http://www.pio.gov.cy/docs/euro/european_union/european_council/concl19950306.htm.
12. For the entire text of the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, see Internet Site: <http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/index.html>
13. The most significant, thoughtful and in-depth analyses and interpretations of the Helsinki conclusions as viewed by key politicians, academics and decision-makers in Greece, can be found in Couloumbis Theodore and Dokos Thanos, eds., **Review of Defense and Foreign Policy 2000: Greek-Turkish Relations 1999-2000**,

(ELIAMEP and Paratiritis, Athens, 2000) [in Greek]. See also CNN.com, "Turkey Hesitates But Accepts EU Membership," Internet Site: <http://www.urfa.net/cnn/>; **Financial Times**, "Dramatic Shift In Relations Between Old Enemies," Internet Site: <http://www.ft.com/ftsurveys/country/scb43e.htm>; **Time**, "The State of the Union," Internet Site: <http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/1999/1220/helsinki.html>.

14. Papandreou George, "Greek-Turkish Relations: From Confrontation to Cooperation and the Building of the Europe of the 21st Century," in Couloumbis and Dokos, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

15. See Theodoropoulos Vyron, "We Need Reason To Be Master," in Couloumbis and Dokos, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

16. "Conclusions of the Presidency, Helsinki 10 and 11 December 1999"; emphasis added. See Internet Site: <http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/index.html>

17. See Internet Site <http://www.greekembassy.org/press/bulletin/dec99.html>. On the same site it is reported that US President Bill Clinton 'sent a letter of congratulations to Mr. Simitis, expressing his "respect and appreciation" for the Greek Prime Minister's "responsible" position.' It should also be added that many of the opposition parties in Greece were more skeptical in their reactions to the Helsinki conclusions. See **To Vima**, 12 December 1999 for complete coverage on this point.

18. **To Vima**, 12 December 1999; emphasis added.

19. See Internet Site <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/can/199/9912.can.html>.

20. See **Ta Nea**, 13 December 1999.

21. See Internet Site <http://www.greekembassy.org/press/bulletin/dec99.html>.

22. Internet Site: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/candidate.htm>. This is an unofficial translation.

23. Quoted by CNN.com. See Internet Site: <http://www.urfa.net/cnn>.

24. Denktash's statement was made on 11 December 1999. For the full text, see Internet Site: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/helsinki.html>
25. **Financial Times**, "Reform Process Speeded Up For Accession," Internet Site: <http://www.ft.com/fteuro/qb32e.htm>.
26. Hitchens, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
27. **I Kathimerine**, 20 August 2000. On the Makarios-Denktash agreements, see Kyle, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
28. **Financial Times**, *Survey: Greece 1999*. Internet Site: <http://www.ft.com/ftsurveys/country/scb43e.html>
29. Kyle Keith, **Cyprus: In Search of Peace**, (Minority Rights Group International, London, 1997), p. 31.
30. For a sophisticated, in-depth and well argued analysis of how perceptions of Cyprus' military and geo-strategic importance influenced and often determined its fate, see O'Malley and Craig, *op. cit.*
31. See **I Kathimerine**, 13 August 2000.
32. "Cyprus and the European Union: The Relevant Factors" paper presented by Andrew Mango at the conference on "New Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy in the year 2000 and Beyond" organized by Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, 24-25 March 2000.' See Internet Site: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/amango.htm>. Andrew Mango is the author of a recent (and rather well received) biography of Atatürk (**Ataturk**, John Murray, London, 1999). It is to be hoped though that this study is more objective than Mango's web paper.
33. As regards the last assertion, Mango probably has in mind the kind of massive deaths that were the result of the 1974 Turkish invasion. For an account of relatively recent events leading to bloodshed in Cyprus, admittedly at a small but still unjustifiable scale, see Keith Kyle, *op. cit.*, p. 32 and O'Malley and Craig, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-1.
34. Valinakis Yannis, "The Decisions at Helsinki and EU-Turkish Relations," in Couloumbis and Dokos., *op. cit.*, p. 100. This essay probably represents the closest and most thoughtful reading of the Helsinki conclusions. Although critical and skeptical, it is not unfair or alarmist.

35. On this point, see **To Vima**, 19 December 1999 and a regional report on Cyprus by the Western Policy Center that can be found at the Internet Site: <http://www.westernpolicy.org/publications/reports/2000/a/cyprus.asp>.

36. See Theofanous Andreas, **Cyprus in the European Union and the New International Environment: Challenges and Prospects**, (I. Sideris, Athens, 2000), p. 27 fn. 1 [in Greek]. The wording of the resolution is taken from a document distributed by the Embassy of Cyprus at the Hague. See also **Eleftheros Typos**, 11 March 2000 for an analysis of the annual Cypriot report on the Cyprus Issue that reveals comments made by the Foreign Ministers of Holland and Italy in line with the resolution of the Dutch Parliament but prior to Helsinki.

37. See **The Economist**, 10 June 2000 and **The Economist**, 15 July 2000.

38. The two leaders never meet face-to-face, but actually have separate meetings with the UN's General Secretary Kofi Annan, as well as other UN officials. The first round of 'proximity' talks took place in New York during 3-14 December 1999, and the second in Geneva during 31 January to 8 February 2000.

39. See **Emerisia**, 26 June 2000.

40. See **The Economist**, 15 July 2000 and **Eleftherotypia**, 3 July 2000.

41. Some Greek newspapers decided to call the Strovilia military action Attila-3, linking it with the two Turkish invasions of the summer of 1974. For example, see **Eleftherotypia**, 7 July 2000. For some perceptive comments on the naming of the 1974 operations, see Hitchens, *op. cit.*, pp.119-20.

42. **Eleftherotypia**, 12 July 2000.

43. See **Eleftherotypia**, 22 July 2000. An earlier letter was more 'neutral' stating plainly what had taken place. See **Eleftherotypia**, 12 July 2000.

44. See **I Kathimerine**, 9 July 2000.

- 45 On this point, see **Eleftherotypia**, 11 July 2000.
46. For the text of the interview, see **Eleftherotypia**, 21 August 2000.
47. See **To Vima**, 6 August 1999. For the official response of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Internet Site: http://www.papandreou.gr/August2000/ypex_ana_cem_02082000.html.
48. See **Eleftherotypia**, 7 August 2000.
49. See **Eleftherotypia**, 5 September 2000.
50. Cited in **Ta Nea**, 14 September 2000; emphasis added.
51. See **To Vima**, 16 September 2000.
52. See **To Vima** 22 September 2000, **Eleftherotypia**, 23 September 2000, In.gr, 25 September 2000 at Internet Site: <http://www.in.gr/innews/narticle.asp?nid=33634> and **Eleftherotypia**, 29 September 2000.
53. **Eleftherotypia**, 25 November 2000.
54. Ibid. See also In.gr, 16 February 2001 at Internet Site: <http://www.in.gr/news/print.asp?nid=55171>.
55. EU Commission, "Turkish Accession Partnership", 8 November 2000. It can be found at Internet site: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/EU/explanatory.htm>.
56. See Internet Site: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/accessionpartnership.htm>.
57. See **Flash.gr**, 3 January 2001 at Internet Site: http://greece.flash.gr/politics/2001/1/3/3774id/print_version.htm.
58. See **The Economist**, 24 February 2001. In the same article it is revealed that 90% of Turkish-Cypriots favor joining the EU.

Thoughts on Cyprus as a Geopolitical Condition in the Eastern Mediterranean

Kosta Gouliamos*

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur esquisse un cadre nouveau basé sur le rôle géopolitique de Chypre dans la région méditerranéenne. Ses réflexions se destinent aux chercheurs actifs dans le domaine des affaires étrangères grecques et turques.

ABSTRACT

Through his reflections, the author offers researchers in the field of Greek and Turkish affairs a different frame work based on the geopolitical role of Cyprus within the Mediterranean region.

Deficit of Geopolitical Strategy

Perhaps the most striking characteristics of the geopolitics of Cyprus over the last century are the growth in its content and the change in context within which the Cyprus issue has evolved.

The contextual change became very apparent, for example, shortly after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Since then, the changes associated with amateur foreign policy management led to the notable road to geopolitical reductionism for the Greek interest in the Eastern Mediterranean. What needs to be considered is that the present geopolitical context, in all its aspects, comes as the intended result of various hegemonic (in Gramscian terms) and neo-colonial practices implemented by an Anglo-American axis in collaboration with the local élite. Despite the fact that the anglo-american axis is somehow incompatible, the Greek geopolitical position eroded in the Eastern Mediterranean ignoring Cyprus strategic position. According to Hitchens (1997), Cyprus occupies a strategic position in the Levant

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and outside powers have never scrupled to employ local and regional rivalries in order to get their own way there.

Once again, the lack of foreign policy-making strategy did not help to capitalize on the definite antagonistic symptoms between London and Washington. Having failed to exploit such symptoms, Athens annihilated its own astonishing geopolitical interest in the area. Moreover, all the mistakes and inconsistencies (essentially those before and after Helsinki) spelled out the disintegration of the Republic of Cyprus.

One might think that the appalling crisis in the former Yugoslavia, in conjunction with the anatomy of turmoil and violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, had the effect of deepening the geopolitical eclipse of Greece in the region.

More precisely, the controversies surrounding the current Greek official action towards Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, including the Cyprus issue, have led to the geopolitical eclipse of Greece.

Given this eclipse, it seems that Athens is incapable, due to the lack of geopolitical strategy, of estimating and tackling the revival of Turkish expansionism, reinforced by a vast industrial-military complex.

Undoubtedly, a new set of problems emerges when we look at the relationship of advanced military technology to the problems of regional destruction.

A consequence of this concentration on military applications of technology in Turkey has been the build-up of a vast industrial-military complex. Major industrial firms are now involved in the production of military equipment or machines. Control is thus usually achieved by concentrating on military production.

Critical decisions about rapid military industrialization, however, are taken not in the light of public debate about general social or even political desirability, but rather on Turkey's expansionist objectives of

panturanism Frank Weber (1979) and Fitzroy Maclean (1949) point out that Turkey's roots on *panturanism* go back to the late 30s foreign policies.

I would argue that these objectives are attached to the orientations of a *neo-Ottoman* foreign policy model. According to Constantinides (2000), this model goes against the European orientation of Turkey. In the broadest possible sense, Turkey becomes increasingly linked with the mechanisms of military technology, and welded into one mammoth war structure. This implies that the increasing use and reliance on military technology itself leads to strengthening authoritarian political management driven by the military autocracy.

The main point, however, is that the existing 'depoliticization' associated with the military autocracy, makes such a system appear a 'rational necessity' lying outside the field of political democracy. This necessity is already apparent in support of highly authoritarian and coercive policies for population as well as for ethnic control. Virtually, political and economic democracy in Turkey can be achieved through a system of confederation. Indeed, as a mosaic of various nations, Turkey can be a modern democracy if a system of confederation is designed to meet nations needs, human and political rights. Whatever one feels about the political significance towards a confederation system in Turkey, one of the more important practical ideas to have emerged from it is the need for a geopolitical equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In this sense, nations will be liberated from the domination and exploitation inherent in Turkey's totalitarian régime and, at least, will therefore contribute to the required decentralization of power.

Apart from that, the projected sense for the need of a 'post-emotional' approach to the Greek-Turkish relations (a concept somewhat related to postmodernism) stems from either quasi-historical arguments or apolitical as well as irrational foreign affairs methodology which contribute to geopolitical annihilation in an indisputable manner.

There are even post-emotional rationalizations for why Turkey would not stop its own carefully planned goals pertaining to territorial aggrandizement in the form of confederation in Cyprus and consolidation in the Aegean. It seems there is a concrete world of rooted fictions saturated with concrete geopolitical goals. In fact it seems as unreasonable to suppose that there is absolutely no evidence.

By continuous misassessment of Turkey's geopolitical goals, Greece has forfeited a historic opportunity to foster development, stability and security in Eastern Mediterranean as well as to possess an efficient political mechanism to stop naked aggression, as Turkey showed in the Cypriot village of Strovilia, last summer.

Perhaps the most consistent feature of the Greek foreign policy toward Turkey has been its inconsistency. Such a policy, primarily consisting of rhetoric but practically ineffective and counterproductive, reaffirms an apparent chronic instability which is instrumental in Turkey's geopolitical patterns on the content growth of the Cyprus issue. The subsequent eclipse of Greece and the resulting alienation between Athens and Nicosia have made Ankara an operational center of political gravity in the whole region.

Given the geopolitical eclipse of Greece, it is conspicuous continuity for the international community (whether through the UN, EU or other) to perform with equanimity and reluctance; in other words, not to act more forcefully at an earlier stage leading, therefore, Turkey to view the international consideration as only a relatively minor obstacle to Ankara's goals.

Again the case of Strovilia, after Helsinki, along with the impending decision by Athens-Nicosia to go (in 2000) through political contortions has proved the fallacy of Greek foreign policy.

The recent, rather selective and one-dimensional political imaginary inevitably marginalizes some wills and national interests. Even more discouraging for the content and context of the Cyprus issue are the projections for the *catalysis* (abolition) of the Republic of Cyprus, if one takes into account the recent 'proximity talks' started in New York on December 3, 1999.

What is surprising then is not the fact that the manipulation of information falsified the content of *catalysis*, but rather the fact that the governments (Athens and Nicosia) did not provide an efficient foreign policy response to those who foment the Republic of Cyprus.

Ultimately, one can conclude the following: the disappearance of Greece and appearance of Turkey created a new geopolitical *fait accompli* in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Rather than encourage a geopolitical strategy, Athens has tended to look for illusory solutions and present simplistic versions for the content and context of the Cyprus issue, particularly in the post-Helsinki era.

Greece's ineffectiveness in designing and implementing geopolitical strategy has led to its intention, along with Nicosia, for absolution in respect to the *catalysis* of the Republic of Cyprus. Whether they negotiate a quasi-solution or seek to improve their European affairs, the Simitis and Clerides governments will be doing so from a less favorable position than that which it might have achieved, if it had established geopolitical strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In addition, the current practice of forcing the victims of Turkish aggression (Cypriots) to negotiate with their tormentors, while keeping the victims weak through an arms embargo (S-300) or a defense system, is morally reprehensible and politically unwise, serving only to reward Turkey's aggression by legitimizing ill-gotten invasion gains. Meanwhile the bilateral strategic partnership between Ankara and Tel Aviv is considered a geopolitical threat to a EuroMed security system. According to Mourtos (2000) the geopolitical dimension of this alliance is not confined to the narrow geographical limits of the two countries. It extends both to the Eastern Mediterranean and the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, infiltrated by Turkish and Israeli interests in a mutually supplementary manner, thus creating a joint power network.

Predictably, such a practice also has the effect of creating the context for continued tensions. Thus, Cyprus-occupied territories should be returned to the control of their legitimate government before negotia-

tions are undertaken in Geneva or New York. Following the restoration of the territorial integrity of Cyprus, internationally sponsored peace negotiations can address several issues such as the following four:

1. the rights and security of all ethnicities and minorities must be guaranteed;
2. all refugees must be permitted and assisted to return safely to their rightful homes, where many dwellings need to be rebuilt;
3. all the settlers have to leave Cyprus;
4. invasion crimes trials for violators should be undertaken to underscore the seriousness of the world community's commitment to human rights.

In sum, Turkey's perpetual aggression, along with Greece's geopolitical absence in the Eastern Mediterranean, has introduced a potentially dangerous destabilization in region in which there is no delicate balance.

Towards the *Catalysis* of the Republic of Cyprus

All the phenomena of new geopolitical developments and changes should be considered from the perspective of their structural foreign and defence policy determination as well as their relation to contrasting strategic positions.

As Loucas (2000) points out the recent crisis in Kosovo, many folds of which have continued up to today, assured all of us that a triangle of instability, whose angles are Yugoslavia, Caucasus and Middle East, was set up in our broader region ten years after the dissolution of the USSR. Greece has the misfortune and fortune to be located within this triangle. It is a misfortune, because security runs high risks from the shaking of stability and peace in these three areas. But at the same time, it is a fortune, because through participation in NATO, OSCE and EU, Greece has a major role in the formation of the new geopo-

litical sub-system in that specific area of Eurasia. By examining the matters through this context, we observe that the geopolitical map of Balkans (from day after NATO air raids against Yugoslavia began) is characterized by a completely 'new' structure for the macro-historic reality of the region.

Geopolitics should be seen as a form-determined foreign policy and, therefore, it will be more suited to the pursuit of some types of economic or political strategy than others because of the modes of intervention and resources which characterize that system of geopolitics.

Furthermore, one cannot understand the context of geopolitical strategy without referring to political or economic strategic selectivity by other antagonistic states as main foreign policy *modus operandi*; nor can one understand the activities of these states, without referring to their level of substantive operational unity.

It is a matter of great importance that strategic selectivity is, at least in principle, the *modus operandi* of Turkey in the post-Helsinki era.

In a recent paper, F. Tayfur (2000) comments that the Turks perceive the Mediterranean region as being composed of the Middle East, Greece and Cyprus, the Balkans, and Europe. This means that Mediterranean really means the Eastern Mediterranean in Turkish foreign and defence policy thinking. This focus stems from the fact that the Eastern Mediterranean presents a variety of problems that are perceived as important threats to Turkish territorial integrity and the country's vital interests. The problems with Greece and Syria, the Cyprus problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict and its spillover effects in the region constitute the main preoccupations of the Turkish foreign policy establishment in the Mediterranean overall.

On the other hand, Alifantis (2000) underlines that the regional developments surrounding the kind of national security that is interconnected with national aspirations are summarized clearly in the following question: Can the revisionist claims of Ankara be covered by the strategic interests of the USA or the Greek geostrategic control of the Aegean Sea that assures the security of the eastern Greek islands —

especially since this situation continues to constitute the basis of the Euro-atlantic nexus of security as was in the post-war period.

A favourable development for Ankara is steadily based on the Turkish provocation of tension and friction in the Aegean sea. Tension-invitation for international mediation in a *de facto* Greek-Turkish negotiation or indirect regulations in various international organizations, e.g. NATO and ICAO. On the other hand, any Turkish attempt for controlled crises in the Aegean Sea, even if such an attempt fails completely as a method of compulsory diplomacy at the expense of Greece, shall have provoked international interference as in the crises of 1974, 1976, 1987 and 1996.

Since Greece has failed to produce a strategic geopolitical codification, the relational character of foreign policy based mostly on reactionary activities appears all the more clearly.

It is here that the role of Greece's political administration of foreign policy (before and after Helsinki) is crucial in understanding how a geopolitical absence, in conjunction with the relative apathy on Cyprus issue, is imposed on the various (in)activities and how these (in) activities place the *catalysis* of the Republic of Cyprus. Such a *catalysis* became quite evident last September in New York when Secretary-General of the UN stressed equal status of parties in Cyprus proximity talks.

What follows is the text of Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement read on September 12, 2000, to the participants in the Cyprus proximity talks, Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş:

"The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot parties have been participating, since December 1999, in proximity talks to prepare the ground for meaningful negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement. I believe the time has now come to move ahead.

In the course of these talks I have ascertained that the parties share a common desire to bring about, thorough negotiations in which each represents its side,

and no one else, as the political equal of the other, a comprehensive settlement enshrining a new partnership on which to build a better future in peace, security and prosperity on a united island.

In this spirit, and with the purpose of expediting negotiations in good faith and without preconditions on all issues before them, I have concluded that the equal status of the parties must and should be recognized explicitly in the comprehensive settlement, which will embody the results of the detailed negotiations required to translate this concept into clear and practical provisions".

However, besides the argument of the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus, there are very serious challenges to the accession of Cyprus to the European Union (EU). In summary, D.B. Sezer (1999) stated that Turkey was opposed to the accession of Cyprus to the EU above all else on the argument that the Guarantee Agreements of 1960 rule out the accession of Cyprus before that of Turkey. In other words, the proposed accession of Cyprus to the EU would be in violation of the international agreements that created the republic in the first place until after Turkey has joined.

Despite the Turkish 'perforated' arguments on accession legitimacy, which targets the annihilation of the Republic of Cyprus, the process of EU enlargement suits Cypriot and Greek strategic objectives of encouraging stability and peace in the South East Mediterranean region. On top of it all, the last report produced by the EU (November 2000) indicates that Cyprus has achieved substantive progress in various areas of the *acquis* and continued with further harmonization measures. In this sense, it is regrettable that Turkey has not been able to realize the unique impetus that the European perspective offers to a Cyprus solution. EU membership would introduce in Cyprus a network of rules, principles and institutions that would respect democracy, human and political rights, religion and cultural heritage. In the final analysis, Cyprus will offer geopolitical benefits to EU and Greece, as a member of the European Union, is affected directly.

Nonetheless, we can consider actual as well as potential political criticisms on the absence of geopolitics which, in turn, implies a constant need for strategems and processes towards rational foreign policy management.

Adopting a geopolitical strategy approach also involves re-thinking the relations between nation(s) conscious action and the nation(s) relevance of action.

For both, nation(s) relevance and nation(s) power must be defined in terms of their impact on nation(s) interest in the whole region.

In light of this, Greece should incorporate the institutional mechanisms that will make it possible to guarantee the effectiveness and coherence of a geopolitical approach based *inter alia* on:

- Continuity
- Simplification of diplomatic structures
- Interface between foreign and defence policy
- Strategic intelligence, planning and information pooling
- Strategic mobility
- Electronic interoperability

To that will have to be added substantial progress on both the research and development (R&D) practices of foreign and defense departments.

A Greek geopolitical vision of Cyprus and subsequently of the Eastern Mediterranean could prove to be sufficiently a key factor for its own capability to compete and cooperate in the region.

Any discussion of Greece's current foreign policy has to start with the fact that the Euromediterranean transformations and European enlargement run parallel. According to Horafas (2000), Greece has a central geopolitical position, exceptional geopolitical significance, in conjunction with the shift of the basic orientation of international security from the East-West relations of the previous decades to the North-south relations.

Greece is the only member state of the European Union, NATO and Western European Union in the region of the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean and, for this reason only, it could and should play a stabilizing role in the broader region.

If Greece follows through, it should propose an international verification apparatus to prevent any transgressions or violations, as took place last July in Strovilia. Furthermore, in an era of virtual diplomacy, outmoded administrative and human resources practices as well as obsolete information technology threaten Greece's geopolitical capability in Eastern Mediterranean, with far-reaching consequences for nation security and prosperity.

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DOCUMENTS SUR LA COMMUNAUTÉ GRECQUE DE TURQUIE

DOCUMENTS ON GREEK COMMUNITY OF TURKEY

Nous publions deux documents sur les événements violents du 6 septembre 1955 qui ont conduit au déracinement et à la destruction de la communauté grecque de Turquie. Le premier document provient du Département d'État américain et le deuxième du Ministère des Affaires étrangères français. Le document français provient d'une recherche des archives du Quai d'Orsay que mène depuis plusieurs années notre collaborateur Jean Catsiapis¹. Le document américain a été déjà présenté par le professeur Speros Vryonis en 1996 avec la remarque que « le pogrom de 1955 était un « succès » turc comme il a réussi de détruire l'Hellénisme ancien de Constantinople, physiquement et psychologiquement »².

In this issue we publish two documents on the destruction of the Greek Community of Turkey during the violent events of September 6, 1955. The first document is from the archives of the US State Department and the second from the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The French document, published herein for the first time, stems from the research of our collaborator Jean Catsiapis, who has been consulting these archives for many years now. The American text was published by professor Speros Vryonis in 1996³. Professor Vryonis noted at his presentation: "The pogrom of 1955 was a Turkish "success" as it finally destroyed the ancient Hellenism of Constantinople, both in its physical and psychological dimensions"⁴.

1. Nous rappelons qu'un autre document résultant de la recherche de Jean Catsiapis relatif aux positions du général de Gaulle sur la question chypriote a été publié par notre revue dans son édition vol. 4, no 1, printemps 1996.
2. The AHEPAN, Fall 1996
3. **Ibid**
4. **Ibid**

DOCUMENT

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES, FRANCE

Istanbul, le 15 septembre 1955

No 846/ EU

M. JACQUES TARDE de SAINT HARDOUIN
AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE EN TURQUIE

A

SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR ANTOINE PINAY
MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

Direction d'Europe

S/Direction d'Europe Méridionale

(3) s. Evènements du 6 septembre. —

Communiqué à :

- Athènes

Au cours d'un entretien qu'il a eu récemment avec M. KAPSAMBELIS, Consul Général de Grèce à Istanbul, qu'il connaît personnellement, le Conseil de cette Ambassade a pu recueillir des indications intéressantes sur les réactions des représentants hellènes aux évènements du 6 septembre.

Il semble que l'on ait tendance, dans les milieux grecs, pleinement convaincus de la préméditation gouvernementale, à faire retomber la responsabilité moins sur M. MENDERES que sur certains membres de son entourage. Sans doute considère-t-on comme acquis le fait que le Gouvernement turc non seulement était averti des manifestations qui se préparaient, mais avait activement participé à leur élaboration. Le memorandum grec dont le département voudra bien trouver ci-joint la traduction, et qui selon toute vraisemblance a été préparé en anglais à l'intention des autorités américaines, le montre clairement. Le Président du Conseil n'aura agi que sous la pression d'éléments extrémistes. Le rôle joué par M. ZORLU, notamment, aurait été décisif à cet égard.

Cette appréciation de l'attitude de M. MENDERES serait confirmée par ses réactions à mesure qu'évoluait la situation dans la soirée du 6. Averti à la gare d'Istanbul, avant son départ pour Ankara, de la tournure fâcheuse que prenaient les manifestations, il aurait donné l'ordre de faire immédiatement donner la troupe. Mais il aurait été impossible d'exécuter cet ordre, les officiers, à cette heure, étant pour la plupart absents des casernes. D'autre part, lorsque le Gouverneur d'Istanbul lui fit savoir à son arrêt à Ismit, que la situation tournait au pire, le Président du Conseil, en autorisant la proclamation de l'état de siège, aurait enjoint à l'Armée de tirer s'il le fallait pour rétablir le calme. Cet ordre n'a pas été suivi par le Commandant de la Place d'Istanbul, d'après qui, seul le Ministre de la Défense Nationale pouvait prendre une telle initiative. C'est à la suite de cet acte d'insubordination que cet officier a été, le lendemain même des émeutes, relevé de son commandement. M. ZORLU, que j'ai vu hier soir, me l'a d'ailleurs confirmé en ajoutant que si le Gouverneur d'Istanbul allait sans doute conserver son poste, c'était parce que son chef, le Ministre de l'Intérieur, se trouvait ce soir-là auprès de lui et que la responsabilité devait être partagée entre M. GEDIK qui n'avait pas su agir à temps et les militaires qui n'avaient pas suivi les directives du pouvoir civil. Mais des deux côtés les sanctions nécessaires avaient été prises.

D'après M. KAPSAMBEIIS enfin, le Gouvernement turc, en permettant des démonstrations hostiles à la Grèce, n'avait pas seulement cherché à jeter le poids de l'indignation populaire dans la balance des négociations de Londres; il entendait aussi rappeler à la riche minorité grecque d'Istanbul que les Turcs, plus que jamais, étaient les maîtres, et qu'il ne lui fallait pas s'aventurer dans les chemins douteux d'un acquiescement, même tacite, aux thèses de l'Enosis et encore moins dans un appui financier à ce mouvement.

Sans doute les opinions exprimées par le Consul Général de Grèce à Istanbul, de même que le compte rendu des événements et l'évaluation des dommages faits par ses services, peuvent-ils être entachés d'une certaine partialité. Ils ne semblent cependant pas dénués de vraisemblance, aussi m'a-t-il paru intéressant de les porter à la connaissance du Département./.

SAINT HARDOUIN

MEMORANDUM

Voici un bref aperçu des récents événements tragiques d'après des informations recueillies de diverses sources dignes de foi et des témoignages visuels. L'on espère qu'il pourra être de quelque utilité dans l'appréciation de l'étendue de ces événements.

De l'opinion généralement exprimée, il ressort sans contestation possible :

- a) que le mouvement avait été préparé et organisé longtemps à l'avance ;
- b) il n'aurait pu être mené à bien sans l'accord, et, dans certains cas, le concours de la police locale.

L'intervention différée des forces armées, qui a provoqué l'arrêt immédiat des actes de violence, prouve que des autorités d'un niveau plus élevé étaient jusqu'à un certain point de connivence avec le but de cette manifestation, telle qu'il avait été défini à l'origine, et lui laissèrent le champ libre. Ce n'est que lorsque la foule se déchaîna et ne fut plus contrôlable que le Gouvernement prit conscience de ses responsabilités et se soucia des répercussions possibles de l'émeute, tant sur le plan national qu'international.

Ceci est confirmé :

- 1o) Par le déroulement synchronisé des événements. Ce n'est que quelques heures après l'explosion de la cartouche de dynamite déposée au Consulat de Turquie à Salonique et la destruction prétendue de la maison d'ATATURK que commencèrent les manifestations.
- 2o) L'explosion simultanée d'actes de violence dans un rayon de plusieurs centaines de kilomètres.
- 3o) Le caractère commun des attaques qui ont été centrées sur les églises, les écoles, les centres communautaires, les boutiques et les domiciles de Grecs, tout en évitant, autant que possible, l'effusion de sang.

Ce triple dessein visait à la destruction de la puissance financière des Grecs, de leur communauté et de leur vie religieuse.

Bien qu'incomplètes les informations montrent comme suit l'étendue des dommages et des pertes :

- 1o) *Dommages causés aux personnes* : L'on rapporte que le prêtre de l'église orthodoxe de Balikli fut pris dans l'émeute et brûlé vif. Le sort du prêtre du monastère de Hebeli Ada est inconnu. Le diacre de l'église de Thérapia fut sauvagement battu, placé inconscient dans un cercueil et jeté au Bosphore. Il fut sauvé par une personne non identifiée qui se jeta à l'eau, le ramena et le soigna pendant le reste de la nuit. Le Métropolite de Héliopolis fut frappé violemment sur la tête pendant que l'on pillait sa maison à Arnautköy. Le Métropolite de Derkon fut bloqué dans le bâtiment en flammes de l'archevêché à Thérapia et il aurait péri s'il n'avait, à

la dernière minute, été sauvé par deux de ses paroissiens. L'évêque de Panphylon à Balikli souffre d'une commotion cérébrale, conséquence d'une violente batonnade et se trouve encore dans un état critique.

On signale que des jeunes filles vivant au Foyer des Jeunes Filles de Büyük Ada furent enlevées et violées. Plusieurs autres jeunes filles dans le district de Kumkapi, Samatya, Yedi Kule et Uakjidar auraient eu le même sort et sont en traitement à l'hôpital de Balikli. Des agressions moins graves ont été commises sur des centaines de personnes.

- 2o) *Églises* : Sur les 80 églises établies dans la zone d'Istanbul, seules 8 ou 10 demeurent intactes. L'église de la Trinité de Taksim, l'Eglise du Christ à Galata, St-Nicholas, St Jean de Chic. Au-delà, les églises de Kurtulus, Langa, Kumkapi, Edirnekapi, Yedi Kule, etc. .. sont complètement détruites. Il en est de même des églises des communautés grecques orthodoxes au Bosphore et des îles. Le séminaire de Hebeli Ada a été endommagé.
- 3o) *Cimetières* : Les cimetières de Balikli et de Sisli ont été profanés. Les sépultures des Patriarches de Balikli ont été ouverts et les restes jetés dans la boue. Des tombes au cimetière de Sisli ont également été ouverts et les cercueils et les corps dispersés. On sait que la tombe de feu Nicolas ELIASCO (oncle du Gouverneur de la Banque Nationale de Grèce d'Athènes), décédé il y a un mois, a été ouverte et son corps poignardé.
- 4o) *Écoles* : sur les 5 écoles supérieures de la minorité grecque, deux ont été épargnées; les écoles supérieures Zografyon et le lycée de jeunes filles. Des écoles primaires ont subi de grands dommages, mais l'on ne possède pas encore de compte rendu détaillé.
- 5o) *Presses* : les installations des quotidiens grecs ont été détruites. Seuls ont échappé deux hebdomadaires.
- 6o) *Magasins et domiciles* : presque la totalité des magasins grecs sont entièrement détruits dans l'ensemble de la région d'Istanbul.

L'estimation des dommages figurant ci-dessous est approximative et n'a pas été entièrement vérifiée. On peut toutefois les considérer comme une appréciation valable de la situation.

Propriétaires	Destructions Commerces / domiciles		Dommages évalués en LTQS
1) Nationaux grecs	1100	600	300 millions
2) Nationaux turcs, d'origine grecque	3000	1500	750 millions

DOCUMENT

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

DAMAGE CAUSED TO GREEK ORTHODOX COMMUNITY ESTABLISHMENTS DURING THE SEPTEMBER 6 RIOTS

A survey of the damage inflicted on public establishments of the Greek Community of Istanbul during the rioting on the night of September 6-7 shows the destruction caused has been extremely widespread. In fact, only a very small percentage of community property appears to have escaped molestation. Although there are as yet no figures available assessing the damage sustained, the number of establishments attacked and the nature of the destruction caused in the course of the night under reference convey a clear picture of the scope of the devastation. In most cases the assault on these establishments involved a thorough wrecking of installations, furniture, equipment, desecration of holy shrines and relics, and looting. In certain instances serious damage was inflicted on the buildings themselves by fire.

Information received from the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate shows that of the 95 houses of worship listed on the books of the Archbishopric of Istanbul 61 were either completely or partially damaged. Eight of them became the victims of flames. The religious edifices thus affected are identified as follows :

1. Aghia Triada, Taksim – Wrecked, pillaged and destroyed by fire
2. St. Constantin, Kalyoncu Kulluk – Wrecked, pillaged and destroyed by fire
3. Metamorphosis, Cemetery of Sisli – Wrecked, pillaged and destroyed by fire
4. Sotiros Christou, Galata – Wrecked and pillaged
5. Saint Nicolas, Galata – Wrecked and pillaged
6. Saint Jean, Galata – Wrecked and pillaged
7. Saint Dimitri, Kurtulus – Wrecked and pillaged
8. Saint Athanase, Kurtulus – Wrecked and pillaged
9. Saint Elephtere, Kurtulus – Wrecked and pillaged
10. Evangelistrias, Kurtulus – Wrecked and pillaged
11. Ghenethlion tis Theotocou, Besiktas – Wrecked and pillaged
12. Saint Phocas, Ortaköy – Wrecked and pillaged
13. Saint Dimitri, Kuruçesme – Wrecked and pillaged

14. Ton Taxiarchon, together with residence of Bishop, Arnavutköy – Wrecked and destroyed by fire
15. Saint Haralambos, Bebek – Wrecked and pillaged
16. Evangelismos tis Theotokou, Boyaciköy – Wrecked and pillaged
17. Taxiarchon, Istynye – Wrecked and pillaged
18. Saint Nicolas, Yeniköy – Wrecked and pillaged
19. Saint Paraskevi, Tarabya and residence of Bishop – Wrecked and destroyed by fire
20. Saint Paraskevi, Büyükdere – Wrecked and pillaged
21. Saint Jean, Yeni Mahalle, – Wrecked and pillaged
22. Saint Constantin, Pasabagce – Wrecked and pillaged
23. Genethion tis Theotokou, Kandilli – Wrecked and pillaged
24. Saint Georges, Cengelköy – Wrecked and pillaged
25. Prophet Ilia, Üsküdar – Wrecked and pillaged
26. Agia Triada, with residence of Bishop – Kadiköy – Wrecked, pillaged and destroyed by fire
27. Saint Georges, Kadiköy – Wrecked and pillaged
28. Saint Jean Chrysostome, Kadiköy – Wrecked and pillaged
29. Saint Ignace, Kadiköy – Wrecked and pillaged
30. Saint Dimitri, Büyükada – Wrecked and pillaged
31. Dormition of the Virgin, Büyükada – Wrecked and pillaged
32. Metamorphosis tou Christou, Büyükada – Wrecked and pillaged
33. Saint Georges, monastery, Heybeliada – Wrecked and pillaged
34. Saint Spiridon, monastery, Heybeliada – Wrecked and pillaged
35. Zoodochos Pighi, Balikli – Wrecked and destroyed by fire
36. Genethlion tis Theotokou, Beligradiou, Yedikule – Wrecked & pillaged
37. Saint Constantin, Samatya – Wrecked and pillaged
38. Saint Paraskevi, Samatya – Wrecked and pillaged
39. Saint Georges, Samatya – Wrecked and pillaged
40. Saint Minas, Samatya – Wrecked and pillaged
41. Dormition of the Vergin, Exi Marmara – Wrecked and pillaged
42. Saint Theodore, Langa – Wrecked and pillaged
43. Saint Elpida, Kumkapi – Wrecked and pillaged
44. Saint Kiriaki, Kumkapi – Wrecked and pillaged
45. Saint Nicolas, Topkapu – Wrecked and pillaged
46. Saint Georges, Edimekapu – Wrecked and pillaged
47. Dormition of the Virgin, Edimekapu – Wrecked and pillaged

48. Another Dormition of the Virgin, Edirnekapu – Wrecked and pillaged
49. Taxiarchon, Balat – Wrecked and pillaged
50. Panaghia tis Soudas, Egrikapu – Wrecked and pillaged
51. Dormition of the Virgin, Blacherne, Ayvansaray – Wrecked and pillaged
52. Saint Dimitri, Xiloportis – damaged
53. Dormition of the Virgin, Valinu, – damaged
54. Saint Jean Prodrome, Valinu, monastery – Wrecked
55. Saint Georges Potira – Wrecked
56. Vierge Mouchliotissa, Phanar – Wrecked and pillaged
57. Saint Nicolas, Cibali – Wrecked and pillaged
58. Saint Haralambos, Chapel, Cibali – Wrecked and pillaged
59. Dormition of the Virgin, Vefa – Wrecked and pillaged
60. Saint Paraskevi, Hasköy – Wrecked and pillaged
61. Aghioi Therapon – damaged

In addition to the above religious establishments the following properties belonging to the Monastery of St. Sinai, said to contain irreplaceable objects of art of Byzantine origin and religious relics of great value, apparently, also suffered serious destruction and pillage :

1. Monastery of St. Georges ti Krimnou, Hoybeli Ada
2. Monastery of St. Georges, Fener
3. Monastery of St. Georges, Yeniköy

Reports show that the dependencies of the religious edifices hit were also not spared and that very serious damage was inflicted on presbyteries and well-appointed community meeting quarters, libraries, and dispensaries attached to these establishments.

Among the Greek churches heavily attacked also figures the church of the Greek Catholic Uniate at Hamal Bapi, Beyoglu. Report has it that the presbytery of the said church and the congregational school attached thereto were also severely damaged. As a matter of fact three other Catholic churches having no connection whatever with the Greek community, are reported to have also suffered serious damage during the rioting.

Reports on hand indicate that the rioting crowd hit with particular frenzy at two important Greek Orthodox community centers : the central cemetery at Sisli and the cemetery of the Patriarchs at Balikli. The former sustained particularly extensive destruction. Crosses and statues were knocked down, sepulchers and vaults opened and remains of the dead removed and dispersed. At Balikli, the sarcophaguses of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchs were desecrated.

As for the Greek Orthodox clergy itself, considering the scale and severity of the acts of violence recorded, it appears that only a relatively few were exposed to the fury of rioters. According to information given by the Patriarchate only one aged Orthodox priest, monk Chysanthos of Balikli, is believed to have been killed during the rioting. Since his body has not been recovered he is listed as missing. It is supposed that he perished during the burning of his church. The principal dignitaries of the Orthodox church who were maltreated during the disturbances and made to suffer indignities are reported to be the following :

- The Metropolitan of New Cesarea, Usküdar
- The Metropolitan of Troy, Boyaciköy
- The Metropolitan of Derkos, Therapia
- The Metropolitan of Chalchidon, Kadiköy
- Bishop Panphilion, Balikli
- Bishop Ilioupolios, Arnavutköy
- The Archdeacon of the Patriarchate, Yeniköy

Extensive damage also seems to have been suffered by the educational establishments of the Greek community. At least 36 of the 48 schools of the community are reported to have been more or less seriously damaged. The principal victims are the Zappeion Girls' College at Taksim and the Megali Scholi Boys' College of Phanar, both prices of the community, the Theological School at Heybeli, and the high schools at Haskoy, Edirne Kapu, Bakirkoy, Gelata, Taksim and Arnavutköy. The elaborate dispensary of the Taksim High School and several public soup kitchens operated in conjunction with these educational institutions were also demolished. A list of the schools hit by the rioters is given below :

1. The Greek Catholic School at Hamal Basi
2. The Zappeion Girls' College, Taksim
3. The Megali Scholi Boys College, Phanar
4. The School of Hasköy
5. The School of Evangelistria
6. The School of Galata
7. The School of Ortaköy
8. The School of St. Constantin, Beyoglu
9. The School of Bakirköy
10. The School of Boyaciköy
11. The School of Kurtulus
12. The School of Yeniköy
13. The School of Feriköy

14. The Theological School of Heybeli Ada
15. The School at Nane Street
16. The School of Aynali Çesme
17. The School of Arbavyutköy
18. The School of Aghia Triada, Taksim
19. The School of Bebek
20. The School of Besiktas
21. The School of Kandilli
22. The School of Cengelköy
23. The School of Kuzgunouk
24. The School of Üsküdar (Yeni Mahalle)
25. The School of Kadiköy (Yeldeğirmen)
26. The School of Cafer Aga
27. The School of Balat
28. The School of Lonca
29. The School of Edirne Kapu
30. The School of Samatya
31. The School of Lenga
32. The School of Büyükdere
33. The School of Tarabya
34. The School of Büyük Ada
35. The School of Ioakimeion Parthenagogeion
36. The School of Kentrikon Parthenagogeion

Efforts are now being made to immediately repair some of the damage to make possible opening of these schools by the end of this month. To that effect a preliminary aid of 110, 000 Turkish liras had been allocated to the community by Turkish authorities. Special appropriations are also expected for the repair of damaged religious institutions and cemeteries, since, neither the community itself nor the Patriarchate is in a position to provide adequate funds for the purpose. As the allocation of such funds will require legislative action, an emergency relief of 200,000 Turkish liras is announced for urgent repair work.

Though not specifically community property, it might be appropriate to consider in the present report also the damage sustained by the Greek language press. All three principal dailies, the *Apogevmatini*, the *Tachydromos* and the *Embros* suffered heavy losses. The first two had both their offices and printing establishments completely wrecked. In the case of the *Embros*, only its offices were destroyed, since it had no printing press of its own. The

Apogevmatini (circulation 10,000), the most heavily hit, managed to resume publication two weeks after the rioting. Its losses alone are estimated at half a million liras. The Tachydromos (circulation 5,000) has as yet not been able to recuperate from the blow but is scheduled to appear in the near future. The Embros (circulation 7,000) reappeared a few days after the disturbances. The weekly Chronos (circulation 5,000) managed to continue its publication without interruption, though its offices were also heavily wrecked. Like the Ethnos, it has no printing press of its own.

As pointed out in the opening paragraphs of this report, a monetary assessment of the damage caused to Greek community property in the course of the September 6 riot has as yet not been attempted. Very general estimates on the part of community and church leaders would indicate that it goes into millions of Turkish liras. The Department will be informed as soon as a substantive estimate is available.

The lethal pogrom of September 6-7, 1955 delivered a fatal blow to the Hellenism of Constantinople in seven hours. Well planned (for some years), masterfully carried out in a well organized manner by the Turkish government, the Turks destroyed 71 churches, 41 schools, 4,008 stores, the offices and printing presses of eight newspapers, and approximately 2,100 dwellings, all the property of the Greeks and their communities.

The Turks killed 28 Greeks and also carried out the rapes of Greek women. They profaned and soiled the Greek Orthodox religious vessels; they smashed and dug up the graves in Greek cemeteries, throwing out the bones and remains of the dead; they effected circumcisions on some elderly priests in the streets.

The Turkish government, press and nation "justified" this savagery on the false pretext that the Greeks had bombed the house of Atatürk in Thessaloniki. In reality the Greeks had not placed the bomb in the Turkish consular complex in that city on September 6. It had been put there by a Turk, in collusion with the Turkish government, in order to provide the pretext for a carefully laid plan to destroy the houses, the businesses, the property, the churches, the schools, the newspapers of the Greeks in Constantinople.

Professor Speros Vryonis Jr

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2

Philosophical Studies

Methodological Prolegomena to Proclus

Reference Text “About Plato’s Theology” (I, 5.6-8.15)

Christos Terezis and Georgia Deli*

RÉSUMÉ

Proclus, un prééminent philosophe néoplatonicien, a vécu au V^{ème} siècle après J.-C. (410-485). Né à Constantinople et ayant reçu son éducation à Alexandrie, Proclus a été un des derniers scolaires de l’Académie platonicienne avant sa clôture, en 529, par l’empereur Justinien et un des derniers grands philosophes (surnommé le Grand) de l’Antiquité. Parmi ses oeuvres, une des plus importantes est son *In Platonis Theologiae* ainsi que ses commentaires sur le *Timée*, la *République* et le *Parménide* de Platon et sur le *Premier Livre* d’Euclide et le *Tétrabiblos* de Ptolémée. L’article qui suit entreprend d’élucider, à partir de leur expression linguistique, quelques concepts fondamentaux du système hiérarchique de Proclus.

ABSTRACT

Proclus was a prominent Neo-Platonic philosopher who lived in the Vth century AD (410-485). Born in Constantinople and educated in Alexandria, Proclus was one of the last leaders of the Platonic Academy before its closing, in 529, by Justinian and one of the last philosophers of Antiquity. Among his works, noteworthy is his *About Plato’s Theology* (*Peri tês kata Platôna thelogias*) along with his commentaries on Plato’s *Timaeus*, *Republic* and *Parmenides* as well as his comments on Euclid’s *First Book* and Ptolemy’s *Tetrabiblos*. This brief article endeavours to explain, through the “appropriate linguistic material”, a few key concepts of Proclus’s hierarchical system as it relates to the “Platonic theology”.

One of the main characteristics of Proclus’s philosophical system is that it is based upon strictly limited and multiple hierarchical systems joined in a form of a rational and organic consequence. In other words, there is an invariable distinction in his texts between something superior and something inferior; between something perfect and something imperfect; between something that remains unalterable

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and something that alters. The factor of superiority is therefore predominant, since every ontological level - except the first one that is utterly transcendent - is inferior to the one preceding and superior to the one following. This characteristic is mainly noticed in his texts treating *The Metaphysics*. In almost every case the neoplatonic philosopher sets off his reasoning by describing a superior entity compared to some others. This entity is presented, initially at least, as unalterable, unchangeable and undifferentiated, as far as its ontological quality is concerned. It is identical to itself. In the next analytical stage, another entity is introduced which is inferior to the previous one and stems from the previous entity as a result. This entity has gradually begun to demonstrate the development of differentiations.

This process of always introducing inferior entities is continued until a system consisting of first, middle and last part is completed and until are established the preconditions or laws according to which it is altered or degraded.¹ What should be pointed out is that Proclus uses the appropriate linguistic material as well. His texts are dominated by a general use of verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs, which are suggestive of the sequential alterations and subordinations. We highlight and analyze some linguistic or grammatical elements in the reference text. Specifically, we will focus on adjectives, as they accurately state the properties, comparisons, and relationships as well as the permanent or altering qualities. We believe that through the meanings, derived from adjectives, Proclus' theoretical orientation will be illuminated. In other words, the principles on which he founds a very intricate and multi-scaled system will be illuminated. With this in mind, we have selected all the adjectives which declare the superior situations mentioned above and we present them systematically, according to their mutual relevancy. Lastly, we point out that our research will not have the character of a random term choice and will not function as a sampling. The chosen terms can be enlisted in a common and unified theoretical context.

The adjectives to be examined are the following:

Superior (*kreittôn*), good (*agathoeidês*), supernatural-transcendent (*hyperphuês*), big (*megalos*), pure (*agnos*), tranquil (*atremês*), authentic

(*gnêsiôtatos*), unalloyed (*katharôtatos*), prime (*exairetos*), perfect (*teleiôtatos*), complete (*pantelês*), high (*hupsêlos*), excellent (*aristos*), veritable (*alêthinos*), divine (*theios*).

These adjectives, in a preliminary stage, declare the very state of an entity. In other words, they declare what they are according to themselves only. In a second interpretative stage, they can function comparatively or superlatively as an entity is co-examined with others since they indirectly declare contradictions or distinctions. What is very interesting, though, is that the above adjectives do not refer exclusively to entities. Through them Proclus describes and evaluates various past philosophical systems or philosophical methods through which entities are approached gnoseologically. Therefore, adjectives can function at both the ontological and gnoseological level. This is to be expected because an entity should, according to the status it has on the ontological system, be approached gnoseologically in an analogous way.² This analogy forms an inviolate scientific rule for the neoplatonic philosopher. Through this rule, is also indicated the most appropriate philosophical system which we must use in our descriptions. We must also note that in many cases Proclus uses his adjectives in pairs for reasons defined by what he wishes each time to declare or by the emphasis he places on his meanings.

The cases of the hierarchical use of the adjectives we present are as follows:

- 1) "*Tên tôn kreittonôn agathoeidê boulêsin*" (5,8).

A reference is made here to superior gods, something that indirectly states that inferior gods exist as well. This is the well known metaphysical hierarchy of Proclus according to which inferior gods must exist in order to bring the superior gods in touch with the world of experience.³ Moreover, the fine quality of the superior gods is stressed by characterizing their wish as good. Good in the ultimate grade is the One, namely the superior source of Everything. Therefore, whatever is the One in essence attributes it as properties to the rest metaphysical entities which become, in this way, its special appearances.⁴

2) "*Tên peri autôn tôn theiôn mustagôgian en agnô bathrô katharôs hidrumenên*" (5,17-18)

At this point, Proclus refers to the ontological and ethical clearance and indirectly contra-distinguishes it from the opposite situation. Noteworthy is the fact that he brings out a strict analogy between the ontological and the ethical level. In order to achieve approaching realities of divine character, of excellent and unchangeable nature, untouchable by any perishable essence, one must have been ethically purified and follow a mystic course. In other words, one should transcend any situation that connects him with the tangible and, according to Plato's tradition, the changeable entities as well as transcend the gnoseological means by which he approaches them. Consequently, ontological hierarchies define the ethical or the anthropological ones.⁵

3) "*Tôn hyperphuôn kai megalôn agathôn*" (5,11-12)

In this part of the text, both the metaphysical interpretation (version) of good and the range of its quality and quantity are being brought out. As a first characteristic Proclus declares that the source of every good is located in the metaphysical world; at the same time he indirectly implies that the goods are categorized as superempirical and empirical. The first category is beyond the possibilities of the human knowledge while the second one can be known. The use of the second adjective stems from the meaning of the first. The goods are characterized as great and thus are contra-distinguished from some small or smaller ones than these. Apparently, the superempirical ones are great and the empirical are small. Nevertheless, regardless of the hierarchies or the discriminations, the quality of good is a catholic reality.⁶

4) "*To gnêsiôtaton kai katharôtaton tês alêtheias phôs*" (7,1-2)

Here hierarchies refer to the gnoseological level. The superlative forms of the adjectives are used in order that the properties of truth be declared. Truth appears as an absolutely authentic situation of describing the reality. It is not mixed by various added elements that would alter it. It illuminates with its absolute clearance and is thus differentiated from untruth. If Proclus described untruth, he would also use superlative adjectives but in the exactly opposite meaning.⁷

5) “*Tôn atremôn phasmatôn ôn metalambanousi hai tês eudaimonos kai makarias zôês gnêsiôs antechomenai psuchai*” (6,5-6).

Here Proclus refers to immutable metaphysical expressions. This statement concerns cases which move in a mystic area, an area which is not approached by strictly ontological criteria. Nevertheless, this area is not inaccessible for the human soul. If a soul moves in a pure way, it will be able to enjoy the felicity and the prosperity of divine situations. Indirectly but clearly stated: if there is no purity in the human innermost, the metaphysical area is unapproachable. In this way, souls are graded ethically or evaluated according to the way of their lives.⁸

6) “*Kai telos to ariston exomen tês en hêmin ôdinos ên echomen peri ta theia*” (8,12-13).

Here Proclus refers to the quality of the outcome or the integration of a procedure for meeting that the Divine has. It is emphasized again that the end, compared with the outset and the middle part, has superior characteristics. The procedure is a grievous course during which the individual is purified from his passions and from his imperfections (demerits). The final communication with the Divine is hierarchically superior both to the state of non-Communication and to the states during the procedure. Extensively, the individual who communicates with the Divine is superior to the one who does not communicate and the one who is proceeding towards communication. In other words, it is a kind of ethical hierarchy which is defined both by the existential preparedness or by the personal integration of human beings and by the quality of a metaphysical entity with whom these human beings must communicate so that their existence and their life be meaningful.⁹

7) “*Hup’ Hêgemoni tô tôn kath’ hêmas teleôtatô*” (7,15-16).

Proclus uses this common expression when he refers to Plato, or to his teacher Syrianos. Here the point of the distinction among the philosophers is raised as far as the range of their work is concerned. Namely, we can use any philosopher but someone must function as the final yardstick in order to judge the accuracy of our views. The

epistemological commitment introduced is obvious. Since we have reached the conclusion that one philosopher holds the most eminent position among the others, we are obliged to follow him with no detours. Every contravention of this principle can lead to either errors or approximations of truth which are of an inferior level.¹⁰

8) "*To tês Platônîkês philosophias exaireton agathon*" (7,12-13).

Despite the fact that Proclus considers the Platonic philosophy the leading one, he distinguishes within its interior graded levels. He considers superior those included in the dialogue *Parmenides* which, according to Plato's estimations, describes the superior metaphysical realities. It is concerned with realities that surpass all the others and, consequently, can not coexist. We should therefore approach the supreme good of Plato's philosophy by using our most authentic gnoseological powers.¹¹

9) "*Eis to panteles kai hupsêlon telos tês Platônîkês theôrias*" (7,20-21).

In this point too, there is a reference to the hierarchy existing in the interior of the actual (very) Platonic philosophy. Proclus most probably means that Plato had gone through various evolutionary stages in order to be directed to the final expression of his thought. These stages are evaluated according to their results which have conquered the utmost grade of superiority and are, by this time, incomparable to anything proceeding. Namely, it refers to what is theoretically most creditable, but it also implies our need to comprehend the sequence of specific methodological procedures. Therefore, the reference to integration or to a conclusion presupposes the existence of primary and intermediate stage.¹²

10) "*Tôn alêthinôn teletôn, has telountai chôristheisai tôn peri gên topôn hai psuchai*" (6,3) – *Hupo tinôn hierôn alêthinôn*" (6,11).

Here, the meaning of truth coincides with the very reality, or with anything considered authentic. Some references are made to procedures or abilities, which presuppose purity from any material or corporal status. These are spiritual qualities, which are obtained by those

persons who have transcended their commitments from those powers, which alter or perish them. We would add that is put on the ethical purity or on an anthropological property which joins the purified subject with secret situations and metaphysical powers.¹³

11) “*Tôn peri autôn tôn theiôn mustagôgian*” (5,17) — “*Tàs tôn theiôn phasmatôn ellampseis*” (6,14) — “*Peri tôn theiôn huphêgêseis*” (6,17) — “*Tês peri tôn theiôn mustikês alêtheias*” (7,7-8) — “*Oute noêsai to theion allôs dunaton ê tô par’ autôn phôti telesthentas*” (7,24-8,1) — “*Tên tôn theiôn onomatôn anelixin*” (8,4) — “*Telos to ariston exomen tês en hêmin ôdinos, hên echomen peri ta theia*” (8,11-12).

The meaning of divines illuminates and sets the rest of the meanings we have elaborated to their real extent. It refers to three levels: a) to the metaphysical world (Ontology), b) to the procedure of approaching it (Methodology) and finally c) to the expressive ways through which it is described (Gnoseology). As far as the first level is concerned, Proclus declares the ontological and evaluative superiority of the metaphysical world as compared to the physical. Regarding the second, he refers to the required ethical presuppositions of ethical and mental clearance (lucidity) so that an authentic world, like the metaphysical one, be approached in a systematic way. Regarding the third, he defines the lingual means by which a person can describe nicely the experience he has had with the divine conditions. All these passages declare that there may be a relation, a strong relation indeed, between the human and the divine as long as the preconditions of an existential purification are provided. Whoever does not ensure these preconditions is cut off from the divine.¹⁴

According to the examined facts, we reach the following three conclusions:

- 1) All the adjectives Proclus uses are directly incorporated within the context of the same theory. In other words, they serve his systematically based view that the divine world is being situated within a distance of the tangible one, a distance though that can be covered in a level of both deed and thought by the human efforts. In this

sense, the philosopher uses those strict epistemological and methodological criteria which do not infringe upon any element of his theory or discredit it.

2) Each adjective acquires its meaning in two ways. The first way is its unique significance through which it is differentiated from the rest (notional autonomy). The second is its relevance with some or all of the other adjectives through which it leads to the formation of a unified notional unity (notional supplementarity). That is to say, that the adjective's definition is complete, once considered from these two points of view.

3) Proclus is indirectly introducing the rules of constructing a system. Despite the fact that he uses plenty of words, he unifies concepts and describes ontological areas which are characterized by their inner indissoluble relevance. He brings out the variety of an area maintaining at the same time its unity (cohesion). In other words, his system has an inner vigor but it does not bring out some strictly set limits. It is self-defined which means that, even if it is externally intervened, it assimilates the interventions by using its own properties. Thus, we could claim that the Neoplatonic philosopher founds the pattern of self-reliance at least according to the perspectives he sets.

NOTES

1. Suggestively, see About **Plato's Theology** (*Peri tês kata Platôna theologias*) I, 83.20-99.23. We have to notice that both in this text and in the rest of the texts dealing with the same subject Proclus marks the entities with philosophical terms, as *homoion-anomoion* (like - unlike), *tauton-heteron* (same - opposite), *ison-anison* (equal - unequal), etc. In this way, he indirectly scales the terms of the Platonic (mainly) and Aristotelian tradition.

2. About the Gnoseological Methods of Proclus, see **Commentary to Plato's First Alcibiades** (*Eis ton Platônos Prôton Alkibiadên*), 21.8-22.15 and 140.16-141.4. see also **Commentary to Plato's Timaeus**

(*Eis ton Timaiion Platônos*) III, 296.7 - 325.13. P. Bastid, **Proclus et le crépuscule de la pensée grecque**, J. Vrin, Paris 1969, pp. 414-446. Also L. Siassos, **The lovers of Truth**, Salonica 1984, pp. 31-35.

3. See **Elements of Theology** (*Stoicheiôsis theologikê*), pr. 97-112, 86.8-100.4. See also **Commentary to Plato's Parmenides** (*Eis ton Platônos Parmenidên*), 1089.17-1239.21. S. Gersh, **From Iamblichus to Eriugena**, Leiden 1978, pp. 141-151.

4. See **About Plato's Theology**, II, 40.2-43.11. **Elements of Theology**, pr. 1-6, 2.1-8.34. Also St. Breton "Le Théorème de l'Un dans les *Éléments de Théologie de Proclus*", **Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques**, 58 (1974), pp. 561-583.

5. See **About Plato's Theology**, II, 64.11-65.26. About Proclus' view on ethics, see L. J. Rosan, **The Philosophy of Proclus**, New York 1949, pp. 193-217.

6. See **Elements of Theology**, pp. 7-13, 8.1-16.8

7. For an analytical view on the subject see Ev. Moutsopoulos, **Les structures de l'imaginaire de Proclus**, *Les belles lettres*, Paris 1985, pp. 98-175.

8. About Proclus's views on souls see **Elements of Theology**, pp. 184-211, 160.21-184.20. Also J. Trouillard, **L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus**, Paris 1972, pp. 27-67, 111-131 and 155-170.

9. On human's relation with the divine suggestively see *Eis ton Platônos Prôton Alkibiadên*, 67.19-083.16.

10. We should point out that in all his texts Proclus either directly or indirectly claims that Plato is the most eminent thinker of the entire Ancient Greek Philosophical tradition. Suggestively see **About Plato's Theology I**, 12.11-17.7. *Eis ton Platônos Prôton Alkibiadên*, 1.1-30.4.

11. On the meaning that Proclus renders to the Platonic **Parmenides** see his extended memo on Plato's **Parmenides**. Also H.D. Saffrey, **Recherches sur le Néoplatonisme après Plotin**, J. Vrin, Paris 1990,

pp. 173-184, where we can read "*C'est donc le Parménide qui ramène à l'unité tout le corps de doctrines de la théologie platonicienne*" (183).

12. On the way Proclus presents the evolution of the Platonic thinking, see **About Plato's Theology**, V, 78.26-148.25, where, referring to the mental gods, he detects their indications in various Platonic dialogues to finally argue that they are mainly completed in Parmenides and secondly in **Timaeus**.

13. On mystical Neo-Platonic ceremonies, see P. Bouancé, "Théurgie et téléstique néoplatoniciennes", **Revue de l'histoire des religions**, 149 (1955), pp189-209. J.Trouillard, **L'Un et l' âme selon Proclus**, pp.171-189.

14. We could claim that the entire philosophy of Proclus is an initiation. The terms and names he uses stem from the tradition of mystical theology and attempt to describe super-empirical situations. See J. Trouillard, **La mystagogie de Proclus**, "Les belles lettres" Paris 1982.

Chronologie-Grèce

(1^{er} octobre 2000-28 février 2001)

22 octobre : La Grèce se retire de l'exercice de l'OTAN, baptisé « Destined glory » en raison de son différend avec la Turquie sur l'appartenance de plusieurs îlots en mer Egée.

15 novembre : Grégoire Niotis remplace Mme Angelique Laiou au poste de Secrétaire d'État aux affaires étrangères.

19 novembre : Le Premier ministre remplace Théodore Pangalos par Evangelos Venizelos au poste de Ministre de la Culture.

30 novembre : Le Parlement hellénique célèbre le 80^{ème} anniversaire du rattachement de la Thrace à la Grèce .

14 décembre : M.Dimitri Avramopoulos, maire d'Athènes, annonce son intention de créer prochainement un nouveau parti politique.

18 décembre : Réélection de Mme Aleka Papariga au poste de Secrétaire général du parti communiste KKE à l'issue du XVI^{ème} Congrès de ce parti.

23 décembre : La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme condamne la Grèce à indemniser l'ancien roi Constantin et sa famille après la confiscation par le gouvernement hellénique de biens privés appartenant à l'ancienne cour royale.

1^{er} janvier : Entrée de la drachme dans la zone euro.

24 janvier : M. Costis Stéphanopoulos, Président de la République, en visite au Vatican, invite le Pape Jean-Paul II à se rendre officiellement en Grèce.

1^{er} février : Protestation de Washington après la déclaration d'Apostolos Kaklamanis, Président du Parlement hellénique accusant les États Unis d'utiliser l'argument du terrorisme pour tenter d'empêcher la tenue des Jeux olympiques d'Athènes de 2004.

4 février : Mort du compositeur, mathématicien et architecte français d'origine grecque, Iannis Xénakis.

22 février : La Grèce achète 60 avions Eurofighter d'un montant de 5 milliards d'euros.

Chronologie-Chypre

(1^{er} octobre 2000 - 28 février 2001)

4 octobre : Le Parlement européen adopte un rapport sur la demande d'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE (483 pour, 12 contre et 33 abstentions), qui souligne que l'adhésion de Chypre renforcera l'influence de ce pays en Méditerranée orientale, ce qui contribuera à accroître la sécurité dans la région.

1^{er}-10 novembre : Cinquième tour des pourparlers intercommunautaires indirects à Genève sous les auspices de l'ONU.

4 décembre : Grève en zone d'occupation militaire turque à l'appel de vingt syndicats pour protester contre les mesures d'ordre économique imposées à l'initiative du gouvernement d'Ankara.

7 décembre : M. Glafcos Cléridès, Président de la République de Chypre a participé à Nice à la rencontre du sommet de la Conférence européenne, qui a précédé les travaux du Conseil européen.

13 décembre : Le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU dans sa résolution 1331 exprime sa réprobation des actions de l'armée d'occupation turque à Strovia.

9-10 janvier : Visite officielle à Chypre du premier ministre irlandais Bertie Ahern.

19 janvier : Le sénateur français Louis le Pensec déclare à Nicosie que « parmi les pays candidats, Chypre occupe une très bonne place et qu'elle sera bientôt membre de l'UE ».

24 janvier : Le Commissaire européen chargé de l'élargissement, Gunter Verheugen, déclare que « Chypre s'intégrera à l'Union européenne avec ou sans solution à son problème politique ».

15 février : Özker Özgür, un des dirigeants du Mouvement de l'Union patriotique (YBH), déclare que plus de 50 000 Chypriotes turcs ont émigré depuis 1974 alors que dans la période 1963-1974 il y a eu moins de 6000 départs. Ce fort mouvement d'émigration, selon ce responsable chypriote turc, serait dû à la division de Chypre et à l'absence de solution de la question chypriote.

19 février : Rencontre à Nicosie de responsables politiques, chypriotes grecs et chypriotes turcs organisée par l'Ambassadeur de Slovaquie Duzan Rozbora.

Recensions / Book Reviews

La Grèce contemporaine constitue aujourd'hui un thème souvent étudié par les jeunes chercheurs des Universités françaises. Deux thèses de doctorat d'État (science politique) méritent d'être mentionnées : l'une soutenue à l'Université de Nancy 2 par Marietta Karamanli, en 1999, l'autre présentée à l'IEP de Paris par Gilles Bertrand en 2000.

Marietta KARAMANLI : « État et société en Grèce : permanences et mutations »

La guerre du Kosovo, les déplacements et les exodes de population dans les Balkans ont mis au premier plan le rôle de la Grèce dans cette région d'Europe, exposé souvent de façon caricaturale par la presse occidentale, qui a l'habitude de présenter ce pays comme État « à part ». Il est vrai que nombre de commentateurs européens n'ont pas compris pourquoi la Grèce, membre de l'OTAN et de l'Union européenne n'a pas cru devoir approuver sans de sérieuses réticences la politique menée par ces deux entités à l'égard de la Yougoslavie et des États, qui en sont issus.

C'est donc pour expliquer la réalité étatique et politique de la Grèce, dont elle est originaire, que Marietta Karamanli, établie en France depuis une quinzaine d'années, où elle s'est impliquée activement dans la vie politique de son pays d'accueil, a souhaité, par la rédaction de sa thèse, faire connaître la réalité étatique et politique grecque, qu'ignore encore la grande majorité des milieux universitaires d'Europe occidentale.

L'auteur de cette thèse expose ainsi qu'aux pratiques clientélistes, fondées sur l'insuffisance de traditions civiques, qu'explique le lourd héritage de l'empire ottoman a succédé une modernisation politique et administrative, justifiée par une demande sociale en faveur d'une dépendance moindre par rapport au patronage des élus. Si M. Karamanlis insiste, à juste titre, sur l'importance de l'appartenance de la Grèce à l'UE pour expliquer l'ampleur des mutations en cours dans ce pays, elle ne croit pas cependant devoir souligner les conséquences de la chute de la dictature des colonels (1967-1974) sur l'évolution de

la politique hellénique. On doit en effet observer que la Grèce, dès la fin de ce régime militaire, et par réaction à celui-ci, a tenu à s'engager, de façon accélérée sur la voie de la modernisation avec une nouvelle Constitution et un système de partis politiques, débarrassé du poids des traditions passées. M. Karamanli expose avec soin les rapports entre l'État et l'Église orthodoxe, dont elle analyse l'influence, en déclin, selon elle, sur la vie politique.

Il convient enfin de mentionner que cette thèse a été rédigée avec l'heureux souci de mettre en pratique le principe de pluridisciplinarité puisque chacune des trois parties, qui la composent a été rédigée par le recours à une discipline spécifique : l'histoire, pour la première partie relative à l'État et à ses fondements, la sociologie pour la seconde partie concernant l'analyse des facteurs socio-culturels et le droit pour la troisième partie principalement consacrée aux réformes politiques et administratives.

Gilles BERTRAND : « Le conflit helléno-turc : nouvelles données et nouveaux acteurs dans le système postbipolaire et à l'âge de la globalisation »

Spécialiste, de la Grèce et de la Turquie, Gilles Bertrand, après différentes publications sur les Balkans, en particulier sur l'ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine (FYROM) a consacré sa thèse au conflit helléno-turc, qu'il étudie dans la décennie 1990 marquée par la post-bipolarité et un essor sans précédent des échanges mondiaux et de nouvelles manières de penser le monde. Avec la disparition de la guerre froide, et la globalisation, les relations internationales se trouvent modifiées. G. Bertrand se demande donc si le conflit helléno-turc, inter-étatique par nature n'est pas affecté par les profonds changements économiques et sociaux, culturels, et politiques à l'échelle mondiale. Son approche sociologique du conflit helléno-turc le conduit à mettre en lumière l'action des acteurs non étatiques, non sans traiter de façon classique les facteurs de ce conflit dans les deux premières parties de la thèse intitulées, « Un conflit hors du cadre bipolaire » et « Le conflit dans le nouveau contexte post-bipolaire ».

G. Bertrand fait preuve d'une incontestable originalité avec sa troisième partie consacrée aux « Initiatives de paix non étatiques » dans laquelle il expose les initiatives de rapprochement entre la Grèce

et la Turquie, dont il établit une typologie. S'il évoque- peut- être en le surestimant – l'impact de l'Association d'amitié gréco-turque, fondée par les compositeurs Zûlfü Livaneli et Mikis Théodorakis, il décrit très judicieusement les nombreuses manifestations de sympathie et de solidarité entre les sociétés civiles grecque et turque observées en 1999, année au cours de laquelle la Grèce et la Turquie ont été éprouvées par différents séismes. G. Bertrand a eu aussi l'heureuse idée de faire le point sur l'affaire Loïzidou, qui concerne la requête d'une Chypriote contre la Turquie devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, et éclaire ainsi tant la judiciarisation du conflit helléno-turc, que l'initiative d'une citoyenne chypriote désireuse d'obtenir satisfaction pour la défense de ses intérêts face à l'impuissance de son gouvernement.

Utilisant largement, pour ses recherches, les sources de la presse de Grèce, de Turquie et de Chypre, grâce à son apprentissage du grec et du turc, G. Bertrand a aussi conduit une centaine d'entretiens avec des responsables politiques, des universitaires, des journalistes et des acteurs non étatiques de ces trois pays, qui lui ont ainsi permis de rédiger une thèse d'une rigueur remarquable.

Jean Catsiapis

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