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Is the Greek-Turkish Conflict a Security Dilemma?
Le conflit greco-turc : dilemme de sécurité ?

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The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations: Theory and Practice

Panayotis J. Tsakonas*

It is usually said that a dilemma is worse than a problem, because it necessitates a choice between two equal, mostly equally undesirable, alternatives. The notion of the security dilemma in world politics seems to be one of the most significant and pervasive features of relations between states seeking the transcendent value in international politics and governments' first and foremost obligation, namely security.

Theorists agree that a security dilemma exists when the military preparations as well as the foreign policy behaviour of one state create an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another state as to whether those preparations and/or behaviour are for 'defensive' purposes only — in order to enhance its security in an uncertain world — or whether they are for offensive purposes; i.e., to change the *status quo* to its advantage.[1] Indeed, whatever the actual intentions of a state engaging in military preparations or joining particular alliances, it is the *irresolvable uncertainty* in the mind of the other state about the meaning of the first state's intentions and capabilities which creates the dilemma. Precisely because it is impossible for the other to see inside one's mind it can never be certain as to one's intentions.

The idea of the security dilemma holds, in essence, that one nation will feel insecure if it makes no effort to protect its security, while any effort to do so will threaten the security of one or more nations. As a consequence, the first nation faces a dilemma: it will be insecure if it does not act as well as if it does.[2] Thus, at one horn of the security dilemma is a self-defeating quest for security while at the opposite horn are the risks attendant upon not responding to the perceived threat. In the words of Booth and Wheeler, this genuine dilemma

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takes the following form: "should the other's military preparations be matched and so risk an arms race and the further build-up of mistrust, danger, and cost, or should a wait-and-see policy be adopted thereby risking exposure to coercion or attack as a result of relative weakness?"[3]

This is actually the 'tragedy' of the security dilemma and the reason –according to neo-realism– that it cannot be either solved or abolished, but only ameliorated.[4] In an anarchic international system when a state decides to increase its security by, for instance arming itself, the security of other states decreases automatically. Thus, one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others. This is merely due to the fact that although it is difficult to draw inferences about a state's intentions from its military posture and capabilities, states do draw such inferences, even when they are unwarranted. Thus, as a prominent 'security dilemma' theorist suggested "governments believe that other governments see them as they see themselves, i.e., they find it difficult to see themselves as a threat."[5]

The Evolution of the Concept

The notion of the security dilemma is as old as human history. In his book on the Peloponnesian war, the Greek historian Thucydides, claimed that "what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused to Sparta".[6] His phrase lies at the heart of the security dilemma. The Greek philosopher Xenophon has also pointed to the concept when describing a scenario in which two people can go to war despite neither wanting such an outcome.[7]

Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth century English philosopher is the one most associated with the idea of politics being a struggle for security in a hostile environment. In such a 'Hobbesian state of nature — where life is 'nasty, brutish and short'— the drive for security becomes the dominant preoccupation. Although from different philosophical starting points, Rousseau, the French philosopher, highlighted the notion of the security dilemma by pointing out the central role of trust in international relations by introducing the parable of the stag

hunt.[8] In the example of the stag hunt, Rousseau has shown how fear, mistrust and mainly uncertainty about others, real intentions (the key-notion of the security dilemma) in relations between states destroy the prospects for cooperation and increase the pressures for confrontational conflict. Indeed, often the behaviour of some states resemble Rousseau's Stag Hunt in that each side would prefer mutual cooperation, but is driven to defect solely by the fear that the other side has or will develop a different preference.

However, the term 'security dilemma' was first coined by John Herz and the concept started gaining widespread usage in the 1950s through the writings of Herbert Butterfield. Undoubtedly, the bipolarity of the Cold War gave the security dilemma its utmost poignancy. Butterfield's notion of the 'irreducible dilemma', which counts for all past and present conflicts was at the root of all the tensions of the present day. In addition, Butterfield considered the inability to 'enter onto the other man's counter fear' as the central feature of the security dilemma. His phrase 'Hobbesian fear' became a useful shorthand for the dynamic driving security dilemmas. He has eloquently described the situation he called 'Hobbesian fear' by writing: "...you know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possible for you to realize or remember properly that since he cannot see inside your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have. As this operates on both sides the Chinese puzzle is complete in all its interlockings –and neither party sees the nature of the predicament it is in, for each only imagines that the other party is being hostile and unreasonable."[9]

Working along similar lines, John Herz argued that the security dilemma is the natural product of an anarchic international system and it always existed in a situation where there was interaction between men and groups in the absence of a higher political authority. For Herz, the quest for more and more power –in order to escape the impact of the power of others– renders in turn the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst.[10] Thus, both Herz and Butterfield believed that the search for security through military power tends to provoke insecurity in others.

Based on assumptions of flawed human nature and the sin of humanity, Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out that although security is so much desired, it can never be achieved. Security cannot be achieved, because although so strongly desired it is power that is sought to guarantee it. But the more it is sought the greater the problems of maintaining whatever levels of power or security are desired.

By distancing himself from analyses based on the sin of humanity Kenneth Waltz has introduced to students of international politics an influential analysis arguing that the security dilemma is the inevitable consequence of the structure of the international system. More specifically, Waltz described the security dilemma as "a condition in which states, unsure of one another's intentions, arm for the sake of security, and in doing so set a vicious circle in motion. Having armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and buy more arms because the means to anyone's security is a threat to someone else who in turn responds by arming".[11] In Waltzian logic, anarchy was seen as inevitably creating a sense of insecurity of governments.

Game theory, through the influential work of Thomas Schelling, has also helped to clarify the dynamics of insecurity. By discussing the dynamics of mutual distrust, the 'compounding of each person's fear of what the other fears',[12] Schelling has developed a 'nervousness model' to argue that by the dynamics of mutual distrust, rational decisions (rational calculation of probabilities or a rational choice of strategy) can produce irrational outcomes (mutual destruction).

The Contemporary Problematique

What is of catalytic importance in the contemporary security dilemma literature is the -not always clear- differentiation between *'inadvertent'*, *'structural'* or *'system-induced security dilemma'* on the one hand and *'deliberate'* or *'state-induced security dilemma'* on the other.

Inadvertent

In an 'inadvertent', or 'system-induced'[13] security dilemma, two states are engaged in a struggle over security, yet their security is not under threat since both have benign intent; their conflict is based upon a false, illusory incompatibility.[14] In this case the security dilemma is the *unintended* product or the "tragic consequence" of the anarchic nature of the international system since "the unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive constitutes the security dilemma".[15] It could be thus argued that the dilemma is created in the one of the two governments' mind by the other's failure to act carefully on security matters, by the other's forwarding of unintended signals and/or by the other's insensitivity to the security needs of the other state. Indeed, "...statesmen ...rarely...consider seriously the possibility that such a policy will increase the danger of war instead of lessening it".[16]

This is in fact the classic version of the security dilemma at work and a representation of Robert Jervis' –by far the most prolific writer of the security dilemma and the first who examined the interplay between the pressures [constraints] created by the structure of the system and the behavior of the units in the interstate system– 'spiral model'.[17] Jack Snyder also refers to this aspect of the security dilemma as a 'structural' security dilemma and argues that because states perceive each other as a threat, a war can occur: 'a status quo state may choose to attack another *status quo* state, though both would prefer a stable compromise to war".[18]

To give an example, in the case of 'inadvertent security dilemma', the Greek-Turkish arms race would be the result of inadvertent actions of either the Greek or the Turkish government whose defensive military preparations to enhance its security in an uncertain world (but with no intention to overthrow the military *status quo*) have increased the sense of insecurity felt by the other. This stems from the fact that no matter what the real intentions are, the fundamental problem is that governments can never fully know the minds of others.[19] So if either Greece or Turkey perceives the 'defensive' preparations of the

other as potentially threatening and offensive, then an inadvertent security dilemma arises.

In this classic version of the security dilemma neither state is able to exhibit the 'defensiveness' needed, namely determine each other's intent accurately or provide for their own defense without creating fear in each other. It is worth noting that the reaction of one state to another state's deployment could be affected by the 'defensiveness' of the forces and by the uncertainty of the states on whether offense or defense hold an advantage as a means of waging war. The security dilemma is thus intensified by the states' inability to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons and mainly by their uncertainty about whether offense or defense has the advantage. When offense has the advantage over defense in military technology, the spiral is tightened and the incentive to launch pre-emptive attack increases because states see a preventive advantage in fighting now, rather than later. In such a case, "*status-quo* powers must then act like aggressors; the fact that they would gladly agree to forego the opportunity for expansion in return for guarantees for their security has no implications for their behavior".[20] To make things worse, especially if a state comes to believe that the other state is such a menace that the former can be secure only if the latter is crippled, if not destroyed, then conflict and deadlock appear the best or the only route to the former state's security. Thus, if a level of mistrust is at such a level, and the offense is so dominant, a state may even decide to pre-empt what is interpreted as an inevitable attack by the other. This fear of surprise attack is the most potent and most dangerous driver of the spiral.[21]

Deliberate

The security dilemma may also be the product of an *intended state policy* rooted in the ideological beliefs and goals of man and the state and their orientation towards the international political and territorial *status quo*. Therefore, unlike the case of 'inadvertent security dilemma', where it is the anarchic system that induces conflict between states who have benign intentions, in the case of 'deliberate security

dilemma', conflict between the states is a result of one of the two states' desire to expand. Still the ultimate goal of the state's desire to expand is security, achieved through either expansionism or military superiority.

It is worth noting at this point the difficulty to equate *security* with the *preservation of the status quo*.[22] It seems that only few states in the world are completely satisfied with the *status quo* and will not take any measure to improve their position, especially when the risks attendant upon this action are minimal. Moreover, motivated by the dictum 'that which stops growing begins to rot', some states have to expand in order to feel secure.[23] If we consider change as inevitable, the maintenance of *status quo* by the opponent is seen as source of conflict. As Jervis has put it: "If each side can feel secure only when it has a larger army than the other, an abstract agreement on a willingness to forgo advantages so that both sides can gain security will be illusory".[24] In such a case states will be forced to compete even if their primary goal is security.

By extension, it is also difficult to contrast *expansionism* with *security-seeking*, in the sense that the expansionism may in fact be pursued as a route to security-seeking and thus a state's 'expansionist' behaviour can be 'defensive' in nature. Of course sometimes such beliefs are but rationalizations for more purely predatory drives; at other times they are not, and is extremely difficult for later analysts, let alone contemporary observers, to tell which is which. However, even of the motives are defensive the pursuit of superiority is itself bound to perpetuate a security dilemma.

A deliberate security dilemma therefore exists where one state believes *it can only be secure if others are insecure*.[25] In that case the dilemma is created in a government's mind *as a result of the deliberate actions of another state*. In Booth and Wheeler's reasoning these deliberate actions may be of two kinds, though.

Firstly, they may be from a *militarily status quo state* which adopts deliberately 'offensive' strategies in order to deter another, because it

sees itself in an adversarial relationship with it. In this case, the second state may be thrown into a dilemma as a result of the apparent contradiction between the first declared defensive intentions and its (threatening) military capabilities.

Secondly, they may be from a *revisionist* or revolutionary state, which wishes to change the *status quo* and which adopts a posture designed to lull the other state into a false sense of security. In that case, the other state may be thrown into a dilemma as a result of the apparent contradiction between the revisionist's state declared policy (reassuring) and its actual military capability (over-arming) and behaviour (threatening).[26]

Alternatives to 'security dilemma'

Given that a security dilemma situation exists *only when behaviour can be explained in security terms*, the most obvious alternative to a security dilemma is a situation in which one state seeks to expand **in order to achieve non-security goals**, meaning that this state is *inherently expansionistic*. As an alternative to the security dilemma, this situation is close to John Herz's description of policies motivated by interests *that go beyond security proper* (our emphasis). By referring to policies motivated by such interests Herz meant that all states pursue security, yet some pursue security *plus ambition*. Hitler's behaviour in the 1930s is the most vivid example of this type of behaviour. With regard to Hitler's behavior Herz has put it bluntly: "it can hardly be maintained that it was a German security dilemma which lay at the heart of that conflict, *but rather one man's, or one regime's ambition to master the world*"[27] (our emphasis).

Benign intent becomes a rather crucial criterion in tracking down alternatives to the security dilemma. For example, if a predatory state, motivated by non-security expansion and absolute gains, exists there is no security dilemma. Such a situation resembles to Jack Snyder's 'imperialist dilemma'. By that Snyder refers to an aggressor state, which seeks a goal that would require the target state to forfeit a valu-

able asset, e.g., territory, sovereignty. "In order to achieve its expansive …goals, the aspiring imperialist state develops offensive military forces for the purpose of conquest or intimidation. [the imperialist dilemma] is thus a by-product of the *competition over non-security issues.*"[28] (our emphasis). In Snyder's model the imperialist state does believe that the other state intends to do it harm and, therefore, it arms not only to acquire its original role, but also to protect itself. However, although the states in Snyder's imperialist dilemma may be in a dilemma, the situation *is not* a security dilemma since one of the states, or even both, actually intend harm to the other. Needless to say that in such a situation any attempt by the other state to accept reasonable settlements of key issues (e.g. arms control) and greater conciliation would have been useless and might have even invited pressure by the other side.

By extension, a second – logical – alternative to the security dilemma, that is consistent with classical views of human nature viewing humans as harbouring original sin and being driven by the will to dominate, would depict *both sides as seeking to alter the status quo*, obviously with the aim *of achieving non-security goals*. Such a view would be likely to result in a portrayal of *both sides as aggressive or evil.*

A Research Agenda

In the field of international relations and security studies, the security dilemma has proved to be a fruitful diagnostic tool to analyse relations and to explain conflict emerging between states operating in an anarchic international system – especially with regard to the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.[29]

However, the most critical conflict in the Mediterranean basin, namely the Greek-Turkish dispute, acquired much less theoretical attention. Indeed, although this enduring conflict makes headlines for the last twenty-five years in both states' media – and all over the world – its examination by using the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma has been totally overlooked by both the Greek and Turkish interna-

tional relations scholars. As a matter of fact, the decision made by **Hellenic Studies** to publish a special issue on the Greek-Turkish security dilemma is the first attempt for Greek-Turkish relations to be analysed and for the Greco-Turkish conflict to be explained in terms of the security dilemma.[30]

In the present special issue of **Hellenic Studies/Etudes helléniques** an attempt is made by a group of Greek and Turkish international relations experts and security analysts to examine particular case studies, which fall into the three basic manifestations of the Greek-Turkish, or the Turkish-Greek, conflict in the post-Cold War era. As theory and practice suggest, the security dilemma manifests itself (a) in *arms-race* {as the core of the action-reaction phenomenon characterizing the armaments dynamics}; (b) in crisis scenarios {in a low degree of *crisis stability* evidenced in vicious circles of "reciprocal fears and surprise attack"}, and (c) in *competitive alliance formation* {i.e., a tendency toward a continous struggle for "preemptive alignment"}.

Pairs of Greek and Turkish scholars examine a variety of cases that stem from the history of the Greek-Turkish conflict with reference to the three aforementioned thematic areas and reflect upon certain instances of the Greek-Turkish conflict since the end of the Cold War. Needless to say that in analyzing the Greek-Turkish conflict, country representation is considered as necessary. Assessments are often formed or influenced by the Greek and Turkish perceptions of the cases under examination. Indeed, behaviour underlying the security dilemma is shaped not simply by the strategic situation or the circumstances that constitute the security dilemma; i.e., anarchy and offensive advantages, but also by the *participants' perceptions* of that situation and their expectations of each others' like behaviour in that situation. Indeed, cognitive dynamics impact on the security dilemma in crucial ways. In examining a particular case study, contributors may try to capture the way cognitive dynamics can intensify the security dilemma.[31]

The first thematic area, devoted to arms races, is analyzed by the contributions of Christos Kollias and Gunlay-Gunluk Senesen. Given

that even during the post-bipolar period – at a time when other NATO members have been trimming their defence spending– Greek and Turkish military expenditures have continued to grow in real terms, Kollias addresses some methodological issues, which hinder the empirical examination of the Greek-Turkish armaments race with the aim of identifying whether the issue of an action-reaction régime between Greek and Turkish military spending can be established and a systematic Greek-Turkish arms race can be empirically verified. Along the same line of reasoning, Senesen attempts to identify whether Turkish defense expenditures during 1983-2000 (the choice of the period is based on availability of detailed data on Turkish defense expenditures) and relations with Greece in the same period have a common pattern. It seems that recent empirical literature on a long-run arms race between Turkey and Greece is inconclusive and Senesen attempts to find out to what extent the continuum of per-ceived threats upon which Turkish defense decisions react are attrib-utable to threats emanating from neighboring Greece.

A particular crisis scenario, namely the Imia (Kardak for Turkey) incident of 1996 is the focus of the analyses provided by Kostas Ifantis and Gulden Ayman. Structural factors along with the revisionist, predatory (non-security) goals of Turkey are highlighted by Ifantis as the major causes of the Greek-Turkish conflict while the Turkish con-duct in the Imia incident is explored with the aim the above men-tioned premise to be empirically verified. In her contribution Ayman explores various crisis models to show how crises lead to conflict and even war. Models are contrasted with the example of the Kardak cri-sis. Factors such as history, policy, strategy, social pressures, and diplo-macy are considered while the impact of the particular crisis on Turkish-Greek relations is also discussed.

The tendency of the states leaving under the security dilemma toward a continous struggle for the formation of "preemptive align-ment" is another thematic area under consideration. Antonia Dimou and Marios Evriviadis explore Turkey's search for pre-emptive align-ments and a hegemonic role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East, as it reflected on the Turkish-Israeli alliance. The

alliance's background, its modern version and the motives behind its formation are thus analysed while the Greek and Cypriot concerns – and responses – to this partnership are also discussed.

Making Assessments that the Security Dilemma is at Work

Before discussing the criteria that should be used for making assessments that in an adversarial relationship the security dilemma is or it is not at work, one should refer to a series of difficulties and ambiguities inherent in such a discussion.

Undoubtedly, the difficulty in assessing accurately the other side intentions always appears as the most difficult enterprise, and the essence of the security dilemma situation. It is also possible that a government, which objectively faces an inadvertent security dilemma, may misperceive it, and as a result it may deal with the other state as facing a deliberate security dilemma, thus choosing to emphasize a 'deterrent' response. The latter might include offensive weapons and doctrine. In this case the result might be to exacerbate tension further. This misperception, however, can hardly be doubted –and thus corrected—because it is simply rather hard to doubt the *reasonableness* of decision-makers. Moreover, the reasonableness of decision-makers, who are, by definition, committed to defend the national interest, can be hardly criticized. There are many times decision-makers are wrong about the other's side intentions, yet they prefer to take a friend for an enemy rather than pay the costs of mistaking an enemy for a friend. Who could really blame them for doing so, given the ambiguous nature of the evidence available and mainly the (probably unbearable) costs their country has to pay because they incorrectly believed that the other side was not hostile.

In addition, one may also observe ambiguities as far as the basic concept of security is concerned. Thus when it remains unclear what is the object of security (e.g. the state, the individual, the régime) one can hardly doubt the relativity of the content of the terms that are commonly used to characterize states and their behavior: e.g. "*expan-*

sionist", "status-quo", "security-seeking", "opportunity-driven" etc. While discussing the content of the 'deliberate security dilemma' we noted - and further explained - the difficulty to equate *security* with *the preservation of the status quo* as well as the difficulty to contrast *expansionism* with *security seeking*. Difficulties also appear when one is called upon to distinguish between *revisionism* and *aggressiveness*. There are states, which may regard the *status quo* as unacceptable and they are also willing to pay a high price to change it. In both cases, one may refer to revisionist states, yet it is the second case that can be regarded as being aggressive. Thus, **aggressive** behavior should not be regarded as entailing only a desire to expand, but *a willingness to undertake high risks and dangerous efforts - even risk the state's survival - to change the status quo.*[32] (our emphasis) This is a rather important criterion. Actually, to the extent that the empirical findings of the case studies indicate that either Greece or Turkey was willing to pay a high price to gain superiority in order to coerce the other into changing the *status quo* the security dilemma analysis will be misleading.

Most importantly, the empirical research and examination of the particular case studies should also make some logically sound inferences about a series of issues:

(a) What do empirical findings suggest about Greece and Turkey? Are they 'status-quo states', 'security-seekers', 'power-maximizers', 'opportunity-driven states', 'aggressive states'?

Although all the above terms are problematic and it is difficult to say which state fits into each category, they give a usable, if rough, distinction. As a result, what does empirical research suggest about Greece's dictum that Turkey is 'inherently expansionistic' or/and 'inherently aggressive'? Are there clear indications – if not proofs – that Turkey has been willing to undertake high risks and dangerous efforts – even risk the state's survival – to change the *status quo* in the Aegean or elsewhere?

The Cold War analogy makes an interesting point here. A recent explanation of the US/Soviet rivalry through the use of the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma suggests that Soviet leaders were *not*

willing to risk what they had achieved in order to get more, yet they did *want*, *expect*, and *seek more*. However, the American belief that the Soviet Union was inherently expansionistic ruled out cooperation, precluded the adoption of a purely defensive posture by the US and led to the conclusion that demonstrations of resolve were crucial while the only way to underscore US resolve was by prevailing in crises.[33]

(b) Is the Greek-Turkish conflict a security dilemma (or a security problem)? If it is a security dilemma what is actually the type of this dilemma? Inadvertent or Deliberate? Were there instances or periods when *both types* of the security dilemma were at work?

In refining the criteria that should be met for a security dilemma to be at work, one should have in mind that each side will not be willing to pay a high price to gain superiority in order to coerce the other into changing the status quo. More specifically, in a deliberate security dilemma situation one of the two states could be either 'expansionistic' (e.g., Greece by desiring to expand its territorial waters in the Aegean) or 'security seeker' (e.g., Turkey, although the value of security may be seen as achieved by either hegemony, expansionism or the existence of asymmetry in military might) because it is driven by nightmares of inferiority (not by hopes for gain).

The Greek-Turkish state of affairs cannot be classified as simply a 'security problem', but indeed as a security dilemma only after verifying that the threat posed by one state to another, be it inadvertent or deliberate, **has not been** accurately perceived by the potential or actual target state. The empirical findings of the particular case-studies should also demonstrate that the Greek-Turkish security dilemma is comprised by both *dilemmas of interpretation* (i.e., are the other's policies defensive or offensive?) and then *dilemmas of response* (i.e., should these policies be matched and so risk an arms race, counter-alliances or/and crisis escalation or should a wait-and-see policy be adopted thereby risking exposure to coercion or even attack as a result of relative weakness).

(c) What inferences can be drawn by the case-studies with regard to the primary concerns and fears of the two states in conflict? Are they driven by 'absolute' or 'relative gains' concerns?

As realism suggests, the states' concern is often not that the other side is currently aggressive or that the current situation is threatening, but that it may become so in the future as others change their capabilities and intentions. The fact that others or their successors can change, are at the heart of the security dilemma. Thus it is not correct to argue that security concerns and the security dilemma will disappear if states could be certain of others' benign intentions. Indeed, the fact that the opponent may change its intentions, compel states to always seek to compare their absolute gains with those of other states. In these circumstances, unilateral gains from defection may lead to the accumulation of relative advantages, which serve as a hedge against future defection by the opponent.[34] As a consequence, even if none of the states starts with predatory motives, the desire to protect one's future position under conditions of the security dilemma can transform a situation from the Stag Hunt into the Prisoners' Dilemma, in which exploiting the other side is preferred to mutual cooperation.[35]

It is worth noting that recent empirical findings on the two superpowers rivalry suggest that in US/Soviet relations there have been instances (mostly related to the Third World) where the security dilemma was at work because the Soviet Union was merely taking advantage of opportunities - rather than creating them - *with the aim of weakening the US influence and position*.[36] (our emphasis). Thus, in many cases cooperation is inhibited both by fears that the other side will cheat and by hopes to gain a better distribution of the values in dispute.

(d) Were there instances in post-Cold War Greek-Turkish relations when a *deep security dilemma* was at work?

Robert Jervis has described the situation of a 'deep security dilemma' as a state of affairs where, unlike one based on mistrust that could be overcome, there are no missed opportunities for radically improving relations. In such a situation, both sides may be willing

to give up the chance of expansion if they can be made secure, but a number of other factors – the fear that the other's relative power is dangerously increasing, technology, events outside their control, and their subjective security requirements – put such a solution out of reach.[37]

(e) To what extent the Greek-Turkish conflict resembles the US-Soviet competition during the Cold War? Are there analogies in Greece/US, Turkey/US behavior?

With regard to the US/Soviet Union rivalry, it is worth-noted that in the beginning of the Cold War, the United States wanted to freeze the *status quo*. At any point in the Cold War – with the significant exception of its final years when victory was in sight – the United States would have been happy to sacrifice the possibility of further gains in return for a high degree of security. At the start of the Cold War, the image of the Soviet Union was as uremittingly hostile (if cautious). It can be argued that although the US was a security seeker and did not want to run major risks to roll back the Soviet influence, it was not hesitant to exploit opportunities to weaken US influence. Most interesting is the fact that these efforts were indistinguishable in their effect from expansionism, and very much resemble to what is called "deep" security dilemma, in the sense that although the US primarily sought security the unintended effect was to preclude mutually acceptable arrangements.[38]

Undoubtedly, credible answers on whether a security dilemma is at work can better be provided if both the Greek and the Turkish archives could be examined. However, contrary to other conflicts – such as the one between the superpowers in the Cold War era that have been possible to be examined through archival research – the Greek-Turkish one is still in progress while access to both Greek and Turkish archives of the post-1974 period with regard to the two states foreign relations is not allowed.

The basic aim of the project is, after empirically analysing certain aspects of the Greek-Turkish conflict, to sound out whether a security dilemma has been or still is at work. Of course, state behaviour

alone cannot say whether a security dilemma exists. A hostile attitude can be the product of the hope for gain or the fear of loss, of offensive drives as well as of defensive responses. Moreover, as it has already been stressed complexity and ambivalence are also present when one asks whether Greece and Turkey are driven primarily by fear rather than the hope for gain, as security dilemma analysis expects. It is not thus expected that the empirical evidence, whatever this may be, will yield *an unambiguous conclusion*. As a matter of fact, if the academic community still cannot decide whether World War I was the result of the security dilemma, it would be surprising that this special issue to come up with some unambiguous conclusions about the actual type of a conflict, which is still in progress.

Yet, the diagnosis of the existence of elements or/and particular types of the security dilemma in the Greek-Turkish conflict is politically attractive and useful. This is actually where the policy-relevance of this project lies, namely to identify the ways for the amelioration of the Greek-Turkish conflict and provide a good basis for a credible and mainly viable conciliation. Most importantly, the theoretical conclusions and policy implications of this project can in fact go beyond an interpretation of the conflict by creating a solid basis for the next step in the debate between Greek and Turkish 'epistemic communities', namely a *critical definition of the security dilemma*. Such a definition will reflect the contested nature of a politically contingent reality and recognize that Greece and Turkey are not actors that pursue a particular view of rationality.

As the official *rapprochement*, initiated by the two states' Foreign Ministers and greatly facilitated in 1999 by the catastrophic earthquakes that shook Turkey and Greece, has aptly demonstrated, groups within both states disagreed – and still disagree – on the desirability and possibility of cooperation. Indeed, particular groups argued – and still argue – that cooperation is impossible, conciliatory gestures naïve and a strong defense posture necessary. Some other groups, however, have seen   greater possibilities of cooperation and advocate policies designed to facilitate cooperation. Dealing with the security dilemma in a critical way, namely as a political dispute over what constitutes the

state's (either Greece or Turkey) interests and how best to pursue those interests, reveals the possibility that uncertainty can be transcended and that the Greek-Turkish security dilemma can be ameliorated.

With the exception of the most doctrinaire realists, there is a wide-spread belief – especially among more sophisticated neorealists – that humans do have some choice on the matter of the security dilemma and as a consequence the impact of the security dilemma can be mitigated through "improved anarchies"[39] and by the development of a mature society of states. The crucial question as to the Greek-Turkish conflict remains whether reassurance can be possible as well as whether mutual security is a goal that can be attained and under what particular circumstances. To that end, the analysis of the Greek-Turkish conflict with the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma can offer valuable insights as to the policies that need to be developed in order for arms competition to be reversed; crisis stability, increased and arms reduction, encouraged between Greece and Turkey.

NOTES

1. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler "The Security Dilemma" in John Baylis and N.J. Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas in World Politics. International Issues in a Changing World* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), p. 30.

2. Richard Smoke "A Theory of Mutual Security" in Richard Smoke and Andrei Kortunov (eds.), *Mutual Security: A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations* (London, 1991), p. 76.

3. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p. 31.

4. See Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", *International Organization* (Vol. 36, no. 2, 1982), p. 178 and Idem, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics* (Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1978), pp. 167-213.

5. John Foster Dulles used to believe that the Soviet Union it "does not need to be convinced of our good intentions. Khrushchev knows we are not aggressors and do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union". As quoted in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976), p. 68.

6. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, (trans. Rex Warner, London, 1970), p. 25.

7. Xenophon wrote "I know of cases that have occurred in the past when people, sometimes as the result of slanderous information and sometimes merely on the strength of suspicion, have become frightened of each other and then, in their anxiety to strike first before anything is done to them, have done irreparable harm to those who neither intended nor even wanted to do them any harm". As quoted in Gideon Akavia, "Defensive Defense and the Nature of Armed Conflict", *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (Vol. 14, No. 1, 1991), p. 29.

8. Rousseau describes five hungry men cooperating to hunt for a stag. The hunger of each would be satisfied by the fifth portion of a stag, but the hunger of one would be satisfied by a hare. When one of the men spies a hare within reach he leaves the group to grab it, so allowing the stag to escape. His own hunger is satisfied, but his defection and the collapse of cooperation this causes leaves his fellows hungry. The fundamental problem in such a self-help situation is that none of the hunters knows whether the others will defect and chase the hare. Because of this uncertainty and lack of trust, it is understandable that each hunter will assume the worst and pursue his 'apparent' interest at the expense of his 'real' interest.

9. Herbert Butterfield considered the inability 'to enter into the other man's counter fear' as the central feature of the security dilemma. See Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (Collins, London, 1951), p. 51.

10. John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", *World Politics* (Vol. 2, No. 2, 1950), p. 157.

11. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1972), p. 187.

12. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 2078.

13. The terms are coined to Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler.

14. To most theorists of the security dilemma, it is the 'benign intent' that lies at the core of the security dilemma. See, among others, Alan Collins, *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War* (Keele University Press, New York, 1995), p. 10-11.

15. See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, op. cit., p. 66.

16. See Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes*, op. cit., p. 360.

17. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, op. cit., pp. 62-7.

18. See Jack Snyder "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914" in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), *Psychology and Deterrence* (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985), p. 160.

19. As Lord Grey, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain at the eve of the First World War, so eloquently put it "The distinction between preparations made with the intention of going to war and preparations against attack is a true distinction, clear and definite in the minds of those who build up armaments. But it is a distinction **that is not obvious or certain to others** (our emphasis). Each government, therefore, while resenting any suggestion that its own measures are anything more than for defense, regards similar measures of another Government as preparation to attack". As quoted in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, op. cit., p. 69.

20. See Robert Jervis, *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma*, op. cit., p. 169. The structural security dilemma emphasizes how a belief in the advantage of the offensive can exacerbate the fear of attack and create - not only intensify - a security dilemma.

21. *Ibid*, p. 189. On this line of reasoning see the 'recipe' of the "massive first-strike" provided by the Greek philosopher Panayotis Kondylis in order for the Hellenism's gradual shrinkage to be reversed. Kondylis proposed strategy is based on the false assumption – common to Greek philosophers who – inter alia- lack a deep knowledge of Turkey's domestic politics, yet they are not hesitant to write on Greek-Turkish relations 'on the side' – that a Greek-Turkish war would result in Greece's destruction while peace will soon or late turn Greece into a Turkey's satellite. Kondylis' proposed strategy vis-à-vis Turkey seems to fulfil George Kennan's dictum that 'those who live by the worst-case forecast may die by the worst-case forecast'. It must be stressed, however, that in Kondylis' logic Greek-Turkish relations are far from carrying even elements of the security dilemma. As a matter of fact, Greek-Turkish relations are close to what is described as an alternative to the security dilemma, namely that one of the two states in conflict (i.e., Turkey) is inherently expansionistic and aims to achieve non-security goals. In other words Turkey's behavior resembles Hitler's behavior in the 1930s. Thus, paraphrasing Herz, it can be argued that "it can hardly be maintained that it is a [Turkish] security dilemma, which lay at the heart of that conflict, but rather one man's, or one regime's ambition to ['Finlandize' Greece and turn it into a state of 'limited sovereignty']. See Panayotis Kondylis, *Theory of War* (Themelio, Athens, 1997, in Greek), especially "Geopolitical and Strategic Parameters of a Greek-Turkish War", pp. 381-411.

22. For a critique on neorealism's *status-quo* bias, see Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's *Status-Quo* Bias What Security Dilemma?", *Security Studies* (Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 1996), pp. 90-121.

23. Recent studies indicate that there was a widespread belief among many Germans that the choice facing their country before World War I was between "world power or decline". See, inter alia, Fritz Fischer, *World Power or Decline* (Norton, New York, 1974).

24. See Robert Jervis "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?", *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Vol.3, No.1, Winter 2001), p.40.

25. See Jack Snyder, *Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914,* op. cit., pp. 153-79. This is in fact the line of reasoning of the traditional Russian belief, namely that 'fear bred respect'. According to Jervis, France's policy towards Germany in the inter-war period was also based on the premise that French security depended on German insecurity, since for France Germany could be neither conciliated nor reassured and therefore France's military superiority was necessary to deter German power. See Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes*, p. 177.

26. See Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p. 31.

27. See John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1979) and Idem, *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*, p. 157.

28. Jack Snyder, *The Imperialist Dilemma*, op. cit., pp. 165-6.

29. For recent explanation of the Cold War conflict between the two super powers through the use of the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, *Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?*, pp. 36-60. Other attempts include Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (revised edition, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); and Alan Collins, *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

30. An epistemic approach to Greek-Turkish relations would also be of particular importance in analyzing the interaction between domestic and international sources of state behavior as well as the role ideas play in shaping each state policy. However, it seems that so far the approach Greek and Turkish 'epistemic communities' (i.e., networks of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular domain) follow in order to analyze the Greek-Turkish conflict is, more or less, based on the same 'consensual knowledge', which is a shared set of beliefs about a particular cause-effect relationship. This relationship is most often overburden by a set of particular cognitive dynamics which force almost all members of the 'epistemic communities' on both sides to highlight the structural reasons that make states becoming power-maximizing rational egoists who define security in zero-sum terms. On the literature on epistemic and intellectual communities, see Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", *International* Organization (Vol. 46, 1992), pp. 1-35 and Emmanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Arms Control", International Organization (Vol. 46, 1992), pp. 101-146. On ideas defined as 'consensual knowledge', see J.T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change. Soviet/Russian Behaviour and the End of the Cold War* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997).

31. Cognitive dynamics may include - among others - ethnocentrism, 'doctrinal realism', ideological fundamentalism, strategic reductionism and zero-sum thinking.

32. Robert Jervis, *Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?*, op. cit., p. 39.

33. Ibid, pp. 58-60.

34. On relative gains argument see Joseph Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1990) and Robert Powell "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory", *American Political Science Review* (No. 85, December 1991), pp. 1303-20.

35. See Robert Jervis, *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma*, op. cit., pp. 167-213.

36. See Robert Jervis, *Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?*, op. cit., pp. 52-3.

37. *Ibid*, p.41.

38. *Ibid*, pp. 55-60.

39. In Buzan's words, such a 'mature anarchy' will be composed of "large, politically strong, relatively self-reliant, relatively tolerant, and relatively evenly powered units". See Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Harvester and Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p. 208. See also Idem, "Is International Security Possible?" in Ken Booth (ed.), *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (Unwin Hyman, London, 1991), pp.31-53

Power Politics, Security Dilemma, and Crisis Behaviour: The Case of Imia

Kostas Ifantis*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article cherche à cerner la nature du dilemme sécuritaire greco-turc à travers le comportment des acteurs de la crise d'Imia, tout en démêlant les événements qui constituent cette crise. Selon l'auteur les facteurs structuraux revètent une importance capitale ainsi que les objectifs revisionnistes de la Turquie, décrits comme n'étant pas liés à la sécurité de cet Etat, constituent une source majeure d'instabilité et de conflit

ABSTRACT

This article unravels the string of events surrounding the Imia Crisis while seeking to address the nature of the Greek-Turkish security dilemma with respect to crisis behaviour. The analytical framework is defined along clear neo-realist lines, where insecurity and conflict is caused by the inescapable self-help nature of the system and the emergence, thus, of balance of power and/or power politics state behaviour. The author argues that the structure of Greek-Turkish relations alone, defined as the distribution of capabilities and the anarchic nature of the system, cannot account for the security dilemma (and its intensity) which exists between the two states. Structural factors are extremely important, but equally important are the revisionist goals, described as non-security expansion, of one of the two actors – Turkey, as a major cause of instability and conflict. The predatory, power maximization Turkish behaviour has resulted in power politics. This premise is supported empirically by a review of Turkey's crisis conduct in the Imia incident of 1996.

Background

Since 1980 Greece and Turkey have been in a relationship of low intensity conflict 'disrupted' by shorter or longer détentes. This situation has also been described as a relationship of manageable tension. Regardless of terminology, there exists the disturbing potential of escalation leading to a more serious crisis with alarming destabilizing effects at a regional level.

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In January 1996 a team of Turkish journalists removed a Greek flag from the islet of Imia in the Dodecanese complex and hoisted a Turkish one. Greek troops replaced the Greek flag. The Greek Foreign Ministry considered the affair closed until the Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller laid an official claim on that and many other Greek islets and commenced a confrontation that almost escalated to warfare. The crisis was defused through US diplomatic intervention but yet another item was added to the overburdened agenda of Greek-Turkish problems.[1] According to Mavridis and Fakiolas, the Imia Crisis, "marked, primarily, a change in the way Turkey pursued coercion. Using military force for the first time, Ankara explicitly challenged Greek territorial integrity. The bloodless occupation of the western part of the Imia islets coupled with the military, diplomatic, and political management of the ensuing escalation lead to the conclusion that the Turkish leadership had adopted new policies in order to serve its objectives."[2] These objectives have been clearly perceived by Greece as revisionist, causing major security problems.

Ironically, despite the end of the Cold War and resulting overnight transformation of the military situation in Europe, Greece experienced the change less intensely than all its neighbours and allies. The post-bipolar order did not change the basic parameters as these have been consistently articulated by both Greek élites and public opinion. The Greek point of view treats Greece as 'status quo' country and Turkey as an adversary who has never stopped pursuing revisionist policies in Cyprus, the Aegean, and Thrace as well as aiming at altering the balance of power and interests in the region.

Argument and Context

This article seeks to address the nature of the Greek-Turkish security dilemma with respect to the crisis behaviour. The analytical framework is defined along clear neo-realist lines, where insecurity and conflict is caused by the inescapable self-help nature of the system and the emergence, thus, of balance of power and/or power politics state behaviour. My argument is that the structure of Greek-Turkish rela-

tions alone, defined as the distribution of capabilities and the anarchic nature of the system, cannot account for the security dilemma (and its intensity) which exists between the two states. Structural factors are extremely important, but equally important are the revisionist goals, described as non-security expansion, of one of the two actors – Turkey, as a major cause of instability and conflict. The predatory, power maximization Turkish behavior has resulted in a power politics Greek-Turkish interaction, which finds vivid expression in the numerous recurring crises in the Aegean and Cyprus. This premise is supported empirically by a review of Turkey's crisis conduct in the Imia incident of 1996.

The neo-realism perspective on international politics derives from its two core assumptions: the centrality of autonomous states wishing to survive and the salience of international anarchy.[3] Because world politics takes place within a self-help realm, states must rely on their own resources to protect themselves and further their interests. Whether they desire safety or opportunistic expansion, states are better served by superior, not equal, power. For this reason, statesmen are usually more concerned with relative advantages than with absolute gains. The problem of uneven gains giving advantage to one side or another makes international cooperation difficult to achieve and hard to maintain. The neo-realist paradigm is built on a fundamental belief in strong links between anarchy, security, and relative gains. Though states are not in a constant state of war, anarchy means that nations must constantly fear enslavement or extinction. Because the consequences of a mistake can be catastrophic, states must be cautious in assessing the intentions of both foes and allies, since today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy.

In the neo-realist perspective, the security dilemma refers to the notion that a state's efforts to increase its security, by threatening another state which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state's security.[4] The two states, without intending to do so, thus find themselves in a spiral of mounting hostility and arms buildup. The intensity with which the security dilemma operates depends upon a number of conditions: the degree

of trust between states; the extent to which uncertainty and incomplete information produce misperception of intentions; whether offensive or defensive forces would have the advantage; and whether states can distinguish between others' offensive and defensive armaments.[5] The operation of the security dilemma is one of the key reasons that peace under anarchy may not be stable. Even if no states have explicitly aggressive intentions, anarchy fuels the security dilemma and can produce spirals that lead to growing hostility and, ultimately, to conflict. "The possibility that force may be used to settle disputes, even among peaceful, status-quo powers means that states cannot escape the security dilemma-an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others. Insecurity and the use of force, realists argue are enduring attributes of the self-help international system".[6] The logic of the security dilemma arises from the anarchic structure of international relations.

Indeed, structure matters. However, in the absence of a rigid bipolar distribution of power in the wider international system, more attention should be paid to unit-level variables. When dealing with regional conflicts, like the Greek-Turkish competition, while structure-level variables are extremely important, studying unit-level variables becomes necessary. This means that, differences in state goals-whether states seek the minimum power required for security or additional power for goals other than security-have to be accorded an equal consideration along with anarchy and the distribution of capabilities. The attempt in this paper, thus, is to bring the concept of the revisionist state back in the neo-realist context. At bottom, the concept of the security dilemma in international politics rests on the fundamental assumption that some states are perceived to be either currently harbouring aggressive designs, or that they may become aggressive in the future.

Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains are mainly responsible for power politics behaviors – instead of the more 'benign' security-seeking balancing behavior - that can prevail in international relations. The aim of revisionist states is "self-extension", which often requires power enhancement. "Goals of self-extension

generally place an extremely high premium on the resort to power as a means. The chances of bringing about any major change in the international *status quo* by means other than power or even violence are slim indeed. Because it is also true that self-extension is often sought passionately if not fanatically and by actors of various sorts of motivations, the tendency is toward frequent and intensive quests for enhanced power by nations belonging to this category".[7] Aggressive states trigger recurring power politics turmoils (crises). Therefore, the level of system stability depends on unit-level variations, namely on the strength of revisionist (status-quo) forces. In the following section, the extent to which the power politics expectations on revisionism and aggressive conduct in crises are confirmed empirically within the context of the Greek-Turkish crisis over the Imia islets is examined.

Power Politics: Aggressive Turkish Behaviour in the Imia Crisis

As a school of thought in international relations, power politics makes an almost unqualified equation of the Hobbesian state of nature with international politics. Each state is, at least potentially, in the situation of a war against all others. State-to-state relations are dominated by conflict. The very basic assumption is the state quest for maximization of power. Thus, power is seen both as an end and as a means. Power is not only a crucial means for achieving security, but also a key objective for its own sake.[8] According to the power politics perspective, states, wishing to maximize their power and seeking superiority, will embark on expansionist foreign policies and adopt offensive military doctrines. In times of crisis, such inclinations are likely to result in aggressive, or force-prone, behaviour.[9]

The popular image of Greek-Turkish relations meets nicely the expectations of the power politics perspective concerning aggressive security and power-maximizing state behaviour. This appears to be especially true during recurring crises in the Aegean and in Cyprus in which Turkey either used military force or threatened to do so and thereby posed a serious threat to regional peace. Turkey's crisis behaviour seems to have been especially competitive and confrontational.

During the Imia Crisis elements of aggressive Turkish conduct are rather easy to point out.

The beginning of the incident dates back to December 26, 1995, when a Turkish freighter ran aground on an uninhabited rocky islet group, called Imia, just off the eastern coast of the Dodecanese Island of Kalymnos[10] and about four miles off the Turkish coast. The freighter captain's refusal of Greek assistance coupled with the position of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Imia Islets are in Turkish territorial waters constituted an indirect challenge to Greek territorial integrity. The *verbal note* submitted to the Greek embassy in Ankara, on December 29, stating "that Kardak rocks are an integral part of Turkish territory"[11] was a direct challenge and thus represented quite a confrontational Turkish attitude aimed clearly at provoking a crisis. Indicative of this fact is the Turkish Foreign Ministry's not offering any credible argument or evidence to back its claim.

The Greek response came ten days later with a *verbal note* dated January 9, 1996, stating that the Imia islets belonged to Greece, and making a detail reference to the 1932 agreements between Italy and Turkey, which provided for the delimitation of the Italo-Turkish boundary between the Dodecanese islands and the Turkish coast.[12] It was a moderate diplomatic response, and a clear exhibition of Greece's commitment to the status quo and its ability to react.[13]

Although Turkey had not yet replied, on January 16, Greece suddenly increased surveillance measures in the area of the islets, an unanticipated action given the political language in the Greek *verbal note*. "This partial mobilization was not explicitly linked to the dispute over the salvage, in the sense that the Greeks had failed to give prior warning to Turkey of the military implications of its stance. The mobilization could be taken as an unreliable indication of deterrence. In fact, the military warning of deterrence seemed to be inconsistent with the political warning of deterrence".[14]

Meanwhile, Costas Simitis, having formed a new government on the January 22, tried to reshape the Greek strategy of deterrence. The

main feature of his approach was to keep a low profile and convey a clear indication of deterrence through diplomatic channels. The Greek minister of foreign affairs openly voiced the opinion that the entire issue was not worthy of debate. His statement clearly demonstrated Greece's will to avoid escalation of the dispute, while the new Greek *verbal note*, communicated to Ankara on January 26, aimed at placing emphasis on the seriousness of the issue for Greek interests. On January 27, the Turkish newspaper *Hurriyet* sent a boatload of journalists to Imia, where they took dawn the Greek flag, recently placed there by the mayor of Kalymnos, and hoisted a Turkish one. Media in each country took up the issue, in several cases with exaggerated, jingoistic coverage. Forced by events, the Greek government expanded the military measures of deterrence in tandem with the intensification of its diplomatic efforts. On January 28, a naval vessel was ordered to restore the Greek flag and a contingent of commandos landed on the islets giving a clear military warning of deterrence. Compared to the mobilization during the first phase, this move was at least timely and was linked to the ongoing incident. The Greek minister of foreign affairs briefed the ambassadors of the European Union's member-states and the United States of America on the incident, presented a new *verbal note* to Ankara, on January 28, and made it clear that the Greek government was determined to re-examine its position on the issue of Turkey's customs union with the EU.

The Greek actions, however, had no effect on Turkey's behavior. On January 29, Ankara issued another *verbal note* to Athens challenging Greek sovereignty over not only Imia, but numerous other Aegean islets as well, and demanding the removal of the Greek troops and flag. The Greek response came the same day in the Greek Parliament by the Prime Minister himself, who rigorously rejected the Turkish demands and demonstrated Greece's will to counter Turkish revisionism.

From that point onwards, Ankara increases the pace of response, thus, escalating the tension. Turkish naval forces become increasingly challenging and its conduct rather 'reckless', while Turkish air force violates Greek airspace. On January 30, Turkish National Security Council adopts a hard and rather aggressive stance. Moreover, Prime

Minister Tansu Ciller via the US President demanded the settlement of the dispute within the next two hours. According to Mavridis and Fakiolas, 'this move aimed to force Greece to conform to Turkish claims by political means. It represented an escalation since it transformed the low-intensity crisis into an all-out crisis. It was a political ultimatum, which substantiated a strategy of the escalation of crisis with brinkmanship diplomacy'.[15] After the expiration of the deadline, Turkish troops established a foothold on one unguarded (Imia) islet, while the Turkish government suggested a mutual disengagement and the initiation of negotiations. It becomes profoundly clear that the majority of the political and military leadership in Ankara is not interested in diffusing the crisis but aims at initiating an armed conflict in the Aegean.[16] An armed conflict that would almost certainly lead to a situation where Greece – even after 'winning' - would negotiate on what Turkey describes as 'outstanding issues in the Aegean', after a forceful US intervention. The 'reckless' readiness with which Turkey employed threats to use force, and actually used force is worth noting. 'Recklessness' in this case does not spring from a misperception of the balance of interests, miscalculation of a rival's resolve, or miscalculation of relative capabilities; rather, it is similar to aggressive conduct in being prone to resort to force quickly.

The Imia Crisis should be then understood as a clear demonstration of Turkish revisionism. A revisionism that was reinforced by changes in the function of the Turkish state caused by an alarming neo-authoritarianism and a nationalist hatred brought about by the Kurdish problem.[17] As Kourkoulas has indicated, the military campaign in Southeastern Turkey has resulted in a situation where the use of force or the threat to use force has become totally accepted as a legitimate foreign policy behavior by large parts of the Turkish society. The dominant position of the military in Turkish political life reinforces these tendencies.[18]

In Imia, Ankara saw an opportunity "to fabricate a case so as to put forward the idea of 'grey areas' and push Greece to the negotiations table"[19] in order to revise the status-quo in the Aegean. The Turkish position during the crisis "became a much wider challenge to Greek

sovereignty over small islets along the maritime border, as well as to the border itself". [20] The issue of 'grey areas' in the Aegean had never been raised by Ankara before the Imia Crisis. It should be seen in the context of Turkey's fear of the extension of Greek territorial waters[21] from six to twelve miles. The Turkish argument was that Turkey would lose out with regard to its Aegean high sea rights. The importance of this issue for Turkey was evident in its threat to Greece that any extension would be a cause of war.

Knowing well the weakness of its case, Turkey was reluctant to take the matter to The Hague. In such a context, it seemed that the foreign policy and defence establishments in Ankara invented the notion of 'grey areas' – choosing thus to stoke tension in the Aegean – in order to put more pressure on Greece. As Athanassopoulou notes, "if Turkey could push its borders westwards and thus strengthen its position regarding such questions as the delimitation of the continental shelf, the extent of national air-space and territorial waters." In the months that followed Imia, Ankara pursued the concept with rigour.

In an article published on 13 June 1996, the Turkish daily *Milliyet* listed the inhabited islets of Farmakonisi and Agathonisi as 'gray areas'. Along with disputing Greek sovereignty over islets close to its coast, Turkey in June 1996 also disputed Greece's sovereignty over the island of Gavdos, which lies off the southwest of Crete and is inhabited by some three hundred Greek fishermen. During the planning of the NATO exercise Dynamic Mix, the representative of the Turkish general staff submitted a statement according to which Turkey opposed the inclusion of the Greek island of Gavdos in the exercise 'due to the disputed situation regarding sovereignty'. It should be noted that the régime of Gavdos Island has nothing to do with the Treaty of Lausanne, since it is under Greek sovereignty in accordance with the arrangements of the 1913 Treaty of London.[22]

This Imia aftermath steeled Greek public opinion enormously. However, with Gavdos, Ankara appeared to push its luck too far. The reaction of Athens, this time fully supported by Washington, was strong and Turkey seemed to have withdrawn its claim. It should be

noted, however, that Ankara had indicated clearly its intentions to raise the stakes over the issue of the Greek territorial waters – in the first given instance – at least two years before the 1996 crisis. Ankara continued and intensified the policy of blocking the operationalization of the NATO Commands in Greece, which had been decided back in December 1992 (COMLANDCENT, 7ATAF, MND-SOUTH), while in November 1994 openly attempted to 'increase the heat' in the Aegean by transferring the most important annual Turkish military exercise Deniz Kurdu 2-94, from the Black Sea to the Aegean, and re-scheduling it for the period 14-24 November 1994. 16 November 1994 was the date of entering into force of the New Convention of the Law of the Sea. At the same time, Turkey reinforced its troops in the occupied northern part of Cyprus.[23]

The Imia Crisis was defused through US diplomatic intervention and a return to *status-quo ante* was secured, and, in that context, the outcome of the crisis – contrary to its management — was satisfactory for Athens. The US role and intervention should be interpreted as one of the most influential structural factors in the Greek-Turkish conundrum. It is important to note that the overall American strategic interests in the area have almost inevitably drawn the US into the dispute. The Washington approach was always a pragmatic one, since no American initiative has succeeded in achieving the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations. That is why the US has not been as involved in the search for a solution as actively as one might have expected. Moreover, during the Cold War, successive US administrations felt that the Aegean issues were not as acute as others and therefore placed them low on Washington's list of priorities. Although the dispute was recognized as posing a threat to NATO's southeastern flank, the primary objective of US foreign policy elites has been to control Greek-Turkish tensions and the administration of the implications of the problem for the function of the alliance.

For decades, a major failure of US foreign policy has been the inability to get its two allies astride the Aegean to settle their differences through compromise and cooperation. Washington's efforts have not, of course, been entirely fruitless. In January 1996, American diplo-

matic intervention prevented the crisis over Imia from escalating into violent conflict. In the framework of NATO, the augmented emphasis placed on the Mediterranean stability necessitated, more than ever, a cohesive southeastern flank free from the Greek-Turkish impasse. In what appeared to be a critical step in easing an extremely strained relationship – after the 1996 crisis – the US in the backstage of the Madrid NATO Summit in 1997 pressured the two countries to sign the Madrid Joint Declaration, whereby they committed to engage themselves to a peaceful and consensual settlement of their differences. 'If both sides indeed adhered to it, the communiqué portended a significant step in advancing stability and security in the eastern Mediterranean.'[24] But the expected shifts in relations did not follow. The Cyprus issue, not specifically alluded to in the Madrid Declaration, offered the setting for new-old tensions during the same year. Joint Greek and Greek Cypriot military exercises a few months later were 'enriched' by intense and quite alarming 'dogfights' in the Greek and Cypriot airspace.

Ameliorating the Security Dilemma: The Rapprochement

International anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation among sovereign states difficult. Objectively, there can be little strategic rationale for premeditated conflict between two state actors like Greece and Turkey. Open conflict would pose enormous political risks for both of them, quite apart from uncertainties at the operational level. Yet the risk of an accidental clash remains, given the continuing armed air and naval operations in close proximity and the highly charged atmosphere surrounding competing claims.[25] The Aegean and especially Cyprus are sensitive national questions *par excellence*. Moreover, with both countries modernizing their military capabilities, the potential for destructiveness and escalation is far greater today than in the past. A Greek-Turkish clash would have profound implications for Turkey and the West. It would also have operational consequences for the US. In strategic terms, a conflict under current conditions might result in an open-ended estrangement of Turkey from

the West, since the Cold War imperatives that argued for restraint in sanctions against Turkey in 1974 are absent today. More broadly, a Greek-Turkish conflict might encourage 'civilizational' cleavages in the West. 'Even Israel might be sensitive to the political consequences of too overt a military relationship in the context of a conflict over Cyprus, especially if Israeli weapons were used, and might look for ways to scale back its cooperation.'[26] The risk of a clash and the likely strategic and operational consequences make risk reduction an imperative for the US (and NATO). The same is true for the EU. However, the EU has all the necessary systemic properties to turn an actor from an aggressive power-maximizer to a less threatening security-seeker.

Normalization, even at an embryonic level, represents a change in Greek-Turkish relations that is indeed strategic in nature. The Greek decision to support the offer of EU candidacy to Turkey at the December 1999 Helsinki summit – although emphasizing particular conditions favorable to Greek interests – reflects a new, strategic approach to the future of relations with Ankara, and it certainly represents a major step towards dampening the sources of unitended spirals. The strategic motivations for the Helsinki compromise and the Greek-Turkish raprochement were facilitated by a series of proximate factors. There was a perception on both sides in the wake of the Imia crisis, the 1997-98 tension over the planned deployment of S-300 surface-to-air missiles on Cyprus, and the Spring 1999 Ocalan affair, that brinkmanship had reached very dangerous levels. As noted earlier, an accident or miscalculation in the Aegean could easily escalate to large scale warfare. "This sense of peering over the brink, palpable in 1996, was arguably not unlike the effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis on US-Soviet relations more than 30 years earlier".[27] The Helsinki decisions proved to be instrumental in reversing the deterioration in EU-Turkish relations that had followed the Luxembourg and Cardiff summits and offered a path toward closer Turkish integration in Europe, reducing, thus, the Greek-Turkish tension.

The EU, as a collective security entity, can ameliorate the security dilemma since by nature promotes and deepens cooperation. Over

time, repeated acts of cooperation alter expectations and foster trust and confidence. As states come to expect each other to reciprocate concessions, rather than to exploit them, the wariness that fuels the security dilemma gradually subsides. Moreover, the EU engagement, by increasing transparency and thereby reducing uncertainty and the chances of misperception, decreases the likelihood of unintended spirals. Uncertainty is one of the key factors fueling the security dilemma.

Greece and Turkey cannot easily escape systemic-structural impediments, but they should make every effort to achieve a relatively high level of cooperation by exploring the opportunities offered by the collective security environment of the EU. The challenge for Greece (and Turkey) is enormous. As Jervis notes, it is impossible to eliminate the security dilemma, but it can be ameliorated: 'The ideal solution for a *status quo* power would be to escape from the state of nature. But escape is impossible. The security dilemma cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated. Bonds of shared values and interests can be developed. If actors care about what happens to others and believe that others care about them, they will develop trust and can cooperate for mutual benefit.'[28] The conditions that make collective security possible indeed ameliorate the security dilemma to a certain extent. Uncertainty about motives would be reduced. When the actors hold compatible views of an acceptable bilateral, regional and international order and share a minimum sense of political community, ideational change has already mitigated the suspision and competitiveness that fuel the security dilemma.

However, the European challenge for Turkey is without precedent. So far, Turkish élites have not had to confront the dilemma posed by a strong nationalist tradition and a powerful attachment to state sovereignty, on the one hand, with the prospect of integration in a sovereignty-diluting EU, on the other. Even short of full membership, candidacy implies a great institutionalized scrutiny, convergence and compromise. From the least political issues (e.g. food regulations) to high politics, a closer relationship with formal EU structures will pose

tremendous pressures on traditional Turkish concepts of sovereignty at many levels. For an EU member state, pursuing nationalist options outside the integration context has become almost impossible.

If there is a 'Helsinki spirit', that more than anything else reveals the need – for both countries – for a more 'strategic' approach towards each other. Both countries have a longer-term strategic interest in seeing Turkey's EU vocation succeed. Such a success has the potential of changing Greece's perception of threat, and fostering political and economic reform in a Turkey reassured about its place in Europe. The US and Europe will benefit from a more effective and predictable strategic partnership with Turkey. A key task for US foreign policy élites will be to make sure that Greek-Turkish brinkmanship no longer threatens broader interests in regional détente and integration. The stakes of bringing to fruition this strategy of reciprocal accommodation are extremely high. Lasting *rapprochement* would yield enormous benefits for everybody involved.[29]

However, such a *rapprochement* remains nascent and fragile for three main reasons. First, most of the changes have come on the Greek side. There has been no major shift in Turkish policy. Without a Turkish gesture to match Greece's lifting of its veto to Turkey's EU candidacy it may prove difficult for Athens to maintain domestic support over the long run. Indeed, the Greek government operates with the benefit of the doubt even within its own party confines. Second, so far the *rapprochement* has been limited to less-controversial areas such as trade, the environment, and tourism. The really sensitive issues have yet to be addressed. The current climate will prove its durability only when these issues are included in the reconciliation agenda. Finally, there is the issue of Cyprus. While Cyprus is technically not a bilateral dispute, it is an integral element of the broader fabric of the relationship and cannot be ignored. Although Athens has made a politically costly effort to downplay the linkage, without progress on Cyprus the current *rapprochement* will be impossible to sustain over time.[30]

More than anything, however, the current détente is intimately linked to the evolution of the broader Turkish-European relationship.

Stagnation or deterioration in relations between Brussels and Ankara would complicate and perhaps threaten the improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. Even relative stagnation in EU-Turkish relations would almost certainly result in a sense of disappointment and uncertainty, and would make Turkish behaviour towards Greece more unpredictable and perhaps harder for the US to control. Athens has a high stake in ensuring that Tuerkey's EU candidacy does prove real. The longer the relationship between Turkey and the EU remains overshadowed by uncertainties, the more the US remains 'the only and undisputed' arbiter in an essentially balance of power game. The potential deterioration of Turkey's ties with the EU will further increase the importance of strong ties to the US.

Conclusion

One factor that triggers security dilemmas under anarchy is the emergence of predatory states, the emergence of revisionist behaviour. Indeed, this fact allows us to explain why states should balance rather than 'bandwagon', and why they should be concerned about relative, not absolute, gains and losses. The ultimate concern of (some) states, in an augmented neo-realist perspective, is not only for security but for power as well. The objectives of (some) actors – whether they seek to maintain or overthrow the *status quo* – should be of importance to studies of security dilemmas. In that context, including unit-level attributes as causal variables should not be seen as reductionism. As atomistic actors, revisionist states are more intensive power-maximizers and less security- maximizers. This is especially true with regard to unlimited revisionist states bent on expansion and willing to take great risks to achieve it.[31] Revisionist states tend to value what they covet more than what they currently possess, though this ratio may vary considerably among their ranks and they will not hesitate to employ military force to destroy the existing arrangement among states. Because self-extension almost invariably calls for additional power, countries that seek self-extension tend to be the initiators of power competition and the resort to violence.

It should be emphasized, once more, that all post-1974 Greek governments have conceptualized the Greek-Turkish conflict in terms of Turkish revisionism. Any attempt to normalize bilateral relations is inevitably conditioned not only by the thesis that Ankara should stop pursuing any *anti-status quo* policies, but also by the need to find a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, acceptable to both communities. Military and diplomatic deterrence was, thus, indispensable to the Greek concept of survival. To policy-makers in Athens the stakes seemed extremely high; successful deterrence generated at best an uneasy peace, whereas failure would mean the transformation of Greek islands and Cyprus into battlefields. The Greek policy has had two dimensions: it has been both a policy of deterrence, and a policy of political de-escalation. This twin character has been compatible with the crisis prevention policy of the US, and has enabled Athens and Washington to converge on the specific issue of relaxation of tension in the Aegean.

In the case of Imia, "Turkey relied on several offensive policies of crisis management strategy, which fit the political and military concept of limited war.... Turkey employs the threat of use or the actual use of force to oblige Greece to comply with its demands. Athens usually perceives this position as Ankara's intention to engage in all-out war.... The occupation of the islet was a combined implementation of the strategies of limited, reversible probe and of *fait accompli*, which resulted in moving the conflict up from diplomatic to military engagement."[32] The Turkish conduct was profoundly aggressive and confrontational aiming at intended confrontations and premeditated armed conflict. Aggressive and confrontational conduct means that Turkey was quick to resort to force or to threaten the use of force disproportionately to what is at stake and how it affected its vital security interests. Turkish behaviour in Imia was guided by 'military logic,' using force as a blunt, crude instrument rather as a flexible, refined psychological device for diplomatic purposes.[33] Turkey was neither inclined to show sensitivity to Greece's interests nor responsive to Greece's signalling of its commitments. Indeed, Turkey acted aggressively in order to deliberately manufacture a crisis as a pretext for an

intended armed conflict – limited or all-out. An armed conflict is intended to the extent that a deliberate decision has been made to initiate it in a context that allows the state a choice between war and no war.⁴ The role of military force in the Imia Crisis does meet power politics expectations. The use of force or the threat to use force by Ankara was guided by military as well as diplomatic logic, aiming at an escalation that would have been difficult to control and would have required Turkey to up the ante further.

At the dawn of the new century, despite guarded post-earthquake and post-Helsinki optimism, the prospects for Greek-Turkish relations remain uncertain. The Aegean and Cyprus will remain potential flashpoints and pose an ongoing problem of crisis prevention for the US and Europe. The Greek sense of insecurity in relation to a neighbor of continental scale and uncertain strategic orientation has been sustained by Turkish revisionism. Of course, this is not a new phenomenon. The new element is Turkey's post Cold-War domestic and foreign policy agenda, the extent to which US policy will prove to be successful in defusing any new crisis, and the extent to which progress in EU-Turkish relations would successfully "anchor" Turkey even more closely to European institutional environment. Reinforcing Turkey's European vocation would render nationalist approaches counterproductive and therefore less attractive to Ankara, thus lending greater stability in the Aegean.

NOTES

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2. Mavridis and Fakiolas, "Strategy of Crisis Management and the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: The Case of the Imia Islets", in Christodoulos P. Yallourides and Panayotis J. Tsakonas (eds), *Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War* (Athens and New Rochelle, N.Y., Caratzas, 2001).

3. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

4. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.

5. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma"; and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-113.

6. Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?", in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 116.

7. Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference", in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), as cited in Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias", p. 99.

8. Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990, pp. 34-36.

9. Benjamin Miller, "Competing Realist Perspectives on Great Power Crisis Behavior", in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 328.

10. The narrative of the events is based on the very helpful compilation produced by Mavridis and Fakiolas, "Strategy of Crisis Management", pp. 205-035, and on the excellent analysis of Alkis Kourkoulas, *Imia: Critical Approach of the Turkish Factor*, (Athens: I. Sideris, 1997), pp. 26-55 (in Greek).

11. Kourkoulas, *Imia*, p. 153.

12. Kourkoulas, *Imia*, pp. 154-155.

13. Mavridis and Fakiolas, "Strategy of Crisis Management", p. 205.

14. Mavridis and Fakiolas, "Strategy of Crisis Management", p. 205.

15. Mavridis and Fakiolas, "Strategy of Crisis Management", p. 205.

16. Kourkoulas, *Imia*, p. 51.

17. See Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).

18. Kourkoulas, *Imia*, p. 26.

19. Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1997), p. 86.

20. M. James Wilkinson, "The United States, Turkey, and Greece – Three's a Crowd" in Morton Abramowitz (ed.) *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*, (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000), p. 200.

21. Athanassopoulou, "Blessing in Disguise?", p. 86.

22. Veremis, "The Protracted Crisis", pp. 44-45.

23. See Christos Lymberis, *National Strategy and Crisis Management* (Athens: Piotita, 1997), pp. 219-238 (in Greek).

24. S.Victor Papacosma, "NATO, Greece, and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era" in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds), *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*, (New York: Pella, 1999), pp. 61-62.

25. Ian O. Lesser, *NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean*, (RAND, 2000), p. 32.

26. Lesser, *NATO Looks South*, pp. 34-35.

27. Ian Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee, Michele Zanini, Katia Vlachos, *Greece's New Geopolitics*, (RAND, 2001), p. 22.

28. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, pp. 82-83.

29. Charles A. Kupchan, "Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Strategic Interests and High Stakes", in *The Strategic Regional Report*, vol. 5, No. 2, (February 2000), p. 9.

30. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Is it Durable?", in *The Strategic Regional Report*, Vol. 5, No. 4, (May/June 2000), p. 15.

31. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias", p. 114.

32. Mavridis and Fakiolas, "Strategy of Crisis Management", p. 205.

33. Miller, "Competing Realist Perspectives", pp. 312-313.

34. Miller, "Competing Realist Perspectives", pp. 312-313.

The Kardak (Imia) Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations

S. Gülden Ayman *

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet article l'auteur examine divers modèles afin de démontrer comment les crises peuvent mener à des conflits et même provoquer la guerre. Ces modèles sont appliqués à la crise des Rochers de Kardak (Imia), une crise récente moins connue que la question de Chypre au niveau des relations Greco-Turques. Les perceptions turques de la crise sont aussi analysées. Selon l'auteur, des facteurs tels l'histoire, la stratégie, les pressions sociales et la diplomatie doivent être pris en considération afin de pouvoir comprendre la situation qui prévaut actuellement et l'impact de diverses crises sur les relations internationales.

ABSTRACT

In this article, the author explores various crisis models to show how crises lead to conflict and even war. Models are contrasted with the example of the Kardak Rocks Crisis, a recent crisis less known than the Cyprus issue or Imia incident, within the framework of Greek-Turkish relations. The Turkish perceptions about the origins and outcome of the crisis are also discussed. According to the author, such factors as history, policy, strategy, social pressures, and diplomacy must be considered if we are to gain any understanding of the present situation and the impact of various crises on international relations.

Crisis and War

Short of war, crises are the most salient points of conflict between states. The relationship between international crises and war could be analyzed from three broad perspectives. The first area of investigation deals with the *origins of a crisis* hence it examines the factors leading to the eruption of crises. From this perspective, one may focus on the security concerns of the parties in conflict, international and domestic political, economic reasons that prepare crises. The second approach deals with the *outcome of a crisis* by posing questions like:

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-how crises lead to war?

-why do some crises result in wars while others are resolved through diplomatic means?

-are such outcomes determined by the nature of crisis?

-to what extent are crises a function of decisions made during the course of the crises itself?

-when is war the result of a deliberate decision and when is it the product of miscalculation?

Finally, international crises could also be investigated by their long-term impacts on the relationship between parties in conflict. Especially those crises so intense that they bring the parties to the brink of war and thus may constitute a turning point with respect to the nature of the relationship between the parties. The relationship between crises and underlying patterns of conflict is particularly important in terms of determining in which circumstances crises act to intensify or ameliorate the conflicts they reflect.[1]

When international crises are evaluated with respect to their long-term impacts they appear as important stages towards peace and/or war. This way of approaching crises is contrary to the widespread view that the underlying causes of war, e.g., aspirations for hegemony, demands for territory, hostile ideologies and nationalism, are more important than the immediate causes of war or crises which actually trigger war. According to the view that emphasizes the underlying causes of conflicts, crises are only the end-products of deeply rooted conflicts and as far as these conflicts remain unresolved, crises will erupt in one way or another. In this vein, one of the most important classical books that had greatly influenced students of war was Thucydides's Peloponnesian War. According to Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War (431 BC) was the result of the tension between Athens' Empire and other city states especially Sparta. For Thucydides, if war had not been initiated with Athens's involvement in the war between Corinth and Corcyra, another event would eventually have brought two great powers of ancient Greece to the brink of war. In his view, proximate causes of the Peloponnesian War were

important only in terms of their impact on the determination of the timing of the conflict.[2]

Hobbes, Kant, Rousseau and Marx followed the same line in their approach to the relationship between crises and war by emphasizing the underlying causes more than the immediate causes of the war. The most striking contemporary example of this approach could be found in the historiography of World War I. What is noteworthy is the surprising consensus of the historians who hotly debate which state bears more responsibility for the outbreak of the war in their evaluation of the assassination of the archduke as an excuse for the inevitable war. This may be a result of the fact that when a crisis leads to war, subsequent analyses tend to focus on how it results in war by undermining the essential question of how it may have been prevented. This type of reasoning may be seen as a product of the human mind which once faced with a highly destructive event tends to attribute rationality to its evolution, which in reality it does not possess.[3]

Regarding the long-term impacts of crises, the most important issue is whether or not a crisis reinforces mutual hostile feelings, adversarial perceptions, negative expectations and aggressive behavior patterns among protagonists (that would prepare the ground for war in the middle or long run) or in contrast improves the current state of adversarial relations to a certain extent and/or encourages dynamics of cooperation.

The type of influence which may be expected at the end of a crisis depends largely on how the crisis ends. For example, a crisis terminated through the efforts of the parties in conflict may have different long-term impact than a crisis terminated by the military or diplomatic intervention of a third party (or more parties). Besides, a crisis that terminates in a formal or semi-formal voluntary agreement is more likely to produce mutual satisfaction as a bilateral effect and, therefore, induces more stability than a crisis which ends through a unilateral act or tacit understanding.

Another important point to be considered is whether a crisis produces a winner and a loser even if it does not end up in a war. An

unharmonious definite outcome (victory/defeat) is more likely to accumulate higher tension and instability beyond a crisis than an ambiguous outcome (compromise, stalemate) or a harmonious definitive outcome (victory/victory). One reason would be that the side which was defeated or merely felt defeated is more likely to over-react or resort to aggression should a new problem or crisis emerge between the parties in conflict.[1]

How a crisis ends may also have a major impact on the formulation of foreign policy since there is a learning process implied. A state which experiences failure is more likely to change its strategy and behaviour; whereas, a state that experiences failure tends to provide a rich source of information for determining how to improve its strategy and operations.[5]

The Turkish-Greek Conflict and Crises

The Turkish-Greek case is viewed by many scholars of war and peace as an example of a protracted conflict, which has been defined by Azar *et al* as:

> hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. They are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high... While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination... Protracted conflicts, that is to say, are not specific events or even clusters of events at a point of time; they are processes.[6]

As a process of conflict, Turkish-Greek confrontation had been ameliorated only once in the history, namely during the interwar period. Turkish-Greek *rapprochement* in 1930s stemmed from the existence of a mutually painful stalemate,[7] the emergence of common enemies and the positive role of charismatic political leaders who perceived the

strong need to settle Turkish-Greek conflict. However, for conflicts to be enduringly resolved, for instance, in the Turkish-Greek case, appropriate structures should be designed for the satisfaction of needs and alleviation of the differences in perceptions, which was not the case in the interwar period.[8]

Crises occur within as well as outside of protracted conflicts yet international crisis and international conflict are closely related. In essence, every crisis reflects a "state of conflict" between two or more adversaries, but not every conflict is reflected in crisis. In this vein, the Kardak Crisis is a reflection of the broader Turkish-Greek conflict, reactivated by the Cyprus problem, which emerged in the 1960s as the most critical issue dividing Turkey and Greece.

The Onset and Escalation of the Kardak Crisis

A Turkish bulk carrier called "Figen Akat" ran aground near the Kardak Rocks four miles off the Turkish mainland and two miles from the uninhabited Greek island of Kalimnos in the Aegean Sea, on 25 December 1995. When the captain radioed for help a Greek tug boat near the islet responded, and even though the captain of the Turkish bulk carrier said that he was aground on Turkish territory and awaiting Turkish tugs from the mainland to help him, the Greek captain insisted on helping because of the salvage fees.[9] After the rescue operation, the Greek captain's demand for salvage fees and the Turkish captain's refusal brought this case to the attention of the countries' respective foreign ministries.

Two different theoretical models could be used with respect to our level of analysis to describe the escalation process at the Kardak Rocks. The first one is the "aggressor-defender model", which draws a distinction between aggressor party and postulates a unidirectional causal sequence with the defender reacting to the aggressor's behaviour. The aggressor-defender model is used more often to understand the process because it provides a less complicated explanation about the origins of the crisis, motives and perceptions of the parties.

The second model is the "conflict spiral model", which holds that escalation results from a vicious circle of action and reaction. According to the second model, it is assumed that Party A's tactics encourage a contentious reaction from Party B, which provokes further contentious behaviour from Party A, thus completing the circle and starting it on its next iteration. Unlike the aggressor-defender model where causation flows in only one direction (aggressor acts defender reacts) in the conflict-spiral model, causation flows in both directions.[10]

The conflict-spiral model of escalation should not be viewed as an alternative to the aggressor-defender model for in many cases aggressor-defender sequences are part of larger conflict spirals. While the aggressor-defender model portrays each party's action as a response to the other's immediately preceding action only, in reality each action is the result of cumulative impressions from all the previous actions by the other side.[11] This point is frequently missed when an adversary is viewed as an aggressor and the causes of the conflict are exclusively attributed to adversary's aggression.[12]

In this article the conflict spiral model in conjunction with the aggressor-defender model is applied to understand the emergence of the Kardak Crisis. The conflict spiral model will provide insight to the dynamics or underlying causes of Turkish-Greek conflict while the aggressor-defender model will help us to understand the Turkish perceptions related to the evolution of the crisis. The first model directs our attention to the underlying causes of the Turkish-Greek conflict and to the atmosphere of distrust and lack of confidence. The second model is helpful to define the proximate causes of the conflict. Our analysis of the escalation process will not cover the domestic circumstances that played an important role in the rapid escalation of the dispute over the sovereignty of Kardak which have been examined by other authors.[13]

The Evolution of the Turkish-Greek Conflict

In order to grasp the conflict spiral between Turkey and Greece, one has to look at the broader context of the Turkish-Greek relations. The development of political antagonism between Turkey and Greece begins with the Cyprus problem. British rule of the island ended in 1960 with the new constitution which vested sovereignty jointly in the two communities. However, as many Greek Cypriots regarded the settlement as a temporary step toward the most desired goal of *enosis* (unión with Greece), they began to upset the balance of power violently by ousting the Turkish-Cypriots from the government. Following the December 1963, a unilateral declaration by Cypriot President Makarios to amend the constitution in favour of Greek Cypriot majority rule, thus holding out the potential for *enosis*, intercommunal fighting broke out. By June 1964, Athens had covertly transported five thousand troops to Cyprus. Under tremendous NATO pressure, all plans to change the status of Cyprus were left aside and a negotiated return to the *status quo* was reached. After the 1963-64 crisis, President Makarios followed a policy of controlling the island and consolidating its independence while never excluding *enosis*. In April 1967, a hard-line military junta coup seized power in Athens, which later became the main instigator of the November 15, 1967 attack by General Grivas and the Greek and National Guard troops on the Turkish enclave in Kophinou, thus triggering renewed fighting in the island. Makarios, the Greek-Cypriot leader, was overthrown by a coup directed by the Greek Junta in July 1974, and the well-known former EOKA fighter with a reputation as a Turk killer, Nikos Sampson, was appointed as president. The Turkish government tried to convince the British government that, as the two guarantors, they should jointly intervene to prevent a complete Greek takeover of Cyprus. When Britain was reluctant to get involved, Turkey moved alone under Article 4 (2) of the Treaty of Guarantee with the aim of protecting the independence of the island and putting an end to the terrible destruction of life and property of Turkish-Cypriots.[14]

After 1974, the Turkish-Greek conflict gained new dimensions in the Aegean through Greece's militarization of eastern Aegean Islands and Turkey's response of stationing an Army of the Aegean to defend its western coast against the Greek islands and with the surfacing of problems related to the continental shelf, territorial sea and air space.

The Aegean Problems and the Turkish Strategy

The Aegean problems, which closely parallel the evolution of political antagonism between Turkey and Greece, have important political consequences affecting the vital interests of Turkey. These problems may be seen in terms of four related aspects: the continental shelf, territorial sea; air space; and militarization of Aegean islands. At the heart of the interconnected Aegean problems lie the Aegean islands.

When we focus on the Turkish perception of the Aegean problems we observe that Aegean problems are interlinked with what had happened in the course of the evolution of the Cyprus problem. The lessons that the Turks drew from the Cyprus problem is that the Greek "Megali Idea" of restoring the lost Byzantine Empire of the former Constantinople and in the Anatolian heartland was not dead and any Greek designs and attempts aimed at creating or benefiting from a window of opportunity to extend Greece's borders at the expense of Turkey should not be tolerated in Cyprus, in Aegean or elsewhere.[15]

With regard to the Aegean Sea, Turkish fears stem from Greek attempts to transform the Aegean into a Greek lake.[16] In this vein, one of the most important problems between Turkey and Greece is the continental shelf issue. The problem of delimiting the Aegean continental shelf is exacerbated by Greek claims that Greek islands should have their own continental shelves. Greece has also argued that the whole Aegean is covered with Greek islands and that they constitute a political continuum with the Greek mainland; hence Turkey should not be granted sovereign rights in any area between Greek mainland and the islands. Turkey strongly opposes this argument by stressing that if the principle of allocating to islands their own continental

shelves were adopted, then the continental shelf of almost the whole Aegean would belong to Greece.

The continental shelf issue led to a clear controversy between Turkey and Greece in February 1974, when the Greek government announced oil and natural gas discoveries in the area by claiming all mineral rights on the disputed area. Turkey, in order to prevent a Greek *fait accompli* claim to most of the Aegean continental shelf, proposed negotiations to reach a mutual understanding that would demarcate the respective spheres of the Turkish and Greek continental shelves. However, Turkey could not get any positive response. In March 1976, Turkey carried out exploration activities in the Aegean. This led the Karamanlis government to appeal to the International Court of Justice to institute interim measures of protection to stop all exploration activity. However, in September 1976, the Court rejected the Greek appeal for interim measures of protection on the grounds that Turkey's research activities did not prejudice Greece's rights in the disputed areas. In January 1979, Athens suffered another setback when the Court ruled that Greece lacked jurisdiction in the continental shelf case. It was after the Court's first verdict on interim protection and a UN Security Council's Resolution (395) in September 1976 that called upon Turkey and Greece to resume negotiations, a bilateral dialogue was started, and in November, they signed a declaration which established the guidelines governing future negotiation on the continental shelf. The most important clause of that declaration was Article 6, which stipulated that both parties should abstain from any initiative or act relating to the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea. In spite of the Berne Declaration, which urges parties to refrain from conducting exploration activities until a resolution would be reached among them, Athens resumed oil exploration near the north Aegean Greek island of Thasos in 1981. Ankara responded to this move by declaring that if Athens was going to violate the Berne Declaration, Turkey would do the same. Nevertheless, the escalation of tension between Turkey and Greece was followed by an agreement on a moratorium in July 1982. The goal of the moratorium was again to refrain from statements and actions which could undermine peace

and dialogue. The moratorium was actually very similar to the 1976 Bern Declaration in the sense that both aimed at preventing any military confrontation that could occur due to a spillover of the continental shelf problem between Turkey and Greece.

Despite these efforts to freeze the problem, the continental shelf controversy brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war in March 1987. The apparent reason of this confrontation was the Greek government's ordering a recently nationalized oil company to start drilling for oil near the Greek island of Thasos. In reaction, the Turkish government issued permits to the state owned Turkish Petroleum Company to drill in those parts of the Aegean which the Turkish government considered Turkish property even though Athens announced that it had started to mobilize its armed forces and would fight if Turkey violated Greece's rights on its continental shelf.[17]

The crisis ended within a few days after both capitals exchanged messages. In the end, Greece announced that it was postponing any drilling activity, but reserving the right to do so any time it wished. Ankara responded by declaring that it would not engage in exploration activity in disputed regions as long as Greece did likewise. The parties continued to stick by their views concerning the settlement of the dispute.

A second problem related to Aegean involves Turkey's securing equitable access to the waters of the Aegean. Greece claimed the right to extend its islands territorial sea limits to 12 nautical miles after the signing of the 1982 United Nation's Law of Sea (LOS) Convention. Were this rule applied in the Aegean by the allocation of 12-mile territorial seas to the Greek islands within 24 miles of the mainland coast or from each other it would result in overlapping territorial seas. Consequently, the Greek share of the Aegean would rise to approximately 64 percent while that of Turkey to only 10 percent. The proportion of the remaining high seas would accordingly fall from 56 percent to 26 percent. The Enclosure of Turkey's western coast by extended Greek territorial waters would upset the balance established by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty through the reconciliation of the mutual

economic, navigational and security interests of both states in the Aegean.[18]

As a coastal state, Turkey has neither signed nor ratified the 1982 UNCLOS and has refused to recognize it. Ankara has declared that it would consider Greek territorial sea extension to 12 miles as a *casus belli* because this practically makes the Aegean a Greek lake, as ships traveling between Turkey's Aegean ports would have to pass through Greek territorial waters.

Another problem which preoccupies Turkey in the Aegean is the air space, which includes ten-mile claims of Greece and the Flight Information Region (FIR) issues. Turkish leaders protested Greek government abuses of the FIR responsibilities it held for the Aegean. According to the Turkish perspective, Athens was in violation of its FIR duties when it required that official Turkish aircraft including all military aircraft-file plans for flights in international space over the Aegean.

In another point related to airspace, Turkey refuses to accept that Greek airspace is ten nautical miles whereas its territorial waters are only six nautical miles. The fact is that this would reduce international air space in the Aegean by 50 per cent. Though the current international practice and international law repudiate Greece's policy because they provide for the width of the national airspace to correspond to that of territorial waters, Greece continues to claim that Turkey violates Greek airspace. Ankara frequently challenged the Greek claim by ordering its military aircraft to approach the Greek islands to a distance of six miles in order to demonstrate that Turkey does not recognize Greece's ten-mile airspace.

Turkey pursues a *status quo* policy[19] in the Aegean and defends the preservation of the existing order in the Aegean, as established by the treaties which defined borders and settled Turkish-Greek relations. Turkey's strategy is two-fold. On the one hand, it is based on a continuous effort to find fair, equitable and, therefore, durable solutions to Aegean disputes through diplomatic negotiations; on the other hand, it relies on deterrence to prevent any Greek *fait accompli*.

Turkey adapts the logic of deterrence in relations with Greece whose central argument could be summarized as follows:

> Great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve. This belief will lead the former to test its opponents, usually starting with a small and apparently unimportant issue. If the status quo powers retreat, it will not only lose the specific value at stake but, more important in the long run, will encourage the aggressor to press harder...To avoid this disastrous situation, the state must display the ability and willingness to wage war.[20]

In the context of crisis management, Turkey's deterrent power has been employed through three types of defensive strategy.[21] The first one is the "strategy of drawing a line."[22] By declaring that Turkey would consider Greek territorial seas' extension to 12 miles as *casus belli*, Ankara employs the strategy of drawing a line. This strategy not only reveals how determined Turkey is to protect one of her most important interests but also shows Turkey's willingness to avoid escalation of any crisis that would lead to an inadvertent war. The second strategy that Turkey employs is a "tit-for-tat strategy"[23] in which reprisals are very carefully chosen to match but not exceed the severity of the Greek provocations. Turkey considers "coercive diplomacy" when a tit-for-tat strategy is not successful or is not enough to deter Greece. Coercive diplomacy is defined as a strategy of employing:

> threats of force or quite limited increments of force to persuade the opponent to call off or undo the encroachment in which he is engaged—to induce him, for example, to halt provocations or to give up territory he has sized.[21]

In contrast with pure military coercion, coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade the opponent while providing an opportunity for the adversary to stop or back off before the defender resorts to a military strategy for forcing the adversary to do so. The successful application of

this strategy requires careful limitation of the demands of the defender in order not to give the impression that the threat to use coercive power will damage the interests of the opponent.[25]

The Turkish Perception of the Kardak Rocks

It may have been difficult for other states to understand why Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war in January 1996, for what consists of ten acres of grass and stone, the home of a few wild animals.

The Kardak Rocks, which have not been covered by any of the treaties that transferred islands, are only 3.8 nautical miles from the Turkish coast and closer to Turkey than to any Greek island named in any of the treaties. Besides their closeness to Turkey and the ambiguity of the international documents concerning their ownership, the Kardak Rocks attracted attention because they were viewed as a symbol of the sovereignty struggle between Turkey and Greece related to the unresolved problems in the Aegean on the continental shelf, territorial sea and air space.[26] The political and legal advantages that will be acquired by the acknowledgement of the sovereignty over the rocks were thought to be more significant than the territorial value of the entity.[27]

The issue of the sovereignty of the Kardak Rocks emerged in an atmosphere where Turkey was preoccupied with Greek attempts to inhabit small islands in an artificial and demonstrative fashion. Ankara wondered whether the real intention of Greece was to utilize the islets as baselines for the delimitation of the continental shelf and the territorial seas.[28] Since Turkey was convinced that Greece was pursuing a revisionist strategy in its overall Aegean policy, Ankara interpreted Greece's aims with regard to the sovereignty of the Rocks as the first step of a new Greek expansionist policy.

The Kardak Crisis began with a foreign policy crisis that was triggered by the perception of disruptive events and then was transformed into an international crisis with high levels of tension and the likeli-

hood of violent interaction. The question of which salvage team was going to save the Turkish tug raised the issue of who owned Kardak. The Turkish Foreign Ministry addressed a note to the Embassy of Greece declaring that the Kardak Rocks are Turkish. Greece responded with an assertion that the Kardak Rocks are adjacent to the islands ceded by Italy to Greece; therefore, they belong to Greece. Most interesting is the fact that at the time no crisis erupted. It was only a month later when the dispute was brought to the attention of the Greek public by 'Grammi' newspaper, known for its close ties with the Greek state, which was published on 20 January 1996[29] with the title "The Extreme Provocation from Turkey". Thereafter the sovereignty issue was transformed into an official problem between Turkey and Greece.

The first step towards the escalation of the crisis was the mayor of the Greek island of Kalymnos raising a Greek flag on the Rocks. This event was followed by a team of *Hürriyet* journalists lowering the Greek flag and hoisting a Turkish standard instead. Afterwards Greek navy commandos occupied the Rocks, lowered the Turkish flag and restored that of Greece.[30] At this point, Turkey had warned Greece to withdraw its soldiers and ships from the Turkish territorial waters several times and also made diplomatic initiatives to terminate the crisis, but to no avail. By January 29, both nations had dispatched naval vessels to the vicinity of the islet and Greek forces were put on the highest alert. At various times, up to 20 vessels were reported around Kardak. Turkey requested that Greek troops be recalled from the rocks and that all signs attempting to prove Greek sovereignty be removed. On January 31, Turkish commandos landed in a night operation on an adjacent outcrop where they planted a Turkish flag. Turkish Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal said that the Turkish troops would be removed when Greek forces withdrew from the neighbourhood. On January 31, due to American pressure on both sides, the Greek flag was withdrawn together with ships and commandos of Turkey and Greece.

The Turkish Strategy

The strategy that Turkey implemented during the course of events related to Kardak was shaped by the perception that Greece was attempting to extend its sovereignty to islands beyond those ceded to Greece in the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 and Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. Although Greek aims regarding Kardak sovereignty were considered of a limited character for the time being, they were found unacceptable because it was believed that Turkey was confronted with an example of Greek piecemeal "salami tactics" that would encroach on Turkey's rights in a series of actions then force the country to accept the gradual erosion of its power.

In order to counter Greek claims, a passive appeasement strategy (not explicitly agreeing but not opposing) was found very risky because of the possibility of encouraging Greece to pursue its expansionist aims more actively and evoking further claims in the future. Instead, a tit-for-tat strategy with a limited coercive diplomacy that involved negotiation, bargaining and compromise was selected to be implemented against Greece.

However, this strategy did not prove effective because Greece did not step back. Neither did it show any flexibility, even when the Turkish warships had been deployed in the area. After the failure of the first tit-for-tat, together with coercive diplomacy strategy, Turkey moved to another tit-for-tat mixed again with the idea of compelling the opponent by sending Turkish commandos to the adjacent rocks in order to return to the *status quo ante*. With this second move, the two countries came to the brink of war. Only at this stage of the conflict did American diplomacy get a chance to influence the course of the conflict.

In employing this mixture of strategies, Turkey was very careful not to provoke Greece. On the one hand, Turkish authorities were stressing the possibility of Turkey and Greece engaging in war if Turkish forces were attacked; on the other hand, they were giving assurances to Greece about the limits of Turkish demands by stressing that, "if

there will be no attack on the Turkish soldiers, Turkey has given the order not to open fire on Greek military units and Turkey will withdraw from the Rocks if Greek flag, soldiers and air and naval forces are withdrawn simultaneously with the Turkish forces from the disputed area".[51]

The Long-Term Impacts of the Kardak Crisis

From the perspective of a conflict spiral, it is possible to evaluate the Kardak Crisis as an uncontrolled outcome of unresolved Turkish-Greek conflict and its reflection on the Aegean. However, it is also true that the same crisis is an event that influences the dynamics of conflict between parties and therefore needs to be also evaluated by its own outcomes.

In considering the outcome of this crisis, we must point out that it was not resolved through the use of classical diplomatic channels between Greece and Turkey. The crisis was overcome with the help of American mediation and without reaching a formal agreement between the parties.

From the onset of the crisis, Turkey called for the resolution of the problem through diplomatic means. Afterwards it warned for the urgent withdrawal of Greek ships but could not get a positive reply. Despite Turkey's strong reaction, Greece stressed throughout the crisis that it would not retreat from Kardak.

When the Kardak Crisis is evaluated alongside the 1987 crisis, it may be argued that in every crisis between Turkey and Greece the point where the two countries terminate escalation rises slightly higher. While the employment of a tit-for-tat strategy along with a policy of coercive diplomacy was sufficient for a mutual retreat in 1987, two similar moves plus the American mediation barely stopped the escalation in 1996.

Since the crisis was over through the matching of military forces deployed on the Rocks, by Turkish commandos' landing and with the

United States' warnings, one might easily think of what would have happened if there were no other rocky islets to match Greek presence and if American mediation efforts were unsuccessful. Another point in this regard is that the Greek Defense Minister actually recommended ordering Greek forces to land on the smaller islet and arrest the Turkish commandos. After the crisis was over, Arsenis argued that the decision to withdraw was a political one made by Prime Minister Kostas Simitis.[32]

The Kardak Crisis reveals that strategic warning in emerging conflict might not appear when the course of the incident remains unknown until after the commitment of forces or when the pace of conflict moves too quickly. Kardak shows that an inadvertent war[33] is not impossible between Turkey and Greece and also underscores that prevention of a sudden spillover of a crisis depends heavily on the behaviour of the political leaders.

However, when the mediation role played by the US has been considered, together with the responsibilities of the political leadership, it might also be argued that in terms of highlighting the responsibilities of the political leaders in uncalculated escalations, the long-term impacts of the Kardak Crisis have been diminished by the role of the American mediation. American warnings and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the crisis were critically important in averting war,[34] and their effect could be counterproductive with respect to long term impacts. Yes, American mediation was urgently needed because of the Greek resistance to enter into any kind of diplomatic negotiation with Turkey. Yet, the presence of American mediation may have also diminished the necessity of reaching formal agreements to resolve the Aegean problems. This situation may eventually lead the Turkish and Greek sides to think that the US will never let Turkey and Greece enter into war because this region is so important. The result may actually encourage irresponsible actions to escalate future confrontations.

Though the Kardak Crisis did not ended in fighting, the way war was averted did not contribute to finding possible ways to resolve the

Turkish-Greek conflict. On the contrary, adversarial attitudes were toughened, official theses were opposed, feelings of non-confidence were deepened, negative images were strengthened and the prejudicial judgements of Turks and Greeks towards each other were encouraged. After the crisis, it was widely observed that each party acquired sharper and more inflexible approaches towards the other, felt more confident that the other party had some secret designs to challenge the *status quo* and tended to resort more to "conspiracy theories" in explaining the other's behaviour.

The Kardak Crisis strengthened thinking that Turkish-Greek competition is a competition of military force and underscored the fact that future confrontations, military force, balance and mobilization capability will be very important in determining the outcome. The Kardak Crisis stresses the fact that in order to cope with the adversary one needs to be militarily powerful. In this respect, the Crisis encouraged the arms race between Turkey and Greece.

The Kardak Crisis, to the extent that it stressed power in military terms, is a necessary factor for the future in that it encouraged the arms race (one of the important manifestations of conflict spiral) between Greece and Turkey and to the extent that it led parties to think that "the faster one acts the more successful it will be in a future military confrontation". Kardak has had a diminishing effect on crisis stability. This negative effect has also influenced the perception of confidence-building measures. After the crisis, Greece acted very reluctantly on this issue; whereas Turkey supported broader implementation of such measures and argued that in no way can these measures take the place of negotiations.

Even though the Kardak Crisis was terminated without a war, it created a psychology of glory in Turkey and a psychology of defeat in Greece. The Simitis government, obliged to step back in the Kardak Crisis, was accused of betraying Greece by both the media[35] and the opposition. According to opposition leader, Miltiadis Evert, the government was lying to the people because the withdrawal of the Greek flag constituted the abandonment of national territory and an act of

treason, while an atmosphere of defeat and humiliation dominated in Greece.[36] As opposed to Greece, Turkey emerged from the crisis with a psychology of superiority yet felt the very disturbing possibility of an exaggerated reaction from Greece in future confrontations.

Furthermore, the Kardak Crisis has necessarily implied a learning process because it tested the validity and effectiveness of Turkish and Greek strategies towards each other. Turkey's concerns centered on how she could continue to maintain this power; however, for Greece the question seems to be what should be done in order not to be drawn into a similar position. The intensive attention paid to war scenarios that was observed in different segments of the Greek society could also be interpreted as a reflection of this way of thinking. As a result, while Turkey tried to elaborate her military strategy, Greece embarked upon efforts to change its military strategy.[37]

The Kardak Crisis has also produced some long-term impacts related to the alliance behaviour of Turkey and Greece. In the aftermath of the Kardak Crisis, since many Greeks blamed the United States – interpreting its neutrality as equivalent to siding with Turkey – Greece has temporarily distanced itself from the United States and sought more support from its EU partners.[38] The Kardak Crisis has activated both countries' efforts to establish stronger ties with those countries seen as supplementary to the ties established with the US and the European Union. As the Greek Defense Minister Arsenis pointed out, what stronger deterrence means for the Greek side is not only something to be acquired by the maintenance of strong armed forces but also by the empowerment of Greece through new allies.

> The problems between Greece and Turkey could only be resolved by the deterrence of a strong army. For this reason Greece's agreements on defense cooperation with Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia would be the right decision.[39]

While Greece began strengthening ties with these countries, Turkey strengthened relations with Israel especially to counter the Greek-

Syrian collaboration.[10] The Turkish-Greek conflict, which has already become very complicated because of the multiplicity of problems involved, became all the more intractable with the introduction of new parties and new dividing lines.

NOTES

1. See, Richard Ned Lebow, "Decision Making in Crisis" in Ralph K. White (ed.) *Psychology and Prevention of Nuclear War* (New York: New York University Press, 1986) pp.397-413.

2. See, Thucydides, Rex Warner (trans.) *History of Peloponnesian War* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).

3. Baruch Fischhoff, "Hindsight/Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgement Under Uncertainty", *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance*, Vol.13, No.1, 1975, pp. 288-299.

4. *Ibid.*

5. See, Sim B. Sitkin, "Learning Through Failure: The Strategy of Small Losses", in Barry M. Staw and L.L. Cummings, (eds.), *Research in Organizational Behavior* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1992); Philip Mirvis and David Berg, (eds.), *Failures in Organization Development and Change* (New York: Wiley, 1977).

6. Edward E. Azar, Paul Jureidini and Ronald Mac Laurin "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East", *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Vol.8, No.1, 1978, pp.41-60, p.50.

7. Touval and Zartman suggest that long periods of pain and suffering may finally lead parties in conflict to realize that neither can benefit from the continuation of conflict and both have no choice but to reach a negotiated accomodation. See Touval Saadia and I. William Zartman, (eds.) *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) p. 35-52.

8. For an explanation of these factors see, S.Gülden Ayman, "Settling a Conflict: Graeco-Turkish Relations in the Interwar Period", *CIDC Insight*, No.16, May 1998, pp. 93-101.

9. Nur Batur, Selim Çaglayan, "Ege'de Sertlesme", Hürriyet, 27 January 1996.

10. This model is found in the writings of many theorists, including Richard C. North, Richard A. Brody and Ole R. Holsti "Some Emprical Data on the Conflict Spiral", *Peace Research Society Papers*, No.1, 1964, p:1-14; Charles Osgood *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

11. Ralph K. White, *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations* (New York: The Free Press, 1984).

12. Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruit, Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), p: 72-81.

13. As an example of studies which stresses the role of the political climate which made both governments vulnerable to provocations by explorative press and caused the crisis to spread rapidly out of control see, Michael Robert Hickok, "Falling Toward War in the Aegean", http://www.dodccrp.org/Proceedings/DOCSwcd00000/wcd.00000.htm.

14. For a detailed examination of the factors that had led Turkey's reaction see, Tözün Bahceli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) p.51-95.

15. See *Türk-Yunan Iliskileri* (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Baskanlığı Yayınları, 1986); *Ege Denizi ve Ege Adaları* (Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Basım Evi, 1995).

16. For a detailed examination of the evolution of Aegean problems see, Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute", *Adelphi Papers*, No.155 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979).

17. Süha Bölükbası, "The Turco-Greek Dispute" in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy* (London: The Eothen Press, 1992), p: 27-54.

18. See Rauf Versan, "Legal Problems Concerning Territorial Sea Delimitation in the Aegean Sea", *Aegean Issues: Problems-Legal and Political Matrix* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1995) pp.105-110, p.106.

19. In contrast with 'status quo states', revisionist states typically "feel humiliated, hampered, and oppressed by the status quo and thus demand changes, rectifications of frontiers, a revision of treaties, a distribution of territory and power to modify it. See F.L. Schuman, (1948) *International Politics: The Destiny of the Western State System*, 4th ed. New York: McGraw Hill) p.378.

20. See, Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.58.

21. Alexander George identifies seven different defensive strategies which status quo states employ: "(1) coercive diplomacy; (2) limited escalation of involvement to establish ground rules more favorable to the defender, plus efforts to deter an escalatory response by the opponent; (3) tit-for-tat reprisals without escalation, plus deterrence of escalation by the opponent; (4) accepting a "test of capabilities" within the restrictive ground rules chosen by the opponent that initially appear disadvantageous to the defender; (5) drawing the line; (6) conveying commitment and resolve in order to avoid miscalculation by the challenger; (7) time-buying actions and proposals that provide an opportunity to explore a negotiated settlement of the crisis that might satisfy some, if not all, of the challenger's demands." See, Alexander L.George, *Avoiding War Problems of Crisis Management* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.384.

22. *Ibid.*, p.389-390.

23. *Ibid.*, p.388-389.

24. *Ibid.*, p.384.

25. *Ibid.*, p.384-387.

26. For the legal aspects of the Aegean Problems and The Kardak Crisis see Erdem Denk, *Egemenligi Tartısmalı Adalar: Karsılastırmalı Bir Çalısma* (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birligi Vakfı Yayını, 1999); Bayram Öztürk (ed.) *The Aegean Sea 2000* (Istanbul: Turkish Marine Research Foundation, 2000); Bayram Öztürk, Nesrin Algan (eds.) *Problems of Regional Seas 2001* (Istanbul: Turkish Marine Research Foundation, 2001).

27. See Yüksel Inan and Sertaç Baseren, *Status of The Kardak Rocks*, (Ankara, 1997) p.2.

28. See Ali Kurumahmut, "Kardak Kayalıkları Krizi ve Ege'de Temel Sorunun Ortaya Çıkısı", in Ali Kurumahmut (ed.) *Ege'de Temel Sorun-Egemenligi Tartısmalı Adalar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1998) pp. 6-16, p.10-11.

29. Yasemin Congar, "ABD'den 'Savasmayın' Uyarısı", *Milliyet*, 19 January 1996.

30. "Aykut Fırat, Cesur Sert, "Bayrak Savası", *Hürriyet*, 28 January 1996.

31. "Mehmetcik Kardak'ta", *Milliyet*, 31 January 1996.

32. Taki Berberakis, *Hürriyet*, 12 February 1996.

33. George defines inadvertent war as "a war that is authorized during the course of a crisis, even though at the onset of the crisis central decision makers did not want or expect war". See, George, *op.cit.*, p.8.

34. Çongar, *op.cit.*

35. Stelyo Berberakis "Yunan Ordusu Karıstı", *Milliyet*, 2 February 1997.

36. Nur Batur, "Atina Karıstı", *Hürriyet*, 1 February 1996.

37. As an example of the studies that question the effectiveness of the Greek strategy during The Kardak Crisis see, Eftathios T. Fakiolas and Panayiotis Mavrides, "Strategy of Crisis Management and the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: The Case of the Imia Islets" in Christodoulos K. Yiallourides and Panayotis J. Tsakonas (eds.) *Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War* (New York, Athens: Melissa International Publications, 2001), pp. 205-238.

38. See, Carol Migdalovitz, "Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis", *CRS Report for Congress*, March 7, 1996.

39. Dogan Ertugrul, Atina'dan Savas Çığlıkları", *CHA*, 28 March 1996.

40. "Tarihi Isbirligi", *Sabah*, 28 February 1996.

Turkish Defense Expenditures in View of Ups And Downs in Turkish-Greek Relations: Is There A Reaction?

Gulay Gunluk-Senesen*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article tente d'établir le lien entre les dépenses militaires turques de 1983 à 2000 et les relations greco-turques pendant cette même période. Cette période a été choisie compte tenu de données detaillées disponibles sur les dépenses militaires turques. Il convient de souligner que les études empiriques récentes sur ce thème ne sont pas concluantes. L'auteur constate que certains facteurs revèlent que la prise de décision de débourser des sommes importantes pour la défense nationale turque provient d'un ensemble de menaces perçues, en rien attribuables à la Grèce. D'autres facteurs étudiés n'indiquent pas qu'il y a un lien direct entre les depenses turques d'armement et les situations de conflit ou d'harmonie observées dans les relations entre la Grèce et la Turquie.

ABSTRACT

This article attempts to find out whether Turkish defense expenditures during 1983-2000 and relations with Greece in the same period have a common pattern. The choice of the period of analysis is based on availability of detailed data on Turkish defense expenditures. Recent empirical literature on a long-run arms race between Turkey and Greece is inconclusive. We find that with some indicators, Turkish defense spending decisions react to a continuum of perceived threats, not attributable at all to those from Greece. The patterns of other indicators of Turkish defense expenditures are far from providing supporting evidence for reactionary responses to whether conflict or harmony prevails in bilateral relations.

1. Introduction

The relationships between Greece and Turkey in the last two decades have swung between the extremes: from the brink of war to

rushing to rescue each other's earthquake victims. The ups and downs of the bilateral relations do not follow a smooth pattern; a severe conflict might succeed a friendly act and *vice versa* in subsequent years or even in the same year. Notwithstanding this indeterminate state of affairs, the whole package of conflictual issues between the two countries would seem to justify arms race expectations between them. However, recent research with econometric modelling of the arms race between Turkey and Greece, using annual data, is inconclusive in identifying such a long-run relationship, when one single year, 1974, is left out.[1] Similarly, using a game-theory approach, Smith *et al.*[2] find that there is not a mutual dependence of military expenditures and therefore internal political or bureaucratic inertia rather than external factors might be shaping decisions. We should also add that structural changes in the external political and economic environments over the past 50 years and the arming decisions in response have been severe and therefore pose challenges to quantitative analysis.

This article attempts to find out whether Turkish defense expenditures during 1983-2000 and relations with Greece in the same period have a common pattern. The period of analysis is chosen on the basis of availability of detailed data on Turkish defense expenditures. Significant turning points in the bilateral relations are defined from an economist's perspective. The analysis is limited to the Turkish budget responses, if any, to conflict and harmony with Greece, therefore does not closely follow the established arms race approach. The rather short span of time restricts the analysis to descriptive tools. The main data sources are the publications of the Turkish Ministry of Finance.

The paper is organized as follows: the next section involves an analysis of trends in Turkish defense expenditures during 1980s and 1990s. Observations regarding the ups and downs of Greek-Turkish relations are outlined in the third section. The outcomes of preceding sections are combined in the fourth section to see if Turkish defense spending is reactionary. The final section involves an assessment of findings, challenges and prospects for future research.

2. An overview of Turkish defense expenditures during the 1980s and 1990s

Turkey's initiation of a modernization program in 1985 to update its arms base is a turning point in the country's long-standing arming strategy characterized by extended and strong dependence on US provisions. The major component of this modernization program is the establishment of a domestic arms industry. This long time aspiration was voiced loudly until 1978, following the US embargo triggered by Turkey's Cyprus operation of 1974, but was postponed due to economic bottlenecks until the military coup of 1980. One consensus issue between the military and the bureaucracy during military rule (September 1980-1983) was long-term planning to set up a domestic arms industry. This is ironic because the military government also served to maintain order and discipline during the implementation of a major change in Turkey's development strategy which may be considered another turning point: The import substitution strategy of the past three decades based on planning was abandoned and an outward-looking liberal strategy was introduced in the early 1980.

When begun, the modernization program involved a 10-year horizon and a $10-12 billion budget. In 1996, the scope was revised to involve a 30-year horizon until roughly 2025, with a total budget of $150 billion. A further revision in light of economic bottlenecks in early 2000 involved a 10-year and $20 billion bill as the first phase of the program. This program along with ready purchases is partially financed by the defense budget and partially by extra-budget sources, the Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF) being their main body.[3]

The defense budget of Turkey in monetary terms (in constant prices) stagnated in 1980s but increased steadily from 1989 onwards. The amount spent on defense in 2000 was 2.7 times that spent in 1983. This steady trend could be interpreted as Turkey's determination to improve its military capabilities, given the continuity of perceived threats from all directions, not only Greece. Alternatively, possible reflections of the Turkish defense policy on the government budget in the last decades can be tracked by means of several indicators:

shares in the general budget, shares in the primary budget, growth rates, performance of budget forecasts of defense expenditures and growth of DISF expenditures.

We observe an almost a continuously declining trend for percentage shares of defense (D) expenditures in the general budget (B). As shown in Figure 1, the share was highest, around 15 % until 1986, but then decreased as far as 9 % in 2000.

It would be misleading and contradictory to conclude that defense is losing significance in favour of other budget functions, because another characteristic of the last two decades is the expansion of the overall budget due to the increasing burden of interest payments on debt, in turn due to huge budget deficits. Percentage shares in the primary budget, (PB); i.e., budget netted of interest payments tells a different story. In fact, defense has retained its position in time, varying in range 14%-18%. Its share was around 17% in1983 and also in 2000.¹ Once again these figures support a continuum of perceived threats hence concern in the last two decades.

On the other hand, growth rates of the Turkish defense budget in time as depicted in Figure 1 follow a rather fluctuating pattern. The contractions basically coincide with the bottlenecks in the economy, when the primary budget also had to contract. However, the rates of increase in 1989-1990, 1992, 1996-97 and 1999-2000 are out standing, hence call for a check in the Turkish-Greek relations context. The rates, especially in 1989, 1992 and 2000, deserve attention, as they were exceptionally above the growth rates of the primary budget in these years. It should be noted that during 1987 and 1989-1993, personnel expenditures contributed almost totally to the growth of the defense budget, whereas spending on equipment became the major cause from 1994 onwards.⁵

The routine of the budgeting process in Turkey involves putting into effect the budget allocations for year t, in terms of forecasted values in the fall of year t-1. Though magnitudes differ, for all the budget items, deviations from these forecasts in the subsequent year are typical, not attributable to a specific cause like unexpected inflation or

elections.[6] At this stage, one might introduce the Greece-Turkey rela-
tions factor and focus on the forecasting errors for defense expendi-
tures and equipment expenditures in the defense budget.[7] Related data
will be presented subsequently, here we will only draw attention to
certain features.

Defense expenditures (personnel, equipment, investment, transfers)
were systematically overestimated during 1983-1988, as were defense
equipment expenditures during 1983-1991. In other words, in these
years the initial allocations were not spent fully in the year assigned.
However, both items demanded systematically more funds than ini-
tially allocated later on, defense expenditures from 1989 onwards and

Figure 1

Year	% D/B	% D/PB	% growth D
1983	15	17	
1984	15	17	-3
1985	15	18	-6
1986	15	18	9
1987	13	15	-1
1988	12	15	-8
1989	13	17	15
1990	13	17	20
1991	12	15	4
1992	14	16	16
1993	11	14	5
1994	12	18	-3
1995	12	18	2
1996	10	16	10
1997	11	15	20
1998	10	17	3
1999	10	16	16
2000	9	17	11

Figure 1. Turkish Defense Expenditures: Shares and Growth rates, %

equipment spending from 1992 onwards, that is forecasting errors became positive. Both items had again negative forecasting errors in 1998.

Finally, the growth rates of DISF expenditures on both direct purchases and modernization projects might be considered as an indicator of Turkey's reactions to perceived threats. The pattern is far from being systematic, can be better characterized as unstable in directions and dramatic in magnitudes. To cite an example, the growth rate was 221% in 1988, but - 36 % (contraction) in 1997.

It should also be noted that the indicators we have discussed do not have a common pattern or correlation among themselves. The only exception is the statistically significant correlation coefficient of 0.72 between forecasting errors of the Defense Budget and Defense equipment, which would not be surprising. Having highlighted the defense budget-related trends in time, we now turn to the pattern of relationships between Turkey and Greece.

3. An Overview of Turkish-Greek Relations during the 1980s and 1990s

Turkey's relations with Greece more than any other neighbour have been leading in the international agenda most of the time. We will neither discuss the reasons, nor the issues but attempt to assess significant turning points in the bilateral relations from an economist's perspective, in the context of their possible reflections on Turkey's defense expenditures. Table 1, obviously not comprehensive, and not in perfect chronological order within a year, is organized to serve this purpose only.[8] We denote those events which improve relations or reduce tensions by the *plus* sign, therefore expect a reverse effect on Turkish defense expenditures in the year of the event and/or in the subsequent years[9]. On the other hand, deterioration of relations, indicated by the *minus* sign, might be expected to induce increases in the Turkish defense expenditures.

Table 1. List of recent events reflecting ups (+) and downs (—) of relations between Turkey and Greece.

1982	—	Conflict in the Aegean over seismic exploration by GR (Jan.)
	+	Agreement by GR & TR to refrain from provocations (June)
1983	—	Independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared
1984	—	Conflict over NATO military operations in the Aegean
	—	Conflict over arming of Lemnos by GR
1985	—	TR initiated modernisation program for the TR Armed Forces
	—	GR officially declared new defence doctrine: principal threat from TR; moved forces to TR borders
1986	—	frontier incident between border patrols
1987	—	Conflict over oil exploration in the Aegean .
1992	—	Bosnian war, GR supports Belgrade, TR supports Sarajevo
	+	The Black Sea Economic Cooperation launched
1993	—	GR declared GR-Cyprus Joint Defense Doctrine
1994	—	extension of territorial waters to 12 miles: UNCLOS in effect
1995	—	GR Parliament approved UNCLOS
	—	TR Parliament declared warning on TR rights in the Aegean
	—	GR decided to populate remote Aegean islands
	—	GR initiated "strategic partnership" with Damascus
	+	GR lifted its veto against TR's accession to the Customs Union
1996	—	Imia/Kardak crisis
	—	Greece-Armenia defense cooperation
	—	TR-Israel military cooperation agreement
	—	GR announced modernization program for the GR Armed Forces
	—	Clashes on the Greenline between TRNC and Republic of Cyprus
1997	—	GR vetoed TR's bid for eligibility for EU membership
	—	Conflict on intended procurement of S-300 missiles in Rep. of Cyprus
1998	—	Conflict on intended procurement of S-300 missiles in Rep. of Cyprus
	—	EU began accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus.
	+	US ended foreign aid programE to both GR and TR (end of 7:10 disputes).
	+	Madrid Declaration on peaceful solutions for UNCLOS issues
1999	—	Ocalan sheltered in GR embassy in Kenya (Jan.-Feb.)
	+	Simitis affirmed GR's opposition to terrorism (March)
	+	GR ended official restrictions on assertions of Turkish ethnicity in western Thrace (July)
	+	Earthquakes in TR (Aug.) and GR (Sept.)
	+	GR lifted veto on Turkey's candidacy for EU membership
	+	S-300 project cancelled (transferred to Crete)

Obviously, all the events listed would not have equal weight in influencing Turkish defense spending. In fact, there are only four to five severe incidences which can be associated with a risk of war.[10] We expand our context to major climate changes in search of reflections in both directions, if any.

Several features are revealed in Table 1: First, ups and downs are observed in the same year, like 1982 and 1992, as a sort of neutralizing effect on the relation. Of course the best example is the year 1999, the big negative was cancelled out by even bigger pluses, conveying the positive winds to the present days.[11] Second, there are times when no significant incident is observed, like 1988-1991, although succeeding a troubled year, 1987. Finally, 1983-1987, 1993-1994 and 1996-1997 sub-periods are clearly one of troubles (downs); the rest, 1992, 1995, 1998-2000 are weak in downs, with more weight of the improvements (ups) in the relations, except the Ocalan issue in 1999. An assessment of whether this pattern is reflected on the Turkish defense budgeting behaviour is made in the next section.

4. Is there a reaction?

The obvious expectation or hypothesis is that in response to conflicts with Greece, Turkey increased its defense expenditures in the last two decades. In the case of a long-term concept like defense, it would not be realistic to expect a contraction when the waters are still, however there would be less significant increases, as other priorities in the budget would overtake.

The findings and indicators of the previous two sections are summarized in Table 2. In the light of the developed hypothesis, one would expect a consistently increasing defense budget for Turkey during 1983-1987, which corresponds to dominance of conflicts with Greece. This expectation is contradicted with Table 2. Forecasting errors are negative. Besides, the defense budget, contracted quite significantly in this period, until it recovered the 1983 level only in 1989, with outstandingly high increases in public wages, defense inclusive.

Table 2. Turkish-Greek Relations and Turkish Defence Spending Policy Indicators

Year	TR-GR relations	Growth of Defence Budget %	Forecasting Error for Defence %	Forecasting Error for Defence equipment %	Growth of DISF Expendit %
1983	—		-17.9	-20.7	
1984	—	-3.5	-10.4	-15.8	
1985	—	-5.7	-13.0	-18.1	
1986	—	9.3	-14.9	-19.2	
1987	—	-1.3	-14.5	-20.9	28.2
1988		-8.4	-6.1	-10.7	221.4
1989		14.8	17.6	-3.0	-7.2
1990		20.1	3.6	-6.4	132.8
1991		4.3	16.9	-3.2	-29.3
1992		16.5	9.6	0.2	78.8
1993	—	4.9	8.1	3.5	-22.3
1994	—	-3.0	15.3	9.3	-17.8
1995	— +	1.7	11.3	15.7	41.7
1996	—	9.7	3.6	3.1	29.1
1997	—	19.6	14.7	12.5	-36.1
1998	— +	3.4	-0.5	-1.0	-15.9
1999	— +	15.6			
2000	+	11.0			

The second phase with Turkey-Greece relations is 1988-1992, during which no significant incidence is observed. Again, contrary to the expectations, Turkish defense budget increased, but note basically due to personnel expenditures in this period. Forecasting errors for the defense budget are positive and large, indeed more was spent than intended, however not due to defense equipment spending, as those forecasting errors are negative. Expenditures of the DISF increased remarkably in 1988, however gradually they either grew at a slower rate or contracted.

The pattern of Greek-Turkish relations during 1993-1998, as a sub-period, might be perceived as a troubled one if the downs in 1995 and 1998 are perceived as dominating the ups. Alternatively, if ups are thought to be dominating in these years, the pattern becomes rather indeterminate, and thus a reactionary response of the Turkish defense budget would be an overstatement.

Let us take the first route and also ignore the year 1994 (a serious economic crisis year). The conflicts during 1993-1998 then correspond with Turkish defense budget increases, speculatively reactionary. Forecasting errors for both the defense budget and equipment are positive and large, except in 1998. As mentioned above, defense equipment spending contributed dominantly to the growth of the budget growth in this period. A contradictory evidence, however, is that the DISF spending contracted most of the time in this period, so that the 1998 level in monetary terms is only 63 % of the level in 1992. Even if 1998 is interpreted as a troubled year with Greece, it is obvious that no reaction is observed in this year, in terms of Turkish budget defense indicators: they are either low or negative. Then, only the sub period of 1995-1997 stand out for a possible reactionary Turkish defense spending. There are reservations, however. One cannot argue, on the basis of Table 1 that the conflicts during 1995-1997 were much more serious than those encountered in the rest of the last two decades.

We have limited data for 1999-2000, and what we have is contradictory to the reaction expectations, that is, the growth rate of the defense budget was high at a time when relations with Greece improved a lot. The remarks above do not change direction if one presumes that the Turkish budget responds with a time lag due to redefinition of the security concept focusing only on Greece. Considering also one-, two-, three- and four-year lags, we again find that deterioration and improvement in the relationship in year t is not reflected on the Turkish budget indicators in years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4.[12]

5. Concluding remarks

Advanced empirical work on the long-run bi-directional arms race between Turkey and Greece and our budget indicators analysis on one directional reaction of Turkey against Greece during 1980's and 1990's can be reconciled in their very final conclusion that the issue is inconclusive. We might take this as a final statement, thus conclude that there is not any reaction from Turkey's perspective. This is quite plausible, in view of the fact that Turkey's security concept in this period is not limited to perceived threats from Greece only. A continuum of perceived threats, both internal and external, along with the state of the economy, might be shaping Turkey's arming and therefore defense spending decisions, while Greece's main concern might be perceived threats from Turkey and thus arms racies in reaction.[13] It would be interesting to test whether this statement is supported on the basis of reactions of the Greek defense budget.

In fact, there is a need to consider the capacity of the measures used so far. The production of security has speedily become more technological and thus more capital intensive. Arms procurement remains the crucial issue in decision-making in defense policy. Therefore defense expenditures, regardless of country, are incurred partly to upgrade the arms base. In this respect, more insight into arms racing, in literal terms, would be gained if the patterns in arms imports, arms transfers and arms modernization programs of both Greece and Turkey are analyzed in a comparative context. Here are several related, but contradictory points:

1. Both Turkey and Greece have benefited from the "cascading" process, which began with the signing of the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. As excess equipment in the inventories of northern Allies has been transferred south to replace older equipment in service there, both countries have acquired e.g. the same type of tanks.[14]

2. Symmetry is also observed in the equipment modernization programs of both countries in 1990's, involving most notably main battle tanks, helicopters and aircraft. Noting the case of Lockheed

Martin, which helped both countries build aircraft overhaul and production capability,[15] one would speculate that both countries compete for identical or very similar arms, hence there is an arms race. Alternatively, "The modernization activities underway in Turkey and Greece underscore both nations' resolve to remain military significant members of the NATO alliance."[16] These two points do not leave much space for expecting an arms race.

3. "Greece and Turkey have increased their equipment expenditure strongly in the post-cold war period".[17] This observation, however, arouses suspicions for an arms race.

Notwithstanding problems with consistency of comparable data, even for the last decade, a future agenda arises for both countries for empirical and analytical research. There is a need to focus more on a broader rather than a bilateral context, that is on the international context in general and on links with the international arms market in particular, as arming decisions, regarding both costs and types, are hardly purely national.

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NOTES

1. See Dunne *et al.* "An Econometric Analysis of the Arms Race..." in "The Econometrics of Arms Races".
Smith *et al.* "The Econometrics of Arms Races".

2. Smith et al. "The Prisoner's Dilemma".

3. Gunluk-Senesen, "Turkey's Globalisation in Arms".
Gunluk-Senesen, "Turkey: The Arms Industry Modernization".

4. Gunluk-Senesen, "Budgetary Tradeoffs"
Gunluk-Senesen, "Measuring the Extent" shows that defense has used up funds in an increasing trend if expenditures of the Defense Industry Support Fund for the modernization program is also accounted for.

5. Gunluk-Senesen , "Budgetary Tradeoffs".

6. Gunluk-Senesen, "Butce Baslangic Odemelerinin" Related data are available for 1983-1998.

7. Forecasting error = 100 * (Realised spending - Initial Allocation) / Initial Allocation. A positive forecasting error implies more was spent in year t than was allocated for *year t*, in *year t-1*. Therefore, the expen-

diture in year t was underestimated in *year t-1*. Similarly, a negative forecasting error implies less was spent in *year t* than was allocated for *year t*, in *year t-1*. Therefore, the expenditure in *year t* was overestimated in *year t-1*.

8. Major diplomacy contacts (e.g. Davos meetings) are left out of the list, due to their high frequency and less significant outcomes.

9. The table was compiled from various sources:
Athanassiou and Kollias, "Military Tension".
Bahcheli, "Turkish Policy toward Greece".
Kollias and Makrydakis, "Is there a Greek-Turkish Arms Race?"
Kollias, "The Greek-Turkish Conflict".
Sonmezoglu, *Turkiye ve Yunanistan Iliskileri*, pp. 245-350.
Thanks are due to G. Ayman and F. Sonmezoglu for guidance. All errors are mine.

10. Athanassiou and Kollias, "Military Tension", p.99, lists 1986, 1987, 1994, 1996-1998 as serious tension periods. See also Athanassiou and Kollias, "The Effects of Greek-Turkish Rivalry", p.8.

11. Many similar incidences can be quoted, we will suffice here with one of them: In spring 1999, the Istanbul University Senate banned bilateral academic relations with Greece, due to the Ocalan crisis. In fall 1999, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Mr. George Papandreou delivered the honorary opening speech on the occasion of the new academic year in Istanbul University.

12. The rather short time span limits statistical tools to be used. However, for each of the 4 indicators, using the data in Table 2, arithmetic means were compared using t tests, for both routes and for none as well as several lagged responses, to see if average behaviour on the Turkish side differed with respect to conflict and harmony. All of the results were statistically insignificant, indicating no alternation in response to ups and downs. For example, consider the case that 1995, 1998 and 1999 are taken as harmony years. The reader would be puzzled to find that, for 1 year lag response, average growth rate (12.1 %) of the defence budget following harmony times is actually much larg-

er than that (1.3 %) for conflict times. A similar outcome will be found if 1995, 1998 and 1999 are taken as conflict years, also if similar exercise is carried for forecasting errors of the defence budget or equipment. The differences in means are almost negligible for all variables for longer lags. All these of course contradict the a priori expectation that the opposite should hold true.

13. Andreou and Zombanakis, "Financial versus Human Resources" Christos Kollias, "The Greek-Turkish Conflict" p.225.

14. Fiorenza, "Southern Flank Focus" p.68
Bahcheli, "Turkish Policy toward Greece", p.149.

15. Fiorenza, "Southern Flank Focus" p.68.

16. Fiorenza, "Southern Flank Focus" p.70.

17. *SIPRI Yearbook 2001*, p.230. Data on p.326 show that Turkish total arms imports for 1996-2000 exceed that of Greece by 55 %. This is lower than one would expect. The ratio is similar for average military expenditures during 1991-2000. However, it increases to 67% for 2000 (data on pp.277-282). Finally, in terms of SIPRI classification of defence equipment, the average ratio for the same period is 200% (data on pp.292-294). The ratio is surprisingly higher for 2000: Turkey's expenditure is three (3) times that of Greece.

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A LOOK AT THE METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE GREEK-TURKISH ARMS RACE HYPOTHESIS

Christos Kollias *

RÉSUMÉ

Malgré le fait que la Grèce et la Turquie sont tous les deux membres de l'OTAN, leurs relations sont minées par des différends et des conflits. Ces deux pays allouent une part substantielle de leur économie nationale à la défense. Dans un passé rapproché, des tensions et des frictions concomitantes les ont amené au seuil de la guerre. Même pendant la période de l'après guerre froide, leurs dépenses militaires ont continué d'augmenter en termes réels à un moment où d'autres membres de l'OTAN ont diminué leurs dépenses dans ce domaine. L'hypothèse d'une course aux armements entre la Grèce et la Turquie a été le thème de plusieures études empiriques qui abordent les questions de la défense du point de vue économique, mais les resultats de telles études sont loin d'être concluants. Cet article aborde certaines questions méthodologiques relatives à la course aux armements entre la Grèce et la Turquie.

ABSTRACT

Greece and Turkey are both members of the NATO Alliance, yet disputes and conflicts mar their bilateral relations. In the recent past, concomitant tensions and frictions have brought the two countries to the brink of war. Both countries allocate a substantial part of their national economy to defence. Even during the post bipolar period, their respective military expenditures have continued to grow in real terms at a time when other NATO members have been trimming their defence spending. The hypothesis of a Greek-Turkish arms race has been the subject of a number of empirical studies in the defence economics literature, but the issue of the empirical verification of such a race remains at best inconclusive. This paper addresses some methodological issues which hinder the empirical examination of the Greek-Turkish armaments race.

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INTRODUCTION

The ongoing Greek-Turkish rivalry is well documented in the international relations literature and in recent years has also attracted considerable attention in the defence economics literature.[1] Both countries are members of NATO and Greece is also a member of the EU and the Euro area. Compared to other NATO members, they allocate a substantial part of their national economy to defence uses on an annual basis. Comparatively, both Greece and Turkey are the most militarized countries in terms of the human and material resources that they allocate to national defence. For example, in 1999 the Greek and Turkish defence burdens (military expenditure expressed as a share of GDP) were 4.8% and 5.4% respectively while the NATO average for the same year was 2.2%.

In defence economics literature, the strategic interaction, tense bilateral relations and ongoing weapons accumulation by both countries has caught the interest of defence economists, who query whether the hypothesis of a Greek-Turkish arms race can find a modicum of empirical verification. In particular, the arms race hypothesis has been the subject of a number of empirical studies using various econometric techniques. Researchers have set out to investigate whether an arms race between the two NATO allies can be established empirically. At best, the results reported are inconclusive since they give results both 'for' and 'against' the hypothesis of a systematic arms race. This situation is due in part, at least, to the different time periods covered by the various studies, the different econometric methodologies employed and the different variables used.

Competition between countries may take various forms. An arms race is a manifestation of acute external security concerns which arise from tense, antagonistic bilateral relations, conflicting national interests, and perceptions of mutual hostile intentions. These combine with the concomitant military threat perceptions in the minds of the defence planners of each rival. An armaments race between antagonistic and potentially hostile states is a complex and multidimensional problem. It is essentially understood as a dynamic process of inter-

action between states that leads to a continuous build – up in armaments. As Leidy and Staiger[2] point out, political, technological, economic, psychological, historical and geographic elements among others come into play in this dynamic process.

In the case of Greece and Turkey, almost all studies investigate the presence (or absence) of an action-reaction type régime which points to an arms race between the two countries. This article addresses issues related to the observed weapons build-up by both Greece and Turkey and examines the difficulties associated with establishing in empirical fashion an action-reaction process between the two countries. We proceed with a brief comparative presentation of Greek and Turkish military expenditure data which we then use in the discussion of the arms race hypothesis highlighting the important methodological issues and practical problems associated with the empirical investigation of an armaments race.

GREEK AND TURKISH MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Both Greece and Turkey belong to the same military alliance and appear to have more or less similar international orientations. Their bilateral relations however, are marred by animosity, tension and mistrust. Of course, important improvements have been witnessed in recent years. Nevertheless, the major issues dividing the two countries remain unresolved and could in the future re-ignite tension and conflict. By NATO standards, on the basis of the human and material resources they yearly allocate to defence uses, Greece and Turkey are highly militarized. Despite the fact that in terms of per capita GDP, they are two of the poorest NATO members, both have almost invariably ranked as the alliance members with the highest defence burden; i.e., the share of defence expenditure in GDP. In 1999, defence spending stood at 4.8% of the GDP in Greece and 5.4% in Turkey, compared to a NATO average of 2.2%. Indeed, this has been the case ever since 1974, when the Turkish invasion of Cyprus marked an important escalation in their antagonistic and tense relations.

As it can be seen from both Figure 1 and Table 1 (which summarizes Figure 1), the defence burden series of both countries oscillate around the NATO average up to 1974. Following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the defence burden in both countries has remained - with the exception of a couple years in the case of Turkey - well above the NATO average to the extent that the latter may serve as a benchmark for comparison purposes hereafter. In particular, in the post-74 period defence expenditure in Greece amounts to an average 5.7% of GDP and 4.4% in the case of Turkey while the NATO average for the same period is about 3.2%.

Even more interesting to observe is the fact that in the post bipolar period (1990-99), their respective defence burdens do not show signs of downward trends. In fact they follow an upward path, more pronounced in the case of Turkey, less so in the case of Greece. In contrast, the NATO average exhibits a steady downward trend averaging 2.6% for this period while the respective averages are 4.5% for Greece and 4.1% for Turkey.

If the share of defence expenditures in GDP can act as an indicator of defence needs (plus the concomitant allocation of resources to defence by a country) as these are determined by the strategic international environment then it would appear that Greece and Turkey both face increased defence needs when compared to the rest of NATO. Whether these may be attributed to their tense bilateral relations is a different issue. The fact that both time series (in other words, Greek and Turkish defence spending as a percentage of GDP) follow a similar path in the post-1974 period when both series start diverging from the NATO average, may be taken as an indication that their respective defence needs are at least partially determined by their security concerns about each other. Whether or not they have engaged in a systematic arms race is a totally different question that can not be answered only on the basis of the level and trend of their respective defence burdens, as it will be discussed in the next section.

Table 1: Defence spending as a percentage of GDP

	NATO	Greece	Turkey
1954-99	3.7	5.2	4.5
1954-73	4.4	4.6	4.6
1974-99	3.2	5.7	4.4
1990-99	2.6	4.5	4.1

Figure 1: Defence spending as a percentage of GDP in NATO, Greece and Turkey

A similar picture emerges if the absolute level of military spending is used. As it can be seen from Figure 2, both Greek and Turkish defence expenditures have in real terms followed an upward trend throughout the post World War II period. The immediate impact of the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus can easily be observed in Figure 2. In real terms, Greek military spending increased by about 69% between 1974-75, by 85% between 1974-76 and by 96% between 1974-77. The corresponding increases in Turkish military spending in

real terms were 66% in 1974-75, 90% in 1974-76 and 83% in 1974-77. Overall, during 1950-2000 in real terms Greek military spending increases by about 965% and Turkish by about 1426% while in the post-74 period, i.e. 1974-2000 the corresponding increases are 267% and 447% respectively. As it can be observed in Figure 2 the two time series start to diverge towards the late 1980s when Turkish military spending increases at a faster rate than Greek defence expenditure which nevertheless also exhibits an upward trend albeit less pronounced.

Figure 2: Greek and Turkish defence spending 1950-2000*

* in constant prices

Again, based on this purely descriptive analysis, one can not help but observe a strikingly similar path in the trend of the two time-series which could be taken as a sign of weapons competition between the two, given the tense bilateral relations and the issues of friction that divide them. Even more interesting is the fact that both Greek and Turkish military spending have continued to grow during the post bipolar era. Again, using NATO as the benchmark, during 1989-2000

total NATO defence spending has declined in real terms by about 23%. In contrast, Greek defence expenditure grew by about 35% while Turkish military expenditure increased by as much as 113% in real terms. These trends are shown graphically in Figure 3. Contrary to the dominant international trends, at a period when most countries had drastically reduced their defence budgets following the relaxation of international tensions, Greece and Turkey continued to increase their defence expenditures, thus forfeiting the opportunity to yield the so-called peace dividend.

Figure 3: Military spending in NATO, Greece and Turkey 1989-2000

* SIPRI data in constant 1998 prices

CAN A WEAPONS COMPETITION BE ESTABLISHED?

In the previous section, we used NATO as a benchmark for comparison purposes and briefly examined Greek and Turkish defence expenditures while highlighting trends and similarities that could be indicators of a systematic arms race between the two countries. In this section we examine and discuss issues and problems associated with the hypothesis of a Greek Turkish armaments race and its empirical verification.

An armaments race may be defined as a dynamic process of interaction between states that leads to a continuous build-up in armaments. However, when it comes to the empirical examination of the presence or absence of weapons competition between two rivals, some fundamental methodological issues arise. Some of these issues will be treated here in the context of the Greek-Turkish defence and security concerns, priorities and their weapons build-up.

One major problem that arises when examining arms races is the choice of a measure of defence capability. In other words, what variable should one use in order to test for weapons competition between rivals such as Greece and Turkey and to analyze the dynamics of this interaction? Given the problems associated with data availability in the defence sector, most studies use military expenditures as the best proxy measure of defence capability available. The question is whether such expenditures can be used as the variable that encapsulates the dynamics of an armaments race. It has been argued that military expenditures can be a misleading measure of defence. McCubbins[3] notes, for instance, that the military expenditures of two nations engaged in weapons competition could remain unchanged while intense arms competition may be taking place between one, two or more weapons systems. Similarly, Anderton[4] points out that weapons stocks could be rising even though military expenditures are falling and *vice versa*. This situation stems from the fact that military expenditure is a flow whereas the military capability of a state is determined by the stock of weapons that it possesses. If, for example, the flow of expenditures to weapons exceeds that needed for replacement then the

stock and, logically, military capabilities will be increasing even if the flow has fallen compared to the previous period. As the same author notes, significant parts of military expenditures are allocated to uses other than procurement and maintenance that directly affect defence capability. Military expenditures are an aggregate of many individual expenditures including, for example, payments to retired military personnel who do not contribute directly to military strength. Furthermore, expenditures that affect the military capability of a country are not included in this aggregate. Spending on paramilitary forces such as the *gendarmerie* in the case of Turkey, or the coast guard is not included in the budget of defence ministries. Yet both the *gendarmerie* and the coast guard are part of a country's defence planning and contribute to its total defence, or military capability. There are, therefore, important limitations associated with the use of military expenditures as a measure of defence capability in arms race studies. However, although the optimum case would be to use the data defence policymakers and military planners use, given the absence of such data we will also resort in using military expenditures in this case study.[5]

Based on the purely descriptive analysis of the previous section, a strongly similar trend in the military expenditure series of the two countries is observed (Figure 2). The two series appear to follow a common pattern until the late 1980s when they start to diverge. At that point, Turkish military spending increases at a faster rate than Greek defence spending, which, nevertheless, exhibits an upward trend, albeit less pronounced. The observed common pattern and trend of the two series is further verified if we estimate the correlation coefficient[6] of the two. Although strong correlation does not imply the presence of a causal relation and hence an armaments race, it nevertheless is a useful tool to explore the presence of common trends between time series. Not surprisingly, the value of the estimated correlation coefficient for the whole post-war period is quite high (a value of 0.903) suggesting strong correlation between the two defence expenditure series.

Table 2: Correlation between Greek and Turkish military spending

	Correlation coefficient	p-value
1950-2000	0.903	0.000
1950-1973	0.909	0.000
1950-1990	0.961	0.000
1974-2000	0.722	0.000
1974-1980	0.842	0.017
1974-1990	0.662	0.004
1980-1990	0.323	0.332
1980-2000	0.692	0.001
1990-2000	0.905	0.000

Further correlation analysis for different sub-periods yields interesting results. As can be seen in Table 2, the estimated correlation coefficients vary from 0.323 for the period 1980-90, 0.662; for 1974-90, 0.722; for 1974-2000, 0.842; for 1974-80, to 0.961 for the period 1950-90. This changing degree of correlation between the two series suggests any relation that the correlation analysis might reflect has not remained constant throughout the post-war period. Indeed, the correlation coefficient of 0.961 for the period 1950-90, which is close to unity, points to extremely strong correlation, whereas the coefficient of 0.323 for the period 1980-90 indicates the absence of any correlation between Greek and Turkish military expenditures for this period. Interestingly enough, due to a number of developments during this decade, one would intuitively expect to find the opposite. For most of this decade the "*anti-Turkish*" rhetoric of the PASOK governments in Greece was quite intense, although important efforts at *rapprochement* did take place. However, in 1985, the *New Defence Doctrine* was officially declared. The doctrine regards Turkey as the main threat to Greek national interests. Note that this period also coincides with

serious incidents which mark significant escalations of military tensions, notably the 1987 crisis over proposed oil explorations in the Aegean by Turkey that brought the two countries to the brink of war.

One difficulty in establishing an action-reaction régime between Greek and Turkish military spending is that governments do not necessarily respond instantaneously to their rivals' military acquisitions. As a result, the defence expenditure of one rival may respond with a time lag to the other's armaments or indeed to escalations in their rivalry such as military crises and incidents that present peaks in their animosity. Following the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, Greek military expenditure in the four years that follow the invasion increases by about 100.4% and Turkey's by 67.9% (Table 3). However, a different reaction is observed in the case of other military escalations.

Despite the importance of the 1987 military crisis, the effect that can be traced on military spending is mixed. In 1987-88, the year following the crisis, defence spending increases in Greece by about 5.7% but falls by about −11.9% in Turkey. Even allowing for a time delay in the response, Greek defence spending between 1987-89 declines marginally by 0.9% (the reverse of what one would intuitively expect to find) while Turkish military expenditure marginally rises by 1.9%. Allowing for three years to elapse, Greek military expenditure between 1987-90 marginally rises by 0.2% while the equivalent change for Turkey is a 23% increase (Table 3). The serious fiscal constraints that Greece faces during this period may be cited as one explanation of the absence of any significant response in the level of defence spending following the 1987 crisis. On the other hand, the increase in Turkish expenditures may be attributed not so much to defence concerns over Greece but rather to the emergence of a different issue in the Turkish security agenda and priorities in the late 1980s, namely the Kurdish PKK guerillas and the war against them, which placed substantial upward pressures on the Turkish defence budget.

Table 3: Impact of crises on military expenditures

Cyprus 1974							
Greece				Turkey			
% change from crisis base year		Annual % change		% change from crisis base year		Annual % change	
1970-74	7.8	1971	5.8	1970-74	39.7	1971	17.0
1971-74	1.9	1972	6.6	1971-74	19.3	1972	3.9
1972-74	-4.4	1973	-0.2	1972-74	14.8	1973	5.0
1973-74	-4.2	1974	-4.2	1973-74	9.4	1974	9.4
1974-75	68.9	1975	68.9	1974-75	65.8	1975	65.7
1974-76	85.1	1976	9.6	1974-76	90.3	1976	14.8
1974-77	96.2	1977	6.1	1974-77	83.3	1977	-3.7
1974-78	100.4	1978	2.2	1974-78	67.9	1978	-8.4
Aegean Oil Explorations 1987							
Greece				Turkey			
% change from crisis base year		Annual % change		% change from crisis base year		Annual % change	
1983-87	7.4	1984	16.9	1983-87	19.5	1984	-1.2
1984-87	-8.1	1985	0.6	1984-87	21.1	1985	8.5
1985-87	-8.7	1986	-10.3	1985-87	11.6	1986	13.0
1986-87	1.9	1987	1.87	1986-87	-1.3	1987	-1.3
1987-88	5.7	1988	5.7	1987-88	-11.9	1988	-11.9
1987-89	-0.9	1989	-6.4	1987-89	1.9	1989	15.7
1987-90	0.2	1990	1.2	1987-90	23.1	1990	20.8
1987-91	-5.0	1991	-5.2	1987-91	26.6	1991	2.8
Imia 1996							
Greece				Turkey			
% change from crisis base year		Annual % change		% change from crisis base year		Annual % change	
1992-96	7.1	1993	-2.4	1992-96	20.8	1993	10.6
1993-96	9.8	1994	1.7	1993-96	9.2	1994	-2.1
1994-96	7.9	1995	2.1	1994-96	11.5	1995	2.4
1995-96	5.7	1996	5.7	1995-96	8.9	1996	8.9
1996-97	6.4	1997	6.4	1996-97	-5.3	1997	-5.3
1996-98	15.7	1998	8.8	1996-98	-0.8	1998	4.8
1996-99	21.7	1999	5.2	1996-99	17.8	1999	18.8
1996-00	25.9	2000	3.4	1996-00	27.9	2000	8.6

A further example is the 1996 Imia crisis in which a military confrontation was again narrowly averted. In the aftermath of the crisis, Greece immediately stepped up its weapons acquisition program. Having more or less tackled the fiscal problems of the late 1980s, Greece could now afford to allocate more funds to its military establishment and improve its defence capability vis-à-vis Turkey. The impact of this new procurement program gradually affected the level of military expenditures in the years that follow (Table 3). Thus in 1996-97, Greek military spending increases by 6.4%, in 1996-98 by 15.7%, in 1996-99 by 21.7% and by the year 2000 compared to 1996 (the year of the crisis) it has grown in real terms by about 25.9%. Turkish military spending on the other hand exhibits a different trend. It declines by 5.3% between 1996-97, by 0.82% in 1996-98 and increases by 17.8% in 1996-99 (18.8% in 1998-99) and by 27.9% in 1996-2000 (8.6% in 1999-2000). The picture changes if instead of total military expenditure we concentrate on equipment spending by the two countries. Greek equipment expenditure falls by about 2% in 1996-97 but steadily increases afterwards by 13.4% in 1996-98, 11.9% between 1996-99 and 9.2% by 2000. Turkish equipment spending on the other hand exhibits a different trend. It falls by 8.7% in 1996-97 and by 27% between 1996-98. Then it starts increasing again. In 1999 it grows by 36% and by a further 43.2% in 2000. Compared to 1996, Turkish equipment expenditure has increased by 42% in real terms.

Morrow[7] points out that defence expenditures of two rivals engaged in arms competition may over time oscillate around a general trend and/or "*equilibrium relation*" as the two countries try for example, to juggle the dual problems of defence needs and the economic burden their armaments represent. If this is the case, weapons competition as this may be reflected by military expenditures, may not be a smooth upward process but rather a series of jumps from one level of armaments to another as the one country responds to increases in the military capability of the other and so forth, aiming at maintaining what it considers as an acceptable balance of military strength between itself and its rival. In other words, responses to military acquisitions between rivals may be asynchronous determined, among other things,

by economic constraints and domestic policy priorities. But if they are asynchronous and they result in swings in the military balance between a dyad of countries, the question that arises is whether countries exploit these swings to advance their interests through the use or the threat of use of military force. In other words, it is possible that as a country finds itself in a state of temporary military advantage over its rival, will attempt to capitalize on this advantage. If this is the case then one should also be looking at changes in military spending before the year of the escalation and military crisis. Increases in military expenditure before the year of the military crisis may be interpreted as a sign of military preparations, which upset (or aim to upset) the existing military balance between two powers. As one of the two finds itself in an advantageous position it uses its temporary military superiority to achieve its objectives vis-à-vis its rival. It can be seen from the data in Table 3 that in the case of the Cyprus escalation in 1974, between 1970-74 Turkish military expenditure grew by 39.7% while Greek by 7.8%. The average annual increase for the three years before the Turkish invasion, i.e. 1971-73, was 8.66% for Turkey and 4.07% for Greece. In 1987 the average annual increase for 1984-86 was 2.39% for Greece and 6.75% for Turkey while between 1983-87 military spending increased in real terms by 7.4% for Greece and 19.5% in the case of Turkey. The pattern does not change in the Imia crisis either. Between 1992-96 Turkish military spending increases by 20.8% while the corresponding increase in the case of Greece is 7.1%. The three-year average before the crisis, i.e. 1993-95, is 0.47% for Greece and 3.63% for Turkey. In all three cases used here, a significant asymmetry in the growth rates of military expenditures is recorded a few years before the military crisis. This asymmetry in the growth rates may be reflecting changes in the military strength balance that eventually present the opportunity for one of the two to militarily challenge the other. In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, in 1987 Turkey attempted oil explorations in disputed areas of the Aegean and in 1996 it disputed the sovereignty of Greece over the island of Imia. In all three cases, in the years before the crisis Turkish military expenditure grew faster than Greek. Although such expenditure can hardly be a satisfactory index of military strength it can nevertheless serve as an

approximation in the absence of something better. The asymmetries in the growth rates may reflect swings in the balance of strength in favour of Turkey that then proceeds to use this advantage to achieve its objectives.

A further important issue is that of the time period for which we are trying to examine whether the two countries have been engaged in a systematic armaments race. The frequent structural changes in the international as well as the domestic environment are important obstacles in any attempt to examine whether countries are arms racing. Such changes may include the outbreak of war, changes in the national leadership with the concomitant changes in defence and security policy, changes in threat perceptions, changes in the national economy from which the resources are drawn for the defence sector, the appearance of new security concerns (international or domestic) that may at least partially shift the attention of security decision makers and defence planners for longer or shorter time spans.

Clearly, such factors are important when it comes to the Greek-Turkish case and raise the question of what time period one should use when investigating the arms race hypothesis. Throughout the post war period important changes and developments have occurred which have affected both their bilateral interaction as well as the security concerns and priorities the two countries have faced over the last fifty years. It follows logically that these changes have also affected their respective defence policies.

In the case of Greece, the main security concern during the 1950s was the communist threat, both external in the form of the Warsaw Pact and Greece's northern neighbors, but also internal. However, from the 1960s a gradual and lasting shift took place in the country's security concerns and defence priorities. The perceived threat from its northern neighbours gradually diminished to the point of disappearing making room for a more *traditional* security concern and military threat, that of Turkey, which rapidly increases in importance to the point of becoming imminent.[8] The growing tensions over Cyprus and the 1963 Turkish military intervention which was narrowly averted

after stern US diplomatic intervention and would probably have sparked a Greek-Turkish war, mark the start of an important shift in defence policy. In fact, from this point on, Greek (and Turkish) defence policies for the first time in the post-war period allow for the possibility of an outright war between the two countries. The 1974 Cyprus invasion by Turkey marks the total shift in Greek security concerns and priorities, military threat perceptions and defence planning. The concomitant cost of this shift may be seen in the increases in military spending over the following years (Table 3, Figure 2). Since 1974, Greek defence policy had remained unaltered in its essentials and declarations such as the *New Defence Doctrine* in 1985 constitute official declarations of strategies and defence policies adopted in the past and did not affect strategic commitments or force deployment. Similarly, the declaration of the *Joint Defence Area* between Greece and Cyprus in 1993 was largely the official seal of Greece's extended deterrence and military commitment in Cyprus. Despite the important changes that have followed the end of bipolarity and the flare up of the Balkans, Greek security concerns and military threat perceptions vis-à-vis Turkey remained essentially unchanged. The preceding brief discussion about changes and fluctuations in Greek security concerns raises the following question: should one include the 1950s in the period for which the Greek-Turkish arms race hypothesis is examined or concentrate only on the post-74 period onwards?

Similar changes that may have affected defence planning and spending in Turkey have also occurred. Since the mid-1980s and up to the late-1990s, Turkey faced serious internal security problems that escalated to almost full-scale war in its southeastern provinces against the Kurdish uprising. The war that the Turkish forces have waged against the PKK guerillas for more than a decade undoubtedly placed serious pressures on its defence budget. In fact, a substantial part of the large increases in Turkey's military expenditures over the past decade may be partly attributed to this internal war and less to defence concerns over Greece. Again, the question is whether one should include this period during which Turkey is engaged in serious internal military conflict - with the concomitant impact on its military expenditure - in the analysis of the Greek-Turkish arms race hypothesis.

To complicate matters further, one may cite a host of other factors that temporarily, periodically or even more permanently influenced defence expenditures in either country. As Leidy and Staiger point out, the underlying determinants of a country's perceived external security and defence requirements are numerous, and the way in which they combine to dictate military expenditures extremely complex. Among the determinants that can be cited in the Greek-Turkish case are the Cold War, the Gulf War, country-specific external security concerns such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Bulgaria (in the case of Turkey) or Bulgaria, Albania and the former Yugoslavia (in the case of Greece) before the end of the Cold War. One may also add internal security factors, such as the Kurdish problem in Turkey, the effects of military alliance membership, e.g., NATO. There are also domestic economic constraints that influence the level of defence spending (the current Turkish economic crisis is a typical example of the impact of economic constraints on defence budgets) and other domestic issues and priorities such as the "guns or butter dilemma" that recently arose in Greece, as well as the influence of various interest groups such as military élites. All these may be treated as "external noise" that can not easily be isolated and thus hinders the examination of the underlying relation between Greek and Turkish military spending (Figure 4). Assuming of course, that such an action-reaction relation does exist. But does an arms race exist only if a bi-directional causal relation is established?

**Figure 4: Determinants of Greek and Turkish military spending**

Defence spending is a function of a number of determinants – economic constraints, alliance membership, external and internal security concerns, domestic policy priorities, military élites – that with different and time varying weights influence the level of such expenditure. More specifically, since a country's military expenditure is determined by a number of different security needs – both internal and external – each one with a different and time varying weight, the perceived military threat posed by the rival country is only one, albeit important, determinant of military spending.

In the case of Greece and Turkey, their respective security needs and priorities driving defence spending are quite different. More importantly they have changed fundamentally over the years. In Greece's security agenda, Turkey – although not the single security concern - may rank as the most important threat to its interests. However, this may not be the case for Turkey. For example, in Turkey's security agenda, the internal issue of the Kurds has ranked extremely high and has undoubtedly affected, although it is not clear to what extent, the country's defence spending and armaments program over the past decade or so. Of course, this was not the case in other periods such as from the mid-1960s to perhaps the mid-1980s when disputes with Greece, (Cyprus and the Aegean) probably dominated the Turkish defence agenda. Similarly, Greece's other neighbours present, in comparative terms, less of a military threat to its security than Turkey's neighbours. The Turkish weapons build-up, especially in the post Cold War period, may thus be attributed in part to external and internal security needs not shared by Greece. Since, however, Turkey figures high in Greece's security agenda as the main military threat, its weapons build-up causes Greece to respond by strengthening its military capability to avoid falling behind its rival. This raises the question posed earlier: does an arms race exist only if a bi-directional causal relation is established? What if Turkey armed itself in order to meet increased security needs that are not entirely determined by Greece's military strength? But, it is possible that this strengthening of Turkey's military capability increases the insecurity felt by Greece which responds by increasing its armaments in order to prevent the military strength gap vis-à-vis its main rival to widen or the existing balance to

be upset. The argument can be further extended. What if this narrowing of the gap by Greece, which does not wish to fall behind, causes Turkey to step up its armaments so that not to allow Greece to catch up? In this way both countries enter in an upward armaments spiral the dynamics of which are not wholly determined by security concerns over each other. The actions of the one of the countries in our dyad aimed to increase its security or to meet new security threats, reduce the security felt by the other and force it to increase its defence capability vis-à-vis its rival.

Figure 5: Equipment expenditures by Greece and Turkey 1987-2000

*SIPRI data in constant 1998 prices

Over the past one and a half decades for which data are readily available, Turkey has been implementing a massive armament program. In real terms, its equipment expenditure has risen by about 345% in the period 1987-2000 (Figure 5). The corresponding increase for Greece is about 142%. During this period, the average annual growth rate of equipment expenditure for Greece was 4.1% and 11.8% for Turkey.

For the post bipolar period i.e. 1990-2000 the average annual growth rates were 1.6% and 15.5% respectively. Even if this weapons build-up by Turkey is wholly driven by factors not associated with security concerns and military needs *vis-à-vis* Greece, it nevertheless increases the military insecurity felt by the latter. This causes a reaction in order to avoid falling behind since the weapons accumulated by Turkey can potentially be used against Greece if deterioration in their bilateral relations leads to a military confrontation.

Current defence capability is the result of decisions made by defence planners in the past. Current defence decisions determine future defence capability and balance of military strength between rivals. Defence planning and decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty. If no observable change in the rival's long-term strategy is evident, then defence planners will tend, at least partially, to decide upon past experience. If the rival's behaviour and/or actions in the past were – or were perceived to be – aggressive and hostile, then a *"better safe than sorry"* attitude will tend to dominate defence planning and decisions. If a rival has behaved aggressively in the past, defence planners will tend to assume that there is no reason to expect it will not do so again in the future. Even more so if the rival has in the past relied or used its military strength either to extract concessions or to advance its interests by force.

Based on the experience of past behaviour, claims over sovereign rights, the use of military power in Cyprus, frequent statements by Turkish officials, Greece perceives Turkey as a revisionist power and a long-term threat to its national interests. Even if their current bilateral relations are not tense, disagreements over important issues and long-term disputes help sustain the perception that Turkey poses a long term threat despite short-term improvements in bilateral relations. Consequently, if this is the timeframe security planners use, the need to maintain a credible military deterrence is unaffected by short-term fluctuations in Greek-Turkish relations. Suspicion over each other's long-term intents and strategy is at least partially driving their weapons accumulation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In comparative terms, Greece and Turkey allocate a substantial part of their national income to defence. In the post-Cold War period, contrary to international trends, both have increased their military spending in real terms. The issue of a systematic arms race between the two remains, at best, empirically unresolved. This absence of empirical verification does not necessarily imply that the two countries are arming independently.

The important and as yet unresolved issues dividing the two countries form a fertile ground in which mutual suspicion over long-term intensions and threat perceptions flourish. In their security agenda and defence planning, mutual concerns over each other are an important long-term determinant of their military spending. With a time varying weight and to different extents, each other's military strength and preparations have influenced their respective defence expenditures and perhaps have fueled an arms race. Since defence planning takes place with a medium- to long-term horizon and is affected by a multitude of often interdependent factors, such as economic constraints and security concerns, that are dynamic in nature and ever-changing, it is probably futile to attempt to establish an action-reaction régime between Greek and Turkish military spending. There are, of course, also the limitations associated with this measure of military capability. Although by no means evidence of a causal relation, the correlation between the two time-series points to the presence of a long-term relation. However, for shorter time periods, this relation is affected by other factors of both external and internal nature such as economic constraints and other domestic or external security concerns.

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NOTES

1. A comprehensive survey can be found in Brauer, J. (2002) "Turkey and Greece: a comprehensive survey of the defence economics literature" forthcoming in C. Kollias & G. Gunluk-Senesen *Greece and Turkey in the 21ʰ Century. The Political Economy Perspective.*

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5. For reasons of data compatibility all data used here are taken from SIPRI Yearbooks.

6. Correlation is the degree of linear relationship between two variables. The correlation coefficient assumes values between −1 and +1. If one of the two variables tends to increase as the other decreases then the correlation coefficient is negative. If both variables tend to increase together then the correlation coefficient is positive. The closer to unity the correlation coefficient is, the stronger the correlation between the two variables.

7. Morrow, J. (1989) "A twist of the truth: a re-examination of the effects of arms race   on the occurrence of war", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, No 3.

8. See for example Platias, A. (1991) "Greece's strategic doctrine: in search of autonomy and deterrence", in Constas, D. [ed].

Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Greek Perception

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RÉSUMÉ

Face aux changements perçus au niveau régional et sur le plan intérieur dans la période de l' après-guerre froide, la Turquie a adopté une politique étrangère révisionniste. Cette politique cherche non seulement à changer le rapport des forces en sa faveur, mais aussi à lui assurer un rôle hégémonique en Méditérannée Orientale et de façon plus globale au Proche Orient.

Dans ce cadre, cet article tente de cerner la perception grecque de l'alliance turco-israélienne. À cette fin, les auteurs mettent l'accent sur le contexte des événements et la version moderne de cette alliance. Ils insistent également sur les mobiles qui ont favorisé une telle relation. Enfin sont présentées et analysées les inquiétudes de Chypre et de Grèce face à cette alliance.

ABSTRACT

Turkey has adopted a revisionist foreign policy in response to perceived post-Cold War changes in its regional and domestic scene. This policy seeks not only to alter the regional balance of power in its favor but also to ensure a hegemonic role for Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.

This article attempts to capture the Greek perception of the Turkish-Israeli alliance. To this end, the article explicitly focuses on the background as well as on the modern version of the Turkish-Israeli alliance as well as the motives behind it. Finally, the Greek and Cypriot concerns and responses to this partnership will be also discussed.

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The Background of the Israeli-Turkish Alliance

Relations between Israel and Turkey flourished during the 1950s. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize the State of Israel in March 28, 1949, and the first to establish diplomatic relations in 1950. By the mid-fifties the two countries commenced a multi-level relationship that included military and intelligence cooperation. The strategic military co-operation climaxed in 1958 with the signing of a secret military pact by Prime Minister Ben Gurion and his Turkish counterpart Menderes, August 29-30 during a secret visit by Ben Gurion to Ankara.[1] The 1958 pact provided for joint military planning, intelligence cooperation, exchange of technological and technical know-how in industry and agriculture, secure of financial credits for Turkey, construction of airports,[2] and utilization of Israel's worldwide connections to counter Greece on the Cyprus issue.[3] It was Israel that initiated this partnership as Tel Aviv in a hostile environment approached Turkey in the context of its strategy of survival, a key ingredient of its peripheral strategy of forging alliances with non-Arab states like Iran, Ethiopia and the Christian Lebanon.[4]

In specific, Israel viewed Turkey as a listening and intelligence post, a window to the Middle East, and set up an active diplomatic mission in Ankara. The complementarity of both countries' economies was also emphasized on the combination of the Israeli know-how with the Turkish economic potential.

Equally important was the role of Washington in promoting the Turkish-Israeli partnership, which acted as a catalyst. The Kassemite anti-Western coup that occurred in 1958 wrecked the pro-Western Baghdad Pact. Indeed, at that moment Israel and Turkey concluded their secret pact and agreed to act as proxies of the West in case Aden succumbed to Egyptian subversion, because such a development would have endangered not only the oil tanker routes but also Israel's vital sea lanes.

Turkey for its part, approached Israel for a number of interrelated reasons, among which, the most prominent were the utilization of the Israeli influence with Western centers of power to further promote its

policy to join NATO[5], and court with its Western allies with special emphasis on the US. The above geostrategic and political reasons are just as relevant today as they were then.

The Revitalization of the Alliance

The Israeli-Turkish relationship emerged revitalized because of significant developments in the mid-1990s. The end of the Cold War, emergence of the US as the world's preponderant power, Middle East peace process and normalization of relations between Israel and key Arab states, namely Egypt and Jordan, provided the appropriate context for both Israel and Turkey to proceed with their relationship. In fact, the US has provided the links in the chain linking Israel, Turkey and the US in a special triangular strategic nexus. Officials in Washington, especially in the Pentagon, during the Reagan Administration and afterwards, pushed the two countries together. As also did influential Jewish-American groups working with the Turkish delegation in the American capital as well as a number of prominent Turkish-American businessmen with Turkish-Jews in Istanbul and settled in Israel.[6]

A military accord, entitled "The Agreement on Military Training Co-operation" was signed in Tel Aviv on February 23, 1996.[7] This agreement was complementary to an earlier one signed secretly the previous year, entitled "Memorandum on Military Aircraft and Training".[8] The content of the accords revolves around mutual access to the airspace and bases of both countries' respective forces for separate[9] or joint air force and naval training exercises, and for mutually agreed electronic surveillance flights.

The most controversial aspect of the accords concerns the utilization of the Turkish airspace bordering with Syria, Iran and Iraq by Israeli pilots for training. In fact, by mid-April 1996, Israelis were training in the NATO-built training center of Konya and at the base of Akinci near Ankara, a special area unobserved from the perimeter had been sealed off for their exclusive use.[10] It also includes intelligence cooper-

ation to counter common threats, border security and exchanges of military know-how. It provides for exchanges between the military academies, and the establishment of a security forum for a strategic dialogue between Israel and Turkey. The security forum is the most crucial aspect of this relationship as it establishes a network of institutions, research centres and personal contacts among the military, political and academic elites of both states.[11]

An agreement on military industrial cooperation was also concluded in April 1996. The closer relations between the two countries led to an increase in Turkey's purchases of defense equipment from Israel. This "love affair" involved a few deals, namely the upgrade of Turkish air force F-4, Phantom fighters worth of $640 million signed in 1997, the upgrade of F-5 planes worth of $73 million signed in 1999, and the sale of air-to-ground Popeye missiles manufactured by Rafael worth of $54 million, signed in 2000. However, Israeli defense industries have experienced numerous broken defense deals and losses in their bids to sell Turkey arms systems. An outstanding example is the postponement by the Turkish government in 2000[12] of the sale of fighters worth one billion dollars. In an attempt to neutralize the negative climate, Israeli defense minister Eliahu Ben-Eliezer met with his Turkish counterpart Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, the Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, the President Necdet Sezer and the Chief of the General Staff, Huseyin Kivrikoglu[13] during his one-day visit to Ankara in July 9, 2001, and tried to promote — among other issues[14] — Israeli defense offers. Of course he had taken into account the fact that Turkey plans to spend $150 billion over the next 30 years to modernize its military.

In parallel, high level military visits take place frequently. One of the most recent was that of the Israeli Chief of Staff, Shaul Mofaz, in Ankara, July 28, 2001. The importance of this military visit was demonstrated by a press ban on reports which might refer to the content of the talks. According to leaked reports,[15] the defense officials of both countries reached an agreement on the modernization of the Turkish M-60 tanks to be carried out by the Israelis. The possibility of a joint missile shield to protect Turkey and Israel from potential ene-

mies was also discussed. There were also reports that the two countries had concluded strategic agreements which could affect the fate of the Middle East and Caucasus. These alleged agreements permit, for example, the strike on Iran from Turkey along the lines of the "Operation Babylon" in the course of which the Iraqi nuclear power plant of Osiraq was hit in 1981. Israel can use military bases in Turkey to destroy Iranian nuclear missile bases.[16]

Turkey's Motivations and Regional Implications

On the geopolitical chessboard of the greater Middle East, two kinds of states are identified: active geo-strategic players and geopolitical pivots.[17] Turkey has tried to capitalize on its prominent place in US strategy[18] in the aftermath of the Cold War as a pivotal country in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Central Asia region. The Turkish-Israeli alliance is embodied in the American rationale for Turkey to play a special role in either defining access to these important areas or acting as a defense shield. The concrete motivations behind the Turkish-Israeli alliance are defined as follows:

(a) Proper a wider security system that will pose Central Asia and the Caucasus under the sphere of influence of Turkey, Israel and the US, and will limit drastically the role of Russia and Iran as security guarantors of this critical area.

(b) Additionally, the enhancement of Turkish-Israeli cooperation on oil and gas supplies of the Caspian region, under the US supervision, also demonstrates that an attempt is on the way to inactivate the present Russo-Iranian *modus vivendi* on energy issues.[19] The Russo-Iranian understanding focuses on Russian development of Iranian energy reserves and offer of advanced weapons and technology, in exchange for Tehran's agreement to serve as a route for any proposed energy pipeline from the Caspian. Israel is interested in access to oil and gas from Turkey should Turkey's ambition to become a major pipeline route for energy resources from the Caucasus and Central Asia is realized.

(c) Promotion of a regional project as part of a wider missile defense that will place Turkey, surrounded by the majority of the so-called rogue states at the crossroads of the Middle East and Central Asia, at the center of a major strategic environment. The initial step toward this end was made during the first ever tri-party air-to-air and air-to-ground exercises code-named "Anatolian Eagle" that were staged jointly between Turkey, Israel and the US in the Central Anatolian town of Konya during the period June 18-29, 2001.[20] The air operations demonstrated not only the readiness of the parties involved to work together on defense matters but also Ankara's ambitious goal, under the auspices of the US, to convert the town of Konya into a regional as well as an international ground simulation training center.[21]

It is worth noting that the scenario of the air operations,[22] based on the alleged Kurdish rebels' attacks of April 15, 2001, predicted the Turkish air force bombardment of rebels' positions within the Iranian territory. The Iranian side responded and its air force stroke two Turkish fighters whose pilots were arrested as a proof of invasion. The Turks demanded for their immediate release and special military forces intruded in Iran and Syria as an ally of Tehran. At the same time, the Turkish side asked for help and reinforcement from Israel and the United States. Both nations responded. A missile launch from Turkey's southern and southeastern neighbors, namely Iran, Iraq and Syria took place and a radar system deployed on the mountain of Karadagh detected the incoming missile launches. The anti-missile Arrow system with its powerful Green Pine radar as well as the anti-ballistic Patriot Systems were utilized in mock combat that intercepted the rockets at their boost phase. Additionally, the joint exercises involved destruction tactics against the missile launchers. A "preventive" attack of a 40-joint-aircraft group against missile launchers in Iran, Syria and Iraq took place, while the three countries' aforementioned fighters were destroyed.

The Anatolian Eagle exercises presented the initial test of the theoretical model upon which the American NMD program is based. The US, along with Israel, focuses on shifts from strategic nuclear to

a long-range ballistic missile deterrent in order to halt the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) which, according to Washington and Tel Aviv, is growing around the NATO member-states. In this sense, should the US missile defense strategy[23] become a reality, Turkey, surrounded by what the American administration perceives as "rogue states", will be a NATO ally located in the center of a new strategic environment.

(d) Breakthrough for lucrative defense deals that will cement the increasingly close military cooperation between Israel and Turkey. The most promising is an offer to upgrade Turkish M-60 tanks and co-produce the advanced Gil anti-tank rocket.[24] Equally important is the take-over of major deals such as a military intelligence satellite[25] based on the Israeli *Ofek 3* and attack helicopters. However, it should be noted that because Turkey is undergoing a severe economic crisis, the billion-dollar defense deals that Israel hopes to sign appear frozen, at least in the immediate future. On another level, the purchase of Israeli arms enables Turkey to avoid the structures of politically conditioned EU and US sales, and to mitigate the anti-Turkish policies of governments competing with Israel to sell arms to Turkey.

(e) A clear message to regional countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Jordan either for their gradual or their full integration in the Israeli-Turkish partnership, which is projected as a multi-fold relationship of the State of Israel with a Muslim country. Egypt and Jordan saw no reason to be alarmed from the Israeli defense minister's statements about potential regional dangers, after the assurances given by the Turkish Foreign Ministry that the threat perception of Turkey differs from the threat perception of the Israeli government.[26]

In the case of Jordan, the kingdom has already joined the Turkish-Israeli alliance, albeit not formally. Jordan's strategic location, which serves as a buffer zone for Israel at the crossroads of the State of Israel and, in extension, Turkey with the Gulf and major Arab states namely Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, prompted Tel Aviv and Ankara to engage the kingdom in the process of establishing a new regional security arrangement under US supervision. Amman has main-

tained a pragmatic approach to relations with Turkey, an ally of Israel. Turkish forces carried out exercises under the terms of the military cooperation agreement, originally signed in 1984 but vigorous moves to implement it began in the late 1990s. The agreement includes provision of Turkish military aircraft to exercise in Jordanian space, and for land forces of each country to exercise in the other's territory. Growing military ties, cooperation between Turkey and Israel also intensified with regular high level military visits, hot line telecommunications between military commanders, exchanging of troops for training, and the use of each other's airspace for training and joint maneuvers.[27] Jordanian pilots flying with US-made F-16 receive partial training in Turkey. In 1998, the two armies staged a ground force exercise in Jordan and the late King Hussein awarded the Medal of Merit to Gen. Bir for his contribution in developing these links.[28]

Turkey and Jordan also exchange intelligence information on terrorist activities. The former head of the General Intelligence Department (*aka* dairat al-muhabarat), Samih Battihi, visited Turkey in July 1998 and met with the then under-secretary and now chief of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Senkal Atasagun.[29] Trilateral military contacts have been initiated. In January 1998 and December 1999, Jordan sent an observer to the Israeli-US-Turkish naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, Amman participates in the biannual strategic discussions that take place among Israel and Turkey, under the US auspices. Jordanian sources have revealed[30] that the biannual talks between Israel and Turkey revolve around potential regional dangers such as terrorism. Jordan participates in the talks as the strategic dialogue would not have been as important if the country were absent. According to the Jordanian perspective, Turkey wants to take advantage of Israeli influence in Western circles to either in gaining membership in the EU or dealing with human rights and the problem of Cyprus.

(f) The looming threat of Islamic radicalism in Turkey and the region is yet another cementing factor in the Turkish-Israeli rela-

tionship. For Israel, an Islamic as opposed to a Kemalist Turkey would be a strategic disaster equivalent if not actually more dangerous than Islamic Iran. Thus, Turkey's alliance with Israel is hoped that it will lead to a diminishing of its deference to US views on issues such as the Cyprus issue, correcting Ankara's human rights record and promoting Turkish democratization. All of this because Ankara believes that the Arabs and Iran have not reciprocated on issues that Turkey considers of vital national importance like Cyprus and the Muslims in the Greek region of Thrace.[31]

(g) By cementing relations with Israel, Turkey hopes to affect the evolution of relations between Israel and Syria and especially pre-empt any developments that can affect the regional balance of power at her expense. Turkey is especially concerned about a possible Syrian-Israeli peace agreement that may lead to a re-deployment of Syrian troops from the vicinity of the Golan Heights, which may cause a Syrian military built-up along the Turkish border[32], and wants to be consulted. Towards this end, Turkish and Syrian officials have been working on concluding a joint memorandum on general principles since 2000. The memorandum calls for respect of the mutual interests of the two states, the avoidance of hostile actions and respect of UN principles.[33] In the beginning of June 2001, Ankara hosted a Syrian military delegation[34], the second one in less than six months, with the aim to discuss details of a draft military training scheme and, a Technical and Scientific Cooperation Agreement.[35] A Declaration of Principles Agreement developed between Syria and Turkey is to be signed before a military agreement is concluded.[36]

(h) Turkey is using this special relationship in order to win battles in the US Congress on a number of issues of national importance such as Cyprus, Greece, Armenia, political and democratic rights. Lobbying organizations such as the American-Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC), the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), prominent Jewish organizations such as the American Jewish Committee that has 32 chapters around the US, the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League

often promote the Turkish agenda in the US Congress and the media. An identical case is the wording of the paid advertisement "Congratulations! Mazel Tov! Tebrikler!" in the Op.-Ed. page of the *New York Times* of November 1998, on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Kemalist state, paid by the three aforementioned Jewish organizations.[37] The B'nai B'rith International Center for Public Policy[38] is also among a significant number of US organizations[39] that have US-Turkish and Israeli-Turkish relations high on their agenda. A special reference should be made to the scientific cooperation that is growing, in a wide range of issues without a lot of noise, between Israeli and Turkish universities and research centers such as the Begin Sadat and the Bosphorus University, the Moshe Dayan Center and the Foreign Policy Institute.

The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University in particular, conducts a wide variety of academic activities related to Turkish-Israeli relations. These include the dispatch of visiting faculty and guest lecturers to the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, an annual joint seminar with the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara, scholarships for Israeli students studying at Turkish universities, sponsorship of Turkish students at Tel Aviv University and invitation of guest lecturers from Turkey. In 1999, Tel Aviv university inaugurated the Suleiman Demirel Program for Contemporary Turkish Studies,[40] a program within the Moshe Dayan conducted in partnership with the Council of Higher Education of Turkey. The Suleiman Demirel program[41] has a budget of half a million dollars. In parallel, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University has developed close contacts with Turkish universities such as the Bosphorus University, while its scientific journal MERIA has included a great number of Turkish studies.[42]

Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue

The long-term interest of the West remains the strengthening of Western-oriented states in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle

East. Turkey and Greece are important blocks in any defense architecture. Preserving such an outlook in Turkey and Greece and minimizing differences between these two states constitute important elements for the security of Israel, a state surrounded by countries which only recently have come to terms with its existence.

Cypriot and Greek Concerns

The extension of the EU to Israel's closest non-Arab neighbor, Cyprus, would amount to a greater European commitment to security in a region very close to Israel. Israel's relations with Greece and Cyprus become important, as Greece is a member of both the EU and NATO. The consensual decision-making system in both organizations allows small states great influence. Consequently, it would be in Israel's interest to nurture good relations with Greece without being burdened by Greek objections to its relations with Turkey.

Cyprus upgraded its relations with Israel by sending an ambassador in 1994. A number of economic and cultural agreements were signed in the mid-1990s and Nicosia concluded several deals purchasing military equipment[13] from Tel Aviv. The improved relationship was marked by the first exchange of presidential visits. Israeli president Weitzman visited Cyprus in November 1998, and Cypriot president Clerides reciprocated in March 2000.

The course of bilateral relations, however, presented a black chapter due to several incidents that caused Cypriot and Greek concerns over the consequences of the Turkish-Israeli partnership. Identically, the Cyprus government captured two Israeli Mossad agents who, as it was suspected and despite the given explanations,[14] took part in an operation allegedly intended to collect information about the operational plan to deploy in Cyprus the Russian S-300 missiles and to convey the plan to Turkey. Additionally, it has been revealed that Turkish pilots have been trained in a specially designed Israeli training range in the Negev desert.[15] The training included how to specifically attack the Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missile system that the Cyprus gov-

ernment had purchased from Moscow in September 1998 and whose deployment in the island has been canceled under US pressure.[16] According to a NATO source quoted by the Texas-based Global Intelligence Update of September 10, 1998, the Israeli air force was training Turkish pilots to strike at Cyprus using a mock up of the area where the S-300 were likely to be deployed and by utilizing Israeli reconnaissance photos of Cyprus. Obviously, the Israeli combat experience against Soviet-made weapons systems with which regional countries such as Syria are equipped, made the training of critical importance to Turkey's military.

In another incident, the "I.C.T.S. Global Security" of Ra'anana signed in 1997, a $10-million agreement with the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA) for securing the communications in Cyprus. However, when CYTA administrators and executives found out that some of the heads of the Israeli company were former Israeli intelligence members and maintained connections with the defense establishment, they considered this fact a danger to the interests of the island and cancelled the agreement. Of course, they had the relationship between Israel and Turkey uppermost in their mind.

It is worth noting that Israel has traditionally refrained from taking sides to the Cyprus problem since the 1974 Turkish invasion and has maintained a position of neutrality, expressing the hope that the dispute would be solved by peaceful means. Due to geo-strategic reasons maintaining close links with Turkey are of extreme importance to Israel for the latter wants to establish good relations with Muslim countries. From this "regional" point of view, Greece and Cyprus have a secondary importance to Israel. Athens and Nicosia, however, possess their own strategic importance as countries at the crossroads of the European Union and the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the wider Middle East.

Greek Response and Perceptions

In terms of Greek-Israeli relations, a bilateral military agreement was concluded as early as December 1994, thus predating the Turkish-

Israeli agreement of February 1996. It was signed by the Greek defense minister, Gerasimos Arsenis, and late Israeli Defense Minister and Premier, Yizhak Rabin.

Both sides, however, refrained from activating the agreement for a number of reasons. The most prominent was the Greek unwillingness to disturb the very good relations that Athens maintains with most of the Arab states and Iran, which have traditionally reciprocated on issues considered by Greece to be vital national interests, notably the problem of Cyprus.[17] Another equally important factor was the postponement of the joint naval maneuvers scheduled for the summer 1997.[18] The Greek-Israeli military agreement of 1994[19] provided for joint naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean, training in each other's airspace and cooperation between the military industries, arms sales and intelligence exchange.

It should be pointed out that at the time Israel concluded its first military agreement with a neighboring country, Greece, with the objectives of breaking its isolation from the wider region, upgrading its diplomatic relations with Athens, selling high-tech weapons systems to the Greek market, and promoting joint military industrial ventures in order to penetrate European and various other markets, e.g., the Balkans. The Greek-Israeli *rapprochement* was highlighted when an Israeli rescue team participated in the rescue operations[50] that were carried out after the Athens earthquake in September 1999, and also when Greece headed mediation efforts with the Islamic Republic of Iran for the release of Israelis captured by pro-Iranian Islamic organizations and the release of the 13 Israelis captured by Iranian authorities on charges of conspiracy against Tehran.[51] Parenthetically, according to IRNA, the visit of the late Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Yiannos Kranidiotis, in Tel Aviv in April 4, 1999, during which he met with the then Israeli Foreign Minister, David Levy, and the Minister for Premier's Office, Chaim Ramon, laid the ground for discussions revolved around joint business prospects and bilateral military cooperation.

The official visit of defence minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos to Tel Aviv in October 13-15, 1999, undoubtedly contributed to strengthening

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the two countries' defense ties. The Greek defence minister's visit concluded with the signing of the "Complementary Agreement on Military and Technical Cooperation Between the Ministry of Defense of the Hellenic Republic and the Defense Ministry of the State of Israel". Tsohatzopoulos met in Tel Aviv with the head of the Foreign Relations and Defense Committee of the Israeli parliament (Knesset) Meriodor, and the defense and prime minister Ehud Barak.[52] The complementary agreement aimed at enhancing bilateral cooperation between the two countries in various military fields, with special emphasis on training, joint maneuvers as well as common projects for military industrialization.

Obviously Greek-Israeli relations have experienced an apparent reversal of the previous historic coolness. A security partnership to maintain regional stability remains among the priorities of both states. In fact, Greece has invited Israel to participate in a new era of cooperation in order to counter-balance and neutralize possible negative consequences of the Turkish-Israeli alliance on the Greek and Cypriot national interests. Many of the past Greek suspicions entailed in the Turkish-Israeli ties seem to have been replaced by an understanding of the real motivations behind the partnership. Similarly, Israel should understand the special Greek relationship with the Arab states. In an interview to the Israeli *Jerusalem Post* newspaper during his official visit to Tel Aviv in October 1999, Greek defense minister Tsohatzopoulos stated that Greek worries about a sinister dimension to Turkish-Israeli ties have been replaced by a greater understanding of the motivations behind this relationship. In May 2000, the first ever Greek official presidential visit to Israel took place, and President Stefanopoulos expressed willingness for a boost in the military as well as the economic cooperation between the two states.

Moreover, it has been realized that the geographic location of Greece at the intersection of the Middle East, the Balkans and Europe along with the country's stable macro-economic environment are important features that necessitate cooperation between the Israeli defense industry and the Greek Defense Industry in order to promote the export of weapons systems to the Balkans as well as to Europe.[53]

The normalization of Greek-Israeli relations in combination with the ongoing military bilateral approach may create regional dynamics that limit the negative effects of Greek national interests emanating from the Israeli-Turkish partnership. Greece has repeatedly sought to serve as a factor of stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the wider Middle East and, accordingly, it pursues its regional policies. In this context, a joint program of action between Greece and Israel that would include the coordination of policies, the strengthening of relations between Israel and the EU, as well as the establishment of a structural dialogue on security issues that will pave the way for a Greek-Israeli security cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, possibly with the involvement of other countries of the region,[54] can be materialized.

The militaristic logic of the Israeli-Turkish relation is expected to be downgraded in the case of an Israeli-Syrian rapprochement, the enhancement of the Middle East peace process and the gradual embodiment of Iran in the international system. Even Tehran[55] in the case of a wider peace process, while it is unlikely to sign a formal peace treaty with Tel Aviv, could facilitate substantial decrease in tension with Israel and collaborate in containing Iraq, and thus, reduce Israel's involvement in Eastern Turkey. In the short-term, a Syrian peace plan along with an improvement in military ties with Greece is a strategic option for Israel. But it will not close doors with Ankara. Bet hedging is one thing and balance of power politics is another.[56]

By Way of Conclusion

This article has endeavoured to demonstrate that the Turkish-Israeli alliance forged with US guidance during the 1950s was never in effect broken despite being downgraded by Ankara during the late sixties and seventies. The majority of the motives behind this alliance today differ only in degree from those in the 1950s. The alliance's objectives are not solely based on military cooperation; however, the most prominent ones extend to the fields of intelligence, control over oil

and gas supplies, promotion of the missile defense strategy and establishment of a new regional security arrangement.

The Turkish-Israeli alliance had a decidedly strong impact on the psychological climate of the region. Countries like Greece include this partnership in their foreign policy calculations. The exchange of intelligence information between Israel and Turkey is considered by Greek security analysts as having an anti-Hellenic orientation and thus remains high up on Greece's security agenda. Athens pursues its regional policies as it is a factor of cooperation, peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East. Accordingly it seeks to improve its bilateral relations with both Tel Aviv and Ankara. In any case, each partner of the Turkish-Israeli alliance has to bear in mind the history of the region, which reveals that any attempt by a state or groups of states at hegemony is doomed to failure.

NOTES

1. Amican Nachmani, *Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1987.

2. An offer was discussed to help finance and construct an oil pipeline from then friendly Iran to Turkey. Ultimately, the Shah vetoed in order to avoid that Iran become dependent on Turkey. Marios Evriviades, "The Turkish-Israeli Axis: Alliances and Alignments in the Middle East", *Orient*, No.4, December 1998.

3. A. Nachmani, op.cit., p.p.43-82.

4. A. Nachmani, Ibid.

5. It should be mentioned that most NATO members, including the US, were initially opposed to Turkey's accession in the organization. Furthermore, at Turkey's request the Israeli government was mobilized to help Ankara obtain financial credits from international financial institutions at a time when Turkey was facing serious economic difficulties.
A. Nachamani. Ibid.

6. On the pro-Turkey lobbying activities in Washington, See, P. Vryonis, *The Turkish State and History*, Thessaloniki: The Institute of Balkan Studies, 1991.

7. It was signed by the then Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently ambassador of the State of Israel in Washington D.C., Maj. Gen. David Ivry and the then deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff Cevik Bir.

8. The latter agreement was signed on September 18,1995, in Tel Aviv. Both agreements are subject to the provisions of secrecy of yet another agreement that governs the confidentiality of these and subsequent agreements entitled "Security Confidentiality Pact" signed in March, 31, 1994.
G. Mourtos, *Greece-Israel and the Eclipse of Greece from Its Natural Boundaries*, Athens: Epikoinonies, 1999.

9. The military agreement provides the Israeli Air Force to fly 4 training missions in Turkish air space per year giving pilots experience of flying over unknown terrain. Training flights began on 16 April 1996 with 8 IDF/AF F-16s flying out of Akinci Air Base, West of Ankara. J. Bruce, "Alliance With Turkey Inflames Old Foes", *Janes Defense Weekly*, June 19, 1996.

10. M. Evrviades, op.cit., p.569.

11. M. Evriviades, Ibid.

12. Arie Egozi, "Turkey Changed Its Mind with Regard to Giving the IAI 1000 Tanks to be Upgraded at a Cost of 2,5 Billion Dollars", *Yediot Aharonot*, July 12, 2000, and
A. Egozi, "Is the End of Honeymoon With Turkey?", *Yediot Aharonot*, July 9, 2000.

13. "Ben-Eliezer to Turkey Today", *The Jerusalem Post*, July 9, 2001.

14. It was announced by the Israeli defense minister that land forces from Israel and Turkey would soon hold joint maneuvers.
"Turkey Welcomes Joint Missile-Defense Offer", *The Jerusalem Post*, July 10, 2001.

15. The reports were made by the leading Israeli newspapers Haaretz and Jerusalem Post. The ban decision was taken due to the highly critical nature of the talks that pertain Israel's national security.
Turkish Press Scanner, from the Sabah newspaper, July 31, 2001

16. *Turkish Press Scanner*, from *Ortadogu*, August 1, 2001.

17. Active geostrategic players are the states that have the capacity to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in order to alter the geopolitical state of affairs. Geopolitical pivots are the states whose significance emanates from their sensitive geographic location and from the consequences of their potential vulnerable condition for the behaviour of geostrategic players.

18. A 1995 Pentagon Report sums Turkey's importance as follows:"Turkey in particular is now at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the US on the Eurasian continent including NATO, the Balkans, the Aegean, Iraq sanctions, relations with the Newly Independent States (NIS), the Middle East peace, and transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas".
Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, "United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO", Washington DC: The Pentagon, 1005, p.25.

19. Yasemin Dobra-Manco, "Strategic Alliance in Central Asia Creates New Eurasian Power Center", *Turkish Daily News*, July 17, 2001, and
"Ilnur Cevik Interviews Israeli Ambassador to Turkey", *Turkish Daily News*, June 15, 1998.

20. It is notable that while US and Israeli sources in Ankara confirmed the date of the exercises, the Turkish Air Forces Command (HKK) had refrained from making any comment on the matter.
Turkish Daily News, June 7, 2001.

21. The center in Konya, established in a 200 square kilometer area, is expected to be fully operational in 2004 once the installation of surface-to-air (SAM) systems, threat generators and tactical firing areas are completed. The military hopes to earn annually about 35 million

dollars on an annual basis from the center, charging NATO allies as well as friendly countries interested in joint exercises. See Manos Iliades, "In the Firing Area of Konya, the First Exercise with NMD", *Ependitis* (Greek Daily), June 30 - July 1, 2001, p.45.

22. Some 78 aircraft - 10 F-16s, 2 tanker planes and several helicopters from Israel, 50 F-16s from Turkey as well as 6 F-16s and 2 C-130 from the US bases in Germany - participated in the exercises. The war-games included live bombing and strafing. Simulated surface-to-air missiles (SAM) confronted the aggressors. The attack aspect of the Anatolian Eagle exercise lasted five days, but since its fist phase, code-named *Anatolian Breeze*, the victory was total. In the next two phases, code-named *Anatolian Sunrise* and *Anatolian Sun*, the Turkish-Israeli-US air forces in a demonstration of power, carried low height flights in the airspace of Iran, Syria and Iraq. An operations center set up *ad hoc* in Konya commanded the exercises through computers. The command center sent missile signals that it detected on ground, and warned the jets in the air about the threat on real time basis.

23. The missile defense strategy adopts a regional dimension that Washington, Ankara and Tel Aviv are engaged in, especially since the US secretary of State Colin Powell failed at a Budapest NATO meeting in May 29 to break through NATO's sharp opposition to the missile defense proposal. Despite the existent divergence of views concerning the Israeli proposal to set up a regional early-warning center based on the Green Pine radar system, which incorporated by the Arrow Anti-ballistic system between the Turkish ministries of defense and foreign affairs, Ankara is an integral part of the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Meetings. These meetings aim to find ways so that a regional defense system to counter the threat of ballistic missiles can be established. The first meeting between Israel, Turkey and the US was held in Washington on December 2000, while the second gathering was scheduled to be hosted some time this summer.
"Our Preference for the Missile Shield Within NATO, But Not the Israeli Offer", *Turkish Daily News*, July 11, 2001.
"Ben Eliezer Leaves for Lightning Visit to Turkey", *Haaretz*, July 9, 2001.

Hurriyet, June 22, 2001, and *Haaretz*, June 26, 2001.

24. In a gesture to make its offer more attractive, Israel has proposed to Ankara that it will have the right to sell the Gil rocket to any third country.
"Turkey Welcomes Missile-Defense Offer", *Haaretz*, July 10, 2001.

25. France won the deal last year but it was cancelled in retaliation for Paris' accusations that Turkey committed Genocide against the Armenians. The Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) is expected to submit its offer. See, Antonia Dimou, "Turkish Cancellation of Defense Deals", *Geopolitiki* (Greek monthly magazine), September 2000.

26. See statements of the Jordanian ambassador in Ankara, Musa Breizat, that "We look into the issue in the light of the assurance given by Ankara that its relations with Israel will not harm any Arab country. We have no reason not to be hopeful that Turkey will use its relations to prevail upon the Israeli leadership to be more flexible particularly on the issue of Palestinian and Arab rights…". Also the statement of the Egyptian ambassador Mohammad Fathy al-Shazly that "I understand that the threat perception of the Israeli government is not identical to the Turkish perception of threat". See Saadet Oruc, "No Reason to Be Alarmed", *Turkish Daily News*, July 13, 2001.

27. *Turkish Daily News*, September 15, 1998.

28. *Turkish Probe*, April 26, 1998.

29. An. Dimou, "Jordan: The Arab Extension of the Turkish-Israeli Military Alliance", *Geopolitiki*, No.12, November, 2000.

30. "Jordan to Hold Military Manoeuvres", *Star*, 9/8/1998.

31. "Turco-Israeli Ties: Most Portentous Development in the Middle East", *Turkish Daily News*, August 20, 1998.

32. G. Mourtos, op. cit., p.145.

33. *Milliyet*, March 10, 2000.

34. The delegation was headed by General Ahmed el-Ali from Syria's training department.

35. Drafts of both proposed agreements were submitted by Lt. Gen. Resat Turgut, head of the Plans and Principles Department of the Turkish General Staff to his Syrian counterpart, Gen. Mahmoud Ammar, during the latter's visit to Ankara on January 18, 2001.

36. Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "Turkey Moves to Balance Ties with Israel and Syria", *Turkish Daily News*, June 7, 2001

37. M. Evriviades, *Orient*, op. cit., p. 579.

38. The 156-year-old B'nai B'rith organization is an international broad-based organization that works together with other ones.

39. An increasing number of Jewish-American organisations have sent delegations to Turkey and Central Asia during the last 5 years, such as the delegation that came to Ankara in the event of a conference organized by the Ari Movement in Istanbul in the summer of 1999, that comprised of two well-known Jewish-American organisations; The American-Jewish Committee represented by Barry Jacobs assistant director, and the Washington-based B'nai B'rith represented by its director, Daniel Mariaschin. See "Jewish-American Organizations Lobby for Silk Road Initiative (Part I)", *Turkish Daily News*, July 28, 1999.

40. A conference entitled "Contemporary Turkey: Challenges of Change" was organized by the Moshe Dayan Center in co-operation with the Middle East Technical University of Ankara on June 20-21, 1999.

41. The inauguration of the program took place in June 1998.
Marios L. Evriviades, "The Other Axis: What is Hidden Behind the Israeli-Turkish Academic Cooperation", *Eleftherotypia* (Greek Daily), October 17, 1999.

42. M. Evriviades, Ibid.

43. Israel's official policy is not to sell Cyprus "shooting equipment".

Israeli companies sell Cypriots a variety of security equipment such as a guard ship, communications and night vision equipment and battle suits. Experts from Israel give advise to the civil defense system on the island.

44. The head of the Mossad at that time, Efraim Halevy, visited Nicosia and reported to the Cypriot authorities that the two agents belonged to a unit of the surveillance division of the Mossad that is identified as "Neviot". Their mission was to tap the police and National Guard networks in order to warn other operational Mossad units that followed a Hezbollah or Iranian intelligence target. "Compensation Is On the Way", *Haaretz*, 14 September 1999.

45. Marios Leonidas, "Israel and Turkey: An Eye-Popping Relationship", *The Greek American*, July 25, 1998.

46. S. Rodan, "Cyprus, Russia Ask Israel to Keep Out of S-300 Deal", Defense News, February 23-March 1, 1998, and M. Evriviades, "Israel, Turkey and Greece", *The Cyprus Weekly*, September 18-24, 1998.

47. Zacharia Mihas, "Nicosia Wants a New Strengthen of Ties Between Greece and Israel", *Imerisia* (Greek Daily), August 19-20, 2000.

48. The reason for the postponement was that the Greek navy was busy preventing infiltrations from Albania and could not spare a frigate for the exercises. See John Nomikos, "Greek-Israel Relations", The Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE),, The American-Israeli Co-operative Enterprise (AICE), 1998.

49. Y. Melman, "Like Sirtki: One Step Forward and Two On the Side", *Haaretz*, October 5, 1997.

50. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, See http://www.mfa.co.il.

51. The mediating role was demonstrated after American officials submitted a relevant request to the Greek defense minister Tsohatzopoulos during his official visit in Washington on September 1999.
Dimitri Apokis, "Greek Opening to Israel", *To Vima* (Greek Daily), September 26, 1999.

52. The Israeli Prime Minister stated during the meeting with the Greek delegation that Athens plays a major role in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and in the NATO organisation.

53. Future defense deals between Israel and Greece revolve around the purchase of the electronic warfare system (ASPS) of Elisra for the Greek F-16s' C/D Block-52 Plus, of a Radar System and a Battle Management Center of Tadiran as well as unmanned aerial vehicles planes (UAN's), and of sophisticated weapons systems such as "Cruise" type missiles. Cooperation in security matters in the event of the 2004 Olympic games is equally important. On the military cooperation field and in accordance with the Greek-Israeli Cooperation Agreement on Military Affairs, the Greek General Staff made a Program of Military Cooperation (PMC) for the year 2000 that was submitted to the Israeli side. A joint Greek-Israeli Committee convened on March 11-16 and concluded the two countries' final PMC. See Z. Mihas, "American-Israeli Marriage for the F-16's Warfare Electronic System", Imerisia, December 16-17, 2000, and, L. Blaveris, "Greek-Israeli Relations: The Melt of Ice", *Stratigiki* (Greek monthly Defense magazine), November 1999.

54. This proposal was initially made to the Greek defense minister during his official visit to Tel Aviv in September 1999, and it was repeated in March 2000 by the then Minister for Regional Cooperation, Shimon Peres, to the Greek Foreign Minister, Papandreou, in Athens.

55. It is notable that Iran has curiously toned down its evaluation of border incursions by Turkey calling them accidents and emphasized improvements in Iranian-Turkish relations. For the re-establishment of US-Iranian relations which would also mean that the supreme religious authorities in Tehran may put hostility against Israel on ice, See *COSMOS* newsletter, "Possible Washington-Tehran Dialogue?", Vol.II, No.4, Athens: Institute of International Relations, Nov./Dec.1997.

56. "Israel Plays Both Sides in the Greek-Turkish Dispute", *Stratfor*, Global Intelligence Update, August 6, 1999.

From Confrontation to Detente

Van Coufoudakis*

During the second half of the twentieth century, Greek-Turkish relations went through stages of detente and cooperation as well as confrontation and near conflict. Following the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Turkey systematically challenged Greek sovereignty in the Aegean and the status quo that was established by the treaties of Lausanne (1923), Montreux (1936), and Paris (1947). Turkey relied primarily on political and military methods to promote its objectives while avoiding adjudication given the weakness of its legal claims.

A major arms race between the two countries was one of the effects of the escalating confrontation between Greece and Turkey. In addition, the Greco-Turkish confrontation created the perception in Athens that Turkey threatened Greek sovereignty and territorial integrity, the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus, while aiming to eliminate the Greek minority and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. Thus, from 1974-1999 the common perception that cut across the Greek political spectrum was that Turkey pursued a revisionist agenda with support from the United States and NATO; that the threat confronting Greece was from the East and not from the North as it was commonly assumed during the Cold War; and that Greece had to defend its rights through military modernization and political and diplomatic means at the international level. The latter included sanctions against Turkey for its violations of international law and blocking Turkey's access to EEC/EU funds and to a possible candidacy in the EU.

These tensions culminated in the 1996 crisis over the Imia islets. War was prevented by American intervention, much as the U.S. had done in 1987, in 1974, and in other earlier occasions. Turkey's assertive foreign policy increasingly relied on its military who had undergone significant reorganization and modernization, especially in

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the decades of the 80s and the 90s. Turkey, in turn, perceived threats not only from internal sources (Islam, Kurds) but also from external ones (early on the USSR, Syria, et al.). Turkey felt increasingly isolated in a hostile environment both before and after the end of the Cold War. Thus, Turkey, isolated from Europe, relied extensively on its strategic position, its military strength, and its ties to the U.S., NATO, and Israel to promote its regional interests.

The natural disasters in Turkey and Greece late in the summer of 1999 turned a new page in their bilateral relations. How real this new detente phase in Greco-Turkish relations is will be examined at the end of this essay.

The volume of **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies** includes six articles written by Greek and Turkish scholars on three specific areas that affected Greek-Turkish relations since 1974, which are characteristic of the tensions and perceptions that dominated Greek-Turkish relations since 1974. These include essays on the Imia crisis, the Greco-Turkish arms race, the Turkish-Israeli alliance and a more general essay on the security dilemma confronting the two countries. Tsakonas' essay uses the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma to better understand Greek-Turkish relations. This, he feels, has been a neglected aspect of the study of Greco-Turkish relations even though it is one of the most significant and pervasive features of international relations. A security dilemma exists when military preparation and foreign policy actions create uncertainty to others as to motives and intentions. As one nation feels insecure if it fails to protect its security, it is likely to affect the security perceptions of others.

The Greco-Turkish arms race has been a key feature in the relations of the two countries, especially since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Even though military modernization and defense spending was affected by various reasons other than the specific issues in Greco-Turkish relations (NATO mission, Kurdish insurrection, internal security needs, etc.) the fact remains that the two countries spent the highest percentage of their GDP for defense than any of the other NATO members, even though their economies were among the weak-

est in NATO. Gulay Gunluk-Genesen confirms these trends. The author also concludes that Turkish defense spending was not directly related to that of Greece or to the state of their bilateral relations. Kollias' data confirm that Greco-Turkish military expenditures continue to be the highest among NATO members. Even though these expenditures continue to grow at a slower pace than in the past, other NATO members, since the end of the Cold War, have reduced considerably their military spending. Kollias also concludes that it is hard to establish an action/reaction relationship to Greco-Turkish military expenditures as governments don't respond instantaneously to military acquisitions of their rivals.

The pieces on the 1996 Imia crisis, the most serious among the several near conflict situations between Greece and Turkey since 1974, reach opposing conclusions. Ifantis concludes that the conflict over Imia was a clear case of Turkish revisionism which was reinforced by the Kurdish problem and by the Turkish belief that military force is a useful foreign policy legitimizer. Gulden Ayman, in turn, attributes revisionist motives on the part of Greece and finds that the end of the crisis resulted in a Turkish psychological victory because Turkey drew a line and tested the validity of its deterrent strategy.

The article on the Turkish-Israeli alliance shows one more strategic dimension of the Greco-Turkish rivalry. The Turkish-Israeli "alliance" was perceived in Greece and Cyprus as a means of ensuring Turkey's hegemonic control in the Eastern Mediterranean. These essays clearly show the differences in the perceptions of events, policies, motivations, and consequences in the relations between the two countries. Since 1974, in the case of Greece, military spending cannot be separated from the Turkish threat. In the case of Turkey, increases in military spending can be attributed to a variety of causes other than the Greco-Turkish problem. For example, Turkish threat perceptions did not include Greece at the top of their defense priorities. This was understandable due to geostrategic reasons, and differences in the size and capability of their military forces. In addition, successive Turkish civilian and military elites gave far higher priority to internal security reasons and to regional hegemonic ambitions.

The post-Cold War environment brought profound changes in the international environment in South Eastern Europe, in Eurasia, and in the Middle East. Greece has made a successful transition to a leadership role in the region thanks to its economic recovery, its membership in the EU and in the EMU, and the Europeanization of her foreign policy. At first, Greece's adaptation to the new environment was not easy, especially due to the consequences of the break up of Yugoslavia and the revival of Balkan irredentism. However, after 1995, Greece became part of the solution in the Balkans and managed to move away from the status of a small dependent state to that of a contributing member of an interdependent society.

The end of the Cold War brought fears in Turkey that it would lose the strategic importance it once enjoyed during the Cold War. This is why the late president Ozal attempted to define a new role for his country. Turkey was promoted as America's faithful ally in an unstable region, as a model of economic and political development, and as an island of stability in a region of instability. Turkey presented itself as a model of an Islamic democratic republic to the other Islamic states in Central Asia, to the Middle East, to the United States, and to the EU. Turkey, however, failed to achieve the hegemonic role it aspired to in Central Asia. These former Soviet republics were neither interested in a change of hegemony, nor could expect much in terms of economic and technical development assistance from Turkey.

The Imia crisis has been discussed in the introduction of this essay and in two other essays in this volume. This crisis symbolized the risks of the escalating Greco-Turkish confrontation. In addition, it displayed the EU's inability to respond to such a regional crisis in the absence of a common foreign and defense policy. The twenty years of Greco-Turkish confrontation following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus came to a climax with the arrest of Kurdish PKK leader Ocalan who, in his last days of freedom, had been sheltered by some Greek officials. The changes in the government of Greece that followed that failed operation, along with the humanitarian response to the August 1999 earthquakes in Greece and Turkey, created new opportunities for Foreign Minister George Papandreou to re-orient

Greek policies toward Turkey. Greco-Turkish problems were moved to a European framework following Greece's decision at Helsinki (1999) to remove its objections to Turkey's candidacy for membership in the E.U. Since this courageous decision Greco-Turkish relations have entered a new era of detente. Officials from the two countries have attempted to address issues of low politics as trade, tourism, environment, illegal immigration, crime, et al. However, this "new climate" has not resolved any of the substantive problem areas in Greco-Turkish relations.

Greece's policy of conditional rewards has not met with any reciprocity on the part of Turkey nor has it brought about a change in Turkey's demands in Thrace, the Aegean, or in Cyprus. While this does not imply that we will see a return to policies that led to confrontation and to the isolation of Greece from its European allies, Greece is not likely to accept sacrifices of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, or to betray the rules governing the E.U. in order to appease Turkey and promote further Turkey's European vocation. Nor is Greece likely to sacrifice Cyprus in order to remove another irritant from Greco-Turkish relations, and the relations of Turkey to the E.U.

The challenge now rests with the leadership of Turkey. Will it take advantage of the opportunities offered by George Papandreou's policies and by the EU Helsinki (1999) decisions? My conclusion is not very optimistic as there is no indication that the Turkish military are ready to accept the required changes that will substantially reduce their role in the economy, the politics, and the foreign policy of their country.

This set of articles has touched only on some of the issues affecting Greco-Turkish relations. Despite the present state of detente in the international environment and in the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey, the challenge remains of how to transform the Aegean from a sea of confrontation to a bridge of cooperation. That chapter has yet to be written.

ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

L'Union européenne
et la Méditerranée orientale
CHYPRE - GRÈCE - TURQUIE
Du sommet d'Helsinki au sommet de Nice

The European Union and
Eastern Mediterranean
CYPRUS - GREECE - TURKEY
From the Summit of Helsinki to the Summit of Nice

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DOCUMENT

ENTRETIEN AVEC LE GENERAL PHILIPPE MORILLON, DEPUTE EUROPEEN

Le général d'armée Philippe Morillon, né en 1935, a exercé les fonctions de chef d'État major de la 1ᵉ armée française (1991-92) puis a commandé les Forces de protection de l'ONU (Forpronu) en Bosnie Herzegovine (1992-93) où il s'est distingué par son action courageuse en faveur des habitants musulmans de Srebrenica. Élu député européen en juin 1999 il a été chargé d'un rapport sur la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union européenne sur la base duquel le Parlement européen a adopté une résolution le 15 novembre 2000. Le général Morillon a publié plusieurs ouvrages, notamment « Croire et oser chronique de Sarajevo » (Paris, Grasset 1993). Et « Paroles de soldat » (Paris, Balland 1997).

Cet entretien a été réalisé par Jean Catsiapis*

Q. Les Pères fondateurs des Communautés européennes souhaitaient créer les Etats Unis d'Europe. Que deviendra l'UE après son élargissment à 27 ou 30 États ? Une Europe à plusieurs vitesses ou même une zone de libre échange ?

R. Nous sommes les héritiers des Pères fondateurs de l'Europe mais nous avons une autre conception qu'eux. On ne fera pas les Etats Unis d'Europe sur un modèle à l'américaine. La richesse de l'Europe c'est sa diversité. Or le point le plus sensible en matière de diversité c'est d'accepter une délégation de souveraineté à une entité politique, qui n'existe pas encore. Le parti populaire européen[1] souhaite que l'on réalise une unité politique et ne se réjouirait pas que l'Europe soit une simple zone de libre échange.

Il faut ainsi doter l'Europe d'une capacité de décision et de puissance et de la légitimité démocratique grâce à des dirigeants élus. Nous militons pour l'adoption d'une constitution, qui précisera qui est qui et qui fait quoi aux yeux de tous les citoyens européens. La crise du Kosovo a démontré que l'Europe ne pouvait agir de

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façon autonome. L'opinion publique des quinze pays de l'UE veut une Europe de la défense.

Q. Quelles doivent être les frontières de l'Europe? La Russie doit-elle faire partie de l'UE ?

R. Jusqu'à présent on a soigneusement évité de répondre à cette question car on ne s'est pas mis d'accord sur une question préalable : pourquoi fait-on l'Europe ? Ce qui est certain c'est que l'UE, qui constitue un pôle de paix et de stabilité est attendue partout dans le monde pour jouer un rôle phare : au Proche Orient – les Palestiniens et une partie du peuple d'Israël attendent beaucoup de l'UE – mais aussi en Afghanistan[2] et en Chine.

Q. Il y a eu en France des réactions négatives à la candidature de la Turquie à l'UE[3]. Certains, toutefois, souhaitent que la Turquie dispose du statut de pays candidat à l'UE mais jamais de celui de membre de cette entité. Que pensez vous de cette attitude ?

R. Il s'agit d'une attitude hypocrite. Certes l'adhésion de la Turquie suppose pour ce pays une révolution profonde. Et la question est de savoir si le peuple turc est prêt à l'accepter. Par exemple les Turcs peuvent-ils renoncer à leur législation en matière de droit parental ? Vont-ils accepter la Charte des droits fondamentaux adoptée au sommet de Nice[4] ?

Je suis partisan d'un Partenariat privilégié avec la Turquie, qui n'implique donc pas obligatoirement l'adhésion de cet État à l'UE. L'Europe ne doit pas être une forteresse mais au contraire entretenir des relations étroites avec de nombreux pays, en particulier ceux d'Islam.

Q. Le 15 novembre 2000 vous n'avez pas été favorable à l'adoption par le Parlement européen d'un amendement relatif à la reconnaissance par la Turquie du génocide arménien[5]. Pourquoi ?

R. Si on veut construire l'Europe de demain il faut savoir dépasser les horreurs du passé. Je dis souvent que ma grande mère m'aurait arraché les yeux, si elle avait appris que j'aurai un jour des amis allemands. En Bosnie j'ai vu à quelles extrémités aboutissaient ces rancoeurs du passé. A quoi peut servir la reconnaissance du génocide arménien ? Ceux qui la veulent souhaitent-ils qu'elle débouche sur des prétentions territoriales en Turquie ? Le vote du

15 novembre, acquis à une faible majorité et avec de nombreuses abstentions ne signifie pas que le Parlement européen dans le futur exigera d'Ankara la reconnaissance du génocide arménien comme condition préalable à son adhésion à l'UE.

Q. Pensez-vous que la République de Chypre pourra intégrer l'UE même si la question chypriote n'est pas réglée au moment de son adhésion ?

R. Je ne le pense pas et je ne le souhaite pas. Certes au sommet d'Helsinki on a indiqué qu'il n'y aurait pas pour Chypre, comme condition préalable, la solution à la division de cette île. Mais les choses évoluent. Voyez le récent rapport Poos[6] sur ce sujet. Je connais bien nos amis grecs et je ne les vois pas faire - comme certains le disent – un chantage en refusant tout élargissement de l'UE si Chypre ne faisait pas partie de la prochaine vague d'adhésions.

Q. Comment peut-on construire une Europe de la défense alors que certains pays de l'UE ne sont pas membres de l'OTAN comme l'Irlande ou que d'autres comme l'Allemagne ont une opinion publique partagée quant à l'envoi de forces armées pour des opérations de paix, comme on vient de le constater à propos de la FYROM[7]?

R. C'est essentiellement à partir de l'Alliance atlantique qu'on arrivera à construire l'Europe de la défense. Petit à petit les Européens y joueront un rôle de plus en plus important : tel est mon souhait et mon pronostic. Il est vrai que c'est l'ONU qui est intervenue en 1991 pendant la guerre du Golfe persique puis en Bosnie. Si maintenant c'est l'OTAN, qui intervient au Kosovo et en Macédoine, c'est parce cette organisation, depuis la dissolution du Pacte de Varsovie se devait, pour continuer à exister, de prendre toute sa place dans le système européen de sécurité.

Q. La Grèce a pendant longtemps considéré que la FYROM ne constituait pas un Etat viable compte tenu des conditions de sa création par Tito. Les récents événements survenus dans ce pays, selon vous, ne sont-ils pas l'illustration de sa non-viabilité ?

R. En Macédoine il y a eu pendant plusieurs années l'application d'une sorte de diplomatie préventive. A t-elle échoué ? Je prends le pari que les Macédoniens vont réussir à régler leur problème. Je pense que dans les Balkans les différentes composantes vont finir par s'accepter car il y a de mutuelles dépendances. J'ai ainsi dit à

Rugova[8] qu'il ne devrait pas revendiquer l'indépendance, car l'indépendance c'est quelque chose de dépassé. Il faut savoir s'accepter. Il en va ainsi des peuples comme des couples.

NOTES

1. Le Parti populaire européen, auquel appartient le général Morillon, regroupe les députés démocrates-chrétiens du Parlement européen.

2. Le général Morillon suit au Parlement européen les questions relatives aux droits de l'homme en Afghanistan et a rencontré à ce titre le commandant Massoud, tué en septembre 2001 par le régime des Talibans.

3. Voir *La France et l'opinion publique française face à l'élargissement de l'Union européenne à Chypre et à la Turquie* par J. Catsiapis in *Etudes helléniques*, automne 2000, p. 225-235.

4. Le Conseil européen de Nice, qui s'est tenu à Nice du 7 au 11 décembre 2000 a adopté la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne.

5. Le 15 novembre 2000 un amendement imposant à la Turquie de reconnaître le génocide arménien de 1915 avant d'adhérer à l'UE a été adopté par le Parlement européen contre la volonté du général Morillon par 234 voix contre 213 et 93 abstentions.

6. Jacques Poos, député européen, ancien ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Luxembourg a rédigé un rapport rendu public le 17 juillet 2001 sur la demande d'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE. Dans son rapport, M. Poos, tout en rappelant que la solution de la question de Chypre n'est pas une condition préalable à l'adhésion de ce pays à l'UE indique qu'une telle solution faciliterait cette adhésion de l'île.

Le Parlement européen a adopté le 5 septembre 2001 une résolution sur la base du rapport Poos par 504 voix contre 31 et 36 abstentions.

7. FYROM : Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine.

8. Ibrahim Rugova est le chef de la Ligue démocratique du Kosovo (LDK) parti albanais, qui a pour objectif l'indépendance de cette région autonome de la Yougoslavie.

DOCUMENT

European Parliament resolution on Cyprus's membership application to the European Union and the State of Negotiations (COM(2000) 702 - C5-0602/2000 - 1997/2171(COS)).

The European Parliament,

- having regard to Cyprus's application for membership of the European Union, submitted on 3 July 1990 pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

- having regard to the accession negotiations opened with the Republic of Cyprus on 31 March 1998,

- having regard to the third Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus's progress towards accession (COM(2000) 702 - C5-0602/2000),

- having regard to the Enlargement Strategy Paper on progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries, presented by the Commission (COM(2000) 700),

- having regard to the decisions taken by the European Councils of Copenhagen (21 and 22 June 1993), Florence (21 and 22 June 1996), Luxembourg (12 and 13 December 1997), Helsinki (10 and 11 December 1999), Nice (7-9 December 2000) and Göteborg (15 and 16 June 2001),

- having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 555/2000 of 13 March 2000 on the implementation of operations in the framework of the pre-accession strategy for the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Malta[1], the Council Decision of 20 March 2000 on the principles, priorities, objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Cyprus[2] and Council Regulation (EC) No 390/2001 of 26 February 2001 on assistance to Turkey in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of an Accession Partnership[3],

- having regard to its resolutions of 15 April 1999 (COM(1998) 710 - C4-0108/99)[1] and of 4 October 2000 (COM(1999) 502 - C5-0025/2000 - 1997/2171(COS))[5] on Cyprus' progress towards accession,

- having regard to its resolution of 15 November 2000 on Turkey's progress towards accession (1999)[6],

- having regard to the final declaration of the meeting of the EU-Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee held on 27 March 2001 in Limassol,

- having regard to the conclusions of the EU-Cyprus Association Council held in Brussels on 15 May 2001,

- having regard to Rule 47[1] of its Rules of Procedure,

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy and the opinions of the other committees concerned (A5-0261/2001),

A. whereas the Republic of Cyprus (hereafter referred to as "Cyprus"), the only State internationally recognised as representing the island as a whole, satisfies fully the Copenhagen political and economic criteria as far as is within its power (the division of the island), has made significant progress in adopting the acquis communautaire, and may, therefore, expect to accede to the European Union rapidly,

B. whereas the only legislation that is in compliance with European standards is legislation that eliminates all provisions that specifically criminalize homosexual relations,

C. whereas the Government of Cyprus is negotiating EU accession on behalf of all Cypriots, and whereas, when the accession process is successfully concluded, the entire island and all its citizens will legally be part of the European Union,

D. whereas Cyprus, as a candidate country, is in the paradoxical situation whereby for 27 years 37% of its territory has been occupied by Turkey; whereas, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Nicosia is the only divided capital city in Europe,

E. whereas the accession process and accession itself could serve as a catalyst for the peace effort aimed at achieving a political solution to the problem of the partition of the island; whereas a unified and peaceful Cyprus would bring increased prosperity to the island's population as a whole and increased security to the region,

F. supporting unreservedly all peace efforts by the United Nations, including the batch of proposals put forward by the UN Secretary-General in November 2000, proposing the creation of a joint State with a single international personality, sovereign and indivisible, which would have a single citizenship and guarantee fundamental freedoms and human rights. (The joint State would be composed of two constituent States, each having a large degree of autonomy.)

G. whereas Mr Denktash, with Turkey's backing, withdrew unilaterally from the fifth round of UN-sponsored 'proximity talks', plunging the negotiations into impasse, which the diplomatic efforts made so far have not succeeded in reopening,

H. whereas the Helsinki European Council and high-level Community fora that followed it indicated repeatedly that a political solution was not a precondition for Cyprus' accession to the EU, although such a solution prior to accession is highly desirable,

I. whereas the impasse in the negotiations also has a negative impact on the solution of humanitarian problems such as that of the large number of Cypriot civilians, women and children among them, missing since the Turkish invasion in 1974; whereas Turkey has remained impassive to repeated requests for initiatives by the Council of Europe's Commission of Human Rights,

J. whereas on 10 May 2001 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey was guilty of human rights violations in the northern part of Cyprus,

K. whereas documented plundering of monasteries, churches and cultural buildings has taken place during the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus,

L. whereas Turkey has still not responded to the judgment of the Strasbourg European Court of Human Rights ruling that it is guilty of violating the rights of the Greek Cypriot citizen Titina Loïzidou; whereas Turkey continues to maintain an embargo on all vessels flying the Cypriot flag,

M. whereas the 2000 Regular Report makes reference, for the first time, to the difficult economic situation in the northern part of the island; whereas the evidence is that a large majority of both communities would welcome the accession of the whole island of Cyprus to the European Union,

Political situation

1. Reiterates its wholehearted support for the efforts of the UN Secretary-General in finding a comprehensive and rapid solution, and for his longstanding view that any acceptable solution must be based on international law, as set out in the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), even if a gradual implementation of the acquis in the north of the island could be envisaged, if that might facilitate the end of partition;

2. Reiterates its support for the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council whereby resolution of the Cyprus question is not a prerequisite for accession; endorses unreservedly the position set out by Commissioner Verheugen, i.e. that there is no possibility of separate negotiations with the two parts of the island, and no question either of accession for two Cypriot states or of accession of the northern part of the island upon Turkish accession;

3. Stresses that if Turkey were to carry out its threat of annexing the north of Cyprus in response to Cypriot accession to the EU and to proclaim the northern part as its 82nd province in clear breach of international law, it would put an end to its own ambitions of European Union membership;

4. Invites Turkey to regard the membership of Cyprus as an important contribution not only for the secure existence and development of both communities but also for the welfare of all its citizens; considers that Cyprus' membership, in combination with the demilitarisation of the island and security guarantees by the European Union, could be an enormous step towards peace and stability in the region and would strengthen the accession partnership between Turkey and the EU;

5. Deplores the unjustified unilateral withdrawal by Mr Denktash from the UN-sponsored proximity talks and urges him to agree to start a new round of direct substantial talks;

6. Rejects the formula used by Turkey in its National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) with regard to Cyprus, which it considers contrary to international law, UN General Assembly Resolution 3212/74 and UN Security Council Resolution 541, the proposals of the UN Secretary-General and the acquis communautaire;

7. Welcomes, therefore, the 'enhanced political dialogue' launched at the end of March 2001 between the EU and Turkey, and the fact that the EU has concluded Accession Partnerships with Cyprus and Turkey, positive initiatives that could provide a framework for resolution of the Cyprus question;

8. Calls on the Commission, in this connection, to put on the agenda for the next meeting with Turkey the issue of missing persons, and urges Turkey to comply forthwith with the general and individual judgments of the European Court of Human Rights;

9. Calls on the Commission and Council to maintain the European Union's firm commitment to a negotiated settlement with a view to ending partition of the island, and to use all appropriate instruments at their disposal to speed up the process;

Transposition of the acquis communautaire

10. Reiterates its satisfaction at the progress made by Cyprus in the accession negotiations; notes that, to date, 22 of the 29 chapters have

been provisionally closed, placing Cyprus at the forefront of the candidate countries; urges the Cypriot Government, therefore, to continue its efforts to transpose completely and implement the acquis communautaire so that the accession negotiations may be concluded as soon as possible;

11. Stresses that Cyprus satisfies the Copenhagen political and economic criteria as far as is within its power (the division of the island), and that its progress on the adoption of the acquis communautaire continues to be excellent;

12. Draws attention to the fact that, while Cyprus satisfies the Copenhagen political and economic criteria, its macroeconomic stability has deteriorated recently and its current budgetary policy may not be sustainable over the medium term, a situation that must be monitored carefully;

13. Notes that while the acquis communautaire as a whole is being adopted quickly, certain areas nevertheless require special attention: the environment as a whole, particularly aspects such as waste management and water quantity and quality, the implementation of mechanisms of the agricultural acquis, the free movement of persons, State aid, monitoring of the structure of the banking sector, border controls and maritime safety must all be matters of priority for Cyprus; stresses that, if the negotiations proceed at their current pace, these problems should not be insurmountable;

14. Notes that negotiations on the environment chapter have been opened but not yet completed with Cyprus; calls for any transition periods for full compliance with the acquis to be kept to a minimum, and for the establishment of intermediate targets;

15. Calls on Cyprus to put into place mechanisms necessary to link effectively to the Community's Rapid Alert System, both in terms of alerting the European Food Safety Authority of any serious perceived or identified risk and in terms of action to be taken by the RAS as a result of an EFSA warning;

16. Encourages the participation of Cyprus in the Community's new health action programme, launched in 2000;

17. Stresses that, like the other candidate countries, Cyprus must enhance its administrative and judicial capacity to enable it to implement correctly the acquis communautaire;

18. Notes that direct payments to agricultural producers are playing an important and controversial role in the accession negotiations; stresses the need to bring direct payments within the sphere of the 'second pillar' of the CAP by compulsorily tying premiums to social and ecological criteria (cross-compliance and modulation) in order to make them less controversial and guarantee that direct payments in an enlarged Union will be uniformly determined;

19. Notes that progress has been made in preparing Cypriot agriculture for the CAP, but draws attention to the fact that major components of the agriculture acquis have still not been taken over, in particular as regards the abolition of government monopolies; recommends also that Cyprus establish the requisite administrative and procedural structures;

20. Welcomes the - primarily inter-occupational and tripartite - social dialogue, and urges that bipartite and sectoral social dialogues each be strengthened and broadened;

21. Urges the Cyprus legislature to drop forms of discrimination not permitted under Community law from the rules adopted on access to the labour market and working life, in particular requirements relating to nationality, place of residence, membership of occupational associations and certificates of good character;

22. Points out that adoption of the Community acquis concerning equality between women and men is an essential condition for membership, as this is an integral part of the human rights question and the institutional development needed in this connection is an essential part of full implementation of the acquis;

23. Notes that despite the good standard of Cyprus' system of internal and external financial control, the Cypriot Government still needs to strengthen the independence of internal auditing within the government;

24. Urges Cyprus to take the necessary steps to ensure the proper management of pre-accession funding and future structural funds;

25. Calls upon the Cyprus government to eliminate provisions in the penal code that discriminate against homosexual men and lesbian women, notably Article 171, a provision that has been declared contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Commission of Human Rights;

Recent political developments

26. Expresses its concern over the Akamas peninsula and calls on the Cypriot Government to ensure that it is protected as an environmental area of European importance, paying special attention to the conservation and protection of wild birds;

27. Welcomes contacts, projects and dialogue at all levels between the two communities as elements necessary to confidence-building; considers that events such as the festival organised recently by two political parties from the two communities in the UN buffer zone can play a role in bringing the island's two communities closer together, but judges that they still remain too limited in scope and participation;

28. Calls on the Commission to support and develop further bi-communal activities, making funding more easily available for appropriate projects; urges the Turkish Cypriot representatives to allow the members of their community to fully participate in them; invites the Republic of Cyprus to facilitate the organisation of such events also by easing its criteria for the selection of participants;

29. Insists that a tone of reconciliation be used by leading Cypriot political representatives in their references to the other community and that urgent steps be taken to overcome the economic isolation of the north;

30. Considers that the elaboration, the funding and the implementation of joint projects of eco-tourism for the Akamas and the Karpas area, the cleaning of the area of the copper mines of Lefke, as well as water and waste management projects could all represent challenging opportunities for cooperation between the two communities;

31. Proposes that contacts be developed between the European Parliament and Turkish Cypriot community representatives, civil society, journalists and all Turkish Cypriot political parties;

32. Expresses its concern at the repression of freedom of expression and of opposition in the occupied part of the island;

33. Welcomes the enthusiasm for Cypriot membership of the EU and points out that the climate of opinion is mostly in favour of accession;

34. Calls on the Commission, in this respect, to intensify its contacts in the northern part of the island in order to inform the whole population of the advantages of EU accession;

35. Welcomes the talks between Mr. Verheugen and Mr. Denktash of 27 August 2001 and between Mr. Kofi Annan and Mr. Denktash of 28 August 2001, and hopes that these have given a fresh impetus to the forces of reconciliation;

36. Expresses its concern about the fears (expressed by representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community) regarding the intimidation suffered by supporters of the EU at the hands of a recently established nationalist organisation with official backing in the occupied part; strongly condemns the recent bomb attack on the offices of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper 'Avrupa';

37. Is delighted at the continued dialogue with Cyprus in connection with the Common European Security and Defence Policy;

38. Calls on Turkey to recognise UN Security Council Resolution 1354/01, which was adopted unanimously on 15 June 2001, concerning the six-month extension to the mandate of UNFICYP;

39. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Cyprus and the Government and Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

NOTES

1. OJ L 68, 16.3.2000, p.3.

2. OJ L 78, 29.3.2000, p.10.

3. OJ L 58, 28.2.2001, p.1.

4. OJ C 219, 30.7.1999, p.448.

5. OJ C 178, 22.6.2001, p. 156.

6. OJ C 223, 8.8.2001, p. 182.

Chronologie Grèce : 1er mars - 30 septembre 2001

27 mars : Inauguration du nouvel aéroport d'Athènes *Eleftère Vénizelos*.

30 mars-1er avril : Vème Congrès du parti de la Nouvelle Démocratie, qui enregistre la réintégration de l'ancien ministre Georges Souflias.

5-6 avril : Visite en Turquie du ministre grec des affaires étrangères Georges Papandreou.

22 avril : Une bombe artisanale explose à Athènes devant le bureau du Patriarcat œcuménique orthodoxe de Constantinople. Cet attentat est revendiqué par un groupe anarchiste appelé « Lutte anti-pouvoir », qui a entendu protester contre la visite à Athènes du Pape Jean-Paul II considéré comme « responsable du massacre dans les Bakans ».

26 avril : Leçon inaugurale de Spyros Artavanis-Tsakonas, élu Professeur au Collège de France dans la nouvelle chaire de biologie et génétique du développement.

4-5 mai : Première visite d'un Pape à Athènes. Jean-Paul II demande pardon pour les torts du catholicisme envers les orthodoxes.

17 mai : Grève générale contre la réforme des retraites proposées par le gouvernement.

6 juin : Réunion à Thessalonique du comité de coordination des ministres de la défense des pays balkaniques (Albanie, Bulgarie, Croatie, Italie, FYROM, Grèce, Roumanie, Slovénie et Yougoslavie) en présence du secrétaire d'Etat américain à la défense Donald Rumsfeld.

16 juillet : Georges Papandréou, en visite à Moscou se déclare favorable à la proposition de son homologue russe de la tenue d'une conférence sur les Balkans, relative à l'intégrité des frontières des pays de cette région.

29 août : Le Président Stéphanopoulos s'oppose à la demande de l'Eglise orthodoxe d'organiser un referendum sur la question des cartes d'identité.

7 septembre : Dans son discours de l'inauguration de la Foire de Thessalonique, le Premier ministre Costas Simitis réaffirme les orientations de sa politique : refonte du système de santé, réforme fiscale, privatisation, soutien à l'intégration de Chypre dans l'UE.

10 septembre : Visite de travail à Athènes du Premier ministre français Lionel Jospin.

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Academic Activities-Activités académiques

Lancement du numero 2, vol. 8 de la revue académique Etudes helléniques-Hellenic Studies à Montréal.

Le numero 2, vol. 8 de la revue académique Etudes helléniques-Hellenic Studies a été lancé à Montréal le 4 mai 2001 en présence de l'ambassadeur de la Grèce auprès de l'OACI, M. Eleftherios Karayiannis, du Consul général de la Grèce à Montréal M. Ioannis Papadopoulos et de plusieurs universitaires.

Par la même occasion, une conférence a été donnée par M. Ioannis Papadopoulos sous le titre *Le rôle des Instituts de recherche de la diaspora hellénique pour faire connaître la civilisation grecque : le cas du Centre de recherches helléniques-Canada.* Paris Arnopoulos et Stephanos Constantinides, respectivement président du Conseil d'administration et directeur du Centre ont présenté le numéro d'Etudes helléniques-Hellenic Studies consacré à l'Union européenne et la Méditerranée orientale.

Lecture of the Ambassador of Greece in Ottawa, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos

The Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research Canada-KEEK in cooperation with the Montreal Interuniversity Neo-Hellenic Studies Centre and Unit of Hellenic Studies of Concordia University organised a lecture on Greek Foreign Policy on the 6th June 2001.

The guest speaker was the Greek Ambassador in Ottawa Mr. Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos. Professor Yiannis Philippousis opened the meeting and presented Ambassador Chrysanthopoulos. Professors Jacques Bouchard, Stephanos Constantinides and Nikos Metallinos spoke briefly on behalf of their Institutes.

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Chronologie Chypre : 1er mars-30 septembre 2001

7 mars : Constantin Caramanlis, le Président de la Nouvelle Démocratie déclare à Bruxelles au Président de la Commission Romano Prodi que son parti exclurait tout élargissement de l'Union européenne qui ne concernerait pas Chypre.

28 avril : Le Premier ministre turc Bülent Ecevit déclare au Vème Congrès de son parti, le DLP (Parti de la gauche démocratique) qu'avant 1974 les Chypriotes turcs vivaient dans la crainte d'un génocide et que « L'État turc de Chypre nord » est aujourd'hui un Etat libre et prospère.

10 mai : Décision de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, qui condamne la Turquie pour violation des droits de l'homme dans la partie occupée de Chypre.

27 mai : Résultats des élections législatives :

partis	2001 %	nombre de sièges (sur 56)	1996 %	nombre de sièges
Akel-Gauche Forces nouvelles	34,71	20	33,02	19
Rassemblement Démocratique (DISY)-Libéraux	34,00	19	34,50	20
Parti Démocratique (DIKO)	14,84	9	16,44	10
KISOS (ancien EDEK) Socialistes	6,51	4	8,18	5
Nouvelles Frontières	3	1	1,71	
EDI	2,59	1	5,14	2
ADIK	2,16	1	0,00	
Ecologistes	1,98	1	1,01	

Dimitri Christofias, secrétaire général du parti Akel devient Président de la Chambre des Représentants.

28 mai : Le Conseil national de sécurité turc déclare : « Un accord acceptable pour les deux parties de Chypre dépend de la reconnaissance de l'égalité souveraine des deux Etats sur l'île" ».

15 juin : Le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU renouvelle le mandat de la force des Nations Unies à Chypre et demande instamment à la partie chypriote turque et aux forces turques de rétablir le statu quo ante à Strovilia.

28 juin : Daniel Cohn-Bendit, député européen déclare : « Chypre sera dans les prochains mois le principal problème dans les relations de l'UE avec la Turquie. Une solution est absolument nécessaire avant toute ratification de l'élargissement ».

12 juillet : Rencontre à Paris de Ioannis Kassoulides, Ministre des affaires étrangères de Chypre avec Pierre Moscovici, Ministre délégué chargé des affaires européennes de France.

27 août : Rencontre à Zurich entre Rauf Denktash et Günter Verheugen, Commissaire européen, responsable de l'élargissement en vue de l'établissement d'un dialogue direct entre l'UE et la Communauté chypriote turque. G. Verheugen exclut l'adhésion de deux États chypriotes ainsi que l'adhésion de la partie nord de l'île à travers l'adhésion de la Turquie.

29 août : Rencontre à Nicosie entre le Président Glafkos Clérides et Alvaro de Soto, Conseiller spécial du Secrétaire général de l'ONU pour la question chypriote.

7 septembre : G. Verheugen se déclare déçu par l'attitude de R. Denktash de refuser l'invitation du secrétaire général de l'ONU. Kofi Annan, de participer à la reprise des pourparlers sur le règlement de la question chypriote prévus le 12 septembre.

11 septembre : Le député européen Alain Lamassoure, rapporteur sur la candidature de la Turquie déclare : « Au plus tard à l'automne 2002 le moment de vérité va arriver sur Chypre. Je ne peux pas m'imaginer qu'on puisse se trouver l'an prochain dans une situation de crise à cause de Chypre ».

Recensions/Book Reviews

JOSEPH S. JOSEPH, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, from Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (London/New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1997, third printing 1999), 228 pages.

Also available in Greek, Athens, Papazissis publisher, 2000

In the wake of the Cold War, perhaps the greatest threat to peace in Europe is ethnic conflict. As the breakup of Yugoslavia and subsequent conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and most recently Kosovo illustrate, ethnic hatreds and the potential for violence are close to the surface. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the divided island of Cyprus. In a state of no peace no war since 1974, the Mediterranean island is burdened with a troubled history.

Geographically situated at the crossroads between Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, the island has long been valued for its strategic location. More recently, however, the role and importance of Cyprus, and the implications of the divisions that exist, have become more prominent with the European Union's decision to carry out accession negotiations with Cyprus as a final step toward full membership.

Despite its ties to both Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, Cyprus has traditionally been overlooked in most studies dealing with the security of Europe and Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, because the island has been outside the realm of the EU until recently, it has not been part of discussions of European integration. Yet, as recent events have clearly demonstrated, the island has the potential to destabilize the path toward European integration and European peace and stability.

In *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: from Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*, Joseph S. Joseph places the island firmly into International Relations theory and specifically, in a context he calls the "politicization of ethnicity." One of his

main lines of thinking is that "the rise of ethnonationalism into a major political force in the twentieth century is perhaps the greatest challenge the nation-state has ever faced" (p. 134). Joseph, who teaches International Relations at the University of Cyprus, knows his subject well, and has himself been involved in some of the activities aimed at fostering understanding and communication between the two sides of the Green Line. Although Joseph uses Cyprus to illustrate his specific points, many of his ideas can be generalized to explain how the end of the Cold War has altered the role and place of ethnic conflict in world politics. For a number of reasons, this book makes an important theoretical contribution to our understanding of ethnopolitics as many political scientists are struggling to place these conflicts into existing conceptual and analytical frameworks.

We have much to learn about this Cyprus and Joseph proves to be an informed and objective guide. He places the divisions that exist on the island neatly into historical perspective, reminding the reader that the current ethnic divisions have withstood, and even been built upon, four centuries of history. He clearly guides the reader through the history of the island, the origins of the ethnic and political segregation to the present situation which is unmitigated by any crosscutting linguistic, social or religious ties. He notes that no attempts were ever made to integrate the two major groups, but rather the notion of "communal dualism" was part of the very existence of the society.

Furthermore, this notion was embodied in the 1960 constitution, which provided for the establishment of an independent state that identified and recognized the two primary communities that made up 96 per cent of the population of the island. The two communities, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, were recognized by the constitution with reference to their ethnic background, language, cultural traditions, and religion. The constitution gave each ethnic group the right to celebrate their own national holidays as well as the right to establish separate relationships with Greece and Turkey on many issues. The constitution also institutionalized communal dualism in all aspects of the government. For example, it provided for a president who should be a Greek Cypriot, and a vice-president who should be a

Turkish Cypriot. The house of representatives, composed of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot representatives elected separately by the two communities, exercised legislative power. Separate "ethnic" municipalities were created in the five major towns, although there was some intermingling of the two groups within the municipalities at the time.

That dualism has been embedded in the divisions that now exist on the island in a more formal way. The Green Line that separates the Turkish North from the Greek South separate two groups of people, each of which considers itself to be "Cypriot." However, those in the North who are part of the "Turkish Republic of Northern" Cyprus live in a state that is not recognized by any other government except that of Turkey, while those in the South, the Republic of Cyprus, live in a thriving economically secure society that is internationally recognized by all countries and organizations of the international system.

While it must be remembered that Cyprus was socially divided throughout its history, a point that Joseph makes is that no attempt was ever made to integrate politically the two groups, which is one of the reasons why the ongoing conflict is so intractable. Occasionally, violence flares up across the Green Line, and tensions remain a part of life. Despite repeated attempts to facilitate bicommunal communication between the two ethnic groups, Cyprus remains an area of conflict in Europe. The two communities' ties to Greece and Turkey respectively continue to threaten NATO because of deep animosity between the two alliance partners. The decision by the European Council to invite Cyprus to commence accession negotiations with the European Union, while Turkey's request was rebuffed in Luxembourg in December 1997, generated more tension.

As Joseph reminds the reader, controversies over Cyprus were common during the Cold War, when shifting relations between and among Greece, Turkey, the United States, and the Soviet Union enabled the government of Cyprus to play the various sides off one another politically. Hence, although this is a small and often over-looked island, it is one that has played, and continues to play an important role in international affairs.

For many of those reasons, the United States has been actively engaged in mediation trying to bring some resolution to the conflict. In 1997, Richard Holbrooke, who mediated the end of the war in Bosnia, was named special Cyprus envoy of President Clinton. He made a number of trips to the island and the region, but was unsuccessful in altering the situation. According to Holbrooke, the differences that exist between the two sides on the island are much deeper than those that separated Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. In short, Holbrooke found the situation in Cyprus to be intractable, although he was able to mediate peace in Bosnia.

How to bring the two sides together? As Holbrooke learned, the North now has nothing to gain and everything to lose by compromising. The South, which professes the need to move toward unification once again, also faces economic costs not unlike those West Germany faced when that country was unified. Both, however, have a great deal to lose if the uneasy truce that prevails were to move toward an armed and violent conflict.

In this book, Joseph carefully and methodically walks the reader through the history and background of the conflict and the impact of it on the international community. A point that he makes is that, even though the conflict is often overlooked, it has had and continues to have an impact on NATO, the EU, and the United Nations. Moreover, as he points out quite clearly, Cyprus played quite a role in the Cold War maneuvering between the United States and the Soviet Union. These stories are told clearly and Joseph uses ample sources to support his analysis and interpretation of events.

As one who has studied and been on the island, I found this book to be well crafted and documented. As would be expected in any book dealing with a topic as emotionally charged as this one, there are times when Joseph's own biases do creep in. However, to his credit, these times were few and did not interfere with his analysis in any way. The appendices provide access to important treaties and documents pertaining to the island, including the 1960 Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee, and Alliance. His references to various Security Council

resolutions are strengthened by the inclusion of some of those resolutions as well. All of these make the book easy to follow as Joseph's arguments unfold in a persuasive way.

The structure of the book makes each chapter a story about a particular period in the history of the island. This allows the reader to place Cyprus as it fits into relations among the NATO countries, the EU and the Cold War rivals. However, it also means that there are some redundancies as different chapters occasionally review the same parts of history.

This volume is an updated, expanded, and revised version of Joseph's 1985 book *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern* which I did not read. However, it is clear that a great deal has happened since 1985 that has changed the role of Cyprus in international politics, most of which is included here. I would have liked to see the author update the bibliography a bit more, especially in the parts pertaining to the Atlantic Alliance, but I see that as a minor flaw when the entire book is taken into consideration.

Overall this is a good and timely book that illustrates for the student of international relations, international security, or the Eastern Mediterranean why Cyprus needs to be studied and taken far more seriously than it has been.

Joyce P. Kaufman
Professor of Political Science
Whittier College

Advice to Contributors

Three copies of all manuscripts, typewritten on computer, double-spaced should be submitted on paper and disk. Manuscripts should follow the APA Manual, or the MLA Style Sheet or be consistent with practice in the discipline of each particular author.

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