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GREEK FOREIGN POLICY
Emerging Actors and Processes

LA POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE GRECQUE
Des acteurs et des processus émergents

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Destinés à jouer le rôle de second violon?

Des acteurs et des processus émergents dans l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque

Panayotis Tsakonas*

Des changements dans la politique extérieure grecque

Plusieurs observateurs¹ et analystes² ont noté que la politique extérieure grecque, qu'ils considéraient de nature «défensive», «statique», «introvertie», prônant - entre autres - l'isolement de la Turquie par tous les moyens et à tout prix, a été suivie, depuis le milieu des années '90 par une politique extérieure «post-nationaliste», «extrovertie», «pro-active», «flexible» et beaucoup plus sûre d'elle-même, basée sur une programmation à long terme et sur une volonté de prendre des risques calculés, considérant que les intérêts nationaux de la Grèce sont mieux servis à travers des efforts multilatéraux. Cette nouvelle politique étrangère a essayé de surmonter les travers nationalistes du pays, d'abandonner sa mentalité du «zero-sum game» et de s'adapter à l'environnement de l'après-Guerre Froide.

On devrait souligner qu'il existait une forte volonté de la part du gouvernement de l'époque, au milieu des années '90, afin de transformer le système politique grec en un modèle de gouvernance reflétant les valeurs, les normes et les principes européens³. En d'autres termes, le programme politique et la vision idéologique allaient dans le sens d'une modernisation du système politique grec⁴ et une européanisation de la politique extérieure grecque⁵.

Plus précisément, la modernisation du système politique grec et l'adhésion à l'Union monétaire européenne (UME) étaient perçus comme les moyens qui allaient mettre un terme au «caractère exceptionnel» de la Grèce et faire avancer le pays de la périphérie au centre des développements des affaires européennes. De cette façon le programme de modernisation et l'agenda reformiste du gouvernement grec se complétait par une politique extérieure, prônant la pleine intégration européenne de la Grèce. Ainsi, l'identité grecque serait

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redéfinie dans un cadre européen à l'intérieur d'une société ouverte et multiculturelle.

Pour contrebalancer le fardeau d'une politique extérieure contreproductive du début des années 1990, qui a fait que la Grèce ressemble «à un pays balkanique immature et parvenu au milieu ouest européen tandis que son adhésion même à l'Union européenne était remise en question»⁶, le gouvernement grec était appelé à surmonter les rigidités nationalistes, à s'adapter à l'environnement de l'après-Guerre froide, à se rétablir des traumatismes de la politique balkanique grecque de la période 1989-1995 et réussir à rehausser le rôle joué par le pays dans les Balkans, en augmentant ainsi sa crédibilité aux yeux de la communauté internationale et européenne en particulier⁷.

Afin d'atteindre ces nouvelles exigences, la politique extérieure grecque est allée de l'avant en adaptant rapidement une diplomatie plaçant dans son agenda les nouvelles espèces de «pouvoirs doux», telles l'influence diplomatique, économique, culturelle et morale. Le développement d'une politique extérieure placée dans un environnement de mondialisation a également démontré le lien et l'interdépendance des divers moyens de l'exercer, tels l'économie et la défense. Divers acteurs non-étatiques (ONG, corporations), sont entrés en scène non seulement comme des agents d'exercice (et éventuellement d'élaboration) de la politique extérieure grecque, mais aussi comme des partenaires dans la gérance des questions majeures de cette dernière⁸.

Cette nouvelle approche ayant mûri, ses effets sont vite devenus visibles avec des conséquences positives tant pour la crédibilité internationale du pays que pour son rôle dans les Balkans. En effet, les relations de la Grèce avec ses voisins balkaniques ont été normalisées; les bases étaient jetées pour une nouvelle relation avec son adversaire stratégique majeur, la Turquie; son adhésion à l'Union Européenne était solidifiée politiquement et économiquement avec l'adoption de l'euro; et, finalement, ses liens avec les Etats-Unis, la seule superpuissance de l'époque qui a succédé au système bipolaire, avaient été renforcés, même si à certaines occasions les raids aériens effectués par les forces de l'OTAN surtout au Kosovo, ont exacerbé les réactions anti-américaines de l'opinion publique grecque. Ainsi, les changements apportés à la politique extérieure grecque ont éventuellement permis à la Grèce de revenir à la normalité européenne. On a ainsi cimenté la paix avec la rationalité économique à l'intérieur des structures euro-atlantiques et plus important encore, on a incité le public grec à commencer à s'intéresser à des questions plus larges concernant l'avenir de la Grèce à long terme, dans le contexte d'un monde hautement compétitif de l'après-Guerre Froide⁹.

Les changements dans l'élaboration de la politique étrangère grecque: «De nouveaux acteurs en ville»

De quelle manière ces changements sont-ils survenus? Plus important encore, qui devrait recevoir le crédit pour ces derniers? Devrait-on attribuer le crédit exclusivement au gouvernement socialiste qui a accédé au pouvoir au milieu des années '90 avec une position pro-européenne non ambiguë? Plus encore, devrait-on attribuer le crédit à des personnalités spécifiques - responsables pour l'élaboration et l'application de la politique extérieure de la Grèce - étant donné que, traditionnellement, les personnalités prédominent aux dépens des institutions¹⁰ dans le processus de l'élaboration de la politique extérieure d'un pays?

Partageant le point de vue qu'il y a eu un changement majeur au sein de la politique extérieure de la Grèce au milieu des années '90, diverses contributions dans cette édition spéciale examinent le rôle des acteurs secondaires (tels les médias, la société civile, les communautés scientifiques, le lobby transnational grec et les think-tanks) aussi bien que certains processus (tels l'immigration) dans ce changement survenu pendant la seconde moitié de la première décennie de l'après-Guerre Froide. Comme le démontrent bien les différentes contributions, bien que les personnalités sont demeurées les figures-clés de la planification et de l'application de la politique extérieure grecque, il n'en reste pas moins vrai que d'autres acteurs et processus secondaires sont intervenus dans l'élaboration de cette politique et ont également joué un rôle au niveau du changement de style, des approches à la solution des problèmes et aussi au niveau du discours.

Il faut remarquer que le changement de la politique extérieure grecque du milieu des années '90 -aussi bien que, de façon générale l'élaboration de la politique extérieure du pays- était jusqu'à maintenant attribué à «l'impact de la politique d'eupéanisation», c'est-à-dire l'impact de l'intégration européenne sur la façon de faire de la politique, incluant les acteurs, les problèmes politiques, les instruments, les ressources et les styles¹¹. Les articles de cette édition spéciale soutiennent qu'il y a également eu d'autres types d'eupéanisation qui ont eu un impact sur la politique extérieure grecque et, par extension, le changement devrait également être exploré et expliqué comme un processus d'eupéanisation «politique», «sociétale», et de style au niveau du discours.¹²

Plus particulièrement, le terme «eupéanisation politique» se réfère à l'impact de l'intégration européenne sur les structures institutionnelles domestiques¹³ aussi bien que sur des acteurs politiques (tels les partis politiques et les parlements)¹⁴, les groupes d'intérêts (tels la société civile, les communautés

scientifiques, les médias et l'Eglise)¹⁵ et les processus (tels l'immigration). Le terme «européanisation sociétale» est défini comme un processus de changement au niveau de la «construction de systèmes reliés aux compréhensions collectives» dans le contexte de l'intégration européenne¹⁶. En d'autres termes, l'UE devient un point de référence dans la construction des identités sociales et altère la manière dont de telles identités sont construites et représentées. L'eupéanisation sociétale peut de cette façon être comprise comme un processus de socialisation internationale, entraînant l'internationalisation des croyances et des pratiques constitutives de l'UE, dans l'environnement international d'un État¹⁷. Par extension, les perceptions de la société par elle-même évoluent et changent selon les normes de l'UE et la coordination et la synchronisation avec d'autres États-membres est encouragée, même dans des domaines tels la politique extérieure¹⁸. Inutile de dire, bien qu'on opère à un niveau fondamental, que ce type d'«européanisation» fait référence à une internationalisation plus profonde des normes de l'UE et des pratiques au niveau du discours politique. Les acteurs-clés sont ainsi amenés, autant que les acteurs politiques secondaires, les groupes d'intérêt et les processus (par ex. l'immigration) à faire référence à l'UE (c'est-à-dire à des acteurs et des politiques spécifiques de l'UE)¹⁹.

En plus les articles de ce volume soutiennent que les types d'eupéanisation plus haut mentionnés n'ont pas seulement permis, mais également accordé le pouvoir, à des acteurs particuliers et des processus, tels la société civile, les médias, les communautés scientifiques et l'immigration, entre autres, d'intervenir et, plus important, d'affecter l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque, soit directement, soit indirectement, à travers deux chemins particuliers et interreliés. Plus précisément ils ont affecté la politique extérieure en construisant et identifiant le contexte dans lequel elle a évolué.

Une contribution beaucoup plus réservée et nuancée sur la politique extérieure grecque du milieu des années '90 vient d'un universitaire de la diaspora, Stephanos Constantinides qui traite de l'influence du lobby grec transnational sur l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque. La diaspora grecque a joué historiquement un rôle significatif dans la création et le développement de l'État grec moderne. Ce rôle a diminué de nos jours, mais néanmoins il est toujours présent.

Le rôle de la société civile

L'article bien élaboré de Georges Kalpadakis et Dimitri Sotiropoulos est très édifiant sur la manière dont un groupe d'intérêts particulier, plus précisément

la société civile, a été influencée par la force d'européanisation, tandis que cette dernière à son tour a affecté l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque. Les auteurs soutiennent que le processus d'intégration européenne de la Grèce a amené un certain nombre des changements au sein de la société civile. Ceux-ci comprenaient une transparence plus grande au sein des institutions déjà existantes ainsi que la création d'autres, nouvelles, à partir des initiatives des citoyens, des ONGs, etc. L'avènement d'acteurs locaux collectifs tels des entreprises inter-municipales, l'affaiblissement des traditionnels systèmes clientelistes organisés «verticalement» à cause des relations institutionnelles changeantes entre l'État, l'UE et la société civile, et l'émergence de nouvelles initiatives politiques initiées par des autorités gouvernementales régionales et locales (comme la protection environnementale, l'égalité des sexes, des questions de jeunesse et l'emploi) avaient comme but d'élargir les opportunités pour des acteurs de la société civile.

Cependant, le développement de la société civile grecque comme une arène ouverte à une mobilisation non-partisane à la fin des années 1980 était dû au désillusionnement des services publics et des partis politiques. En même temps, il y a eu une montée d'éléments nationalistes dont les agendas semblaient être en accord avec la politique extérieure poursuivie par les gouvernements Grecs pendant les années 1980 et la première moitié des années 1990, plus précisément le «populisme nationaliste». De 1990 à 1996 deux gouvernements successifs, Nouvelle Démocratie (entre 1990-1993) et PASOK (entre 1993-1996) ont eu tendance à adopter un «cadre d'explication simpliste» (prenant souvent la forme des «théories d'encerclement» et d'«alliances imaginaires») et ont adopté des «thèses maximalistes» sur la question Macédonienne et les relations avec la Serbie. En effet, malgré le «désir du PASOK en 1993 de projeter une image vers le futur», sa politique par rapport au FYROM et la Serbie est demeurée à l'intérieur du cadre tracé par le gouvernement conservateur précédent. Des promesses ont été faites pour «une attitude encore plus dure envers FYROM», et les liens de la Grèce avec la Serbie de Milosevic étaient renforcés.

Ce n'est qu'après le milieu des années 1990 qu'une convergence bipartite sur une politique différente entre la Nouvelle Démocratie et le PASOK a commencé à apparaître. Cette convergence s'est concentrée autour d'un agenda qui considérait le populisme nationaliste des années précédentes comme étant contreproductif, le but de cette nouvelle politique était d'atteindre les niveaux standards politiques et économiques fixés par l'UE. Le premier gouvernement Simitis a en effet mis l'accent sur l'objectif d'atteindre les critères de Maastricht en matière de convergence économique,

et a ainsi favorisé l'eupéanisation. Plus important encore, la société civile et des acteurs non-étatiques apparaissaient comme des piliers essentiels de l'eupéanisation. Par extension, le ministère des Affaires Étrangères a commencé à ériger son secteur «diplomatie de développement» en créant, entre autres, la Direction Générale pour le Développement International et la Coopération et le Comité des ONG. Il a ainsi réussi - bien qu'avec des réactions de la part des diplomates traditionalistes - l'institutionnalisation partielle de la société civile grecque, en fournissant aux acteurs sociaux ayant une tendance plus internationale, un cadre opérationnel d'aide pour réaliser leurs objectifs. Le MFA a réussi dans le but qu'il s'est fixé en élargissant son propre cadre de politique, afin d'inclure une nouvelle dimension de diplomatie relié au développement international et en rehaussant le prestige du secteur de la diplomatie économique. On devrait noter qu'une série d'autres mesures étaient également d'une importance capitale pour créer un climat favorable au plus ample développement de la société civile grecque. Telles étaient les mesures de décentralisation administrative et l'octroi de plus de pouvoirs aux municipalités, l'établissement d'autorités administratives indépendantes qui pourraient assurer une plus grande transparence, tels l'Ombudsman grec, l'indépendance grandissante de syndicats et des groupes d'intérêts et leur inclusion dans l'élaboration des politiques à travers l'établissement du Comité Economique et Social. On a noté aussi la prolifération des think-tanks, des organisations caritatives, et des instituts.

Selon Kalpadakis et Sotiropoulos, l'effort déployé pour l'intégration européenne a stimulé la montée de la société civile en Grèce. Comme un agent de reforme, l'UE a eu un impact aux facettes multiples sur la société civile en facilitant l'établissement des conditions institutionnelles pour son développement, sur la création de nouveaux droits pour les citoyens Grecs découlant d'un cadre légal viable qui les protège, et sur la mise en place de nouvelles structures de coopération basées sur une politique régionale de développement.

De ce que nous avons exposé plus haut apparaît, selon les auteurs, une tendance observée à partir du milieu des années 1990 qui consiste à adopter des outils de politique et d'avoir recours à des cadres conceptuels au niveau de la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère qui étaient à peine présents avant l'intégration de la Grèce à l'UE. Cela se manifeste plus précisément au niveau de l'interaction entre le MFA et divers ONG et au niveau de l'adoption des politiques et l'utilisation occasionnelle des ONG au stade de leur application de l'«eupéanisation politique». Plus important, les cadres conceptuels et les modes de pensée utilisés par les conseillers politiques

du MFA et même par quelques diplomates, pour formuler la politique extérieure, ont commencé à converger avec les points de vue émanant de Bruxelles («européanisation sociétale»). Par conséquent, la prééminence de l'Européanisme après 1996, dû surtout en grande partie à la nouvelle convergence bipartite grandissante (Nouvelle Démocratie-PASOK) en politique extérieure, a émergé dans une ère de création des réseaux entre les services du MFA et des ONG, et a facilité «l'européanisation sociétale» plus haut mentionnée. En tout la société civile grecque renforcée par l'européanisation, était intervenue dans l'élaboration de la politique étrangère grecque depuis le milieu des années '90, pas seulement en influençant le contexte dans lequel les questions de la politique étrangère sont discutées, et moins explicitement en changeant le discours public concernant les questions étrangères, mais aussi en influençant la physionomie de la politique extérieure grecque.

Le rôle des experts et / ou des communautés scientifiques

La contribution de Stella Ladi se concentre sur le rôle des experts et / ou de la «communauté scientifique» dans l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque, et particulièrement, leur rôle concernant les relations greco-turques à partir de 1996. En suivant une approche à trois étapes qui distingue entre des mécanismes «mous» et «durs» d'européanisation, elle poursuit avec l'analyse des facteurs médiatiques de changement et conclut avec les effets possibles de l'européanisation; l'auteur examine de quelle façon ces «mécanismes mous» d'européanisation fonctionnent à travers la diffusion de la connaissance et modifient les styles de politique exercée par les États-membres. Ladi soutient que l'impact d'européanisation peut surtout être identifié dans la «socialisation de l'élite». Cette dernière à son tour met l'accent sur l'internationalisation des habitudes de coopération et rend plus facile la formation des «communautés scientifiques» pour aborder des questions techniques. Ladi pousse cet argument plus loin afin d'explorer si le style de direction de la politique extérieure grecque dans son ensemble a été réellement affecté par la participation accrue des experts due à l'européanisation.

En identifiant et explorant le rôle de cinq groupes particuliers d'experts en politique étrangère et / ou des communautés scientifiques (des départements universitaires et des universitaires, des experts internes et des instituts de recherche financés par le gouvernement, des instituts de recherche affiliés à des partis politiques et des organisations non gouvernementales ayant comme but principal la recherche), l'auteur trouve des éléments de preuve que deux

communautés scientifiques, plutôt dynamiques - et qui se situent à l'extérieur du groupe exploré des cinq - jouent un rôle important dans le changement de stratégie de la Grèce envers la Turquie. La première communauté scientifique a travaillé aux côtés du ministre des Affaires Extérieures de l'époque, tandis que l'autre, activée après la crise d'Imia, a poussé en avant l'idée que la Grèce avait une si forte preuve légale que les îlots contestés lui appartenaient, qu'il était à son avantage de proposer la solution d'aller devant la Cour Internationale de Justice. Les deux communautés scientifiques favorisaient aussi le soutien de la Grèce à la candidature européenne de la Turquie. Pour ce qui est du rôle de tous les autres cinq groupes des communautés scientifiques, Ladi soutient que malgré le fait qu'ils n'ont pas eu d'impact sur le changement de la politique de la Grèce envers la Turquie, on pourrait donner du crédit à quelques uns d'entre eux pour avoir renforcé le discours de changement auprès du public par la publication d'articles et l'organisation de colloques et de conférences à ce sujet.

Chose plus importante, Ladi trouve des éléments de preuve qui montrent qu'un réseau d'experts (une communauté scientifique) a été formé autour du ministre des Affaires Étrangères de l'époque et a planifié et également mis en application le changement de politique étrangère grecque envers la Turquie. Selon ses trouvailles empiriques, à l'origine des comités avaient été créés au MFA avec la participation d'universitaires, d'experts internes, d'ambassadeurs et en général d'experts qui avaient la confiance de la direction politique du Ministère, ayant comme mission d'explorer l'impact qu'un changement de stratégie pourrait avoir au niveau interne mais aussi au niveau des États-membres de l'UE. La communauté scientifique qui avait été formée a continué son travail informel et le résultat a été le changement de la stratégie de la Grèce envers la Turquie.

Bref, la contribution de Ladi suggère que des mécanismes «mous» d'Européanisation ont été mis en place pour ce qui est de la politique extérieure grecque et leur impact sur les règles informelles, les procédures, les paradigmes de politique, les styles, «les façons de faire des choses» et le partage des croyances et des normes ont été significatifs. De plus, l'européanisation a rendu la participation plus facile par ses mécanismes «mous», tels la socialisation de l'élite et l'apprentissage politique. La conséquence de cette évolution a été la création des communautés scientifiques. Plus précisément, dans le cas des relations greco-turques, l'État a demandé l'aide d'experts. Ainsi, selon Ladi une communauté scientifique partageant les mêmes idées au niveau de la politique à suivre envers la Turquie a été créée autour du ministre des Affaires Étrangères de l'époque et a joué un rôle important et primordial pour le changement de la stratégie grecque envers ce pays au milieu des années

1990. Par conséquent, c'est ce réseau d'experts qui devrait recevoir une part du crédit pour le changement survenu en politique extérieure grecque au milieu des années 1990. Au même moment la diffusion de la connaissance et le changement du discours en matière de la politique extérieure avait été répandu par l'intermédiaire des articles et des conférences organisées par d'autres communautés scientifiques moins influentes, telles les instituts de recherche en matière de politiques gouvernementales.

L'influence du lobby grec

La contribution de Stephanos Constantinides traite du lobby transnational grec qui a émergé de la diaspora grecque à travers le monde. L'auteur examine comment ce lobby influence l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque dans le cadre d'une relation triadique: le pays d'accueil, le lobby et le pays d'origine. Malgré le fait que ce lobby grec avait au début comme objectif d'influencer l'élaboration de la politique extérieure des pays d'accueil en faveur des intérêts grecs, depuis quelques années on observe un phénomène inverse. En particulier dans le cas du lobby greco-américain qui est la composante la plus importante du lobby transnational grec, ce phénomène inverse, c'est-à-dire la promotion des intérêts américains à Athènes, est devenu aujourd'hui une habitude courante. L'auteur analyse en même temps l'influence exercée par le lobby grec à Athènes dans la promotion de ses intérêts propres et sa vision de la Grèce, c'est-à-dire les intérêts de la diaspora grecque et sa vision de la Grèce en tant que partie de l'hellénisme. En plus il met l'accent sur le fait que le lobby n'a pas une vision monolithique de la politique extérieure grecque. Quelques voix, particulièrement celles de la communauté des affaires, favorisent le révisionnisme introduit en politique extérieure grecque au milieu des années 1990 sur le paradigme d'«européanisation» et de «modernisation» alors que d'autres restent attachées, en particulier les masses populaires, à ses aspects traditionnels. Par ailleurs des universitaires et les intellectuels sont plus nuancés même s'ils considèrent la modernisation et l'eupéanisation de la politique extérieure grecque comme une nécessité. En même temps, cependant, quelques uns sont critiques envers les méthodes et les pratiques utilisées pour atteindre ces objectifs. D'autres contestent même les objectifs fixés par une telle politique dans les domaines comme celui de la question chypriote, le différend en mer Égée et la politique balkanique. Rares sont aussi les universitaires qui considèrent qu'il y a eu un changement majeur en politique extérieure grecque au milieu des années '90, en particulier pour ce

qui est de la modernisation de ses structures. Quelques uns soulignent même que le soit-disant changement est davantage le fruit d'une opération efficace de communication de cette époque que de la réalité.

Dans une référence historique l'auteur présente la contribution de la diaspora grecque à la création et à l'expansion de l'État grec moderne au 19^e et au 20^e siècle. Constantinides considère que l'influence du lobby grec dans l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque est attribuée en partie aux liens historiques et sentimentaux de la nation grecque avec sa diaspora et en partie à sa force politique et économique d'aujourd'hui dans les pays d'accueil. En conclusion, cependant, l'auteur considère que l'influence actuelle de la diaspora est limitée comparée à ce qu'elle était durant le 19^e siècle et au début du 20^e car la bourgeoisie grecque de cette diaspora dominait en grande partie la vie politique grecque.

Le rôle joué par des événements accidentels

Presque toute la littérature portant sur les relations greco-turques se rapporte au rapprochement qui a suivi les séismes catastrophiques en Turquie et en Grèce en 1999 comme un résultat des actions et des décisions entreprises par les deux gouvernements avant et après les séismes et / ou comme résultat de l'«européanisation» de la politique extérieure de la Grèce. Chose assez intéressante, le principal argument soulevé dans la contribution d'Eugenia Vathakou est que la coopération greco-turque qui a conduit au rapprochement, n'était pas le résultat d'un processus de prise de décision rationnel et n'a pas été provoqué par un système supérieur, qui agissait dans un but spécifique de coopération et de paix dans la région plus large de la Mer Egée.

En utilisant la «théorie des systèmes modernes» de Niklas Luhman Vathakou examine comment un événement accidentel, un désastre naturel tel le séisme devastateur survenu en Turquie en 1999, a entraîné des changements en série, qui ont conduit à l'émergence d'un système de coopération greco-turque. En se concentrant sur la dynamique qui a émergé après le séisme, l'analyse de Vathakou -basée sur une recherche primaire sur le terrain auprès des politiciens Grecs et Turcs, des diplomates, des universitaires, journalistes et des représentants de la société civile - comprend et explique le rapprochement greco-turc comme le résultat de l'évolution de la société qui a rendu possible l'intensification des processus de communication à la base du nouveau système. L'arrivée inattendue du séisme, et les événements et l'action qui l'ont suivi étaient incorporés et

chargés de signification et de causalité par les systèmes sociaux. Par conséquent, l'auteur soutient que le nouvel ordre a émergé au cours de cet événement à l'intérieur des sociétés grecques et turques et n'a pas été imposé de l'extérieur.

Bien que l'analyse de Vathakou s'éloigne de façon décisive de la règle méthodologique qui guide toutes les autres contributions dans ce volume, plus précisément d'une approche déterministe qui cherche à mettre à jour les relations de cause à effet, elle devrait être perçue comme bienvenue car elle nous permet de comprendre l'influence d'acteurs secondaires et / ou des processus dans l'élaboration de la politique extérieure de la Grèce. En effet, des structures sociales, des institutions, des personnes et des organisations ont procuré les fondements adéquats à l'institutionnalisation d'un système de coopération greco-turque. L'analyse de Vathakou explore non seulement le rôle que les différents systèmes sociaux, tels les médias, la diplomatie, les organisations de la société civile peuvent jouer dans la transformation des conflits, mais jette aussi de la lumière sur le rôle qu'un événement inattendu et la chance peuvent jouer dans cette direction. Ainsi, à travers une telle analyse l'auteur constate que l'événement accidentel du séisme avait mis en mouvement certains changements que les gouvernements grec et turc n'étaient pas en mesure de contrôler, et moins encore de planifier leurs développements. Par conséquent, les systèmes grec et turc ont été pris de court par ces développements dramatiques tandis que le camp pro-turc au sein de l'UE a haussé sa voix faisant appel en faveur de la solidarité avec Ankara et a demandé à l'Union de reconsidérer le statut de la candidature de la Turquie. Faisant face à ces nouvelles pressions de la part de l'UE, le gouvernement grec, soutient l'auteur, a perçu l'émergence d'une vague de sympathie pour les victimes turques du séisme au sein de la société grecque, comme un moment opportun de changer la politique suivie du veto concernant la candidature de la Turquie à l'adhésion à l'UE. Vathakou soutient en plus que des responsables de haut-rang au ministère des Affaires Étrangères ont compris que ce changement d'attitude allait faire décroître les réactions contre l'octroi des fonds européens à la Turquie avec le consentement de la Grèce et aussi la levée potentielle du veto grec au sommet d'Helsinki.

De plus, le séisme et les développements qu'il a engendrés ont diminué et ont éventuellement remplacé les vieilles différences conflictuelles bien-ancrées. Le nouveau système de coopération greco-turque a été officiellement institutionnalisé par les deux gouvernements dans une série de domaines (la politique, les affaires, les arts et les médias), en réussissant ainsi

à «placer dans une avenue ce qui avait commencé dans un chemin étroit». Chose plus importante, les structures de coopération ont consolidé un plus large changement d'attitudes au niveau de deux sociétés, qui peut être décrit comme un nouveau système de coopération. Dernière constatation, mais non la moindre, les changements structurels qui ont émergé après le séisme, étaient selon Vathakou, des changements qui ont été effectués par eux-mêmes. En effet, les systèmes sociaux eux-mêmes, aussi bien en Grèce qu'en Turquie ont perçu les développements après le séisme comme un important changement à leur environnement. Ils ont ainsi saisi l'occasion de développer de nouvelles initiatives de rapprochement entre les deux pays.

La contribution de Vathakou montre que le nouveau système de coopération a émergé en Grèce et en Turquie comme une sorte de nouvelle identité, et bien qu'il était provoqué par un événement accidentel, il a été par la suite rationalisé.

Le rôle de l'immigration

Pour la politique étrangère grecque, la migration - surtout la migration clandestine - a émergé comme une importante question de «sécurité nationale» en 1990, presque immédiatement après la chute des régimes communistes en Europe de l'Est et dans les Balkans. A ce moment-là des flux grandissants d'immigrants légaux et clandestins provenant de ces pays sont entrés en Grèce. Dans une contribution bien documentée Charalambos Tsardanidis arrive à la conclusion que l'immigration internationale, particulièrement l'immigration clandestine, est devenue un sujet de préoccupation important pour la sécurité nationale de la Grèce, qu'elle avait été perçue comme une menace à l'identité nationale et à la stabilité politique. Plus particulièrement, le courant de migration que la Grèce a connu depuis le début des années '90 a mené à la naissance de nouvelles perceptions de cette menace et au développement d'un nouveau discours sur l'identité nationale. En citant une pléthore d'exemples, Tsardanidis montre que les immigrants étaient perçus comme une menace aux valeurs majeures de la société et plus particulièrement à l'identité nationale, au bien-être économique et à la stabilité politique du pays.

On devrait noter que le phénomène migratoire était demeuré en dehors des limites confinées de l'euro péanisation et de son impact sur la politique extérieure grecque. Tsardanidis soutient que malgré les programmes de légalisation successifs, la Grèce a fait face et continue de connaître un problème d'immigration parce que les flux migratoires clandestins et leurs coûts d'intégration augmentent. Pour atténuer le réel et / ou perçu impact

destabilisateur de l'immigration internationale sur sa sécurité nationale la Grèce s'est tournée vers l'UE et a insisté que seul le cadre européen pouvait procurer les moyens pour cimenter une politique consistante d'immigration. La Grèce a aussi soutenu la mise en place des politiques communes au sein de l'UE afin de décourager les flux d'immigrants additionnels.

Chose plus importante, en citant divers exemples, l'auteur montre comment l'immigration avait grandement influencé - et continue d'influencer l'élaboration de la politique extérieure de la Grèce envers également les pays d'origine des immigrants - surtout ceux de la Méditerranée Orientale et de la Région des Balkans. À cause de cela, les relations de la Grèce avec l'Albanie ont été grandement influencées par des considérations relatives au traitement des immigrants Albanais par l'État grec. Qui plus est, les trouvailles empiriques de Tsardanidis indiquent que l'immigration crée des tensions avec les pays d'origine des immigrants, ou aggrave les relations avec d'autres qui sont déjà tendues, ayant ainsi un impact sur la stabilité régionale. L'exemple de la Grèce et de la Turquie est caractéristique de ce point de vue: déjà tendu par les questions de Chypre, de la Mer Égée et les droits de minorités en Thrace de l'Ouest et Constantinople, les relations entre la Grèce et la Turquie ont été encore aggravées par une série d'incidents impliquant des immigrants clandestins transitant via la Turquie vers l'Europe de l'Ouest à travers la Grèce. Le cas d'immigrants Kurdes et réfugiés est un autre exemple qui a influencé la politique extérieure grecque et même la politique intérieure dans le cas du leader Turc Ocalan.

Assez intéressantes, les trouvailles empiriques de Tsardanidis suggèrent également qu'en plus d'influencer directement l'élaboration de la politique extérieure, des gouvernements successifs du pays ont à répétition utilisé les immigrants comme un instrument pour promouvoir et atteindre des objectifs particuliers en politique étrangère. À cette fin, la contribution de Tsardanidis détermine une série d'instruments, qui sont devenus partie intégrante de la politique extérieure de la Grèce envers des pays de provenance d'immigrants et à travers lesquels la Grèce a essayé de combattre l'immigration clandestine.

Le rôle des médias

En examinant l'influence des médias dans l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque, Christos Frangonikolopoulos soutient qu'ils préservent un rôle autonome et déterminant et construisent le contexte dans lequel les questions de politique extérieure sont discutées. En appliquant le modèle de Robinson «de politique interactive des médias», l'auteur fait une tentative

d'identifier et spécifier les conditions sous lesquelles les médias peuvent jouer un rôle limité ou significatif dans la politique extérieure grecque. Pour ce faire il examine cinq cas particuliers: la crise entourant les perspectives d'exploitation de gisements de pétrole en 1987, la question «Macédonienne», la crise d'Imia en 1996, la guerre de Kosovo en 1999, et le sommet de l'UE à Helsinki en 1999.

Fonctionnant avec un système de prise de décision déficient, les médias grecs tendent à promouvoir une perspective hautement nationaliste. En prétendant qu'ils représentent le sentiment national et la conscience collective de la nation, les médias s'adaptent aux perceptions populaires confortables de la société dominante. Ainsi, les journalistes et les propriétaires des conglomerats des médias craignent que s'ils adoptent une position alternative, qui diffère des idées et normes du public, ils seront rejetés par les spectateurs et les auditeurs. Ainsi les pratiques journalistiques et les insécurités financières des médias renforcent l'attitude défensive et la mentalité de victimisation du public grec, mais aussi son ambiguïté envers les affaires européennes et internationales. Ceci n'est nullement plus clair, soutient l'auteur, que dans les perceptions concernant la position de la Grèce au sein de l'UE.

La Grèce a en général un profil pro-européen, tel que présenté par l'Eurobaromètre durant les dix dernières années. Cependant l'auteur identifie un paradoxe étant donné que toutes les trouvailles illustrent que la loyauté à la Grèce vient en premier et les éléments culturels symboliques de l'identité grecque obtiennent un très haut score, tandis que les éléments correspondants à l'identification à l'Europe obtiennent un score peu élevé. Les médias grecs accordent peu d'importance aux valeurs sur lesquelles le projet de l'Union Européenne se repose ou devrait se reposer. Dans la plupart des cas les «intérêts nationaux» constituent le facteur dominant dans le discours politique et celui des médias. Ainsi, les commentaires de la presse se réfèrent plus à l'«intérêt national» qu'aux sujets reliés à l'Union Européenne.

Chose plus importante, l'analyse par Frangonikolopoulos de ces cinq cas particuliers démontre que les médias peuvent jouer un rôle décisif dans l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque en orientant l'agenda politique et en dominant le discours de la sphère publique. Comme dans le cas de la crise entourant les prospections de gisements de pétrole, les cas d'Imia, d'Helsinki et de Kosovo suggèrent que la relation entre les acteurs-clés de la politique extérieure (c'est-à-dire le gouvernement et les décideurs politiques) et les médias est essentielle dans le rôle que ces derniers peuvent jouer dans l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque. Ainsi, quand le gouvernement

et les décideurs politiques sont déterminés à poursuivre une action particulière, ils sont peu enclins à être influencés par la couverture critique des médias et l'opposition de la société. Ceci était particulièrement clair dans la guerre de Kosovo, pendant laquelle le gouvernement et la communauté politique du pays ont manipulé stratégiquement le discours des médias et de la société afin de promouvoir leur position ambivalente. Il était également clair lors du sommet d'Helsinki, lors duquel malgré le scepticisme et les critiques de l'opposition, les médias n'étaient pas en mesure de jouer un rôle influent.

Il est intéressant de noter que dans son analyse l'auteur suggère que l'influence des médias augmente quand ils réussissent à multiplier les perceptions et les attentes du public comme cela était le cas pour la question «Macédonienne». En Grèce ceci a conduit à la reproduction et au renforcement d'un discours ethnocentrique et nationaliste, entretenant une image de la Grèce comme étant une nation, sous la menace de l'UE, de l'OTAN et des Etats-Unis, ainsi que des pays voisins (Turquie, FYROM). L'analyse de Frangonikolopoulos suggère que les médias ont contribué à l'aggravation de la perception de la tension et à l'entretien d'une mentalité de siège qui conduit la Grèce à adopter une attitude défensive et aide à exagérer les risques en les transformant en menaces. Les positions des médias ont des repercussions importantes sur le contexte dans lequel les questions de politique extérieure sont discutées autant que sur le contenu du discours public entourant ces mêmes questions. En effet, ce « contexte » se trouve sous pression de l'agenda des médias tandis que le discours public craint d'accepter des solutions négociées et conciliantes à des problèmes qui existent depuis longtemps.

L'étude de tous les cas inclus dans cette édition spéciale a clairement démontré que l'élaboration de la politique extérieure de la Grèce, et particulièrement les changements apparus au milieu des années 1990 n'avaient pas été uniquement le résultat de la pensée du gouvernement de l'époque. Au contraire, une série d'autres acteurs et processus, renforcés par la force d'eupéanisation, - thème devenu dominant au sein du discours de la politique extérieure et intérieure du pays - sont intervenus dans l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque et ont joué un rôle dans le changement de son style et de ses approches pour la solution des problèmes. En effet, des acteurs particuliers, tels la société civile, les médias, les communautés scientifiques, l'immigration et même des événements accidentels, sont intervenus et, chose plus importante, ont influencé l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque soit directement, soit indirectement, en

construisant et déterminant le contexte dans lequel ces questions sont discutées, et en modifiant le discours public les entourant. Inutile de dire que nous obtiendrons une conclusion plus adéquate sur le rôle des acteurs et des processus dans l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque si la liste des cas est complétée par l'exploration du rôle de l'Eglise orthodoxe, des partis politiques grecs, de l'opinion publique grecque, et du Parlement. Nous espérons que cette édition spéciale va constituer un point de départ pour une recherche plus poussée sur les divers acteurs et processus qui affectent l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque contemporaine.

NOTES

1. See - among others - Ian Lesser, Stephen F. Larrabee, Michele Zanini and Katia Vlachos-Dengler, *Greece's New Geopolitics* (RAND, National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, 2001).
2. See -among others-Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal", *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 27, No. 2, June 2005), pp. 217-239; Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment" in Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery* (London Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 73-94; and Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems" in Achilleas Mitsos and E. Mossialos (eds), *Contemporary Greece and Europe* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), pp. 359-372.
3. See P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.
4. See Spyros Economides, "The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy", *West European Politics* (Vol. 28, No. 2, March 2005), p. 481.
5. P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
6. S. Economides, *The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 481; see also Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000).
7. In an article about the future of the turbulent Balkan region, *The Economist* observed in January 1998 that "Greece is more interested in joining Europe's monetary union than in pursuing nationalist dreams", see *The Economist*, January 24, 1998 as quoted in P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 371: (fn) 6.

8. Such as the role played by the NGO's in the process of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1999 and in Greek-Turkish relations in general.
9. For these remarks, see Dimitris Keridis, "Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek Policy towards Turkey Today" in Christodoulos Yallourides and Panayotis Tsakonas (eds), *Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War* (New York, Melissa/Caratzas Publications, 2001), pp. 57-58.
10. See Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Planning Model for Foreign Policy in Greece: People vs. Institutions" in Panayotis Tsakonas (ed.), *Modern Greek Foreign Policy: A Holistic Approach*, Vol. 1 (Athens, Sideris, 2003), pp. 91-136 [in Greek].
11. For a definition of «policy Europeanization», see Claudio M. Radaelli, "Whither Europeanization? Concept, Stretching and Substantive Change", *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 4, No. 8, available at <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>. For accounts of the change in Greece's foreign policy based on «policy-Europeanization», see -among others-P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.* and Spyros Economides, *The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*
12. The common view is that Europeanization involves the impact of the EU dynamics on national politics and policy-making, discourse, identities, political cultures and public policies. See Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change", *European Integration on line Papers* (EIOP) Vol. 4 (2000) N° 15, available at <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm>.
13. On the bureaucratic and institutional adaptation of Greece's foreign policy making structures, see P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-89. See also Dimitrios Kavakas, "Greece" in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds), *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000), pp. 145-148.
14. P. Mair, "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems", *West European Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, pp. 27-51.
15. Maria Green Cowles, "Whiter the Service Sectors? Globalization, Europeanization, and National Patterns of Capitalism", paper presented at the seventh conference of the European Community Studies Association, Madison Wisconsin, 2001.
16. Maria Green Cowles and Thomas Risse, "Transforming Europe: Conclusions" in M. G. Cowles, J. A. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds) *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001, p. 219.
17. Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000, p. 111.

18. K. Glarbo, "Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy" in T. Christiansen, K. E. Jorgensen and A. Wiener (eds), *The Social Construction of Europe*, Sage, London, 2001, pp. 140-57.
19. Thus, «a perfectly Europeanized public discourse» would see all political actors routinely make reference to the European level.

Doomed to Play Second Fiddle?

Emerging Actors and Processes in the Formation of Greece's Foreign Policy

Panayotis Tsakonas*

Change in Greece's Foreign Policy

As noted by many observers¹ and foreign policy analysts² since the mid-90s the “defensive”, “static”, “inward-looking” nature of Greece's foreign policy, arguing – *inter alia* – for the isolation of Turkey by all means and at all costs, was followed by a “post-nationalist”, “outward-looking”, “pro-active”, “flexible”, and much more confident foreign policy based on long-term planning, a willingness to take calculated risks and the faith that Greece's national interests are better served via multilateral efforts. This new foreign policy attempted to overcome the country's nationalist biases, to abandon its “zero-sum game” mentality and to adjust to the post-Cold War environment.

It should be stressed that there was a strong intention and a purposeful action by the Greek administration in the mid-1990s to transfer into the Greek political system a model of governance reflecting the values, norms and principles upon which the EU system and those of its member states are constructed.³ In other words, there was a political as well as an ideological program for intended change and reform towards a parallel process of “Europeanizing” Greek foreign policy while pursuing a modernizing domestic reform process⁴ or “towards ‘modernization’, and therefore, ‘Europeanization’”.⁵ More specifically, the modernization of the Greek political system and membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU) were viewed as the means to put an end to the “Greek exceptionality” and move Greece from the periphery to the epicentre of the European developments. Thus, the modernization program and the reformist agenda of the Greek government had a complementary policy externally, arguing for Greece's full integration into the international distribution of labour and European structures and the redefinition of Greek identity within the framework of an open, multicultural European society.

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Facing the burden of the counterproductive foreign policy of the early 1990s, that made Greece look “as an immature Balkan parvenu in the Western European milieu while its very membership of the EU was [put] in question”⁶, the Greek government was called upon overcoming nationalist rigidities, adapt to the new post-Cold War environment, recover from the traumas of Greece’s Balkan policy of the 1989-1995 period and manage to elevate the country’s role in the Balkans, thus raising the country’s credibility in the eyes of the international, especially European, community⁷.

Towards meeting these new demands, Greek foreign policy went on to the rapid adaptation of its diplomacy by placing in its agenda the new sorts of “soft power”, such as diplomatic, economic, cultural and moral influence. The development of foreign policy in a globalized environment also demonstrated the connection and interdependence of the various means of exercise of foreign policy, such as the economy and defense. Several non-state actors (NGOs, corporations) entered the stage not only as agents of exercise (and eventually of formation) of Greece’s foreign policy, but also as partners in the management of major foreign policy issues ⁸.

As this new approach matured, its effects soon became visible with positive consequences for the country’s international credibility and its role in the Balkans. Indeed, Greece’s relations with its Balkan neighbors were normalized; the ground was laid for a new relationship with its major strategic opponent, Turkey; its membership in the European Union was solidified politically and economically (with Greece’s accession to the common currency); and, finally, its ties with the United States, the sole superpower in the post-bipolar international system, were strengthened, despite the fact that a series of occasions, with the NATO air-strikes in Kosovo foremost among them, spurred the anti-American reflexes of the Greek public opinion. Thus, change in Greece’s foreign policy seemed to eventually succeed in putting Greek politics back to European normalcy, in cementing peace with economic rationality and the Euro-Atlantic structures, and, most importantly, in making the Greek public to start showing concern for the broader long term questions of Greece’s future in the context of a highly competitive post-Cold War world ⁹.

Accounting for Change and Foreign Policy Formation: “New Actors in Town”

How this change occurred and, most importantly, who should get the credit for that change? Should the credit be exclusively given to the socialist

government that came to power in the mid-1990s with an unambiguously pro-European position? Furthermore, should particular personalities - responsible for the design and implementation of Greece's foreign policy - get the credit, given that, traditionally, personalities dominate over institutions¹⁰ in the country's foreign policy making process?

Sharing the view that there was indeed a major change in Greece's foreign policy in the mid-1990s, contributions in this special issue examine the role of secondary actors (such as the media, civil society, epistemic communities and think-tanks) as well as of certain processes (such as immigration) in the change occurred in the Greek foreign policy during the second-half of the first post-Cold War decade. As the various contributions illustrate, although personalities remained the key-features of Greece's foreign policy design and implementation and kept playing a decisive role in the formation of the country's foreign policy, yet other secondary actors and processes intervened in the formation of Greece's foreign policy and also played a role in the change of the country's foreign policy style, problem-solving approaches, narratives and discourses.

It is worth noting that the change of Greek foreign policy in the mid-1990s – as well as, more generally, the formation of the country's foreign policy – was so far attributed to the “policy impact of Europeanization”, i.e. the impact of European integration on policy making, including actors, policy problems, instruments, resources and styles.¹¹ The contributions in this special issue argue that there have also been other types of Europeanization which have impacted on Greece's foreign policy and, by implication, the change in Greece's foreign policy should be also explored and explained as a process of “political”, “societal”, and “discursive Europeanization”¹².

More specifically, “political Europeanization” refers to the impact of European integration on domestic institutional structures (national executives and administrative structures)¹³ as well as on political actors (such as political parties and parliaments)¹⁴, interest groups (such as civil society, epistemic communities, the media and the church)¹⁵ and processes (such as immigration). “Societal Europeanization” is defined as a process of change in the “construction of systems of meanings and collective understandings” within the context of European integration¹⁶. In other words, the EU becomes a reference point in the construction of social identities and alters the way in which such identities are constructed and represented. Societal Europeanization can thus be understood as a process of international socialization, entailing the internalization of the EU constitutive beliefs and practices, in a state's international environme¹⁷. By implication, societal self-

perceptions evolve and change in accordance with the EU norms and practices and coordination and synchronization with other member-states is encouraged, even in domains such as foreign policy.¹⁸ Needless to say, although operating on a fundamental level, this type of Europeanization is rather difficult to be identified and/or measured. Finally, “discursive Europeanization” refers to a more in-depth internalization of the EU norms and practices in the public discourse, thus making key-actors as well as secondary political actors, interest groups and processes to make reference to the EU, i.e. to specific EU actors and policies¹⁹.

Contributions in this volume further argue that the aforementioned types of Europeanization have not only allowed for, but have also empowered, particular actors and processes, such as civil society, media, epistemic communities, and immigration, among others, to intervene and, most importantly, to affect the formation of Greece’s foreign policy either directly or indirectly, through two particular, and interrelated, pathways, namely by constructing and determining the context in which foreign policy issues are discussed, and by changing the public discourse in foreign policy issues.

Less “enthusiastic” on the Greek foreign policy in the mid-1990’s is a specific contribution in this volume from an academic outside of Greece, Stephanos Constantinides, with an article on the Greek transnational lobby and its influence in the formulation of the Greek foreign policy. Greek diaspora has played in the past a significant role in the creation and the development of the modern Greek state. This role has diminished nowadays but, nevertheless, it’s always present.

The Role of Civil Society

George Kalpadakis and Dimitri Sotiropoulos’ well-elaborated contribution is very telling about how a particular interest group, namely the civil society, was influenced by the force of Europeanization while it in turn affected the formation of Greece’s foreign policy. The authors argue that Greece’s participation in the process of European integration brought about certain changes vis-à-vis civil society. These included the advocacy of greater transparency in existing institutions and the promotion of new ones (i.e. citizens’ initiatives, NGOs, etc); the rise of local collective actors such as inter-municipal enterprises, the weakening of the traditional “vertically” organized patron-client system due to the changing institutional relations between the state, the EU and civil society, and the emergence of new policy initiatives by regional and local government authorities (e.g., on environmental protection,

gender equity, youth and employment issues) aimed at broadening opportunities for actors from civil society to mobilize.

However, the rise of the Greek civil society as an arena open to non-partisan mobilization by the end of 1980s was due to disillusionment with the public services and political parties. At the same time, there was an upsurge of nationalist elements whose agendas seemed consonant with the foreign policy followed by Greek governments throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, namely “nationalist populism”. From 1990 to 1996, two successive Greek governments (ND in 1990-1993 and PASOK in 1993-1996) tended to adopt a “simplistic explanatory framework” (often taking the form of “encirclement theories” and “imaginary alliances”) and adopted “maximalist theses” on two of Greece’s national issues at the time, namely the Macedonian issue and relations with Serbia. Indeed, despite PASOK’s “desire to appear forward-looking” in 1993, foreign policy with respect to FYROM and Serbia remained within the framework set out by the previous conservative government. Promises were made for “an even tougher stance on FYROM”, and Greece’s ties with Milosevic’s Serbia were strengthened.

Thus it was not until the mid-1990s when a different bipartite convergence began to take place between New Democracy and PASOK. This convergence has centered around an agenda based on the common assumption that the nationalist populism of Greece’s foreign policy in the previous years was counterproductive; it has been seen as a drive to achieve the political and economic standards set by the EU (the first Simitis government placed emphasis on meeting the Maastricht economic convergence criteria), and it thus favoured Europeanism instead of populism. Most importantly, civil society and non-state actors were not merely a secondary question to the restructuring of the economy and polity, but figured as *essential pillars of Europeanism* (our emphasis). By implication, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to build up its undeveloped sector of “developmental diplomacy” (establishment – *inter alia* – of the General Directorate for International Development and Cooperation and the Committee of NGOs). It had thus succeeded – although with reactions from traditionalist diplomats – in the partial institutionalization of the Greek civil society, by providing the more internationally-oriented social actors with an operational framework in which to promote their goals. The MFA succeeded in this endeavour by broadening its own policy framework, in order to include a novel dimension of diplomacy relating to international development as well as to enhance the sector of economic diplomacy. It is worth noting that a series of other developments were also vital in creating a climate favourable to the further

development of the Greek civil society, such as the devolution of power attempted by the government through administrative decentralization and the empowerment of municipalities, the establishment of independent administrative authorities that could ensure greater transparency such as the Greek Ombudsman, the growing independence of trade unions and interest groups and their inclusion in policy formulation through the establishment of the Economic and Social Committee, the proliferation of think-tanks, voluntary organizations, and institutes.

For Kalpadakis and Sotiropoulos, the drive towards European integration had stimulated the rise of civil society in Greece. As an agent of reform, the EU has had a multifarious impact on civil society by facilitating the establishment of domestic institutional preconditions for the development of civil society, the creation of new rights for Greek citizens accruing from a viable legal framework that protects them, and the setting up of new regional cooperative structures based on regional development policy.

What all the above point to, the authors argue, is the tendency since the mid-1990s to adopt policy tools and to resort to conceptual aspects of foreign-policy decision-making which were hardly present before Greece's integration in the EU, namely the interaction between the MFA and various NGOs at the stage of policy making and the occasional "use" of NGOs at the stage of policy implementation ("political Europeanization"). Most importantly, the conceptual frameworks and modes of thinking, with which MFA policy advisors and even some diplomats formulated policy, began to converge with points of view emanating from Brussels ("societal Europeanization"). By implication, the prevalence of Europeanism after 1996, owing not least to the growing new bipartite (New Democracy-PASOK) convergence in foreign policy, ushered in an era of networking between MFA services and NGOs and facilitated the above noted "societal Europeanization". All in all, empowered by the force of Europeanization the Greek civil society had intervened in Greece's foreign policy formation since the mid-1990s not only by affecting the context in which foreign policy issues are discussed, and less explicitly changing the public discourse in foreign policy issues, but also by affecting the physiognomy of Greece's foreign policy.

The Role of Experts and/or Epistemic Communities

Stella Ladi's contribution focuses on the role of experts and/or "epistemic community" in the formation of Greece's foreign policy, and particularly, their role during the policy shift in Greek-Turkish relations that started in 1996. By

following a three-step approach that distinguishes between “soft” and “hard” mechanisms of Europeanization, continues with the analysis of the mediating factors of change and concludes with the possible outcomes of Europeanization, the author examines how these “soft mechanisms” of Europeanization function through the diffusion of knowledge, and change the policy styles of member-states. Ladi argues that the impact of Europeanization can be particularly identified in “elite socialization”. The latter in turn signifies the internalization of co-operative habits and the facilitation of the formation of “epistemic communities” for the handling of technical issues. Ladi takes this argument further in order to explore whether the whole policy style and direction of Greece’s foreign policy has been actually affected by the increased participation of experts due to Europeanization.

By identifying and exploring the role of five particular groups of foreign policy experts and/or epistemic communities (University departments and academics, in-house experts and government-funded research institutes, policy research institutes, research institutes affiliated to political parties and non-governmental organization with a research focus), the author finds evidence for an important role of two particular and rather dynamic epistemic communities – that lie outside the explored group of five – in Greece’s strategy shift towards Turkey. The first epistemic community worked on the side of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs while the other, activated after the Imia crisis, pushed forward the idea that Greece had so strong legal evidence that the islets were Greek that it was to its advantage to propose a solution through the International Court of Justice. Both epistemic communities were also in favour of Greece’s support to the Turkish candidacy for the EU. As for the role of all other five groups of epistemic communities, Ladi argues that although they did not have an impact on the shift of Greece’s policy towards Turkey, one may credit some of them for strengthening the foreign policy discourse towards change through articles in the press and the organization of relevant conferences and lectures.

Most importantly, Ladi finds evidence that a network of experts (an epistemic community) was formed around the then Foreign Minister and designed as well as implemented Greece’s turn towards Turkey. According to her empirical findings, initially, committees were founded at the MFA with the participation of academics, in-house experts, former ambassadors and in general experts that the leadership trusted, that had as a mission the exploration of the impact that a shift of strategy would have internally, but also among the other EU member-states. The epistemic community that was formed continued its work informally and the result has been the shift in Greece’s strategy towards Turkey.

All in all, Ladi's contribution suggests that "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization have been in place as far as Greek foreign policy is concerned and their impact upon informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms has been significant. Moreover, Europeanization has made the participation more possible through its "soft" mechanisms such as elite socialization and policy learning. By implication, epistemic communities are being created. More specifically, in cases such as the Greek-Turkish relations the state followed the rationalistic paradigm and asked for experts' help. A particular epistemic community with shared beliefs and a common policy enterprise towards Turkey was formulated around the then Minister of Foreign affairs and is the one, Ladi argues, that played an important and prominent role in the strategic shift of Greece's policy towards Turkey in the mid-1990s. By implication, it is this network of experts that should get part of the credit for the change occurred in the mid-1990s in the most critical aspect of Greece's foreign policy, namely its strategy towards Turkey. At the same time, a diffusion of knowledge and a change in foreign policy discourse had also taken place through articles in the press and conferences organized by other less influential epistemic communities, such as institutions and policy research institutes (a clear indication of "societal" and - to a certain extent - "discursive Europeanization").

The Influence of the Greek Lobby

Stephanos Constantinides' contribution focuses on the transnational Greek lobby which emerged from the world large Greek diaspora. He examines how this lobby influences the foreign policymaking in Athens in the framework of a triadic relation: the host country, the lobby itself and the country of origin. Even if this Greek lobby was in the beginning looking to influence the foreign policymaking of the host country in favour of the Greek interests, a reverse phenomenon is in process for some years now. Especially in the case of the Greek-American lobby, the most important component of the trans-national one, this reverse phenomenon, i.e. the promotion of American interests in Athens, is nowadays almost a standard affair. The author analyses the present influence of the Greek lobby in Athens in terms of its interests and its vision of Greece, i.e. the interests of the Greek diaspora and its vision of Greece as a component of Hellenism. Furthermore, the author argues that the lobby doesn't have a monolithic vision of Greek foreign policy. Some voices, especially those of the business community, favour the revisionism introduced in Greek foreign policy in the mid-1990's under the paradigm of "Europeanization" or

“modernization”, while others stay attached to its traditional patterns, especially the popular masses. Academics, on the other hand, are more nuanced, considering the “modernization” or “Europeanization” of the Greek foreign policy as a necessity. But, in the meantime, some of them argue against methods and practices used to attain its objectives. Others contest even the goals fixed by such policy in areas like the Cyprus question, the Aegean contention or the Balkan equation. On the other hand, few are the academics who see a profound major change of Greek foreign policy, especially in terms of modernisation, in the mid-1990’s, some of them arguing even that the so-called change reflects more the communication patterns of this period than the reality. In a historical reference Constantinides presents the contribution of the Greek diaspora in the creation and expansion of the modern Greek state during the 19th and 20th century. The author considers that the influence of the Greek lobby in the foreign policymaking process in Athens is related in part to the historical and sentimental ties of the Greek nation with its diaspora and in part to its present political and economic power in the host countries. In conclusion, however, he considers the present influence of diaspora to be limited compared with what it had been in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, when the Greek bourgeoisie of the diaspora dominated Greek politics.

The Role of Accidental Events

Almost the whole literature in Greek-Turkish relations deals with the rapprochement that followed the catastrophic earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999 as a result of actions and decisions undertaken by the two governments before and after the earthquake and/or as a result of “Europeanization” of Greece’s foreign policy. Interestingly enough, the main argument in Eugenia Vathakou’s contribution is that the system of Greek-Turkish cooperation, manifested in the two states’ rapprochement, was not the result of a rational decision making process nor it developed by a super-system, which was acting under a specific rationale of cooperation and peace in the broader region of the Aegean Sea.

By employing Niklas Luhmann’s “modern systems theory”, Vathakou discusses how an accidental event, a natural disaster such as the devastating earthquake that occurred in Turkey in 1999, have had a “butterfly effect”, namely triggered a chain of changes, which led to the emergence of a system of Greek-Turkish co-operation. Focusing on the timing of the developments and the dynamics that emerged after the earthquake, Vathakou’s analysis – based on primary research with Greek and Turkish politicians, diplomats, academics,

journalists and civil society representatives – understands and explains the Greek-Turkish rapprochement as the evolution of society that enabled the amplification and intensification of communication processes that constituted the new system. The unexpected appearance of the earthquake and the events and actions that followed it were incorporated and endowed with meaning and causality by social systems. By implication, the author argues, the new order emerged in the course of the “autopoiesis”, the ongoing self-renewal of modern functionally differentiated society. It was not imposed from outside, it emerged from within Greece and Turkey.

Although Vathakou’s analysis departs decisively from the methodological rule that guides all other contributions in this volume, namely from a deterministic approach that seeks to uncover cause-effect relationships, it should be viewed as a welcome contribution to our understanding of the influence of secondary actors and/or processes in the formation of Greece’s foreign policy. Indeed, so far determinations of meaning and social structures like themes, institutions, persons and organizations provided adequate grounds for the functional specification and institutionalization of a Greek-Turkish system of cooperation. Vathakou’s analysis explores not only the role different social systems, such as the media, diplomacy, civil society organizations and politics can play in conflict transformation, but it also sheds light to the role contingency and chance can play. Thus, through such an analysis the author finds that the accidental event of the earthquake had set in motion certain changes that the Greek – and Turkish – government was not in the position to control, let alone to design these developments. By implication, the Greek – and Turkish – system was hijacked by these dramatic developments while the pro-Turkish camp within the EU raised its voice urging solidarity with Ankara and asked the Union to reconsider Turkey’s candidate status. Facing these new pressures within the EU, the author argues, the Greek government perceived the emergence of a stream of sympathy for the Turkish victims of the earthquake within Greece, *as an opportune moment to change its policy with regard to the veto* on the Turkish candidacy for membership in the EU (our emphasis). High-ranking officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perceived that this shift of attitudes, Vathakou further argues, would decrease reactions against both the release of the funds by the EU towards Turkey with Greek consent and also the potential lift of the Greek veto at the Helsinki Summit.

Moreover, the earthquake and the developments it brought about broke down and eventually replaced the old well-established differences supportive of the Greek-Turkish conflict (i.e. Greek vs. Turkish interests, Greek state vs.

Turkish state), by new differences (i.e. civil society vs. state, Greeks/Turks vs. politicians, enmity vs. friendship) which found connections in existing referential substrata of both countries.

In addition, the new system of the Greek-Turkish cooperation has been officially institutionalized by the two governments in a series of fields (politics, business, arts and the media), thus managing to “place in an avenue what had began in a narrow road”. More importantly, the structures of cooperation consolidated a broader change of attitudes at the grassroots level, which can be described as a new system of cooperation. Last, but not least, the structural changes that emerged after the earthquake, Vathakou argues, were self-changes, which emerged through self-referential processes of communication. It was social systems themselves in both Greece and Turkey that perceived the developments after the earthquake as an important change to their environment. They picked up the irritation their environments provided them with and they attributed to it meaning, which in turn had a further effect on their own self-description. The reactivation of certain peace initiatives that had been suspended after the Ocalan crisis in February 1999 (i.e. The Greek-Turkish Forum, other initiatives of business-people and local governments) are but clear examples of the emergence of new self-descriptions by people who felt endowed with a different responsibility after the earthquake.

Vathakou's contribution shows that the new system of cooperation emerged from within Greece and Turkey as a new identity, and as a new attractor to order the new differences, interpret the new phenomenon and attribute meaning to aspects of Greek-Turkish relations from the past. Most importantly, the new system of the Greek-Turkish cooperation that was triggered by an accidental event was introduced to *rationalize* the situation following the earthquake (our emphasis).

The Role of Immigration

For Greek foreign policy, migration – mainly irregular migration – emerged as an important “national security” issue in the 1990s, almost immediately after the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. At the time increasing flows of legal and mainly illegal migrants from these countries entered Greece. In a well-documented contribution, Charalambos Tsardanidis comes to the conclusion that international migration, particularly irregular migration, has become a basic concern in Greece's national security, since it has been perceived as a threat to Greece's national identity and political stability. More specifically, the migration

“wave” that Greece has experienced since the early 1990s led to the construction of new threat perceptions and to the development of a new discourse on Greece’s international role and identity. By citing a plethora of examples, Tsardanidis shows how immigrants were perceived as a threat to Greece’s major societal values and more particularly to Greece’s national identity as well as to its economic well-being and political stability.

It is worth noting that the migration phenomenon had remained outside the confines of Europeanization and its impact in Greece’s foreign policy. Tsardanidis argues that despite the successive legalisation programmes Greece faced – and continues to face – an immigration problem as flows of illegal immigrants and the cost of integration rise. For mitigating the real or/and perceived destabilising impact of international migration on its national security, Greek foreign policy turned to the EU and claimed that only the EU framework could provide the means for cementing a consistent immigration policy by making available the means of planning and implementing a successful adaptation policy of its own immigrants while – through the development of EU common policies – deter the inflow of additional immigrants.

Most importantly, by citing several examples, the author shows how immigration had greatly influenced – and keeps influencing– the formulation of Greece’s foreign policy towards both individual countries of origin –mainly those from Eastern Mediterranean – and the Balkan region as a whole. By implication Greece’s foreign policy in the Balkans, in general, and Greece’s bilateral relations with Albania, in particular, was greatly influenced by considerations regarding the handling of Albanian immigrants by the Greek state. Moreover, Tsardanidis’ empirical findings indicate that migration creates tensions with individual countries of origin, or aggravates already strained bilateral relations with others, thus impacting regional stability. The example of Greece and Turkey is a characteristic one: already strained by the issues of Cyprus, the Aegean Sea and minority rights in Western Thrace and Istanbul, relations between Greece and Turkey have been further burdened by a series of incidents involving irregular immigrants transiting from Turkey into Western Europe via Greece. The case of Kurdish immigrants and refugees used as tools of what might be termed “private foreign policies”, is another example. In such cases, some of the most active advocates of Kurdish immigrants to Greece appeared primarily concerned with the discrediting and ultimate change of regime in Turkey rather than with the plight of the Kurdish refugees themselves. Needless to say that the use of refugee admissions, as a tool of foreign policy, is an increasingly

dangerous game – as the Ocalan case proved – as it can backfire badly, in both domestic and foreign policy.

Interestingly enough, Tsardanidis' empirical findings also suggest that apart from directly influencing the formation of Greece's foreign policy, successive Greek governments have repeatedly used immigrants both as an instrument of statecraft (in order to impose restraints upon the actions of the home governments and for further deterring the immigrants population influx) and as a tool in order to promote and achieve particular foreign policy objectives. To this end, Tsardanidis' contribution identifies a series of policy instruments, which had become integral parts of Greece's foreign policy towards immigrants home countries in the Balkans and in Eastern Mediterranean and through which Greece's migration policies have attempted to combat illegal immigration.

The Role of Media

Exploring the role of the media in the formation of the Greek foreign policy Christos Frangonikolopoulos' contribution argues that the media are neither only a significant medium – operating as the main provider of information to the public – nor they are only restricted to the reporting and coverage of issues. They, moreover, preserve an *autonomous* role by *determining and constructing the context* in which the foreign issues are discussed (our emphasis). By applying Robinson's "policy media interaction model", the author attempts to identify and specify the conditions under which the media may play a limited or significant role in Greece's foreign policy. In so doing he examines five particular cases: the Greek-Turkish oil-drilling crisis of 1987, the "Macedonian issue", the Imia crisis in 1996, the war of Kosovo in 1999, and the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999.

Functioning within a deficient decision-making system, the Greek media tend to promote a highly nationalistic perspective. Claiming that they represent the national sentiment and the collective consciousness of the nation, the media adjust their coverage and framing to the dominant, popular and comfortable views and perceptions of society. By implication, journalists and owners of media conglomerates fear that if they adopt an alternative position, one that differs from the rigid and closed ethnocentric ideas and norms of the public, it will be rejected by the viewers and audiences. Suffering from introversion, poor journalistic practices and habits and commercial anxieties, the media not only reinforce the reactionary defensiveness and victimization mentality of the Greek public, but also its ambiguity towards

European and international affairs. Nowhere is this clearer, the author argues, than on the perceptions regarding Greece's position in the EU.

Greece in general has a pro-EU profile, as presented by the Eurobarometer over the last ten years. Yet the author identifies a paradox since all findings illustrate that loyalty to Greece comes first and the symbolic cultural elements of Greek identity score very high, whereas the corresponding elements for identification with Europe score very low. The Greek media also represent the EU in the same way. Very little importance is given to the values on which the European Union project rests, or should rest. In most cases the "interests" of the nation are the dominant factor in the political and media discourse. By implication, the press comments more on the "national interest" in relation to the events or matters of the European Union

Most importantly, Frangonikolopoulos' examination of the particular five cases demonstrates that the media can have a decisive role in the formation of Greece's foreign policy by directing the policy agenda and dominating the discourse of the public sphere. As the oil drilling, Imia, Helsinki and Kosovo cases suggest the relationship between the key-actors in foreign policy (i.e. government and policy makers) and the media is essential for the role the media can play in the formation of the Greek foreign policy. Thus, when the government and policy makers are determined to pursue a particular action, they are unlikely to be influenced by the critical coverage of the media and the opposition of society. This was particularly clear in the Kosovo war, where the government and the political community of the country strategically manipulated the discourse of the media and society to promote its ambivalent position. It was also clear in the Helsinki Summit, where despite the skepticism and criticism of the opposition parties, the media was not able to pursue an influential role.

Interestingly enough, the author's analysis suggests that the media influence increases when it is framed in such a way as to multiply the perceptions and expectations of the public (e.g., the "Macedonian issue"). In Greece this has led to the reproduction and reinforcement of ethnocentric and nationalist discourse, sustaining a representation of Greece as being a nation under threat from the EU, the NATO alliance and the USA, and from its neighboring countries (Turkey, FYROM). Thus, Frangonikolopoulos' analysis suggests that the media contributed to the aggravation and perpetuation of tension and the cultivation of a siege mentality that makes Greeks defensive and oversensitive and helps exaggerate risks and turn them into threats. The consequences are severe for both the construction of the context in which foreign policy issues are discussed as well as for the content of the public

discourse in foreign policy issues. Indeed, the first is under pressure from what is on the media agenda, while the latter creates a fear to pursue and accept negotiated and conciliatory solutions to long-standing problems.

All cases included in this special issue have clearly demonstrated that the formation of Greece's foreign policy, and particularly its major change in the mid-1990s, had not been exclusively the result of the government's, at the time, thinking and decisions. Instead, a series of other actors and processes, empowered by the force of Europeanization, which – especially since the mid-1990s – had become the dominant theme in the country's foreign and domestic discourse, intervened in the formation of Greece's foreign policy and played a role in the change of the country's foreign policy style, problem-solving approaches, narratives and discourses. Indeed, particular actors and processes, such as civil society, media, epistemic communities, immigration, and even accidental events, have intervened and, most importantly, have affected the formation of Greece's foreign policy either directly or indirectly, by constructing and determining the context in which foreign policy issues are discussed, and by changing the public discourse in foreign policy issues. Needless to say that a more accurate inference on the role of the secondary actors and processes in the formation of Greece's foreign policy is taken if the list of the cases is complemented with the exploration of the role the Orthodox Church, the Greek political parties, the Greek public opinion, and/or the Parliament can play. Hopefully, this special issue will constitute a kick-off for further research of the various actors and processes that affect the formation of the contemporary Greek foreign policy.

NOTES

1. See – among others - Ian Lesser, Stephen F. Larrabee, Michele Zanini and Katia Vlachos-Dengler, *Greece's New Geopolitics* (RAND, National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, 2001).
2. See – among others – Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal", *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 27, No. 2, June 2005), pp. 217-239; Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment" in Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery* (London Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 73-94; and Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems" in Achilleas

- Mitsos and E. Mossialos (eds), *Contemporary Greece and Europe* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), pp. 359-372.
3. See P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.
 4. See Spyros Economides, "The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy", *West European Politics* (Vol. 28, No. 2, March 2005), p. 481.
 5. P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
 6. S. Economides, *The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 481; see also Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000).
 7. In an article about the future of the turbulent Balkan region, *The Economist* observed in January 1998 that "Greece is more interested in joining Europe's monetary union than in pursuing nationalist dreams", see *The Economist*, January 24, 1998 as quoted in P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 371: (fn) 6.
 8. Such as the role played by the NGOs in the process of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1999 and in Greek-Turkish relations in general.
 9. For these remarks, see Dimitris Keridis, "Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek Policy towards Turkey Today" in Christodoulos Yallourides and Panayotis Tsakonas (eds), *Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War* (New York, Melissa/Caratzas Publications, 2001), pp. 57-58.
 10. See Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Planning Model for Foreign Policy in Greece: People vs. Institutions" in Panayotis Tsakonas (ed.), *Modern Greek Foreign Policy: A Holistic Approach*, Vol. 1 (Athens, Sideris, 2003), pp. 91-136 [in Greek].
 11. For a definition of "policy Europeanization", see Claudio M. Radaelli, "Whither Europeanization? Concept, Stretching and Substantive Change", *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 4, No. 8, available at <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>. For accounts of the change in Greece's foreign policy based on "policy-Europeanization", see – among others – P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.* and Spyros Economides, *The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*
 12. The common view is that Europeanization involves the impact of the EU dynamics on national politics and policy-making, discourse, identities, political cultures and public policies. See Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change", *European Integration online Papers* (EIOP) Vol. 4 (2000) N° 15, available at <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm>.
 13. On the bureaucratic and institutional adaptation of Greece's foreign policy making structures, see P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.*, pp.

- 87-89. See also Dimitrios Kavakas, "Greece" in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds), *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000), pp. 145-148.
14. P. Mair, "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems", *West European Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, pp. 27-51.
 15. Maria Green Cowles, "Whiter the Service Sectors? Globalization, Europeanization, and National Patterns of Capitalism", paper presented at the seventh conference of the European Community Studies Association, Madison Wisconsin, 2001.
 16. Maria Green Cowles and Thomas Risse, "Transforming Europe: Conclusions" in M. G. Cowles, J. A. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds) *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001, p. 219.
 17. Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000, p. 111.
 18. K. Glarbo, "Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy" in T. Christiansen, K. E. Jorgensen and A. Wiener (eds), *The Social Construction of Europe*, Sage, London, 2001, p. 140-57.
 19. Thus, "a perfectly Europeanized public discourse" would see all political actors routinely make reference to the European level.

Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy*

George Kalpadakis and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos**

RÉSUMÉ

Le discours sur la politique étrangère adopté par les acteurs de la société civile en Grèce peut-être décrit par des termes d'un contraste idéologique entre l' "Européanisme" et le "populisme nationaliste." Ce discours a pénétré dans la politique grecque au moins depuis les premières années de la décennie 1980. En examinant les conséquences des quelques événements pour la politique grecque (p.e. la crise politique intérieure de 1989, les guerres de Yougoslavie), ainsi que l'européanisation de la Grèce, nous interprétons les façons par lesquelles la société civile a acquis un rôle important dans la politique étrangère grecque. En 1989-1996, les acteurs de la société civile inspirés par le discours nationaliste populiste ont prévalu sur les voix antinationalistes pro-européennes. Après 1996, la marche vers l'intégration européenne et la convergence croissante entre les deux grands partis (PASOK - Nouvelle Démocratie) sur la politique étrangère a fait avancer les acteurs pro-européens de la société civile.

ABSTRACT

The foreign policy discourse adopted by civil society actors in Greece may be described in terms of an ideological contrast between "Europeanism" and "nationalist populism". This discourse has pervaded Greek politics, particularly foreign policy, at least since the early 1980s. By examining the consequences of certain events for Greek politics, e.g. the domestic political crisis of 1989, the wars in Yugoslavia, as well as the Europeanization of Greece, we interpret the ways in which civil society has assumed a significant role in Greek foreign policy. In 1989-1996, civil society actors imbued by the nationalist populist discourse prevailed over pro-European, anti-nationalist voices. After 1996, the drive towards European integration and the growing bipartite (PASOK - New Democracy) convergence in foreign policy stimulated the rise of pro-European civil society actors.

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Introduction

There is a broad consensus in Greece that civil society has won a recognizable place in the formulation and even more so in the implementation of Greek foreign policy. The consensus is shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the media, as well as the wider international relations (IR) academic community. There are two theses which we will advance here: 1. an ongoing dualism exists between what we shall call Europeanism and nationalist populism in Greek foreign policy, and state proponents and civil society supporters of these two discourses have played a role in forging the post-1989 Greek foreign policy; and 2. historically, the integration of Greece into the EU, the domestic political crisis of 1989 and the developments in Southeast European politics were conducive to the rise of Greek civil society, and had important consequences for the institutionalization of civil society into the policy framework.

Although the literature on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy has grown¹, the influence of civil society on this process has not been fully analyzed². “Civil society” is a normatively charged concept which suggests the possibility of an active public, equipped with institutionalized forms of participation (independent institutes, mass media, interest groups, NGOs, social movements), and of a “public sphere” based on rational constructive debate. We shall investigate the ways in which Europeanism and nationalist populism - in our opinion the two major discursive dimensions of Greek post-1989 foreign policy - have been employed by the actors of Greece’s nascent civil society.

We begin by describing the impact of the EU on the Greek state and society before treating Europeanization briefly. The historical roots of nationalist populism and Europeanism in Greek foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the emergence of the former, are then explored with some mention of the shaping of Modern Greek national identity and the implications of nationalist populism for foreign policy and civil society, particularly in the 1981-1996 period. We then proceed to examine the conjunctures which were conducive to the involvement of the Greek civil society in shaping foreign policy from 1989 to 1996. After an examination of Greece’s foreign policy after 1996 in the context of the bipartite convergence, we note the mobilization of pro-European civil society actors. Finally, we attempt to reach some wider conclusions about the role of civil society in Greek foreign policy in view of its shift from nationalist populism to Europeanism, acknowledging of course that our contrast between the two discourses is not a rigid analytical schema, but a way to interpret policy change.

This article draws upon various sources including anonymous personal interviews with officials and policy advisors, public statements and interviews by members of government and NGO activists, press reports, and Greek - and English - language international relations and political science literature on contemporary Greece. The theoretical framework is eclectic, drawing on discourse analysis (understood here to include not only the relevant rhetoric but also policy measures and political practices), the post-Weberian approach of Greek sociology and political science³ and the institutionalist approach to Europeanization⁴.

Dualism of Greek Political Culture and EU's Impact on Post-authoritarian Greek Society

The EU, Greek Civil Society and Europeanization

The EU has functioned as a modernizing force in terms of Greek foreign policy. Overall it has entailed the further consolidation of democracy, the creation of institutional preconditions for the development of civil society, and the creation of new rights for Greek citizens. The consolidation of post-1974 democracy achieved in Greece partly through its contact with the EU was largely connected with the socializing effect of its membership⁵. After 1974, in post-authoritarian Greece, the EEC figured as an external safeguard, useful in restoring democracy to the post-Junta country.

Greece's participation in the process of European integration brought about the following changes vis-à-vis civil society: (1) The advocacy of greater transparency in existing institutions and the promotion of new ones (citizens' initiatives, NGOs); through this process, acts and practices of traditional state institutions, such as central services of ministries, were periodically subjected to scrutiny by new institutions, such as the Greek Ombudsman and the Independent Personal Data Protection Authority. Recently, traditional social actors, namely trade unions, faced competition from new collective actors, for example, the anti-globalization movement. (2) The rise of local collective actors such as inter-municipal enterprises. The drive to secure funds and technical assistance from the EU incited local social groups to develop networks for communication at a national and European level. (3) The traditional "vertically" organized patron-client system was somewhat weakened because of the changing institutional relations between the state, the EU and the civil society. (4) The EU encouraged decentralization by providing political and economic incentives for autonomous activities, independent

from the state, at a regional level. New policy initiatives by regional and local government authorities related to environmental protection, gender equity, youth and employment issues sought to broaden the opportunities for actors from civil society to mobilize⁶.

The EU also created a powerful legal framework with institutions for the protection of citizens' rights: the European Ombudsman, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament constitute authorities which promote citizens' rights. Greece's entanglement in the "Balkan imbroglio", however, mitigated the positive impact of the EU on civil society. Analysts of South-East European politics, such as Thanos Veremis, have noted the far-reaching effects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia⁷. Between 1989 and 1995, in addition to the ever-present Christian Orthodox Church, non-state actors like nationalist networks and ethnocentric citizens' associations emerged, whose outlooks tended to correspond to the broadly nationalist populist foreign policy adopted by the governments of the time. The effects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia on Greece, for instance the rise of xenophobia and nationalism, can help to illustrate the interplay between Greece's then nascent civil society and foreign policy.

Europeanization involves the impact of the EU dynamics on national politics and policy-making, discourse, identities, political structures and public policies⁸. As a process, it assumes many forms and operates at more than one level. The most common form is the Europeanization of the substance of policies. This involves the mainstreaming of the national economies of individual EU member-states and the transposition of legislation from the EU to the national level, for example, the agricultural policy. Another, less well-known form is the Europeanization of the mode of policy-making. The latter includes the EU's impact on the discourse of national collective agents. This could be termed the cognitive level of Europeanization. In other words, adaptation to the EU involves other aspects beyond the legal order and economic performance of member-states. These aspects include acquiring a European mentality, i.e., thinking in terms of synchronization with other member-states of the Union, and also employing concepts and procedures, such as long-term planning, meeting deadlines, competing for available funds, and absorbing funds in time. Loukas Tsoukalis speaks of another aspect of the same phenomenon-benchmarking⁹. In various policy areas, including foreign policy, this less visible but no less real cognitive type of Europeanization concerns the way decisionmaking structures, politicians and individual citizens describe and

understand the trends of domestic politics and foreign affairs.

Europeanization also involved administrative effects. After Greece's accession to the EEC in 1981, changes in government organization took place. A special post of deputy minister of European Affairs was created at the Greek ministry of foreign affairs. At various ministries, notably economy, labour and social security, and education, new units under the banner of Special Secretariats (which had existed since the 1980s but flourished in the 1990s), were founded and staffed with outside experts and political appointees. New public agencies were created to oversee the absorption and use of EU funds. Throughout the public sector, committees emerged, put together by ministers and heads of public enterprises in order to deal with Greece's adaptation to the requirements of European integration. All this revealed the tendency of Greek governments to circumvent the public administration, including the apparatus of the ministry of foreign affairs, judged as reluctant to adapt to policy change.

In Greece, both the cognitive adaptation and administrative reorganization took a long time to sink in, partly because of the change of government in October 1981, when the conservative party (ND) was replaced by the socialist party (PASOK) which did not bring to power a pro-European political élite. On the contrary, PASOK initially held a skeptical stance towards the EEC. While in opposition (1974-1981), PASOK had cultivated an anti-EEC profile, which it upheld until after the first term in power (1981-1985)¹⁰. The Nea Demokratia (ND), in office from 1990 to 1993, contained an amalgam of nationalist and pro-European politicians but quickly succumbed to nationalist pressures and forged close links with Serbia. Upon its return to power (1993), PASOK also adopted an ethnocentric stance in foreign affairs. Only with the 1996 rise of an ex-minister of PASOK, Costas Simitis, did the socialist party and its government adopt an unambiguously pro-European position.

The Roots of "Nationalist Populism"

Nikiforos Diamandouros' study of modern Greek political culture yields a useful distinction between a "reformist" and an "underdog" strand in Greek foreign policy¹¹. Rooted in the middle classes of the late nineteenth-century Greek Diaspora, the "reformist" culture favours moderate and gradual changes which civil society may initiate. Foreign policy is also liberated from the state-centered, introverted and fearful discourses intrinsic to the worldview of the "nationalists", and invested with ideas rooted in the Enlightenment such as rationality, democratization, and human rights. The term "underdog culture" is

a subcategory of cultures like Greece's, "which have experienced contact with more "developed" systems, have established asymmetrical, subordinate relations with them, and have internalized this asymmetry in negative and defensive terms that have translated in a commensurately diffident and xenophobic view of the international order"¹². In such a culture, "the state is perceived as the "natural" ally and protector of the weak and non-competitive layers and structures, whose interests it will safeguard from the ever-threatening and increasing pressures of the market mechanism and of the international system"¹³.

A crucial point about the "underdog culture" is that it "exhibits a distinct preference for small and familiar structures compatible with clientelistic practices"¹⁴. The nation's rights "are invested with a permanent, incessant, and morally superior content that raises them above the moral relativism, "dirty" political struggles and world of compromises they invariably come with"¹⁵. These rights are evoked in foreign policy to highlight the threats against "just" Greek policies or Greek sovereign rights. The guiding ideology of the Greek state throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s was "nationalist populism". Populism, based on the inclusion of the masses into active politics through their direct *rapport* with a charismatic leader, reduced the space for the creation of a strong civil society. Not necessarily identical to nationalism but belonging to the underdog culture, nationalist populism led many citizens into believing that the Greek nation is "perpetually betrayed, nationally superior but historically unfortunate, always right but always disaffected by Western "foreigners" who detest it and machinate towards its exclusion"¹⁶.

As Panayiotis Ioakimides has noted, the tension between Greece's self-perception as a "Balkan state" in the EU and an "EU state" in the Balkans also stems from this dualism and is linked with the issue of the Greek national identity and the nature of Greek citizens' relations to the state¹⁷. In late-developing societies, the process of unprecedented social change generated by capitalism and the emergence of the nation-state uprooted segmental localism from all levels of social life, inducing individuals to shift their allegiance from their traditional community to the "national centre". The process of inclusion into the centralized mechanisms of the state, the national market and national education system meant getting people involved discursively in the "imagined community" of the nascent nation-states, ensuring the transformation of "subjects" into "citizens".

Nevertheless, the form civil society would take depended on the structure of pre-industrial/modern central administrative power. Historically, in most of the social formations which were later to become advanced industrial Western

societies, a delicate balance had been achieved between the monarch and the élites, creating the space for the *corps intermédiaires*¹⁸. Under these conditions a strong civil society was created in the West, one which could check state power and represent collective interests autonomously. By contrast, in the early nineteenth century, Greece had no room for autonomous interest groups. The country simply lacked the organizational, cultural, and political basis on which civil society relies in the West. After the country's national independence (1830), the establishment of parliamentary institutions preceded the expansion of industrial capitalism, while the state had to respond to growing pressures from below which stemmed from rapid urbanization. Political parties employed two mechanisms to absorb these pressures and also ensure a minimum of intra-élite political competition. Nicos Mouzelis has called these modes of political domination *clientelism* and *populism*¹⁹.

Clientelism, or the formation of client-patron networks based on transaction of political and/or economic capital, was successfully connected to the political strategy of using the public sector as a safety valve for rising unemployment and social/political unrest. This form of bringing citizens into the modern state atomized their interests, thus diminishing the potential for forging forms of loyalty based on civic bonds. In Greece clientelism endured as a mode of political domination throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. Clientelism also set the scene for the development of an hypertrophic and particularistic state unable to facilitate the pluralist interest representation observed in Western European countries²⁰. Nationalism thus served to unite these modes of domination, defining the nature of citizen participation in Greek political life. In the case of Greece, nationalism was born when the modern Greek social formation was still part of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the shifting of alliances from the local to national level did not go hand in hand with industrialization and the administrative consolidation of the nation-state. Untempered by the socio-economic and political realities of modernization, the nationalist discourse was allowed to take more utopian, volatile, and ultimately uncontrollable forms. The political conjuncture of 1981-1995, to which we now turn, offers an illustration of the effects of nationalist populism.

PASOK's Nationalist Populism

From 1981 to 1989, PASOK evoked a volatile discourse²¹ for the purposes of legitimating its foreign policy strategy. In juxtaposition to the conservative nationalism associated with the pre-1974 *status quo*, a leftwing nationalist

ideology was constructed, grounded on a combination of “anti-imperialism”, clientelism, and populism giving impetus to the charismatic personality of PASOK’s leader, Andreas Papandreou. Through clientelist practices, PASOK ushered in (particularly through employment in the public sector) large parts of the working class, the rural population and the lower middle class. These segments of Greek society had been excluded from the centres of power owing to the ideologically discriminatory clientelism which followed the defeat of the communists in the Greek Civil War (1946-49). The new clientelism was organized by the socialist party’s bureaucracy rather than individual members of the political élite²². It was not restricted to the entry level of the civil service but extended to the élite level, composed of party cadres and new businessmen who engaged in business with the state.

PASOK also utilized the anti-American sentiments, which had grown because of the widespread perception of American involvement in the earlier breakdown of Greek democracy (1967) and the debacle in Cyprus (1974). PASOK’s hegemony thus helped replace anti-communist nationalism with nationalist populism. Its foreign policy did not make openings for a strong civil society, something which would have been supported by the discourse of Europeanism. It drew upon popular support as a legitimizing element, employing a discourse which evoked the notion of brotherhood among “peoples”, rather than the idea of rights, voluntary associations and deliberation among partners of equal standing. The major domestic crisis of 1989 highlighted the dead-ends of the nationalist populism of PASOK as an impediment to the rise of a robust civil society.

The Rise of Greek Civil Society as a Player in the Foreign Policy Area

The Domestic Political Crisis of 1989

After the mid-1980s, political cynicism and alienation in Greece²³ appeared and peaked in the late 1980s. By 1989, PASOK may have been extolling the benefits that would accrue from conforming to the Single European Market but it suffered a deep identity crisis. A divide emerged between supporters of technocratic reform favouring a more dynamic agenda of liberalization and European integration, and opponents of this reform who emphasized “the national interest” and adhered to large public spending. The ensuing political crisis was reflected in two political affairs. The “corn affair” of the late 1980s stemmed from the revelation that officials of the Ministry of Finance were implicated in falsifying official documents related to the shipping of goods.

The documents falsely confirmed that a cargo of Yugoslavian corn was Greek, so as to benefit from relevant EEC legislation for products of EEC member-states. In his defense at the court, the accused former Deputy Minister of Finance did not deny the charges but chose to evoke the “national interest” to legitimize his actions. Thirteen former ministers, who were called in to testify as defense witnesses, also evoked the national interest²⁴.

The most representative instance of the political crisis was the Koskotas affair, a case of extensive money-laundering operations implicating high-ranking state officials. The Koskotas story reflected deeper issues surrounding the relations between state and civil society²⁵. Disillusionment with public services and political parties functioned as a catalyst for the emergence of civil society as an arena open to non-partisan mobilization. At the same time, there was an upsurge of nationalist elements whose agendas seemed consonant with the foreign policy followed by Greek governments in the early 1990s. The effects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia on Greek foreign policy provide a fine illustration of this point as seen below.

The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Greek Civil Society

As late as in 1992, Greece had no coherent foreign policy towards the new Balkan states. It was therefore a shock for politicians submerged in the webs of Greece’s political crisis to witness the resurgence of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as an independent state, which both adopted the symbol of the ancient Macedonian royal house and, more alarmingly, inserted in its constitution terms that could have been taken to imply claims on Greek territory²⁶. At the same time, Turkey was renewing its interest in the Muslims of Thrace. Meanwhile, the Cyprus problem remained unresolved²⁷. These developments were exacerbated by the corresponding inability of the Greek state to use both its EC/EU and NATO memberships and its economic superiority in the Balkans as a springboard for the pursuit of a leading regional role.

In the face of changes following the collapse of Yugoslavia, two successive Greek governments (ND in 1990-1993 and PASOK, 1993-1996) tended to adopt a “simplistic explanatory framework” (often taking the form of “encirclement theories” and “imaginary alliances”) grounded on a “maximalist thesis”²⁸: any bilateral negotiation with FYROM would rest on the assumption that its official name does not contain any references to “Macedonia”²⁹. As no such reassurances could be made, Greece was silently castigated for its stance by the rest of the EC/EU members, who were

making efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement³⁰. In August 1992, the Greek government imposed an oil embargo on FYROM, while two years later PASOK generalized the embargo by closing down the Greek General Consulate in Skopje and prohibiting the circulation of goods to and from FYROM (excluding food and pharmaceutical products). A million-strong demonstration that took place in February 1992 in Thessaloniki appeared to legitimize the maximalist foreign policy line³¹.

Serbian nationalism also became an emotional subject for Greeks, as Milosevic initially figured as another Tito struggling to reunite Yugoslavia. During the war in Bosnia, Greece opposed any military operation against Serbia. On grounds of national interest, the Greek Foreign Minister rejected the UN decision to create a no-fly zone over Bosnian airspace because this would have made it permissible for Turkish aircrafts to fly in Greek airspace. Furthermore, when it became known that a number of Greek businessmen violated the economic embargo imposed on Serbia, the Greek government demonstrated reluctance to punish the perpetrators³². With its stance, Greece gradually managed to alienate the EU and international community at large, and even a section of the business community in Northern Greece (which operated on the profit-seeking approach). During this period, nationalist politicians on all sides exploited the patriotic ferment in Greece with regard to the “Macedonian” issue and relations with Serbia³³.

By the mid-1990s, pro-maximalist sentiments in Greek society began to subside³⁴. A temporary settlement (Interim Accord) was signed by Greece and FYROM in 1995. Yet, for as long as two years later, Athens-based media, influential political analysts, and powerful economic and commercial interests seemed to advocate an increasingly confrontational policy towards Skopje. These groups were reinforced by segments of civil society in northern Greece and “a highly sensitive diaspora entrenched in maximalist positions”³⁵. The Greek privately-owned media are a case in point. Following the divorce of mass media from the state in the early 1990s, a media culture based on sensationalism grew. The absence of state regulation on new television channels led to the development of a so-called Darwinian environment for media competition, further exacerbating its ethnocentric core through the negative portrayal of incoming immigrants from Southeastern Europe³⁶.

Between 1989 and 1995, all the elements prevalent in Greek nationalist populism at large, became conjoined and condensed into a nationalist foreign policy³⁷. NGOs and citizens’ groups which disagreed with this policy were confronted with the paradoxical situation of having to articulate a

rights-based discourse without the benefits of a more developed civil society, as all three composite characteristics of civil society (material base, organizational expression, ideology and values)³⁸ were present in Greece, but were imbued with the element of state-centrism. Indeed, although weakened by the crisis at the end of the 1980s, the paternalistic state demonstrated resilience by forging a complementary relationship with the nationalist segments of civil society. Despite PASOK's desire to appear forward-looking³⁹ in 1993, foreign policy with respect to FYROM and Serbia remained within the framework set out by the previous conservative government. Promises were made for "an even tougher stance on FYROM", and Greece's ties with Milosevic's Serbia were strengthened. The unusual degree to which the aspirations of Greek civil society actors corresponded to the orientation of the state's foreign policy at the time, becomes explicable if one acknowledges that their ideological core degenerated into an ethnocentric discourse similar to the age-long, traditional nationalist discourse of the Greek state.

Greece's New Foreign Policy

Pro-Europeanists in Power: Foreign Policy and Civil Society

By the mid-1990s, a different bipartite convergence began to take place between ND and PASOK, which has been seen as a drive to achieve the political and economic standards set by Western European countries. This drive was facilitated by the spread of pro-European ideas (Europeanism). In fact, Costas Simitis won both general elections in 1996 and 2000, remaining in power until March 2004. Since 1996 the bipartite convergence in foreign policy goals has centered around an agenda based on the common assumption that the nationalist populism of Greece's foreign policy in the previous years was counterproductive with respect to the national interest. This was attributed to the inordinate extent to which factors of personality and charismatic leadership had impacted on the formulation of foreign policy⁴⁰. Clientelism, which functions in the absence of institutional structures and leads to the electoral game of ethno-political outbidding, was also conducive to making non-rational policy choices, for example, the very friendly policy vis-à-vis Serbia.

At this point we would like to suggest a rough, but not too rigid, conceptual division between followers of Europeanism who adhere to economic, political and administrative changes in line with EU requirements, on the one hand;

and its opponents, usually associated with xenophobic social strata, nationalist actors and generally those who feel like “outsiders” vis-à-vis the process of Europeanization, on the other. While after 1974 opponents to Greece’s entry into the then EEC focused on the economic inequalities that might emerge from Greece’s integration into the Common Market, in the 1990s opponents were concerned about the threat it may pose to the Greek cultural identity. On the other hand, Europeanism has also been portrayed as a force that has exploited the nascent civil society while preserving intact clientelism, owing to the fact that the management and allocation of EU funds usually goes through the “party-controlled state”⁴¹.

In the mid-1990s, the first Simitis government emphasized meeting the Maastricht economic convergence criteria. An acute awareness prevailed within his Cabinet regarding “the tarnished image of past statism”⁴². For politicians like George Papandreou, civil society and non-state actors were not merely a secondary question to the restructuring of the economy and polity but figured as pillars of Europeanism. This is clearly a pluralist approach, advocating that civil society actors be represented in the social dialogue between state and society⁴³. Democratization became associated with peace and human rights, in opposition to nationalist populism which linked democratization to “anti-imperialism” and national sovereignty. In its struggle to break with this rhetoric, Europeanism seemed to repudiate the notion of “anti-imperialism” altogether. In Greece, concerns with this lack of criticism towards great power politics were voiced by trade unions, the parliamentary and non-parliamentary left, and sectors of the media throughout the wars in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan. Unlike nationalist populism, Europeanism was associated with the new discourse of humanitarian intervention or the “war on terrorism”. Europeanism has tended to downplay the importance of “sovereignty” and national-popular struggles (Kurds), while emphasizing the struggles of minority groups for recognition (Muslims in former Yugoslavia) or the struggles of social movements for basic human rights (the women’s movement in Afghanistan). International solidarity is thus linked more with civic bonds and human rights, rather than with historical-ideological or religious bonds tying together national struggles of different peoples around the world.

In this context, the fact that significant sectors of the Greek population have been hostile towards the United States and the Western powers has not affected the rise of a new bipartite (ND-PASOK) convergence in Greek politics. As a foreign policy analyst noted in 2003, post-1996 PASOK became “a champion” in the “two-level games-approach” required for

managing the discrepancy between its pro-western orientation in foreign policy and the sensibilities of Greek public opinion. Thanks to its mastery of this technique, "PASOK is emerging as a reliable partner to its Western allies since it is the only [party] that can manipulate the unruly Greek public opinion and absorb its reactions"⁴⁴. This became apparent during the NATO bombings of Serbia in 1999. While the overwhelming majority of citizens expressed its opposition to them, a tacit approval existed regarding the government's obligation to align itself with the rest of the NATO members in supporting military action⁴⁵.

Following the rise of Europeanists under Simitis and George Papandreou, the MFA started to build up its undeveloped sector of "developmental diplomacy." In the past, Greece had been on the receiving end of funding programs (Integrated Mediterranean Programs in the 1980s) but by the mid-1990s it was assuming the new role and responsibilities of an OECD donor-state. This also affected the character of civil society, whose nationalist elements seemed to be dissipating while a new framework was being created for their incorporation into a coherent policy framework. Greek NGOs such as European Perspective, Humanitarian Defense, and Doctors Without Borders could begin to work on an international level within both the development policy outlined at Maastricht in 1992 and the EU's Liaison Committee on NGOs. At the same time, NGOs drew ideological legitimacy from the Stability Pact and the multilateral cooperative model it propagated⁴⁶. By leaving non-state actors outside its operational framework, the MFA leadership realized that it would be failing to address an emerging situation: as the head of the MFA's Committee on NGOs has noted, "while a few years ago about 90 percent of decisions on foreign affairs had to go through the MFA, today it is only about 50-60 percent"⁴⁷. The new approach to civil society became especially clear in 1999, which was marked by the appointment of George Papandreou as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the wake of the Ocalan case.

From the Ocalan Case to the Institutionalization of Civil Society

Despite the fact that by 1999 the nationalist, "underdog culture"-influences on Greek foreign policy had declined, their sudden resurgence in the so-called Ocalan case signified the end of an era in which foreign policy had alternated between nationalist populism and the then-emerging bipartite (ND-PASOK) consensus. Nationalist forces had also played a role in the Imia crisis in 1996, largely due to the media and their sensationalist

coverage of the near-military confrontation between Greece and Turkey⁴⁸.

In 1999, however, the state experienced the implosion of an “abscess” (as one foreign policy analyst has described it) “of para-state nationalists, amateurish agents, responsibility-fearing members of the administration, and a political leadership that seemed to be in complete disarray”⁴⁹. In the Ocalan crisis the specter of its own nationalist elements came back to haunt Greece, as the country was isolated internationally in a manner not dissimilar to the period preceding the Interim Accord with FYROM in 1995. The crisis helped state officials overcome the zero-sum game logic, according to which what was harmful for Turkish interests was good for Greek interests. With the appointment of George Papandreou as Minister of Foreign Affairs, a number of major changes took place. Subsequent to the outbreak of the Kosovo crisis and the articulation of the anti-nationalist policy of the new MFA administration, organizations of the Greek civil society found it easier than in the past to engage in humanitarian efforts⁵⁰. From 1999 to 2000, development funding increased by 300 percent⁵¹. In the meantime, Greece entered the EMU (2001). In 2002, the Greek MFA’s Committee on NGOs registered many Greek NGOs that fulfilled its two criteria: they both participated in an international advocacy network and had significant international experience of at least two years. “Humanitarian Defense” (HD), established in 1999, sought to provide the victims of Kosovo with aid, irrespective of their nationality, religion, or political beliefs. Thus with the cooperation of the ministries of foreign affairs and defense (General Staff), HD established contacts with local authorities in the rural areas of FYROM and sent over aid packages with food, clothing, and medical supplies⁵². “European Perspective” (EP) was also among the Greek NGOs that mobilized during the Kosovo crisis and assumed the role of a “lead agency” of the European Agency for Reconstruction⁵³.

Other factors were also vital in creating a climate favorable to the development of the Greek civil society: namely, the devolution of power attempted by the government through administrative decentralization and the empowerment of municipalities, the establishment of independent administrative authorities that could ensure greater transparency such as the Greek Ombudsman, the growing independence of trade unions and interest groups and their inclusion in policy formulation through the establishment of the Economic and Social Committee⁵⁴, the proliferation of think-tanks, voluntary organizations, and institutes, and the encouragement of voluntary activism by the government⁵⁵. What foreign affairs achieved was the partial institutionalization of civil society, by providing the more internationally-

oriented social actors with an operational framework in which to promote their goals. The ministry succeeded in this endeavor by broadening its own policy framework, in order to include a novel dimension of diplomacy relating to international development as well as to enhance the sector of economic diplomacy. The institutionalization of civil society stirred up reactions from traditionalist diplomats, who were obligated to interact with multiple structures of diplomacy, which moreover seemed to supersede their own, neorealist agenda⁵⁶.

In 1996, the MFA had already begun negotiating the First Five-Year Programme for Bilateral Development Cooperation with the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), of which it belatedly became a member in 1999. In 1999, the ministry established the General Directorate for International Development and Cooperation (YDAS) that is responsible for financing and monitoring development assistance, emergency- and post-humanitarian aid programmes initiated by NGOs and directed towards developing countries. YDAS also aimed to encourage the development of Greek civil society. Such encouragement included sensitizing public opinion to humanitarian issues, providing a framework for selecting the most reliable actors of civil society, and promoting the development of Greek civil society and its coordination with the MFA based on "transparency, mutual trust, the rational use of public funds and an exchange of information" through programs for the promotion of voluntarism and development education⁵⁷.

A final aspect of the institutionalization of the relations between Greek NGOs and the MFA concerns the establishment of the Committee on NGOs, which provides information to Greek NGOs about the ways in which they could acquire a consultative status in international institutions such as the EU, NATO, the UN, and the OSCE. This committee attempted to create a network for effective communication and collaboration among NGOs and all the directorates of the MFA⁵⁸. In 2003, when it assumed the EU Presidency, the Greek government put forth a number of innovations designed to upgrade the role of NGOs. Over the course of every European presidency, about 1,000 NGOs engaged in a dialogue with officials from the presiding country in a parallel forum. The Greek government promoted the development of mechanisms for technical and experience-transfer between Northern and Southern non-state actors, the further institutionalization of the "Euromed Civil Forum", the enhancement of the "Euroregions Initiative" (which aims to stimulate cross-border collaboration among local societies), and the strengthening of civil society through the creation of a

viable multilateral framework⁵⁹. Greece's "Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans", initiated in 2002, was a five-year scheme designed to allocate 550 million euros for the development of the Balkans. Although the Plan was never really implemented, it is noteworthy that about 20 percent of its budget was earmarked for co-financing "private productive investments"⁶⁰.

Relations with Turkey were also affected by the MFA's new approach, even though they had traditionally been considered as a "special" issue requiring a firmer, neorealist approach. What came to be known as the earthquake diplomacy of 1999, however, helped reverse previous nationalist trends in Greek public opinion and the media, facilitating public support for the new framework for Greek-Turkish relations adopted by the new leadership of the MFA (and manifested in the Confidence Building Measures signed with Turkey in 2000). As noted by Panagiotis Tsakonas, the new bilateral framework was consonant with institutionalist principles⁶¹. In 2000, the EU resolved to support a five-year program aimed at strengthening civil society in Turkey which included a sub-program called "Civic Dialogue" between Greece and Turkey. This has involved support for "demonstration dialogue" activities by three experienced NGO networks (Women's Initiative for Peace, European student organization AEGEE, and European Center for Common Ground on Cooperation with the Media). The program also provided for NGO networking and dialogue promotion through workshops and manuals, as well as the offer of micro-grants to stimulate exchanges and joint projects between private actors from Greece and Turkey's civil societies⁶².

New Democracy in Power

On March 7, 2004, PASOK's eleven-year rule ended. In September 2005, "Citizens' Project' (*Ergo Politon*) was established, an executive body overlooked by the Prime Minister. The project regulates the funds flowing from the Ministries of foreign affairs, health, culture, the interior, as well as from Public Utilities and Organizations (DEKO) towards civil society organizations. One of the areas where the new ND government was especially critical of its predecessors relates to the allocation of state funds to NGOs. Already in early 2005 Euripides Stylianides, ND's Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for YDAS, was preparing an inventory of the NGOs affiliated to the MFA. It was clear that the MFA's leadership was alarmed by the fact that the number of certified NGOs were, according to Stylianides, close to 360; i.e., six times that of European "NGO-superpower" Holland, and about four

times more than those of the USA⁶³. In fact, the bad press received by NGOs in Greece can be partly traced to the reputed mismanagement of their funds and associated absence of transparency frameworks. The further development of the NGOs was also hampered by other factors, such as the low interpersonal trust traceable to the country's weak civic bonds⁶⁴. In order to end what was perceived to be a huge drain on public resources, the ND government terminated the funding of many NGOs. Still, members of both parties were accused either for acting as mediators for NGOs (in order for them to receive funding) or for using specific NGOs as a means for self-promotion⁶⁵.

Otherwise, in terms of the role of civil society in foreign policy, the ND government appeared to be moving along the same lines as its predecessors. In 2004, Greece sent 250,000 Euros-worth of humanitarian aid to Sudan (one of the 18 target-countries) during the Darfour crisis⁶⁶. In December 2004, Greece was the first country to help in the recovery of tsunami-stricken Sri Lanka, sending aid aboard several C-130 aircrafts. The Greek government also raised 35 million Euros for relief purposes by appealing to citizens through the media⁶⁷. In Southeastern Europe, regarding the implementation of the "Plan for Economic Reconstruction", Stylianides claimed that the rates of fund absorption rose to 10.4 percent in 2006 (two years earlier it remained no higher than 2.4 percent)⁶⁸. Several alternative diplomatic avenues were pursued with mixed success, such as cross-border cooperation projects notably in the cases of Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM. As regards Turkey, the MFA reaffirmed its intentions to promote links between Greek and Turkish civil society actors, for example on the economic level through the Council of Greek-Turkish Business Cooperation and the cultural level with academic and think-tank symposia.

Concluding Remarks and Theoretical Implications

In this article we have argued that nationalist populism advocated a specific nationalist foreign policy based on anti-Americanism and a state-centric notion of national solidarity. Rooted in the underdog culture, nationalist populism had the effect of forestalling the cultivation of an autonomous space for civic interaction. The domestic political crisis of 1989 was conducive to the gradual decline of nationalist populism and also signaled the rise of non-state actors in Greece. The sway of nationalist populism over society was such, however, that it dominated public debate vis-à-vis the disintegration of Yugoslavia. This discourse was coupled by ND's (1990-1993) and PASOK's (1993-1996) favourable stance towards the

Milosevic régime and maximalist policy towards FYROM. The main protagonists of Greek civil society's mobilization in 1989-1996 were imbued with the nationalist populist discourse.

Another conjuncture that stimulated the rise of civil society in Greece, albeit one that dampened the influence of domestic nationalist populist forces, was the drive towards European integration. As an agent of reform, the EU has had a multifarious impact on civil society by facilitating the establishment of domestic institutional preconditions for the development of civil society, the creation of new rights for Greek citizens accruing from a viable legal framework that protects them, and the setting up of new regional cooperative structures based on regional development policy.

All this points to the tendency to adopt policy tools and to resort to conceptual aspects of foreign-policy decision-making which were hardly present before Greece's integration in the EU, namely the interaction between the MFA and various NGOs at the stage of policy-making and the occasional "use" of NGOs at the stage of policy implementation. The conceptual frameworks and modes of thinking with which MFA policy advisors and even some diplomats formulated policy began to converge with points of view emanating from Brussels (cognitive Europeanization). The prevalence of Europeanism after 1996, owing not least to the growing new bipartite (ND-PASOK) convergence in foreign policy, ushered in an era of networking between MFA services and NGOs and facilitated the above noted "cognitive" Europeanization.

The growing influence of Europeanism also signaled the partial abandonment of nationalist populism and the underdog culture in which it was grounded. Pro-European politicians and diplomats adopted the EU development policy framework and new responsibilities of an OECD donor-state⁶⁹. The ministerial turnover at the MFA in 1999 was a catalyst in the process of institutionalizing civil society. Moreover, the Ocallan case in early 1999, which preceded the turnover, helped state officials overcome their traditional zero-sum game logic vis-à-vis Turkey and seemed to mark the decline of nationalist elements in the Greek civil society. The new MFA leadership pushed towards the delegitimization of these elements, instead providing domestic, pro-European non-state actors with a framework in which to mobilize and promote their organizational goals. It broadened its own policy framework to include a novel dimension of diplomacy relating to development, manifested during the crisis in Kosovo. During that crisis, actors from Greek civil society engaged in emergency and post-humanitarian

aid programmes under the finance schemes and monitoring of YDAS, and enhanced economic diplomacy.

In theoretical terms, the dualism in Greek foreign policy should not be seen as a rigid bipolar pattern. Politicians, officials, journalists and the wider public, as well as collective actors, such as trade unions and NGOs, while rallying around either Europeanism or nationalist populism, may shift positions, depending on the historical conjuncture. Thus Europeanism and national populism may be treated as an analytical set of two concepts, a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Another theoretical implication related to these developments refers to the limits of autonomous growth of Greek civil society. Traditionally weak and hampered by clientelism and populism, the two prevalent modes of political domination in Greece, the Greek civil society has started growing since the late 1980s. Yet it seems that at least in foreign policy-making civil society's steps were closely monitored by the MFA, which after 1999, in particular, provided NGOs with funds, technical aid and legitimization. This poses obvious limits to the autonomy of Greek civil society which need further research.

To sum up, we examined key events in Greek politics; i.e. the domestic political crisis of 1989, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the war in Kosovo, as well as the wider context of Greece's road to Europe. We discussed the fundamental ways in which Greek foreign policy was first under the sway of nationalist populism, roughly until 1996, and of Europeanism thereafter. There are indications, then, that Greek foreign policy no longer remains confined to the corridors of the ministry of foreign affairs, but is likely to be shaped by struggles, cross-cutting both high politics and a progressively maturing civil society.

NOTES

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2. An exception is Pantelis Sklias and Asteris Huliaras (eds), *The Diplomacy of Civil Society: NGOs and International Development Cooperation* (Athens, Papazisis, 2002). [In Greek].
 3. Nicos Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America* (London, Macmillan, 1986); Nicos Mouzelis, *Post-Marxist Alternatives: the Construction of Social Order*, London, Macmillan Press, 1990); Nicos Mouzelis, "Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society", *Civil Society*, No.1, Winter issue, 1998, pp. 40-52 [in Greek]; Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-Authoritarian Greece", working paper 1994/50, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (Madrid, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 1994); Loukas Tsoukalis, *Open the Windows!* (Athens, Potamos, 2002) [in Greek].
 4. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003).
 5. For the "socializing effect" in foreign policy, see Panagiotis Tsakonas, "The Origins of Greece's "Socialization Strategy" vis-à-vis Turkey," *Études Helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, No. 14, Issue 1, 2006, pp. 113-139.
 6. Panayiotis Ioakimides, "EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: The Tension between Bureaucratic Centralism and Regionalism," in Lisbet Hooghe (ed.), *Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multilevel Governance* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996).
 7. See for example, Thanos Veremis, *Action Without Foresight – Western Involvement in Yugoslavia* (Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2002).
 8. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, *op. cit.*
 9. Loukas Tsoukalis, "Greece: Like Any Other European Country?," *The National Interest* (Spring 1999), pp. 65-74.
 10. Suzannah Verney, "From the "Special Relationship" to Europeanism: PASOK and the European Community, 1981-89" in Richard Clogg (ed.) *Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade* (Basingstoke and New York, Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 131-153.

11. N. Diamandouros, "Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-Authoritarian Greece," *op. cit.*; see also George Pagoulatos, "Greece, the European Union and the 2003 Presidency," *op. cit.*, pp. 1-38.
12. N. Diamandouros, "Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-Authoritarian Greece," *op. cit.*, p. 89.
13. *ibid.*, p. 22.
14. *ibid.*, p. 21.
15. *ibid.*, p.88
16. George Pagoulatos, "Has Our Political System Been Outdone?" *Epikentra*, no. 80, 1994 [in Greek], p. 69, also quoted in Frangonicolopoulos (2003), pp. 429-30.
17. Panayiotis Ioakimides, "Greece, the European Union and Southeastern Europe: Past Failures and Future Prospects", in Van Coufoudakis and Harry J. Psomiades (eds), *Greece and the New Balkans* (New York, Pella Publishers, 1999), pp. 176-191.
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28. Van Coufoudakis and Harry J. Psomiades (eds), *Greece and the New Balkans* (New York, Pella Publishers, 1999), pp. 423-431.
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40. P. Ioakimides, "The Planning Model for Foreign Policy in Greece: People vs. Institutions," *op. cit.*, pp. 108-115.

41. Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, *The Apex of the Clientelist State*, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 14-33 and 146-157.
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43. Interview with official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2003.
44. Dimitris Keridis, "The Foreign Policy of Modernization: From Confrontation to Interdependence," in Panayiotis Tsakonas (ed.), *Modern Greek Foreign Policy: A Holistic Approach*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 323. [in Greek].
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46. Haralambos Kondonis, "Civil Society and Multilateral Cooperative Models: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe," in Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos and Thanos Veremis (eds), *Is Southeastern Europe Doomed to Instability? A Regional Perspective* (London, Frank Cass, 2003), p. 60.
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51. Anonymous interview with official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2003.
52. Despoina Syrri, "Refugees of the Yugoslav Crisis and the Role of 'Humanitarian Defense,'" in Pantelis Sklias and Asteris Huliaras (eds), *The Diplomacy of Civil Society: NGOs and International Development Cooperation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-264. [in Greek].
53. Angelos Laskaris, "The 'European Perspective' in Kosovo," in Pantelis Sklias and Asteris Huliaras (eds), *The Diplomacy of Civil Society: NGOs and International Development Cooperation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-298 [in Greek].
54. David H. Close, *Greece Since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 279.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 283, 292. In the year 2000 alone, the government allocated \$165 million for the equipment and training of a nationwide network for preventing and fighting forest fires.
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57. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "General Secretariat for International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation," (Athens, 2003), pp. 29-51, [in Greek].

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60. See Haralambos Tsardanides and Asteris Huliaras, "The Rise and Fall of the Greek Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans," *Agora Xoris Synora*, Vol.11, No. 1, 2005, pp. 34-58 [in Greek].
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62. Association des États Généraux des Étudiants de l'Europe (AEGEE, 2002), "Rebuilding Communication," www.aegEE.sakarya.edu.tr.
63. In March 2005, Stylianides informed a reporter that when NGOs "amount to fortune-seeking efforts aimed at profit, and are not monitored for the effectiveness of their activities and the transparency in the management of the funds they receive from the state, then it is clearly a bad thing and detrimental to civil society". "Greece is a 'champion' in NGOs," *To Paron*, 20/3/05.
64. *Greece – Europe European: Society – Politics – Values*, Social Survey Results, National Center for Social Research (Greece), November 2003, pp. 7-9. Compared to Portuguese, Spaniards, British and Dutch, Greeks show the highest rates of generalized social distrust.
65. Marina Mani, "An inventory on NGOs," *Eleftherotypia*, 28/11/04. There are newspaper reports claiming that the management of funds dedicated to NGOs has been inefficient and not transparent. See the newspapers *Eleftherotypia* 9/6/05, *Ta Nea* 12/7/05 and *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia* 4/6/06. See also "Ministry of Foreign Affairs invites NGOs," *Eleftherotypia*, 13/2/05.
66. "Greek humanitarian aid to Darfour," *Eleftherotypia*, 19/9/04.
67. Interview of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Stylianides on *Sky Radio*, 27/12/05.
68. Interview of Deputy Foreign Minister E. Stylianidis, *Adesmeftos Typos*, 13.11.05.
69. As of 2007, Greece is obligated to increase the percentage of its GDP apportioned to donor aid from 0,21 percent (about 300 million euros for 2005) to 0,33 percent, and eventually to 0,75 percent. Data published by Marina Mani, "An inventory on NGOs", *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia* 28/11/04, p. 10.

The Role of Experts in Greek Foreign Policy

Stella Ladi*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine le rôle de l'expertise en matière de politique étrangère grecque en faisant un lien entre l'eupéanisation et le cadre d'une communauté scientifique. La connaissance, le pouvoir et la politique extérieure sont analysés au niveau des mécanismes «mous» d'eupéanisation et celui de la mise en évidence du rôle des experts. Les questions théoriques soulevées dans cet article sont illustrées à travers la discussion sur les changements de stratégie grecque des années 1990 à propos de la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union Européenne. La nature et l'action de la communauté scientifique qui a poussé pour l'adoption et l'application de cette réforme est également discutée.

ABSTRACT

This article explores the role of expertise in Greek foreign policy by linking the literature on Europeanization and the epistemic community framework. Knowledge, power and foreign policy reform are considered in an analysis of the “soft” mechanisms of Europeanization and of the way in which the expert's role is being enhanced. The theoretical claims made herein are illustrated in a discussion of the strategy shift of the 1990s as regards Greece's stand on Turkey's EU candidacy. The nature and action of the epistemic community that pushed for the adoption and implementation of this reform is also discussed.

Introduction

The Europeanization of the public policies of European Union (EU) member-states has become undisputable in the last decade. The discussion has now moved to specific mechanisms of Europeanization and to a comparison of its impact upon different policy areas¹. Some argue that Europeanization is affecting policy areas even where “soft” mechanisms are in place and low levels of EU regulation exist². An interesting example is foreign policy where the EU level of co-operation may well be loose but a number of changes in ministries of foreign affairs, policy-styles and the constitutions of EU member-states may

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nonetheless be observed³. The “soft” mechanisms of Europeanization include the imitation, diffusion and framing of domestic beliefs and expectations⁴. This article focuses on the way these “soft” mechanisms function through the diffusion of knowledge and change the policy styles of member-states. The creation and impact of *epistemic communities*, especially in the field of foreign policy, is explored as part of Europeanization.

The empirical focus of the article is on the role of experts in Greek foreign policy. The following key questions should be asked: *Can we observe an increased role for experts in Greek foreign policy? What has been the impact of Europeanization on the participation of experts in Greek foreign policy-making?* Greece yields interesting examples because variation in foreign policy choices may be observed as of 1981, date of Greece's entry into the EU and right up to today⁵. At the same time, an expectation (often a belief) exists that Greece as a small state is a country whose foreign policy would be easily Europeanized. Yet in practice, the opposite has often proved true. The changing role of experts in foreign policy is explored through an analysis of their impact during the policy shift in Greek-Turkish relations begun in 1996⁶. This example proves fruitful as an increased participation of experts can be observed. The “epistemic communities” framework proves useful for the description and analysis of the knowledge resources which were in place during this policy shift⁷.

The article is divided into two parts. The first offers theoretical background on the “soft” mechanism of Europeanization and links them to the epistemic communities discussion. Specific hypotheses are developed in order to direct the empirical exploration but also to contribute to the Europeanization literature. The second part applies the theoretical framework to the Greek case. First, the main characteristics of EU foreign policy are treated. An introduction to the discussion of the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy follows to set the scene for the exploration of the experts' role. The policy shift of the Greek government towards Turkey serves as the main example. The agents of knowledge are outlined, and the hypotheses on “soft” mechanisms of Europeanization and epistemic communities are then discussed.

Europeanization and Epistemic Communities

The impact of the EU on a state is often described as Europeanization. The term first appeared in the 1990s to describe a process different from both European integration and harmonization, both concepts which focus on the domestic adjustment of states to EU obligations⁸. Europeanization

thus acknowledges the two-way process of policy change between the EU and domestic environments in contrast to terms such as European integration which describe the one-way impact of the EU on member-states⁹. Europeanization may be defined as “a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making”¹⁰ or as “the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance”¹¹.

For Radaelli, Europeanization refers to¹² processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things”, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.

The operationalization of definitions of Europeanization in the study of its impact upon member-states has largely followed a historical institutionalist approach. Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso adopt a three-step top-down approach, whereby they first look at changes at the European level, continue with adaptational pressures for change and finally, confront domestic mediating factors¹³. In an attempt to be more analytical about what happens at the European level, Schmidt¹⁴ and Knill¹⁵ begin by analysing the mechanisms of Europeanization. In my work, a different three-step approach was followed, namely one which distinguishes between “soft” and “hard” mechanisms of Europeanization, continues with analysis of the mediating factors of change and concludes with some possible outcomes of Europeanization¹⁶. This article focuses upon “soft” mechanisms of Europeanization because EU foreign policy is an intergovernmental EU policy where only “soft” mechanisms of Europeanization are in place.

“Soft” mechanisms of Europeanization are difficult to observe and to demonstrate but remain especially important for the understanding of policy areas where even though EU regulation is low, convergence of policy styles and policy decisions may be seen. Knill describes this “soft” mechanism as *framing domestic beliefs and expectations*¹⁷. The EU goal in this respect would be to prepare the ground for institutional change by altering the “cognitive input” of domestic actors also in areas where no institutional requirements exist. Page describes *polydiffusion* as a soft mechanism similar to Knill’s *framing domestic beliefs and expectations*¹⁸. The difference resides in the fact that for Page this is an unimportant mechanism because if policy change is to occur, choice and deliberation as well as generation and maintenance of

public support are needed. Radaelli also outlines the cognitive and normative dimensions of Europeanization that can impact formal political structures but also affect prevalent domestic discourses, norms and values¹⁹.

“Soft” mechanisms of Europeanization are put into practice through the activation of networks such as *epistemic communities*, advocacy coalitions and policy transfer networks²⁰. The common characteristic of these formations is that possessors of knowledge participate in networks which seek to influence policy learning and to provoke policy change. *Knowledge* is the main resource of the actors involved. The discussion of the relationship between knowledge, power and public policy change seems old and diverse. Gagnon, for example, distinguishes three different pathways within the literature. The first pathway discusses the relationship between knowledge and power as part of a rationalistic paradigm where the state, seeking help, turns to “scientists”²¹. The second sees an indirect relationship between knowledge and power, where knowledge is diffused and influences power centres as part of a “common wisdom”. The third understands knowledge and power as organically related and seeks to explain the emergence of other power centres such as policy research institutes. Regardless, any evaluation of the validity of these three pathways requires an analysis of the meso-level if we are to shed light on the existing networks and processes of policy change.

One of the most interesting and useful approaches to understanding the role of experts in foreign policy, is *epistemic communities*. These may be defined as networks of specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type of policies to which they should be applied²².

What unites these specialists is their belief that a particular form of knowledge can be applied to policy development. Policy-makers turn to experts because of the uncertainty that they have to face. Policy-makers might indeed use only the knowledge that legitimizes their decisions, but Haas argues that epistemic communities will probably at some point influence policy makers by providing them with alternatives²³. The primary resource of epistemic communities remains their possession of scientific knowledge. Indeed Haas describes think tanks as a “key location” for epistemic communities²⁴. Adler and Haas claim that epistemic communities dispense advice from within their national borders through interaction with other specialists through conferences or publications²⁵. When epistemic communities are transnational, as is increasingly the case within the EU, they are expected to produce a convergence of policy preferences through the

diffusion of knowledge. Furthermore, Adler and Haas argue that if policy diffusion is translated into learning, it can mean the adoption of either new practices or new goals²⁶.

According to Haas, four features define an epistemic community: (a) shared normative and principled beliefs (b) shared causal beliefs (c) shared notions of validity and (d) a common policy enterprise²⁷. Within the EU framework, the transnationality of epistemic communities and of all four features is enhanced. In particular, “soft” mechanisms of Europeanization affect the beliefs, norms and policy goals of epistemic communities. Antoniadou distinguishes between two levels of action for the epistemic communities. The first level is the “cognitive” level where epistemic communities are (re)producing social reality and the second level is the “practical” level where epistemic communities are directly related to policy change. The two levels interact with each other²⁸. At the cognitive level, change is directed to the discourse and worldview of a society, while at the “practical” level the epistemic communities’ action is linked to the policy process itself. Involvement can be direct by having members of the epistemic community participate in the process as policy-makers, or indirect, by having them participate as advisors to policy-makers.

A few problems exist with the notion of *epistemic communities*: First, the concept concentrates on knowledge elites who possess expertise; however, it is possible to have other kinds of agents, e.g., groups without any expert knowledge representing oppressed people, yet interacting within the same framework. Second, when notions such as epistemic communities are used as explanatory models, one should be aware of counterfactuals that are not related to knowledge, but are still important reasons for policy change, for example the structural power of financial sector markets. Finally, the *epistemic communities framework* does not provide an explanation of policy inertia whereby experts’ knowledge is simply not taken into account. The key to the successful use of the epistemic community framework is to use it interchangeably with other frameworks such as advocacy coalitions and policy networks. It should be preferred only when there is good reason for doing so, as in the case of an exploration of the increased role of experts in foreign policy.

In order to use and develop the above theoretical assumptions, a methodology and specific hypotheses are needed. Haas argues that in relation to a specific community the members involved should be identified, their principled and causal beliefs should be determined and their activities designed to influence decision makers should be demonstrated²⁹. Furthermore, the use

of counterfactuals may prove useful, such as the identification of alternative credible outcomes, in case of lack of influence on the part of the epistemic community or the exploration of alternative explanations for the actions of decisionmakers. The main argument put forward here is that Europeanization increases the importance of the role of epistemic communities by emphasizing the rational and technical aspects of public policies. It also enhances the transnational character of epistemic communities through increased interaction. Actually, “soft” mechanisms of Europeanization are possible primarily through the activities of epistemic communities. The field of EU foreign policy in which low levels of regulation exist provides fertile ground for demonstrating the above argument.

Europeanization, Foreign Policy and the Role of Experts in Greece

Has the role of experts in Greek foreign policy increased and, if so, is this a feature of its Europeanization? Answering this particular empirical question will help us both shed light on recent developments in Greek foreign policy and come to a conclusion about the theoretical argument presented in the previous section. Accordingly, the characteristics of European foreign policy are discussed; the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy explored. Special emphasis is placed upon the existence of epistemic communities, think-tanks and other knowledge locations. Finally, a specific case study illustrating increased participation of experts in foreign policy-making is analyzed. The case concerns the Greek foreign policy shift towards an acceptance of Turkey’s aspirations for entry in the EU.

A European Foreign Policy?

Foreign policy is not among the most developed policies in the EU. It is an area where co-operation among member-states exists in almost an intergovernmental mode. Nevertheless, an effort for close co-operation exists. Hill (2004: 145) defines European foreign policy as “the ensemble of the international activities of the EU, including output from all three of the EU’s pillars, and not just that relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)”³⁰. There are two dimensions in the discussion of the EU foreign policy: the institutional and the operational. Both are treated here.

The development or lack of a European foreign policy is one of the most political issues confronted by the EU; hence, any development in this area has an impact on the actual nature of the European polity. The implementation of a common foreign policy would mean that the EU was moving towards a

federal state model³¹. The most important step towards such closer co-operation was made in Maastricht with the adoption of CFSP. The CFSP was designed so that the EU would have a common foreign policy. However, the decision-making process remained intergovernmental because in practice unanimity was required for any decision and the international relations of the EU were the responsibility of the Presidency of the EU which rotates every six months among EU member-states. The Treaty of Amsterdam complicated matters even further by introducing the position of High Representative of the CFSP. This post is occupied by the General Secretary of the Council and co-exists with the Presidency. The Draft Constitution proposed the introduction of a Foreign Minister in order to increase the visibility of EU foreign policy and simplify its function³². Since 1998, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has also been in place with the following aims: 1. give the EU some real military capability; 2. allow the West European Union (WEU) to dissolve in order to make the EU relationship with NATO more direct; 3. bind the UK into EU foreign and security policy³³.

Evaluating the operational level and the penetration of European foreign policy is a complex task. Lack of agreement over the Iraq crisis has been used as the most eloquent example of the inapplicability of the CFSP. Bush's decision to strike Iraq deeply divided Europe. The UK was determined to support the Americans while Germany steadily opposed any intervention and France tried to keep a middle position. The rest of the member-states also divided into camps with Italy and Spain showing more sympathy to the US, and Greece and the "neutrals" lining up at the other end of the spectrum. The CFSP remained silent, although all the actors tried to use the EU in order to strengthen their positions. That being said, in other cases, such as the immediate reaction after September 11 and the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan, the EU has shown greater unity³⁴.

In Europeanization terms, one must ask whether domestic foreign policies are actually converging or not. Hill, after analyzing the examples discussed in the previous paragraph, has argued that both renationalization and regrouping can be observed³⁵. It is argued that in order to obtain a more concrete picture of the outcomes of EU foreign policy, its mechanisms and domestic mediating factors should be taken into account. From the institutional discussion of EU foreign policy is evident that "soft" and not "hard" mechanisms of Europeanization are in place. This means that although operationally foreign policy decisions of member-states do not necessarily converge, informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms are becoming more

similar. Smith argues that the impact of Europeanization can be observed in four areas which are: 1) élite socialization, 2) bureaucratic reorganization, 3) constitutional change and 4) increase in the public support for European political co-operation³⁶. Elite socialization signifies the internalization of co-operative habits and the formation of “epistemic communities” for the handling of technical issues. This article is taking this argument further in order to explore whether the whole policy style and direction of a domestic foreign policy can be actually affected by the increased participation of experts due to Europeanization.

Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy and the Role of Experts

Scholars generally agree that there has been strong evidence of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy since the country's entry into the EU³⁷. The current focus of the discussion is rather on the form that this Europeanization process has taken³⁸ and its completeness³⁹. In this section, some of the main arguments about the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy are discussed and a description of the organisation of experts since Greece's EU début is provided.

The impact of the EU on Greek foreign policy divides easily into two categories: style and substance⁴⁰. An increased role for experts is one of the key characteristics of a Europeanized policy style. It is expected that their increased participation also affects the substance of foreign policy. In terms of substance, the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy equals Westernization and modernization. This is also the case with the rest of public policies⁴¹. One of the main substantive changes has been the translocation of Greek policy preference and interests regarding two key issues: Cyprus and Turkey. Observers have also noted increased interest in matters beyond the region and greater involvement in international humanitarian and peacekeeping activities in Southeastern Europe as well as other areas⁴².

Given that foreign policy remains an area where mainly “soft” mechanisms of Europeanization are in place, it is interesting to see the impact of this process on the very style of Greek foreign policy. Tsardanidis and Stavridis argue that Europeanization has increased as never before since 1996⁴³. Although to a large extent the process has been a top-down one, since 1996 there is more evidence of a bottom-up process when some of Greece's priorities have been successfully promoted, e.g., Cyprus's accession to the EU. Two key changes can be observed as far as style is concerned. Foreign policy-making has become more consensual and more multilateral.

Moreover, there is strong evidence that élite socialization has also been taking place. One practical example is the increased input of foreign policy actors either through the ministries or through NGOs in the formulation of Greek positions regarding the EU⁴⁴. Within this context, informed knowledge is increasingly important; the role of experts, strengthened.

If we go a step further and evaluate the role of experts in Greek foreign policy, we need a mapping of experts' locations. Based on previous research on the topic, one can argue that the development of independent research institutes and think-tanks has been limited following the general pattern of a weak civil society and the lack of an associational culture in Greece⁴⁵. Five locations for foreign policy experts can be identified.

1) University Departments and Academics:

International relations (IR) and EU scholars are often part of epistemic communities and policy networks working close to the government. The institutional impact of university departments is much lower although nine Greek universities have either independent IR departments or relevant sections in related departments. Tsakonas argues that the IR academic community rather than acting as an agent of reform promoting the Europeanization and rationalisation of Greek foreign policy has been quite passive. Indeed, if anything, it reproduces and legitimizes existing stereotypes⁴⁶. Nevertheless, individual academics working as formal or informal consultants close to ministers of foreign affairs, or in other similar posts, have been crucial in the Europeanization process.

2) In-house Experts and Government-Funded Research Institutes:

The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has its own in-house experts that have limited capabilities. The clientelistic nature of the Greek state system and the bureaucratization of the MFA have a negative impact upon their performance. Research institutes funded by the government are the oldest type of research institute in this area. In the 1980s, the government began recognizing the increased need for some research input, and organizations such as the Foundation for Mediterranean Studies (IMM, Ίδρυμα Μεσογειακών Μελετών) and the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM, Ελληνικό Κέντρο Ευρωπαϊκών Μελετών) emerged. These are non-profit organizations under the supervision of Ministries. They seek to enhance research opportunities. For example, EKEM was founded in 1988 and its main objective is "the study of issues that are at the heart of developments in the European Union and Europe in general and,

consequently affect Greek politics” (EKEM, Information Leaflet). Under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its research and administrative committee includes academics and diplomats. These research institutes are not really policy-oriented and their contribution remains academic.

3) Policy Research Institutes:

Within the same decade, a small number of non-profit organisations seeking to advise and influence the government appeared. Organisations such as the Hellenic Foundation for European and International Affairs (ELIAMEP, Ελληνικό Ίδρυμα Ευρωπαϊκής και Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής), which was created in 1988, and the Maragopoulou Institute for Human Rights (IMDA, Ίδρυμα Μαργαπούλου για τα Δικαιώματα του Ανθρώπου), which came into existence in 1978, fall into this category. The emphasis was placed on issues related to foreign affairs with organisations working on areas such as minorities, the relationship with the Balkans and international economic affairs⁴⁷. Interestingly enough, most of these institutes are closely linked to universities and attract governmental as well as private funding. As in Italy, their staff members are mainly academics also paid by universities, and their institutional affiliation is essential for the reputation of the institute⁴⁸.

4) Research Institutes affiliated to Political Parties:

In the 1990s, political parties organized in-house research capacity, based on the German model⁴⁹. For example, in 1995, the research institute ISTANCE (Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών και Αναπτυξιακών Μελετών) was set up by PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement - Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) to provide a forum for research and political discussion so as to inform political practice. In 1998, the New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία, ND) established the “Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy” (Ινστιτούτο Δημοκρατίας Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής) to research a range of social, political and economic issues. Although policy research in these institutes may not be limited to foreign policy, it is one of their main areas of concern⁵⁰.

5) Non-Governmental Organisation with a Research Focus:

The latest development has been the emergence of a variety of organizations, e.g., the Organisation for the Modernisation of Society (ΟΡΕΚ, Όμιλος Προβληματισμού για τον Εξσυγχρονισμό της Κοινωνίας) and Citizens’ Union Paremvassi (Ένωση Πολιτών Παρέμβαση) in the 1990s. Ideologically, they belong to the centre-left and aim to assist the government

in modernizing the country⁵¹. Even if they do not conduct research themselves, they have an important role in disseminating research findings and in stimulating debate. These organizations bring together networks of policy-makers, academics and policy activists and are active in all policy areas including foreign policy and EU matters.

The Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Relations

The improvement of Greek-Turkish relations since 1996 has been described in both countries to a large extent as a result of the Europeanization process⁵². Taking this as a starting point and considering the primacy of Greek-Turkish relations for Greek foreign policy, this article selects this issue as an example for the concrete exploration of the argument developed up to now. *What has been the role of experts during the shift of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey? Have processes of Europeanization facilitated an increased role for experts?* In this section, a brief description of the main changes that have occurred is given and then the existence of an epistemic community that has pushed for these changes is explored.

Adopted in the mid-1990s, the new Greek strategy towards Turkey has remained unchanged. Greece had traditionally relied on a combination of “internal” balancing (strong armed forces) and “external” balancing (participation in security and political organizations)⁵³. The combination of a serious crisis in 1996 over the islets of Imia, and a newly elected government in Greece, provided the impulse for radical change. The newly elected government may have been socialist, but it was led by Costas Simitis who wanted to appear and act as a modernizer. His vision was to develop a “comprehensive strategy” that would challenge the bipolar character of the relation and the logic of *casus belli*. He proposed bringing the issue to the EU and considering Greek-Turkish relations as part of Greece’s strategy to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU)⁵⁴. The strategy that was adopted introduced the idea of Turkey’s engagement in the EU. The rationale was that Turkey’s European orientation would force Istanbul to adopt less aggressive behaviour towards an EU member-state⁵⁵.

In fact, during the Helsinki European Council in 1999, Greece decided not to use its veto and allowed the EU to grant Turkey candidacy status. As a result, Turkey had to commit to resolve any border disputes, and in case of failure, the country would be brought in front of the International Court of Justice. This meant that progress on Turkey’s EU membership was linked to the resolution of its border disputes with Greece. Since then, there has been an

improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. Co-operation has been achieved in a number of areas, and official visits have become routine. Unavoidably, there have been instances of tension such as Turkish fighter jets accused of harassing Greek jets in the summer of 2003. However, more important is the fact that the two governments have chosen not to escalate the crisis. Moreover, the change of government in both countries has not altered the main strategy.⁵⁶

From the above discussion, it is evident that although Greek-Turkish relations have not been dealt with through the CFSP, or other EU foreign policy tools, “soft” mechanisms of Europeanization have been in place and the EU has played an important role in Greece’s strategy shift. The observable change in Greece’s policy style reflects a more consensual and more multilateral strategy towards Turkey. All the more interesting is the realization that this shift was characterized by a dynamic epistemic community working on the side of the Minister of Foreign Policy, George Papandreou (N.B. information from interviews). Was this epistemic community a result of the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy or was it just a result of the will of the particular leadership of the MFA? There is evidence that another epistemic community worked close to the government at that point. Antoniadou argues that after the Imia Crisis, an epistemic community to which belonged both the Prime Minister (C. Simitis) and deputy minister of Foreign Affairs (C. Rozakis) put forth the idea that Greece had such strong legal evidence proving the islets were Greek that it was to Greece’s advantage to propose a solution through the International Court of Justice⁵⁷.

In favour of Greece’s support to the Turkish candidacy for the EU, a different epistemic community was created. No institutional role may be attributed to university departments; however, individual academics participated and played a decisive role in the formulation of the concept, but also in its implementation⁵⁸. Neither MFA in-house experts, nor government-funded research institutes such as EKEM, had an impact on the shift of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey. Again, their role was limited to in-house experts who participated in the epistemic community due to personal interest or through their good relationship with George Papandreou⁵⁹. Policy research institutes such as ELIAMEP can only be described as actors on the periphery of the policy process. They had no access to MFA’s leadership. Their role was limited to supporting the decision with articles in the press and the organisation of relevant conferences and lectures⁶⁰. Research institutes affiliated to political parties and non-governmental organisation with a research focus, also played a minimal role by mainly re-enforcing the discourse towards change⁶¹.

What is interesting is that although no institutions participated in the preparation of the foreign policy shift, many agree that a network of experts (an epistemic community) was formed around the Foreign Minister. This network, in effect, both designed and implemented Greece's turn towards Turkey⁶². Initially, committees were struck at the MFA with the participation of academics, in-house experts, former ambassadors and experts trusted by the leadership. Their mission was to explore the impact that a shift of strategy would have internally but also externally; i.e., among the other EU member-states⁶³. That epistemic community continued its work informally, and the result has been the strategy described at the beginning of this article. There is general consensus that the leadership of the MFA at this point was particularly open to the participation of experts. Although the result was positive, this does not mean that such participation will continue⁶⁴. To a large extent, it lies in the hands of each minister of foreign affairs to decide whether he/she will activate an epistemic community. As far as Europeanization is concerned, it can be argued that a "window of opportunity" opens due to a change in the policy style of Greek foreign policy for the increased participation of experts, but there is no guarantee or obligation for the consacration of such a practice⁶⁵.

Conclusions

The following conclusions relate to "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization, the role of experts and the specific example of the Greek government's shift of strategy regarding to Turkey's EU candidacy.

Undoubtedly, "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization have been in place, as far as Greek foreign policy is concerned. Equally strong is the evidence that their impact upon informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms has been significant. With regard to the role of experts, it can be argued that élite socialization has taken place and epistemic communities are being created. Both main paradigms explaining the relationship between knowledge, power and public policy relate to Greek foreign policy. In cases such as the Greek-Turkish relations, the State followed the rationalistic paradigm and asked for experts' assistance. At the same time, a diffusion of knowledge took place through articles in the press and conferences organized by policy research institutes.

Futher conclusions concern the formation and operation of an epistemic community in relation to the change of strategy in Greek foreign policy with

respect to Turkish EU candidacy. An epistemic community with shared beliefs and a common policy enterprise towards Turkey was formulated around George Papandreu, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. The epistemic community was initiated by the MFA but continued functioning informally. Most observers agree that it played an important role during this period of change⁶⁶. Despite such success, such a practice has not become the norm in Greek foreign policy and depends largely upon MFA leadership. What can be argued, however, is that Europeanization has facilitated such participation through its “soft” mechanisms such as élite socialization and policy learning.

List of Interviews

#1 Interview with Academic, Athens, 30/1/07.

#2 Telephone Interview with Academic and Foreign Minister Advisor, Athens, 31/1/07.

#3 Interview with Former Ambassador, Athens, 5/2/07.

#4 Interview with Former Director of Policy Research Institute, Athens, 7/2/07.

#5 Interview with Academic and Foreign Minister Advisor, Athens, 12/2/07.

#6 Interview with Foreign Minister Advisor, Athens, 14/2/07.

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Le lobby grec et son influence sur l'élaboration de la politique étrangère grecque

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the transnational Greek lobby which emerged from the world large Greek diaspora. The author examines how this lobby influences the foreign policymaking in Athens in the framework of a triadic relation: the host country, the lobby itself and the country of origin. He argues that the lobby doesn't have a monolithic vision of Greek foreign policy. Some voices favour the revisionism introduced in the mid-1990's while others stay attached to its traditional patterns. Academics in particular are more nuanced, considering the modernisation or Européanisation of the Greek foreign policy as a necessity. But few of them see a profound major change of this policy in the mid-1990's, especially in terms of modernisation. Others even contest the goals fixed by such policy in areas like the Cyprus question (the Annan plan), the Aegean contention or the Balkan equation.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article présente le lobby grec transnational qui a émergé de la diaspora grecque à travers le monde. L'auteur examine comment le lobby grec influence l'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque dans le cadre d'une relation triadique: le pays d'accueil, le lobby et le pays d'origine. Il soutient que le lobby n'a pas une vision monolithique de la politique étrangère grecque. Quelques voix sont en faveur du revisionnisme introduit au milieu des années '90, alors que d'autres restent attachées à une vision plus traditionnelle de celle-ci. La communauté universitaire est plus nuancée, considérant la modernisation et l'eupéanisation de la politique extérieure grecque comme une nécessité. En même temps rares sont ceux qui considèrent qu'il y a eu un changement majeur en politique extérieure grecque au milieu des années '90, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la modernisation de ses structures. D'autres contestent même les objectifs fixés par une telle politique dans le domaine comme celui de la question chypriote (le plan Annan), le différend en mer Égée et la politique balkanique.

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En guise d'introduction

Il est généralement admis que de nos jours les différents lobbies jouent un rôle significatif au niveau du système politique de tout pays. Ce rôle est encore plus important auprès du système politique des pays qui sont des acteurs majeurs du système international. L'étude des lobbies, en particulier des lobbies ethniques, est relativement récente. Néanmoins la science politique s'est tournée vers l'étude de ce phénomène avec un intérêt accru ces dernières années étant donnée la présence d'une industrie importante des lobbies, génératrice de milliards de dollars.

Même si le phénomène du lobby date historiquement du 19^e siècle, et nous vient de la tradition du parlementarisme britannique, c'est surtout aux Etats-Unis qu'il a pris son essor. Historiquement le terme lobby désignait le hall du parlement britannique où les députés recevaient le public. Généralement le terme désignait la partie de tout parlement où public, individus ou groupes avaient accès pour rencontrer les parlementaires et les persuader d'adopter des politiques favorables à leurs intérêts. Il s'agit en fait d'une action politique d'information, de persuasion ou de pression qui s'exerçait autrefois dans les couloirs des parlements. Aujourd'hui évidemment il s'agit de la même action politique qui s'exerce à différents niveaux du pouvoir législatif ou exécutif.

Parmi les différents lobbies ce qu'on appelle le lobby ethnique est apparu parmi les derniers. Un lobby ethnique est un groupe d'intérêts constitué sur la base de lignes culturelles, ethniques, religieuses, ou raciales de ses membres et qui cherche à influencer directement ou indirectement le pouvoir politique en faveur des intérêts du groupe. En matière de politique étrangère un lobby ethnique cherche à influencer la politique du pays hôte en faveur du pays d'origine. Bien qu'il existe des lobbies ethniques dans plusieurs pays c'est surtout aux Etats-Unis que ce phénomène a pris une ampleur sans précédent après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. Cela s'explique par la nature du système politique américain, l'immigration de millions de gens vers ce pays et du fait de son rôle international important à la fois comme l'une des superpuissances et actuellement en tant qu'unique superpuissance.

Ce que nous appelons le lobby grec est surtout connu comme le lobby grec américain. Néanmoins étant donné la présence d'une diaspora grecque à travers le monde ce lobby ne se limite pas seulement aux Etats-Unis. On pourrait ainsi signaler sa présence dans divers pays, mais plus particulièrement dans les pays qui jouent un rôle international marqué. Ainsi le lobby grec s'active principalement aux Etats-Unis, au Canada, en Australie et en Grande Bretagne et en deuxième lieu dans différents autres pays. Il n'en

reste pas moins vrai que dès qu'on parle de lobby grec on se tourne vers les Etats-Unis. Évidemment on se tourne aussi de plus en plus vers Bruxelles, la capitale européenne, étant donné l'importance de l'influence européenne sur la politique nationale. Cependant, dans le cas de Bruxelles on ne peut pas parler de la présence d'un lobby ethnique, comme dans le cas des Etats-Unis car la nature de ce lobby est différente. Il s'exerce directement soit par des diplomates, soit par des lobbyistes qui agissent tantôt pour le compte de différents groupes et ou tantôt pour le compte de différents pays. En tout cas Bruxelles devient après Washington le deuxième centre du lobbyisme international. Tant la Grèce, mais aussi Chypre, ont à défendre des intérêts incontournables importants dans la capitale belge.

Si les lobbies en général constituent aujourd'hui des acteurs du système international, les lobbies ethniques deviennent aussi des acteurs transnationaux. C'est en tant qu'acteur transnational qu'on pourrait étudier et analyser le lobby grec. Cette analyse devrait s'arrêter sur l'envergure de son influence dans l'élaboration de la politique étrangère grecque. En quoi ce lobby est-il un des éléments qu'il faut considérer dans l'étude de la politique étrangère grecque ? La plupart des études réalisées sur le lobby grec analysent l'impact de ce dernier sur la politique étrangère des pays où résident des communautés grecques de la diaspora¹. On tente ainsi d'évaluer l'influence du lobby grec américain sur l'élaboration de la politique étrangère américaine, celle du lobby grec canadien sur la politique étrangère canadienne, celle du lobby grec australien sur la politique étrangère australienne et ainsi de suite. Quelques auteurs néanmoins se sont demandé quelle était l'influence du lobby grec sur l'élaboration de la politique étrangère grecque. Ces auteurs constatent que depuis un certain temps le compte à rebours a commencé et que les pays hôtes commencent aussi à utiliser le lobby grec pour promouvoir leurs propres intérêts auprès du gouvernement grec². C'est pourquoi on a parlé d'une relation triadique qui s'installe de plus en plus entre le lobby grec, le pays hôte et le pays d'origine. Même si en principe le lobby grec travaille pour promouvoir les intérêts grecs auprès des différents gouvernements des pays où résident les communautés grecques, il n'en reste pas moins vrai qu'il exerce aussi une influence sur les orientations de la politique étrangère grecque.

Dans cet article nous allons surtout insister sur l'influence que le lobby grec exerce dans l'élaboration de la politique étrangère grecque soit par la façon qu'il conseille les responsables de la politique étrangère grecque, soit en agissant pour les intérêts du pays hôte, soit pour défendre les intérêts de la diaspora.

La structure du lobby grec transnational

Le lobby grec présente une image aux plusieurs facettes, non seulement à cause de sa présence dans plusieurs pays, mais aussi parce qu'il n'y a pas de véritable structure de coordination transnationale, ni nationale locale. Pendant longtemps l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque a tenté de jouer ce rôle de coordination tant au niveau transnational qu'au niveau national local. Cela n'a pas donné de résultats positifs étant donné l'isolement et l'affaiblissement du Patriarcat Œcuménique de Constantinople auquel les Grecs orthodoxes de la diaspora sont attachés. D'autant plus que le Patriarcat s'oppose au rôle que les Eglises locales ont tenté de jouer sur ce plan. Par ailleurs sur le plan national local l'Eglise fut contestée par les groupes laïques qui n'acceptaient pas son leadership. D'autres initiatives locales au niveau des différents pays afin de créer des structures de coordination n'ont pas donné non plus des résultats très encourageants. Par exemple au Canada a été créé aux années '80, un peu sur le modèle juif, le Congrès helléno-canadien avec l'ambition de rassembler tous les organismes helléno-canadiens et de coordonner leurs actions. Ses efforts n'ont pas été couronnés de succès parce que d'un côté l'Eglise continuait à agir parallèlement au Congrès et de l'autre côté parce que les grandes Communautés helléniques qui font partie du Congrès n'ont jamais abandonné leurs prérogatives en faveur d'une structure fédérative forte de coordination. Aux États-Unis les organismes grecs n'ont jamais réussi à créer une structure unique de coordination. Seule l'Eglise a tenté de jouer par moments ce rôle là, tout dépendant de la personnalité qui s'est trouvée à sa tête. Par exemple l'archevêque Iakovos, sans réussir à unifier tous les organismes et groupes, a exercé une certaine hégémonie sur la communauté grecque des États-Unis. Après son départ l'Eglise a été affaiblie et divisée en diverses entités administratives autonomes, soumises directement au Patriarcat Œcuménique de Constantinople.

Sans doute la plus importante tentative de créer une structure transnationale de coordination de la diaspora grecque a été celle entreprise par l'État grec avec la création du Conseil des Grecs de l'Étranger- SAE (Συμβούλιο Αποδημίου Ελληνισμού-ΣΑΕ). La première assemblée des représentants des organismes grecs de la diaspora pour la création du SAE a eu lieu à Salonique en décembre 1995 sous l'égide du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Grecques. Sa création résulte d'une loi votée par le parlement grec. Le Parlement agissait ainsi en tenant compte de la constitution grecque qui dans son article 108.1 stipulait: «L'État veille aux conditions de vie de la diaspora hellénique et au maintien de ses liens avec la Mère Patrie. Il veille également à l'instruction et à la promotion

sociale et professionnelle des Hellènes qui travaillent en dehors du territoire national». La révision constitutionnelle de 2001 a enchassé dans la constitution l'existence même du Conseil des Grecs de l'Étranger. En effet, dans son article 108.2 elle prévoit: «La loi fixe ce qui concerne l'organisation, le fonctionnement et les compétences du Conseil des Grecs de l'Étranger, qui a pour mission d'exprimer toutes les forces de l'hellénisme où qu'il soit».

En pratique cette instance de coordination n'a pas réussi à s'imposer. D'un côté il y a ceux qui contestent l'intervention de l'État grec dans les affaires de la diaspora et de l'autre côté il y a ceux qui mettent en cause sa représentativité. Sur le terrain les divers organismes grecs continuent à agir plus ou moins de façon autonome. Par ailleurs le Patriarcat craignant qu'une Eglise orthodoxe greco-américaine comprenant les Etats-Unis, le Canada, l'Amérique Centrale et l'Amérique Latine, soit très forte et ait la tentation de devenir indépendante (autocéphale) a procédé à sa division en diverses unités administratives soumises directement à Constantinople.

Si on se réfère aux Etats-Unis où se trouve le cœur de la diaspora grecque, on constate la présence d'une série d'organismes qui tentent de promouvoir les intérêts grecs auprès de l'administration américaine, effectuant quelquefois l'effort de présenter un front unique et autrefois de façon dispersée. Après l'Eglise grecque orthodoxe les organismes les plus importants sont AHEPA, fondé en 1922 (American Hellenic Progressive Association), l'Institut hellénoaméricain-AHI, fondé en 1974 par Eugène Rossides qui a servi comme Assistant Secrétaire au Trésor dans l'Administration Nixon, le Congrès helléno-américain Uni-UHAC, fondé en 1975 par Andrew Athens sur l'instigation de l'archevêque Iakovos, le Conseil national américain qui agit comme parapluie pour différents organismes, diverses fédérations ethnorégionales, telles la Fédération macédonienne, épirote et pontienne, ainsi que les organismes chypriotes groupés au sein de PSEKA (Comité Mondial Justice pour Chypre). Le riche Angelo Tsakopoulos a créé en 1995 le Western Policy Center-WPC, incorporé en 2004 au Woodrow Wilson International Center. La compagnie «Manatos and Manatos», créée par Andrew Manatos, agit comme lobby professionnel pour le compte du UHAC et de PSEKA et à certaines occasions aussi pour le compte des gouvernements grec et chypriote³.

On trouve pratiquement la même structure chez les Grecs du Canada et d'Australie. Cependant il existe dans ces deux pays quelques Communautés helléniques fortes, en partie laïques, que l'Eglise n'a pas réussi à transformer en paroisses.

En Europe les structures de la communauté grecque sont différentes. D'abord le rôle de l'Eglise n'est pas aussi déterminant qu'aux Etats-Unis et ensuite on trouve une structure laïque avec une sensibilité politique proche des lignes politiques du pays d'origine. C'est le cas en particulier de la communauté grecque en Allemagne, alors qu'en France il y a surtout une influence intellectuelle. En Grande Bretagne c'est la présence de la forte communauté chypriote qui détermine les activités du lobby grec. Il y a aussi cependant une présence intellectuelle avec les chaires grecques dans certaines universités britanniques et surtout avec la forte présence des armateurs grecs à Londres⁴.

On trouve aussi des particularités d'organisation dans le cas des communautés grecques des pays de l'ancienne Union soviétique, ainsi que dans le cas des communautés grecques d'Afrique. De façon générale ce qui caractérise les structures de la diaspora grecque est la dispersion, le manque de coordination dans son action en tant que lobby et la faiblesse de son leadership.

Signalons aussi que depuis l'invasion de Chypre par la Turquie en 1974, la République de Chypre a aidé à l'organisation des Chypriotes de l'étranger par la création de la Fédération mondiale de Chypriotes de l'étranger-POMAK et le Comité International Justice Pour Chypre-PSEKA. POMAK a son siège social à Londres, étant donné que la plus importante diaspora chypriote se trouve en Grande-Bretagne, alors que PSEKA a son siège à New York, étant donné l'importance qu'on accorde au rôle des Etats-Unis et des Nations Unies pour la solution de la question chypriote.

L'apparition et le développement du lobby grec

On situe généralement les débuts du lobby grec après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, au moment où a été soulevée la question chypriote. C'est à ce moment que la diaspora grecque se mobilise, en particulier celle des Etats-Unis et de la Grande Bretagne pour soutenir la cause chypriote. Cependant dans le cas des Etats-Unis et sans doute dans le cas du Canada, le lobby grec se manifeste déjà au début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale au moment de la création du Fonds Grec de Soutien à la Grèce. Cet organisme a apporté une aide considérable à la Grèce durant la guerre, ainsi que durant l'occupation allemande.⁵ Quoi qu'il en soit, dans les années '50 la question chypriote a été soulevée par le lobby grec, surtout auprès du Congrès américain. Les résultats de cette mobilisation n'ont pas été encourageants. D'un côté à cette époque l'influence du Congrès en matière de politique étrangère était limitée et de

l'autre côté le lobby était mal préparé pour une telle action.

La crise de Chypre en 1963-1964 a mobilisé à nouveau le lobby grec, tant aux Etats-Unis qu'en Grande Bretagne, au Canada et en Australie. Durant cette période aussi il conserve un profil bas⁶. La dictature militaire en Grèce (1967-1974) est une autre occasion de mobilisation de la diaspora grecque en faveur de la restauration de la démocratie. Aux Etats-Unis le mouvement contre la dictature est resté faible étant donné que l'Eglise, ainsi que l'establishment des communautés grecques était en collusion avec la dictature. Par contre au Canada et en Australie où les communautés grecques étaient constituées en grande majorité par des immigrants de la première génération, la mobilisation contre la dictature était beaucoup plus forte. En Europe aussi la mobilisation était forte, tant au sein des travailleurs Grecs, qu'au sein des intellectuels et des étudiants⁷.

Cependant le grand moment du lobby grec, surtout aux Etats-Unis, se situe en 1974 au moment de l'invasion de Chypre par l'armée turque. Cette fois le lobby grec arrive à une certaine maturité et ses efforts ont été couronnés de succès en persuadant le Congrès américain d'imposer un embargo de vente d'armes à la Turquie. Les années 1974-1978 sont considérées comme l'âge d'or du lobby grec. Toute une mythologie a été créée autour de son rôle et de sa supposée puissance. Il faut situer le succès du lobby grec aux Etats-Unis dans le contexte politique américain de cette période. Le pouvoir exécutif est affaibli à cause de la guerre du Vietnam, mais surtout à cause du scandale du Watergate qui a conduit finalement à la démission du président Nixon. Dans ce contexte le Congrès américain manifesta son désir d'avoir un rôle beaucoup plus marqué dans l'élaboration et la conduite de la politique étrangère américaine. Néanmoins, la mythologie qui a entouré l'action du lobby grec pendant cette période a été aussi le résultat de la propagande du Secrétaire d'Etat Henry Kissinger qui voulait ainsi contrecarrer l'action du Congrès américain en le présentant sous l'influence d'un puissant lobby ethnique. Avec l'arrivée à la présidence des Etats-Unis du démocrate Jimmy Carter l'administration américaine réussit à briser l'embargo de ventes d'armes à la Turquie malgré l'opposition du lobby grec. Dans le contexte politique à Washington où le nouveau président démocrate prétendait moraliser la politique étrangère américaine et avec un Congrès dominé aussi par les démocrates, le vent a tourné au détriment du lobby grec⁸.

On assiste au cours des années suivantes au déclin graduel du lobby grec américain. Au Canada, en Australie et ailleurs la mobilisation en faveur de Chypre regresse aussi graduellement.

Durant les années '90 après la désintégration de la Yougoslavie et la

proclamation d'une république au nom de Macédoine le lobby transnational grec se manifeste de façon dynamique contre ce qui était considéré comme une usurpation de l'histoire grecque de la Macédoine. Des manifestations monstres ont eu lieu dans différents pays, surtout au Canada, en Australie et aux États-Unis. Si aux États-Unis le succès de cette mobilisation fut mitigé, au Canada et en Australie elle a eu beaucoup plus de succès forçant les gouvernements de ce pays à ne pas reconnaître sous le nom de Macédoine l'ancienne République Yougoslave de Macédoine. Le pourrissement de la question macédonienne a évidemment conduit aussi à la démobilisation du lobby transnational grec⁹.

Malgré ses faiblesses évidentes le lobby grec continue à défendre certaines causes grecques comme la question chypriote, la défense du Patriarcat Œcuménique face à la discrimination dont il est victime de la part de la Turquie, etc.

L'impact du lobby grec sur la formulation des orientations de la politique étrangère grecque

Comme on l'a vu, historiquement le lobby grec fut créé afin de promouvoir les intérêts nationaux de la Grèce dans les différentes capitales du monde et plus particulièrement dans celle de la superpuissance américaine. Il est évident que tout lobby ethnique a plus ou moins le même objectif. Il est vu et considéré comme une sorte d'arme d'un pays pour défendre ses intérêts au niveau du système international. Néanmoins, depuis un certain temps on a commencé à réfléchir, à chercher, à analyser l'impact des différents lobbys ethniques dans le sens inverse, à savoir l'influence qu'ils exercent sur la politique extérieure du pays d'origine. Comme toujours, le prototype étant le lobby juif, les premières études ont cherché à comprendre son rôle inverse sur les orientations de la politique étrangère israélienne¹⁰. Dans le cas du lobby grec la question a déjà été posée aux années '80. Van Coufoudakis a été parmi les premiers à poser cette question de l'influence du lobby grec américain sur les orientations de la politique étrangère grecque¹¹. Coufoudakis a soutenu que les communautés ethniques, bien établies, comme c'est le cas de la communauté grecque américaine, ont montré leur habileté d'agir pour les intérêts de leur pays d'origine, tout en agissant dans un contexte plus large qui tient compte des intérêts de leur pays d'accueil. Il soutient aussi que la Communauté greco-américaine a montré son habileté à agir indépendamment, tant de son pays d'origine que de son pays d'accueil. Ainsi, par exemple, en faisant valoir l'argument du respect de la loi américaine («the rule of law»), dans le cas de l'embargo de la vente des armes à la Turquie, il défendait en

même temps les intérêts de la Grèce et ceux des Etats-Unis dont la Turquie avait violé la loi. Il est évident que cet exercice n'est pas facile quand on tente de concilier les intérêts des deux pays. Cela pourrait même conduire à une sorte d'artifice, soit pour donner bonne conscience d'avoir une fidélité égale aux pays d'origine et d'accueil, soit pour ne pas paraître plus intéressé par les intérêts du pays d'origine que par ceux du pays d'accueil. Il est cependant dans l'intérêt de tout lobby ethnique de ne pas paraître à la solde du pays d'accueil. Car d'un côté cela pourrait créer des réactions hostiles parmi les autres citoyens et surtout compromettre sa propre efficacité. C'est dans ce contexte que l'évocation du respect de la loi américaine par le lobby grec dans la défense de la cause chypriote s'est avérée une stratégie payante.

De façon plus générale on voit aujourd'hui l'utilisation du principe du respect des droits de l'homme par différents groupes, ethniques ou autres, tout en défendant en même temps des causes nationales, comme cela était le cas dans le conflit yougoslave. Il faut se rappeler aussi que le lobby grec a fait appel au même principe tant aux Etats-Unis qu'ailleurs pour défendre différentes causes grecques telles les questions chypriote et macédonienne, la situation du Patriarcat Œcuménique, etc.

Cette politique bicéphale du lobby grec, lui permettait d'exercer directement ou indirectement son influence sur la formulation de la politique étrangère grecque. Et cela même si la perception était, surtout en Grèce, que son action s'exerçait surtout auprès de l'administration américaine. Durant la période de 1974-1980 cette influence du lobby grec auprès d'Athènes était presque naturelle, surtout celle de l'Eglise et de son archevêque Iakovos, étant donné la coïncidence des orientations idéologiques du gouvernement grec avec celles du lobby. Cependant, l'arrivée au pouvoir du PASOK en 1980 a affecté pour un certain temps les relations des deux partenaires. Néanmoins, très vite Andreas Papandreou, malgré l'opinion négative qu'il avait de l'establishment greco-américain, a rétabli des ponts entre son gouvernement et le leadership de la communauté grecque américaine, y compris l'Eglise et l'archevêque Iakovos. Il est évidemment difficile de mesurer l'influence du lobby grec sur le gouvernement grec non seulement à partir de 1980 quand le PASOK est arrivé au pouvoir, mais même avant pendant la période du gouvernement de Constantin Karamanlis et de la Nouvelle Démocratie. Il est cependant bien connu que cette influence s'exerçait principalement par le biais des conseils donnés sur le fonctionnement du système politique américain dont il avait une connaissance certaine. L'accès que le leadership greco-américain avait auprès de l'administration américaine forçait tous les

gouvernements grecs à prêter une oreille attentive à ses conseils et ses opinions.

Néanmoins, dans certains cas le lobby grec, tant aux Etats-Unis qu'ailleurs, s'est opposé directement à des politiques adoptées par Athènes et a exercé des pressions pour les reorienter. Ainsi, par exemple, le lobby greco-américain s'est opposé à certaines positions d'Andreas Papandreou qu'il considérait antiaméricaines. Il a par ailleurs défendu la coopération militaire entre les Etats-Unis et la Grèce à un moment où le gouvernement grec parlait d'éloignement du pays des bases américaines. Une certaine pression a aussi été exercée sur le gouvernement grec durant les années '80 pour l'extradition aux Etats-Unis des «terroristes» palestiniens ainsi que pour la restauration de la statue du président Truman à Athènes après qu'elle a été endommagée par une explosion en 1986.

Au même moment certaines politiques d'Athènes au milieu des années '80 permettant la normalisation des relations avec l'Albanie ont été vivement critiquées par des groupes grecs originaires de l'Epire du nord, tant aux Etats-Unis qu'en Australie et au Canada¹².

La question macédonienne est devenue depuis le milieu des années '90 une pomme de discorde entre les communautés grecques de la diaspora issues de la Grèce du nord et les gouvernements grecs. En particulier la Fédération Panmacédonienne, tant aux Etats-Unis qu'en Australie et au Canada est critique envers la politique suivie par les gouvernements Costas Simitis et Costas Karamanlis envers l'ancienne République Yougoslave Macédonienne. Dans certains milieux de la diaspora grecque il y a aussi des critiques envers le rapprochement greco-turc parce qu'on considère que la Grèce fait des concessions à Ankara sans contrepartie.

Sur la question macédonienne il existe une grande sensibilité qui va au-delà des organismes représentant les Grecs des régions du Nord du pays. Ainsi, par exemple, à la dernière Assemblée mondiale du SAE à Thessaloniki en décembre 2006, les congressistes ont adopté unanimement une résolution enjoignant le gouvernement grec de ne pas céder sur le principe du nom de l'ancienne République Yougoslave de Macédoine¹³.

L'impact du lobby grec sur la formulation de la politique étrangère d'Athènes se fait sentir aussi sur des affaires autres que ce qu'on appelle les questions nationales. Ainsi, par exemple, on observe une pression exercée sur le gouvernement grec afin de signer des ententes en matière de sécurité sociale avec les différents pays d'accueil ce qui permettrait aux Grecs de la diaspora de faire un transfert de leurs droits sociaux. Dans le même ordre des choses des pressions ont aussi été exercées pour la signature d'ententes dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la culture.

Les partis politiques grecs ont créé après 1974 des organisations locales dans plusieurs pays au sein des communautés grecques. Ces organisations deviennent aussi une sorte de courroie d'influence de la diaspora auprès du gouvernement et des partis politiques grecs. En plus des membres de la diaspora inscrits sur les listes électorales en Grèce retournent au pays au moment des élections pour voter et participer aussi à des activités partisans. Si ce vote est négligeable à cause des distances pour ce qui est des Etats-Unis, le Canada et l'Australie, tel n'est pas le cas pour l'Allemagne. C'est pourquoi la communauté grecque d'Allemagne constitue un lobby puissant sur certaines questions en particulier celles de l'éducation des enfants grecs de ce pays. En effet, c'est par milliers que les Grecs d'Allemagne reviennent au pays au moment des élections pour voter et participer aux activités partisans.

Depuis longtemps la diaspora grecque exige d'Athènes le droit de vote pour ses membres qui détiennent la citoyenneté grecque, soit auprès des ambassades et des consulats grecs soit par ce qu'on appelle le vote épistolaire pour ceux qui sont éloignés des représentations diplomatiques et consulaires grecques. Même si tous les partis politiques étaient d'accord pour accorder ce droit aux citoyens Grecs de la diaspora et malgré les promesses mille fois répétées, ce n'est que dernièrement que le gouvernement grec a déposé une loi au Parlement grec accordant ce droit, en principe non pas pour les prochaines élections mais pour celles qui se dérouleront après la dissolution du Parlement issu des prochaines élections. Encore là les partis politiques ne sont pas d'accord sur les modalités d'exercer ce droit de vote. Il y a des partis qui préfèrent l'élection des quelques parlementaires représentants de la diaspora alors que le gouvernement dans son projet de loi prévoit l'inscription des citoyens Grecs de la diaspora sur les listes des électeurs des différentes circonscriptions.

Le lobby grec outil du pays d'accueil

L'administration américaine a très tôt compris qu'elle avait la possibilité d'utiliser le lobby grec en sens inverse pour promouvoir ses propres intérêts auprès du gouvernement grec. Sa façon d'agir était subtile. En s'adressant aux organismes grecs elle leur faisait savoir que l'Administration voulait travailler avec la Grèce et la Turquie pour résoudre les différends entre eux puisqu'il s'agissait d'alliés au sein de l'Alliance Atlantique. En exprimant cette volonté elle leur demandait en même temps de lui apporter un soutien dans ses efforts. Certains des organismes grecs sont tombés dans ce piège et ont accepté le rôle d'ambassadeur pour transmettre ce message au gouvernement grec. En même temps ils ont accepté d'effectuer des visites de bonne volonté tant à Athènes

qu'à Ankara passant même par Nicosie pour discuter de la question chypriote. L'administration américaine se charge même de faciliter ses visites des organismes grecs mais aussi des hommes d'affaires d'origine grecque. Ainsi le lobby grec devient une courroie de transmission des positions américaines aux autorités grecques exerçant une subtile pression sur Athènes pour modérer ses positions. Déjà en 1999 le professeur américain d'origine grecque Nicolas Stavrou notait que le lobby grec «au lieu d'exercer de la pression sur le State Department et la Maison Blanche pour arrêter l'hypocrisie et soutenir l'imposition du droit international à Chypre, en Mère Egée et dans les Balkans, courait vers Athènes pour exercer là son influence»¹⁴. Il existe aussi le cas du Western Policy Center créé par le riche Angelos Tsakopoulos un des supporters financiers du Parti Démocrate et en particulier de la famille Clinton qui déclarait ouvertement «qu'il avait comme but de promouvoir les intérêts géopolitiques des Etats-Unis et des valeurs occidentales dans l'Europe du Sud-Est ainsi que la solution des différends greco-turcs»¹⁵.

Eugène Rossidis ancien Secrétaire du Commerce au sein de l'administration Nixon et fondateur de l'Institut helléno-américain, constate aussi «qu'il existe aujourd'hui un groupe dont les positions sont proches de celles défendues par la Turquie»¹⁶. Il fait sans doute référence au groupe de Tsakopoulos, le Western Policy Center, dont le directeur John Citylidis s'était fait dans ses conférences et dans ses positions en général le promoteur des idées américaines sur les affaires grecques.

Il n'y a pas de doute que le leader de l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Amérique, l'archevêque Iakovos, à l'apogée de sa puissance effectuait la promotion subtile des positions américaines auprès des divers gouvernements grecs. Même si les médias grecs l'accusèrent de travailler davantage pour les intérêts de Washington que pour ceux d'Athènes, ces accusations sont excessives car il cherchait à trouver un équilibre entre les intérêts des deux capitales. Il ne faudrait pas non plus oublier qu'il avait aussi sa propre agenda dans ces jeux d'équilibre afin de satisfaire ses ambitions pour se hisser au trône du Patriarcat Œcuménique. Cela le forçait, surtout pendant la période du pouvoir de Turgut Özal en Turquie, à jouer un jeu subtil avec Washington, Athènes et Ankara¹⁷.

Ce même jeu subtil est de plus en plus joué aussi par différents groupes hellénoaméricains ainsi que par certaines personnalités et hommes d'affaires de la communauté grecque qui cherchent à établir un équilibre dans cette relation triadique, lobby-pays d'origine et pays d'accueil. Le but est évidemment de servir aussi leurs propres intérêts.

Le même jeu triadique commence aussi à faire son apparition au sein d'autres communautés de la diaspora grecque comme celles de l'Australie et du Canada. Ces communautés ont des intérêts à défendre tant auprès des gouvernements d'Athènes qu'auprès des gouvernements des pays d'accueil. Il n'est donc pas rare dans cette relation de défendre auprès des gouvernements d'Athènes certains intérêts du pays d'accueil.

La diaspora face au «révisionnisme» en politique étrangère

Il est certain qu'on ne peut pas parler d'une vision monolithique de la diaspora grecque envers la politique extérieure de la Grèce. C'est pourquoi il faudrait plutôt parler de vision diversifiée. Cette diversification résulte de l'espace géographique où sont installées les communautés grecques de la diaspora ainsi que de leurs structures socio-économiques. Par exemple, les Grecs des Etats-Unis jugent la politique étrangère différemment des Grecs de l'Europe Occidentale. Aussi les universitaires et les intellectuels jugent cette politique différemment des hommes d'affaires ou des masses de travailleurs. Plus encore les Grecs de la deuxième et de la troisième génération jugent différemment la politique étrangère grecque de ceux qui appartiennent à la première génération d'immigrants. Il y donc des facteurs géographiques, sociaux, économiques, démographiques et autres qui déterminent le comportement des diverses composantes de la diaspora envers la politique étrangère d'Athènes.

En ce qui concerne la période qui va du milieu des années '90 avec l'arrivée au pouvoir de Costas Simitis nous pourrions signaler globalement trois sortes de réactions: tout d'abord ceux qui n'ont pas accepté le révisionnisme qui a marqué la politique étrangère de cette période. On les trouve surtout aux Etats-Unis et en partie au Canada et en Australie. Ils appartiennent aux couches les plus populaires mais aussi à des couches bien éduquées. Certains sont en désaccord avec la politique suivie sur la question Macédonienne, d'autres avec la politique suivie envers la Turquie. Dans un deuxième temps il y a ceux qui ont soutenu les changements marqués dans la politique étrangère grecque. Il s'agit surtout d'hommes d'affaires et on les trouve surtout aux Etats-Unis. En troisième lieu ceux qui sont plus nuancés et qu'on trouve surtout chez les universitaires, les intellectuels et les plus éduqués. Il faut cependant dire que dans cette catégorie il y a un nombre considérable, surtout d'universitaires, très critiques envers la politique extérieure d'Athènes. Il ne s'agit pas tellement d'une opposition à ses fondements, mais surtout d'une opposition à la façon qu'elle est conduite.

Quelques voix, particulièrement celles de la communauté des affaires,

favorisent le révisionnisme introduit en politique extérieure grecque au milieu des années 1990 sur le paradigme d' «européanisation» et de «modernisation» alors que d'autres restent attachées, en particulier les masses populaires, à ses aspects traditionnels. Par ailleurs des universitaires et intellectuels sont plus nuancés, même s'ils considèrent la modernisation et l'eupéanisation de la politique extérieure grecque comme une nécessité. En même temps, cependant, quelques uns sont critiques envers les méthodes et les pratiques utilisées pour atteindre ces objectifs. D'autres contestent même les objectifs fixés par une telle politique dans le domaine comme celui de la question chypriote, le différend en mer Égée et la politique balkanique.

Rares sont aussi les universitaires qui considèrent qu'il y ait eu un changement majeur de la politique extérieure grecque au milieu des années '90, plus particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la modernisation de ses structures. Quelques uns soulignent même que le soit-disant changement est davantage le fruit d'une opération efficace de communication de cette époque que le véritable reflet de la réalité.

Il faut dire que la diaspora grecque de façon générale est favorable à l'intégration européenne de la Grèce et à ce qu'on pourrait appeler l'eupéanisation de la vie politique grecque. Néanmoins plusieurs universitaires et intellectuels acceptent mal cet engouement idéologique d'eupéanisation mis en avant à Athènes au milieu des années '90. Ils considèrent qu'il s'agit d'une coquille idéologique vide pour justifier les faiblesses et l'inefficacité de la politique étrangère.

Les sources de l'influence du lobby grec à Athènes

De façon générale on pourrait considérer que la principale source de l'influence du lobby grec auprès des gouvernements grecs est politique. Néanmoins, on avance de plus en plus comme source de cette influence des intérêts aussi économiques. Par ailleurs d'autres sources de cette influence sont de nature historique et sentimentale.

La source politique

Sur le plan politique la diaspora grecque dispose d'un certain poids à cause de ses succès dans divers pays. Le cas des Etats-Unis reste toujours le plus intéressant. On peut toujours critiquer le lobby grec dans ce pays, on peut toujours parler de son inefficacité, surtout ces dernières années, il ne reste pas moins qu'il s'agit d'une force politique. Ce n'est pas un hasard s'il y a eu déjà un vice-président américain d'origine grecque, Spiro Agnew, ainsi qu'un

candidat aux élections présidentielles contre George Bush père en 1988, Michael Dukakis. Depuis des années il y a aussi des membres du Congrès dans les deux Chambres qui sont d'origine grecque. Des membres de la communauté grecque ont aussi occupé des postes importants au sein de l'administration américaine comme celui du représentant aux Nations unies ou celui du directeur de la CIA. L'opinion publique en Grèce attendait évidemment de ces gens, un peu naïvement, de faire fléchir la politique américaine sur des questions d'intérêt grec. Mais les élites grecques comprennent que la seule influence qu'on peut avoir sur la politique américaine n'est pas au niveau du pouvoir exécutif mais plutôt au niveau de la législature américaine. Effectivement à ce niveau les membres du Congrès américain d'origine grecque n'ont pas manqué d'apporter un soutien aux questions d'intérêt grec. Quoiqu'il en soit il est évident qu'une diaspora comme celle des Etats-Unis qui réussit à avoir un certain poids politique dans ce pays ne peut qu'influencer aussi les élites du pays d'origine. Il y a d'ailleurs des liens assez étroits entre ces élites et la diaspora greco-américaine. Des centaines des Grecs ont étudié dans les universités américaines et ont établi des liens avec la diaspora. L'actuel premier ministre de la Grèce Costas Karamanlis ainsi que le chef de l'opposition officielle, le président du PASOK George Papandreou, ont étudié dans les universités américaines et ont toujours des relations marquées avec les élites de la diaspora greco-américaine. Il y a par ailleurs des centaines d'universitaires et des scientifiques d'origine grecque qui font carrière aux Etats-Unis et qui d'une façon ou d'une autre ont des relations avec la Grèce.

Le cas de la diaspora greco-américaine n'est pas unique même si il s'agit du paradigme dominant quand on analyse l'influence du lobby grec sur les orientations de la politique étrangère grecque. La diaspora grecque de l'Australie et celle du Canada suivent de près l'exemple américain. Dans ces deux pays des citoyens issus des communautés grecques sont aussi présents sur la scène politique, en particulier en Australie. Cette présence politique se repercute aussi en influence sur les gouvernements grecs.

Dans le cas de la Grande Bretagne c'est surtout la présence des Chypriotes qui est déterminante pour la question de Chypre. On remarque évidemment les mêmes faiblesses qu'on constate dans le cas du lobby greco-américain. Il ne reste pas moins que les Chypriotes de la Grande Bretagne exercent une influence certaine sur les orientations de la politique extérieure de Nicosie. Tous les partis politiques chypriotes disposent d'organisations locales à Londres et les politiciens de Nicosie se trouvent très souvent dans la capitale britannique pour participer à des activités politiques et culturelles organisées

par leurs antennes locales. Soulignons aussi qu'une partie des élites chypriotes a étudié dans les universités britanniques.

La source économique

Néanmoins l'influence du lobby grec sur les orientations de la politique étrangère grecque n'est pas seulement de source politique. Le facteur économique, le poids économique de la diaspora devient aussi une source d'influence sur les affaires grecques. Certes il n'y a pas d'étude spécifique dans ce domaine mais on sait qu'historiquement la diaspora grecque a beaucoup investi dans le pays d'origine par le passé. Des études concernant l'influence de la diaspora historique au 19^e siècle et même au début du 20^e éclairent en partie cette question.¹⁸ Par contre pour la diaspora issue de l'émigration de la fin du 19^e siècle et surtout de l'émigration du 20^e siècle nous n'avons que des indications. Cependant nous savons que des richissimes Grecs contribuent de façon significative ces dernières années aux campagnes électorales de deux grands partis aux Etats-Unis. Ces mêmes personnes entretiennent des relations étroites avec des élites politiques grecques. Dans certains cas elles ont par exemple contribué à la création des chaires dites politiques dans les universités américaines pour honorer des personnalités politiques grecques telles Constantin Karamanlis et Constantin Mitsotakis. Certains indices permettent aussi de supposer d'un financement de leur part de partis politiques grecs.

Le capital généré par les activités des armateurs grecs est aussi relié à la diaspora grecque. Il n'y a pas de doute que ce capital est aussi la source d'une influence politique certaine sur les affaires politiques grecques. On a par exemple soutenu que pendant la guerre arabo-israélienne de 1973, le dictateur George Papadopoulos a succombé aux pressions des armateurs grecs qui avaient des intérêts importants dans le monde arabe et n'a pas permis l'utilisation du sol grec aux avions militaires américains avec capacité nucléaire. C'est ainsi que certains analystes expliquent sa chute au profit du brigadier général Dimitrios Ioannidis bien plus enclin à suivre les directives de Washington. Il y a d'ailleurs un précédent concernant l'influence des armateurs Grecs sur la politique étrangère grecque au moment de la crise du canal de Suez en 1956. La Grèce a été conviée à participer à la conférence de Londres qui a été organisée par les Britanniques après la nationalisation du canal par Nasser au mois d'Août 1956. A l'époque on s'est demandé au sein de différents milieux diplomatiques pourquoi la Grèce, un petit pays, fut convié à cette conférence sur l'avenir du canal de Suez. On trouve la réponse dans le journal français *Le Monde* du 8 Août 1956. On lit, en effet, dans ce journal que «la Grèce était conviée puisque

les armateurs Grecs contrôlent, sous pavillon national et sous pavillons étrangers, la plus importante flotte maritime du monde»¹⁹. Le gouvernement de l'époque de Constantin Caramanlis n'a pas accepté l'invitation puisque l'objectif de la Conférence de Londres était de condamner Nasser et de suggérer des mesures punitives contre lui. Les armateurs Grecs qui avaient des intérêts importants dans le monde arabe pour le transfert du pétrole ont apparemment exercé des pressions sur Caramanlis de s'abstenir afin de ne pas brouiller les bonnes relations greco-arabes. Georges Dertilis note d'ailleurs que ce refus de Caramanlis de participer à la Conférence de Londres a été interprété par les alliés Occidentaux de la Grèce et plus particulièrement par les États-Unis comme un pas vers l'affranchissement de la Grèce de la tutelle Occidentale et plus particulièrement de la tutelle américaine²⁰. Dans tous les cas les armateurs Grecs constituent une force économique considérable et contrôlent aujourd'hui des secteurs importants de l'économie grecque et en grande partie les médias grecs. D'ailleurs cette présence économique des armateurs Grecs ainsi que leur influence politique s'est fait sentir à plusieurs reprises pour toute la période qui s'étend de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale jusqu'à nos jours. On n'a qu'à se rappeler par exemple la présence d'Aristote Onassis qui a créé entre autres Olympic Airways, la compagnie nationale grecque d'aviation. Même aujourd'hui avec la fondation Onassis qui gère une grande partie de son héritage le millionnaire Grec reste présent dans la vie économique, sociale et culturelle du pays. Onassis originaire de Smyrne, fils de réfugiés Grecs, est parti de la diaspora grecque d'Argentine où il a exercé même des fonctions de consul honoraire pour la Grèce. D'autres comme Stavros Niarchos et quelques autres plus contemporains font aussi partie du paysage culturel et politico-médiatique grec.

Dans le contexte actuel des changements majeurs dans les Balkans et la présence de la Grèce au sein de l'Union européenne il n'y a pas de doute que des capitaux provenant de la diaspora grecque s'intéressent aux marchés des Balkans, de la Méditerranée orientale, de l'Europe et de l'espace post-soviétique. Il est évident qu'il y a des ramifications entre l'économie et la politique. Dans quelle mesure cela permet à la diaspora grecque d'influencer les orientations de la politique étrangère grecque? Il est difficile de répondre mais il ne faut pas l'exclure.

La source historique

La troisième source de l'influence de la diaspora grecque sur les affaires grecques est de nature historique et sentimentale. Il faut se rappeler que c'est

dans la diaspora grecque que le mouvement de libération nationale a pris naissance au 19^e siècle. L'organisation clandestine Filiki Etaireia qui a préparé la guerre de l'indépendance est née en Odessa au début du 19^e siècle (le 14 Septembre 1814), et a reçu le soutien nécessaire des communautés grecques de la diaspora historique de cette époque. Plus tard après la création du petit Etat grec c'est toujours la diaspora qui l'a soutenu ayant sur lui une influence considérable tout au long du 19^e siècle. Des investissements, mais aussi d'importants dons ont soutenu l'économie et la culture de l'Etat national grec, créé après l'indépendance. Cela avait évidemment une contrepartie, l'exercice d'une influence certaine sur ses orientations politiques. Cela a créé un lien sentimental entre la diaspora et l'Etat national grec. Il ne faudrait pas d'ailleurs oublier le rôle du mouvement intellectuel des lumières qui a été à la naissance d'une identité politique grecque tout au long du 18^e et du 19^e siècle. Des personnalités comme Rigas Velenstinlis, Adamantios Korais et d'autres qui ont vécu dans la diaspora grecque restent à jamais gravées dans la mémoire collective grecque. Des hommes de lettres qui ont vécu dans la diaspora grecque occupent aussi une place prépondérante au sein de la littérature et de la culture grecque en général. Tel est le cas par exemple du linguiste Jean Psycharis qui a vécu à Paris et a enseigné le grec à l'Ecole des Langues Orientales, ainsi que des grands poètes Andreas Kalvos et Constantin Cavafis. Ce dernier, de renommée internationale aujourd'hui, constitue le lien entre la diaspora grecque de l'Egypte et en particulier celle de l'Alexandrie avec la Grèce. Une diaspora qui a donné d'ailleurs aux lettres grecques plusieurs autres intellectuels et hommes de lettres tels Nikos Nikolaidis, le Chypriote, Yiorgos Skliros, et le grand romancier Stratis Tsirkas. Ce lien sentimental sera plus tard perpétué avec la diaspora transatlantique issue de l'émigration. Pendant longtemps la grande majorité des familles grecques, surtout celles de la campagne avaient un lien de parenté avec des Grecs de la diaspora. Au moment difficile des guerres, surtout pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale et l'occupation, cette nouvelle diaspora transatlantique s'est mobilisée pour aider le pays d'origine à survivre. Ce lien se perpétue plus tard quand cette même diaspora s'implique pour soutenir la mère patrie dans ses revendications nationales comme cela était le cas avec les questions chypriote et macédonienne.

Par ailleurs la diaspora grecque d'aujourd'hui perpétue cette idée d'un certain œcuménisme cosmopolite grec. Le fait que des milliers de Grecs qui font partie des élites et qui occupent des postes importants au sein de la société grecque ont vécu à un moment ou à un autre à l'étranger et ont tissé des liens avec la diaspora explique aussi en partie le lien sentimental entre la Grèce et sa diaspora. Cela explique aussi pourquoi ce lien historique et sentimental

devient une source d'influence de la diaspora grecque sur les orientations de la politique étrangère grecque. Notons qu'après la chute de la dictature et la restauration de la démocratie en 1974 il y a eu des centaines et des centaines des membres de la diaspora grecque qui sont retournés au pays d'origine pour occuper des fonctions importantes au sein de l'appareil politique, économique, culturel et social. Des personnalités telles Andreas Papandreou, Melina Mercouri, Mikis Theodorakis, Gerasimos Arsenis, Loucas Papadimos, sont venus de la diaspora, ou ont vécu dans la diaspora au moment de la dictature militaire et ont toujours gardé des liens avec celle-ci. Sans parler de Constantin Caramanlis, le premier ministre de 1974, qui est revenu aussi de Paris où il avait vécu auto-exilé depuis 1964.

Conclusion

Malgré sa force la diaspora grecque d'aujourd'hui n'est pas en mesure d'imposer sa vision des choses à l'État grec. On est loin du 19^e siècle où la riche bourgeoisie de la diaspora était en mesure sinon d'imposer son point de vue, au moins de peser lourdement sur les décisions prises à Athènes. Encore au début du 20^e siècle Eleftherios Venizelos a mené sa politique d'expansion de la Grèce en étroite collaboration avec cette bourgeoisie grecque de la diaspora qui a d'ailleurs financé en grande partie sa politique. Il s'agissait évidemment d'une alliance qui allait servir les intérêts de cette bourgeoisie qui se sentait menacée par les grands monopoles européens et voulait ériger un État grec fort qui lui procurait ainsi une certaine protection. Aujourd'hui la Grèce malgré ses faiblesses structurelles au niveau économique et social est relativement un pays riche et prospère même si elle se trouve à la périphérie des pays développés. Contrairement au 19^e siècle c'est la diaspora qui a plutôt maintenant besoin de l'aide et du soutien de l'État grec. Ceci étant dit elle reste malgré tout un facteur incontournable dont il faut tenir compte quand on analyse la politique étrangère grecque.

NOTES

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Alexander Kitroeff et Stephanos Constantinides, «The Greek-Americans and US Foreign Policy Since 1950», *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 6, No.1, Spring 1998.

- Laurence Halley, *Ancient Affections, Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy*, New York, Praeger, 1985.
- Alexander Kitroeff, «Le rôle du lobby helléno-américain à l'élaboration de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis: 1992-2001», in Panayotis Tsakonas, *Politique étrangère grecque contemporaine*, vol. 1, Athènes, I. Sideris, 2003 (en grec).
- Stephanos Constantinides, *Le lobby helléno-américain, mythes et réalités*, Working Paper Series 8, Athènes, Institute of International Relations, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences (en grec).
2. Van Coufoudakis, «The Reverse Influence Phenomenon: The Impact of the Greek American Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Greece», in Dimitri Conostas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics*, London, The McMillan Press, 1993.
Nicolas Stavrou «Lobbyistes: un Groupe d'Amateurs», *Eleftherotypia*, 27 novembre 1999).
 3. Sur la structure du lobby grec voir entre autres: Alexander Kitroeff and Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*, Dimitri Conostas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics, op. cit.*
 4. Costa Carras, «Hellenism, Orthodoxy and the Greek Community in Britain», in Christos P. Ioannidis, *Greeks in English Speaking Countries*, New York, Aristide D. Caratzas, 1997, p. 35.
 5. Harry Psomiades, «Ethnic Politics in America: Greek Americans», *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 5, no 1, Winter (1994), pp. 56-64.
 6. Alexander Kitroeff and Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*
Pour le Canada voir Stephanos Constantinides, «The Impact of the Greek-Canadian Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Canada», in Christos P. Ioannidis, *Greeks in English Speaking Countries, op. cit.*, p. 379.
Pour l'Australie voir George Karaïsaridis, «The Greek Lobby in Australia: Rethinking the Fundamentals», in Christos P. Ioannidis, *Greeks in English Speaking Countries, op. cit.*, p. 413.
 7. Stephanos Constantinides, *La présence des Grecs au Canada*, Rethymno, Université de Crète, EDIAMME, 2004.
 8. Alexander Kitroeff and Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*
Dimitri Conostas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics, op. cit.*
 9. Stephanos Constantinides, «The Impact of the Greek-Canadian Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Canada», in Christos P. Ioannidis, *Greeks in English Speaking Countries, op. cit.*
Alexander Kitroeff, «Le rôle du lobby helléno-américain, à l'élaboration de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis: 1992-2001», in Panayotis Tsakonas, *Politique étrangère grecque contemporaine*, vol. 1, Athènes, I. Sideris, 2003 (en grec).

Recherche sur le terrain par l'auteur de cet article concernant la mobilisation des Grecs de la Diaspora au sujet de la question macédonienne.

10. Gabriel Scheffer, «Jewry, Jews and Israeli Foreign Policy: A Critical Perspective», in Dimitri Conostas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics*, op. cit., p. 203.
11. Van Coufoudakis, «The Reverse Influence Phenomenon: The Impact of the Greek American Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Greece», in Dimitri Conostas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics*, London, The McMillan Press, 1993, pp. 51-75.
12. Recherche sur le terrain, observation directe du comportement des groupes grecs pendant cette période, la presse ethnique grecque aux Etats-Unis, au Canada et en Australie.
13. Procès verbaux de l'Assemblée mondiale du SAE à Salonique, décembre 2006, archives du Centre des recherches helléniques du Canada.
14. Nicolas Stavrou «Lobbyistes: un Groupe d'Amateurs», *Eleftherotypia*, 27 novembre 1999.
15. Alexander Kitroeff, «Le rôle du lobby helléno-américain, à l'élaboration de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis: 1992-2001», in Panayotis Tsakonas, *Politique étrangère grecque contemporaine*, vol. 1, Athènes, I. Sideris, 2003 (en grec).
16. Eugène Rossidis, «Les centres du pouvoir et nos cinq mouvements», *Eleftherotypia*, 27 novembre 1999.
17. Ce qu'on appelait autrefois la politique phanariote de ces notables Grecs qui travaillaient pour l'Empire Ottoman, tout en s'efforçant de protéger les intérêts de leurs compatriotes.
18. Constantinos Tsoukalas, *Dépendance et Reproduction. Le rôle social des appareils scolaires en Grèce*, Athènes, Themelio, 1977, en particulier le chapitre 3 «Le développement de l'hellénisme de la diaspora», p. 267 (en grec), texte original en français, thèse de doctorat d'Etat, Paris, Sorbonne, 1976.
Georges Dertilis, Histoire de l'État Grec 1830-1920, vol. A et B, en particulier la partie I du volume B «La Marine Marchande et la Diaspora» (1750-2000), p. 769.
Tsoukalas, en se référant au soutien sans équivoque de la bourgeoisie grecque de la diaspora à la politique d'expansion de Venizelos et de la création d'un État grec moderne, est révélateur. Il cite des noms comme ceux de Basile Zacharof banquier et marchand d'armes, un des hommes les plus riches du monde à cette époque, celui d'Emmanuel Sygros, celui de Bodosakis-Athanasiadis, et plusieurs noms de la bourgeoisie grecque de Londres avec qui Venizelos avait aussi des relations familiales en épousant en 1921 Elena Skylitsi, fille d'un grand armateur vivant à Londres. Il cite encore Emmanuel Benakis, un riche bourgeois de la diaspora grecque d'Egypte qui s'installa en Grèce à partir de 1910 et participa à la vie politique à côté de Venizelos.

Georges Dertilis souligne «que la façon dont nous comprenons et interprétons l'histoire grecque moderne dépend en grande partie de la façon que nous approfondissons la connaissance de l'histoire des bourgeois Grecs de l'Empire Ottoman et de la diaspora du 18^e siècle jusqu'à la fin du 20^e», *op. cit.*, p. 769. Dertilis se réfère au rôle primordial joué par les armateurs Grecs de la diaspora ainsi que par les marchands.

19. Cité par Georges Dertilis, *Histoire de l'État Grec 1830-1920*, vol. B, *op.cit.*, p.819.

20. *Ibid.*

The Emergence of a Greek-Turkish Cooperation System as the Result of a “Butterfly Effect”

Eugenia Vathakou*

RÉSUMÉ

En utilisant la théorie des systèmes modernes de Niklas Luhmann, on analyse, dans cet article, la façon avec laquelle un événement accidentel ou un désastre naturel, tel que le dévastateur tremblement de terre qui a eu lieu en Turquie en 1999, peut avoir un effet boule de neige, c'est-à-dire déclencher une série de changements ayant contribué à l'émergence d'un système de collaboration entre les Grecs et les Turcs. À cette fin, non seulement on étudie le rôle que les différents systèmes sociaux (tels que les médias, la diplomatie, les organisations de la société civile et la politique) jouent à propos des transformations de conflits, mais on essaie aussi d'illustrer le rôle que la contingence et la chance peuvent jouer. L'argument principal de cet essai est que le nouvel ordre qui a vu le jour, c'est-à-dire le système de collaboration entre la Grèce et la Turquie, s'est constitué à partir d'une réaction de cause à effet et n'est pas le résultat d'une décision rationnelle. La recherche révèle *les points cachés* des systèmes sociaux qui ont contribué à la constitution de ce nouvel ordre, mais qui n'ont pas pu voir ni contrôler leur contribution. Cet article s'appuie sur une recherche sur le terrain en Turquie et en Grèce; il s'est fait à partir de 20 entrevues avec des politiciens, diplomates, journalistes et représentants de la société civile aussi bien Grecs que Turcs.

ABSTRACT

By employing Niklas Luhmann's modern systems theory, this article discusses how an accidental event, a natural disaster such as the devastating earthquake that occurred in Turkey in 1999, could have a “butterfly effect”, namely trigger a chain of changes, which led to the emergence of a system of Greek-Turkish co-operation. To this end, it explores not only the role different social systems, such as the media, diplomacy, civil society organizations and politics can play in conflict transformation, but it also sheds light to the role contingency and chance can play. The article's main argument is that the new emerging order, the system of Greek-Turkish cooperation, was constituted through a causal process and it was not the result of a rational decision making process. The research conducted reveals *the blind spots* of social systems which contributed to the constitution of this emerging order and yet they could not see and control their contribution into it. The article is based on fieldwork conducted in Turkey and Greece and involves primary

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source material gathered through more than 20 interviews with Greek and Turkish politicians, diplomats, academics, journalists and civil society representatives.

Introduction

On 17 August 1999, Turkey's Marmara region was ravaged by one of the century's most devastating earthquakes. This accidental event had an unprecedented impact on Greek-Turkish relations. It seems that it has brought Greeks and Turks closer to cooperation than ever. Initially, Greeks were mobilized to gather aid for the victims of the earthquake. During the months after the earthquake, however, this expression of solidarity was transformed to cooperation in a number of fields such as politics, business, trade, arts, education and sports.

There are not many analyses in the literature of Greek-Turkish relations that attempt to explain and evaluate the impact of the earthquake and the emergence of the cooperation that followed it. Practitioners, like politicians, journalists and diplomats, are puzzled by this phenomenon that followed the earthquake. Yet, they usually do not consider the earthquake as the central factor in the emergence of these positive developments in Greek-Turkish relations. Isolating inter-governmental relations, they argue that this rapprochement was the result of actions and decisions undertaken by the two governments before and after the earthquake. They seek to establish continuity in the aims each country held before and after the earthquake and they base their analyses on an assumed rational calculation made by the Greek and Turkish decision-makers or by emphasizing the EU parameter¹.

Other approaches suggest that peace initiatives, both governmental and non-governmental, that developed between 1996 – in the aftermath of the crisis over the Imia/Kardak islets – and 1999 prepared the ground for and built up this phenomenon². Analytical tools from conflict resolution theory have also been employed to describe this phenomenon. This approach attempts to consider and evaluate developments on different levels of society, such as politics, media and civil society organizations. Nevertheless, it fails to establish links among them and cannot explain the timing of the developments and the dynamics that emerged after the earthquake. In the end, this approach too, returns to governmental politics, frustrated by its inability to provide an explanation for the complexity involved.

This article examines the phenomenon that emerged after the earthquake as a dynamic process of morphogenetic social change in Greece and Turkey. Based

on Niklas Luhmann's theory of social autopoiesis³, it argues that the earthquake was the decisive point for a shift from the existing self-description of the Greek-Turkish conflict in Greece and Turkey, to a new self-description, which developed around themes of cooperation. The earthquake was the "irritation", the "stimulus" that triggered fast-moving communication processes in a multitude of social and psychic systems in Greece and Turkey. Social systems structurally – that is a causally – coupled with each other increased the complexity which then enforced the emergence of a new emerging order, a new "attractor", i.e. a social system of Greek-Turkish cooperation.

The article is divided into four main parts. The first part presents the phenomenon that followed the earthquake as a "butterfly effect", thereby describing the autocatalytic chain reactions the earthquake triggered in Greece and Turkey. The second part argues that this "butterfly effect" was due to the self-referential and thus paradoxical nature of the operation of social and psychic systems. The third part describes the transition from the stage of bifurcation – that is a stage of increased complexity – to the emergence of the new attractor of cooperation. Here, the article examines the mechanics of communication in order to demonstrate that the new order emerged after the establishment of new differences through a process of generalization and re-specification of communication. The last part argues that this new system is autonomous from the other social systems.

The Earthquake of 1999 as a "Butterfly"

The devastating earthquake that occurred in Turkey on 17 August 1999, registered 7.4 on the Richter scale, caused the death of more than 30,000 people. The argument here is that the earthquake was the "butterfly" that triggered a chain of spontaneous reactions within a multitude of social systems and their subsystems in Greece and Turkey.⁴ The media, municipalities, professional associations and individuals in Greece were mobilized in order to help the victims of the earthquake. As the Greek mobilization was projected on the news media, it provoked positive reactions within Turkey which in turn were reported back in Greece further amplifying communication about cooperation. This section seeks to describe the autopoiesis or self-constitution of communication about cooperation and its autocatalytic nature through concrete examples of social systems' operations.

The earthquake became a front-page headline in the Greek news media for the first days afterwards. On 17 and 18 August, Greek newspapers devoted tens of pages to the situation in the area struck by the earthquake. Greek TV

channels adapted their everyday programming to the earthquake showing live coverage of scenes from the rescue operations and extensive coverage of the consequences of the earthquake.

The first telegram of support from Greece to Turkey was sent in the afternoon of the first day after the earthquake, 17 August, by the President of the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Panayiotis Koutsikos.⁵ The Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, expressed their sympathy to the Turkish government on 18 August. The first official Greek mission of people and humanitarian aid arrived in Istanbul in three C-130 airplanes, in the early afternoon of 18 August.⁶

From 18 August, initiatives were undertaken by Greek civil society organizations in order to gather money as well as primary necessities for the victims of the earthquake. On 19 August a group of Greek Red Cross doctors, professional and volunteer nurses and members of the Samaritans left for Istanbul. The Municipality of Athens set up centres where the Athenians could bring food, clothes and other basic necessities for the victims of the earthquake.

On the same day this mobilization reached the Turkish news media through Stelios Berberakis's articles in the Turkish newspaper *Sabah*. Berberakis referred to the humanitarian aid sent by the Greek government to Turkey, described the mobilization of the municipality of Athens, media and other civil society organizations for the gathering of aid.⁷

By 20 August, the mobilization of Greek civil society had already received the name *Operation Solidarity* from the Greek news media. The newspaper *Ta Nea* itself started a campaign for Turkish homeless and orphaned children. Stelios Berberakis presented all these initiatives on 20 August in the newspaper *Sabah* in a more detailed article. Yet, it was on 21 August that the mobilization in Greece appeared on the front page of the Turkish newspaper *Sabah* with the title "Neighbour, We Could Not Have Known You Are Like That".

The Greek and Turkish news media started observing themselves and the change in their own attitudes which led to a spontaneous public dialogue. The initiatives undertaken by the Greek newspaper *Ta Nea* were news for the Turkish *Hürriyet*. On 22 August, *Hürriyet* was writing about an "Earthquake in the Media...Aid Account from Ta Nea".⁸ "Thank You Very Much, Neighbour" was the leading article of *Hürriyet* on 23 August and it was also written in Greek.⁹ The Greek press expressed its surprise and replied in the same spirit.

On 24 August, the City Council of Thessaloniki, the second largest city of Greece, gathered and sent to Turkey more than 20 tons of food, pharmaceutical

supplies, tents and clothes. The Greek Orthodox Church entered the campaign on 24 August. The Bishop of the island of Rhodes, the head of the Prefecture and other local authorities also started a campaign gathering humanitarian aid for the victims of the earthquake. The Prefecture of Kefallinia and Ithaki, two Greek islands, opened bank accounts for the victims.

Hundreds of Greeks visited or called the Turkish embassy in order to express their sympathy and learn how they could help the victims of the earthquake. The Turkish embassy in Athens and the consulate in Thessaloniki issued statements expressing their gratitude for Greek support in light of the great disaster. The Prefecture of Xanthi and the Greek State Radio and the GSEE (General Confederation of Workers of Greece), in agreement with Turkish labour unions, organized large concerts in Xanthi, Athens and Istanbul for the victims of Izmit with famous Greek and Turkish artists such as Mikis Theodorakis, Zulfu Livaneli, George Dalaras, Maria Farantouri.¹⁰ Organisations such as the Red Cross, the Médecins sans frontières, the National Kapodistrian University of Athens, the Greek left-wing political party *Synaspismos* in Thessaloniki, the Athens Bar and the Pharmacists' Association of Attica Province and many others, all gathered and sent medical and other aid to the victims of the earthquake.

The attitudes of the Greek people triggered further reactions of ordinary people from Turkey and Turks from all over the world, who started expressing their gratitude to Greeks in various ways. The Greek news media published dozens of electronic messages and letters of thanks that had been sent to them by Turks. Greeks who happened to be in Turkey those days experienced this sudden change of attitudes in their interactions with Turks which, in turn, reached the Greek news media as "news". On 23 August, the newspaper *Ta Nea* wrote about the way its crew in Turkey was being treated by Turks in the streets or in cafeterias and other public places. "The owner of the small shop outside Agia Sophia did not accept money and the owner of the café, whose grandfather was a Turk from Crete, burst into tears".

Foreign news media also observed these changes of attitudes between Greeks and Turks and wrote about it. *Corriere della Sera*, the *New York Times* and the *Boston News*, all published articles on this new situation, reproducing parts of articles from Greek and Turkish newspapers and also publishing letters sent to them by their Greek and Turkish readers. This was fed back to the Greek and Turkish news media, which started reflecting on how foreign news media were examining this phenomenon in Greek-Turkish relations.

Official state authorities from other countries noticed and supported this change. The American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the German

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder praised the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and the Foreign Minister George Papandreou for the Greek help to Turkey.¹¹

The Blind Spots of Social Systems

The previous section has described the chain reactions that occurred in a multitude of social and psychic systems in Greece and Turkey after the earthquake. Nevertheless, this description cannot explain how these reactions came about nor can it explain their effects. This section, therefore, demonstrates that the actions and events described above were simplifications of complex processes of meaning determination carried out within various social systems, such as the media, civil society organizations and politics. It is argued that every action, after its occurrence, becomes autonomous from the conditions that brought it about and acquires informational and connective value for other systems which will in turn select it, i.e. interpret it for their own self-reproduction. This also means that the same element is used by more than one social system and that it has different meaning – different selectivity and connectivity – for each of them. Furthermore, the earthquake was an event that was employed by various social and psychic systems for their further autopoiesis. It was “news” for the Greek and Turkish news media, the stimulus for expressing philanthropic sentiments which drove Greek civil society organizations to action, a profit opportunity for certain humanitarian aid organizations, a publicity opportunity for Greek politicians, an unexpected opening for a long-sought change of policy for a part of the Greek government and so on.

Modern systems theory helps us to understand how each social and psychic system operated during that time. The element emphasized here is simultaneity. Each system remained opaque and incalculable to the others, accessing complexity only selectively and only through reference to itself that is through its pre-established schemes of interpretation. By acting, it introduced its distinctions back to the emerging order. Nevertheless, it could not observe this re-entry and its consequences. It could not see that it could not see what it could not see. Systems cannot “see” their own blind spots. In what follows, this section highlights this mode of operation of social systems and presents examples of structural couplings that occurred after the earthquake among various social and psychic systems in Greece and Turkey.

The System of News Media

The news media is a system, which makes distinctions according to the binary code news/not news¹². The selection of the issues, that is, the

construction of news, after the earthquake in the Greek and Turkish news media, followed the rules and the rationale of news production. The aim of the Greek and Turkish news media was not the propagation of friendship and cooperation. They only implemented their normal functions guided by their previously institutionalized practices and patterns of behaviour.¹³

The earthquake in Turkey had all the characteristics of news for the Greek and Turkish news media, it was surprising and unusual and it referred to the life and death of thousands of people¹⁴. Similarly, the spontaneous reaction of Greek civil society organizations and the emergence of dialogue of friendship and cooperation among Greek and Turkish media were also surprising and unusual developments.

There was no central planning about the way the earthquake or the other issues that emerged in the course of the first days after the earthquake should be presented. Greek and Turkish journalists and editors emphatically insist on the day-to-day development of the media agenda. This chapter presents examples of news construction, exploring the emergence of news items, as complex nexuses of meaning and of structural couplings between various social and psychic systems. These examples are taken from the Turkish television channel NTV, the Turkish newspaper *Sabah*, the Greek newspapers *Eleftherotypia* and *Ta Nea* and the Greek state radio station.

The Turkish news channel NTV was one of the most important and reliable sources of information about the situation in the earthquake area in Turkey. Many news programs had references to the Greek relief workers in the area of the earthquakes as well as the developments within Greece. According to the foreign news editor, Mustafa Aşcıoğlu, three main reasons explain why the Turkish news media made news out of the Greek aid story.

First the Greek aid was news because it was unusual and surprising. Second, we saw that CNN-Turk [the other important news channel in Turkey] had a story about a Greek rescue team and so we asked our own reporter to work on a similar story... Third, it was a good opportunity, a way to make up for past mistakes. We had all understood the bad role the news media had played in the Imia/Kardak crisis and the mistakes we had made and there was an opportunity to make up for that as well.¹⁵ Stelios Berberakis's articles from Athens for *Sabah* and his reports on the Turkish TV channel ATV provided the Turkish public with the first descriptions of the developments within Greece.¹⁶ Berberakis described his own rationale as follows:

There were two important things for me at the time; one was the Greek television and the second an article in Eleftherotypia noticing a sudden radical change. After

*that I realized this is something different, this is important and I immediately took a camera and went to the hospitals to take pictures of the people who were giving blood.*¹⁷

The article in *Eleftherotypia* that motivated Berberakis was written by Anna Stergiou. The title of this article was “Weapons Have Not Brought Happiness’ and the author pointed to the sudden change of Greek attitudes. Stergiou at that time was not a columnist at the newspaper but a young reporter. Nevertheless, that day she felt like writing this article to which nobody paid attention when she turned it in.¹⁸ In subsequent days, however, everybody started talking about it. It was reproduced by Berberakis in the Turkish newspaper *Sabah* and by the American newspaper *The Boston News*, too.

Institutionalized processes of cooperation among Greek and Turkish journalists established from 1996-1999 not only offered a scheme of interpretation for what was happening in the form of themes for journalists like Mustafa Aşçıoğlu but in some cases they provided the structures for further cooperation. The concert for the victims of the earthquake organized by the Greek State Radio Station in Xanthi was an initiative undertaken by the Director of the Hellenic Radio Station, Ioannis Tzanetakos and his close associates. The implementation of this project was supervised by Damon Damianos, the director of the local State Radio Station of Komotini. Tzanetakos and Damianos were both active members of the “Movement of Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace” at that time. After the former became General Director of the State Radio Station in 1998 and the latter Director of the local radio station in 1999, they undertook several initiatives to promote cooperation between Greece and Turkey, “taking advantage of the inertia of the structures of state mechanisms”, rather than by cooperating with the state authorities.¹⁹

The journalists and columnists who first described the changes in Greek-Turkish relations that followed the earthquake in their writings had participated in the workshops that took place from 1996 until the earthquake. Stelios Berberakis, Sami Kohen, Mehmet Ali Birand, Damon Damianos, Ioannis Tzanetakos, Zeynep Göğüş and Alkis Kourkoulas were only some of them.

To sum up this section, the news media, by means of their normal functions, provided irritations and increased the communication possibilities and constrained complexity towards the direction of cooperation. The transmission of information to an undetermined number of potential receivers who could continue communication created an open field of experimentation in Greece and Turkey. That enabled unexpected structural couplings to occur in Greece and Turkey.

Civil Society Organizations

Greek non-governmental organizations specialized in humanitarian aid, ordinary people, intellectuals, authors and journalists made a major contribution to the emerging order, the system of cooperation²⁰. Yet, each system, operated by drawing on different distinctions and following different aims.

The Greek non-governmental organizations that specialized in humanitarian aid missions – like *Kessa Dimitra* and *European Perspective* – reacted not as Greek organizations but rather as humanitarian aid organizations. Their first mission to Turkey after the earthquakes was completely independent of the Greek government. They were financed by the European Union (European Community Humanitarian Office).²¹ Offering aid to the victims of the earthquake was their job and they had to accomplish it according to certain international standards. However, their Greek and not their European identity and source of funding was accentuated by the Turkish people they worked with, as well as by the Turkish news media. It was precisely this element that was selected and interpreted and served for further structural couplings that enabled the autopoiesis of Greek-Turkish cooperation.

Labour union leaders from various associations in Greece with a strong leftist ideological tone participated in the campaigns for the victims of the earthquake in order to express their solidarity with their colleagues from Turkey with whom they had established some contact before the earthquake. There we find international solidarity to be consciously opposed to the Greek and Turkish nationalisms.

Leftists used the rhetoric of international solidarity and peace among people when they wrote about the earthquake in Turkey and the stance of the Greek people. A characteristic example is the article that provoked the dialogue between one of the best selling Greek newspapers, *Ta Nea*, and the Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet*. That article was written by Mihalis Mitsos, with the title “We Are All Turks”. When Mitsos wrote this article he “projected the idea of international solidarity rather than something else”.²² The paradox here was that this article was reproduced by the right-wing Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet*.²³ *Hürriyet* was not concerned with the ideological message that the article conveyed. It selected this article for its striking title and also because it was written by a Greek journalist in one of the two best-selling Greek newspapers. In addition, when Mitsos wrote this article, he did not think of its possible effects, nor had he been following the developments in Turkey after he wrote it, since he is not a specialist in Greek-Turkish relations. Three years later, he was surprised to hear that the

Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* had reproduced a part of his own article.²⁴

It is important to note here that no communication with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other official authorities had preceded initiatives such as the message of support by the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce and the organization of the campaign for the gathering of humanitarian aid and the blood donation by the Municipality of Sappes.²⁵

The hundreds of Greek citizens who rushed to offer money, blood or other necessities and expressed their sympathy and solidarity with the Turkish victims of the earthquake, on one hand, and the Turks who expressed their gratitude, on the other, played an important role in the emergence of this phenomenon. They explained their attitudes in their letters, electronic messages and face-to-face interactions which reflect four main motivations. Firstly, Greeks felt they share a common fate with Turks because of the vicinity of the two countries. Secondly, the vivid images of destruction and pain that the earthquake had caused, projected through electronic media, stimulated feelings of compassion for the families of the victims. Thirdly, again, some Greeks and Turks employed a leftist ideology, which put the emphasis on solidarity among peoples and opposed Greek and Turkish nationalism in favour of internationalism. Finally, personal memories that Turks and Greeks had from the years they were living side by side in Istanbul or even positive impressions from visiting the other's country emerged now to contradict the system of conflict and provide the background for their personal initiatives.

The System of Politics

The argument put forth here is that the Greek and the Turkish governments were not in a position to control, let alone to design these developments.²⁶ Rather, the changes occurred in the wake of the earthquake transformed their environment and imposed cooperative attitudes on the systems of Greek and Turkish politics. These changes reinforced within both systems of politics structures favourable to cooperation and rapprochement and provided connecting points for their further development contributing to the overall dynamics of communication about cooperation.

The humanitarian aid gathered by Greek non-governmental organizations and the massive mobilization of Greek civil society brought about a new situation, which changed the environment of the system of Greek politics. The media noticed, recognized and reinforced this change by making "news" about it. Questions posed by journalists to politicians invited comments on people's

reactions. The new emerging issues of communication provided a field of experimentation not only for the news media but for politicians too.

The first statements of sympathy and the humanitarian aid sent by Greece to Turkey and the reply received were within the framework of the international official code of conduct. Nevertheless, the change in the official communication between the two governments was important. The provocative statements usually hurled every now and then towards the other side were now replaced by expressions of sympathy and words of friendship. These statements, however formal or however technical they might have been, were oriented towards the direction of cooperation and thus they were coupled with other communications from other social systems that had chosen the same direction.

The mobilization of the Greek authorities was spontaneous. Fotis Xydas, Consul-General of the Greek Consulate in Istanbul, a junction point for the humanitarian help coming from Greece, argued that there was not a well-organized plan driving the action of the various governmental agencies. He said that:

[t]he TV set played a major role.... The mobilization of the Greek authorities did not follow a specific programme. It was just for appearances' sake because the Greek TV channels were showing images from the earthquake for a long time... It was more the result of a kind of competition among the different agencies and organizations regarding who would appear more on the Greek TV.²⁷

The mobilization itself, however, created its own self-referential dynamics. It required continuous contacts on a daily basis among officials on both sides of the Aegean in order to cope with their tasks. The lack of understanding and the absence of common ground for cooperation that had been characteristics of the contact between the two sides of the Aegean over the years were now replaced by this specific and practical task to be implemented.

The stance of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, was important for these developments. Papandreou encouraged the Greek initiatives within civil society and he was personally engaged in certain efforts in that direction. The statements he made and his personal initiative for generous funding of Turkey by the European Union was in accordance with his previous policy of rapprochement with Turkey. Nevertheless, the Greek government was not in control of these developments for two reasons. Firstly, the statements which encouraged people to make a contribution to the aid campaign were made on 24 August, which was seven days after the earthquake. By that time, tons of humanitarian aid supplies had already been

gathered. Secondly, these statements cannot be considered as active coordination or engineering of the mobilization. Rather, the cooperative perspective of the Greek Foreign Minister vis-à-vis Greek-Turkish relations was structurally, that is, a causally coupled, synchronized, with the other spontaneous processes of communication emerging in and between various social and psychic systems in Greece and Turkey.

To explain the Greek government's stance we have to take also into account the change of dynamics which the earthquake set in motion within the European Union regarding EU-Turkish relations. The pro-Turkish camp within the EU raised its voice urging solidarity with Ankara and asked the Union to reconsider Turkey's candidate status.²⁸

Facing these new pressures within the EU, the Greek government perceived the emergence of a stream of sympathy for the Turkish victims of the earthquake within Greece, as an opportune moment to change its policy with regard to the veto on the Turkish candidacy for membership in the EU. High-ranking officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perceived that this shift of attitudes would decrease reactions against both the release of the funds by the EU towards Turkey with Greek consent and also the potential lift of the Greek veto at the Helsinki Summit. The Greek veto had been considered by Greeks to be a stronghold in the undeclared Greek-Turkish diplomatic war within the various EU bodies. The resistance built around it within the Greek society made this issue seem like a minefield for any Greek government until the time of the earthquake.

Ambassador Xydas's observation with regard to the impact of the earthquake on the perceptions of the Greek officials is illuminating: "[I]t was only afterwards [after the first weeks that followed the earthquake] that we saw its beneficial results".²⁹ Xydas's empirical observation underlines the spontaneity of the changes occurred within Greece and challenges the assumption of engineering from above.

Neither were the Turkish attitudes determined by a rationale of cooperation or peaceful resolution of the conflict. The unexpected phenomenon that followed the first days of the earthquake, with the Greek aid flowing towards Turkey from different sources within Greece, was a major surprise for Turkish authorities. Again, the Greek Consul in Istanbul describes the situation as follows: "At the beginning they [Turkish authorities] were completely dazed at what was happening. What does this attack [of friendship] mean now? What is its purpose? They thought that we [Greeks] were influencing public opinion... But the dynamic of the whole situation made them more flexible".³⁰

From Bifurcation to Attractor

The previous section described the emergence of the unexpected dynamics of cooperation as uncoordinated selectivity, oriented to the same direction, namely the direction of cooperation and solidarity. Social systems and psychic systems, each “acting” under their own rationale, increased the complexity of the situation and contributed to the emergence of a stage of bifurcation, a stage of undecidability where alternatives to the well-established explanations about the Greek-Turkish conflict emerged and eventually prevailed.

This section explores the process of transition from the stage of bifurcation created by the dispersion of communication about the earthquake to the emergence of a new “attractor”, a new order of cooperation. As discussed above an “attractor” is a self-description that has prevailed in society and has become stable condition through networks of recursive observations of observations. Here, it is demonstrated that observing systems carry on their operations of self and other observation based on existing differences or by establishing new differences. The old well-established differences supportive of the Greek-Turkish conflict that were taken for granted before the earthquake were Greek vs. Turkish interests, Greek state vs. Turkish state. The earthquake and the developments it brought about broke down and eventually replaced these differences by new differences such as civil society vs. state, Greeks/Turks vs. politicians, enmity vs. friendship. These new differences found connections in existing referential substrata of both countries.

It is argued that cooperation emerged as a new identity, a new attractor to order the new differences, interpret the new phenomenon and attribute meaning to aspects of Greek-Turkish relations from the past. It was introduced to rationalize the new situation and to help social and psychic systems handling infinite complexity. The linking device for the structural couplings, which led to the emergence of the new order, was the language already formed through similar processes of morphogenetic evolution from 1996 to 1999 or even before.

The Emergence of New Differences

The mobilization of Greek civil society in order to gather humanitarian aid, offer money and express sympathy for and solidarity with the victims of the earthquake broke down the long-held image of Greeks as enemies who seek to inflict harm upon Turks. On the other hand, in Greece, the image of Turks as the worst and most dangerous enemy of Greeks collapsed in front of the image of Turkish people mourning myriad victims of the earthquake.

Turks appeared as human beings suffering, in agony for their families who were still under the ruins. Furthermore, the Turkish reactions that followed the dispatch of material aid and relief workers were a surprise, which further broke down the expectation of the enemy according to the image built up over the years.

The emergence of the new differences can be traced in the articles, writings and the public speech of these days. Mihalīs Mitsos wrote on 20 August in his article “We are all Turks!” that, “if pain and joy really bring peoples together, then *Greeks* and *Turks* should be brothers.... we might believe in a different God, we might not believe in a God at all, but we pray for you, because whatever our *governments* say, whatever propaganda our channels transmit, we love you, we stand by you, we are close to you”.³¹

Panayiotīs Ioakeimidis, an academic and a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote in the same newspaper on the same day about the common elements that the two people share and pointed to the vanity of the conflict:

“Looking at those maps and reading about the disaster of biblical proportions, a disaster that the experts say can strike our country at any time, one can reflect on really how pointless it is for the two countries to come to the brink of war for some arid rocks, for some arid islets, whether they are called Imia or Kardak. The fate of the two *peoples* is indeed somehow common in many important things”.³²

“From now on, nobody will be able to follow the “*politics* of tension” just because the “*public* wants it this way”. Nobody will be able to write provocative words by taking refuge in the same superficial argument. The public’s wish was determined by this disaster”, Sami Kohen stated categorically.³³

As noted above the motive for Stelios Berberakis to write his report in the Turkish newspaper *Sabah* where he described Greek reactions was an article written by Anna Stergiou. He quoted a part of this article in his own report:

*Family, school, armywith all these institutions and a series of historical and political examples we, the Greeks, fed feelings of hatred and antagonism and we believed that the Turks are our enemies. But how did it happen that these feelings, full of hatred and antagonism, that have lasted for years, are deleted and gone within a day? The enemy is becoming a friend overnight.*³⁴

On 22 August, the columnist Zeynep Göğüs wrote in *Sabah* about the collapse of Greek stereotypes. The next day, she emphasized the fact that those who were considered to be Turkey’s enemies, such as the Greeks, Russians and

Israelis, had been the first ones who had arrived quickly to help the Turks. Bekir Coskun wrote in *Hürriyet* on 28 of August about “the flower of friendship of the two *peoples* that grew in the ruins of the earthquake” stating that he “will never again believe those *politicians* who instigate crises between the two states”.³⁵

A group of 21 nuclear physicists from Turkey sent their best wishes to Greece “which proved that humanism is more powerful than everything else”. Another “friend from Turkey” thanked the newspaper *Ta Nea* for publishing his electronic mail message to the Greek people. “Our Brothers the Greeks”, wrote the columnist of *Cumhuriyet* Ahmet Kislali, who used to employ a strong language in his criticism of the Greek policy vis-à-vis Turkey.³⁶

On 27 August, the newspaper *Ta Nea* published a number of electronic messages sent to it from Turkey. A characteristic example is the following, written by Cengiz Sarri: “We have always loved you in spite of *politics*. You know it and we know it. ...I am sending you my best wishes and I hope for your friendship. I am sending you the best wishes of the Turkish *people* too!”³⁷ Adnan Caglayan, correspondent of the Anatolian News Agency and Stelios Berberakis correspondent of *Sabah*, when asked by *Eleftherotypia* about the possibility of a non-aggression agreement between the two countries and cuts to both countries’ military budgets, answered positively, arguing that “*peoples’* and *journalists’* initiatives can be more effective than those of *politicians* and *governments*”.³⁸

During the days after the earthquake, ordinary Greek and Turkish citizens instead of politicians became the focus of the observation of various social systems. Greek rescue teams and humanitarian non-governmental organizations at the location of the natural disaster working together with Turks, side by side in the rescue operations and other activities broke down the difference Greeks vs. Turks. Initiatives undertaken by ordinary people landed on the front pages of the newspapers. Turks and Greeks, became symbols of the friendship of the two peoples. Little Güven, the boy that the Greek rescue team found in the ruins of his house, a Greek woman fire-fighter who went to Turkey as the head of the mission that would help in putting out a big fire³⁹, the pilot of a military aeroplane, who now flew a cargo plane with humanitarian aid are only some examples.

Another focus of observation became the way the Turkish state dealt with the crisis the earthquake created. The expectation that the Turkish state would be strong and could protect its people against external enemies and

any disaster was shattered.⁴⁰ The Turkish government found itself subject to intense criticism about delays and its inability to deal with the problems that the earthquake had created. In addition, the new situation challenged and eventually broke down the well-established theory in Turkey “of Turkey being isolated and surrounded by enemies”. This theory was built upon the differences Turkey vs. world and Turkey vs. Greece. Now the enemies, including Greece, were running to help.

The extracts from the Turkish press below reveal that these observations gave rise to the emergence of new differences such as the Turkish people vs. the Turkish state, people/civil society/world society vs. state, cooperation vs. conflict.

On 20 August an article was reporting on “the fourth day of the earthquake and the rescue operations of the state!” with the title “Political Ruins”. Bekir Coskun wrote an article in *Hürriyet* with the title “Where Are You?” to state that “the most frequently asked question is “Where are you?” This word of the question “where?”..... Where is the aid?..... Where are the rescue teams?.. Where is the state?.. There is no answer to those questions.....”.

The next day Cüneyt Ülsever wrote in *Hürriyet*. “The bureaucracy with the army in this state since a long time ago justify those who say that ‘this state structure is useless’”. In *Milliyet* on the same day Duygu Asena wrote an article with the title “Yes, they came into terms with that!” He argued:

“...But the state isn’t there....They work voluntarily with their hearts and minds. They work simply to succeed at what the state has not done. We were in Yalova and Cinarcik. We did not see either intensive work or anyone in charge from the *state*... Indeed, there was complete harmonic cooperation...that was among the *citizens*....”.

On 24 August *Milliyet* criticising the authorities for the serious delays to rescue operation, wrote “The People are Unprotected”. The Islamic newspaper *Zaman* reported on the same deficiencies. Its main headline was “Disaster at Night, Scandal in the Day”.

The revelation of the inability of the state to meet the needs of the people operated as a reinforcing factor for the emerging system of Greek-Turkish cooperation for two reasons. Firstly, it contributed to the breaking down of the difference our nation/your nation. It was not the Turkish state, but the world that came to help the thousands of victims of the earthquake. Now, worldwide civil society emerged in contrast to the political system. In addition, although those that had officially sent help were governments, Turkish correspondents could see and thus project the image of individuals

in the field. Secondly, this contingency enabled further structural couplings within Greece. This critical reporting vis-à-vis the Turkish authorities was important news for the Greek news media. It particularly found good ground among leftists who still held vivid memories of the years of the Greek junta and perceived the criticisms against the Turkish state as a reaction of the Turkish people against an autocratic regime.

The Institutionalization of Cooperation

The new system can be identified through the institutions, programmes and roles that have been established in various fields after the earthquake. From early September, expectations for cooperation began to assume an institutionalized form in a number of fields, creating the conditions and setting the goals for further promotion of cooperation. The structures of cooperation established in politics, business, arts and the media consolidated a broader change of attitudes at the grassroots level, which can be described as a new system of cooperation.

Cooperation on the governmental level was consolidated with the signature of nine agreements on economic cooperation, environment, tourism, security and other issues.⁴¹ The discussions about these agreements started after the Kosovo crisis in April 1999. The Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Ali Tuygan uses a metaphor to describe the impact of the earthquake upon this process saying, “the earthquake helped to place in an avenue what had begun in a narrow road”.⁴²

Greece and Turkey co-authored a resolution to the UN, creating a unit for emergency situations. Furthermore, Greek seismological institutes established closer cooperation with their Turkish colleagues on issues of scientific interest. The universities of Athens and Istanbul signed an agreement, which established the creation of new Departments of Turkish and Greek Studies in both universities. Indeed, many projects have been implemented in the years from 1999 to 2002, among the schools and faculties of various universities of the two countries.

The municipalities of Istanbul and Athens have established a permanent channel of communication and cooperation, which has enabled close contact and the development of projects in the framework of EU-funded programmes. The European Union’s funds have encouraged cooperation among municipalities, allocating a considerable amount of money for the promotion of the institution of sister-cities, as well as for developmental programmes.⁴³

The Municipality of Sapes initiated and completed the creation of a network of municipalities, which includes municipalities in Western Thrace in Greece and municipalities in Eastern Thrace in Turkey. As the Mayor of Sapes, Dinos Haritopoulos, emphasized, it was only after the earthquake that the mayors of the other cities took the courage to visit Turkey and start some sort of cooperation, overcoming the impediment of the previous prejudices that they or their constituents held.⁴⁴ The municipality of Kavala also established an office in Istanbul with the task of providing information for tourists and those interested in trade with this part of Greece. Thessaloniki, the second largest Greek city, has also developed close bonds with the municipality of Istanbul.

Several Greek banks have expressed their interest in investing in Turkey and have opened offices, which actively search for local partners in Turkey. Various associations, artists and organizations have found a way to develop cooperation in their neighbouring country. Films of Greek-Turkish production have been produced in the latest years and have been very successful.⁴⁵ Several exhibitions of different kinds of art have been organized in both countries. Furthermore, the number of Greeks who have visited Turkey and the number of Turks who have visited Greece since the earthquakes has increased impressively.⁴⁶

Nikitas Lionarakis, chairman of the Greek Foreign Ministry's liaison committee for non-governmental organizations and Ali Tuygan, the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, both admit that today it is impossible for the official authorities of both countries to catch up with the majority of these initiatives. After the two earthquakes, these initiatives have multiplied on a scale that cannot be followed, as most of them do not involve the Greek or Turkish state in any way.⁴⁷ These processes of cooperative interactions culminated in the lifting of the Greek veto at the Helsinki Summit of the leaders of the 15 members of the EU, in December 1999.

The Emergence of New Self-descriptions

The structural changes that emerged after the earthquake were self-changes. More precisely, they were changes of social systems' self-descriptions. The main operations of social and psychic systems, which are observing systems, are the operations of self-observation and other-observation as well as self-description. The previous section explored how social systems observed their environment and themselves within it, with what semantics they made their selections of observations. The present section examines the way these observations affected the self-descriptions of social systems. The analysis below emphasizes again that

a social system is constituted as the unity of the system/environment difference.

Initiatives that had been suspended after the Ocalan crisis of February 1999 were activated after the earthquake. The initiatives of business-people for peace got back on track after the earthquake. The Greek part of the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce was the first Greek civil society organization that sent messages of support and offered material support to its Turkish counterpart.⁴⁸ Mayors of Greek and Turkish cities were encouraged to pursue some kind of cooperation with municipalities from the “other side”. Furthermore, the Greek-Turkish Forum managed to come up with a concrete proposal about the resolution of the dispute over the continental shelf in May 2000, which was welcomed by the Greek and Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs as an important contribution to the peaceful resolution of the dispute.⁴⁹

These changes were self-changes, which emerged through self-referential processes of communication. The systems themselves played a part in the alteration of their own structures. The information employed was selected from a domain of potentialities that each system devised and held to be relevant. It was social systems themselves in both Greece and Turkey that perceived the developments after the earthquake as an important change to their environment. They picked up the irritation their environments provided them with and they attributed to it meaning, which in turn had a further effect on their own self-description.

To give an example, members of the Greek-Turkish Forum admit that they felt endowed with a different responsibility after the earthquake. They felt that the two people wanted peace and this justified their effort.⁵⁰ For that reason, they decided to be “more ambitious” and discuss the core of the conflict in the Aegean.⁵¹ This new perspective as well as the previous transformations of the Greek-Turkish Forum reveals the paradoxical nature of social change. Members of the Forum like Ambassador Costas Zeppos and Ambassador Ilter Türkmen had participated in many discussions on Greek-Turkish problems in the past from their official positions. Ambassador Zeppos was the Head of the Department of Greek-Turkish Relations in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Türkmen had served in important posts within the Turkish Ministry, as Turkey’s representative at the United Nations and also as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, they had never come so close to the production of a formula for the resolution of the dispute over the continental shelf, a long-lasting thorny issue between the two countries. Both of them attest to the importance of the environment of trust and cooperation established within the Forum. Furthermore, the impact of the earthquake

upon their interaction comes to show that their perception of the environment outside of the Forum is equally important.

This sudden transformation draws our attention to one more feature of these processes. Thus, the differences that emerged after the earthquake existed before the earthquake. Yet, the developments brought about by the earthquake made social and psychic systems aware of them leading them to new self-descriptions. Once again, here it becomes apparent that the operation of self-description does not amount to some kind of accurate or objective description of reality. This is an evolutionary achievement rather than the result of a rational calculation.

The change of self-description is reflected in the statements and writings of politicians, journalists, intellectuals and ordinary people. The expression of surprise that followed these developments illustrates further the autonomy of the operation of self-description. We read on the front page of the newspaper *Hürriyet* "The People Run Ahead of Us". The director of the newspaper *Ta Nea*, Leon Karapanayiotis, stated that "the solidarity that the Greek people express is not a surprise only for you [the Turks], but for us as well".⁵² Politicians too recognized the change and the emergence of new arrangements. The Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem and the Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, have talked about the expectations this phenomenon has created. Ismael Cem, in an interview he gave to a Turkish channel, openly confessed that these developments have gone far beyond what politicians had thought and he expressed his fears as to the risks of disappointment but also the responsibility politicians bear after this.⁵³ "The earthquake has changed everything" in Greek-Turkish relations, wrote Mehmet Ali Birand.⁵⁴

These statements recognized the emergence of the new system. This very recognition reinforced the emerging order and ultimately contributed to its construction too. Causal analysis, based on narrowly defined interactions, cannot cope with these paradoxes of communication. Morphogenesis describes the complex processes of social change, going well beyond the general and abstract remarks of the sociality of peace processes. This autonomy of the new system of cooperation will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

The Autonomy of the System of Cooperation

The previous sections explored the increase of complexity after the occurrence of the earthquake and described the emergence of the new order as enforced selectivity towards the direction of cooperation. The new system of

cooperation employed previous determinations of meaning for its autopoiesis. This is possible due to the self-referential nature of communications and the specific strategies of generalization and re-specification.

Communications after the earthquake were generalized on all the three dimensions of meaning, i.e. the issue, the temporal and the social dimensions. Past events were recalled and connected to present occurrences and future expectations were formed through extrapolations from the past and the present. References to the Greek help for the victims of the earthquake detached themselves from the specific events of the earthquake and sought connections to references to a history of cooperation and peaceful Greek-Turkish coexistence. Turks who had memories from the years they lived together with Greeks in Istanbul,⁵⁵ Greeks who had travelled to Turkey on holiday and had enjoyed Turkish hospitality,⁵⁶ the common elements in the cultures of the two people, all were recalled to support and provide points for further connections in building up the new system.

Paradoxically enough, the system of cooperation emerged as something that had always been there. In the interpretations of these developments, the adverb “always” (alternating with “never”) underlines the process of generalization on the temporal dimension, indicating duration and existence in time. Cengiz Sarri wrote in his electronic message “we have always loved you in spite of politics”. Bekir Coskun argued “we will never again believe those politicians who instigate crises between the two states”. “It has always been there” maintained the columnist Hadi Uluengin.

Generalization in the social dimension means that there is no constraint as to who is going to make what contribution and when that will happen. Different social partners can make a contribution to the new order. As was shown above, not only and not mainly politicians, but journalists and ordinary people contributed to the emergence of the system of cooperation. The Greek pensioner, Turkish intellectuals who had contacts with Greek writers and poets on the other side of the Aegean Sea,⁵⁷ they all made contributions to the emerging order.

This analysis of the emergence of Greek-Turkish cooperation in the aftermath of the earthquake demonstrates that the new system was independent of the will and planning of the various social and psychic systems that contributed to its constitution. It cannot be identified with the rationale of the system of politics and neither with the rationale of mass media or civil society organizations. Ultimately, it was independent from what brought it about, that is, cooperation for relief of the victims of the

earthquake. It acquired its own identity, its own existence as a complex system of Greek-Turkish cooperation.

Conclusion

The emergence and sudden diversification and multiplication of cooperative interactions between Greeks and Turks have often been described as a paradox, as “lacking reason”. Indeed, the analysis in this article demonstrates that the system of cooperation lacked reason. It was neither instigated nor developed by a super-system, which was acting under a specific rationale of cooperation and peace in the broader region of the Aegean Sea.

The new system of cooperation was the product of the transformational dynamics of communications. Recursive operations of meaning production and processing triggered by the earthquake, were set in motion in the news media (Greek, Turkish and foreign), civil society organizations, politics and amongst ordinary citizens. Cascades of communication flows, which happened to get caught up in meaning networks that intersected one another, enabled the increase of complexity and created the need for its reduction. Ultimately, the new system of cooperation was itself a reduction of complexity. In that sense there is not a cause, a reason for its emergence and constitution. The new system itself has enforced selectivity towards the direction of cooperation.

The initial condition that gave rise to this system was a natural disaster, an accidental and thus contingent event. This analysis points to the role of contingency and chance but it underlines at the same time that chance does not mean randomness. Chance means lack of coordination among social systems. The absence of coordination can nevertheless produce effects and trigger causal processes. Furthermore, the analysis in this chapter demonstrates that it was the evolution of society that enabled the amplification and intensification of communication processes that constituted the new system. The unexpected appearance of the earthquake and the events and actions that followed it were incorporated and endowed with meaning and causality by social systems. Previous determinations of meaning and social structures like themes, institutions, persons and organizations provided adequate grounds for the functional specification and institutionalization of a Greek-Turkish system of cooperation. The new order emerged in the course of the autopoiesis, the ongoing self-renewal of modern functionally differentiated society. It was not imposed from outside, it emerged from within Greece and Turkey.

The systems theory perspective sheds light on the transformation process of

the Greek-Turkish conflict as a dynamic process which involves the whole of society in both countries. Furthermore, it breaks the illusion of Greek-Turkish relations as being in a state of stability, to describe their development as a constant process of becoming, restless change and movement - which is a state of dynamic stability. Thus, the analysis on the basis of Luhmann's theory departs decisively from deterministic approaches, which seek to uncover cause-effect relationships according to a machine-like Newtonian logic. The dynamics that unfolded after the earthquake were the dynamics of selectivity and connectivity of communication processes.

Finally, the aim of this article was to provide an insight into the complexity of this phenomenon. It does not claim that this is a representation of the reality. The judgement of the usefulness of the theory rests with the readers and whether it offers a better understanding of the complexities of modern society for them. This will be answered through the observations of the author's observations by other second order observers. The success of this viewpoint depends on its connectability and the way in which it is integrated into further communication.

NOTES

1. For an overview see Rumelili, Bahar, "The Talkers and the Silent Ones, The EU and Change in Greek-Turkish Relations", *Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies*, No 10. Oct. 2004; Muftuler-Bac, Meltem, *The Impact of the EU on Turkish Politics, East European Quarterly*, 34(2), pp. 159-179, 2000;
2. Heraclides, Alexis, "Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Détente: A Preliminary Evaluation", *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol.1, No.3, Spring 2002, pp.17-32. Also many participants in civil society peace initiatives argue in favour of this interpretation. Interview with Paulina Lampsa, Athens, 01.09.2001.
3. Luhmann, Niklas, *Social Systems*, Stanford University Press, 1995.
4. The empirical data presented in this paper were mainly gathered from the Greek newspapers *Eleftherotypia* and *Ta Nea* and the Turkish newspapers *Sabah* and *Hürriyet*.
5. Interview with the Managing Director and Official Spokesman of the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Harry Caloudis, Athens, 20.07.2001.
6. Many countries from all around the world sent humanitarian aid and trained teams equipped for the rescue works. For information regarding the humanitarian aid offered, see the articles "Rain of Aid", *Hürriyet*, 18.08.1999, "The World Runs to Help", *Hürriyet* 19.08.1999.

7. *Sabah*, 19.08.1999.
8. *Hürriyet*, 22.08.1999.
9. *Hürriyet*, 23.08.1999.
10. Mikis Theodorakis and Zulfu Livaneli have been in the forefront of efforts for cooperation before the earthquake and even in the most difficult times for Greek-Turkish relations.
11. See *Eleftherotypia* 28.08.1999 and *Hürriyet* 29.08.1999.
12. Luhmann, Niklas, *The Reality of Mass Media*, Polity Press, 2000.
13. Luhmann's framework allows research to explore the complexity involved in news production and the interaction of the system of media with the other social systems avoiding the general assumptions for manipulation or independence of the media. For analysis of the media product through conventional theoretical perspectives see Giallourides, C.K., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict - From Cyprus to Imia to S-300 and the Helsinki, 1955-2000, The Press Perspective*, [in Greek], Sideris, Athens, 2001 and Tilic, Dogan, *Journalism in Greece and Turkey - "I am ashamed, but I am a journalist"* (in Greek), Papazisis, 2000.
14. See MacQuail, Denis, *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*, 1987: p. 204.
15. Interview with Mustafa Asçıoglu, editor of foreign news at the News Channel NTV, Istanbul, 20.08.2001.
16. See *ZAMAN*, 25.09.1999.
17. Interview with Stelios Berberakis, Athens, 11.03.2001.
18. Interview with Anna Stergiou, Athens, 07.03.2002.
19. Interviews with General Director of the Hellenic State Radio Station, Ioannis Tzanetakos, Athens, 07.03.2002 and the director of the Radio Station in Komotini, Damon Damianos, Komotini, 01.04.2002.
20. See also Kubicek 2002 and Gundogdu 2001
21. Interview with Pantelis Sklias, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Greek NGO European Perspective Development and Education Center, Athens, 11.06.2002.
22. Interview with journalist Mihalīs Mitsos, Athens, 05.03.2002.
23. *Hürriyet*, 25.08.1999, "The Greek *Ta Nea*: 'We Are All Turks'".
24. Interview with Mihalīs Mitsos, journalist, Athens, 05.03.2002.
25. Interview with Harry A. Caloudis, Managing Director and Official Spokesman of the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Athens, 20.07.2001, Interview with the Mayor of Sappes, Dinos Haritopoulos, Istanbul, 08.12.2001.
26. The mainstream literature focuses on the system of politics based on the assumption of the rational acting of states without doing research and questioning the role of

- civil society. See for example Giallourides, C. K. & Tsakonas, P. I. (eds), *Greece and Turkey - After the end of the Cold War*, [in Greek], Sideris, Athens, 1999. A great part of the literature examines the role of the EU from this perspective. For example Kazakos and Ioakeimides, P.C., "Contradictions between Policy and Performance" in Kevin Featherstone and Ifantis (eds) *Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994; Gunduz, Aslan, "Greek Turkish Disputes: How to Resolve them?" In Keridis, Dimitris and Triandafyllou, Dimitris (eds), *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalisation*, Everett, MA: Brassey's, 2001.
27. Interview with the Consul General of the Greek Consulate in Istanbul, Fotis Xydias, Istanbul, 22.04.2001.
 28. See French President Jacques Chirac and the European Commission's official responsible for Turkey Günther Verheugen's statements, *Turkish Daily News*, 12.09.1999.
 29. Interview with Ambassador Fotis Xydias, Istanbul, 22.04.2001.
 30. *Ibid.*
 31. *Ta Nea*, 20.08.1999.
 32. *Ta Nea*, 20.08.1999.
 33. Sami Kohen, "The Public's Wish", *Milliyet*, 25.08.1999.
 34. *Sabah*, 21.08.1999.
 35. Bekir Coskun, *Hürriyet*, 28.08.1999.
 36. *Cumhuriyet*, 24.08.1999.
 37. *Ta Nea*, 27.08.1999.
 38. Hristina Corae, *Eleftherotypia*, 17.09.1999.
 39. That was the answer from interviews with people from this area two years after the earthquake on the question "Who put out the fire in the refineries?"
 40. For the Turkish political culture and the role of the state see Dodd 1990 and Erguder 1987.
 41. Interview with Ambassador Ali Tuygan, Athens, 18.07.2001
 42. *Ibid.*
 43. Some of them are the MERP, MEDA and INTERREG programmes. For further information see <http://www.europa.int>.
 44. Interview with the Mayor of Sappes, Dinos Haritopoulos, Istanbul, 08.12.2001.
 45. See for example the cinema movie *Buyuk Baba Kucuk Ask* as well as the Turkish TV series programme *Yilan Hikayesi* which made known to the Turkish public Katerina Moutsatsou, a young Greek actress. Interview with Katerina Mutsatsou, Istanbul, 20.12.2001. The Greek actress Karyofilia Karabeti played also a role in a

film of Greek-Turkish production and the songs of the Greek singer Angela Dimitriou have been at the top spots of the charts in Turkish radio and TV stations.

46. Interview with Socrates Tragotsis, Consul General in Istanbul, 10.03.2000.
47. Interviews with Nikitas Lionarakis, President of Foreign Ministry's Liaison Committee for NGOs, Athens, 07.08.2001 and Ambassador Ali Tuygan, Athens, 18.07.2001.
48. For statistics about trade between Greece and Turkey over the last eight years see the website of the Turkish organization DEIK, www.deik.org.tr.
49. For the proposal see the Greek-Turkish Forum's website www.greekturkishforum.org.
50. Interviews with Ambassador Costas Zeppos, Paulina Lampsas, Ambassador Ilter Türkmen
51. Interview with Ambassador Ilter Türkmen, Istanbul, 13.11.2001.
52. *Hürriyet*, 29.08.1999, Ferai Tinc, p. 1 and p. 18. See also the article written by Sami Kohen in *Milliyet*, 25.08.1999, "...The attitude of various levels of society from the ordinary man to the businessman, from intellectuals to civilian organizations, surprised not only us, but also government officials in Athens...".
53. "The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, said that he has lost the capacity to control developments because as he emphasized "immediately after the earthquakes new expectations have been established in both countries", *Eleftherotypia*, 15.09.1999
54. Mehmet Ali Birand, "Efharisto Poli, File", http://www.greekturkishforum.org/arti_6.htm
55. Hadi Uluengin in *Hürriyet*, 26.08.1999 and Turgul Savkay writing about the Greek national poet Giannis Ritsos, in *Hürriyet* 29.08.1999.
56. See article about the letter Giannis T. Kouris sent to the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Ali Tuygan, *Hürriyet*, 25.08.1999.
57. *Hürriyet*, 26.08.1999.

Immigration and Its Impact on Greek Foreign Policy*

Charalambos Tsardanidis**

RÉSUMÉ

L'immigration internationale a longtemps été considérée comme une partie intégrale de l'agenda de «politique basse» et donc un thème périphérique dans le domaine de l'enseignement des relations internationales. En Grèce la migration a émergé en tant que question importante «de sécurité nationale» dans les années 1990. Cet article examine l'impact réel et perçu de la migration (surtout clandestine) sur la politique étrangère grecque. En regardant la situation de plus près l'auteur explique comment la migration façonne la politique étrangère contemporaine et l'agenda de sécurité. Il avance ainsi l'argument que la «vague» de migration que la Grèce a connu récemment a conduit à l'édification de nouvelles perceptions de la menace et au développement d'un nouveau discours sur le rôle international de la Grèce et de son identité. La migration a également influencé de façon décisive l'agenda de la politique étrangère et a altéré de façon significative ses priorités et ses objectifs externes.

ABSTRACT

International immigration has long been considered part of the “low politics” agenda and thus peripheral to international relations scholarship. In Greece, migration emerged during the 1990s as an important national security issue. The paper examines the real and perceived impact of migration (especially illegal migration) on Greek foreign policy. A closer look at how migration shapes the contemporary foreign policy and security agendas may help argue that the migration “wave” recently experienced in Greece has led to the construction of new perceptions of threat as well as the development of a new discourse on Greece's international role and identity. Migration also has influenced decisively Greek foreign policy agenda. Migration has also significantly altered its external priorities and objectives.

Introduction

After the collapse of the Communist régimes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in the 1990s, increasing flows of legal and mainly illegal migrants from these countries entered Greece. In fact Greece is now a labour-

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importing country with legal and illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries, such as Albania and Bulgaria, as well as from countries situated as far away as Pakistan and the Philippines. During the last five years in particular, illegal immigrants fleeing war and poverty mostly in the East, entered the country by sea with a view towards settling in Greece and via Greece to Italy and other European countries¹. Today the total estimated number of foreigners, including regularized labour migrants (about 600,000 in 2001), irregular migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union exceeds one million. Greece now has more immigrants than any Southern European country in proportion to its population. The great majority of immigrants to Greece come from countries with which it shares borders. In fact the exceptional domination of one source country, Albania, remains distinct in the Greek experience².

This article deals with the impact of international immigration, especially irregular immigration, on Greek foreign policy. For Greece, international immigration is by now considered as a major factor in the security and foreign policy problematic because the country has been overwhelmed with massive influxes of immigrants coming from the south and east of the Mediterranean, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. The first part of this article examines migration within the context of foreign policy. The second part deals with the impact of immigration on Greek national security concept, and the third analyzes the consequences of immigration on Greek foreign policy.

Foreign Policy and Migration

In recent years international migration has no longer been confined to the realms of humanitarian, labour market and social integration concerns. On the contrary, it has gained prominence on the agenda of heads of governments and of various inter-governmental organisations becoming a salient issue of “high politics”³. However, migration has received little attention in major general approaches of contemporary international relations theory, whether that of neorealists, liberals or constructivists. Neomarxists and world systems theorists have discussed migration but they have focused primarily on explaining the phenomenon of migration under modern capitalism in terms of unequal exchange and dependency⁴. Migration has also long been considered peripheral to foreign policy analysis. As Mark Miller and Demetrios Papademetriou have observed “underlying assumptions concerning the fundamental nature of foreign policy and international politics have left migration matters outside the traditional focus of foreign policy analysis in much the same way that the foreign

policy significance of energy, finance, and political terrorism issues long were underestimated. It belonged, after all, in the domain of 'low politics'⁵. Bimal Ghosh has advocated more extensive coordination of immigration policy with foreign policy. "The contention is that, despite the important consequences, there is too little thought given to international migration in policy-making"⁶.

Even among International Political Economy (IPE) scholars who gradually found a voice in the security discourse, questions of the politics of capital and trade received the bulk of academic attention, while questions of migration (from an international perspective) were addressed by a largely marginalized interdisciplinary group of scholars⁷. Only in the mid-to late 1990s did the discipline of international relations begin to recognize that international population movements can have a dramatic effect on security and foreign policy⁸. Therefore, as Myron Weiner had observed correctly twelve years ago, the literature on international relations "says relatively little about population movements, except insofar as the refugee phenomenon is described as an outcome of conflicts"⁹.

However, in developing countries as well as in developed ones, governments, public opinion, media and scholars increasingly perceive international migration as a threat to national, regional and international stability. As Sarah Collinson has noticed "migration has the propensity to feature prominently in connection with a variety of broader security issues because it dovetails closely with a number of deepening concerns about the wider regional and global economic, political and strategic environment in which European governments will have to operate in coming decades"¹⁰. International migration therefore is emerging as one of the most prominent aspects of foreign policy and international security. Indeed, this shift in emphasis on security can be explained by the emergence of four factors.

First of all, governments are worried about what they perceive as a global migration crisis. Over the last two decades, migration has truly become a worldwide phenomenon in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In many countries, civil wars, gross human rights violations, poverty, unemployment, demographic growth and environmental degradation push millions of people to migrate. Large influxes of immigrants may represent an unbearable burden not only for developing, but also for developed countries. As a consequence, mass migration may create tensions which are likely to disrupt national and regional stability.

Second, the economic causes of migration are often inextricably linked with political ones, thus blurring the traditional dichotomy between voluntary and

non-voluntary migration. In light of the restrictions imposed since the 1980s by industrialized countries on the legal channels of migration, many economic migrants seek to enter the developed world through the asylum procedure or by circumventing legal procedures. As Allan Findlay notes, “policies to close off one channel of migration only added to pressure for immigration via other channels”¹¹. This situation, notably the increase in irregular migration, has provoked a shift in the perception of international migration among industrialized countries. The fear of losing control over who and how many should be granted access to their territory has led governments in Western Europe and North America to underline the destabilizing effect of immigration on their internal stability and national security.

The third factor relates to the reassessment of security which took place after the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, discussions about international security mainly centered on military issues such as the balance of power, the risk of nuclear and conventional war and the need for arms reduction; however, the end of the bipolar world saw increasing concern in the international community for non-military global matters such as environment, population growth, transnational terrorism, human rights and migration. Governments, inter- and non-governmental organizations and scholars began to recognize that security cannot be considered in strictly military terms anymore. Instead, it must also cover various non-military aspects¹². In fact security has to be considered as well at the individual and societal levels.

In its 1994 *Human Development Report*, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) examined the concept of “human security” at the individual level (United Nations Development Report, 1994:2)¹³. According to the UNDP Report, until recently the concept of security “ha[d] been related more to nation-states than to people”. Therefore, a “profound transition in thinking” is needed, in order to take into account the threats which could disrupt the life of ordinary people. In this respect, human security “ means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in home, in jobs or in communities”¹⁴.

In addition to human security, society becomes one of the main objects of the late twentieth century’s threats¹⁵. In fact, as pointed out by Barry Buzan, concerns about “threats and vulnerabilities that affect patterns of communal identity and culture” are gaining prominence in the governments’ security agenda. In this respect, international migration can be perceived as threatening

“both nationally and internationally on the security agenda of governments the ability of the existing society to reproduce itself in the old way”¹⁶. According to some scholars, the issues of migration and identity now appear at the top of the security agenda¹⁷. The concept of “societal security” has been developed in order to identify “situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms’, such as influxes of immigrants or refugees. More specifically, in Ole Waever’s mind, societal security “is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional partners of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and customs”¹⁸. Paul Roe concurs, stating that a society feels insecure when its “ability to reproduce its traditions and way of life” is threatened¹⁹. In this framework by introducing large numbers of people of diverse ethno-cultural and ideological backgrounds to a host-society is a potentially significant threat²⁰.

Fourth, immigration may influence and serve the goals of national foreign policy²¹. Both sending and receiving countries have found that migration may acquire marked importance in their bilateral dealings, serving varied roles as stakes or instruments in state- to- state interaction²². Foreign military or political interventions and internal or external responses to intervention, often result in mass migrations²³. Of course, such active foreign policy interventions also produce refugees. The absence of policies may also trigger migration so foreign intervention (direct or indirect) might actually serve to restrain mass out-migration. Such conditions may arise when domestic economic or political conditions deteriorate into economic desperation, large-scale internal repression, or the rise of totalitarian governments²⁴.

Further Relationships

Immigration and foreign policy are related in three other important ways:

First, even when immigration policy responds strictly to domestic political demands, the effects of policy decisions are felt abroad hence immigration policy-making often has foreign policy consequences and may cause international political responses.

A second, general type of interaction between immigration and foreign policy occurs when foreign policy implications are so important that foreign policy concerns cause immigration policy decisions. Flows and stocks of immigrants do not have an impact on host countries’ national security only. They also have important implications for any host country’s foreign policy. As a result, considerations of immigration policy as foreign policy point to a strategy that takes into account foreign policy concerns²⁵.

Third, as immigration becomes an issue of foreign policy as well as a matter for bilateral or regional negotiations, then a shift in power will take place from ministries and departments concerned with labour and home affairs to those concerned with external affairs and defense. The result will be change in the intra-bureaucratic relationships. In turn, this will introduce new and often conflicting interests in the consideration of policies which affect immigration in the whole decisionmaking apparatus²⁶.

This article deals primarily with irregular immigration. The most likely type of population flows to have real or perceived implications for national security and foreign policy is irregular immigration. Any illegal, undocumented or uncontrolled mass movement of people, be it in response to conflict, disaster or economic difficulty, can represent a major potential threat to national well-being. Because this threat originates abroad, it can also menace security²⁷. Nonetheless, we should not forget that even other types of migration (permanent migration, labour migration, refugees and asylum seekers) may have an impact on national security and foreign policy. For example, the political activities of Kurdish and Croatian guestworkers in Germany have created tensions within the receiving country, as well as between the latter and their countries of origin²⁸.

Three Key Concepts

Before we go any further, some key terms should be defined according to contemporary foreign policy usage.

First of all, the definition of security depends upon the geographical and temporal context in which it is used. What is seen as threatening by one society may not necessarily represent a threat for another. For instance, countries with a multicultural tradition may feel less threatened by an influx of immigrants than countries which have been built on the basis of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Security should be understood therefore within a social context; i.e., as the product of “social practices in a particular spatial and temporal context”²⁹.

Secondly, a distinction should be made between real and perceived threats. Fears about immigration may be exaggerated with respect to existing realities. Nonetheless, as perception actually shapes the foreign policy adopted by countries in order to deal with immigration issues, these so-called threats must be considered in the analysis of the impact of international migration on national and international security. “In this respect, it is important to distinguish between ‘threat’ (as probable) and ‘risk’ (as possible danger)”³⁰.

Thirdly, the idea of immigration as threat does not mean forgetting the positive side. People leaving their countries of origin actually do find safety or better living conditions elsewhere. There they may be joined by their families. Migration contributes significantly to the development of the countries of origin through remittances and the reduction of pressures on their local labour market. Countries of destination benefit from the economic performance of immigrants and from their contribution to intercultural exchange. Moreover, migration brings concerned countries together through international discussions and co-operation, either bilaterally or multilaterally.

The Impact of Immigration on the Greek National Security Concept

Among the many trends influencing international migration in recent decades, perhaps the most notable has been the securitization of migration policies³¹. Clearly the latest waves of migration have led to political crises in many countries in both the developed and the developing world. Not surprisingly, at the heart of the political science literature on international immigration one finds concerns about the institutions of sovereignty and national security. In looking at the politics of sovereignty and national security, as James Hollifield points out “we are concerned not just with domestic politics, the play of organized interests, and issues of state autonomy, but also with foreign policy and the nature and structure of the international system”³². Immigrants can be perceived as a threat to the major societal values of the receiving country and more particularly to national identity, to economic well-being and to political stability.

Immigration should thus be regarded as a factor capable of creating tension with other countries. Although, fears about immigration are often exaggerated, these elements must be taken into account in any analysis of the impacts of immigration on national and international security. In this respect, it is important to distinguish clearly between “threat” (as probable) and “risk” (as possible) danger³³.

Immigration as a Threat to Greek National Identity

According to some scholars, issues of immigration and identity now appear at the top of the European security agenda³⁴. If determining or changing the composition of a people, questions of membership will obviously go straight to the heart of basic character or identity. Moreover, one might expect that a large influx or stock of immigrants will wish to maintain their cultural, linguistic and religious traditions. As it is unrealistic to think that the people of the host

country will exhibit a cavalier disregard for the preservation of the culture they share, understandably they will seek immigration policies which nurture and protect their culture. Immigration triggers these deep reactions because it forces a people to address the questions, who are we and who do we want to be?³⁵

In Western Europe, the fear of being swamped by a large influx of immigrants of different cultural backgrounds remains rooted in the centuries-old process of creation and evolution of the nation-state which emphasized cultural homogeneity. Moreover, this perception has been highlighted in recent years by the European integration process. An ethnically homogeneous society may place a higher value on preserving its ethnic character than does a heterogenous society. In this case, it sees a population influx as a threat to security³⁶. Although in most cases these fears appear to be exaggerated, they nevertheless do exert an important influence on the formulation of government policies regarding immigration. Moreover, one might expect that the perception of immigration as a threat to national identity in Western Europe would grow stronger in the future simply because migration pressures in European countries show no sign of abating. Actually, one of the ideas shaping European governmental perception of immigration is that immigrants usually settle permanently, thus initiating the longer term problem of cohabitation and religious identity³⁷.

Also among the “new” immigrant communities in Europe, as in Greece, a lot of immigrants maintain strong links with the culture of their countries of origin. Furthermore they do not wish to abandon their linguistic, religious and cultural practices. The issue of a clash with local populations, who may feel threatened in terms of culture and identity, lies at the core of the perception of international migration as a security problem. In this respect, Barry Buzan remarks that “migration threatens communal identity and culture by directly altering the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of the population”³⁸.

Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum have noted that if one segment of a given population – in terms of a socially defined category such as race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation – grows more rapidly than another, such changes may shift domestic political power balances³⁹. This may also fundamentally challenge a polity’s conception of national identity and long-held beliefs. Consequently, mass immigration is the most viable means of initiating rapid demographic and social change that can in turn create perceptions of threat and bring identity issues to the forefront of the political agenda in receiving states⁴⁰.

In Greece, fears that foreigners of other races and religious creeds, especially Muslims, would not be easily integrated into “traditional” Greek society have also arisen. In the minds of many Greeks, Islam remains associated historically with Ottoman rule and thus today is connected with the so-called Turkish threat. Moreover, an indigenous Muslim (mainly Turkish) population already exists in the northern part of the country. In fact, some Islamic non-governmental organisations and Middle Eastern countries have paid attention to the welfare of Muslims in Greece. These issues have gained prominence in recent years because Greek society has undergone modernization and consequently has abandoned some of its traditional characteristics⁴¹. Some believe that immigrants to Greece are transforming the ethnic and cultural milieu of a country traditionally proud of its perceived homogeneity. The immigrants are presenting the Greek state and society with difficult, unfamiliar problems⁴². Indeed, the issue of identity loss is particularly high on the agenda of Greece’s powerful Orthodox Church and other conservative elements. The Church believes that the country’s most salient security issue is loss of identity, a problem severe enough to threaten the nation’s very survival. The root of the problem, as they see it, is the de-Christianization of the society in the face of the avalanche of foreign and mainly non-Christian elements. The Head of the Church, Archbishop Christodoulos, holds politicians responsible for the country’s social ills⁴³. Not surprisingly for years, thanks to efforts led by the Archbishop, the Greek Orthodox Church has successfully blocked plans to build a mosque and a Muslim cultural centre in Athens. Another characteristic example of this attitude came from a former Minister, who argued that there should be a *quid pro quo* from Turkey, “There should be reciprocity. To open a mosque, they should give us the keys of Aghia Sophia” (the famous Byzantine church in Istanbul, which was first turned into a mosque and then into a museum).

Furthermore, in the early 1990s a geopolitical view appeared in the Greek media and in foreign policy-making circles about the existence of a “Muslim crescent or arc” in the Balkans that threatened the stability of the entire region and posed a serious threat to Greek national security. The story was quite simple: Muslim populations in the Balkans formed an axis, an “arc” or a crescent from Turkey to Albania, that was crossing Bulgaria, FYROM, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Greeks thought that Turkey tried to manipulate this arc in order to create conditions suitable for Muslim secessionist movements (involving also Western Thrace - a Greek territory with approx. 100,000 Muslim inhabitants). Note that many in Greece preferred to use the term “Turkish” instead of “Muslim” or “Islamic” arc or crescent. Behind this

concept was the fear that the Turkish “threat” to Greek territorial integrity would spread from the eastern to the northern borders of the country. The constant repetition of the “Muslim threat” theme in innumerable articles in Greek newspapers until 1994 proved extremely effective. Many Greek intellectuals supported and strengthened this view. Proponents of the arc idea thought that Greece should develop a counter-strategy aiming at the creation of an alliance of “Orthodox forces”, of an “Orthodox arc”⁴⁴.

Negative images of immigrants have been reinforced by the following factors, social and political-ideological:

First, until recently, the prevailing collective image of Greece was of an ethnically homogeneous society. This image, combined with the lack of any debate about multiculturalism, rendered it difficult to entertain any notion of acceptance of the other. Similarly, political developments in the Balkans during the 1990s revived nationalism in the region. As a result, Albanian immigrants have been the most heavily stereotyped and stigmatized. This occurred not so much because of their essential “difference” from Greeks but because, as neighbours, they represent the “near Other” who becomes, through immigration, the “Other within”⁴⁵.

Second, foreign policy considerations that lead to differential treatment for similar immigrants from different countries can stimulate divisive political protest. For example the criteria for Greekness replicate and reinforce the ethnic-cultural-religious definition of the Greek “nation”. The boundary between insiders and outsiders is defined by a combination of ethnic and religious features. This issue is particularly relevant for Albania, the major immigrant-sending country, where people who are Christian Orthodox and have Greek origins are given preference over Muslim Albanians. Furthermore, regarding matters of the foreign policy of the Greek state - or, as it was so eloquently stated by both NGO representatives and public administrative employees, “for matters of national interest” Greek immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union (Pontioi) - were given full rights and Greek passports, while Greek Albanians were treated as guestworkers. In other words, Greek Albanians were “also a bit like Greeks”, but their Greekness remained unrecognized because it was in the interest of Greek foreign policy that they remain in Albania to keep the Greek minority alive there⁴⁶. Consequently a hierarchy of Greekness has been constructed in the political discourse whereby priority was given to real Greek; i.e., citizens of the Greek state, of Greek ethnicity and Orthodox religion⁴⁷. Only recently has it been announced that Greek-origin immigrants from Albania could apply for Greek citizenship.

Third, should the law also facilitate naturalization, those ethnic or religious communities which have a higher fertility rate than the Greeks may challenge the long-established, albeit entirely unrealistic, model of national identity⁴⁸. Some estimate that by 2015 about 25 percent of the population of Greece will be first - and - second generation “foreigners”. This means that out of an estimated population of 14.2 million, 3.5 million will be first- and second generation immigrants. In a homogeneous and largely Christian Orthodox country like Greece, these developments raise serious concerns⁴⁹.

Immigration as a Tension-Creating Factor with Other Countries

It now appears, however, that sending countries may have more control over outmigration than was previously thought. Indeed, out migration may be visualised as a kind of “national resource”, to be managed like any other⁵⁰. Inevitably, therefore, measures to restrain illegal immigration taken by the receiving countries can be expected to incur some foreign policy costs.

During the past fifteen years, irregular immigration from the Eastern Europe and the South Mediterranean countries has often resulted in bilateral tensions between countries of destination, countries of origin and transit countries⁵¹. Additional instability in already strained bilateral relations arose for the following seven reasons:

First, destination countries blamed countries of origin or transit countries for not taking concrete actions against clandestine departures and human trafficking. A country's concern that an immigration influx is the result of population “dumping” (clearly a matter of perception of intentions) is likely to be greatest when there is a history of enmity between sending and receiving countries. Already tense relations between Greece and Turkey have been further burdened by a series of incidents involving irregular immigrants transiting from Turkey into Western Europe via Greece. Therefore, irregular migration and migrant trafficking appear likely to burden bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey, already strained by the issues of Cyprus, the Aegean Sea and minority rights in Western Thrace and Istanbul.

Irregular migration and refugee flows may have been used by the country of origin to trump cards in interstate negotiations, in order to force destination countries to make political, commercial, economic or strategic concessions⁵². Gil Loescher has argued that by expressing an inability to control the population outflow or by demonstrating a willingness to manipulate it a home country is in a position to extract foreign policy and strategic concessions from the receiving state⁵³. For example, the Albanian government has linked its

cooperation in the control of irregular migration and human trafficking to requests for financial aid and increasing legal emigration opportunities. Naturally these requests are addressed to the Greek and Italian governments, and via Italy and Greece, to the European Union⁵⁴.

Forced emigration can be also an instrument in a home-country foreign policy. It can press a neighbouring state to provide aid or credit in return for stopping the flow of immigrants. An examination of both historical and contemporary population movements demonstrates that countries of emigration have more control over international population flows than is usually mentioned by political analysts. Moreover, what often appears to be spontaneous emigration and refugee movements may represent deliberate emigration policies on the part of sending countries⁵⁵.

Second, countries favouring outmigration, for whatever reason, may be expected to oppose efforts by the countries of destination to regulate the entry of their nationals. Such opposition may be expressed through diplomatic channels, through criticism in the domestic and international media, through retaliatory measures, or even through support for certain political groups in the receiving country⁵⁶.

Third, immigrants and refugees may attempt to convince the host country to support their cause against the régime they fled through diplomatic pressure, thus raising the possibility of bilateral tensions, particularly when the receiving country may actively support the refugees in their quest to change the régime of their country of origin⁵⁷. Although the receiving country may have no such intention, where its motives are humanitarian, the mere granting of asylum based on a finding that fear of persecution exists may be treated by the home country as interference in its affairs. In the end, this may be sufficient to create an antagonistic relationship with the sending country. Yet, whether the national security of the host state is threatened depends on the abilities of the home country to respond against the host. For example, although the Cuban government may object to the opposition activities of Cuban-Americans, Cuba lacks the ability to pose a credible threat to US national security. Nevertheless, the activities of migrants still can create foreign policy problems for host countries, even if those problems do not pose a threat to national security⁵⁸.

Moreover governments of the host country are quite often concerned that refugees to whom they give protection may turn against them if they are unwilling to assist refugees in their opposition to the government of their country of origin⁵⁹.

Fourth, refugees have been used as tools of what might be termed “private foreign policies”. Immigrant groups also may pose a security threat to host countries forming alliances with domestic opposition groups. This use of immigrants or refugees arises when nongovernmental groups of the host country opposed to particular foreign régimes see mass exodus from those countries as a weapon to dramatize the reasons for their opposition and thus exert pressure on their government to change its foreign policy⁶⁰. In the end, some of the most active advocates of Kurdish immigrants and refugees to Greece appeared primarily concerned with discrediting and ultimately changing the régime in Turkey; in other words, less than with the plight of the Kurdish refugees themselves. The use of refugee admissions, however, as a tool of foreign policy has become an increasingly dangerous game, as the Ocalan case proved. It can backfire badly in both domestic and foreign policy.

Fifth, the immigrants themselves may become a focal point of controversy between the home and host countries, among contending groups within the immigrants/diaspora, or between sections of the immigrants and the home government⁶¹. Immigrants and refugees usually maintain personal links with their homelands. They can support political parties, factions or ethnic groups in their country of origin through representation, political lobbying or, more directly, through recruitment and the sending of funds and of arms. Although lacking the right to vote and hold office, resident aliens can have an effect upon the conduct of foreign policy. But more unorthodox and potentially violent examples should also be noted. The recent past has seen conflicts between Greek and Slavomacedonian nationalist immigrants in Canada and Australia. However, there have also been clashes and even violent actions between right and left Albanian immigrants in Greece over the past few years.

Sixth, the presence of substantial numbers of immigrants and diaspora members could be mobilized by the sending country in support of its own positions in dealings with the receiving country. Domestic pressures by the Greek-American community played an important role in the 1970s on American foreign policy regarding the Cyprus problem, Greek-Turkish disputes, and in the 1990s the so-called Macedonian question. Two factors do, however, limit the political power of immigrant groups and diasporas in the national policy-making of their host country. One is the immigrant group's cohesion which relies on organizational and material capabilities. The other is the group's access to political power, determined largely by the political institutions of each host society. In countries that facilitate the acquisition of citizenship and grant other participatory rights, if immigrant groups are large,

homogeneous, and well organized, they will have greater influence over the host country's foreign policy. Conversely, in countries where immigrants are less organized and less able to participate in the political process, they will have less influence. Ultimately though, immigrant influence only matters if immigrant preferences are distinctive from those of the host society⁶².

Seventh, the home country may exert diplomatic pressure on the host country complaining about the treatment which immigrants are receiving in the host country. Greece has felt similar diplomatic pressures from sending countries to facilitate outmigration, often from the foreign ministries of the home countries. The Albanian government, for example, had opposed Greek proposals to restrain illegal immigration or to take measures to limit illegal entry across the Greek border. However, Greece's prime concern in relations to Albania was to avoid conflict, since tensions between Greeks and Albanians in Greece have quite often led to a nationalist mobilisation in Albania in support of the Albanian immigrants in Greece. This could consequently affect the Albanian immigrant community in Greece and damage bilateral relations between Greece and Albania. For instance the improving situation of Albanian immigrants has periodically experienced several aberrations, stemming neither from labour market insufficiency to absorb foreign workers nor from a limited societal capacity to accept newcomers. Deportations of undocumented Albanian immigrants have actually been inspired by electoral motivations or concerns from the Greek community in Albania regarding infringement of ethnic, human, educational or cultural rights. Albanian reaction has been immediate: parliamentary statements, media pressure, coercion of Greek minority, and delays in opening schools in Greek-populated areas of Albania⁶³. However, Greek Foreign Ministry officials rejected the suggestion that immigration policy depended on considerations of bilateral relations with host countries, like Albania, although they recognized that it had impact on these relations⁶⁴.

In Greece, the diplomatic representatives of Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait and Indonesia, have also shown an interest in the welfare of the emerging Muslim communities in Greece. The diplomats' efforts have mainly focused on the establishment of a central Mosque and an Islamic cultural centre in the suburbs of Athens. On the other hand, the Islamic organization active in Greece, the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at Islam Lahore (the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement), is more interested in translating several books on Islam into the Greek and Albanian languages as well as converting the Albanian immigrants in Greece into devout Muslims⁶⁵.

Immigration as a Tool of Greek Foreign Policy

As Kenneth J. Franzblau points out the effect of immigration on the foreign policy of a receiving country is determined by a number of considerations. First, if the numbers of immigrants are small or they are easily assimilated into society, the impact on the foreign policy of the host country will likely be small⁶⁶. However, if the receiving country perceives that the level of immigration is too high or that substantial numbers of immigrants are entering the country outside the legal framework, as is the case of Greece, foreign policy may be used as an instrument to prevent the emergence of displacement and mass migration or, if movement cannot be stopped, as an instrument to regulate migration and keep migration away from the country⁶⁷. On the other hand, at the level of official policy, states can also mobilize first- and second-generation immigrants to assist in achieving particular foreign policy projects, like the American government did by mobilizing highly skilled Afghan immigrants for nation-building in Afghanistan, and relying on Palestinian Americans as negotiators in various rounds of Middle East peace talks⁶⁸.

According to Jorge Dominguez “the deterrence of illegal immigration is more complex than normal deterrence in foreign policy, which is ordinarily aimed as a particular government to ensure that it will not engage in undesirable behavior. To deter illegal migration, however, it is also necessary to deter individuals who are acting on their own”⁶⁹.

Over the past eighteen years, Greece has faced foreign policy choices about immigration that were complex, emotional, and deeply intertwined with domestic concerns. Other countries may have faced challenges, but it is clear that the immigration experience of Greece differs from that of other European countries on several points.

The first is the shift in the 1990s from the status of emigration to one of immigration. Greece suddenly realized that new issues had appeared on its foreign policy agenda. This shift also affected debates about the impact of immigration on the priorities of Greek foreign policy.

Second, there was the prevalence of a single source country. Just over 65 percent of the immigrants participating in the Greek regularization program originated from Albania while the second most important country, Bulgaria, accounted for only 7 percent. Albanians migrate to Greece primarily for economic reasons. No similar degree of dominance is to be found in any other countries of Southern Europe⁷⁰.

Third, immigration pressures are being further exacerbated by political instability and economic failure of the neighbourhood sending countries.

Political instability in countries of origin can spill over into Greece, thus giving an impact on the latter's public order and foreign policy towards the country of origin.

Policy Instruments Employed in Greece

Greek migration policies were exclusively designed with a view to combating illegal immigration through the following set of policy instruments, all of which had effects on Greek foreign policy:

Initially better instruments of control were sought to establish and enforce stricter border régimes. *The first instrument involved, besides patrolling the extended Greek borders, using internal policy controls to prevent overstaying, tightening up visa procedures and launching media campaigns and for police operations to discourage illegal immigrants from coming.*

A second instrument was to develop prevention and intervention strategies to restrain existing immigrants outflows through instruments of foreign policy. Such strategies were based on diplomatic negotiations, pressures, economic sanctions, expulsions of irregular immigrants and withdrawal of financial and development assistance. Where generosity did not work or was not financially feasible, receiving countries were getting a variety of threats to halt emigration⁷¹. Therefore diplomatic pressures, including coercive diplomacy, was exerted⁷². All in all, the leverage exercised by destination countries should not be underestimated because emigration is considered by many countries of origin as an essential economic resource. Labour migration can greatly contribute to the country of origin's development and economic well-being through worker's remittances and lessened pressure on the local labour market⁷³. The home countries have long been aware of their dependence upon migration and have recognized that any sudden influx of returning migrants would create a major problem for domestic security.

The situation of Albanian irregular migrants in Greece illustrates this point. Clandestine migration between Albania and Greece became one of the most salient aspects of their bilateral relations. Since the beginning of the 1990s, many Albanians have emigrated illegally to Greece. In the mid-1990s, Albanian migrants working abroad were sending home remittances estimated by various sources to be worth between \$300 million and \$1 billion *per annum*⁷⁴. This represented the country's major source of external income after aid and corresponded to a third of the GDP. Remittances were also several times the value of Albania's exports⁷⁵. The Greek government chose to deal with the influx of illegal migrants by using sporadic waves of administrative

deportations and mass expulsions. It linked the regularization of Albanian clandestine immigrants to the respect paid by the Tirana authorities to the rights of the Greek minority living in southern Albania⁷⁶. The Greek authorities have thus deported about 2.3 million immigrants since 1990. It is estimated, however, that only 764,000 irregular migrants had been deported from Greece between January 1991 and August 1994. Out of those 96 percent were Albanians sent back when incidents involving the Greek minority in Albania occurred, thus putting important economic and social pressure on the Albanian government. Nevertheless, many of those deported during that period had illegally crossed the border several times since then. As a result, discussions started in Spring 1995 between Greece and Albania and culminated in the signing of an agreement in March 1996. Under the provisions of this agreement, Albania accepted the creation of a Greek consulate in Korytsa, the opening of two new border posts and the establishment of more school classes for the Greek minority. On the other hand, Greece agreed to receive seasonal Albanian workers and to study the regularization of Albanian clandestine immigrants already living on its soil. Nevertheless, through extended and costly police operations, the Greek government continued to expel illegal immigrants, largely to appease domestic residents.

The policies of expulsion, however, appear to have had limited success because other immigrants were entering the country as (false) tourists, students or legal short-term workers, and then were overstaying. Also, despite the creation of a special police force to protect the borders, the illegal entry of foreigners into the country was not restrained in the least; instead, it continued without diminution. One reason was that the decrees for the punishment of offenders – both illegal foreign workers and their Greek employers – were scarcely ever applied⁷⁷.

A third instrument was to address the social, economic, and political consequences that actually or potentially generate mass emigration in the home countries. It has been shown that trade liberalization, foreign investment, and development assistance can reduce the pressures of emigration by creating income-generating opportunities, reducing unemployment, and improving wages in countries of origin. Four foreign policy tools were used in this context.

The first tool is trade liberalization, the key concept in international economic relations nowadays. With regard to forced migration, it is assumed that free trade will promote economic growth and social development, thus eventually diminishing migration pressures. In the short run, however, a rise in the unemployment of the country of origin should be expected thus increasing

the supply- push emigration pressures. Under these circumstances, there can be a migration hump, meaning that the same policies that decrease emigration pressures in the long term can increase them in the short term⁷⁸.

Foreign direct investment is the second tool. In a global economy, the volume and importance of foreign investments is increasing substantially. Investments and subsequent economic development may play a role in reducing immigration or changing the direction of migratory movements⁷⁹.

The third tool is foreign aid. The importance of private and public aid for socio-economic development remains significant. In recent years, this aid has come under strain as a result of alleged donor fatigue and the expressed need to use development funds for emergency relief. The presence of large immigrant and ethnic minority populations from developing countries within the European countries, however, could help to revive interest in development programs. In addition, there are good examples of the active involvement of immigrants in supporting development projects in their countries of origin.

The fourth tool, is the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance, which could have a positive effect on the general climate in a country, resulting in improved socio-economic development, increased opportunities and hence, the elimination of at least some of the key causes of forced migration. Governments from donor countries are increasingly attaching conditions on aid to progress in these areas. NGOs are increasingly monitoring the practices of trans-national companies and demand their respect for fundamental human rights in the countries in which they operate.

From the above instruments Greek foreign policy has used all of them particularly towards the Balkan countries except free trade, which however has been implemented for Bulgaria and Romania through the European Association Agreements and the admission negotiations and for the Western Balkan countries through the Process of Association and Stabilization.

Since the mid 1990s, it gradually became clear that Greece had major economic and political interests in the Balkans and that a new political approach reflecting them – including immigration – had become necessary. Therefore, Greek foreign policy priorities and the interests of Greek business have started to come together as never before.

As far as Foreign Direct Investment is concerned, thousands of Greek companies (mostly joined ventures with local partners) have set up operations across the Balkans. Most of the Greek investment in the post-1996 period was not private – it came from Greek para-statal companies like the state-owned telecommunications company and the state petroleum company. The

establishment of the Greek banks in the region has been promoted, to a large extent, by the presence of immigrants and has facilitated remittances and their channeling into productive investment at home⁸⁰. A much more ambitious objective for the Greek foreign policy is an aid project towards the Balkan countries called Hellenic Plan for the Reconstruction of the Balkans. Although it announced in 1999 for various reasons its implementation started only in 2002. The total aid according to the Plan could reach the sum of 550 million euros. Twenty five percent of this aid would be given exclusively to Greek companies to invest in the region and the rest to projects for improving the substruction and for promoting democracy and good governance⁸¹.

However, despite the fact that Greece has been emerged as a substantial donor and big investor in the Balkans, so far there are not signs that immigration from these countries has been reduced. For example there is doubt that the enough labour forces of Albania or Bulgaria and other northern neighbour(s) countries have become somewhat dependent on employment opportunities from the Greek investments and by this way people are discouraged to immigrate. Hence, it is far from certain that the instruments of investment or aid could curtail illegal immigration and thereby serve Greek foreign policy interests regarding immigration. Meritorious as these tools are, there is no evidence that they can reduce emigration in the short run⁸².

A fourth instrument to deter Greece immigration flows was to put emphasis on negotiating bilateral agreements with the sending countries. Negotiation is a relatively new and promising mechanism for policy development in the area of immigration control. Bilateral agreements between sending and receiving states lay out in more detail how these states intend to regulate migration and protect the rights of the parties involved. Such agreements may foster links between states and could have a positive impact on other domains of co-operation.

Greece's relatively wide latitude in foreign policy offered some justification for using this approach to limit flows. In fact, negotiations had been central to Greece's dealing with Albania and Turkey over the last ten years. For example, in 1999, Turkey and Greece started to negotiate a total of ten agreements, including one on illegal immigration. Half of these agreements were signed in Ankara when the Greek Foreign Minister Andreas Papandreou paid a historic visit to Turkey on January 19-22, 2000, the first in three decades. The other half were signed in Athens during Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem's visit on February 1-2, 2002. A Protocol on Combating Crime, Especially Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Illegal Immigration was signed between Greece and Turkey in November 2001. The Protocol

provided detailed co-operation procedures for the readmission of citizens of either country or of a third country, who enter either country unlawfully.

Christopher Mitchell observes there are four factors among others which could maintain that negotiation for bilateral agreements is not an effective instrument: sending nations may prefer the *status quo* and see little reason to bargain; sending governments may lack the administrative capacity to restrain emigration; receiving countries negotiators have limited and political leeway to promise certain levels of legal migration access; the host government hesitates to provide “side- payments” in return for restraint by sending states⁸³.

By 2006, it became clear that although Turkey was accepting some readmissions, there were considerable delays and problems. According to the Greek authorities, between April 2002 and November 2006, they had submitted 1,892 cases (covering 23,689 aliens) out of which Turkey accepted to take back 2,841 persons, but in reality took only 1,463⁸⁴.

A fifth instrument has been regional cooperation. Immigration can not only influence bilateral relations between the receiving country and the country of origin but also have implications for the former's regional foreign policy. From the beginning of the 1980's, the United Nations General Assembly has acknowledged that “*massive flows of refugees may not only affect the domestic order and stability of receiving states but also jeopardize the political and social stability and the economic development of entire regions and thus endanger international peace and security. Consequently, governments in various regions of the world now recognize that the implementation of innovative approaches to the problems of international population movement and human displacement necessitate the establishment of regional frameworks to replace ineffective unilateral activities*”⁸⁵.

Greece's national interests (particularly in the Balkans) as far as immigration is concerned were seen as better served since 1999 via multilateral efforts rather than unilateral or bilateral ones. Not only the nationalistic and opportunistic policy of the early 1990s was abandoned but the bilateral framework was considered as secondary to the multilateral. Fearing that political and economic instability in the Balkans and the South Mediterranean countries could trigger major migration influxes, Greece and other South member states of the EU tried to involve the European Union in more active and consistent policies towards migration. This attitude could be explained also by the fact that Greek institutions lack of expertise on migration issues and on the other because the Greek government quite often used the EU as a scapegoat to justify measures regarding the immigrants. These were often measures Greece would have implemented anyway⁸⁶.

In this context, Athens has remained strongly in favour of making EU migration a horizontal, “cross-pillar” issue in EU external relations. The Government also wants to incorporate standard readmission clauses in all association and cooperation agreements concluded by the EU with third countries. Therefore, use of the conditionality approach should continue to dominate relations with the new member states and the Eastern and Southern neighbours of the Union, which have traditionally been countries of emigration or countries of transit for migrants. “This purposeful and institutionalized form of policy transfer has become a central element in the EU approach towards immigration, and is a means by which to extend the reach of common policies to tackle problems further away from the common territory”⁸⁷. For example, the Association Agreement with Turkey and the Co-operation Agreement with three Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) include provisions on migration. In fact, these bilateral Agreements could not ignore the high proportion of immigrant workers of Maghrebian or Turkish origin who reside in member states, and Mediterranean countries insisted that this matter should be an integral part of the policy of co-operation. The provisions offer Turkish and Maghreb workers residing in the Union protection against discrimination as regards working conditions, remuneration and social security⁸⁸.

Greece also has moved up on the agenda the issue of immigration within the framework of other regional cooperation schemes like the South East European Cooperation Process, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation and the Mediterranean Forum.

Conclusions

This article highlighted the implications of immigration for the national security as well as the foreign policy of Greece. We conclude that international migration, particularly irregular migration, has become a basic concern in Greece’s national security because it is increasingly perceived as a threat to national identity and political stability. Moreover, immigration does influence the formulation of Greece’s foreign policy towards both individual countries of origin, mainly those from Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan region as a whole. It creates tensions with them or aggravates already strained bilateral relations with others, thus impacting regional stability. On the other hand, Greek governments have used immigrants not only as an instrument of statecraft in order to impose restraints upon the actions of the home governments or to deter the population influx but also as a tool to achieve its own foreign policy objectives.

The reluctance of the Greek government to accept immigration as a long-term feature of modern Greek society was initially related to the novelty and unexpected character of the phenomenon. The dominant impression in the public and policy discourse was that the immigrants considered Greece as the “waiting room”, a place to stay for a couple of years in order to pay off the debt to the smugglers and then finance the second trip to other European countries⁸⁹. Despite successive legalisation programs, Greece continues to face an immigration problem as flows of illegal immigrants and the cost of integration continues to rise. Therefore, the net costs associated with their smooth integration into the host labour market and into Greek society have raised concern over the scope and effectiveness of immigration policies. For this reason Greece has become aware of the necessity to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives in order to mitigate the real or/and perceived destabilizing impact of international migration on its national security. Greek foreign policy-makers claim that only the EU framework could provide the means for cementing a consistent immigration policy. Overall, the EU could make available the means of planning and implementing a successful adaptation policy of its own immigrants and could, through the development of EU common policies and measures, deter the inflow of other immigrants.

NOTES

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12. R. Lohrmann, "Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity. Current Threats to Peace", *International Migration* (Vol. 38, No. 4, 2000), p. 5. See also B. Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century", *International Affairs* (Vol. 67, No. 3, 1991), pp. 431-451; R. B. J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge to World Politics", *Alternatives* (Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990), pp. 3-27.
13. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 2.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
15. The introduction of the concept of "society" into the analysis of international security can be seen as a transitional phase in a shift within the mainstream tradition from material to cognitive structural resources, and from state to human subjects of security. See R. Furuseth, *Creating Security Through Immigration Control* (Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Report 274, 2003), p. 16.
16. B. Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty- First Century", *op. cit.*, p. 447.
17. D. Waxman, "Immigration and Identity: A New Security Perspective in Euro-Maghreb Relations", *Conflict Studies* (No. 302, 1997), p. 329.
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- These are: (1) changing patterns of international migration; (2) the increasing diversity of migration flows; (3) changing migrant preferences regarding assimilation and integration; and (4) a cycle of threat that is created when government policies are seen as ineffectual in stopping unwanted migration. See C. Rudolf "Globalization and Security: Migration and Evolving Conceptions of Security in Statecraft and Scholarship", *op. cit.*, p. 22.
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 24. *Ibid.*, p. 433.
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 27. Irregular migration is taken here as migrant influxes circumventing the regulations of destination countries on entry, residence and employment. It includes both people legally entering with a passport, a visa or a student permit but then overstaying the legal period of stay, and people entering in an unauthorized way of illegal points of entry.
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51. By accelerating and amplifying the phenomenon of irregular migration, traffickers of migrants undermine governmental rules of entry, asylum and immigration procedures. In the 1990's Southern Europe became a major 'pole of attraction' for migrant traffickers, both as transit area and as a destination region. Immigrants are smuggled into Greece, mainly from Albania, Turkey, Bulgaria and FYROM (Former Republic of Macedonia). Turkey is becoming a major transit country for Iranians, Iraqis, Pakistanis, South-Asians and African irregular migrants desperately wanting to enter Western Europe. In recent years Greece has increased coast-guard patrols and have mobilised their armies in order to restore effective control at their borders against the inflows of clandestine immigrants transported by human smugglers.
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55. M. Weiner, "Introduction: Security, Stability and International Migration", *op. cit.*, p. 8.
56. M. Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 448.
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The Media and Foreign Policy: The Case of Greece

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine comment les médias grecs peuvent influencer le processus d'élaboration de la politique extérieure grecque. L'auteur applique le «modèle d'interaction médiatique de la politique» proposé par Robinson afin d'identifier et souligner les conditions dans lesquelles les médias influencent la politique extérieure. Pour ce faire il examine la crise greco-turque entourant la prospection en vue de localiser d'éventuels gisements de pétrole (1987), la crise d'Imia (1996), le sommet d'Helsinki (1999), la guerre de Kosovo (1999) et la question «Macédonienne». Une série d'importantes questions est également posée: comment et pourquoi le processus décisionnel et la culture politique de la Grèce permettent-ils aux médias de dominer la sphère publique lorsqu'il s'agit de questions nationales, des crises et des problèmes avec les voisins? Comment les médias comprennent et véhiculent le sens de l'action en politique étrangère? Comment les médias déterminent et construisent les questions nationales, européennes et internationales?

ABSTRACT

This article examines when and how the media in Greece can influence the foreign policymaking process. It applies Robinson's policy media interaction model in order to specify the conditions under which the media may play a limited or significant role in foreign policy. In so doing, it examines the Greek-Turkish oil-drilling crisis (1987), the Imia crisis (1996), the Helsinki Summit (1999), the war in Kosovo (1999) and the Macedonian issue. The following key questions are asked: How and why the decisionmaking process and political culture of Greece allow the media to dominate the public sphere on "national issues", crises and problems with neighbors? How do the media understand and mediate the meaning of action in foreign policy? How do the media determine and construct national, European and international issues?

Introduction

In recent years there has been considerable debate regarding the ability of the media to influence the course of Greek foreign policy. Some maintain that

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through the proliferation of newspapers and the deregulation and liberalization of the television and radio market¹, the media have been dislodged from the traditional role of official vehicle providing information on foreign and international news². According to the argument, the media have become a significant medium, operating as the main provider of information to the public. However, they are not restricted to reporting and covering issues only; instead they preserve an autonomous role by determining and constructing the context in which the foreign issues are discussed³.

To a certain extent, the above remarks are not far from reality. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the media have become key actors in defining the priorities of politicians and decisionmakers in foreign policy. The final responsibility for the direction of foreign policy still rests with the government. Yet, the media have become an important component of the domestic and international environment which politicians and decisionmakers within any country need to consider as they develop policy. As it is rightly argued, the media may deligitimize decisions by becoming extremely critical. They can also alter the agenda of foreign policy by intentionally focusing attention on particular issues while ignoring others. They may also oblige the government under the pressure of time to develop contradictory and incorrect policies⁴.

Given this context, the central task of this article is twofold: first, examine *when* and *how* the media in Greece influence the foreign policy process, and second, understand *how* and *why* the decisionmaking process and political culture of Greece allows the media to dominate the public sphere on national issues, crises and problems with neighbours. Accordingly, the first section briefly outlines the international debate on the role of the media in foreign policy and presents the theoretical model which will guide our discussion of the Greek case.

Theoretical Foundations

The debate over “[...] *the extent to which the media serves the interests of the decisions makers, or alternatively plays a powerful role in shaping outcomes, is characterized by dichotomous and one-sided claims*”⁵. Many analysts would argue that the proliferation of new communication technologies have changed the way the media influence foreign policy. The technologies provide them with considerable power in shaping, defining and determining policy responses to foreign and international events. Such views have found support in the discussion of the “*CNN effect*” and, in particular, over the ability of global communication networks to provide a constant flow of news⁶. Their

underlying assumption is that the news can make foreign policy.

Other analysts maintain that the mass media have little or no influence on the formation of foreign policy. Journalists, it is argued, operate within the governmental boundaries of foreign policy coverage and are inclined to support the stated foreign policy objectives. Governments and decisionmakers are the main source of information to the media, controlling the content of foreign news, as well as the direction of foreign policy. Political élites impel journalists and the media to understand foreign and global news in a particular way. The media, therefore, have no other role than to “manufacture consent”, functioning primarily to secure support for the policy decisions of the dominant élites⁷.

No one can deny that governments control the flow of information available and that they bear the responsibility of their decisions. Yet, it is also very difficult to deny the impact of the media on the foreign policy process. Reality demonstrates that the role of the media in foreign policy is more complex. Indeed, the media not only provide decisionmakers with opportunities to advance their goals but also constrain them⁸.

Piers Robinson in an attempt to move beyond the simple dichotomy of the debate has developed the *policy media interaction model*. His model provides a two-way understanding of the relationship between the media and decisionmakers while specifying four conditions under which the media may play a limited or significant role in foreign policy. These conditions assert that⁹:

1. When there is governmental, political and societal consensus over an issue, the media are unlikely to produce coverage that challenges that consensus. In this case, the media operate within the “sphere of consensus” and their coverage reflects that consensus. They remain uncritical and help build support for official policy.
2. When there is governmental/political dissensus with respect to an issue, media coverage reflects the debate between politicians, decision makers and society. The media operates within the “sphere of legitimate controversy” and what we observe is a variety of critical and supportive framing in news reports.
3. When society/public opinion is opposed to the government’s policy, media coverage becomes critical. The media pressures the government to change policy and acquires the potential to begin playing a more active and influential role in the policy debate. If however, there is a high level of policy certainty within the government and political élite, the government will draw upon its substantial resources and credibility to manipulate the media and public opinion.

4. If policy uncertainty in government is combined with political élite dissensus and strong opposition from society, the media can influence policy outcomes. The media may take sides in the political debate; hence coverage may become extremely critical of the government. The media can become active participants so that policy-makers feel pressured to respond with a policy or else face a public relations disaster.

The above model goes some way in reconciling the contrasting claims of the debate. It also contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the interaction between the media and policy-makers on any given policy process. It provides, therefore, an excellent starting point to examine the Greek case¹⁰. In applying this model, the Greek-Turkish oil-drilling crisis of 1987 and the “Macedonian” issue will be examined in relation to the first condition, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 will serve as an example of the second condition; the war of Kosovo in 1999, for the third condition, and the crisis of Imia in 1996, for the fourth condition. The following three questions will also be asked throughout:

- 1) given Greece’s decisionmaking process, how do the media understand and mediate the meaning of action in foreign policy?
- 2) given Greece’s populist political culture, how do the media determine and construct national, European and international issues?
- 3) lastly, are the media a crucial actor in influencing the national and European identity?

The Greek-Turkish Oil-drilling Crisis

In March 1987, Greece and Turkey went to the brink of war over mineral rights in the Aegean Sea. It all began when the Greek government tabled a bill to take control of the Canadian North Aegean Petroleum Company that exploited the Prinos oilfield off the Greek island of Thasos. Turkey accused Greece of having violated the Bern Protocol of 1976 and as a result granted exploration and exploitation licences to the state owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation in international waters near the Greek island of Samothrace. On March 28, the Turkish survey ship *Sismik* under military naval escort set sail for the Aegean Sea, and Greek and Turkish ships were placed under alert.

The Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, responded with determined moves that increased the credibility of the war threat. He declared that all necessary measures would be taken to safeguard Greece’s sovereign rights. He also accused NATO, in particular the USA, as responsible for the crisis and ordered the suspension of the communication facilities at the

American base at Nea Makri. The Greek foreign minister was dispatched to Sofia to consult with the Bulgarian President Tudor Jivkov and the ambassadors of the Warsaw Pact countries in Athens were briefed in advance of their NATO counterparts. In the end, the threat of hostilities were averted when Turkish Prime Minister Ozal declared that the *Sismik* would operate only in Turkish territorial waters. Likewise, Greece declared that no drilling would take place in disputed waters¹¹.

During this crisis, all of the Greek media adopted what has been termed a "cooperative function"¹², and supported the dominant post-1974 position of the Greek government and society towards the so-called Turkish provocations. Media discourse was in line with the government's definition of the situation, informed and influenced by the government's choices¹³. In particular, the Greek media, with very few instances from the newspapers of the opposition, appeared to be closely linked to the policy of the government. They supported the possibility of resorting to military means, spoke of *Zero Hour* and warned Turkey not to play with fire. Their content was dramatic, evoking feelings of insecurity, danger, threat and national unity. The Turkish state was characterized as "neo Ottoman" and "expansionist", with "military designs" on the Greek islands in the Aegean.

This alignment with the government's decisive stance may arguably be justified as a patriotic duty, or the rallying behind the flag phenomenon. Over the years, however, the media have played a major role not only by "manufacturing consent", legitimizing the claims and nationalist positions of the Greek governments, but also by contributing to the construction of an aggressive and inflexible position. By concentrating only on the threatening statements and actions of the *Other*, the media have not allowed for any type of retreat or for a serious consideration of the factors that could lead to the resolution of the Greek-Turkish differences. As the Anan Plan in 2004 indicates (see below), negotiated and conciliatory approaches have become more difficult as a result of hard line positions expressed by the media. The media both reflect and feed public opinion, creating a vicious circle concerning the perception of the Other. They perpetuate and reinforce the tension of the conflict by putting considerable pressure on the government to "act tough"¹⁴.

The Macedonian Issue

In the early 1990s, a consensus developed among the government, policy-makers and society based on the position that the newly independent and neighbouring country (then referred to as Skopja), should not be

diplomatically recognized by Greece, the European Union and the international community if it decided to use the name “Macedonia” or any other derivative. According to public opinion polls of 1992-1993, 73% to 91% of the respondents supported this position¹⁵.

The media supported and reinforced this position. According to a study of the Greek newspapers for the period 1991-1993, 71% of the articles examined adopted a rigid ethnocentric and nationalist line¹⁶. In particular, FYROM was referred to as a small, inferior political entity that should not enjoy the full rights of sovereignty and self-determination, a “statelet” or “pseudostate” (κροατίδιο). The inhabitants were described with terms connoting poverty, such as “barefoot” (ξυπόλυτοι) or “*gipsy skopjeans*”. Through the presentation of maps (according to which large parts of Northern Greece were represented as part of FYROM’s territory-published by the nationalist political parties (VMRO) of FYROM) the “enemy” was also represented as a homogenous entity determined to deprive Greece of its territory¹⁷.

Such coverage, however, cannot be explained only by the fact that the media could not deviate from the feeling of national unity towards the “danger”. In many ways this consensus was constructed. The Greek government was under pressure to abide by the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty (reduction of the public deficit/debt, privatization of major Greek state-owned companies) and, therefore, strategically used the name issue to divert public attention from the painful consequences of its economic policies¹⁸. This issue also coincided with the liberalization of the media market in Greece further heightened by the desire of certain powerful media groups to penetrate various forms of entrepreneurial activities and circles of political power. Given public sensitivity to the Macedonian issue, the government could not disregard the media, which often pressured by ignoring basic rules of journalistic ethics¹⁹.

In this context of power relations, the government diverted Greece from its real foreign policy priorities at the end of the Cold War. By insisting on the name issue, Greece became part of the Balkan problem and created difficulties for the European Union’s policy towards the Balkan region, as the EU “[...] *was not used as a means to the logic of Europeanization for Greek foreign policy but, rather, as a place where European foreign policy could cater for Greek foreign policy demands*”²⁰. This also had an impact on how the European Union was presented and understood by the public. In the mid-1990s, the European Union was seen no longer as a guarantor of peace and democracy but rather as a threat to Greece’s national identity and national interest²¹. On the other hand, by affirming and multiplying the inclinations and expectations of the

Greek public, the media cultivated insecurity for Greece was supposedly under threat from its neighbouring countries. Such coverage created insurmountable limits to decisionmakers. Politicians who expressed the need of an alternative policy, one of negotiation on the name of the neighbouring country, were characterized as submissive²². Today, despite the détente in Greece's relations with FYROM, the name issue remains far from resolved.

The Helsinki Summit

At the Helsinki Summit of the European Union (10-11 December, 1999) Greece lifted its veto and Turkey acquired candidate status on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria (democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the protection of minorities). The Greek government, and in particular Prime Minister Costas Simitis, insisted on this policy change by arguing that it would shift the Greek-Turkish rivalry to a European level²³. Turkey's "socialization" to the EU's political system, it was stressed, would also decrease the likelihood of Ankara using or threatening violence to press its claims against Greece²⁴. The opposition, in particular Costas Karamanlis (leader of New Democracy), however, adopted a different position. It accused the government of selling out national interests and characterized this policy change as a major retreat and defeat of fixed Greek foreign policy.

Yet the government and policy-makers were set on this course of action and could not be influenced to alter direction. NATO's intervention in Kosovo and the continuous instability in Southeastern Europe highlighted the need for an end to antagonism between the two pivotal states of the region (Greece and Turkey). In addition, the solidarity which had developed between the people of the two countries after the devastating earthquakes of 1999 did yield some positive results in promoting *low-politics cooperation* and in initiating proximity talks between the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus²⁵. These incidents were covered extensively by the Greek media, especially during and after the earthquake in Istanbul. Special emphasis was placed upon the manifestation of friendship between the two countries. The impact on Greek public opinion is reflected in a poll conducted by the newspaper *Ta Nea* (December 12, 1999): 57.5% of the respondents had a more positive stance for the Turks and 51.1% believed in a positive change in Greek-Turkish relations²⁶.

In this context, the government was able to control and pursue its agenda, allowing little room for the media to pursue an active and critical role. The media reflected the reference frames of the debate and became promoters of the

policy preferences of the two sides, government and opposition²⁷. The right-wing papers and “*Eleftheros Typos*” and “*Adesmeftos Typos*” in particular, reported that the agreement was the “*Waterloo*” of Greek diplomacy, as the government relinquished Greece’s national interests, “*sold*” the Aegean and enhanced the division of Cyprus. Turkey was presented as antidemocratic, an underdeveloped, economically and socially, Islamic state, that would not adjust to European standards. Knowing this Ankara had no interest to abandon its “*expansionist*” designs and engage in a serious negotiation with Greece.

The centre-left media and in particular the newspapers (*Ta Nea*, *To Vima* and *Eleftherotypia*), which had supported the government of PASOK, welcomed the Helsinki agreement as a success of Greek foreign policy. The agreement, according to their reports, underlined the European dimension of Greek foreign policy. Greece, it was argued, achieved a diplomatic victory that met all the conditions placed on the bargaining table by the Prime Minister. The agreement was also perceived as a positive step in the improvement of bilateral economic relations and the gradual elimination of negative stereotypes between the two countries. It was also stressed that Greece had every interest in facilitating Turkey’s European prospects and in so doing would also elevate all those Turkish democratic actors, European actors and forces.

Such reports certainly contributed to cultivating a positive image of the European Union and justified the shift of foreign policy initiated by Costas Simitis. At the same time, however, they also revealed how deficient the Greek media was. Up until the Helsinki Summit, the dominant media position was that the European Union was on Ankara’s side, pressuring Athens to lift its veto so as to eventually allow Brussels to admit Turkey as a full member. A position that failed to explain how and why after Helsinki the “traditional” and “long-time” European allies of Ankara had become extremely cautious and negative regarding Turkey’s admission. This ethnocentric and contradictory manner generally pervades media discourse and journalistic practice in Greece and does not allow the public to understand the complexities surrounding international and European politics. Moreover, it influences, as we shall examine below, the ways the media understand and present issues concerning national and European identity.

The War in Kosovo

The NATO air attacks, as an instrument of force against Serbia to terminate the abuse of the Albanian population in Kosovo and supported by a significant part of the international community, were received much differently in Greece.

According to several opinion polls, over 95% of the population was against the war. Other opinion polls showed that 91% of the Greeks declared themselves “not at all satisfied” with the position of the European Union and 94.4% had a negative view of President Clinton²⁸.

Key to the climate of strong disagreement was the role of the Greek media. The main topical concerns that dominated the Greek media coverage did not differ from the foci in other international media (media stories or analyses around the issues of military operations and refugees). The framing of the news and interpretations of developments, however, were different²⁹. Putting aside their ideological and political inclinations, the Greek newspapers collectively condemned the “humanitarian” rationale of the NATO bombings³⁰. Television coverage portrayed them as a manifestation of Western and NATO aggression. There was an ongoing preoccupation with visual teasers announcing dramatic footage and documents that proved NATO “atrocities”³¹. In general, the Greek media rejected the actual logic of NATO, which claimed that the bombings were a necessary tool for protecting the Kosovo-Albanian population against Serbian aggression. NATO, it was stressed, was fighting an “unjust war” against a weaker military country. Integral to Greek media anti-war advocacy was also the extensive announcement and coverage of protest demonstrations in many parts of the country. The frequently live broadcast coverage of numerous protest marches and concerts, organized by worker’s unions, activist groups and the Greek Orthodox Church, demonstrated a united front³².

Despite such coverage, the media were not able to influence the official government line. The Greek government was by no means pro-war, as it constantly advocated diplomacy as opposed to military action. Nonetheless, and according to Prime Minister Costas Simitis, it was also clear that participation in NATO implied obligations which the country had to fulfill. The government -as well as the Greek Conservative Party- supported the view that Greece was right not to veto the decision of NATO to bomb Serbia. The main concern was to promote Greek interests and the only way to do so was to support every unanimous decision made by the allies. The government’s slogan at the time was that “Greece comes first”³³. According to Theodore Pangalos, the foreign minister at the time, “[...] *Greece had more important issues to think of for the sake of its own national interests, namely the problem of Cyprus. A country cannot pose two vetoes at the same time. It would have been like trying to carry two water melons under the same arm*”³⁴.

At the same time, with a crisis in Greece’s backyard, the government and the

political élite felt that anti-Americanism could work as a uniting factor. Therefore, despite the argument that Greece's obligation was to support NATO, the majority of the Greek political community denounced the war by developing the following arguments. Firstly, that it was against the dogma of preserving the *status quo* in the region. Any alternation of borders, it was stressed, would not only create a large number of refugees, but could also encourage territorial claims by neighboring countries³⁵. Secondly, that the USA were responsible for the war in Kosovo and not Milosevic. The allied bombing of Serbia, it was argued, was another opportunity for Washington to throw its weight around the global arena. Costas Simitis acknowledged NATO's role as guarantor of European Security but at the same time he pointed out that he would not like to see NATO extending its influence beyond Europe and becoming a global policeman. Karolos Papoulias accused the USA of undermining European integration, by creating sources of instability in the Balkans. Costas Karamanlis, then leader of the opposition, argued that the USA would from now on feel free to invade any country in any part of the world, in the name of protecting human rights³⁶.

Such positions, as Elizabeth Tsakona rightly argues justified the government's ambivalent position. In "[...] *that sense it could be said that America was the scapegoat for the government's inability to deal decisively with the situation in Kosovo. On the one hand Greece was a full member of NATO and the European Union, on the other hand it was so adjacent to the crisis that the threat of a spill-over was imminent*"³⁷. The important issue, however, is that the awkward balance between the national sentiment of resentment against NATO and the country's commitment to its alliance duties, reinforced the media's and the public's selective and biased position – empathy with the Serbs not with the Kosovars. Of course, this was not something new, as it repeated a pre-existing pattern of media coverage of the wars in the Balkans. As a result of the Orthodox faith that Greeks share with the Serbs, media reports were much more concentrated on the Serbs' ordeals than on the Croats' and Bosnian-Muslim's losses³⁸. Prior to the Kosovo crisis, the media had also created moral panics in news items regarding the formation of the "Islamic arc" to the north and east of Greece. In addition, reports on the Islamization of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were also frequent. ANT1, a private television station, presented the refusal of the religious leader of the Bosnian Muslims to meet with the Serb Patriarch in Sarajevo as an act of intransigence. The Greek Public Broadcast Corporation (ET1) associated the Bosnian government with Saudi Arabia. It featured reports of Bosnian Muslims, including the republic's president, traveling for the annual *hadj* to

Mecca, emphasizing that all their expenses were paid by Saudi Arabia³⁹.

During the Kosovo crisis the media did not discuss the massacres committed by the Serbs. Neither was the moral obligation of every human being to prevent it ever discussed. No mention was made of the fact that Belgrade controlled and manipulated the flow of information. All those actors who stood against Milosevic, the opposition, the intellectuals, the students and the workers' unions, were not worthy of consideration by the Greek media⁴⁰. Instead, the Greek media chose to represent and act in the name of all those diverse elements of Greek society (right-wing parties, left-wing parties, religious and cultural groups), which took the form of a united front, an "Unholy Alliance"⁴¹ against the invasive and imperialistic forces behind the NATO bombings. Given the country's experiences (Junta 1967-1974, Cyprus 1974) the readers and audiences in Greece may have felt comfortable with reports against the USA and NATO. The question, however, was not only NATO. In Europe and other parts of the world, many were the journalists, newspapers and television stations that disagreed with the bombings. In so doing, however, they did not disregard the massacres committed by the Serbs. The Greek position facilitated the construction of a national identity dissociated from the European values of pluralism and freedom⁴². It is also indicative, as shall be argued in the last section of this paper, of the populist political culture of Greece and the introvert way that media treats and covers European and international news.

The Imia Crisis

The crisis over the islet of Imia in 1996 is "[...] *in retrospect, a ridiculous but most convincing example of how the media brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war*"⁴³. The cause triggering the crisis occurred on December 25, 1995, when the Turkish cargo boat the *Figen Akat* ran aground on the islet. The captain of the Turkish vessel refused assistance from Greek authorities claiming that he was within Turkish territorial waters. It was only on December 28 that the boat was finally freed and towed to the Turkish port of Gulluk with the aid of a Greek salvage company, and only after a continuous exchange of verbal notes between the Greek and Turkish authorities. Following that, on December 29, a verbal note was sent to the Greek embassy in Ankara by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, claiming that the islet constituted part of Turkey's territory. This move initiated a silent exchange of verbal notes between the two countries. In fact for a month the two sides remained engaged in a silent dispute regarding the status of the islet⁴⁴.

This silence indicated that both foreign ministries considered the matter minor and unworthy of public opinion. However, the diplomatic activities of both countries were aired by the Greek commercial TV station ANT1 on January 24, 1996. This “revelation”, it could be argued, was a consequence of the change of government in Athens. The moderate and reformist Costas Simitis won the election in PASOK’s parliamentary group to succeed ailing Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister. The loser, Gerasimos Arsenis, then Minister of Defense, as well as the opposition New Democracy, had converging reasons to challenge the new Prime Minister on what they considered his soft, conciliatory approach to Turkey and international relations. That the matter was first revealed by a pro-New Democracy channel and that the PASOK Mayor of Kalymnos (an island next to Imia), known for his leanings towards Arsenis rushed to plant the Greek flag on Imia on January 25, provided crucial concurring evidence⁴⁵.

All this was not enough to bring the two countries to the verge of war. Only when the Turkish side responded did matters get worse. The newspaper *Hurriyet* with a team of journalists and photographers arrived on the island, asking the mayor to remove the Greek flag and hoist the Turkish one⁴⁶. The action took place, and of course *Hurriyet* could not refrain from triumphantly publishing the photograph of the journalists removing the Greek flag on its front page the very next day. To which the Greek media replied. In particular, the Greek TV stations intercepted from the Turkish channels the episode with the flag and showed it tens of times to the Greek public with the following humiliating and war-mongering statements: “we lost the flag”, “they took our flag”. Turkish actions were reported using direct war vocabulary. The Turkish journalists’ activity on the islet, for example, was characterized as “landing”, “invasion” and “agents’ assault”⁴⁷.

Greek artists, intellectuals, academics, politicians and former officers of the Greek armed forces, were asked to express their opinion on televised and live shows. A famous actress went so far as to donate her jewelry to the Greek Navy! It is also reported that a journalist requested the leadership of the Greek Navy not to undertake any operations in the night, as that would not allow his station to have clear pictures of the hostilities in the Aegean!⁴⁸ All this created a psychosis of war and continuous appeals for aggressive and heroic acts – “Let’s answer with new Thermopylae, Marathons and Salamines”, “Ciller for Imia? We for Constantinople”⁴⁹, “Ciller threatens us with war, Ciller wants 1,000 islands”, “We must be armed to the teeth, the Turks understand no other language”, “We will answer Tsouler [slight change of Ciller’s name to remind

the reader/viewer of 'tsoula', meaning 'hussy' in Greek], "If the Tourkalades want, they should come and take them. We are ready for war, how do they humiliate us?", wrote the newspapers and reported the TV stations⁵⁰.

As a result, the government was suddenly faced with an unexpected dispute that the media portrayed as crucial. Moreover the government was expected to react promptly in order to save the nation's pride. Lacking an official agenda and troubled by the ongoing inner party disputes of PASOK, Costas Simitis responded by ordering the Greek Navy to change the flag. In Turkey, Prime Minister Ciller, head of new coalition government after tough negotiations, also picked up the issue and adjusted it to her own interests. In statements to the Turkish media she declared that there are 1,000 to 3,000 islets in the Aegean that are part of the Turkish territory. The Turkish media reinforced this policy line. "Not only nine pallikaria [Greek for brave young men], but the whole of whole Greece will get a slap in the face if it goes there [to Imia]", "Turkey can overwhelm Greece in 72 hrs", wrote the Turkish papers⁵¹.

By January 31, the Greek and Turkish Naval forces stood opposite each other in the Aegean. A group of Turkish people landed on the islet opposite Imia and a Greek helicopter had crashed into the sea costing the life of one pilot. Fortunately enough, however, the media did not have overall control of the crisis, due to the entrance of the USA which prevented the situation from escalating into a military showdown between the two countries. The USA government, as it is rightly argued, "[...] *proved more influential on the policy lines followed by the two governments. That was because, despite the increasing pressure the media put on the two actors regarding the cost they would have if they withdrew, the cost of the information conveyed by the USA was much greater, threatening the two actors about the costly consequences they would have in case of a war*"⁵².

This crisis constitutes, however, a perfect example of those factors that make the media a powerful actor in the policy process. Not only did they operate as a constraining factor, disrupting the silent diplomatic process⁵³ but judging from the way they presented and framed the issue, they also pursued a protagonist role⁵⁴. When in December 1995 the diplomats of the two countries were exchanging silent routine notes, no one seemed to believe or even realize that this event would prove serious enough to bring the two states to the brink of war. By triggering and putting the issue on the policy agenda, by transforming it into a public spectacle and *thriller* and by aggravating the dispute, the media did not allow for dialogue and cooperation. They put considerable pressure on both governments to react "tough" [sic] in a conflict that carried a special danger

of escalation. But there will not always be a Bill Clinton and his telephone, instructing the leaders of both countries to calm down.

Concluding Remarks on the Greek Case⁵⁵

Taken together, the above case studies illustrate that *policy certainty is a major factor in determining whether or not the media can influence the process of foreign policy*. As shown through the Imia crisis, when there is no policy certainty (combined with political dissensus and strong opposition from society), media influence will not only disrupt the policy process, but will also direct the policy agenda and dominate the discourse of the public sphere. When there is policy certainty, as in case of the oil drilling crisis, the media will pursue no active role. It will rally behind the flag thus supporting the position and claims of the government.

Furthermore, the examples given above show *that when the government and policy-makers are determined to pursue a particular action, they are unlikely to be influenced by the critical coverage of the media and the opposition of society*. This is clear in the Kosovo war, where the government and political community of the country strategically manipulated the discourse of the media and society to promote its ambivalent position⁵⁶. It is also clear in the Helsinki Summit, where despite the skepticism and criticism of opposition parties, the media was not able to pursue an influential role. Rather, the media took sides on the debate surrounding this important shift and landmark of Greek foreign policy.

Lastly, we see *that media influence is not only greatest when it is extremely critical* (Imia, Kosovo), *but also when it is framed in such a way as to multiply the perceptions and expectations of the public* (Macedonian issue). In Greece, this has led to the reproduction and reinforcement of ethnocentric and nationalist discourse, sustaining a representation of Greece as being a nation under threat from the EU, the NATO alliance and the USA, and from its neighboring countries (Turkey, FYROM). The media contribute to the aggravation and perpetuation of tension, and the cultivation of a siege mentality that “[...] makes Greeks defensive and oversensitive, which helps exaggerate risks and turn them into threats”⁵⁷. Greek governments, as result, not only remain under pressure from what is on the media agenda, but also fear to pursue and accept negotiated and conciliatory solutions to long-standing problems as they involve a loss of face. A good example in this direction was provided by the Annan Plan (2004) for the settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

As in the case of the Imia crisis, the absence of a clear and determined stance in the newly elected government of New Democracy, as well as the dissensus

that characterized the political community of Greece (George Papandreou favoured acceptance of the plan), allowed the media to dominate the public sphere. The negotiations in Switzerland were reported as a victory for Turkey. "Turks and Turkish Cypriots celebrate," wrote the Greek papers. In this context the rejection of the Annan Plan was projected as "inevitable". "National unity" was considered essential in face of "imperialist plans" (EU and USA) and the "Turkish danger". Turkish-Cypriot positions were not presented and Greek-Turkish arguments were praised in accordance with international law. Even the media with center-left inclinations came in sharp contrast with the position of PASOK. *Eleftherotypia*, for example, wrote on the "Holy Case" of Cyprus and reported of "agony and disappointment in Greek Cyprus"⁵⁸.

Such coverage not only influenced and defined public response (65-70% against the plan according to public opinion polls of the time), but also repeated the discourse on the Cyprus issue that has dominated in Greece since 1974. According to this discourse, any third party intervention (the UN, EU or USA) should take into consideration and justify only the claims of the Greek side, rejecting the arguments and "truths" of the Turkish side⁵⁹. This logic, combined with the negative, sensational and dramatic media reporting, explains the reaction of the Greek public which saw its long nourished expectations and anticipations collapse in the face of diplomatic reality. This reality, however, is not only the result of the principles governing foreign and international news coverage, but also the product of Greece's deficient decisionmaking system which is combined with a certain populist political culture that refuses to bear the political cost. If we ignore this reality, we remain unable to understand fully why the media have directed and dominated the public sphere on "national" issues, crises and problems with neighbors.

As Professor Ioakimidis has rightly argued, the absence of effective and legitimized mechanisms for the design and implementation of Greek foreign policy allows for the predominance of political personalities (prime minister/foreign minister) in the decisionmaking process. As a result, the exercise of foreign policy is also largely motivated by the need of maximizing electoral impact and popularity. Public opinion, therefore, becomes a fundamental source of decisions and priorities, facilitating the adoption of inflexible and irrational positions (for example, the embargo on the FYROM). This not only leads to antagonism and alienation with the country's allies, but also does not allow public opinion to accept negotiated solutions and conciliatory compromises. It effectively multiplies the perception of a country under siege from external pressure while not allowing the government and the policy-makers to evaluate their priorities. They thus lose the initiative,

become reactive, driven by impulses, public opinion and demagoguery⁶⁰.

Under such conditions, the media are encouraged by the general disappointment of public opinion, as well as their commercial motives, and promote a highly nationalistic perspective. Claiming that they represent the national sentiment and collective consciousness of the nation, the media adjust their coverage and framing to the dominant, popular and comfortable views and perceptions of society⁶¹. Journalists and owners of media conglomerates fear that if they adopt an alternative position, one that differs from the rigid and closed ethnocentric ideas and norms of the public, it will be rejected by the viewers and audiences⁶². Suffering as they do from “introversion”, few are the correspondents the Greek media assign to report from international organizations. Not surprisingly, there is no in-depth research and analysis of today’s international developments and complex problems. Journalists are asked to translate and reproduce foreign texts and reports. Traveling abroad is not encouraged as it is considered costly and useless. Such journalistic practices and commercial anxieties, however, not only reinforce the reactionary defensiveness and victimization mentality of the Greek public, but also its ambiguity towards European and international affairs. No where is this clearer than on the perceptions regarding Greece’s position in the European Union.

Greece in general has a pro-EU profile, as presented by the *Eurobarometer* over the last ten years. Yet therein lies a paradox. All findings illustrate that loyalty to Greece comes first. The symbolic cultural elements of Greek identity score very high; whereas, the corresponding elements for identification with Europe score very low⁶³. According to opinion polls, 50% to 60% of the respondents feel that within the EU Greece’s identity is endangered⁶⁴. Greece’s pro-EU profile is mainly linked to the social and economic benefits of the country’s membership. It is also linked to the insecurity of the Greek public and political community towards the so-called threat of Turkey. The European Union is perceived as a “security umbrella”, a reality that gives rise to contradictory positions towards the admission of Turkey. According to an opinion poll from October-November 2005, only 28.8% of the respondents were in favour of Turkish admission. At the same time, however, 55% declared that with Turkey in the European Union Greece would be “safer”. It is also interesting to note that in a opinion poll of June 2005, 19.6% of the respondents declared that they would, if given the opportunity, vote against the European Constitutional Treaty so as to prevent the admission of Turkey. Before the elections for the European Parliament in June 2004, two months after the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek-Cypriots, 70.6% of those surveyed also declared

that they were highly disappointed with the policy of the EU on Cyprus⁶⁵.

The Greek media also represent the European Union in the same way. Very little importance is given to the values on which the European Union project rests or should rest⁶⁶. In most cases the interests of the nation are the dominant factor in the political and media discourse⁶⁷. The press comments more on the “national interest” in relation to the events or matters of the European Union and the television concentrates on sensational events, e.g., demonstrations during European Summits⁶⁸. The Greek public is thus ill-informed of events and developments in the European Union, as illustrated by the contradictory and ethnocentric 2003 positions of the Greek public towards the enlargement process. According to a 2003 opinion poll, some 52% of the respondents declared that enlargement would strengthen the European Union; 55% said that it would weaken the decision making system of the European Union; 69% stated that it would provide new markets to Greek products; 71% said that it would open the doors to immigrants; 56% thought that it would create many problems for Greek agriculture; 57% said that it would reduce the amount of economic assistance Greece received and 44% asserted that Greeks would find it difficult to work in the new member countries of the European Union⁶⁹.

All of the above are quite disquieting given Greece’s challenges in the twenty-first century. Firstly, as Professor Couloumbis argues, the Aegean, Cyprus and “Macedonia” are not Greece’s only national issues. The refinement of the country’s public sector, the improvement of its educational system and the elimination of corruption, are also extremely important national issues. Indeed the “treatment” of these issues will make a difference between a Greece which finds itself relegated to the margins of the European Union and a Greece which strives and eventually reaches the European average⁷⁰.

Secondly, on all issues of Greek foreign policy there is a significant gap between what Greece can achieve on the basis of international legal norms and geopolitical realities and what is expected by public opinion. Nothing is being done to reduce this discrepancy. The government, the broader political community and the media have made no effort to discuss and explain the country’s realistic options, the need for conciliatory compromises and what those imply. Greek citizens need to know before they take a position⁷¹. Only in that way may the lack of confidence and political will that characterizes the decisionmakers in dealing firmly with national issues be overcome. Greece’s national issues cannot appropriately be handled through the use of inflexible and rigid positions nor with the hope that the future holds something “good for us”. This is how Greece dealt with Macedonia and Cyprus in the past and it did not “win”.

Given the new geopolitical environment gradually and steadily developing around Greece, in the Balkans (Kosovo), Turkey (Kurdish minority) and the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria), decisionmakers need to develop alternative versions and scenarios of foreign policy. They need to be more constructive and in so doing re-examine the way in which they have dealt Greece's foreign policy issues over the past three decades. The formulation of a flexible and effective foreign policy should be a continuous process of analysis and re-examination of not only new developments but also the basic parameters according to which Greece has developed its foreign policy. In today's rapidly changing world, in addition to military power and membership in regional and global alliances, *self-knowledge* and *self criticism* are basic prerequisites for success⁷². By working in this direction, Greek citizens will be able to overcome their victimization syndrome and the incompatibility between their preceived reality and perceptions of global politics. Greece enjoys the benefits that are secured by the preponderance of the West and also has benefited from being a member of the European Union⁷³. Greece needs to acknowledge this reality. Indeed, if Greece wants to secure its rights, the country must enhance and upgrade its international role, position and capabilities as well as promote effectively its national interests through active participation and intervention in global politics.

In a turbulent world, where the global agenda is so complex and multifaceted, the political élite must encourage the projection and exchange of views on contemporary complex issues, as well as the creation of new frameworks for communication, cooperation and concurrence. In that sense, the Greek media should also provide multiple sources of information and multiple points of intervention. They need to project and discuss the developments of our global village, thus contributing to the creation of an informed critical citizenry by adopting a cosmopolitan perspective, acknowledging and appreciating different cultures and respecting their differences. To acquire an understanding of today's world and Greece's position within it, the media need to be sincere, yes, but also studious in order to engage in dialogue and an exchange of views. Regional and global developments should not be dealt with using the facts and ideological frames of the past. The dialogue should promote identities other than the national. What is needed is media content that will reveal different aspects of Greek and neighboring societies, including the aspirations, achievements and cultural life of their individuals' common economic, social and environmental problems⁷⁴.

Greek shares borders with countries and regions that are suffering from protracted and unpredictable crises which could affect the country's political,

social and economic position. The media should therefore be able to assess and value the complexity of these crises⁷⁵. They should benefit from the geographical position of the country and develop a constructive and intricate mechanism of correspondents and “insiders” on the assessment of the problems and crises surrounding Greece’s region. In so doing, it is important that they work to contribute to more and in-depth communication between journalists and media practitioners, reflect a more balanced view of the realities of the Other, seek a more active role by carrying out informational campaigns detailing the costs of conflicts, explore the conflicts and seek resolution and common ground while reporting, promote interaction between media gatekeepers and owners, as well as with youth, political actors and non-governmental organizations⁷⁶. The challenge might seem insurmountable but should not be ignored if Greece does not want the crises and problems of her neighbouring countries to affect her development and position negatively. Simplified, one-sided, rigid and ethnocentric approaches to foreign and international developments lead to deadlocks.

NOTES

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DOCUMENTS

Archives du Quai d'Orsay

La position française au Conseil de l'Europe face à la violation des droits de l'homme par la dictature militaire grecque (1969-1970)

Jean Catsiapis*

La France a adopté pendant la dictature des colonels grecs une attitude originale. Alors que certains pays européens, comme les Etats scandinaves, prenaient une position franchement hostile envers le régime des colonels et que les Etats-Unis, en revanche, après une première période de réserve vis-à-vis des nouvelles autorités grecques n'hésitaient pas à les soutenir activement, en particulier avec des livraisons d'armes, la France décidait d'entretenir des relations cordiales avec la junte d'Athènes. Tout en souhaitant un rétablissement de la démocratie en Grèce et en accueillant de nombreux exilés fuyant la dictature, le gouvernement français a déployé, de 1967 à 1974, une politique active de développement des relations commerciales avec ce pays. C'est grâce à cette position globalement bienveillante vis-à-vis de la dictature militaire que la France a pu bénéficier de la faveur des autorités économiques grecques désireuses de développer une coopération étroite avec les investisseurs et exportateurs de cette grande puissance européenne.

La publication ci-dessous de documents issus des archives du Quai d'Orsay permet de comprendre comment la France, lors de l'examen par le Conseil de l'Europe en 1969 et 1970 du dossier de la violation des droits de l'homme par la dictature des colonels grecs, a joué un rôle actif pour essayer d'éviter l'adoption des sanctions préparées par cette organisation internationale à l'encontre de la Grèce.

Le refus de la France de s'associer au projet de résolution suspendant la participation de la Grèce du Conseil de l'Europe

L'Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l'Europe ayant pris l'initiative de demander au Comité des ministres de statuer sur la continuation de l'appartenance de la Grèce à cette organisation, la France a choisi de s'abstenir,

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le 6 mai 1969, lorsque ce Comité a voté une résolution décidant qu'il trancherait cette question lors de sa prochaine session. Pour justifier cette attitude le ministre français des affaires étrangères en réponse à une question écrite du député Odru invoque à la fois le principe de non ingérence et les intérêts économiques de la France:

«L'attitude du gouvernement français vis-à-vis de la Grèce repose sur le respect du principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Etats. Elle est aussi dictée par notre souci de ne pas risquer de compromettre par des interventions étrangères la libéralisation progressive du régime que, bien entendu, nous souhaitons et qui a été promise par le gouvernement d'Athènes. Les relations entre les deux pays, après une période de réserve de la part de la France au lendemain du coup d'Etat de 1967, sont devenues progressivement normales. Rien ne s'opposait donc à ce que le colonel Makarezos effectue une visite en France qu'il fit du 4 au 7 juin 1969, sur l'invitation du ministre des armées à l'occasion du Salon de l'aéronautique. Quant à la vente par la France à la Grèce de quatre vedettes et de leur équipement en missiles mer-mer, il s'agit là d'un armement qui ne peut en aucune façon être utilisé dans une éventuelle épreuve de force entre le régime grec et ses opposants dont certains séjournent d'ailleurs en France, conformément aux traditions d'hospitalité de notre pays»(JO. QE. Assemblée nationale 23 août 1969, p. 2072).

Dans le document du 26 août 1969 (**Document 1**) de la Sous- Direction d'Europe méridionale où est décrite la rencontre entre le Chargé d'affaires de Grèce à Paris, M. Velissaropoulos, et le Secrétaire général du Quai d'Orsay, M. Alphand, on observe la volonté de la diplomatie française d'aider la dictature grecque à faire face aux attaques du Conseil de l'Europe. Il est ainsi indiqué dans ce texte que la France a intérêt à agir en faveur d'Athènes «au lendemain des propositions d'achat d'équipements qu'il nous ont présentées».

Le compte- rendu de l'entretien du ministre français des affaires étrangères Maurice Schumann et l'Ambassadeur de Grèce, le Général Markopouliotis du 11 novembre 1969 (**Document 2**) permet de dévoiler la volonté de Paris de mettre en échec l'exclusion projetée de la Grèce du Conseil de l'Europe. M. Schumann n'hésite pas à dénoncer «l'opinion publique française, notamment le Parlement, dont la pression pourrait s'exercer de façon gênante» et à affirmer «qu'il ne veut rien d'autre que d'aider les Grecs et ne demande qu'une chose: que ceux-ci l'aident à les aider».

A l'approche du 12 décembre 1969, date à laquelle le Comité des ministres devait se prononcer sur la suspension de la Grèce du Conseil de l'Europe, le Général Markopouliotis multiplie les pressions sur le Quai d'Orsay pour

s'assurer l'appui de la France. C'est ainsi que dans la note du 26 novembre 1969 (**Document 3**), qui décrit sa rencontre avec le Directeur de la direction des affaires politiques d'Europe, il fait part des propos de son ministre des affaires étrangères Panayiotis Pipinelis qui classe en deux catégories les Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe en fonction de leur attitude à l'égard de la Grèce: «Il y a à la vérité deux pôles: d'un côté, l'Angleterre, qui plus encore que les pays scandinaves, intrigue et fait campagne pour rallier des voix en faveur de l'exclusion d'Athènes; de l'autre, la France, autour de laquelle doivent se regrouper naturellement les pays désireux d'éviter une décision aussi préjudiciable au Conseil de l'Europe qu'à la Grèce elle-même».. D'autre part dans cette même note le Quai d'Orsay affirme qu'il lui sera difficile de soutenir que c'est à l'unanimité que le Conseil de l'Europe devrait décider de l'exclusion de la Grèce. En revanche il semble aux diplomates français plus facile de plaider en faveur de la règle de la majorité des deux-tiers pour statuer sur une telle exclusion.

Enfin le document du 29 novembre 1969 (**Document 4**), qui fait le point sur la position de la France indique

- premièrement qu'une décision de suspension de la Grèce «irait à l'encontre du but recherché et n'aurait d'autre résultat que de renforcer à Athènes les tendances les plus hostiles à une libéralisation du régime».
- deuxièmement qu'une telle décision doit être prise à la majorité des 2/3
- troisièmement que Paris s'abstiendra en cas de vote sur l'exclusion de la Grèce

Le 12 décembre 1969, la Grèce pour éviter son exclusion décide de se retirer du Conseil de l'Europe. Ce même jour le Comité des ministres après avoir reçu la notification de ce retrait adopte une résolution «considérant que la Grèce a enfreint gravement les dispositions de l'article 3 du statut du Conseil de l'Europe». La France, finalement, se résigne à voter en faveur de la résolution du 12 décembre 1969 demandant la suspension de la Grèce, Etat qui bénéficiait toutefois pendant un délai de 3 mois du droit de se maintenir dans cette organisation. Le secrétaire d'Etat français aux affaires étrangères, Jean de Lipkowski, en réponse à une question orale du sénateur Cavaillat, justifie ainsi ce vote inattendu, compte tenu de la position affichée dans le document du 29 novembre 1969:

«Le rétablissement des libertés et des institutions démocratiques en Grèce n'est pas intervenu et c'est un fait déplorable que notre organisation se doit de constater. Le texte en question, voté après que M. Pipinellis eut fait savoir que la Grèce se retirait du Conseil de l'Europe, exprimait l'intention du Conseil de

l'Europe de marquer que ce qui se passait en Grèce n'était pas compatible avec les règles de notre organisation. Nous nous sommes associés à ce texte pour les raisons que je viens d'exprimer». (JO, Sénat 27 mai 1970, p. 519).

Le refus de la France de participer au vote constatant la violation par la Grèce de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme

Une seconde procédure contre la Grèce s'est déroulée au Conseil de l'Europe dans le cadre de la convention européenne des droits de l'homme à la suite d'une plainte contre cet Etat à l'initiative du Danemark, de la Norvège, de la Suède et des Pays Bas. Le 15 avril 1970, le Comité des ministres après avoir examiné le rapport de la Commission européenne des droits de l'homme décide de condamner la Grèce et de publier ce rapport qui motive la condamnation. Dans le document publié ci-dessous reproduisant l'intervention du représentant français au Comité des Ministres insiste sur l'inefficacité d'un retrait de la Grèce (**Document 5**): «Nous nous interrogeons sur la méthode la plus propre à encourager une évolution satisfaisante de la situation en Grèce. Nous pensons qu'isoler l'Etat grec n'est pas la meilleure méthode».

Le refus français de participer au vote contre Athènes repose sur deux arguments. Le premier est juridiquement inattaquable mais politiquement inopportun. Le second est politiquement neutre mais juridiquement sans valeur:

1. La non ratification par la France de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme

Il est vrai que la France en 1969 n'avait pas encore ratifié la Convention européenne des Droits de l'homme et qu'en conséquence elle ne pouvait participer à un vote sanctionnant un Etat ayant violé cette convention. Mais en invoquant cet argument le gouvernement français prêtait évidemment le flanc aux critiques qui lui reprochaient de se refuser à ratifier ce texte. On notera, au demeurant que Paris se décidera, seulement en 1974, à procéder à la ratification de la Convention.

2. La non appartenance de la Grèce au Conseil de l'Europe

Le second argument que la France avance pour justifier son refus de participer au vote constatant la violation par la Grèce de la convention européenne des droits de l'homme repose sur le fait que ce pays s'étant retiré du Conseil de l'Europe le 12 décembre 1969 il devenait sans objet de statuer à son encontre. Cette raison invoquée par le gouvernement français pour ne pas avoir à prendre

position contre un Etat avec lequel il développe une coopération économique soutenue est juridiquement infondée. En effet, selon l'article 65 de la Convention toute dénonciation de ce texte ne prend effet qu'après un préavis de six mois. En tout état de cause la Grèce était donc soumise à la Convention jusqu'au 13 juin 1970. C'est d'ailleurs ce qu'a admis la Commission européenne elle-même, en acceptant une nouvelle requête du Danemark, de la Norvège et de la Suède contre la Grèce déposée le 10 avril 1970.

En conclusion, force est de constater que l'attitude de la France ménageant la dictature militaire grecque a été habile et efficace, même si certains ont pu la juger cynique. Paris a ainsi pu obtenir en Grèce de fortes positions économiques, qu'elle a su consolider en 1974 avec le retour de la démocratie à Athènes, rappelant alors opportunément qu'elle avait accueilli des milliers d'exilés grecs, comme Constantin Caramanlis, qui eut à cœur de pratiquer une diplomatie très pro-française.

Document 1

26 Août 1969

*Direction des Affaires Politiques
d'EUROPE*

*Sous-Direction
d'Europe Méridionale*

CONFIDENTIEL

NOTE

a.s. Initiative grecque à la Commission des
Droits de l'Homme du Conseil de l'Europe.

1) Le Chargé d'Affaires de Grèce a remis, confidentiellement, le 25 août, à M. Alphand, un document par lequel le Gouvernement grec précise les étapes suivant lesquelles il déclare avoir décidé de rétablir les libertés fondamentales. M. Velissaropoulos a indiqué au Secrétaire Général que M. Pipinelis le remettait le même jour aux membres de la sous-commission des Droits de l'Homme du Conseil de l'Europe. Cette initiative était destinée à démontrer

aux Etats ayant déposé un recours contre la Grèce devant la Commission des Droits de l'Homme la volonté des dirigeants grecs de «normaliser» progressivement leur régime. Les Grecs nous en informaient en espérant que la France contribuerait à faire cesser les attaques portées contre leur pays au Conseil de l'Europe.

Cette initiative avait été préparée dans des conditions que M. Velissaropoulos avait relatées le 21 août au Directeur d'Europe. Le Ministre grec des Affaires Etrangères avait reçu trois membres de la sous-commission des Droits de l'Homme et leur avait expliqué qu'il voulait éviter une situation telle, au niveau du Comité des Ministres, qu'il puisse en résulter des sanctions ou l'exclusion de la Grèce du Conseil de l'Europe. Cette situation ne profiterait pas à ceux qui, en Grèce comme ailleurs, souhaitent un retour à la normale. Si les membres de la sous-commission, et notamment ceux des pays requérants, peuvent donner des assurances selon lesquelles ils ne sont pas hostiles par principe à la Grèce, mais cherchent simplement à encourager ce retour à la normale, le Gouvernement grec, de son côté, leur présenterait à cet effet un programme sous forme d'un calendrier, et leur suggérerait d'autre part de charger la Croix Rouge d'enquêter sur le comportement de la police et les conditions de vie des prisonniers politiques. Les Grecs ont apparemment estimé avoir reçu, à la suite de cette ouverture, des indications suffisamment intéressantes pour que M. Pipinelis soit autorisé à remettre leur calendrier. Mais il est peut-être à noter que, lors de son entretien avec M. Alphand, le Chargé d'Affaires grec n'a plus mentionné le projet de mission confié à la Croix Rouge.

2) En première lecture, l'impression prévaut que les auteurs de ce document ont eu recours de façon trop apparente au procédé de l'emballage factice.

C'est ainsi que le premier paragraphe, qui a trait aux «aménagements» immédiats, ne paraît pas apporter de garanties sûres, ni en matière judiciaire, à cause notamment de l'exception prévue pour les tribunaux militaires, ni en matière de presse. Le paragraphe II annonce la prochaine mise en vigueur de la loi sur la presse, dont les dispositions sont connues et sont, comme on le sait, très discutées.

Les deux derniers paragraphes ont toutefois meilleure allure. Le délai fixé par le dernier est, il est vrai, à échéance lointaine (fin 1970) mais les 14 projets de loi qui y sont énumérés, depuis celui sur le secret de la correspondance jusqu'à celui sur l'élection des députés, donnent le sentiment d'un retour complet à la «normale». Le point faible en est l'absence d'indication sur le contenu de ces lois, si ce n'est la référence à la Constitution de 1968 qui, en ce qui concerne

par exemple l'indépendance des magistrats, apporte certaines garanties.

Le passage consacré par l'avant-dernier paragraphe sur la presse est encourageant dans la mesure où il paraît annoncer, pour septembre 1970 au plus tard, la révision dans un sens plus libéral de la loi actuellement en passe d'être adoptée.

Enfin, l'indication la plus positive, et qui semble fournir le meilleur argument en faveur des Grecs, est celle qui, dans ce même paragraphe, annonce le rétablissement des articles 10, 12, 111 et 112 de la Constitution, lesquels prévoient des garanties sérieuses d'ordre judiciaire.

Par ailleurs, les Grecs sont fondés à dire que la Convention européenne sur les Droits de l'Homme ne les oblige pas à s'engager à tenir des élections à une date déterminée et que le choix d'une telle date – c'est là effectivement un point communément admis – est une affaire strictement intérieure. Les représentants grecs au Conseil de l'Europe ont peut-être eu tort de donner dans le passé des assurances à cet égard, mais ces assurances ne sauraient constituer des engagements. Toutefois, il peut paraître regrettable que la mise en vigueur de la loi sur «l'élection des députés» figure à la dernière étape du calendrier, celle dont le délai expire en décembre 1970.

3) N'étant pas membres de la Commission des Droits de l'Homme, nous ne pouvons influencer directement sur ses travaux. Mais le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe, dont nous faisons partie, sera appelé à statuer sur son rapport. D'autre part, ce Comité est également saisi, par l'Assemblée Consultative, de l'affaire grecque sur le fondement de l'article 8 du statut du Conseil de l'Europe. Le rapport que la Commission des droits de l'Homme soumettra au Comité jouera son rôle dans l'attitude que prendra celui-ci sur cette seconde affaire. M. de Lipkowski avait d'ailleurs recommandé au Comité des Ministres, lors de sa précédente session, que celui-ci attende ce rapport pour statuer. Nous pouvons donc, si nous le jugeons bon, exercer une influence modératrice sur les Etats requérants à la Commission des Droits de l'Homme (Etats Scandinaves et Pays-Bas) en faisant valoir le geste de bonne volonté du Gouvernement grec et les quelques éléments positifs du document analysé ci-dessus.

Nous avons évidemment intérêt, vis-à-vis des Grecs, à le faire (et ce au lendemain des propositions d'achat d'équipements qu'il nous ont présentées).

Au-delà de cet aspect bilatéral du problème, il est exact de dire qu'un conflit au Conseil de l'Europe ne servirait pas ceux qui, en Grèce et ailleurs, souhaitent une libéralisation. L'action de M. Pipinelis, même imparfaite, mérite d'être encouragée.

Mais si nous donnions quelque appui aux Grecs, nous devrions aussi les presser de s'engager plus sérieusement. C'est d'ailleurs à cette condition que nous pourrions renforcer ceux qui, parmi eux, souhaitent l'évolution attendue de leur régime, et éviter de donner une prime aux artisans de faux-semblants. Ne pourrait-on leur suggérer de préciser certains points, d'abréger le délai prévu pour la loi sur les élections, de donner dans l'immédiat l'assurance que la législation actuelle, provisoirement maintenue, sera plus libéralement appliquée, d'accepter un assouplissement à la loi sur la presse?

Document 2

14 November 1969

S./Direction d'Europe Méridionale

COMPTE-RENDU
DE L'ENTRETIEN DU MINISTRE
AVEC M. MARKOPOULIOTIS, AMBASSADEUR DE GRECE
Le 11 November 1969

M. Markopouliotis tient à remercier M. Schumann de lui avoir accordé si rapidement une audience. Il a été appelé en consultation à Athènes et souhaitait vivement s'entretenir avec le Ministre auparavant.

M. Schumann désirait également cet entretien.

M. Markopouliotis commence par décrire la situation en Grèce, et ses perspectives d'évolution, en se bornant à l'essentiel.

Au moment de la révolution d'avril 1967, le libéralisme lui-même était en jeu, dans son pays; une intervention était donc bien nécessaire. `A présent, M. Markopouliotis est en mesure d'assurer au Ministre que c'est l'intention sincère de son gouvernement de poursuivre les objectifs suivants: garantir la sécurité nationale, promouvoir le développement de l'économie, réorganiser l'appareil administratif, asseoir la vie politique sur des bases plus saines: mettre en vigueur la Constitution adoptée par référendum en 1968. Mettre en doute à cet égard la sincérité du gouvernement grec, comme le font certains, revient à traiter de mensongères les déclarations solennelles du Premier Ministre.

Déjà, le gouvernement grec s'est engagé dans la voie qui le mènera à l'application intégrale de la Constitution. Sans entrer dans le détail, car il a préparé sur ce sujet un mémorandum à l'intention du Ministre, M. Markopouliotis rappelle que les dispositions constitutionnelles sur l'inviolabilité du domicile, les droits de réunion et d'association ont été mises en vigueur. Depuis le début de l'année, le cas de tous les détenus a été réexaminé; huit cent ont pu rejoindre leurs foyers. Après examen, la plupart des fonctionnaires de rang inférieur ou moyen qui avaient été licenciés ont été réintégrés. La censure a été abolie. En attendant la promulgation, dans quelques jours, de la loi sur la presse, la liberté de la presse a été rétablie, par des mesures administratives provisoires. Enfin, tout dernièrement, un accord a été conclu avec la Croix-Rouge Internationale, qui permet à cette dernière d'inspecter sans restrictions les prisons, les camps et les commissariats de police.

Cependant, tout cela n'a pas arrêté les adversaires de la Grèce. Le Ministre a peut-être son idée sur les accusations qui sont portées contre elle. Il y a vingt ans, déjà, la Grèce était traitée, par les mêmes pays, d'Etat monarche-faciste, et ce fut grâce à une intervention personnelle de M. Schumann qu'elle a pu entrer au Conseil de l'Europe. Aujourd'hui, ces pays reçoivent le renfort de certains qui étaient autrefois grands amis de la Grèce.

La date de la session du Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe qui examinera les accusations des Scandinaves approche. Il semble que certains petits Etats souhaiteraient trouver une formule qui permette d'éviter les solutions extrêmes. Ce ne sera évidemment pas la Grande-Bretagne qui les y encouragera. Quant au nouveau gouvernement de la République Fédérale, on ignore à Athènes quelle sera sa position. Pour ce qui est de la France, M. Markopouliotis sait qu'elle n'a pas encore arrêté la sienne. Mais quelle qu'elle doive être, la Grèce, compte tenu de la politique suivie par le gouvernement français, lui fait confiance.

Fondamentalement, la meilleure solution serait que le Comité des Ministres constate qu'il serait injuste de condamner la Grèce sans lui laisser le temps de démontrer la sincérité de ses intentions. Aujourd'hui, la Grèce a besoin de ses vrais amis, ce qui ne veut pas dire, précise M. Markopouliotis, les amis de son régime actuel. La Grèce est heureuse de penser qu'elle en a un en la personne du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères français et, encore une fois, elle fait confiance à la France.

M. Schumann remercie M. Markopouliotis. Comme celui-ci l'a compris, la France n'est pas animée de mauvaises intentions à l'égard de son pays, bien au contraire. Son rôle est à certains égards plus facile que celui d'autres membres

du Conseil de l'Europe: tout en observant rigoureusement la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, elle n'en est pas partie. Parmi les mesures récemment prises par le gouvernement grec, il en est une qui est importante: l'accord conclu avec la Croix-Rouge.

Mais M. Schumann ne cache pas à l'Ambassadeur que la situation à Strasbourg est délicate. Il a parlé de cette affaire dans chacune des capitales qu'il vient de visiter, et il a fait des pointages. Si l'exclusion de la Grèce est demandée, le scrutin sera à une ou deux voix près.

Dans ces conditions, la République Fédérale est appelée à jouer un rôle décisif. M. Brandt était Ministre des Affaires Etrangères lorsque Paris et Bern ont fait des démarches conjointes auprès des Scandinaves et des Hollandais. Pour parler à M. Markopouliotis avec une franchise égale à la sienne, M. Schumann croit qu'une très forte pression va s'exercer sur le chancelier, qui est socialiste et dont on connaît les attaches avec la Scandinavie. Il faudrait que les Grecs l'aident – et par là même, aident M. Schumann lui-même – à éviter un résultat que le Ministre regretterait beaucoup, car il est convaincu qu'une exclusion du Conseil de l'Europe ne ferait que durcir les choses en Grèce.

Lors des conversations du Ministre avec M. Luns et M. Harmel, l'accent a été mis sur un point que ceux-ci jugeaient essentiel: les mesures de libéralisation annoncées par la Grèce sont assorties d'une réserve, permettant au gouvernement hellénique, en cas de force majeure, de s'affranchir des règles qu'il a lui-même tracées. M. Harmel n'est pas un homme de gauche et M. Luns n'est pas violemment hostile au gouvernement d'Athènes. Pourtant, en ce moment, ils voteraient contre lui, tout en le regrettant. Comme ils sont dans cet état d'esprit, quelques améliorations au «calendrier», aux mesures annoncées, comme par exemple la suppression de cette clause à laquelle il vient d'être fait allusion, faciliteraient beaucoup les choses à M. Brandt, qui ne veut pas de mal aux Grecs, et au Ministre lui-même, qui leur veut du bien.

Par ailleurs, sur le plan français, l'affaire Starakis préoccupe le Ministre. En Grèce, Starakis est Grec, et le gouvernement hellénique est dans son droit. Mais en France, il est français. Sa famille est en relations suivies avec les autorités. Certaines campagnes de presse, qui sont gênantes, seraient découragées ou perdraient de leur efficacité, l'effet produit au Parlement serait utile, si le gouvernement grec pouvait conclure qu'il serait habile sur le plan tactique et amical envers la France de prendre une mesure d'apaisement. Le Ministre aimerait que l'Ambassadeur veuille bien transmettre ce message à son gouvernement.

En conclusion, M. Schumann a deux préoccupations: le gouvernement

allemand, dont le rôle sera décisif, et l'opinion publique française, notamment le Parlement, dont la pression pourrait s'exercer de façon gênante. Il ne veut rien d'autre qu'aider les Grecs et ne demande qu'une chose: que ceux-ci l'aident à les aider.

M. Markopouliotis remercie le Ministre. Il sait combien de problèmes il a à résoudre et ne souhaite pas que son pays lui en ajoute d'autres. Il parlera à son Gouvernement du «calendrier» de libéralisation et de l'affaire Starakis et fera connaître au Ministre à son retour, le résultat de ses entretiens. En tout cas, il peut assurer au Ministre que son gouvernement est déterminé à appliquer le calendrier, qui ne sera en aucun cas remis en cause./.

Document 3

26 November 1969

Le Directeur d'Europe

NOTE

L' Ambassadeur de Grèce m'a rendu visite le 26 novembre. J'ai saisi cette occasion pour lui faire part des remarques qu'avaient inspirées au Ministre les dispositions de la loi sur la presse récemment promulguée à Athènes: le nombre des délits de presse définis par cette loi, le caractère vague de certaines définitions (ainsi de celle qui vise «les publications attisant les passions politiques»), le fait que ces délits doivent être jugés selon la procédure du flagrant délit et que le sursis ne soit pas admis en la matière, donnaient l'impression qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'une libéralisation réelle, que les adversaires de la Grèce pourraient y trouver de nouveaux motifs de critiquer son régime et que la tâche de ceux qui s'efforcent de faire prévaloir la modération au Conseil de l'Europe n'en serait pas facilitée. J'ai ajouté qu'après avoir enregistré avec satisfaction l'accord intervenu entre le gouvernement d'Athènes et la Croix Rouge, nous avions regretté d'apprendre, aussitôt après, que son application se heurtait à des difficultés.

Le Général Markopouliotis n'a répondu sur le premier point qu'en me remettant une brochure intitulée «Vers une presse grecque libre et démocratique», qui s'efforce de démontrer que la nouvelle loi «institue la

liberté dans la presse selon l'acception authentique du terme». Il m'a fait part des propos de M. Pipinelis, avec qui il venait de s'entretenir à Athènes, sur l'attitude des différents membres du Conseil de l'Europe à l'égard de la Grèce: «Il y a, à la vérité, deux pôles: d'un côté, l'Angleterre qui, plus encore que les pays scandinaves, intrigue et fait campagne pour rallier des voix en faveur de l'exclusion d'Athènes: de l'autre, la France, autour de laquelle doivent se regrouper naturellement les pays désireux d'éviter une décision aussi préjudiciable au Conseil de l'Europe qu'à la Grèce elle-même».

Les questions de procédure ont été évoquées. J'ai indiqué qu'il nous paraissait difficile de soutenir la thèse selon laquelle l'exclusion exigerait un vote unanime. L'Ambassadeur a aussitôt reconnu que c'était là une thèse maximale et que la délégation grecque comprendrait fort bien qu'elle ne soit pas retenue. En revanche, elle insisterait naturellement pour que s'applique la majorité des deux tiers. J'ai dit que nous n'avions pas encore pris définitivement position sur ce point; il nous semblait cependant que l'exigence de la majorité qualifiée était plus facile à plaider que celle de l'unanimité./.

Document 4

*MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES
TÉLÉGRAMME AU DÉPART*

*DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES EUROPE
S/DIRECTION D'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE*

*PARIS LE 29 NOVEMBRE 1969
ENR. AU SCT LE22h.05*

AMBAFRANCE ANKARA – ATHÈNES – BERNE – BONN – BRUXELLES
– COPENHAGUE – DUBLIN – LA HAYE – LA VALETTE – LONDRES –
LUXEMBOURG – NICOSIE – OSLO – REYKJAVIK – ROME –
STOCKHOLM – VIENNE – COMMUNIQUÉ À WASHINGTON
CIRCULAIRE NO 478

A/S: LE CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE ET LA GRÈCE

LE COMITÉ DES MINISTRES DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE EST APPELÉ À SE PRONONCER, LORS DE SA SESSION DU 12 DÉCEMBRE À PARIS, SUR LE CAS DE LA GRÈCE. IL SERA SAISI, D'UNE PART, D'UN RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME QUI A PROCÉDÉ À UNE ENQUÊTE APPROFONDIE SUR LA SITUATION DANS CE PAYS ET D'AUTRE PART, D'UN PROJET DE RÉSOLUTION ÉMANANT DU DANEMARK, DE LA NORVÈGE ET DE LA SUÈDE ET TENDANT À SUSPENDRE LA GRÈCE DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE.

TOUT EN ÉTANT AUSSI DÉSIREUX QUE L'ENSEMBLE DES ÉTATS MEMBRES DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE DE VOIR LA GRÈCE S'ENGAGER DANS LA VOIE D'UN RETOUR AUX LIBERTÉS DÉMOCRATIQUES ET AU RESPECT DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, NOUS PENSONS QU'UNE DÉCISION DE SUSPENSION IRAIT À L'ENCONTRE DU BUT RECHERCHÉ ET N'AURAIT D'AUTRE RESULTAT QUE DE RENFORCER À ATHÈNES LES TENDANCES LES PLUS HOSTILES À UNE LIBÉRALISATION DU RÉGIME. IL NOUS PARAÎT, D'AILLEURS, QUE LE CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE NE POURRAIT, SANS CONTRADICTION AVEC SES PROPRES PRINCIPES, SANCTIONNER L'UN DE SES MEMBRES SANS LUI AVOIR LAISSÉ LA POSSIBILITÉ D'ÉPUISER LES VOIES DE RECOURS QUI LUI SONT OFFERTES. ENFIN LE RÔLE DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE CONSISTE MOINS À PRONONCER DES CONDAMNATIONS QU'À ASSURER LE RÉTABLISSEMENT DES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX LÀ OÙ ILS ONT CESSÉ D'ÊTRE RESPECTÉS.

CECI NOUS CONDUIT À ADOPTER L'ATTITUDE SUIVANTE:

- 1/. – NOUS CONSIDÉRONS QU'UNE ÉVENTUELLE DÉCISION DE SUSPENSION D'UN ÉTAT MEMBRE EST TROP IMPORTANTE POUR ÊTRE TRANCHÉE, À LA MAJORITÉ SIMPLE DES REPRÉSENTANTS AYANT DROIT DE VOTE ET À LA MAJORITÉ DES DEUX TIERS DES VOIX EXPRIMÉES, AINSI QUE LE SUGGÈRE LE SERVICE JURIDIQUE DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE. NOUS ESTIMONS, AU CONTRAIRE, QUE LA PROCÉDURE DEVRAIT ÊTRE LA MÊME QUE POUR L'ADMISSION D'UN NOUVEAU MEMBRE. C'EST À DIRE COMPORTER L'APPLICATION DE LA MAJORITÉ DES DEUX TIERS DES ÉTATS MEMBRES.
- 2/. – NOUS NE CROYONS PAS SOUHAITABLE QU'ON EN VIENNE À

UN VOTE SUR UNE DÉCISION DE SUSPENSION. DANS LE CAS, TOUTEFOIS, OÙ LE TEXTE SCANDINAVE SERAIT MIS AUX VOIX, NOUS NOUS ABSTIENDRIONS.

3/ – QUANT AUX CONCLUSIONS DU RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, IL APPARAÎT QU'ÀUX TERMES DE L'ARTICLE 32 DE LA CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, LE COMITÉ DES MINISTRES N'EST COMPÉTENT POUR STATUER À LEUR SUJET QU'À L'EXPIRATION D'UN DÉLAI DE TROIS MOIS PENDANT LEQUEL UN RECOURS PEUT ÊTRE INTERJETÉ DEVANT LA COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME; UN TEL RECOURS AYANT POUR EFFET DE DESSAISIR LE COMITÉ DES MINISTRES. EN TOUT ÉTAT DE CAUSE, N'ÉTANT PAS NOUS-MÊMES PARTIE À CETTE CONVENTION, NOUS AVONS POUR RÈGLE DE NE PAS PARTICIPER AUX DÉCISIONS PRISES EN VERTU DE SES DISPOSITIONS.

4/. – CECI N'EXCLUT PAS, CEPENDANT, QUE LE COMITÉ DES MINISTRES, DANS L'EXERCICE DE SES RESPONSABILITÉS POLITIQUES, DEMANDE AU GOUVERNEMENT GREC DE PRENDRE CERTAINS ENGAGEMENTS DE LIBÉRALISATION ET FIXE UN CALENDRIER POUR LEUR EXÉCUTION. NOUS SERIONS TOUT DISPOSÉS, POUR NOTRE PART, À NOUS ASSOCIER AU VOTE D'UN TEXTE DE RÉOLUTION DANS CE SENS QUI POURRAIT D'AILLEURS S'INSPIRER DE L'ESPRIT, SINON DE LA LETTRE, DES CONCLUSIONS DE LA COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME.

- POUR ANKARA – ATHÈNES – BERNE – BONN – BRUXELLES – DUBLIN – LA VALETTE, LUXEMBOURG – NICOSIE – VIENNE-

VEUILLEZ PORTER LES INDICATIONS QUI PRÉCÈDENT À LA CONNAISSANCE DES AUTORITÉS DU PAYS DE VOTRE RÉSIDENCE ET RECUEILLIR LEURS RÉACTIONS. LE CAS ÉCHÉANT, VOUS AJOUTEREZ QUE NOUS ACCUEILLERONS AVEC INTÉRÊT TOUTE SUGGESTION QUI POURRAIT NOUS ÊTRE FAITE EN CE QUI CONCERNE LE TEXTE D'UNE RÉOLUTION DU GENRE DE CELLE QUI EST ENVISAGÉE AU POINT 4 CI-DESSUS.

- POUR COPENHAGUE – LA HAYE – LONDRES – OSLO – REYKJAVIK – ROME – STOCKHOLM -

À MOINS QUE VOUS N'EN JUGIEZ AUTREMENT, IL ME PARAÎT PRÉFÉRABLE QUE VOUS NE PRENIEZ PAS L'INITIATIVE DE FAIRE CONNAÎTRE, NOTRE ATTITUDE AUX AUTORITÉS DU PAYS DE VOTRE RÉSIDENCE MAIS QUE VOUS VOUS BORNIEZ À EN FAIRE ÉTAT SI VOUS ÊTES INTERROGÉ./.

DIPLOMATIE

P.O.

J. DE BEAUMARCHAIS

Document 5

Déclaration du représentant français au Comité des ministres du Conseil de l'Europe sur le retrait de la Grèce

(Strasbourg, 15 avril 1970)

Comme j'ai eu l'occasion de le dire lors de notre dernière Session en votant la résolution du 12 décembre, il n'est pas possible de garder le silence quand il s'agit des Droits de l'Homme et du libre exercice de la démocratie. Au surplus, il s'agit d'un pays européen et notre silence au sujet de son comportement équivaldrait à admettre que soit gravement et impunément déformée une certaine idée que nous nous faisons de l'Europe: cette Europe nous la voulons exemplaire sur le plan de la démocratie et du respect de ses principes.

La non-ratification par la France de la convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme

De quoi s'agit-il dans le débat qui nous réunit ici même? D'abord de nous prononcer ou non sur la publication d'un rapport. Sur ce point précis, ma délégation ne pourra prendre part au vote et ceci pour des raisons techniques: le rapport établi par la commission des Droits de l'Homme se fonde sur la convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme et dès lors que la France n'a pas ratifié cette convention, notre jurisprudence constante ne nous met pas en état de nous prononcer sur le rapport de la Commission.

Mais je ne me réfugierai pas derrière ces arguments techniques. Je souhaite au contraire rappeler notre position en ce qui concerne les aspects humains

et politiques de ce qui constitue pour nous tous une douloureuse affaire.

Nul plus que nous ne condamne les violations du droit, ni ne souhaite plus ardemment que la Grèce remplisse à nouveau les conditions qui lui permettraient de reprendre sa place au Conseil de l'Europe. Nul plus que nous ne se réjouirait de ce que la Démocratie soit pleinement restaurée en Grèce. Nous pensons qu'il faut que le gouvernement grec le sache et nous ne nous cachons pas pour le lui dire. Le président de la République l'a lui-même indiqué lorsqu'il a reçu les lettres de créance de l'Ambassadeur de Grèce en octobre 1969. Ceci est clair et, si je ne fais pas de procès d'intention à personne, je ne permettrai pas qu'on nous en fasse.

L'inefficacité d'un retrait de la Grèce

Mais, soucieux d'atteindre ces objectifs, nous ne pouvons non plus éviter de réfléchir à l'efficacité de notre action. Nous nous interrogeons sur la méthode la plus propre à encourager une évolution satisfaisante de la situation en Grèce. Nous pensons à ce sujet qu'isoler l'État grec n'est pas la meilleure méthode. Vous avez entendu M. Pipinelis le 12 décembre dernier demander «de ne pas couper les ponts avec le gouvernement hellénique» pour conserver sur lui une influence et ne pas renforcer les courants extrémistes. Vous connaissez les démarches et les efforts qu'il avait entrepris auparavant pour nous convaincre qu'il fallait donner une chance aux dirigeants d'Athènes, qu'il fallait encourager la tendance à une évolution dont nous regrettons profondément qu'elle soit beaucoup trop lente.

Nous entendons rester fidèles à l'esprit que je viens d'évoquer. A cet égard, nous nous demandons s'il est utile de confirmer en quelque sorte une seconde fois ce qui a été décidé. Est-il opportun en effet de dire que notre Comité aura compétence pour suivre l'évolution du régime grec, au risque de paraître s'octroyer un droit d'intervention dans les affaires intérieures d'un État qui est désormais tiers par rapport au Conseil de l'Europe ou le sera à brève échéance?

Ces réflexions sont au fond inspirées par le souci de l'efficacité. Le débat entre l'intransigeance doctrinale et la recherche de l'efficacité est vieux comme le monde, et nul ne saurait prétendre le franchir une fois pour toutes. Chaque cas auquel il s'applique a ses caractéristiques propres et doit être étudié en lui-même. Nous pensons aujourd'hui – et nous avons des raisons sérieuses, voire tel ou tel indice pour nous confirmer dans cette opinion – que notre attitude pourrait contribuer peu à peu à ce que nous souhaitons tous ardemment ici, c'est-à-dire voir une Grèce redevenue fidèle à ses grandes traditions démocratiques réintégrer notre Communauté européenne.

Chronologies

Chypre: 1er novembre 2006 – 15 mars 2007

29 novembre: Le gouvernement finlandais, qui préside au second semestre 2006 l'Union européenne, annule faute d'accord entre les parties intéressées une rencontre entre les représentants d'Ankara et ceux des deux communautés de Chypre.

14-15 décembre: Le Conseil européen décide de suspendre les négociations d'adhésion de la Turquie portant sur 8 des 35 chapitres devant être discutés tant qu'Ankara n'ouvrira pas ses ports et aéroports aux navires et avions en provenance de Chypre.

17 janvier: Accord entre Chypre et le Liban définissant leurs frontières maritimes pour faciliter la future exploration de pétrole et de gaz naturel au large de leurs côtes.

13 février: Chypre demande officiellement son entrée dans la zone euro à compter du 1er janvier 2008.

15 février: Ouverture officielle à Nicosie, en présence du ministre égyptien du pétrole, de la période se terminant le 16 juillet 2007, au cours de laquelle doivent être soumises les propositions des sociétés candidates à l'obtention d'autorisations d'exploration des hydrocarbures dans la zone située au sud et au sud est de Chypre et en direction de l'Égypte.

28 février: Signature à Paris de l'accord franco-chypriote de coopération militaire. Ankara qualifie cet accord de «préoccupant» et estime qu'il ne ferait qu'encourager encore davantage la position des Chypriotes grecs et entamerait les efforts en faveur d'un règlement global» de la division de l'île.

8 mars: Le gouvernement chypriote décide unilatéralement d'abattre le mur de la rue Ledra divisant la capitale Nicosie et se propose d'ouvrir un nouveau point de passage vers la zone occupée.

Grèce: 1er novembre 2006 – 15 mars 2007

24 novembre: 10^{ème} Congrès d'affaires gréco-turc à Athènes: le commerce entre la Grèce et la Turquie d'un montant de 200 millions de dollars en 1999 est passé à 2,2 milliards en 2005 et est estimé à 2,6 milliards pour 2006.

14 décembre: Mgr Christodoulos, Archevêque d'Athènes et chef de l'Eglise orthodoxe de Grèce a été reçu au Vatican par le Pape Benoît XVI. Il s'agit de la première visite d'un Primat de cette Eglise.

9 janvier: Décès de Jean-Pierre Vernant, grand résistant et helléniste de renom, auteur de *Les origines de la pensée grecque* (CNRS, collection «Mythes et Religions», Paris, 1962).

12 janvier: Une roquette anti-char a été tirée contre l'ambassade des Etats-unis à Athènes provoquant des dommages matériels limités. Cet attentat a été revendiqué par l'organisation d'extrême gauche *Lutte Révolutionnaire*.

31 janvier: Le ministre grec du développement Dimitri Sioufas et son homologue italien Pier Luigi Bersani signent un accord pour la construction d'une interconnexion gazière entre la Grèce et l'Italie (pipe line sous marin de 200 km entre la côte ouest grecque et le sud de l'Italie).

5 février: La motion de censure du Pasok contre le gouvernement Caramanlis est rejetée par 164 voix contre 122.

13 février: La Commission européenne indique que la Grèce a réussi à diviser son déficit public par deux entre 2005 et 2006 (de 5,2% à 2,6%).

1^{er} mars: Athènes juge «inadmissible» le fait qu'Ankara ait demandé et obtenu le report de manoeuvres aériennes de l'OTAN dans la région d'Aghios Efstratios en mer Egée en invoquant «des questions de souveraineté» sur cette île grecque.

8 mars: Vote par le seul parti de la *Nouvelle Démocratie* de la loi-cadre sur l'enseignement supérieur, qui prévoit de nouvelles règles en matière d'autonomie des universités et du droit d'asile universitaire. Pendant huit semaines la vie universitaire a été paralysée par des grèves et des occupations de locaux visant à s'opposer à cette loi-cadre et à la révision de l'article 16 de la constitution dont la nouvelle rédaction permet la possibilité de création d'universités privées.

12 mars: Le ministre de la défense Vangelis Meimarakis exprime son opposition à la proposition d'Ankara d'un commandement turc, à compter du mois d'août 2007, de la force navale de l'ONU au Liban.

15 mars: Signature à Athènes par le Premier ministre grec Costas

Caramanlis, le président Vladimir Poutine, et le Premier ministre bulgare Sergueï Stanichev de l'accord sur la construction de l'oléoduc Bourgas – Alexandroupolis. Cet oléoduc, qui sera construit de 2008 à 2011, reliera le port bulgare de Bourgas à celui d'Alexandroupolis en Grèce afin d'acheminer le pétrole de la Caspienne vers l'Europe de l'Ouest en contournant les détroits turcs saturés. Son débit annuel sera de 35 millions de tonnes et son coût atteindra 783 millions d'euros.

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