

ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

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Letter from Glafcos Clerides to Kofi Annan

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The Greek-Americans and US Foreign Policy since 1950

Alexander Kitroeff*
Stephanos Constantinides**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article fait un survol historique général des efforts helléno-américains d'influencer la politique américaine envers la Grèce et ses voisins pendant la seconde moitié du XX^{ème} siècle. Avant 1974, c'est-à-dire avant la création du "lobby" helléno-américain fondé suite à l'invasion turque de Chypre, avaient eu lieu une série d'efforts moins organisés, mais tout de même déterminants. En 1978, l'embargo sur la vente d'armes à la Turquie prit fin. Par la suite, le "lobby" helléno-américain perdit considérablement de son pouvoir, quoiqu'il ait continué à exercer une certaine influence.

La première section de l'article porte sur des questions d'interprétation alors que le reste consiste à donner un aperçu chronologique de ces efforts avec les caractéristiques particulières de ce "lobby".

ABSTRACT

This article offers a general historical overview of Greek-American efforts to influence US foreign policy toward Greece and its neighbors in the second half of the twentieth century. Prior to 1974, when Turkey's invasion of Cyprus led to the creation of the Greek-American lobby, there had been a series of less organized but determined efforts to influence US policy on the part of the Greek-Americans. After 1978, when the embargo was lifted, the Greek-American lobby retained a part of the influence it had gained, although its ability to shape US policy diminished considerably. Following an introductory sections that deals with issues of interpretation, the rest of this article consists of a chronological account of the Greek-American efforts to influence US policy that stresses the particular characteristics of Greek-American lobbying.

Introduction

The 1950s

Unlike their earlier involvement with homeland nationalism which led many to return to Greece as volunteers in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the Greek-Americans expressed their concerns through efforts to influence US foreign policy towards Cyprus as well as Greece and Turkey after World War II.

In the World War I era, President Wilson, whose foreign policy was subject to immigrant pressures, admonished ethnics for harboring

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"ancient affections."¹ However by the post-World War II era, and particularly from the late 1960s onwards, the era of ethnic pluralism, the immigrant's balancing act was acceptable. Two parallel developments in American society after 1950, the rise of interest group politics and the legitimization of ethnicity, ushered the phenomenon of ethnic lobbies in Washington D.C.

In the very early hours of April 1, 1955 about twenty bombs exploded in or around British military installations on the island of Cyprus. This marked the beginning of a four-year guerilla and terrorist campaign against British targets launched by EOKA (National Organization of the Cypriot Struggle.) Frustrated with the Greek-Cypriot leadership's failure to gain support for an end to British colonial rule on Cyprus and the island's union with Greece, EOKA, the newly-founded military wing of the Greek-Cypriot movement resorted to armed struggle. EOKA's activities, although focused upon the British, inevitably affected the eighteen percent Turkish Cypriot minority and caused Turkey, with Britain's urging, to become involved in the island's affairs. With the old spectre of Greek-Turkish rivalry casting its shadow across the Eastern Mediterranean, EOKA, on the very night its struggle began, distributed leaflets which ended with the appeal "Greeks, wherever you are, hear our voice: forward, all together, for the liberty of our land of Cyprus!"²

Support for the Greek-Cypriot cause among Greek-Americans, whether they were from Greece proper or Cyprus, came naturally for all those who retained a sense of ethnic identity. That Cyprus was "Greek" was part of the conventional wisdom shared by Greeks the world over, it was part of their heritage and this was conveyed by Greek secular and religious education and sustained by most communal institutions in the diaspora. An article in a Greek-American annual almanac of 1930, reporting on a Swedish archaeological dig on Cyprus that confirmed the Classical Greek presence on the island in Antiquity, mentioned that it was "superfluous" to state the island had always been Greek.³

It is not surprising to note that within the Greek-American community, the drive for Cypriot self-determination and Enosis with Greece was understood in nationalistic terms, the goal of Enosis stressed more than the call for self-determination. The Greek-Cypriot struggle was often described as the "sacred national struggle of our brother Cypriots," while their communications to the Greek-Cypriots expressing Greek-American solidarity with their cause were described as "patriotic telegrams."

While Greek-Americans referred to Cyprus in nationalistic terms when communicating among themselves, they tailored their remarks when conversing with policymakers and the American public. Emphasizing the struggle for self-determination over its ultimate goal, the proposed union with Greece would ensure that the Greek-Cypriot movement gained

sympathy and support from many Americans who were critical of British and French colonialism. There were frequent editorials in favour of the Greek-Cypriot struggle in the American press.

Senators and Congressmen were only too happy to lend their support to the Greek-Cypriot cause. The AHEPA-sponsored Justice for Cyprus Committee boasted the names of a great number of legislators and other nationally and locally elected officials. Three days after the guerilla war against the British began on Cyprus, the *Atlantis* newspaper published an AHEPA announcement which claimed "a majority in the American Congress has already declared itself in favor of the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination. This was achieved through the education and appraisal of American Congressmen of the situation in Cyprus by members of AHEPA in the course of dinners, public and private meetings."⁴

Effective as the Greek-American leadership was in relating the Greek-Cypriot struggle to public feeling against colonialism and in enlisting the support of Congressmen, no results could be seen on the policy level. The mid-1950s were not a time in which Congress was likely to take the initiative in foreign policy formulation because it was generally considered to be the responsibility of President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The policy they followed was officially one of neutrality; in practice the United States's policies were designed to blunt the enosis movement and to discourage the Greek-Cypriot attempts to get their case heard at the United Nations. It was Dulles' preoccupation with containment and security in the Eastern Mediterranean which is assumed to have been behind his thinking on Cyprus. In any event, the key to any shift in US policy towards Cyprus lay in either pressuring or persuading Eisenhower or Dulles. The Greek-American leadership was apparently unwilling to put any direct pressure on either the President or his Secretary of State in relation to US policy on Cyprus.

The reasons that prompted the Greek-American leadership to avoid engaging directly with Eisenhower or Dulles over Cyprus are difficult to establish since no direct information exists in the available sources. They can be inferred, however, from the conventional wisdom governing public attitudes over foreign policy in the 1950s, a period which political scientist Gabriel Almond has described as one of "consensus" over foreign policy. It was very unusual to have groups, especially ethnic groups, expressing alternative views about what the United States should be doing internationally.

In light of all this, overt criticism of senior officials in the administration or the President himself were out of the question. Although strong language describing the Administration's attitude of non-involvement in

Cyprus was common in the press and in publications such as *Life Magazine* reporting on the events on the island, the Hellenic community's press refrained from open criticism of either Eisenhower or Foster Dulles. On the contrary, the Greek-American leadership sought to ingratiate itself with the President. As the crisis on Cyprus unfolded, the AHEPA leadership continued its annual ceremonial and "photo opportunity" visits to President Eisenhower.

There was one exception to the rule governing the Greek-American community's attitude towards Eisenhower and Dulles. That exception proves there were strong underlying feelings over their handling of the Cyprus situation. The proof lies in a memorandum submitted to the National Democratic Convention held in Chicago in 1956, by the Hellenic-American Democratic Club of Chicago soon after the British authorities arrested the leader of the Greek-Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios. Evidently, the particular context in which the memorandum was submitted ensured that its authors though apt to be accused of party partisanship, could not be easily deemed disloyal Americans. The memorandum mentioned, among other things, that "The Republican Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, has blundered, mismanaged, and bungled the entire Cyprus question and has almost succeeded in alienating the people of Greece, who have been our traditional allies."⁵

By the late 1950s, intense diplomatic pressure was exerted on Greece and even more so on the Greek-Cypriots with a view of terminating the EOKA struggle and arriving at a solution of the Cyprus crisis. The Greek-American community, having tested its strength against the US foreign policy establishment, would not have to wait long for another opportunity to flex again.

The Cyprus Crisis in the 1960s

The Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960 as a compromise between the Greek-Cypriot wish for union with Greece and the unwillingness of Britain and Turkey to see Cyprus incorporated into Greece. The heated diplomatic negotiations held in London and Zurich in 1959 and which led to this compromise solution produced a document entitled the "Basic Structure" on which Cyprus' future constitutional arrangements would be based. Those arrangements were designed to ensure harmony between the majority Greek and minority Turkish population. Yet as analysis of the "Basic Structure" compiled by the US Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research in 1959 concluded "in a number of respects the solution agreed upon sets up new and largely untried procedures...there are dangers inherent not only in the comparative rigidity of the new state but also in the detailed codification of community rights which will tend to perpetuate rather than eliminate the communal

cleavages.”⁶ Ethnic strife erupted between the two communities in December 1963. Tension built up steadily and the threat of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and a Greek-Turkish war loomed over the Eastern Mediterranean until the United States and the United Nations intervened to restore a fragile peace in the late summer of 1964.

During the 1960s, the United States, unlike its spectator status in the 1950s, was to play a key role in the affairs of Cyprus. Following the outbreak of ethnic conflict in December 1963, Britain, one of the three “guarantor powers” of Cypriot sovereignty along with Greece and Turkey, formally requested that the United States take the initiative in resolving the crisis. Since both Greece and Turkey were NATO members and also dependent on US aid, this gave the United States additional leverage with which it could influence the course of events. Indeed, in June 1964 a Turkish invasion of Cyprus was halted only after President Lyndon Johnson contacted the Turkish premier and threatened American intervention. Though successful in creating short term solutions to the crisis, Johnson was unsuccessful in imposing a scheme for a long term resolution of the problems on Cyprus after meeting separately with the Greek and Turkish prime ministers in June. By August he was ready with a new initiative, the so-called Acheson Plan which was eventually dropped.

This time a less coercive domestic climate and the President’s explicit initiatives over Cyprus emboldened the Greek-Americans in their efforts to pressurize the Administration. In March 1964 Marketos published a long front page editorial in the *Ethnikos Kyrix* stating that the crisis on Cyprus had forced Greek-Americans to go against the President for the first time in their history but went on to elaborate that there was no contradiction between supporting the Greek-Cypriot cause and being a democracy-loving American citizen.⁷

But Hellenic community leadership continued to proceed cautiously, and the press was careful to ensure that any criticism of the president would be tempered with explicit affirmation of the community’s belief in American principles. An editorial in the other Greek language daily, the *Atlantis*, on the occasion of the Fourth of July, lamented the fact that the United States had not moved against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot minority whose disruptive actions were violating the principles of freedom and democracy, those integral values of American Independence.

For want of anything better, the issue was again presented by the Greek-Americans as one of “self-determination” despite the fact that it involved Greco-Turkish ethnic conflict and the threat of Turkey invading the island.⁸ Yet this was not done consistently; rather, there emanated various interpretations of what was going on in Cyprus, e.g., Greco-Turkish ethnic strife was explained as anti-democratic moves by the

Turkish Cypriots; after jets bombed civilian targets on Cyprus humanitarian arguments about the protection of the Greek-Cypriots were also enlisted. Finally, as a preview of the major tactic to be successfully employed in 1974, the bombings were also condemned by the Greek-American press because US-supplied missiles were used. Yet there was little reaction from either the public or policymakers.

If the wider issues raised by ethnic conflict in Cyprus were blurred in the community's interaction with Congress and the general public, they sharply focused around nationalist concerns in its internal debates. A good example of this is the way the readers of the *Ethnikos Kyrix* responded to Marketos editorial in March 1964 which explained why the Greek-Americans were disagreeing with the President's foreign policy. A reader wrote "we are all proud to have a Greek newspaper representing the Greek-American community with courage, burning patriotism and historical clarity during this period of national crisis."⁹ Another reader described the newspaper's stance as one of "Greek-like pride." This difference of opinion with the President, for those and many other readers, was not a normal consequence of living in a democracy, but rather an instance of asserting Greek national principles.

In keeping with this view of the Cyprus issue, the community's mobilization over Cyprus in the community reflected the old nationalist perspective that Cyprus should be united with Greece. In contrast to the "American Committee for Cyprus Self-Determination" formed by the Greek-American leadership which included experienced activists over Cyprus such as Rossides and John Plumides of the AHEPA and which called for Cyprus' "full independence with the right of self determination for the people of Cyprus"¹⁰ demonstrators in Atlantic City and Chicago demanded Cyprus' union with Greece. The Greek-language press, meanwhile emphasized the Turkish atrocities only when reporting on the ethnic strife on the island, while the community protested what it saw as biased reporting of the events in Cyprus by the national press in the United States.

Understanding full well how counterproductive the Greek-American nationalist perspective could be in rebutting the alleged misrepresentation of Cyprus by the print media and promoting the Greek-Cypriot case, the community's leadership took practical measures to change it. The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese produced a "Campaign Kit for defending the Reputation of Americans of Greek Descent," the implication being that negative reports on, for instance, Greek-Cypriot actions against Turkish Cypriots would reflect negatively on the Greek-Americans. A parallel was drawn between how Japanese Americans had been maligned during World War II and what conceivably could happen to the Greek-Americans. The "campaign kit" consisted of a set of instructions on how to lobby effectively: "Postcards: Each Greek Orthodox Church will

receive large quantities of postcards showing a wounded little boy. The photograph has been specially chosen - it is the only one that was not gruesome. The caption does not rant at the Turks... Letters to the Editor:...If the letter writer refers to an article printed by the newspaper, i.e. an attack on Greece, he should not let his arguments be determined by those used in the attack he is answering; the readers would not remember the exact contents of the attack and there is no reason to remind them. Moreover, the attack could probably be based on facts that are not necessarily the most favourable for the presentation of the Greek case."¹¹

The situation on Cyprus was eventually pacified in late 1964. While the community's pressure on the US government may not have produced concrete results their lobbying had gained them useful experience for the future.

The Greek-American Lobby, 1974-1978

The role of the Greek-American lobby in connection with the Turkish arms embargo, imposed by Congress between 1975 and 1978 has been the subject of numerous studies. Works on US foreign policy formulation have described the Greek-American lobby as an example of the way ethnic groups can put pressure on Congress and influence foreign policy. Critics of ethnic lobbying have singled out the Jewish-American and the Greek-American lobbies as examples of what they see as detrimental influences in foreign policy. Other works, which focus on Congress' foreign policy formulation potential, and which regard ethnic lobbies as of secondary importance, have nonetheless noted that out the Greek-American lobby between 1974-78 as an example of how Congress' initiative can be aided by an ethnic lobby.

The Greek-American lobby has been the subject of numerous monographs. The views of the lobby offered in this corpus of work have ranged from claiming its role was crucial in imposing the Turkish arms embargo to, in contrast, disputing its potential to be of any effective influence on Congress. A middle position is offered by Paul Y. Watanabe in his book *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy* where he argues that the lobby was crucial in aiding Congress in the initiative it took to impose the embargo. Here, it is argued that this "middle position" is correct but it involved two distinct phases. In the early phase of the imposition of the embargo, from mid-1974 to early 1975 the Greek-Americans — there was no "lobby" as such — were active in backing Congress. From mid-1975 onwards, began a second phase in which Congress' assertiveness in the foreign policy sphere began to wane. Two parallel developments ensued; firstly the Greek-Americans did become organized into a "lobby." Secondly, there emerged a mythology of an all-powerful "Greek lobby" in the press, especially by commentators hostile to the Turkish arms embargo who were anxious to attribute its imposition not on Congress but on ethnic lobbying.

The Imposition of the Embargo

The fragile peace established on Cyprus in 1964 lasted more or less intact to 1974. In July 1974, the colonels' dictatorship which had ruled Greece since 1967 engineered a coup which overthrew President Makarios who escaped abroad, and installed in power an extreme right-wing Greek-Cypriot regime. This provoked a two-stage Turkish military invasion of Cyprus which resulted in a third of the island being occupied by Turkish forces with thousands of Greek-Cypriots either being killed, captured or being made into refugees. The regime collapsed immediately and democracy was restored in Cyprus and in Greece. Nevertheless, the Turkish occupation remained a grim reality.

Television images and front-page stories in the American press replete with photographs of the Greek-Cypriot victims of the Turkish invasion electrified the Greek-American community. The events on Cyprus went to the core of Greek sensitivity about the century-long suffering of Greeks at the hands of the Turks. The community was immediately stung into action. In its essence, its mobilization was similar to previous actions during the earlier crises on Cyprus: support for the Greek cause on Cyprus. The invasion, however, raised a multiplicity of issues, political, humanitarian, legal and so on, and the form and content of this mobilization, compared to earlier ones, were much more diverse. As a result, reactions to the events among Greek-Americans were varied and in many cases spontaneous, and often went beyond the particular initiatives sponsored by AHEPA and by the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese.

They included demonstrations outside the United Nations building in New York, a demonstration held in early August opposite the White House and a deluge of "mailgrams" sent to the President, the State Department, senators and congressmen. The issues raised in this varied mobilization were themselves diverse, addressing the Turkish invasion as a violation of the sovereignty of an independent state or as a violation of human rights, questioning the United States and Britain's responsibilities for allowing the invasion to take place and for not appearing prepared to take measures for its reversal.

Under those circumstances, traditional community leadership was superseded by the following three events or individuals: the initiative on Cyprus taken in Washington D.C. by congressmen and senators including those of Greek origin; a professional lobbying organization, AHI-PAC, established by Eugene Rossides a Washington-based Greek who had served in the Nixon Administration and, lastly, several grassroots organizations. The grassroots organizations, bodies such as the New York-based Panhellenic Emergency Committee, the Minnesota Friends of Cyprus and the Save Cyprus Committee of Southern

California sought to coordinate and sustain the spontaneous activities undertaken by many Greek-Americans. What eventually emerged was a loose network of organizations: its "head" were the members of Congress and the Rossides group which reached out to the entire community via the Archdiocese - the Archbishop created his own equivalent of AHI-PAC, the Chicago based UHAC - the AHEPA and the various grassroots organizations.

It is important to note that UHAC was established only one year later in the summer of 1975. Until that time, there were very few public references to the existence of a Greek-American lobby. The conventional wisdom during the imposition of the embargo from mid-1974 to early 1975 was that Congress was primarily responsible for promoting the idea of an embargo.

Indeed a small group of Congressmen reacted to the news of the coup and the ensuing invasion on Cyprus well before they were contacted by their Greek-American constituents. This group of congressmen, all of them Democrats, included John Brademas of Indiana, Benjamin Rosenthal of New York and Paul Sarbanes of Maryland. Initially critical of the Administration's failure to control the Greek junta, the congressmen quickly addressed the post-invasion situation and became critical of the Administration's attitude toward Turkey. They met with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in August to protest the passivity of the American policy. Finally, after Turkey completed the second stage of its invasion on August 14, the number of protesting Congressmen rose, and as the focus shifted further towards Turkey's policies and the Administration's inactivity, calls for arms cutoffs were first made.

AHEPA's biannual convention had opened in Boston on August 16th 1974, a day after the second stage of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was completed. The convention became a forum in and around which a number of different responses to the events on Cyprus were aired. Thirty members of the MIT-Harvard Hellenic Students Association began a two-day hunger strike protesting the "criminal policy of the US government on the Cyprus issue. One demonstrator in downtown Boston was reported to be carrying a sign which read "President Ford: Rid Cyprus of Dirty Turks," while a photograph showed another sign appealing to the president to "stop the Turks from Bombing and Killing."¹²

One of the speakers at that demonstration, Massachusetts Democratic gubernatorial candidate Michael Dukakis was calmer, urging an end to "indecisive American policy" in response to the events on Cyprus. Mindful of the broad range of issues relating to the Cyprus crisis, and not wanting to be outflanked from within the community, AHEPA adopted a suitably broad resolution which called for the enforcement of a cease fire

on Cyprus proposed by the United Nations, for Turkey's withdrawal of its army from Cyprus, for the United States to reassert its "moral leadership" in support of self-determination and freedom for Cyprus, and for "the world's peace-loving nations to join in providing massive relief for the Greek-Cypriot refugees."¹³

The broader range of demands notwithstanding, AHEPA's attitude towards influencing US policy makers and public opinion in connection with events on Cyprus remained much as it had been during previous crises on the island. AHEPA, while not ignoring Congress, remained focused on gently pressuring the Administration. AHEPA's leadership was being circumspect as usual, having witnessed the failure of similar mobilizations in the past to make a dent in foreign policy. Yet by the close of the convention, it was evident that on this occasion there was greater momentum in the community's mobilization and there was real concern in Congress over the United States' policies towards Cyprus. How could the two be linked?

Knowing by experience that AHEPA was reluctant and ill-equipped to lobby effectively, Eugene Rossides had formed his professional lobbying organization, AHI-PAC, which was to function as the link between the Congressmen concerned with the Cyprus issue and AHEPA, the Archdiocese and other Greek-American Organizations. In Rossides' consultations with Congressmen Brademas, Rosenthal and Sarbanes, it became obvious to all that the most effective tactic for involving the greatest number of legislators would be to emphasize the illegal nature of Turkey's use of US-supplied arms in the invasion.

Brademas and his colleagues began focusing on this particular issue and their efforts were rewarded soon. At a press conference on August 19, Secretary of State Kissinger was asked whether the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act did not require a cut off in assistance to Turkey since, according to the law, military aid could only be used only for internal security or legitimate self-defence. He responded by saying that he was waiting for the results of a study being conducted by State Department lawyers but until such information was available the Administration would adhere to its position that an arms embargo was contrary to US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Two weeks later, information that the report was not being made public because Kissinger was trying to alter its damaging conclusions for the administration's policies was "leaked" to one of the Administration's critics, Senator Thomas Eagleton. The Senator from Missouri, addressing the Senate in early September charges that President Gerald Ford was being ill-advised or misinformed of the legal implications of his inaction over the Cyprus crisis. And in an obvious reference to the Watergate crisis which had toppled President Richard Nixon less than month earlier, Eagleton added "we have learned that the policies created in ignorance or in spite of the law are doomed to failure."¹⁴

Eagleton, to his surprise, discovered a groundswell of support among his colleagues; clearly the Administration's continued inertia over the invasion and the legal implications of the use of arms were a matter of growing concern in the Senate, as were associated issues such as the Greek-Cypriot refugee problem which Senator Edward Kennedy was pursuing. When Eagleton confronted Kissinger, who was addressing the Democratic caucus on Capitol Hill, with the words "Mr. Secretary, you do not understand the rule of law," he in effect enunciated the principle on which the embargo's supporters in both the House of Representatives and the Senate would wage battle: the embargo on Turkey would symbolize the application of the "rule of law," a critically sensitive notion in the aftermath of Watergate. By late September, both Houses had passed the first of a series of legislative measures which would lead to a US embargo on arms sales to Turkey, which, after some delays, went into operation in February 1975. The Greek-American community's lobbying efforts have been widely recognized as a crucial factor which ensured the passage of the relevant embargo legislation especially since the measure was opposed vigorously by the Administration as well as the by leadership of both parties in both Houses. But it is important to note that the initiative, and the overall strategy (the "rule of law" argument) was in the hands of a small group of Congressmen.

Pro-embargo lobbying was effective because it was able to focus its lobbying efforts around the issue of "the rule of law." The embargo related activity on Capitol Hill represented the first breakthrough in terms of international intervention in the Cyprus crisis. By mid-September 1974 it was clear that neither the United States government, the United Nations or any other national or international body was about to take any practical action. Thus, for all concerned Greek-Americans, Congressional initiative over Cyprus along the lines of the rule of law was incentive enough to put aside the variety of particular demands aired at the AHEPA conference and to fall behind the pro-embargo group in Congress. Nevertheless, Ethnic mobilization still operated along a pronounced nationalistic vein. Photographs taken at a massive Greek-American demonstration in Washington on July 20, 1975 opposing the Ford Administration's attempt to persuade Congress to lift the embargo reveal a mixture of Greek and American flags and demonstrators dressed in Greek national costumes. Anti-Turkish messages and images were evident in the reports on Cyprus by the two Greek-American Greek language dailies, the *Ethnikos Kyrix* and the *Proini*, although less so in their editorial comments.

But the Greek-American leadership "translated" the ethnic concerns into the wider concerns that legislators had in the wake of the illegalities of the Watergate crisis, namely the "rule of law." Many of the individuals concerned, for example, Eugene Rossides, *Ethnikos Kyrix's* now elderly editor Babis Marketos, AHEPA officials such as John Plumides and the

Greek Orthodox Archbishop Iakovos had experienced the Greek-American mobilizations over Cyprus in the 1950s and the 1960s and were aware how easily the movement could fail to make an impact. Even after the legislation was eventually passed and adopted as policy in early 1975, the message sent out time and time again to Greek-Americans by organizations such as AHI-PAC was that the embargo would be not a pro-Greek or anti-Turkish measure, but "an important victory for the rule of law."¹⁵

Throughout this first phase, which involved the imposition of the embargo, President Ford had consistently ignored the Greek-American factor and had focused his attention on persuading Congress not to impose the embargo. Precisely at the time when the embargo went into operation in February 1975, Ford and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger launched a campaign to persuade Congress to drop its antagonism towards the Administration over foreign policy. The campaign bore fruit, especially a few month later when Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese heralding the end of the Vietnam war. The Administration secured a narrow victory over the embargo in April when the Senate voted to lift the embargo; the House of Representatives was still in a majority in favor of the embargo.

The next few months saw a struggle by the Administration to erode the pro-embargo sentiment in Congress. Finally, on July 24th the House of Representatives voted to preserve the embargo on July 24th. Turkey retaliated by closing US bases on its soil, prompting the Senate to reaffirm, again by a single vote, its opposition to the embargo by a vote of 47 to 46. Renewed pressure was placed on the House of Representatives with the issues involving US security interests and electronic surveillance capacities in the Eastern Mediterranean. This time around, the pro-embargo group delayed the vote and with the help of Congressman Madden (D-Ind), a close friend of Brademas who was acting speaker, prevented the embargo issue to be placed on the agenda just before the summer recess.

Throughout this period public commentators painted a picture of an all-powerful Greek-American lobby. For example, in describing the situation in the House of Representatives The New York Times wrote "individual congressmen have been pressed hard by the so-called Greek-lobby to reaffirm previous House votes and prevent Turkey from receiving further American arms until she makes significant concessions to the Greek-Cypriotes."¹⁶ In the same newspaper, a senior journalist, Cyrus Sulzberger, writing from London where Ford and Kissinger were attending a NATO summit, noted that "The Administration realizes that in all these [foreign policy] matters its position is being weakened by special ethnic groups in Washington" which included "the splendidly organized 'Greek lobby'."¹⁷

When Congress reconvened in September 1975, the pro-embargo forces could postpone the vote any longer. Under great pressure by the Ford Administration the House of Representatives voted to "ease" the embargo by a 223 to 206 vote. The Senate, which had voted against the embargo before the summer recess quickly agreed on this compromise position. The "easing" of the embargo permitted the delivery of about \$185 million worth of equipment contracted for by Turkey before the embargo took effect, commercial cash sales of arms through private suppliers in the United States as well as US government sales and credits up to \$175 million needed for Turkey's responsibilities to NATO.

Nevertheless the image of the all-powerful lobby was preserved intact: the "easing" rather than the total lifting of the embargo, reinforced the Greek-American lobby's notoriety. A long article published in the Baltimore Sunday Sun in early September 1975, a few days before the House of Representatives was to begin discussing the proposal that the embargo on Turkey be eased. The article, written by two journalists who later on published a book criticizing ethnic lobbies, painted a stark picture of the "Greek lobby" forcing Congress to vote for the Turkish arms embargo over what were the nation's real interests.¹⁸ By early October, AHI-PAC was obliged to rebut such charges in letters it sent soliciting the membership of prominent Greek-Americans. The letters mentioned that "Secretary of State Kissinger has charged that we are engaged in 'ethnic politics' with references to the so-called 'Greek' lobby. Americans of Greek descent interested in this issue are not a 'Greek' lobby. They are Americans working for decency and respect for basic American principles - the rule of law in domestic and international affairs and opposition to aggression - and for the proper role of congress in foreign affairs."¹⁹ The hostility which coloured the public recognition of the Greek-American lobby's impact caused its role to be exaggerated. The fact remains that the lobby did not initiate any policy in the summer of 1975. It merely worked towards the preservation of a particular policy which congress had elaborated and imposed the previous year. At no point between June and October 1975 did the Greek-American PACs or any other communal organization seek to impose any particular strategy or tactic on the embargo's supporters in Congress. On the contrary, as the AHI-PAC and UHAC documents show, the Greek-American organizations functioned strictly as transmission belts between Capitol Hill and the community across the United States. But the reputation of the Greek-American lobby had by now been established and lasted through the next phase, from mid-1975 onwards.

The Lifting of the Embargo

When Jimmy Carter was running for president in 1976, he declared that he would preserve the embargo until Turkish troops left the island. As a result, the Greek-American leadership threw its support behind him. So much enthusiasm was generated that after his victory in November of 1976 that Greek-Cypriots were dancing in the streets of the Greek sector of Cyprus' divided capital, Nicosia.

But by April 1978, Carter had decided that the embargo should be lifted since Turkey was too much of a valuable ally of the United States. The Greek-American Lobby shifted into full gear again., but the domestic climate had changed. Congress was losing its initiative in foreign policy while the presidency, through Carter, was regaining the ground it had lost to Congress under Nixon and Ford. The "rule of law" argument which had resonated so widely in the immediate aftermath of the Watergate crisis of 1974 was less appealing to the public and policy-makers. The supporters who believed in Turkey's paramount strategic value to US policy had been ably assisted by public relations campaigns financed by the Turkish government.

The struggle over the embargo eventually culminated in debates in the Senate (July 25) and the in House of Representatives (August 1st). The pro-embargo side won handily in the Senate but very narrowly - by only three votes in the House of Representatives (208-205) and the embargo was lifted. The "strategic interests" arguments put forward by the Administration had won the day. In the House of Representatives, 31 of the 43 Congressmen who changed their votes gave as their reasons the factors of national security and the failure of the embargo to bring about negotiations over the situation in Cyprus. Needless to say, the specter of an ethnic lobby dictating foreign policy was raised in connection with the debates in the House of Representatives. Before the issue was taken up in the House, the *Wall Street Journal* editorialized that "the only reason for maintaining the embargo is that more Greek descendants than Turkish descendants vote in electing members of the House."²⁰ On the floor of the House, Paul Findley (R-Ill.), author of a book criticizing the Jewish American lobby's activities, said, quite erroneously, that the issue was being decided on an emotional basis because "Greek-Americans are prominent in every Congressional district in this country."²¹

The very narrowness of the vote in the House of Representatives (208 to 205) has served to sustain the image of power and influence commonly associated with the Greek-American lobby between 1974 and 1978. The embargo had died, but its heroic agony in the House of Representatives coupled with the way opponents exaggerated its actual role only added to the Greek-American lobby's reputation. Only days after Congress voted to lift the embargo and Time magazine reflected on how difficult the decision had been for the Senate because "senators were subjected to

considerable pressure by the pro-Greek lobby"²² despite the Senate having voted to lift the embargo by a fifteen-vote margin in a debate described by one observer as having proceeded "almost listlessly, with a few sharp exchanges" despite senators having spoken with "feeling for repeal or retention."²³

The mythology surrounding the Greek-American lobby was related to the accepted practice of lobbying and interest group politics in Washington D.C. were also important contributing factors. Another crucial factor was public acceptability of "ethnicity" a result of the revival of ethnicity in the United States in the late 1960s. Since both lobbying and ethnicity were considered part of social and political life, Congressmen displayed a sensitivity towards ethnic lobbying. While the Greek-American community did not have the numerical strength to required to determine elections even in congressional districts, even legislators who were undecided or indifferent to Cyprus took notice of representations made by their Greek-American constituents. This was the first step towards coming around to supporting their constituents' demands. In one study, aides to Congressmen are cited as recalling large numbers of phone calls, letters and the emotion with which Greek-American constituents pressured Congressmen and one aide apparently recalled Representative David Clancy, Republican of Ohio, saying "Maybe I would not have lost my seat over this, but who wants the hassle" -although it should be said that some opponents of the embargo expressed themselves negatively about ethnic pressures.²⁴

Yet on the whole, ethnic lobbying was acceptable, especially to the large number of Congressmen who were indifferent to the Cyprus question. One often quoted story, probably apocryphal, has one Congressman remarking that he was voting in favor of the embargo because there were more Greek than Turkish restaurants in his constituency.

Even more importantly, the revival of ethnicity made interest expressed in homeland affairs legitimate - this concern was part of the ethnic heritage that US society sought to preserve. This belief was shared even among opponents of the policies put forward by the Greek-American lobby. For example, Representative George Mahon, Texas Democrat (chairman of the important Appropriations Committee), opposed Rosenthal's proposal to stop aid to Turkey unless "substantial progress" was made over resolving the crisis on Cyprus. Mahon argued that the measure was rash and potentially counterproductive for the Greek side and added that "We have throughout this country numerous communities, where Americans of Greek descent live. These people are entitled, as well as all other Americans to our consideration and to an attitude of helpfulness. To do something which would jeopardize their homeland, more or less, would seem most ill-advised... I am concerned about the welfare and interests of American citizens of Greek descent..."²⁵

The Post 1978 Era

The post 1978 era has been described as one of decline of the Greek-American lobby.²⁶ In fact it became less effective year by year although the myth of a powerful Greek Lobby in Washington is alive not only in Greece but even among numerous Greek communities of the diaspora.

Let us take a look at the evolution of this lobby after 1978. There have been some efforts at better organization, especially after the decline of the enthusiasm generated by the Cyprus invasion.

The Cypriot organizations around the world managed to create the POMAK (World Organization of Cypriots Abroad) and PSEKA (International Coordinating Committee Justice for Cyprus), two umbrella organizations of the Cypriot diaspora in order to demonstrate support for the Cypriot people against the Turkish invasion and occupation of almost 40% of the territory of the island. PSEKA, based in New York, directs its main activities in the USA in an effort to influence American administration and Congress for a more favourable position of the Cyprus question.

Another important evolution was the creation of SAE (Symvoulion Apodimou Ellinismou - Council of Hellenes Abroad) on December 1995 in Thessaloniki, a world wide umbrella organization of which the presidency is based in the USA. The SAE of Americas, including Canada and Latin America, is one of the most important components of the organization.

There have been also efforts from Angelo Tsakopoulos, a wealthy Californian Greek - American supporter of President Clinton to establish his own group, the Western Policy Center, originally based in California and transferred in 1998 to Washington.

These groups have been added to the older existing structures, such as the Greek Orthodox Church's network, the AHEPA (American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association) and the American Hellenic Institute (AHI) with its Public affairs committee (AHI-PAC).

The creation of the SAE has been criticized by influential Greek-Americans who consider it an artificial structure and a compromise between the late Archbishop Iakovos and the Greek government. Andrew Athens, a wealthy Greek-American based in Chicago and a close friend of Iakovos, has been promoted to the post of president of the SAE. Some critics also opposed the role of the Greek government in the establishment of the organization and the conservative orientation of its Greek-American leadership. SAE looked upon itself as a vehicle for coordinating activities of various Greek organizations around the world and especially those in the USA. However, not all those organizations accept its leadership and guidance.

Differences in political philosophy, goals and tactics, but also personal differences lead sometimes to clashes among these groups but nevertheless common actions have been achieved in other cases.

Rivalries, for example, between AHI-PAC and the SAE are well known and the Manatos and Manatos professional firm acting on behalf of the SAE, PSEKA and some other groups has been criticized not only by AHI-PAC but also by friends of Tsakopoulos who established their own lobby group.²⁷

It is worth noting that Manatos and Manatos worked for a long time with the UHAC (United Hellenic American Congress) established in June 1975 and presided by Andrew Athens, the actual president of the world SAE. UHAC was regarded as the creation of Archbishop Iakovos.

The same Andrew Athens has signed a memo drafted - according to Christopher Hitchens - by Andrew Manatos addressed to the then President of Cyprus, George Vassiliou, asking for a five year commitment of \$200,000 *per annum* - a mere million - for the activities of Manatos and Manatos. The memo published by the Wall Street Journal on January 10, 1990 was described as «a bottom line appeal from a US citizen to the head of a foreign state to gain influence in Congress over US foreign policy».²⁸

Philip Christopher, President of PSEKA and a close ally of Athens, repeated the same demand in Nicosia on the occasion of the annual meeting of its organization on August 1994. Mr. Christopher, «whose community and lobbying efforts in New York and Washington are well known, told his audience - which included President Glafcos Clerides, Foreign Minister Alecos Michaelides, and Archbishop Chrysostomos - that if Cyprus would give \$ 50 million annually to the lobbying cause, then «our national question will be solved in three years». Pro rata, that's only \$ 150 million to clean up the Cyprus dispute. Not bad!».²⁹

These assertions damage Greek causes and give a cynical impression. Of course money is important to lobby effectively in Washington, and fundraising for American politicians is very important, but there are much smarter ways to go about the matter.

On the other hand, there is no assurance that the money given by taxpayers either in Cyprus or in Greece is well spent. Critics inside the Greek-American Communities but also in Greece and Cyprus raise the question from time to time and consider the activities of the Greek lobby as a failure. Especially when they compare the Greek lobby with what they consider as a succesful pro-turkish lobby in Washington.

Another important evolution inside the Greek-American lobby was the the fact that Archbishop Iakovos quitted in 1996. Not only did a new leader take his place, Archbishop Spyridon, but also the Archdiocese was weakened since the Patriarchate of Constantinople decided to remove Canada and Latin America, creating independent dioceses in these areas. The new Archbishop does not have the personality, experience or connections of Iakovos to play a major role as a leader of the Greek-American community.

The 'reverse influence phenomenon'; i.e., the influence of the Greek-American lobby on the formulation of the foreign policy of Greece, is another important evolution of the Greek-American lobby, especially given the Americanization through successive generations of Greek-Americans. The American administration succeeded in using the Greek lobby to promote its policy either on the Cyprus question or on Greek-Turkish relations. The latest example of this reverse influence phenomenon is the promotion of Richard Holbrooke's mission on the Cyprus issue in a way that embarrasses the Greek side and gives a chance to the Americans to exercise more pressure on the Cypriot and Greek governments. Yet another recent example is the visit of AHEPA's leadership in Ankara, Athens and Nicosia in April 1998. These visits have been viewed as promoting American interests and policy in the region and were organized in part by official American channels. Some Greek-Americans were very critical of this visit since they felt it was an American pressure tactic applied to the Cypriot and Greek governments.

Under these circumstances, the Greek and Cypriot governments will be forced to re-examine their own strategies and tactics on how to lobby Washington as well as their relations with the Greek-American lobby. Obviously the first thing to do is to establish clear objectives on the Greek-American lobby's expectations. The 'honeymoon' relationship is definitely over.

Another important evolution in the 1990's is the fact that the Greek causes to defend in Washington have multiplied. The Cyprus question still occupies an important place, but the whole spectre of Greek-Turkish relations is now a major issue, especially after the Aegean crisis. After the cold war ended, disputes with Balkan neighbours, especially the Macedonian question, took on a certain importance in the activities of the Greek-American lobby. Under these circumstances the Greek-American lobby was obliged to fight on different fronts with the result that they spread themselves too thin.

Of course the question of the Greek-American lobby is extremely complex; hence more documented case studies are necessary for a more enlightened judgement. On the other hand, even if one concedes little success to this lobby, the question remains: what would Greek causes be without the lobby's presence in Washington? Obviously the use of such terms as «success» or «failure» must be nuanced. Neither term gives the real image of the Greek-American lobby. The Greek-American lobby has experienced both successes and failures but what remains certain is that with more coordination and effective communication of its objectives, the lobby would be more successful.

Conclusion

To be effective, an ethnic lobby needs organization, technical efficiency, coordination, clear objectives and leadership. None of these characteristics has been fully present in the case of the Greek-American lobby. Its organization is weak; technical efficiency is too limited; coordination is not systematic; objectives are confused and the lack of leadership - with few exceptions - is more than evident for any careful observer. Some of the leaders of the Greek-American lobby may be successful in business but they usually lack the necessary intellectual capacities for lobbying. By the same token, intellectuals are either eliminated as «dangerous» because of their liberal ideas or they have voluntarily retired from public affairs because of disillusionment.

The inadequacy of the leadership of the Greek-American lobby may partially be the result of the dominant role of the Greek Orthodox Church and recently, the role of the Greek governments — especially in the case of SAE — which exercised influence over the choice of lobby leaders.

One way or another, these problems do not permit the Greek-American lobby to earn the full financial and political support of the Greek community.

On the other hand, the reverse influence phenomenon as Coufoudakis put it, the influence of the Greek-American lobby on the formulation and conduct of the foreign policy of Greece becomes more and more important.³⁰ The American administration is aware of the possibility to use the Greek-American lobby as a channel of pressure on the Greek government using subtle tactics and sophisticated methods. As a result of the Americanization, this triadic relationship is now an integral part of the lobby game and if Greece expects help from the Greek-American lobby, in return Greece will have to listen to its demands. Simply put, the Greek-American lobby will no longer identify automatically with Greece and Greek interests and objectives.

This is, therefore, a transition period for the Greek-American lobby. Greece and Cyprus have to analyse the present situation in terms of realistic considerations rather than in the usual sentimental fashion. The Greek-American community will continue to maintain ties to the 'homeland', but in the meantime a stronger loyalty toward the host country will appear in future generations.

ENDNOTES

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The Greek-American Voice: From an Ethnic to a Political Definition

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine l'évolution de la structure organisationnelle des communautés grecques aux États-Unis. Selon l'auteur, à partir des premières associations de nature 'ethno-culturelle et locale', jusqu'à la création de l'AHEPA et du soi-disant 'lobby' grec dans les années soixante-dix, il existe une continuité qui se conforme aux besoins changeants de la communauté grecque ainsi qu'à la manière du gouvernement américain d'intégrer et d'articuler les intérêts des groupes minoritaires dans le processus décisionnel. Enfin, l'auteur analyse les questions ainsi que les facteurs internes et externes qui ont contribué à l'évolution de l'AHIPAC et qui ont déterminé ses fonctions et ses limites.

ABSTRACT

This article examines the growth process of the ethnic-organizational structure of Greeks in America. It claims that from the first "local ethno-cultural associations" to the establishment of AHEPA and to the creation of the so called Greek lobby in the 1970's, there is a linear continuity conforming to the changing needs of the Greek community as well as the changing manner by which the United States incorporates and articulates the interests of its minorities in the decision making process. Finally, the issues investigated in some depth are the internal and external factors that contributed to the rise of the Greek lobby, defined its functions and determined its limits.

Introduction

Since the 1970s, we have witnessed a significant increase in the participation of American ethnic groups in a movement toward stronger articulation of their interests, especially in the area of American foreign policy. As early as 1975 Glazer and Moynihan stated emphatically:

The immigration process is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy. This process regulates the ethnic composition of the American electorate. American foreign policy responds to that composition. (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975: P. 23-24)

The above statement captures the trend rather than the reality of the issue at hand. The complexity of American foreign policy makes it impossible for a single factor - and especially the ethnic group factor - to be the determining one. Nevertheless the work of Glazer and Moynihan and other scholars on this issue, point two very important tendencies:

a) a growing commitment of American ethnic groups to formal organization and the pursuit of professional competence in influencing foreign policy; and

b) a renewed and intensive intellectual and popular concern regarding the activities of ethnic groups.

Numerous factors have contributed to the increased participation of ethnic groups in American foreign policy development. At a very general level, this growing participation can be viewed as a natural occurrence for an open, democratic and affluent society characterized by a high degree of ethnic diversity. Furthermore, the American political system is open to this type of activity. Its constitutional arrangements have created a suitable environment for the emergence of multiple political interests and groups representing those interests. The separation of powers which define the American political system have, in effect, created a decentralization of political power and provide numerous venues for civil society to exert political influence. The office of the president, the congress, even congressional committees can either initiate policies or can effectively block policies initiated by other political actors. In turn, interest groups are able to manipulate policy development through strategic lobbying at various political levels. For this reason, the US has been characterized as a weak state with a strong civil society. This is not, of course, the case in many countries. In Canada and many western European countries, for example, foreign policy development remains the almost exclusive domain of a handful of politicians and bureaucrats who are isolated from the demands of civil society. (Goldberg 1990: p. 9, Constantinides 1993: 108).

Similarly, the still unfolding conservative revolution has deeply affected the way America is governed since the early 1980's. The new prevailing political attitude which calls for a smaller and more efficient government has further eclipsed the traditional mechanisms of closed-door foreign policy development. Neo-conservatism has added a new dynamic to the decision-making process and to the formulation of government policy in general. New criteria for success have been established for all players. Success is measured in terms of achieving tangible results. For ethnic groups, this means the satisfaction of their particular and narrowly defined goals, while for political actors it means the satisfaction of different constituencies in return for electoral and financial support. All in all, this new attitude has made both groups more responsive and more dependent on each other. The neo-conservative art of governing has been the catalyst for the empowerment of special interest lobby groups, ethnic and others.¹

The Collective Greek Presence: an Evolutionary Journey

The official creation of the Greek Lobby in 1974 after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was not symptomatic of this tragic event; instead, it was the physiological culmination of a growth process. Three stages define the growth process of the ethnic-organizational structure of Greeks in America. What needs to be stressed at the outset is that continuity, rather than discontinuity, marks the parameters of its history.

First Stage: The Enigma of Arrival

The arrival of thousands of Greek immigrants in the United States after the 1880's saw the creation of the so-called "local ethno-cultural associations" or "ethnikotopikos syllogos". Their main purpose was to help immigrants from the same town or village establish regular contact among themselves for mutual benefit. At the same time, these associations by organizing various cultural events would keep alive memories and loyalty to the old country. This organizational structure was consistent with the whole logic of the immigration experience at the time. In the main, this period was characterized by a chain migration movement from the Greek country side to overseas destinations, mainly to the United States. Between 1880-1920, 370,000 Greeks immigrated to the United States (Tsoukalas, 1982:107). Immigration was a carefully thought out family project. Usually one of the oldest sons was chosen to emigrate for the purpose of helping the family to take care of its financial obligations (Tastsoglou and Stubos, 1992). This meant helping the family unit provide cash dowries to the daughters, while helping increase the family plot to be sufficient for the male members to earn a livelihood. Most frequently, the immigrant son would invite one or two of his brothers to join him so they could fulfill the family project more effectively. This chain migration would extend to other close relatives or, whenever possible, to other members of the same village or town. (Tsoukalas, 1982; Vergopoulos 1975)

Thus, at this point the "local ethno-cultural associations" functioned as a necessary organizational structure fulfilling basic needs of early Greek-Americans. The most basic need was the replication of self-help communal networks. This was vital for providing work opportunities to old and new immigrants. Conversely, while these associations served to promote group identification and a sense of security they also served to keep their members apart from the rest of society. This allowed for prejudices and discrimination and encouraged the further alienation of early Greek Americans from American society. These conditions seem to prevail until the early 1920s when the United States virtually closed its doors to Greek and other immigrants.

Second Stage: The Formation of a Collective Voice

The draconian Immigration Policy of 1923 had a serious impact on all ethnic groups in America and on patterns of immigration thereafter. Chain migration ceased to be an option, hence Greek immigrants, like all other ethnic groups, had to revise their initial plans and objectives. The realization gradually set in that immigration to the U.S. meant adopting the United States as a permanent home. The cultivation of ethnic differences was no longer tolerated. It was this simple and common-sensical realization that ushered in the second phase of Greek ethnic organization - an organization responding to the new conditions and the new needs of immigrants.

AHEPA was established in 1922 by a small group of Greek businessmen from Atlanta "for the purpose of assisting all immigrants of Greek descent to achieve American citizenship" (AHEPA: 1995). AHEPA's stated objectives can be summarized under three general goals: a) to advance and promote pure Americanism among Greeks, b) to educate Greeks in the matter of democracy and the government of the United States, c) to promote fraternity, sociability and the practice of benevolent aid among its members (AHEPA 1995). Epigrammatically, AHEPA was created as a reaction to the new conditions and as a consequence of the Greek communities' self-imposed estrangement. The emergence of xenophobia, the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and the rise of discrimination against immigrants from the Mediterranean basin, all of which contributed to the introduction of the new Immigration Act, served to solidify the fear of Greek immigrants and consequently their need for a protective shield. The AHEPA response was indeed ingenious. The Greek immigrant's defensive position had to be abandoned in the name of an offensive strategy; i.e., a drive toward assimilation which was consistent with the prevailing melting-pot attitudes. Over the next fifty years, AHEPA became a formidable organization that remained focused on its objectives AHEPA and thus managed to plant the seeds for the next stage of organization.

A wide variety of studies published in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrate that Greeks showed a strong identification with American society and a considerable degree of political efficacy, maintaining at the same time, in either a latent or manifest way, a strong attachment to their ethnic culture (see Scourby 1980 and 1984, Watanabe 1984, Humphrey and Lewis 1973). It was this simultaneous identification with American society and attachment to their ethnic culture that in the 1970's and after would become partly the epicentre or mobilizing force behind the group's political activism. The other part of this foundation was the impressive institutional structure of the Greek Orthodox Church which for decades had established a permanent community presence serving not only religious but also other broader, social and political needs of its parishioners. By 1974 this prerequisite had been accomplished. (Coufoudakis 1993: 53; Watanabe 1993: 33-34).

Third Stage: Precarious Actors on the Central Stage

The tragic events related to the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 affected the Greek American community profoundly. Reports of deaths, senseless brutalities, physical destruction and the enormous number of dislocated Greek-Cypriots provoked ethnic outrage among Greek-Americans and served as a catalyst for one of the longest demonstrations of ethnic mobilization witnessed in Washington (Watanabe, 1984: 87). Soon afterwards the Greek-American lobby apparatus, hence known as AHIPAC was created and was patterned after the highly successful

Jewish-American Lobby. ² It should be noted that AHIPAC is the only organization registered with the US Congress under the Lobbying Act. This demonstrates a degree of political sophistication on the part of the Greek-American community which was not witnessed in previous years and testifies to the evolutionary growth process of ethnic-organizational structures.³

The Lobby could be set up so speedily only because the Greek American communities were already organized on two levels: Firstly, they were organized on a parochial level through the Greek Orthodox Church. At the time, there were 502 parishes, organized into eight districts (Halley, 1985: 43-44). The second level of Greek community organization belonged to AHEPA with 40,000 members of good standing and 430 chapters nation-wide. AHEPA's headquarters were conveniently located in Washington and had established lines of communication with the political establishment (Moskos, 1989: 75-76). In addition, the efforts of other Greek American organizations such as The United Hellenic American Congress, the Pan-Cyprian Association of America, the American Hellenic Affairs Alliance and other smaller regional groups were also brought under the leadership of AHIPAC (Koufoudakis, 1991: 73).

AHIPAC, which in fact was the political arm of the American Hellenic Institute (AHI)⁴, stated its objectives as: a) coordinating the activities of other American-Hellenic organizations b) performing a valuable surveillance function regarding the activities of congress and the executive branch c) and mounting an effective and successful lobbying effort in Washington promoting the interests and concerns of Greek-Americans (AHIPAC: 1996).

AHIPAC's statement of intention was followed by swift action. Its professional staff in a very short period of time compiled valuable information on the personal, political and cultural background of all congressional members. It founded and started to publish a regular newsletter titled *Washington Report* which aimed to inform its membership and Washington's political community systematically. Most importantly, AHIPAC members testified formally before senate sub-committees on international relations and on various military and refugee issues of key interest to Greek Americans. In the next few years, AHIPAC representatives as well as leaders of the other prominent Greek organizations, either collectively or individually met on a regular basis with administration officials in Washington including the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.

It is incontrovertible that AHIPAC's beginning was a very successful one. Its coordinating role and lobbying activities were instrumental and decisive for the imposed US Arms Embargo on Turkey. As Watanabe has stated «the Greek lobby demonstrated diligent activism, unity, organization, overall competence and sustained commitment» (Watanabe, 1984: 153).

The Greek lobby demonstrated seemingly textbook precision. It also managed to present its case not in the form of the old chauvinistic ethnic mode but in terms of the US's own stated principles and self-interests. Its case was presented in broad legal and moral terms, stressing, for the most part, the principle of the 'Rule of Law'. As Brademas put it: "If we had not been able to put together a compelling case, in terms of law, policy and morality, we would not have been effective" (as found in Scourby, 1984:104).

Another equally important accomplishment of the Greek lobby was that it managed to articulate the political conjecture and environment of the time, thus gaining support not only from the Jewish caucus but also from the Black caucus, which was particularly annoyed by the Turkish government's stance on the poppy growing issue.⁵ The Turkish arms embargo struggle attracted the attention of other ethnic groups with anti-Turkish sentiments. In fact, many Armenian organizations actively supported the Greek American efforts (Watanabe, 1984:60). This too served to further legitimize the actions and demands of the Greek lobby.

In this respect, AHIPAC proved to be quite up to the task of coordinating the lobbying effort in Washington during the first two years of its existence. It managed to continue its own information gathering and dissemination network with grassroots support provided by AHEPA. By using AHEPA's network in the various Greek communities, AHIPAC was able to remain organizationally small, professional, highly coordinated, without isolating itself from its natural base of support. Its impact was more than felt on Capitol Hill. In itself, this was quite an accomplishment. Greek Americans, particularly after the second world war, have never really constituted an electoral threat, since their level of concentration has diminished progressively. Knowing this fact fully well, AHIPAC adopted a different strategy which focused on:

a) Increasing its visibility through consistent political hyperactivity at the centre of power, as Watanabe calls it (Watanabe, 1984:153)

b) Increasingly using the power of the purse by contributing to key congressional electoral campaigns, a self-evident mode of influence that needs no further comment, and

c) Articulating its claims through the fundamental principle of the Rule of Law. This successful articulation of the political conjuncture combined with an effective utilization of existing resources signaled the arrival of the Greek Lobby as a competent and efficient organization.

After 1977 the Greek-American Lobby entered a new phase. Its concerns and activities were widened to include not only the illegal Turkish occupation of Cyprus but also Turkey's expansionist moves in the Aegean Sea and Islands. Its political intervention, however, was limited to

"historical anniversaries" dealing with either the military aid to Turkey and Greece, allocated by the American administration once a year, or commemorating the anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus by raising such issues as human rights violations.

During the past few years, the Greek-American Lobby was revived in reaction to the Macedonian issue. It has concentrated its efforts on convincing the current administration to withhold recognition of the former Yugoslavian Republic until the dispute over the name, its symbols and constitution has been resolved. This particular campaign proved to be anything but successful. One case in point is Christopher Hitchen's article titled "Dead End: The Decline and Fall of the Greek Lobby in America" which provides a journalistic account of how little political clout the Greek lobby has had with Washington officials in recent years and how its activities and efforts are criticized both within the Greek community and throughout the US.

The failure of the Macedonian campaign reveals the broader and deeper problems faced by the Greek lobby. The lobby seems to have lost its effectiveness and consequently its organizational coherence. It is no longer a unified front. AHIPAC has lost its hegemonic position among various prominent Greek organizations. These associations are no longer structurally linked to each other. The degree of professionalism and efficiency exhibited in the past is no longer there. As Constantinides (1993: 120-23) put it "to be effective an ethnic lobby needs organization, technical efficiency, coordination and leadership". None of these characteristics seem to be evident anymore. This has also served to de-legitimize the actions of the Greek American lobby both in the eyes of the American press and Washington officials.

Another aspect of the broader obstacles faced by the Greek lobby stems from what Van Coufoudakis describes as 'reverse lobbying' (1991: 71). To date, the Greek lobby in the United States has attempted primarily to influence American foreign policy on issues pertaining to Greece. However, the lobby is not a political organ of Greece nor is it financed by the Greek state. In fact, it often finds itself in direct disagreement with Greek foreign policy pertaining to the US. AHIPAC has on several occasions lobbied Athens in an effort to strengthen relations between the United States and Greece particularly during the PASOK years. However, the lobby has enjoyed limited success in directly influencing Greek policy making. (Koufoudakis, 1991: 81). These efforts call attention to the inherent duality of ethnic group identification. The Greek American lobby faces the task of portraying its interests as both 'Greek' and 'American' depending on which administration they are lobbying in an effort to justify their existence. The struggle to find a balance within this triadic relationship has challenged the organizational unity of the lobby, limited its effectiveness and undermined its institutionalization.

The Present Dilemma: The Limits of the Possible

In the remaining part of this article, an effort will be made to explore the factors that have contributed to the decline of the Greek American lobby and its precarious future. In this regard two important questions need to be addressed:

- 1) What are the objective/exogenous factors that have limited and continue to limit the further institutional staying power and influence of the Greek Lobby?
- 2) What are the objective/endogenous factors that would potentially limit and restrict the future growth and effectiveness of the Greek Lobby?

Exogenous Factors

From its inception up to the present, The Greek lobby has had to deal with issues that, in terms of the American foreign policy agenda, tend to have a periodic character. The Cyprus problem, for example, captures the attention of American decision-makers only when Congress comes to debate its foreign aid packages. Therefore, this issue is condemned to brief meteoric appearances in the political skies of Washington. The sort of permanence that lends institutional staying power to the Greek Lobby is difficult to achieve. In contrast, issues concerning the Middle East have a chronic character that keeps them at the forefront of policy considerations and decisions. The reason is rather obvious: key American interests are at stake in the Middle East; hence, the actions of the Jewish lobby, for example, always seem contemporary, relevant and topical.

Furthermore, Greek issues are peripheral rather than core issues for American foreign policy. Issues of human rights violations, /military aid to Turkey, the recognition of the former Republic of Macedonia, do not keep American policy-makers or the American public on the edge of their seats. On the contrary, the Middle East situation inhabits the very center of American foreign policy. It relates to the vital geo-political interests of the only remaining empire. A peripheral issue can be pursued only for a limited time and with limited expectations of success depending on the broader scheme of things, and depending on the political conjuncture of the time. A core issue, on the other hand, can be pursued consistently, irrespective of other unfolding developments either on the foreign or domestic front.

Endogenous Factors

If we reflect on the whole history of the Greek-American Lobby, then we are tempted to classify it as an antagonistic rather than an advocacy group (Trice, 1976: 9). An advocacy group is one that has reached a stage at which its scope of political activities has exceeded mere protest and opposition and has moved into the realm of political action where its

contribution is essential for the conception, formulation and execution of decisions affecting foreign and domestic policy. The Jewish lobby has reached that level. The Greek lobby, on the other hand, still bears the signs of an antagonist group. Its actions seem to be antagonistic toward other political groups and players and, more importantly, its input does not seem to be ever-present during policy formulations; instead, its pressure is more noticeable at the stage of policy execution.

The distinction between advocacy and antagonistic groups can be reduced to the timing of a group's action. An advocacy group selects strategies, techniques and policy positions in a synchronic manner to the system it hopes to influence. In that sense it is pro-active. An antagonistic group times its actions as a reaction to the system it hopes to influence; hence it is reactive. The Greek lobby belongs to the latter category.

To use another distinction made by David Truman on the nature of lobby groups, they can be classified as falling under the democratic mold or the corporate type (Truman 1951: 129-55). Democratic lobby groups are characterized by the fact that their interaction is an institutional product. It is the result of a panoptic institutional vigilance. Information is gathered, digested, articulated at various levels within the organization. The end product is a consensual one, expressing the past, present and future goals of the organization. The Jewish lobby falls under this category. On the other hand, the Greek lobby can be classified as the corporate type. The implication here is that the group operates within an imposed agenda, while its articulation of policy positions, its actions and interventions depend almost exclusively on its leaders their status and influence. This structure inherently carries the danger of undermining the unity of the group.⁶

Reflection on the above history and analysis of the Greek lobby leads to the conclusion that it is incapable of intervening at the level of everyday politics and policy making. For the most part, the lobby seems to intervene either at historical anniversaries or when unfolding events seem to threaten ominously the interests of its constituency. Yet the central issue is not whether different strategies or a more efficient organizational or administrative structure could have guaranteed the continued survival and success of the Greek lobby. Objective conditions prevent the Greek lobby from becoming a permanent fixture of the American political arena. The Achilles heel here lies in the lack of institutional maturity; as a result, the future holds only the promise of limited success. The history of the Greek lobby demonstrates that it can be a meaningful and effective 'eye and voice' for its constituency only as an event-driven advocacy group.

ENDNOTES

1. I would like parenthetically to register the point that, if these contentions are correct, they seem to question the validity and currency of the melting-pot theory which has been widely used to explain various aspects of American culture and national identity. In a provocative manner, one can argue that the symbolic notion of the U.S. as a melting-pot - emphasizing ethnic group assimilation - is not a realistic representation of American society and cannot be used as a basis for understanding ethnic-group formation and representation in the United States. The melting-pot model claims that groups with diverse beliefs, behavior patterns and cultural traits become fused in a common culture. Thus, «interests» in general are defined in economic terms and not by ties of language, religion, tribe or national origin. The common culture model presupposes that foreign policy formation will place emphasis on «common national identification». Obviously, this model lacks capacity to explain the proliferation of ethnic groups and ethnic lobbies in the United States. For a similar argument see Watanabe 1984: 4
2. For a comprehensive analysis of the Jewish Lobby in America, its organizational structure and its effect on American Foreign Policy see Golberg, 1990; Tivnan 1987. For recent accounts of AHIPAC's activities see Elgindy 1995; Levy 1995.
3. Harry Psomiades (1994) describes the Second World War period as the time of the first Greek-American Lobby. He makes reference to a coalition of 120 Greek-American organizations which came together under the Greek War Relief Association with the support of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Coalition managed to raise substantial amounts of capital which were used to send relief supplies to Axis-occupied Greece. The association also used political influence with the American government to persuade Britain to lift its blockade and allow relief supplies to enter the country. Without disputing the historical importance of this coalition, I would argue that its activity, scope and objectives do not make it a political activist group with an identifiable structure, organization, technical efficiency and leadership that characterize a lobby group in the contemporary sense of the term.
4. AHI itself was formally established after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 as an exclusive trade association with little over 200 members. AHI's founder Eugene Telemachus Rossides very early established himself in the eyes of policy makers in Washington as the primary spokesman for the Greek lobby (Halley 1985: 42).
5. The Black caucus was persuaded that Turkey's unwillingness to suppress poppy-cultivation was anti-American in intent. The caucus was concerned about the effects of drugs on American youth. There are some that contend that the Greek lobby's propaganda cultivated this concern into anti-Turkish sentiment (Halley 1985:72).
6. Some examples of prominent personalities of the Greek American Lobby include: Nicholas Gage representing the Epirote Committee, Eugene Rossides founder of AHI and AHIPAC, Andrew Athens of the United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC) and the former Archbishop Iakovos as head of the Greek Orthodox Church in America. Clashes and disagreements between these powerful personalities and other leaders of the Greek-American community have in the past and continue to challenge the cohesion of the Greek American lobby and consequently its clout and effectiveness.

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The Activities of Hellenic-Canadian Secular Organizations in the Context of Canadian Multiculturalism

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RÉSUMÉ

Le présent article tente de mieux cerner le contexte politique et de démentir ainsi quelques unes des *approches critiques* du multiculturalisme. L'auteur examine la façon dont ces approches touchent les activités des organisations séculaires Helléno-Canadiennes (HCSO). Suite à un survol historique du multiculturalisme ainsi qu'un résumé des critiques de la politique multiculturelle, l'article présente des évaluations des critiques les plus fréquentes. L'article questionne la définition traditionnelle du multiculturalisme en tant qu'outil d'analyse de la société canadienne. Il situe les activités des HCSO au sein de la structure multiculturelle et argumente que leurs activités encouragent un multiculturalisme folklorique et non civique. En guise de conclusion, l'article propose une compréhension plus poussée et critique de la culture, de la politique dite ethnique et de la composition sociale des membres des HCSO afin de faciliter la "participation à part entière" des grecs ou des canadiens d'origine grecque au sein des institutions canadiennes.

ABSTRACT

This article attempts to debunk and contextualize politically some of the critical approaches to multiculturalism. It examines if and how they relate to the activities of Hellenic-Canadian Secular Organizations (HCSOs). It traces the historical development of multiculturalism and presents a brief summary and evaluations of several of its critiques. It challenges the conception of multiculturalism as a theoretical tool for the analysis of Canadian society. It situates the activities of HCSOs within the multicultural framework and argues that their activities promote folkloric, not civic multiculturalism. Finally, it proposes that a more critical and thorough understanding of culture, "ethnic" politics and the social composition of the membership of HCSOs is required for our "full participation" in Canadian institutions.

In recent years Canada's policy of multiculturalism has come under escalating attacks. Several academic, political and "popular" critiques have been directed not only at the official government policy, but on its ideology as well. To belated skeptics, it appears that multiculturalism creates more problems in Canadian society than it seeks to resolve. Multiculturalism has become, to put it mildly, a controversial issue.

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Supporters of the policy view it as a substantive, unifying policy that fosters diversity and thus has a positive, catalytic influence on our social climate. It is better than the American melting pot. Critics, on the other hand, argue that multiculturalism is an ineffective, divisive, regressive, merely symbolic, or even fraudulent policy (Fleras and Elliott, 1996:348).

In an attempt to 'contextualize politically' some of the critical approaches to multiculturalism, and examine if and how they relate to the activities of Hellenic-Canadian Secular Organizations (HCSOs) this article will:

- a) Define multiculturalism and trace its historical development;
- b) Present a brief summary and evaluation of several critiques of multiculturalism;
- c) Situate the activities of Hellenic-Canadian Secular Organizations within the multicultural framework.

1. Definition, Aims, and Dimensions of Multiculturalism

The definition of the term multiculturalism is as convoluted and chaotic as that of terms such as culture, race and ethnicity. Multiculturalism means different things to different people. This confusion necessitates a simplified start. The term, like most others, is historically specific; it has different meanings in different places and at different times. Here it is understood as an ideology, based on Canadian social reality, that gives rise to sets of economic, political and social practices, which in turn define boundaries and set limits to ethnic and 'racial' group relations in order to either maintain 'social order' or manage social change (Lioudakis and Satzewich, in Samuelson and Antony, 1998).

Four analytically distinct but interdependent dimensions of multiculturalism are discernible: a) it is a demographic reality; b) it is part of pluralist ideology; c) it is a set of government policies and accompanying programmes; d) it is a terrain of struggle among groups for access to economic and political resources (Fleras and Elliott, 1994:325).

A. Multiculturalism is a Canadian Demographic Reality.

The Canadian population comprises members from many cultural groups, often mistaken for or equated with ethnic groups.¹ Canadian society, of course, has never been culturally (or ethnically) homogeneous. It might have appeared or been presented as such because of the British and/or French dominance.² Until the introduction of the 1971 policy, Canada was *de facto* multicultural, but not *de jure*, because of the state's active promotion of cultural conformity to British and/or French dominant norms (Bolaria and Li, 1988, Li, 1988). Our multicultural demography, however, is not an exclusive characteristic of the Canadian state. Few, if any, countries of the world have ever been or are today culturally (or ethnically) homogeneous.

B. Multiculturalism is an Integral Part of Pluralist Ideology. Pluralism provides an ideological "point of entry" into Canadian society. It argues that there is not a single group with enough power that dominates others politically, economically or culturally. Power is dispersed among several groups, albeit unevenly. In its cultural interpretation, pluralism includes a definition of what Canada is, as well as normative descriptions about how Canadian society ought to be. Canada is seen as a peaceful society consisting of many cultural groups (not of competing social classes, gender or other groups). It advocates tolerance (not acceptance) and promotion of our cultural diversity. Most importantly, cultural diversity is believed to be an effective mechanism for achieving "peaceful coexistence" in culturally and/or ethnically heterogeneous societies. For Canada, cultural diversity is considered compatible with the goals of national unity and socio-economic progress (Fleras and Elliott, 1996:321, 326).

A constituent part of pluralist ideology, and a basic principle of multiculturalism, is cultural relativism. Contrary to ethnocentrism, it holds that we should not evaluate other cultures by standards of our own. Instead, we should recognize the right of individuals and groups to self-identification and promotion of their own culture, regardless of cultural distance. In other words, everyone should mind his/her own cultural business.

C. Multiculturalism is a Set of Government Policies and Accompanying Programmes.

It is a somewhat recent activity of the Canadian state and seeks to transform the ideology of multiculturalism into concrete forms of economic, political and social intervention and organization. Book IV of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1970), entitled *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups*, brought to the fore the arguments of some non-British, non-French groups. Several "other ethnic" lobbies (especially the Ukrainian and German) argued successfully that their languages and cultures had made valuable contributions to Canada.³ Their preservation and promotion, therefore, was consistent with national goals. Two years later, on October 8, 1971, then Liberal Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau officially announced in the House of Commons the introduction of the policy.

The pronounced aims of the multicultural policy were the following: The federal government would support all of Canada's cultures and seek to assist the development of those cultural groups that had demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, as well as a clear need for assistance;

2. The government would assist all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society;
3. The government would promote creative encounters and interchange among Canadian cultural groups in the interests of national unity;
4. The government would continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's two official languages, in order to become full participants in Canadian society (Hawkins, 1989:220).

According to Fleras and Elliott (1996:328-334), three stages of development are distinguishable: the folkloric (1971-1980), the institutional (1981-1990) and the civic (1990-present). Each stage of development has somewhat different aims and uses different corresponding means to achieve its stated goals. Each stage has, then, different associate meanings.

Folkloric multiculturalism's predilection for "song and dance" activities of cultural groups placed emphasis on "celebrating our differences", that is, on the idea that cultural diversity was in the heart of Canadian identity. The years of Anglo-conformity were behind us. God, King and the Empire could no longer be the cultural imperative of all Canadians. All cultures were seen as equal, all contributing to the Canadian mosaic. We had to move away from the "two founding nations" cultural model, and move towards a bilingual but multicultural vision that included "the third force" of non-British and non-French ethno-cultural groups. Culture had become an issue of personal choice; it should not be imposed by the state. Individuals were supposedly protected against any discrimination arising from their cultural "choices", and were strongly encouraged to cultivate and develop them. They were also expected to fully participate in all aspects of Canadian life (Fleras and Elliott, 1996:331).

During the 1980s, multiculturalism became institutionalized. In fact by 1988, the conservative government had passed the Multiculturalism Act, another Canadian original. This legal framework raised multiculturalism to the same plane as bilingualism. The Constitution (1982) and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985) were to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the notion of multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society. In addition, multiculturalism was increasingly cast in economic dimensions. The neo-conservative government legitimized the Multiculturalism Act (1988) not only on pluralist ideological grounds, but also in terms of its potential economic advantages. This market-driven approach understood multiculturalism as being very beneficial to our economy. In Richardson terms, Canada's plethora of cultures and languages would lead to increased international

trade and improve its comparative advantage *vis-à-vis* our supposedly unilingual and monocultural competition in the global economy. Shifts in the traditional sources of immigration to Canada from European to "Third World" countries hastened the resurgence of racist sentiments, supposedly stemming from "apparent drastic changes" of Canada's "character". Consequently, explicit concerns over "race" relations appeared in the policy content of multiculturalism. Emphasis was also put on racism and discrimination, not only on "cultural barriers". People's physiognomic characteristics were now added to the list of obstacles to full participation in Canadian society (Kobayashi, 1992).

In the 1990s, a third stage of policy development has arisen. Civic multiculturalism is characterized by "society-building". It is considered as a more serious attempt to foster a common sense of identity and belonging, in order to facilitate the inclusion and participation of all Canadians in national institutions. It is an endeavour to associate the aims of folkloric and institutional multiculturalism with citizenship (Fleras and Elliott, 1996: 334-335). It found a temporary institutional roof in the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, under Canadian Heritage. This phase, however, is also linked with a withdrawal from programmes associated with folkloric multiculturalism.

D. The fourth Dimension of Multiculturalism is Related to the Third.

As do most government policies do, multiculturalism demarcates a field of struggle. It is not located outside the bounds of conflictual forms of social and political action, but rather forms a contested terrain and a process of competition among various groups (e.g., political parties, cultural, ethnic) for access to and control of economic, political and ideological resources.

Overall multiculturalism can be considered as a product of this struggle. Its emergence was a response to political pressure exerted upon the federal government by the "third force". It was not granted; it was "earned". The policy, however, was based upon ulterior motives. The Liberals introduced it in order to capture the increasingly large non-British, non-French vote in Canada (Hawkins, 1989:218). It was also a strategy to diminish the weight of native claims for self-government by reducing native peoples to cultural groups, as well as to undermine some of French Canada's claims to equality in English Canada and/or Quebec's demands for political autonomy (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992). An additional example of struggle is the competition among "other ethnic groups" for self-identification and government funding for some of their activities.

2. Criticisms of Multiculturalism

Few government policy fields have received greater criticism than multiculturalism. Early analyses exposed the policy's intrinsic incapacity to "deliver the goods" and to resolve the issues it set out to address. In realistic terms, an average of \$30 million per annum is supposed to assist cultural groups in their quest for self-identification and development; promote cultural interchanges with other groups; establish and maintain official language(s) acquisition programmes; fight racism and discrimination, and remove vaguely-defined cultural barriers to social equality and to full participation in all aspects of Canadian life. But how far could \$30 million go? In the following paragraphs, five criticisms will be given and contextualized politically. Space considerations do not allow a more extensive presentation and evaluation.

A. Multiculturalism Helps Reproduce Stereotypes of Ethnic Groups.

Some commentators contend that multiculturalism leads inevitably to the hardening and intensification of ethnic and "racial" stereotypes (Bissoondath, 1994). "Caravans" and "folkfests" do not promote serious cultural exchanges; they are, instead, superficial expressions of devalued culture. They trivialize and commodify culture. Culture, thus, has become folklore. It is "a thing that can be displayed, performed, admired, bought, sold or forgotten" (Bissoondath, 1994:83). Multiculturalism places individuals into preconceived stereotypes. It accentuates what people are, not who they are. The outcome of multiculturalism is a country of cultural hybrids (Bissoondath, 1994:224). We are of so many colours, that we are essentially colourless (Bissoondath, 1994: 73).

There is no evidence to suggest that any serious cultural interchange does indeed take place among ethno-cultural groups. More importantly, Bissoondath's observations are accurate. Whatever exchanges do occur, they may be found in "Caravan" settings and are usually limited to ethnic food, costumes and dance. Superficial, folkloric exchanges cannot and will not solve the problems of racism and discrimination, nor will they achieve any of the proclaimed aims of the policy.

B. Multiculturalism Undermines Social Cohesion and Canadian Unity.

Cultural relativism, claims Bibby (1990), undermines Canadian values and social cohesion. By attempting to promote peaceful coexistence based on cultural relativism, we have in fact ended up promoting the breakdown of group life. Excessive individualism and cultural relativism have led to the construction of "mosaics within mosaics" (Bibby, 1990:7-8), so that we have no "team spirit", no social spirit. We confuse choice with the best, and we give everything an "A" (Bibby, 1990:98, 176). We have moved away from the collectivism that characterized Canadian life in the 1950s

and now lack a sense of community (Bibby, 1990:15). Truth, which transcends cultures and individuals, does not count anymore. It has been replaced by personal viewpoints (1990:2), masked under the rubric of cultural choices. Furthermore, multiculturalism is vague. It does not offer an ultimate vision of the kind of society it hopes to create (Bissoondath, 1994:42). It has a myopic view of the present that ignores the future (Bissoondath, 1994:44).

Certain federal political parties have presented more extreme versions of the above argument. The Reform Party of Canada, for example, has called for the abolition of the policy of multiculturalism and the Multicultural Department altogether. This Reform policy position is based on the premise that the state has no place in promoting cultural diversity; the latter is a matter of private choice. Instead, it is the obligation of the Federal government to, first, preserve and promote our "national" culture, and second, to encourage ethnic cultures to integrate into it (Reform Party of Canada, in Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992:373).

Affected by the relative electoral success of Reform, the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, while in power, passed in 1991 a number of similar resolutions that also called for the abandonment of the policy. The Federal government should, instead, "try to foster a common national identity for the people living together in harmony as equal citizens, loyal to the Canadian ideal" (Progressive-Conservative Party of Canada, in Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992:374, emphasis mine). The governing PCs were found in the awkward position of having to defend their own policy to their own members. Admitting indirectly that the PC party did not have a strong "ethnic" electoral base, Gerry Weiner, heritage minister at the time, attributed the party resolution to the under-representation of minorities in the body of PC delegates. Interestingly enough, no one mentioned the lack of "ethnic" representation in the body of delegates with respect to other resolutions they passed on the economy, international relations, human rights, education, etc. This is another example of the way political parties conceptualize ethnicity and multiculturalism. "Ethnics", in their eyes, do not or should not have opinions on matters that are not purely "ethnic". Multiculturalism is conceived in this light.

Most of the above critics share the same assumptions and vision for Canadian society. They imply that the policy of multiculturalism is somehow favouring the "third force" at the expense of the "founding nations", and that multiculturalism poses a threat to Canadian national unity. This is an assimilationist and politically regressive position, disguised as "Canadianism". Notice that supporters of these ideas are always silent or persistently vague in explicating what constitutes Canadian culture, Canadian identity, Canadian values, "our national

character", or the Canadian "ideal". It is unclear into what "other ethnic" subcultures or counter cultures are supposed to integrate. Note that most of the time they mean Anglo-tradition but they do not say it outright. It is not explicit in their analyses what constitutes "the truth", or "the best", who defines it, whose community it is, and whose interests it serves. As political economists keep reminding us, the North American Free Trade Agreement and our concomitant economic, political and cultural merger with the USA present far greater threats to Canadian unity and social cohesion than multiculturalism. Changes in "Canadian" culture are more attributable to American influence than to the arrival of new immigrants from the "Third World" or cultural relativism.

Furthermore, cultural pluralism does not mean cultural parity, nor does it necessarily lead to relativism. Multiculturalism does not encourage an "everything goes" mentality; it operates within limits. It "rejects any customs that violate Canadian laws, interfere with the rights of others, offend the moral sensibilities of most Canadians or disturb central institutions or core values" (Fleras and Elliott, 1994: 354). It is reasonable to suggest that all of the above represent dominant, not subordinate cultural norms and mores. It is not surprising, then, that certain cultural practices prevalent in other parts of the world, such as female genital mutilation, presumably part of the cultural heritage of some (culturally subordinate) Canadians, are illegal in Canada precisely because they violate the human rights of young women, and offend dominant notions of equality and human integrity.⁴

C. Multiculturalism Ghettoizes Ethnic Groups.

It is not surprising that the Liberal Party of Canada, which first implemented both a non-discriminatory immigration policy and the policy of multiculturalism, has kept a grip on most of the "ethnic" vote. What is surprising, however, is that even within its ranks, influential critiques of multiculturalism emerged in the early 1990s. Some Liberal Members of Parliament of "ethnic" backgrounds have argued that the policy of multiculturalism promotes the ghettoization of Canada's ethnic communities and treats hyphenated Canadians as second class citizens. Ethnic communities, it appears, are so busy preserving and promoting their own culture that they have no time, resources or incentives in participating in national institutions.

John Nunziata, then Liberal MP, was intensely vocal in opposing multiculturalism.⁵ He argued that it no longer served a constructive purpose in Canadian society. Citing the case of Japanese-Canadians who were interned and saw their property confiscated during WW II, Nunziata pointed out that the Department of Multiculturalism handled the complaints and not the Department of Justice. He considered that a justice issue treated as an ethnic one was a harmful consequence of the policy.

Subsequently, at the 1992 Liberal Party convention some of these criticisms were incorporated into the campaign platform. Delegates called for a single cultural policy and a single Department of Culture and Communications (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992:376). When the party resumed power in 1993, it moved quickly in this direction. There was a shift in favour of society-building, civic multiculturalism that promoted "citizenship", and the Ministry of Canadian Heritage was established. Multiculturalism was once more relegated to a branch of a larger federal department. This movement towards civic multiculturalism, however, has yet to bear fruit. Large segments of ethnic communities are still under-represented in Canadian political institutions and clustered in low-paying jobs (Li, 1988). Multiculturalism has not proved to be a social panacea.

D. Multiculturalism Undermines the Special Claims of Francophones and Native People.

Some critics have suggested that the policy of multiculturalism undermines the legitimacy of Quebec nationalism, by reducing the Quebec factor to an ethnic phenomenon (Bissonnath, 1994:40, 62). Quebec nationalists would prefer to do business with English Canada in the bilingual and bicultural setting. Being a "founding nation" makes Quebec distinct. Multiculturalism, the critics argue, separates culture and language. It rejects the "two founding nations" thesis and thus minoritizes Francophones. It is a strategy to "buy" allophone votes in Quebec, and the hostility of the Parti Québécois towards the federal policy must be understood in this light (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992:367-368).

Reacting to the federal policy, Quebec governments launched policies of "cultural convergence" (Parti Québécois) and of interculturalism (Bourassa's Liberals), which recognized the existence of cultural diversity within Quebec, but it did not reduce Quebec's "national" question to an ethnic phenomenon. It discouraged the persistence of ethnic enclaves and linguistic assimilation of immigrants to the English language (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992:368). As various language laws illustrate, however, Quebec policies also separate the culture of immigrants from their own languages. In this respect, they are no different from "assimilationist" Federal government policies.

Many native people and their representative organizations have expressed similar criticisms and have similar reservations about multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, they insist, reduces them to the status of "just another minority", undermining thus their self-government aspirations (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992:367). Their rights are special and unique, since they were the first residents of Canada; hence their preferred name, First Nations. They are not merely part of a pluralist society; they are distinct peoples. They favour negotiating their future within a framework that recognizes their special status instead of multiculturalism, which endangers their survival (Fleras and Elliott, 1996:343).

E. Multiculturalism Depoliticizes and Obscures Social Inequality.

Multiculturalism, with its early emphasis on "song and dance" activities, did little to challenge the British and/or French dominance in the political, economic and cultural realms (Roberts and Clifton, 1982; Lewycky, 1992). It created the impression of departure from the "two founding nations" interpretation of Canadian society without altering the fundamental bases of specific social inequalities, seemingly predicated upon our cultural and/or ethnic diversity (Bolaria and Li, 1988, Moodley, 1983).

Obviously the policy of multiculturalism understands culture and ethnicity as being synonymous. The nature of the activities and the representation of cultural groups are always described by ethnic adjectives. Of course this is a problematic postulation (Li, 1990:8-11). As mentioned earlier, even within ethnically homogeneous societies there always exist subordinate cultural norms, subcultures and countercultures. Multiculturalism homogenizes, ethnicizes and marginalizes certain populations. It is not surprising that the adjective "ethnic" is usually reserved for non-British, non-French groups. As Merhgi writes, "the tendency to perceive someone as 'ethnic' increases with how different that person is from the social, cultural and racial norms of dominant groups" (Merhgi, in Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992:377).

Multiculturalism not only understands culture(s) as being monolithic and unitary, but is also projects a mono-dimensional image of Canadian society that treats cultural groups as frozen-in-time "entities" or primordial "substances". Cultures, of course, cannot be abstracted from the social, economic and political contexts in which they develop (Harris, 1979:155, Satzewich, in Bolaria and Li, 1994:89). Barriers to full participation in national institutions, should then be attributable not only to ethno-cultural differences, but also to the nature of the Canadian class structure, processes of class formation, patriarchal ideologies and practices.

Multiculturalism is a state strategy for legitimizing the existing social order. By emphasizing linguistic and cultural barriers to social equality, the policy conceals other perhaps more fundamental sources of social inequalities based on people's property rights, position in the labour market, education, gender and age. Canadian society is definitely characterized by a clear ethnically and gender-based class hierarchy and struggle, which is not addressed by multiculturalism (Stasiulis, 1980:34). Shifting competition to the "cultural" realm diffuses the struggle against capitalism and patriarchy.

Using the terminology of political economy, multiculturalism is part of capitalist class hegemony. The state and the hegemonic block have not only the ability to impose their "world view" on subordinate groups, but,

also, the ability to articulate, project, and often impose on people different conceptions of social reality, in ways that neutralize their potential antagonisms (Stasiulis, 1980:34-37). Instead of portraying Canadian society as divided along antagonistic class and gender lines, multiculturalism paints a picture of society as a "community of communities" in which the only, or most important cleavages are cultural and/or linguistic. If we "learn to live with each other", everything will be fine.

Political economists have also argued that multiculturalism involves tactics of *co-optation*: the state, by funding specific activities of ethnic organizations or by appointing community leaders, regulates their actions and keeps them in line (Ng, 1988). What is then the nature of the activities of HCSOs, and how do they fit in the framework of multiculturalism? In the following pages we will explore these issues, keeping in mind the preceding critiques.

3. The Activities of HCSOs in the Context of Multiculturalism.

The final objective of this paper is to situate the activities of HCSOs within the framework of multiculturalism. This section examines which of their activities are consonant with the pronounced aims of multiculturalism and which are not. It explores the issue in light of the criticisms of multiculturalism presented above while attempting to explain why and how some of these activities a) limit the scope of both material and symbolic services provided to the members of HCSOs, and b) hinder the genuine understanding of some aspects of Hellenic culture that transcend prevalent folkloric interpretations.

Today, the Greek-Canadian community as a whole exhibits:

- high levels of institutional completeness (Chimbos, 1980, Gavaki, 1983);
- high rates of Greek language retention, urbanization, endogamy and residential segregation (Herberg, 1989: 52, 54-55, 108-109, 138);
- below average educational attainment and income levels, and a non-typical class structure (Li, 1988:76, 78, 82, 90, 92, 102, 110, 116).

Greek-Canadians are over-represented in the classes of workers, petty bourgeoisie and employers, but under-represented in the professional and managerial categories (Li, 1988:90, 92).

In terms of political organization, an examination of the structure of Greek community organizations immediately reveals similarities to Breton's federated model (1991). Despite the intra-ethnic organizational division into religious and secular components (Chimbos, 1980, 1986) and the segmentation of HCSOs, the latter exhibit patterns of inter-organizational cooperation and communication. Note that HCSOs refer to civic organizations of Greek-Canadians that are independent of the

Greek Orthodox Church of Canada (GOC). Their leadership is not appointed or approved by the GOC, but is democratically elected directly from their membership. They conduct their affairs according to their own by-laws, without adhering to the Uniform Parish Regulations of the GOC. Organizations of this kind are: a) local associations (LAs) such as the Cretans' Association of Toronto or the Association of Laconians in Toronto; b) broader, more inclusive community organizations (ICOs) like the Greek Community of Metropolitan Toronto, Inc., and that of Montreal, and c) umbrella organizations (UOs) such as the Pan-Macedonian Association of Ontario or the Hellenic-Canadian Congress of Canada (HCCC). Associations of professionals like doctors, lawyers or business-people are not included in my definition of HCSOs. The membership of LAs and ICOs consists of individuals, whereas UOs represent other, lower level organizations. Their organizational structure resembles a pyramid, with a large number of LAs on the bottom, and a smaller number of Province- and Canada-wide UOs on the top.

Unfortunately, with the notable exception of Chimbos (1980, 1986) and in french Constantinides (1983, 1993), few studies on HCSOs have been conducted. Needless to say that scientific research in this area remains almost non-existent. The analysis that follows is primarily based on the author's current research on the social composition of the leadership of HCSOs, and the nature of services they offer to their members. All of these organizations are political entities. They are "encapsulated political systems" embedded in the larger Canadian sociopolitical and economic conditions. They have both "external" and domestic affairs and provide material and symbolic services to their members (Breton, 1991:3). The domestic affairs of ethnic community organizations, such as HCSOs, ordinarily include the provision of material services (e.g., accommodating new immigrants and the elderly), as well as symbolic services such as activities that pertain to the maintenance and development of the group's (dominant) cultural norms and values. Examples of such activities are celebrations of historical events and heroes, language instruction, dances and theatrical performances, musical concerts, etc. The external affairs of ethnic community organizations relate to a) matters of government policies on immigration, multiculturalism, public education, human rights, the economy, etc., b) issues of discrimination and prejudice, c) relations with broader societal institutions (e.g., main-stream mass media, unions, the police), and d) relations with the country of origin and its representatives (Breton, 1991:3).

Historically, the provision of both material and symbolic services by HCSOs to their members predates both the policy and the ideology of multiculturalism in Canada. As Chimbos (1980, 1986) has shown, even

during the years of Anglo-conformity, HCSOs provided Greek language instruction, assisted new Greek immigrants to Canada, fought against prejudice and discrimination, struggled to maintain elements of Hellenic culture in Canada, and to transmit them to new generations. Multiculturalism then is not a prerequisite for community action in these areas. Many ethnic communities, including ours, in countries without an official policy of multiculturalism, e.g., Germany, France, South Africa, Argentina, are engaged in similar activities. The extent to which they are successful remains, of course, another (not-well-researched) matter.

The policy and ideology of multiculturalism, however, do offer a definitely better interpretation of Canadian society than that of the "two founding nations" and yields political opportunities for minorities (Kallen, 1995). As Abu-Laban and Stasiulis suggest (1992:381), it allows "for a more inclusionary definition or discourse about membership in the Canadian political community that grows in importance" now that Canada is becoming an even more diverse society. Multiculturalism provides additional ideological legitimacy for the provision of the services mentioned above. Indeed, it often compels various levels of government to assist financially ethnic community organizations like the HCSOs, as indicated by the funding for social programmes and international language instruction, reducing thus the community's need to rely exclusively on its own, often insufficient funds (Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992:283).

4. Two out of Four ain't Bad. But is it Enough?

Discerning students of multiculturalism question the relationship between the pronounced aims of the policy and the activities of ethno-cultural groups. In the case of HCSOs, one might ask if their activities are compatible with the aims of the policy. Let us say that HCSOs, for reasons of their own and not in the name of national unity, have been actively promoting only two of the four aims of the policy of multiculturalism, namely: a) the government's support for official language(s) acquisition programmes, and b) the maintenance and of Hellenic culture and identity. Furthermore, the manner in which HCSOs have been advancing the above policy objectives contradicts the objectives of the other two, namely a) overcoming "cultural" barriers to full participation in Canadian society, and b) promoting creative encounters and interchange among Canadian cultural groups in the interests of national unity.

During the years of extensive immigration from Greece to Canada (late 1950s-mid 1970s), numerous LAs and ICOs were indeed actively involved and assisting new immigrants in overcoming "cultural shock" and adapting to Canada's environment. Remember that UOs are a recent

phenomenon. The LAs and ICOs were providing English or French language instruction services, arranging employment or training opportunities, and struggling to maintain Hellenic identity and culture (Chimbos, 1986:212). Since the late 1970s-early 1980s, however, the flow of new immigrants from Greece has been steadily dwindling. Statistics Canada reports show that in the 1990s, the numbers have become negligible. In 1991-1992, 517 people from Greece immigrated to Canada, and in 1995-1996 only 287 (Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Matrix 2).

Of course, this reality is reflected in the nature and scope of the activities of HCSOs. Today, very few (if any) HCSOs participate in or offer official language acquisition programmes. The activities of HCSOs and most of the material and symbolic services they provide to their members are geared exclusively towards the maintenance of Hellenic culture and language and their transmission to new generations of Greek-Canadians. My contention is, however, that their efforts are not based upon some vaguely defined "urgency" to contribute to "Canada" or to "Canadian unity", as the policy of multiculturalism prescribes. The primary reasons for the mobilization of HCSOs are related to another "urgency", that of the seemingly unavoidable assimilation of new Greek-Canadians to "Canadian" culture, or fears thereof. These fears are based upon some apparent and some real dangers: the drastically shrinking numbers of new Greek immigrants, the rising rates of exogamy, the steady decline in the number of students attending Greek language programmes, and the alarmingly low participation and representation rates of second and third generation Greek-Canadians in the membership and leadership positions of HCSOs.

A. Type and Scope of the Activities of HCSOs.

There exists an organizational "division of labour" among HCSOs, although it is not always clearly defined who does what and why. One could argue that LAs are primarily involved in the maintenance of local and regional aspects of Hellenic culture, achieved through activities that emphasize the particularity and distinctiveness of the customs, traditions and history of a specific area of Greece. For example, the Cretans' Association of Toronto "Cnossos" is active in engaging and immersing Greek-Canadians of Cretan origin in traditional Cretan dances, costumes, customs, food and history. Its annual dances commemorate important regional historical events and holidays specific to Crete, e.g., the Arkadi Holocaust, the Battle of Crete, Venizelos's memorial, not "national" ones e.g., the 1821 Revolution, October 28, 1940. The Association does, however, participate in the respective commemorative activities of ICOs. It does not offer Greek language instruction, although it did for a short period in the late 1970s-early 1980s, or social services. This is the responsibility of ICOs.

ICOs usually cover broader areas of activities that transcend the particularities and distinctiveness of LAs. They offer both material and symbolic services of Greek national, not regional features. The primary objective of ICOs is the maintenance and promotion of Hellenic culture, language and identity, as well as the protection and promotion of the so-called "national interests" of their members, who come from all over Greece, but reside in a big Canadian urban centre. For example, the Greek Community of Metropolitan Toronto Inc., in its day-to-day operations, offers Greek language instruction, lessons of what it considers national (not regional) dances, Greek theatre lessons, social services (to all Greek-Canadians irrespective of regional origin), and religious services (for financial reasons).⁶ It honours and celebrates national Greek holidays by organizing parades, holding memorial services, or presenting lectures, and generally, it strives to construct what is frequently called "Greek national consciousness".

UOs have a somewhat different mission. Because their membership consists of other organizations (not of individuals), and their *raison d'être* is mainly the political representation of Greek-Canadians to various levels of Canadian and Greek governments, they are not actively involved, on a daily basis, in issues of Greek education, culture, identity maintenance, and the like. They are, of course, attentive to such issues. Their engagement, however, remains at the strategic or policy formation level, not at the actual implementation or service delivery level. The Hellenic-Canadian Congress of Canada (HCCC) represents all Greek-Canadians, from all regions of Greece, residing in all of Canada. It has, for example, a legitimate stake in the quality of Greek education in Canada, but does not have its own language schools. It is vigilant in promoting the interests of Greek-Canadian retirees, but does not offer social services. The HCCC ordinarily confronts issues that relate to relations between the Canadian and Greek states, and Greek national issues such as the problem of Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations, Canadian-Turkish relations, and the so-called Macedonian issue. But these activities exemplify only partially what Breton has termed the "external affairs" of ethnic communities (Breton, 1991:3). They are restricted to Greek "national" issues and are rarely concerned with wider Canadian society issues. As will be shown below, this is a problematic situation.

B. The Effects of the Activities and Services Provided by HCSOs.

A prefatory glance at the activities of HCSOs might indicate that they are not only typical of the activities of other ethnic communities, but also the correct course of action for achieving their goals. As they relate to the critiques of the policy and the ideology of multiculturalism, however, a more in-depth examination reveals that the folklorism which

characterizes our domestic affairs, coupled with the "ethnicization" of the external affairs of HCSOs, lead inevitably to the ghettoization of the Greek community that creates and reproduces social rather than "cultural" barriers to full participation in Canadian political and social institutions and/or processes.

In their efforts to maintain and promote Hellenic culture and identity, HCSOs make crucial omissions and errors in the way they understand and present Hellenic culture, both to their members and to members of Canadian society at large. HCSOs, in their quest for homogenizing a Greek-Canadian population of diverse regional, educational, class, gender, linguistic, residential and generational characteristics, expose and promote only a folkloric version of Hellenic culture. But as suggested earlier, culture is not synonymous with ethnicity, let alone folklore. Since every culture remains anchored in specific social, economic and political conditions, it varies according to time and place, the nature of the socialization of individuals, their class place, gender.⁷ HCSOs, however, are reproducing the devaluation of that which multiculturalism claims to protect and promote. Most of the activities of HCSOs that are supposedly promoting Hellenic culture have folkloric characteristics with a retrograde perspective; as a result, Hellenic culture is usually presented as primordial, monolithic and quaint.

To use Bissoondath's words, our dances and festivals are full of "superficial expressions of devalued culture". They are simplifying, (self) stereotyping,⁸ and thus 'essentializing' Hellenic culture. Although appealing to and fostering national pride, and having the homogenizing effects necessary for forging "national consciousness", such dances or festivals do not and cannot capture or represent appropriately modern aspects of Hellenic culture. Even in Greek language and heritage instruction schools, new generation Greek-Canadians learn and often internalize "half the story", so to speak. As Bissoondath (1994) poignantly remarks, not every Greek is a "jolly Zorba". Hellenic culture is not and should not be merely confined to wine, souvlaki and tsamiko dances. It also encompasses dialogue, debate, disagreement, modern as well as ancient Greek art, cinema, theatre, philosophy, literature and poetry. Unfortunately, the emphasis of HCSOs on folkloric activities reduces culture to a substance or "a thing" that can be displayed, performed, admired or detested, remembered or forgotten (Bissoondath, 1994:83); it does not perceive or celebrate it as a dynamic process that can be practiced, developed, experienced or lived.

A second observation pertains to the lack of institutionalized dialogue within our own community about who we are as Greek-Canadians, or who *we* should be. In the process of self-definition, *we*, unavoidably, often create a 'them' (non-Greek-Canadians) versus 'us' (Greek-Canadians)

attitude, hoping that this distinction will solidify our community and will avert its assimilation to the Canadian mainstream. No one seems to realize that the process of self-identification is inexorably relational: *who-we-are* is necessarily defined in relation to others, and to *what- or who-we-are-not*. A better understanding of other cultures promotes an improved understanding of our own. But no serious cultural exchanges with other cultural or ethnic groups in Canada take place. The activities of HCSOs do not promote a better understanding of our own culture in relation to others. They are not even conducive to a better understanding of cultural differences between different historical epochs, within Greece or in other countries where people of Hellenic descent reside.

Regarding the activities of ICOs and UOs, it can be argued that since they represent the vast majority of Greek-Canadians, the onus to manage responsibly the aforementioned "external affairs" of our community is placed squarely upon them. As a group, Greek-Canadians are relatively active in Canadian politics. We consistently show high levels of voter turnout and have moderate numbers of candidates for municipal, provincial and federal elections (associated mostly with the Liberal Party). Recently, Canadians sent three elected representatives of Hellenic descent to the House of Commons. Nonetheless, most of the actions of ICOs and UOs are concentrated in issues specific to so-called Greek-Canadian interests. Unfortunately, ICOs and UOs conceive these interests in purely "ethnic" terms. They are exclusively concerned with "national" problems particular to Greek-Canadians, not with all problems of Canadian society. Issues of the Canadian economy, social justice, the educational system, the on going constitutional debate, gender or native issues are not considered relevant to "ethnic" communities and their organizations. ICOs and UOs may protest against the Canadian government's selling of military airplanes or Candu reactors to Turkey, but not against government spending cuts to education, health care or other social services that affect large segments of the Greek-Canadian population. The latter are not considered Greek "ethnic" problems. No one suggests discarding or abandoning the former activities in favour of the latter. The point is that Greek lobby or interest groups should extend our actions to cover all issues of Canadian society. ICOs and UOs must move beyond the narrow confines of ethnic politics into the broader arena of Canadian politics, part of which they no doubt are.

In addition, ICOs and UOs do not cooperate on a regular basis with the political organizations of other ethnic communities in order to exert greater pressure to Canadian governments on all Canadian issues. With the exception of *ad hoc* alliances with, for example, Jewish- and Italian-Canadian organizations on Constitutional issues in the 1980s and 1990s, and recently with Serbian- and Armenian-Canadian groups on Canadian

foreign policy issues (all of which took place only at the élite leadership level), no grassroots consultation and cooperation takes place. Moreover, we have not learned from the experiences and activities of other ethnic community organizations, like the ones just mentioned. For instance, the Canadian Jewish Congress makes regular submissions to various levels of Canadian government and Royal Commissions of Inquiry on all Canadian issues, including cuts to unemployment insurance or health benefits, proposed changes in the application procedures for immigration to Canada, human rights violations, racism, economic policies, the educational system, and language laws.

A final point concerns the provision of various types of social services by ICOs. Historically, the leadership of HCSOs has tended to overlook the community need for social services and to focus instead upon cultural and educational activities (Stathopoulos, 1971, in Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992:281-282). The latter are "national consciousness-building" initiatives, whereas the former do not contribute to this process. But even in the provision of social services, HCSOs pay attention to issues of pensions, translation and interpretation, and ignore larger social issues of day care, re-training, community employment programmes, social assistance and the like, that concern larger segments of the Greek-Canadian population. Therefore, although curious, this phenomenon is not accidental. The leadership of HCSOs consists primarily of first-generation, well-educated male professionals or small employers. They are our "ethnic brokers". They are part of the so-called "minority circuit" (Amit-Talai, in Amit-Talai and Knowles, 1996:89-114), and often have their own agendas and interests, which do not always correspond with those of other segments of the community. More importantly for our analysis, their understanding of Canadian society, culture and "cultural" barriers, or ethnicity and the "ethnic interest", is consistent with the basic ideological tenets of folkloric multiculturalism. For the HCSOs leaders, it seems, civic multiculturalism begins with citizenship preparation classes and ends when funding is either cut or runs out.

5. Suggestions on What Is to Be Done.

If these are the problems facing HCSOs, what are the solutions? How could we maintain our culture and language and still fully participate in Canadian institutions? There is no simple answer to such difficult questions. The substantial financial and human resources required for the undertaking of such monumental task are not always available. What is available, often is not fully utilized. I believe, however, that a new, even if modest beginning is possible provided that HCSOs, in the immediate future, do the following:

a) Conceptualize and approach Greek-Canadians, not as a socially unitary or homogeneous group, but as one comprising people of different regional, educational, linguistic, class, gender and generational characteristics, often with different and even opposing needs and interests.

b) Having recognized this diversity, place emphasis on the immediate needs of second and third generation Greek-Canadians and recruit them in their membership and in leadership positions.

c) Transform their activities and fashion the material and symbolic services they provide to their members according to their specific generational, linguistic, educational, cultural, social and political needs.

d) Move away from folkloric multiculturalism incrementally, embrace the progressive elements of civic multiculturalism, expand their cultural activities to include fresh elements of Hellenic culture, and actively promote to the new generation Greek-Canadians and the Canadian public at large modern Greek art, literature and poetry, cinema, theatre, etc.

e) Focus on the social, economic and political barriers preventing large numbers of Greek-Canadians from fully participating in all aspects of Canadian life, and jettison the rhetoric and fib of so-called "cultural" barriers.

f) Seek cultural interchanges and the establishment of broader and long-lasting political alliances with other ethnic communities, and other non-ethnic groups and/or institutions with similar goals and interests.

g) Institutionalize political lobbying at the ICOs and UOs levels, not only on matters pertaining to "Greek-Canadian" issues but also on all conceivable economic, political, social and cultural matters relevant to the lives of all Canadian citizens.

Such small but imperative steps will bear fruits eventually. First, by re-aligning priorities and by focusing on youth, HCSOs can rejuvenate both their membership and leadership. They can no longer afford to be primarily concerned with first generation Greek-Canadians. Instead of setting up a second Hellenic Home for the Aged in Toronto, they could, for instance, invest in libraries, youth and cultural centres, or in better educational programmes and facilities that will bring second and third generation Canadians of Hellenic descent closer to HCSOs.

The promotion of more elements of modern Hellenic culture and the encouragement of local productions by HCSOs can facilitate the development and flourishing of Greek-Canadian culture that could be not simply "tolerated", but also understood and accepted into the Canadian mainstream. By building bridges to other ethnic communities and by forging political alliances with ethnic and non-ethnic political and social organizations, and/or institutions with similar concerns (as we do with the

United Way/Centraide on issues of social services), HCSOs will demonstrate a commitment to the progressive elements of civic multiculturalism, and will simultaneously invalidate and de-legitimate folkloric multiculturalism. Speaking out on all Canadian economic, political and social issues will attest to the HCSOs' engagement and commitment to full participation in the affairs of the country whose passport we carry. Then, perhaps, its governments might take our "ethnic" concerns a bit more seriously.

NOTES

1. The link between culture and ethnicity is, as Li (1990:9) puts it, "tenuous at best". Today there is no one to one correspondence between people, culture and nation. People of an apparent common origin do not necessarily share a uniform culture. Several subcultures and countercultures are always found within the same social formation.

2. There exists a serious language problem when using ethnic adjectives to describe whole populations. These adjectives have both a geographical and an ethnic connotation. For example, the terms English, French, Greek, etc. are often confusing when used without qualification or out of context. The words English, French, Greek, etc. may refer to people who come from the corresponding geographical areas, but may also refer to English, French and Greek ethnicity. Ethnic adjectives homogenize the population to which they refer. Not all English people, however, have the same culture. I, for example, when referring to the cultural dominance of the English and the French in Canada, recognize that there is not a single, homogeneous, monolithic or static English or French culture imposed upon weaker groups. Unless otherwise indicated, I use these terms to denote geographical origin as well as dominant, not subordinate cultural norms and practices. For instance, what was imposed on native groups in Canada was not the English or French working class counterculture of say collectivism and solidarity, but the dominant cultural views of the market, competition, private property, etc. Working class English and French people were not responsible for the colonization of Canada and the imposition of Anglo- and Franco-conformity (economic, political, cultural) on aboriginal people and other non-charter groups, although I do not deny that some of them might have benefited from it.

3. It is noteworthy that the Commission's mandate did not include an examination of the cultural contribution of native peoples.

4. See Statutes of Canada, Chapter 16, entitled "An Act to Amend the Criminal Code – child prostitution, child sex tourism, criminal harassment and female genital mutilation". This amendment received Royal Assent in April 1997 and came into force on May 26, 1997. The law links female genital mutilation to criminal harassment and regards it as a threat to the life, liberty and security of Canadian women.

5. John Nunziata ran and got elected to the House of Commons as an independent in 1993. Italian-Canadian members of his campaign staff vowed to "end the grip of Liberals on the Italian-Canadian vote".

6. This is a point of conflict and struggle between the HCSOs and the GOC. The Greek Community of Metropolitan Toronto Inc. owns and operates four Greek

Orthodox Churches, and employs the priests, who are, however, appointed by the GOC of Canada. The Greek Community pays a considerable sum of money (10% of gross receipts) to the GOC annually. Many community leaders have suggested that the Greek Community should "withdraw" from the provision of religious services, but the loss of such income sources would be devastating for the Greek Community.

7. Denis (in Li, 1990:174) cites Peter Archibald's argument that class differences in attitudes and behaviour vary more within ethnic groups than among them (1978:186-228). A similar proposition is applicable to gender group differences.

8. For a brief analysis of stereotypes see Driedger, 1996:267-271.

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Ethnicity and Identity: Language and Culture Among Greek-American Youths

Andrew G. Kourvetaris*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article étudie la question de l'éthnicité grecque selon les mesures traditionnelles de distinction et d'auto-identification. L'auteur teste différentes hypothèses véhiculées au passé et des théories sur l'éthnicité avec un échantillon restreint d'étudiants grecs-américains au sein de deux universités privées.

L'étude révèle, tout comme les études pre-existantes sur l'établissement des Grecs, que la transmission des valeurs et traditions "grecques" est particulièrement bien réussie parmi un groupe 'sélectif' d'étudiants grecs-américains. De plus, dans le cas présent, on voit que des générations successives d'origine grecque — en commençant avec la seconde génération de Grecs-Américains — se détachent progressivement de leurs liens linguistiques et d'une participation active au sein de la vie institutionnelle 'ethnique'. Et ceci, même si la majorité des étudiants sondés prétendent garder des liens très forts avec la famille, l'identité ethnique grecque, l'Orthodoxie, et le 'social hellénique', défini ici en opposition à la vie culturelle/sociale.

ABSTRACT

This article explores Greek ethnicity through traditional measures of self-identification and distinction. The author attempts to confirm various hypotheses of previous researchers and theories of ethnicity by studying a select group of Greek-American students at two private universities.

The below study reveals that the transmission of "Greek" values, customs, and traditions is largely successful among a select group of Greek-American university students. Yet, as in the extant literature, successive generations of Greek extraction increasingly detach themselves from Hellenic linguistic ties and from active participation in substantive institutional life. Despite their strong attachments to family, Greek ethnic identity, Greek Orthodoxy, and Greek social¹, as opposed to cultural/social, life.

Introduction

The immigrant Greek experience in the United States, like that of most European immigrant groups, has produced ongoing narratives of hardship and perseverance with resulting failure or success, particularly through the legacies adopted, revised, or rejected by the immigrants' children. A substantial literature documents the struggles and successes of first and second generation Greeks/Greek-Americans (Saloutos 1964,

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1973; Kourvetaris 1971, 1988; Psomiades and Scourby 1982; Scourby 1984; Moskos 1989). As a contribution to this body of knowledge, the following paper provides a qualitative study of a small group of Greek-American students, the majority of whom are second generation. More specifically, it focuses on the extent to which "Greek" values, customs, and traditions have been transmitted to twenty-five students at Northwestern (Evanston, Illinois) and Loyola (Chicago, Illinois—Lakeshore Campus) Universities in the following five substantive areas:

- (1) Language and Participation in Greek Cultural/ Social Groups and Events;
- (2) Education and Career Choice;
- (3) Dating, (Inter)marriage, and Family;
- (4) Ethnic identity (Choosing to be Greek?) and
- (5) Greek Orthodoxy.

Of course, these themes, or "measures," of ethnicity are not comprehensive, nor shall this paper be. Instead, the above measures represent a more general and traditional framework of constructs of Greek ethnicity.

Data were collected by questionnaire. Of the questionnaires disseminated, twenty-five were returned.³ The respondents' ages range from 17 to 24 years and the majority are undergraduates females.

Because this study involves a small group of students with a relatively affluent background, most of whom are members of Hellenic student associations and perhaps more ethnically conscious than other Greek American students in their respective private universities, this paper's limitations become self-evident. Of course, a more inter-ethnic, comparative analysis would have been ideal, so that "Greekness," if such a notion exists as distinguished from other characteristics or qualities and claimed to be an indelible part of one's ethnicity does indeed matter. Limited time and monetary resources prevented such a comparative perspectives. Nevertheless, although the findings are not more generalizable, the diverse attitudes and opinions expressed with respect to the conventional generational themes mentioned previously provide a wide range of valuable insight into these students' own lives and roles as Greek-Americans.

For Greek Americans or philhellenes, the importance of the Greek American identity and family goes without saying. For the non-Greek reader interested in issues of ethnic identity and assimilation, this study attempts to prove or disprove traditional variables of ethnicity, and, as such, can be considered an important, though limited, view of contemporary Greek ethnic identity.

According to Andrew Kopan (1989), one of the primary “missions” of the first generation, and indeed of the Greek American community at large, was to transmit their rich cultural heritage as intact as possible and to perpetuate the Greek language. Thus, for the first generation Greek immigrants in the United States, the Greek language was the very embodiment of cultural perpetuation. Over time, however, the Greek language began to be dissociated from Greek-American ethnicity. For example, of twenty-five respondents, twenty-three (92%) report that they can speak Greek. Seventeen of those twenty-three (73.9%) indicate that they can speak Greek fluently; six (26.1%) say they can speak fairly well and enough to carry on a conversation. However, of those twenty-three respondents who speak Greek, seventeen (not necessarily the same who speak Greek fluently) report that they speak both Greek and English with their immediate family at home; four (17.4%) say that they speak only Greek at home, while two (8.7%) say that they speak only English. Because of the fluidity of language, and the ever-changing nuances of meaning in words, when asked how they would reply if spoken to in Greek: Eleven Greek-speaking respondents (47.8%) would reply in a hybrid half-Greek, half-English language (or ‘Greenglish’ as many immigrant Greeks mockingly call it); two would reply only in English; and ten (43.5%) say that they would reply only in Greek. Interestingly, ‘Greenglish’ can be considered more a “first generation Greek-in-America dialect” than a second, third, or subsequent generation Greek-American development. Usually not able (or refusing) to speak more than a handful of words in English — perhaps because most of them did not attend American schools, lived exclusively in Greek immigrant neighborhoods, and/or had minimal contact with non-Greeks — many Greek immigrants ‘hellenized’ English words. For example, a savings bank became *banka* (which is really *trápeza* in Greek), grocery store became *grosaría* (which is really *magazí* in Greek, though this word refers more to a general products store than specifically to a food store), car became *caro* (which is really *aftokínito* or *amáksi*).

Most studies cite that while the majority of second generation Greek Americans speak Greek, with each successive generation the Greek language fades from knowledge (Saloutos 1964; Kourvetaris 1971; Scourby 1984: 90-97). Of course theories of acculturation and assimilation provide ample reasons for this phenomenon, which will be discussed later. However, a distinction must be made between knowing Greek and passing it on to successive generations. More specific this study, twenty-three respondents who reported being able to speak Greek, the vast majority were second-generation Greek-Americans. (The seventeen respondents who reported they were fluent were all second-generation.) All of this confirms the existing literature. Attending a Greek

school in the United States, from 1 year to 12 years, was reported by twenty-one of the respondents. Twenty-one respondents (not necessarily the same ones who attended Greek schools) report that they want their children to learn Greek, either by sending them to Greek school only (19%), or by sending them to Greek school and teaching them at home (81%). The most common reasons why the twenty-one respondents would want their children to learn Greek are: "Important to maintaining a national [Greek] identity is the maintenance of the nation's language."; "So that they can have an easier time conversing with family in Greece."; "It's the best way to teach the roots. Being bilingual in the US has its difficulties, but later on you become more enriched."; "It's an amazing thing to speak two languages. By doing so, the Greek tradition will carry on. It will help the children maintain their ethnic identity." Two respondents would not teach their children Greek, because as they both mention, they do not speak it. Clearly, the Greek language is considered by the majority to be an important dimension of their ethnicity. Closely related to language is participation in Greek/Greek American associations.

The majority of respondents report that they belong to Greek-American organizations which do not emphasize speaking Greek. The most prevalent organizations are YAL (Youth Adult League, a Greek Orthodox organization), OCF (Orthodox Christian Fellowship), GOYA (Greek Orthodox Youth of America), and, predictably, Northwestern and Loyola Universities' Greek student associations. As becomes immediately evident from the organizations listed above, the vast majority are religious. Greek Orthodoxy, however, will be addressed later.

Perhaps serving as an example of successful generational transfer of Greek cultural traditions, of the twenty-three respondents who belong to Greek American organizations, twenty of them (87%) report that their immediate family belonged to several *topika somateia* (regional associations and local clubs), such as AHEPA (American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association), the Pan-Arcadians, Mani Society, and the Maids of Athena. The obvious problem is that membership in an organization does not necessarily translate into active participation in that organization.

According to Charles Moskos: "For the grandchildren of the immigrants, and even more so, the great-grandchildren, Greek ethnicity is not so much a matter of cultural transmission, but one of voluntary participation in Greek-American institutional life" (Moskos 1980: 148). This is perhaps evident when the respondents were asked if they attended any Greek *cultural* events, defined as lectures, documentary films, museum exhibits, and the like. Using George Kourvetaris's metaphor, Greek *cultural* events could be considered the "Apollonian" or "intellectual" aspects of ethnic group participation, while Greek *social*

(read sociable) events, such as dances, music concerts, night clubs, and the like, could be considered the "Dionysian," or more superficial aspects of ethnic identity (Kourvetaris 1990). In the last year, sixteen of the twenty-five respondents (64%) report that they have not attended any Greek cultural event. By contrast, twenty-three respondents (92%) say that they have attended Greek social events in the past year, especially annual Valentine's and Greek regional dinner-dances, Greektown-located bars and night clubs, and Greek picnics, which are held by area Greek churches—usually on their parking lots—throughout the summer, and which are open to anyone interested Greek music and dancing, food, and the like. This confirms the basis given by Herbert Gans (1979) in his conception of symbolic ethnicity; i.e., overt expressions of what ethnics display as their own ethnic group's unique attributes. For example, gyros and souvlaki can serve as Greek ethnic symbols.

Despite this apparent disparity between the students' participation in sociable versus cultural events, it is too speculative to suggest that for the second and third generation Greek Americans, cultural transmission is less important than voluntary participation in Greek institutional life. As was evident above, the vast majority of respondents want to teach their children Greek, often mentioning as a reason that a certain degree of Greek culture and heritage is preserved through language. Of course, it cannot be assumed that the respondents who say they want to teach their children Greek, either in the home, by sending them to Greek school, or both, will actually do so. That is an option for their children and themselves as parents. In this future-oriented sense, a concerted effort to transmit the Greek language can be considered voluntary (see Waters 1990). Yet regardless of this voluntariness, let us keep in mind the obvious, that is, the ethnic family unit in the United States is not immune to the outside society. Beyond the language issue, then, no ethnic American seems 'safe' from losing some of his/her ethnic heritage.

Related to this loss is the reality that an ethnic American cannot be considered a total embodiment of any ethnicity. What the individual ethnic American learns about his or her ethnicity is only a partial body of knowledge of the collective narrative. In brief, a relatively homogeneous collective narrative alters shape, becomes adapted over time, within the personal narrative, due to constant interaction with an outside heterogeneous society. This last point will be seen in the section entitled "Ethnic Identity (Choosing to be Greek?)" The ethnic American's adaptability to the structural demands of the larger society may partially explain the progressive losses of one's ethnic heritage, which, some argue, is reinforced by the dominant educational institutions in the host country (Konstantellou 1990). Of course others assert that Greek community survival depends on education (Konstantellou 1990; Orfanos, Psomiades, and Spiridakis 1987).

Education and Career Choice

Eva Konstantellou (1990) believes that education is the "ideal mechanism that points to a way out from the either/or dilemma, namely assimilation or separatism" (p. 9). Her analysis involves tailoring curricula to meet the needs of ethnic or "multicultural" students. Criticizing the dominant culture's pressures for ethnic Americans to conform in American society and institutions, particular in the classroom, Konstantellou argues: the dominance of the majority culture rests on a sharp division between the realm of the private/primary relations (family relations, religious practices, cultural festivities) and the realm of the public/secondary relations (participation in educational, economic and political institutions). The private sphere is allowed to exist in so far as it does not interfere with the business-as-usual institutional world of Anglo-Saxon conformity...

If the dichotomy between the private world (where the majority culture exists) and the public world (dominated by the majority culture) is kept intact, then the individual is trapped between the Scylla and Charybdis, forced to give up one world for the sake of the other (1990: 9-10).

Yet if the values of the private world coincide with those of the public world, instead of a trap in which one is forced to give up one identity for another, perhaps choice is more central. Yet choices involve sacrifices. As Kourvetaris (1990) writes about the relationship between education and socioeconomic status: "Ethnicity is sacrificed at the altar of economic success" (p. 53). And economic success is highly correlated with education.

Education, as a category, is not intended to be a comprehensive measure of the respondents' education, either past or present. Since all respondents are Greek-American college students, the value of education is not a central issue. As mentioned in Mary Waters's *Ethnic Options* (1990), educational attainment—along with two other values, family and loyalty—is appropriated as a unique and defining characteristic of the white ethnic individuals she interviewed. As a defining characteristic, the value the respondents in this study and the respondents' parents (as told by the respondents) place on education is no exception. What is more salient, however, is that the respondents' motivation in receiving an education is not in education for its own sake, or in producing/ transmitting knowledge (only one of the twenty-five respondent said she is working towards a career as a professor of art history), but rather as a means toward financial security as professionals. When answering the question about what they consider the most important thing in receiving an education, most of the respondents mention their personal philosophies of education, interspersed with the practical applications and uses they see as inherent in education:

- "The most important thing [about receiving an education] is becoming more knowledgeable about the world around you, learning how to problem-solve, and above all discovering your own interests academically and how they can help you in the future. Getting a job is also a good thing.
- Being well rounded and getting a job that makes you happy.
- To apply the education throughout your life and use it to help people.
- Education is the foundation upon which a person's life is built. It is the foundation, therefore, of his/her family and the foundation of the loves of his/her children."

Despite the above variations in attitudes or personal philosophies on education, twenty-one of the twenty-five respondents (84%) mention that they will become lawyers or healthcare practitioners or technicians. This professional orientation can be partially explained by referring to the first-generation Greek immigrants who may have embraced, or brought with them, the dominant, economic ideology of entrepreneurship (Kourvetaris 1989: 111) and transmitted it to their children. Let us remember here that the majority of respondents' parents are first-generation immigrants in the United States. In other words, the motivation, regardless of successive generations, may become to earning money, but to do so with increasingly higher socioeconomic status. Other partial explanations of why these respondents are overwhelmingly oriented toward a profession could be because of (a) the larger, American, and individual family values placed on students to become professionals (which is usually associated with higher income brackets) and (b) the type of student private universities such as Northwestern and Loyola attract or produce.

Employing Edna Bonacich's 'middleman minority theory,' Kourvetaris relates: "Both early and late Greek immigrants engaged in middleman economic enterprises as restaurateurs, grocers, confectioners... The second generation did not, as a rule, follow the middleman minority enterprises. It entered white-collar professional and semi-professional, and managerial-type occupations" (Kourvetaris 1989: 109). Of course, although all the respondents are college students and not in the labor market yet, their occupational choices could all be considered white-collar.

The respondents' parents' educational attainment or occupations do not seem to match the aspirations of their children, except for the few respondents whose parents are physicians or professors. Here, the reader must keep in mind the early and later Greek immigrants' overwhelming disadvantages when they arrived in the United States, in terms of language, education, and personal, accumulated financial assets, compared to those immigrants' offspring who were born in the United States.

A total of eight of the twenty-five respondents mothers (32%) graduated from college (three of whom have post graduate degrees). By comparison, twelve of the respondents' fathers (48%) graduated from college (nine of whom have post graduate degrees). The clear majority of the respondents' parents have either a high school or elementary school education, which is quite high compared to the American population in general. The majority of the respondents' parents are immigrants, and, not surprisingly perhaps as all parents, they want to see their own children succeed. They thereby project their own unfulfilled aspirations onto them. In addition to educational attainment, the individual's choice of career paths also indicates this vicarious pressure. Though a clear majority of respondents hope to become professionals, the stereotype that 'all Greeks own restaurants' persists.

Leonard Dinnerstein and David M. Reimers (1988) write that most "Americans still connect the Greeks with restaurants, and for good reason. Almost every major American city boasts fine Greek eating establishments, a tradition that goes back more than half a century" (p. 50). To explore whether the respondents can boast of this legacy, eight report that their fathers are either restaurateurs or own stores in the food industry (two of the respondents' fathers are retired restaurant owners). Seven respondents report that their mothers are homemakers while the remaining eighteen respondents report that their mothers work either alongside their spouses or in professions as diverse as education, architecture, middle management, or real estate. Though a fair number of the respondents' parents have been at one time employed in the food industry, the association between restaurants and Greek owners for respondents and their parents cannot be conclusively shown. More noteworthy is the fact that the respondents whose parents did work in the food industry emphasized ownership..

Having explored employment and education as two "measures of success," let us turn to views on dating and eventually marriage, which can be viewed as other forms of success.

Dating, (Inter)Marriage and Family

Strikingly similar in their orientation toward becoming professionals, the students also show marked similarities in their attitudes toward dating and marrying Greeks/Greek-Americans. Yet many authors on the Greek American experience point to the Greek-American's tendency to *inter*-marry rather than *intra*marry, for intermarriage is considered by the assimilationist school as one of the structural forces that contributes to the dissolution of ethnic identity (Saloutos 1973; Psomiades 1982: 81-82; Moskos 1989: 93-94; Kourvetaris 1990: 59-61). Waters (1990) echoes other assimilationist writers when she observes that for white ethnic

Americans, "the longer a group has been in the United States and the greater percentage of its members in later generations, the lower the in-marriage ratios" (p. 104). Though all the students were single, data on their dating behavior and preferences, as well as their views on marriage, provide insight into their upholding of "Greek" values and traditions.

Twelve of the twenty-five respondents (48%) indicate that it is not important that they limit their dating to Greeks or Greek-Americans only. Two of these twelve add that it is not important, *until they get serious*. When asked whether they prefer to marry Greeks/Greek-Americans, six of the twelve respondents (or eighteen of all twenty-five respondents, i.e., 72%) mention that they prefer to marry someone from the same ethnic background; four of the twelve show no preference in their marriage partners—either a Greek/Greek American or a non-Greek would do; and two respondents prefer to marry non-Greeks only. Some reasons given to explain why dating though not necessarily marrying a Greek/Greek American is not that important include the following:

—"I'm open to anyone—If I'm attracted to a person and they're Greek—may be a bonus [sic]; if not, I'm not devastated.

—At the time being, it's not so important but it is something I am looking toward in the future.

—I've never dated a Greek man. This is not to say that I never will, but all the guys I've gone out with have been American.

—It is important to date a Greek American for marriage purposes. But I do date non-Greeks if not for marriage, but just for companionship. [sic]"

By comparison, the other thirteen respondents indicate that it is either somewhat important or very important that they date only Greeks/Greek-Americans. Quite predictably, all except one (who shows no preference) of these thirteen respondents prefer to marry Greeks/ Greek-Americans. Some of their explanations seem to make implicit or explicit reference to marriage; as seen in the following:

—"I was raised to respect three things. Straight out of my father's mouth these, three things, in no particular order, are: *thrisikia*, [religion] *patrida* [homeland] and *oikogenia* [family] The first and third I would have if I dated (and maybe eventually married) a Russian or Serbian Orthodox woman. But it is the «patrida» that only a Greek woman would be able to support.

—It's important because of the sharing of culture, language, religion which can make future decisions, especially regarding children, a lot easier. Yet I don't think it's absolutely necessary.

—Now, [it's] very important because I don't want to be too attached to a non-Greek and then break up with her.

—Very important. The culture has been such a part of my life that I can't see being with anyone else."

Unlike the respondents who believe that it is not that important to date a Greek American, an overwhelming majority report that to their parents, dating and marrying Greek-Americans is very important. Only two of the twenty-five respondents (8%) believe that their parents show no preference. The more typical reasons for respondents' parents to want them to date and eventually marry a Greek/Greek-American include:

— "It is important to them to not lose my culture and heritage. Also makes dealing with in-laws, etc. a lot easier because [they] can relate to them. They're Greek and they want their grandchildren to be Greek.

— It's easier (especially if I'm going to have children). I want my children to have a *definite* identity.

— They don't speak English very well, and want grandchildren to have the same ethnicity and *religion*!

— For the same reasons I want to marry Greek—shared culture, being able to raise children with a heritage to be proud of, religious reasons. There is also an intangible factor involved that non-Greeks would lack."

Aside from the apparent consensus expressed by the respondents' "speaking" for their parents, and the fact that the parents' views on marriage are considered by the respondents at all when considering their own marriage partners, only one respondent shows a lack of consensus between mother and father regarding dating and marrying a Greek/Greek-American:

— "My father (would prefer that I marry Greek)—to a certain extent. [sic] My mother would probably like me to marry an American. Either way my father's family is full of mixed European marriages. As long as I'm happy they won't mind."

This response is similar to the two respondents mentioned above who reported that their parents would not necessarily prefer that they marry a Greek/Greek American:

"They want me to marry whomever I would be happy with, not who my *Yiayia* [Gramma] wants me to marry (she was very against my Mom marrying my Dad).

— "They don't care what ethnicity he is as long as I'm happy."

It is clear, then, that for both respondents and the respondents' parents, marrying—though not necessarily dating someone—within the same ethnic group is preferred, because of either cultural, linguistic, or religious similarities. In addition, it is apparent that the majority of the respondents' parents have explicitly told them not to date individuals from certain ethnic groups. As Waters relates:

Religion was far more important to the parents of all of my respondents, although there were still some who reported that it made no difference. Race was universally an issue, and marriage across racial barriers was not the subject of subtle clues or indirect messages. Most

parents made it very clear to their children that they were not to marry a non-white (1990: 105).

The respondents' parents are no exception.

Sixteen of the twenty-five respondents (64%) reported that their parents have told them not to date individuals from certain ethnic groups (two of these respondents added that it was understood and not explicitly said to them). Corroborating Waters's observation above, in my study thirteen of the sixteen respondents (81.3%) were told either directly or indirectly not to date African-Americans, as well as Asians, Hispanics, or Jews. The other three respondents say that their parents told them not to date anyone who is non-Greek/Greek-American.

The other nine of the twenty-five respondents (36%) indicate that they have not been told directly by their parents not to date individuals from certain ethnic groups (though one respondent added: "They haven't directly spoken the words 'do not date a . . . ' but marrying someone Black, Hispanic, or Asian, or Arabic is indirectly known to be something I won't do."). Moreover, the explicit or implicit prejudices expressed above by the respondents' parents seem to be made regardless of their educational attainment. In fact, five of the sixteen respondents' fathers who were reported as telling the respondents not to date individuals from certain ethnic groups have post graduate degrees; one respondent's father and three of the respondents' mothers have college degrees; two respondents' fathers and two respondents' mothers have some college experience; four of the fathers and eight of the mothers are high school graduates; and four fathers as well as three mothers attended elementary school.

By comparison, four of the nine respondents' fathers, and three of the nine respondents' mothers, who were reported as not telling the respondents to avoid individuals from certain ethnic groups, have post graduate degrees; two respondents' fathers and two of the respondents' mothers completed college; four of the respondents' mothers attended college; and three of the nine respondents' fathers attended elementary school. Of course, the assumption is that with increasing education, racism wanes. Also, a confounding factor can be that only one parent may express disapproval to their children associating with individuals from specific ethnic groups, while the other parent may not. Nevertheless, among these respondents' parents, race is definitely an issue when it comes to dating and marriage.

A further measure of generational transmission (though not a "Greek value" *per se*) with respect to family is whether the respondents wish to have the same number of children as their parents. This is clearly not the case for my respondents. Eleven of the twenty-five respondents (44%) have one sibling. Of these eleven, the majority report wanting three or four children. Five of the twenty-five respondents (20%) have two

siblings. Of these five, one respondent wants four children, two want three children, one wants two children, and the final respondent who has two siblings does not want children. Regarding the four of the twenty-five respondents (16%) with three siblings, one plans to have five children, one wants four, one wants three children, and one does not want children. One of the twenty-five (4%) respondents has four other siblings, and wants three children. Finally, four of twenty-five respondents (16%) are only children. Three of the four respondents who are only children want two kids while the other respondent does not want to have children. Thus, contrary to the national average of a four-member family, respondents seem to prefer to have a medium-sized family, i.e., three or more children. Related to the preferences in wanting (or not wanting) children are preferences in wanting those children to be boys rather than girls or vice versa.

Twenty-one of the twenty-five respondents (84%) express no preference of having their children be girls rather than boys. Two of the twenty-five respondents (8%) want their children to be male only. (The remaining two of the twenty-five respondents do not want children, and thus left the question blank.) In sum, the majority of my respondents show no favoritism toward having boys rather than girls or vice versa. Thus, the traditional notion that boys are favored in the first generation Greek family does not seem to have been transmitted to the respondents. However, attitudes toward their ethnic identities in the larger society has. We will now turn our attention to this.

Ethnic Identity (Choosing to be Greek?)

By ethnic identity, I am referring to a broad construct more or less composed of unified, though fluid, secular and religious narratives (see Cornell 1994; Gans 1979). According to Cornell (1994), in general an "ethnic identity, first of all, is a label. [...] The label is a referent, a symbol, in effect a condensation of a body of knowledge, facts, fictional accounts, assumptions, attitudes that describe what it means to be that particular person" (p. 5). According to Kourvetaris, what comprises Greek ethnic identity for the first generation seems to involve a convergence of some notion of Greekness (as measured by language, traditions, etc.) with Orthodox Christianity; the second generation Greek American identity involves the convergence of some notion of Greekness with Greek Orthodoxy, in addition to some notion of "Americanness"; finally, the third and subsequent generations of Greek Americans lose their "Greekness" and adopt Greek Orthodoxy and "Americanness" as their identity (Kourvetaris 1990: 3-4). By extension, Kourvetaris seems to suggest that this "domino effect" will inevitably lead to a completely "Americanized" Greek American.

Drawing on personal experience as a second generation Greek-American, as well as from discussions with other Greek-Americans, many first generation Greeks in America complain about the second, third, and subsequent generations' "Americanization," they seem to fail (or refuse) to understand that those successive generations are completely immersed, whether by choice or chance, in American social institutions. The ramifications of this situation are, of course, one of the central arguments in theories of acculturation, which refers to the eventual blending by immigrants and their descendants of the cultural behavior, such as language, customs, norms, of the new society; and assimilation, which implies the ingress of the ethnics into the social fabric, such as the business life, civic life, and eventually, the very families, of the host society (Gordon 1964: 60-83 cited in Moskos 1989: 147).

Along assimilationist and acculturationist lines, some authors also point to the endurance, even if reconstituted, of distinct ethnic subcultures in the United States (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Novak 1971). More specific to Greek-Americans, Kourvetaris explains that the second generation Greek American emerges as a product of both a Greek subculture and an American culture and society; in other words, "a sociocultural hybrid with a dual identity" (Kourvetaris 1988: 170). By contrast, Kourvetaris asserts that the immigrant family was socially and culturally "insulated in the Greek colony and did not seriously feel the pressures of American society" (p. 171). This does not imply that Greek "old-country values" are any less important to these respondents; such values are perhaps subject to dilution in the United States. However, such dilution may not necessarily be an inevitable factor of assimilation/-acculturation, but perhaps, though rarely mentioned in the literature, a resignation by first, second, and subsequent generation Greek Americans that Greek ethnicity in the United States is doomed. However, the students in this survey do not find this to be the case for them, at least in terms of the importance of Greek ethnicity in their lives.

All the respondents believe that having a Greek ethnic identity is important. In addition, all twenty-five respondents report that their being Greek is important to their parents. Typical responses of why being Greek is important to the students follow below:

—"It is important to be able to identify with a culture to give yourself a sort of self-concept and identity.

—Because I have a rich background that is a big part of my identity. Also all my family is Greek. A lot of what we do, eat, say, etc. is because we are Greek.

—Coming from such a rich tradition is simply beautiful. I have two of the best—Greek and American. I always felt that being Greek gave me something more than those around me—I was twice them!

—It is my country, my people. We have a language, a culture, a history, an identity in common that no one else has.

—I think the cultural strings and the strong traditions are very strong in the Greek community and I like being a part of it.”

When asked if their being Greek is important to their parents, the respondents gave similar responses but with more comparatives and superlatives in their explanations.

—“For much of the same reasons... but for my parents it’s a much much bigger part of their identity.

—My mom is involved in the Greek community... My dad is not involved in the Greek community, but I still think it’s somewhat important to him, mainly due to family loyalty.

—They’re also very proud of my, our heritage.

—For the same reasons it is important to me—and more. They can truly be attached to a motherland.

—Because they want me to pass on the culture to my children and in so doing propagate the Greek identity as much as possible.”

Analytically, the majority of these respondents’ perceptions of their being Greek seems to involve a conscious choice, which—in light of Waters’s and Gans’s concepts of voluntary ethnicity and symbolic ethnicity, respectively—involves a deliberate effort at internalizing and subsequently exhibiting (or expressing) their ideas of Greekness. However, it is interesting to note that despite the respondents’ consensus on the importance of being Greek, ten of the twenty-five respondents (40%) indicate that their parents have pressured them at some point in their lives to be Greek. The other fifteen respondents (60%) report that they have never felt such pressure by their parents. Although a majority of my respondents do not feel that their parents pressure them to be Greek, twenty-one respondents (84%) say that they have felt different from their non-Greek friends because they are ethnically Greek. The other four respondents (16%) do not feel any different from their non-Greek friends. A wide range of explanations, however stark or subtle, surfaces from the respondents who have felt differently than their friends because of their Greek ethnic identity:

—“Obviously, there are recognizable differences between the different nationalities of those whom I associate [with]. Being Greek is something special.

—I wasn’t allowed to do the things they could do. Things like sleeping over, going to the movies or football games, dating or even talking to or about boys.

—The last name does it. Growing up in a small town where there was

little diversity and names were short and Anglo-Saxonic,[sic] it was tough. Teachers butchered my name and so did kids.

—This is not a bad thing. I felt different, but *better*. I had “one-up” on my friends because I was Greek and had the culture to go along with it. I truly believe that individuals that do not have a strong sense of ethnic culture may envy the Greek culture.

—Because of Easter, Good Friday, fasting—Basically religious differences.

—Parents with accents, strange food, overprotective, stubborn parents.

—I know how to act and adjust to other groups because in grade school, I was the only Greek in my school so I had to make friends and learn the “American way.”

Nineteen of the twenty-five respondents (76%) have not felt that they have had to choose between identifying themselves solely as a Greek or solely as an American. As one of these nineteen says: “When in the US, I’m Greek American and when in Greece, I’m American Greek.”

Another relates: “My background has allowed me to fit into each culture equally well; however, if I had to choose, I would choose to be solely Greek.” Another respondent replies similarly but with different national loyalties: “I can be one or the other depending on the situation and people (but I prefer to be an American first because I was born/raised in this country).” Further yet, another respondent states: “If an American couple was to have a child in China, would that child be considered Chinese or American? I think that most would say ‘American.’ In the same way, my parents came to the US from Greece. Should I be considered Greek or American? I don’t care what others consider me, though. I think of myself as a Greek born with American citizenship due to my being born here.” Two more respondents who say that they have had to choose between identifying solely as Greek or solely as American respond in similar ways to the above respondents, except that choosing to be Greek or American, whether visiting Greece or living in the United States, represents to them a conflict of identities. As one respondent puts it: “When I’m in the US —I have to choose being Greek or American and the same conflict arises in Greece.” Finally, three of the twenty-five respondents (12%) felt that they have had to identify solely as a Greek primarily for the same reasons, namely “Because I don’t consider myself ‘American.’ I consider myself ‘Greek’ and I defend that.”

In sum, the majority feel different (primarily in cultural or nationalistic senses) from their non-Greek friends, but have not allowed these differences to alienate them or force them to choose between identifying solely as an American or solely as a Greek. This would seem to suggest

that Greek cultural transmission is evident but not overbearing in the case of these students. Perhaps the Greek identities of the majority of the respondents do not 'cost' them anything in American society, and in this sense only can be expressed as symbolic (Gans 1979). Yet six of the twenty-five respondents (24%) report that they have felt some form of personal discrimination and/or hostility aimed against them, because they are ethnically Greek (The remaining nineteen respondents (76%) felt no personal discrimination or hostility aimed against them.).

Three of the six respondents who felt some personal discrimination say that it occurred (or occurs) in school; one says that the last time occurred at work; one felt discriminated against by other Greeks; and one reported that when talking politics, hostility occurred as reported below:

—“Some kid in high school called me a “stupid Greek” and I kicked his ass.

—During high school, some people treated me different [sic] because I wasn't “blond-haired” or “blue-eyed.”

—Long ago, even in college —when kids and teachers butchered by name. I guess I have truly gotten used to it to the point where I pronounce my name outloud when I hear the teacher say my first name.

—A woman put Greeks that work in kitchens down because they are illiterate while I was waitressing.

—I do not hide that I'm Greek American and am very up-front about it. As such, I've had my loyalties questioned and have been attacked for my views. On one occasion on an issue completely irrelevant to my ethnicity, I was told to get the f _ _out of the US and go back to Greece, where my true loyalties supposedly are.”

Actually, I feel it often from Greeks, who prefer not to follow the -culture. They criticize me for being close-minded.

Despite the above localized examples of discrimination and/or hostility experienced by six of the twenty-five respondents, when asked if they think being ethnically Greek helps or hinders their goals in the United States, thirteen of the twenty-five respondents (52%) say that being ethnically Greek helps their goals, two (8%) report that it both helps and hinders, and nine (36%) indicate that being ethnically Greek neither helps nor hinders their goals.

Respondents mention that being ethnically Greek helps them to meet their goals because of the following: “I know my past. I know how hard my parents had to work to get where they are, so it gives me more incentive.”; “[W]e stick together and help each other out. We belong to a Greek community within the larger community of the US.”; “It doesn't help that much, but because the Greek community is so close being Greek can open doors with other Greeks (professionally, socially, etc.).” Tying

these themes of identity and utility together, one respondent writes that being ethnically Greek helps his goals in the United States because “[i]t gives you a sense of pride and belonging. This gives you a support group that makes it easier to succeed. You can always find other Greeks who are willing to help one of their own before someone else.”

The two respondents who feel being ethnically Greek helps and hinders their goals say: “It helps in the sense that it gives me the opportunity to show that I am unique and different, especially with [college] admissions. But having a last name that is long [it is] still not 100% acceptable—If you can’t pronounce it, then it’s a bad thing and it’ll make our company/department look bad.” The other respondent states: “It both helps and hinders—it helps because it is easy to make contacts with other Greek-Americans, but I think that at times it can be considered un-American. It hinders in the political and corporate areas.”

Of the nine respondents who believe that being ethnically Greek neither helps nor hinders their goals in the United States, one respondent says: “My goals in the United States are to get an education, and being Greek does not influence this at all.” Another respondent relates that “We’re [i.e., Greek Americans] not considered a minority. We blend into the sea of Caucasians.” Here, the facility by which my respondent can slip in and out of his ethnic roles (Waters 1990: 158) is made explicit. Another ethnic role involves a religious one. As mentioned before, part of the construct of an ethnic identity is religious. The last section deals with the Greek Orthodox Church in terms of the respondents’ identities..

Greek Orthodoxy

All the respondents and their parents are Greek Orthodox. Nine of the twenty-five respondents (36%) regularly attend church (defined as about every week); five respondents (20%) report that they attend church somewhat regularly (defined as about once a month); and eleven respondents (44%) indicate that they attend church infrequently (defined as less than once a month) or during religious holidays only (which is two to three times a year), such as for Easter or Christmas. Only one respondent who used to attend church regularly but now attends rarely explains that college consumes her time. Interestingly, the nine respondents who attend church regularly also report that their parents attend as regularly, if not more often.

Two of the twenty-five respondents (8%) report that the Greek Orthodox church is not that important to them. The other twenty-three (92%) indicate that the church is important. One respondent who says that the Greek Orthodox is not that important states: “I am Christian and have found other services more meaningful and thought-provoking. Not speaking Greek is definitely a hindrance, since much of the service is in

Greek." By contrast, a clear majority of respondents who think the Greek Orthodox church is important to them can be represented by the following response: "I have positive feelings toward the Greek Orthodox church because it is not as suppressing as other faiths can be [...]. The church serves more as a uniting factor for all Greeks. It is at the basis of my culture and all its traditions." To most of the respondents, the Greek Orthodox church is an important religious, cultural, and social institution; it is something they were raised in and thus accept as an important part of their Greek American identity even if they cannot understand the Greek liturgy.

All but two of my respondents (92%) indicate that the Greek Orthodox church is very important to their parents. The one respondent who offers an explanation why the Greek Orthodox church is not at all important to her parents mentions: "I enjoy the cultural experience (almost as a show), but my parents don't find that aspect as interesting as I do. My mom doesn't like the Greek Orthodox church. She says she doesn't feel anything there. My dad doesn't attend church." By contrast, the responses that seem to most typify how important the church is to my respondents' parents are: "The Church is as important [to them] as it is to me; my parents are the ones who instilled my religious beliefs/faith"; "It's important because not only does it provide us with religious education and services but it's also a social gathering place for all Greek Orthodox." Thus, it can be argued that religious values have, for the most part, been successfully transmitted from their parents to my respondents.

Conclusion

This endeavour to examine the extent to which Greek values, customs, and traditions have been transmitted to the respondents has revealed that forms of "Greekness" (given this term's limitations) have been successfully conveyed, and thereby have withstood the test of time. It is difficult in this analysis to conclude whether most of the customs and traditions have been "Americanized" or, rather, have become more diffused in the larger and more diverse American society. While an overwhelming majority of the students can speak Greek, the variability in their degree of fluency proves that knowledge and use of the Greek language is waning. It is open to question whether respondents will actually teach their children Greek. Thus, future prospects of preserving the Greek language appear grim but the values of success and achievement of the respondents' parents, as measured by my respondents' high educational and occupational aspirations, their high levels of self identification as Greek Americans and social consciousness with respect to their ethnic identity in the larger American society, their family attachment, views on marriage, and finally their strong religious beliefs—

all of these can be said to have been successfully passed on to my twenty-five respondents. Whether such values and traditions can be considered solely "Greek" remains an important comparative question which is beyond the scope of this study. Indeed, comparative research is necessary to explore, understand, and appreciate the diverse cultural traditions that are preserved, shared, altered, or forgotten among different ethnic populations living in a predominantly homogeneous-structured society. In this way, hellenism may itself be further preserved, transmitted, and celebrated by future Greek and philhellenic, non-Greek generations born and raised in a genuinely multicultural community.

NOTES

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1. Where the author feels clarification is necessary, an effort will be made to distinguish between sociable and social. Sociable refers to specific events that demand, more or less, individuals in the company of others to be gregarious (such as at a party) while social implies a broader rubric and refers to a larger community or societal setting in which group and/or individual units interact.

2. Please note that twenty-two of my respondents are second generation Greek Americans; two are third generation; and one is fourth generation.

3. Though exact numbers are impossible to obtain (due to name changes, inter-ethnic parentage, etc.), it is estimated that at Loyola University, there are between 400 to 450 Greek/Greek American students; at Northwestern University, there are approximately 70 Greek/Greek American students (Correspondence, Nick Kourvetaris, 6 December 1996). These figures include both graduate and undergraduate students, not professional school students such as those in Medicine, Law, or Dentistry.

4. Today, the "Greek American community" is perhaps a misnomer, especially with the pervasive suburbanization of the United States. Yet as an ethnic consciousness, according to Kopan and others, Greek Americanness involves foremost some semblance of transmitting the demotic, rather than ancient or biblical, Greek language.

5. George A. Kourvetaris distinguishes between the more "intellectual" aspects of Greek ethnic life, which he refers to as Apollonian, i.e., after the mythological Greek god of music, intellect, and culture, and the more "social," culinary, or material aspects of ethnicity, which he considers Dionysian, i.e., after the mythological Greek god of merriment and wine.

6. According to the Digest of Education Statistics 1995, out of the total U.S. population (in thousands) of 189,986 who is 18 years of age or older, at the elementary school level 7,221 attained less than 7 years; 8,102 achieved 7 or 8 yrs.; at the high school level, 18,847 attained 1-3 yrs.; 2,779 4 yrs.; 64,320 graduated. The remainder of the US. population 18 yrs. and older (that is, 88,717) have had varying degrees of college experience.

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Christianisme orthodoxe et nationalisme: Deux composantes de la culture politique grecque moderne.

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ABSTRACT

Orthodox Christianity and communalistic nationalism — used together in the imperial and ecclesiastical hierarchies since the beginning of the Byzantine Empire (Hierocracy) and continued in the fusion of Church and Nation within the Church hierarchy (Ethnarchy) during the Ottoman Empire — have had a lasting influence on the 'political culture' and the 'process of civilization' and have fostered the 'atrophy of the civic society'. The absence of the notions of 'natural law' and 'human rights' in the Greek world, notions which have been present in Western Europe since the Middle Ages, perpetuates the personification of institutions and authority in the spirit of the Greek people and inhibits, the modernization of contemporary Greek society. At this historical point, Greek society, with its 'traditional communal individualism, faces with suspicion the Western mentality with its voluntaristic and legalistic individualism.

RÉSUMÉ

Couplés dans les hiérarchies impériale et ecclésiastique dès la défaite de l'Empire byzantin (hiérocrairie) et, en suite, par le fusionnement de l'Église et de l'état dans la hiérarchie ecclésiastique (ethnarchie) pendant quatre siècles de l'empire ottoman, la chrétienté orthodoxe et le nationalisme communaliste ont beaucoup influencé la 'culture politique' et le processus de la civilisation' en Grèce moderne et ont apporté l'atrophie de la société civique'. L'absence de la notion du 'droit naturel' et celle des 'droits humains' dans le monde grec, notions dont l'Europe occidentale a eu conscience depuis le Moyen Age, fait que la personification des institutions et de l'autorité soit toujours présente à l'esprit du peuple grec et, en plus, est un obstacle au processus de modernisation de la société grecque contemporaine, société qui, avec son individualisme communaliste 'traditionnel' ne peut pas accepter facilement, à ce moment historique, la mentalité occidentale imprégnée d'un individualisme volontariste et légaliste.

Avant de commencer avec l'analyse propre de notre sujet, il serait utile d'expliquer en deux mots notre méthode. Dans le titre mentionné ci-dessus nous utilisons la notion de "culture politique". Sans vouloir entrer dans le détail du débat autour de cette notion, nous en proposons ici une définition à la fois totalisante et historique. Par "culture politique" nous entendons l'ensemble changeant des schémas de perception, de connaissance, d'imagination et d'action au moyen desquels le politique

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trouve au cours de l'histoire ses formes institutionnelles et symboliques ¹. Cette notion se situe à mi-chemin entre les structures sociales et les orientations subjectives et sert aussi à la construction quotidienne de la réalité sociale. Si, d'autre part, nous nous référons à la persistance de certaines traditions du passé dans la mémoire collective, alors celles-ci sont toujours le produit d'une sélection qui s'adapte aux demandes du présent, demandes qui incluent les modes de domination et les fantasmes des sujets. On peut dire que ces schémas sont en rapport étroit avec les fantasmes, puisque ces derniers organisent le rapport "insupportable" des sujets avec le Réel et le manque radical que celui-ci implique. Les sujets parlants sont toujours des êtres "non-adaptés" à la réalité naturelle et sociale, c'est-à-dire qu'il manque toujours "quelque chose"; pour y suppléer, les sujets inventent ².

A travers les mots, les images et les pratiques les sujets mettent en place, individuellement et collectivement, les cadres symboliques et institutionnels qui leur offrent un certain point d'appui dans le Réel. La religion et l'idéologie nationaliste sont deux de ces points d'appui, qui ne se réduisent pas l'un à l'autre. Néanmoins, ce qui nous intéresse ici en plus, c'est le sens du "processus de la civilisation" à travers les avatars religieux et idéologiques. Par "processus de la civilisation" nous entendons aussi le "processus d'Individuation", c'est-à-dire le devenir de la société et de l'homme modernes, à travers les schémas culturels qui y ont présidé ³. Si nous analysons ici l'impact du christianisme orthodoxe, du nationalisme et de leur rapport réciproque sur le devenir de l'identité grecque moderne, ceci n'implique nullement que nous oublions l'existence d'autres "facteurs culturels"; notre analyse ne veut pas être une explication causaliste et réductrice des faits que nous examinons.

Actuellement on est témoin d'un regain du nationalisme et de la religiosité en Grèce. Les occasions qui y ont conduit les gens sont connues: d'un côté l'effondrement de l'idéologie et du système marxiste traditionnels, ainsi que la crise des "valeurs" actuelle, de l'autre côté les bouleversements politiques chez les voisins du nord et de l'est du pays et les menaces mi-réelles mi-imaginaires qui en résultent. Derrière ces attitudes on devine les énormes difficultés de modernisation et d'adaptation économique, administrative et culturelle du pays vis-à-vis la Communauté Européenne, tandis que le racisme montant envers les immigrés et les réfugiés et d'autres problèmes sociaux (comme la nouvelle pauvreté, la criminalité, le terrorisme, etc.) assombrissent le tableau. On pourrait parler de "crise d'identité" et du retour du refoulement nationaliste et religieux, qui s'exprime par un discours creux de glorification du lointain passé antique; son aspect apologétique saute aux yeux. "On" se sent "isolé" et "menacé" et "on" reproduit les "réflexes" connus de défense, d'auto-isolement et d'exclusion ⁴.

A cela s'ajoute une certaine morgue intellectuelle qui voit traditionnellement dans l'état grec et "l'étranger" les "deux mauvais objets" qui sont responsables pour les malheurs de la nation ⁵, au lieu de se poser la question: pourquoi les grecs n'ont pas pu développer jusqu'aujourd'hui les institutions et les forces productrices du pays de telle sorte, qu'ils puissent s'affronter aux diverses difficultés qui se présentent à eux, en étant confiants d'eux au lieu de se plaindre de leur propre impuissance ⁶.

Si toute identité nationale est un bricolage d'éléments multiples, accordés consciemment et/ou inconsciemment au cours des siècles, elle cache aussi sous une forme imaginaire les hauts et les bas de l'histoire d'un peuple. La mémoire collective y retient les gloires et les traumatismes du groupe dans le passé; mais ce dernier dépend de la "perlaboration symbolique" de ces traumatismes, si au présent ils redeviennent actifs au pays: les menaces du présent et les conflits peuvent conduire à une forme d'hystérisation qui reproduit imaginativement les cassures mal cicatrisées du passé.

Mais pourquoi les grecs n'ont pas pu perlaborer les traumatismes du passé, et depuis quand datent ceux-ci? La glorification du passé, avec des tons plus ou moins ethnocentriques, a fonctionné idéologiquement sous la forme du *déni* ⁷ de la décevante réalité actuelle. Habituellement on déplore la faiblesse des Lumières dans la Grèce moderne. Et pourtant il y a eu les Lumières en Grèce pendant toute une période, dès 1770 jusqu'à 1821, l'année de l'insurrection nationale contre les Turcs. Les idéologues de l'insurrection se référaient à l'antiquité en tant que démocrates et républicains; il y a même eu des prêtres orthodoxes éclairés. Mais avec l'indépendance venue en 1830, la Grèce est devenue un royaume, et à partir de là la restauration s'est établie. On voit s'imposer un modèle de nationalisme, autre que républicain. Ce modèle a été fortement inspiré par le romantisme allemand; il combinait alors l'image d'une antiquité idéalisée avec celle du moyen âge byzantin, lui aussi idéalisé. Le tout fut accompagné par l'irrédentisme national qui se termina par la "catastrophe de 1922", avec les massacres et l'expulsion des grecs de l'Asie mineure. Donc si nationalisme il y a, il a toujours été reactualisé par la question de la restauration et de la sauvegarde des parties du pays grec sous "le signe de la croix orthodoxe".

On voit ici l'aspect "fusionnel" entre "l'autel et le trône": les intérêts de l'un ont été les intérêts de l'autre et vice versa. Mais ceci a une longue histoire depuis l'empire byzantin et l'empire ottoman. Si, par la suite, depuis 1923 le trône fut à deux reprises remplacé par la tribune républicaine, néanmoins le schéma persiste, surtout face aux nouveaux traumatismes comme l'occupation naziste/fasciste/bulgare (1941-44), la guerre civile (1943-49), la dictature des colonels (1967-74) et l'occupation

du nord de Chypre par des forces turques (depuis 1974). Mais pour comprendre la fusion entre l'état et l'église et l'échec relatif de l'état laïc, nous sommes obligés de prendre en considération certains faits historiques. Pour l'église orthodoxe le traumatisme majeur reste la 4^{ème} croisade au cours de laquelle en 1204, les latins catholiques imposèrent leur domination par la force et s'efforcèrent au cours des siècles suivants d'y persévérer, sans succès finalement. La deuxième prise de Constantinople par les Turcs en 1453 reste un traumatisme majeur dans la mémoire collective grecque; il a été en partie surmonté par la création de l'état hellénique.

Mais sur le plan religieux il a été moins traumatisant que la première prise de Constantinople en 1204. Car après 1453 le patriarche de Constantinople s'est vu transmettre de nombreux privilèges par le sultan ainsi que l'autogouvernement spirituel de tous les orthodoxes (y fondant un subimpérialisme grec sur les slaves orthodoxes des Balkans). A cause de cela l'église orthodoxe se voyait à l'abri de la concurrence menaçante du redoutable catholicisme, tandis que de l'autre côté elle s'érigait en seule représentante spirituelle *et* nationale du peuple grec; jusqu'à un certain point elle a en effet sauvé la nation jusqu'à la libération. Mais après ?

Bien qu'il y a eu des tentatives d'instauration d'un état laïc, elles ont échoué à cause des particularités de la société et de l'état grecs, dues au passé historique. Bien que l'étude historique et sociologique nous montre une certaine continuité⁸ des institutions et de l'esprit régnant dans l'empire byzantin et dans l'empire ottoman, tous deux étant des états patrimoniaux et des "despotismes orientaux", pourtant l'imaginaire collectif grec y a introduit un clivage et une scission entre le "bon objet" - Byzance - et le "mauvais objet" - les Turcs -. Ainsi les grecs s'accusent souvent de leurs faiblesses, mais en repoussant leur propre responsabilité et la projetant uniquement au temps de la domination turque . Mais ils oublient que celle-ci, mis à part son caractère de domination étrangère, avait reproduit des structures de civilisation homologues à celles de Byzance. Quant aux Occidentaux, ils sont restés, pour des raisons historiques évidentes, un objet d'"haine-amour" ambivalent. Ce qui est certain c'est que les grecs ne se sentent pas encore comme des "Occidentaux" ou des "Européens"; il faut se demander ici seulement quels grecs et pourquoi.

En raison de l'histoire (depuis le Grand Schisme en 1054 et l'apparition des Turcs en même temps) la culture grecque a développé avec insistance un caractère *défensif*, et le même phénomène se reproduit dans la culture politique grecque moderne, avec ses maladroites et son manque de perspicacité, de continuité et de rationalité⁹. Pour comprendre ce phénomène il faut analyser aussi les structures des institutions et du

développement économique qui eurent une forte influence sur la nature du nationalisme. Nous retenons ici trois aspects: *le clientélisme, l'individualisme traditionnel et le communalisme*. Ces aspects sont intéressants pour une raison additionnelle: notre thèse étant qu'ils portent encore les traces des types de comportement et de mentalité qui remontent jusqu'à l'antiquité en passant par Byzance. Nous postulons de la persistance de certains modèles culturels qui, même aujourd'hui brisés, n'ont pas pu être définitivement surmontés et remplacés par d'autres, plus modernes. Le caractère défensif de la culture grecque est ici à l'origine de l'attitude ambivalente envers l'Occident et la modernité¹⁰.

D'abord le clientélisme: le nouvel état hellénique s'est donné dès 1821 des institutions républicaines avancées, tandis que le vote universel fut introduit très tôt ainsi que toutes les formes d'un état de droit. Mais ces formes ont été octroyées d'en haut par des clercs éclairés à un pays pauvre, ravagé par la guerre et en grande partie dominé par des clans. Les institutions étatiques libérales ont été longtemps détournées au profit des intérêts claniques et de leur clientèles. La monarchie, aussi bien que la république, s'est servie de ce système parlementaire en soutenant le pouvoir des clans qui en revanche ont structuré les partis et ainsi réalisé leurs intérêts particularistes¹¹.

En ce qui concerne l'individualisme traditionnel, il est, dès l'antiquité, le produit de l'esprit mercantile grec. Nous le désignons par l'adjectif "traditionnel", car il est différent de l'individualisme moderne. On ne peut comprendre cette distinction sans la rapporter à la notion de communalisme; celle-ci provient de l'importance que revêt la communauté et l'esprit communautaire pour les individus grecs. Au fond le "vrai" individu est la famille. L'individualisme moderne est né, par contre, avec la *société contractuelle*, en brisant le carcan de la communauté traditionnelle. Mais ces deux types-idéaux d'individuation n'existent pas dans un état pur. Et si le commerce et l'économie du marché ont été aux origines de la société contractuelle, il y a eu pourtant un long chemin jusqu'à la victoire définitive et totale de cette forme d'organisation sociale. La production marchande traditionnelle des grecs (mais aussi des chinois, des indiens, etc.) n'est pas "moderne", et ceci implique aussi un type d'homme-individu, non totalement libéré des contraintes communautaires¹².

Il est certain que le développement de l'individualité moderne a, à son tour, accéléré le dépassement du clientélisme. Ce qui a caractérisé l'individu moderne a été son combat pour arracher des libertés et des droits aux autorités et sa *volonté* de régler toutes ses affaires d'une manière *rationnelle et crédible*. Ceci a impliqué aussi la *foi* en la parole de l'Autre (le contrat, le crédit, la confiance), l'avènement de la *loi* et de l'état de *droit*, la confiance en la *Raison*. Toutes ces catégories, bien que connues en Grèce, n'ont pas pu s'y établir jusqu'aujourd'hui. Même la corruption et l'esprit

de "débrouillardise" n'ont pas eu en Grèce un "effet de développement", à cause du manque de ces conditions symboliques qui eurent pu transformer la débrouillardise en action réglée et productive. Par contre le communalisme peut bien coexister avec l'habileté rusée des individus.

Ce communalisme ¹³ est au cœur du nationalisme ici en question et de l'orthodoxie, et tous deux empêchent la modernisation; mais ceci s'accomplit non dans une intention consciente, mais bien au contraire, en revêtant des formes subtiles qui, tout en reconnaissant la vertu de l'esprit entrepreneur, le freinent pourtant au moment décisif. Car le communalisme se nourrit de l'institution familiale (élargie) et de l'esprit "fraternel" du groupe (s'imposant aux individus). Les individus grecs "existent" d'abord en tant que membres d'une famille et d'un "cercle d'amis" (de la fratrie) et leurs relations aux "autres" sont marquées par la méfiance, le privilège et l'exclusion.

Ici il faut revenir à l'orthodoxie pour saisir son rapport avec le nationalisme ¹⁴. Indépendamment des qualités spirituelles de l'orthodoxie, qui ne sont ici ni contestées ni analysées, celle-ci se distingue par une série de traits spécifiques, dont la nature est d'un côté structurelle, d'un autre côté historique. Aujourd'hui, dans tous les pays de cette confession, l'orthodoxie se trouve dans une position de défense. Mais elle l'est depuis plus de 900 ans. Si elle essaie aujourd'hui de répondre aux défis du monde, elle le fait d'une manière maladroite et agressive, en s'identifiant toujours à l'état et à la nation particulière dont elle forme l'église. Cette double identification est un aspect qu'on peut trouver aussi chez des nations catholiques et protestantes. Mais chez les orthodoxes c'est plus profond, car le principe de communauté y prédomine et aussi parce qu'il n'y a ici ni l'universalisme hiérarchique catholique, ni l'individualisme de la conscience protestante. Ces deux dernières formes ont pu se développer parce qu'au moyen âge, l'église catholique a imposé la notion de droit naturel à l'organisation de l'église et de la société/communauté, en acceptant aussi la division institutionnelle entre l'église et l'état.

A Byzance, ces deux formations ont toujours fusionné sous une forme particulière, puisqu'il a existé deux bureaucraties et deux hiérarchies distinctes: il ne s'agissait pas d'une théocratie mais d'un système mixte d'hiérocratie. Pour la théologie politique de Byzance¹⁵ il était d'une grande importance que la personne de l'empereur soit sacrée et, à l'instar de Jésus-Christ, de "double nature" ¹⁶. Ainsi il a été le modèle jamais réalisé des empereurs germaniques et des rois de France; mais, à la différence d'eux, il se soumettait effectivement l'église. On entrevoit ici le rapport étroit entre état, église et peuple, entre lesquels existait un rapport souple et flou à la fois. Mais ici il n'y a pas de notion d'obligations et de droits réciproques, ni de crédibilité et de rationalité, ni de volonté de transformer activement le monde¹⁷. Ainsi, après la disparition de

l'empereur, les structures mentales sous-jacentes sont restées les mêmes, surtout dans les classes populaires et paysannes. (Tout ça malgré le développement du droit privé, imprégné d'un esprit formaliste et instrumental).

On dit souvent que l'orthodoxie a envers le monde une attitude passive et favorise la fuite vers le divin; il est aussi vrai que la théologie politique byzantine avait comme but la conservation de l'empire contre tous les peuples voisins, en tant que royaume méssianique. Ce caractère profondément conservateur et statique a fortement imprégné l'orthodoxie dans son ensemble jusqu'aujourd'hui. La dernière grande querelle théologique, celle des icônes, a eu lieu au 9^{ème} siècle. Depuis lors l'orthodoxie s'est figée dans son aspect conservateur et populiste, passif et mystique, en rejetant tout "individualisme" et toute "société" modernes.

Elle profite aussi de la crise actuelle de la spiritualité à l'occident pour l'attaquer comme "matérialiste" et "rationnaliste". Il faut pourtant dire que si on néglige l'importance de l'aspect spirituel de la culture, on ne pourrait pas comprendre les résistances à la modernisation en Grèce et dans d'autres pays. La demande de spiritualité n'est pas quelque chose qui puisse être "dépassée" par la modernité. Bien au contraire, à ses débuts au 16^{ème} et au 17^{ème} siècles, la modernité a présupposé la spiritualité comme son ressort. Son refoulement par une pensée rationaliste éclairée est le point faible de cette position aujourd'hui, envers la persistance et la résurgence du sacré partout dans le monde.

Mais l'orthodoxie a su en Grèce s'adapter en partie à la modernité. Car la fuite du monde peut impliquer plusieurs options possibles: ou bien une fuite radicale vers le désert et les monastères, ou bien le développement d'un esprit pragmatiste et utilitariste, voire opportuniste envers ce monde-ci. L'instrumentalisme est ici le corollaire de l'*adaptation passive et extérieure* au monde; mais il n'est pas le pragmatisme américain et protestant. Ce pragmatisme "traditionnel" ne connaît pas de règles et ne désigne pas par leur nom les conflits sociaux et individuels. D'autre part il favorise la mobilité sociale¹⁸ dans le cadre des liens sociaux semi-traditionnels et familiaux. Il lui faut à tout prix sauver les apparences d'une "harmonie" du monde, conséquence de la paix divine. Donc les conflits sont refoulés au sein de la communauté des fidèles et il faut faire comme si on vivait dans le meilleur des mondes.

Mais derrière les coulisses, les intrigues, le jeu de pouvoir sans règles et sans foi, font rage. D'où l'hypocrisie byzantine et le rejet de la rationalité au nom de la "fraternité orthodoxe". En plus, le commandement chrétien du pardon est interprété de telle façon qu'on se précipite afin de pardonner à l'autre ses méfaits pour pouvoir mieux se faire pardonner les siens et continuer ainsi impunément à poursuivre ses intérêts irresponsables sans règles. On voit ici le vieux problème qui s'est

posé aussi à Luther ¹⁹ : si la foi (et l'amour) est "au-delà" de la loi, comment faire pour que le bien soit fait s'il n'y a pas la loi, et que les faibles dans la foi ne croient pas que "tout soit permis"? L'orthodoxie n'a pas résolu cette antinomie, bien au contraire, elle se conforte dans sa fuite imaginaire vers la contemplation passive de Dieu avec le but de l'autodivinisation de l'homme.

Néanmoins elle dénonce l'instrumentalisme occidental et la destruction de l'environnement, sans pouvoir vraiment mobiliser les gens. Elle séduit pourtant certains intellectuels ex-communistes, qui sont partis à la recherche d'une "identité grecque pure", pour qui est valable la vieille formule idéologique "grec=orthodoxe" à l'exclusion de toute autre. Ils ont découvert que l'orthodoxie est d'une certaine manière la continuation de l'esprit grec ancien, mais sous ses aspects idéalistes et néo-platoniciens. Nous dirions que ces aspects ne sont *pas les seuls* pour désigner le Logos grec, loin de là; de l'autre côté, ces aspects ont été un *obstacle* pour le développement ultérieur du christianisme. D'ailleurs cette position implique un rejet de l'apport fondamental du judaïsme, car le Verbe n'est pas le Logos philosophique mais le Dabar judaïque ²⁰.

De cette idéologie nous mentionnons deux moments.

a) Dans la religion païenne grecque, on "honore Dieu" à travers le culte de son image ²¹. Cet aspect contemplatif a été surévalué dans l'orthodoxie, tandis que l'ascèse y signifie toujours la fuite hors du monde (un aspect qui coexiste avec l'image de l'harmonie du monde). Mais il n'y a jamais eu de tendance de rationalisation de l'ascèse et de sa transformation en *travail* productif rationnellement organisé.

b) Ceci à cause du manque de la *loi* (dans le sens éthique). A l'opposé de l'esprit pratique romain, l'esprit grec a développé une notion de liberté "esthétique", qui a été récupérée par le christianisme orthodoxe. Il y a ici une tendance très forte de *rejet* de la loi (au profit de "l'amour"), qui fait rapprocher l'orthodoxie de la Gnose néo-platonicienne (dont elle est fortement influencée), elle aussi issue de l'hellénisme tardif ²².

Le manque de la loi n'a pas aussi permis le développement de la notion de la *volonté* ²³, en tant que faculté autonome, qui n'est pas subordonnée ni à la perception, ni à l'intelligence. Dans l'orthodoxie, tout ce qui a à faire avec la loi et le droit porte le caractère de l'instrumental et du provisoire; que la dignité humaine exige un travail constant pour l'établissement d'une société juste qui n'est pas donnée d'avance, ceci n'est pas pensé par l'orthodoxie, puisque la communauté des fidèles est "déjà" le royaume de Dieu: *le manque y est dénié et résorbé*.

Le noyau de l'orthodoxie est "humaniste": Jesus-Christ, en devenant homme, a "divinisé" et "élevé" toute l'humanité, et c'est la connaissance mystique de ce fait qui emmène le salut. Cette position est psychologiquement une position de *déni* (dans le sens freudien) du mal et du manque dans le monde. De là découle un *clivage* ²⁴ du sujet et de sa perception du monde: il est en même temps harmonieux et à fuir. L'arbitraire de l'état patrimonial et plus tard tous les conflits sociaux et

éthiques seront occultés au profit de la contemplation des images (icônes) qui apporte le salut. Mais reste la *méfiance* entre les hommes, puisqu'il n'y a pas de règles rationnelles à suivre. On retrouve le clivage, car la méfiance est ici le double de l'évanouissement du sujet dans la communauté qui en délivre. La volonté, par contre, qui est une notion paulinienne et augustinienne, les conflits de la conscience malheureuse et ses doutes, la foi, non comme croyance mais comme le lien avec la parole de l'Autre, la volonté de révolte et de transformation du monde, tout ça n'est pas au fond connu par l'orthodoxie et n'a pas imprégné la mentalité grecque comme a imprégné la mentalité occidentale ²⁵.

En guise de conclusion: l'orthodoxie et le nationalisme communaliste lié à elle ont été des facteurs décisifs qui ont favorisé ce qu'on peut appeler *l'atrophie de la société civile* ²⁶. Le manque d'une notion de droit naturel et des droits de l'homme et du citoyen dans les esprits (pas sur le papier) ²⁷ perpétue la personification des institutions et de l'autorité; l'assimilation diffuse de l'Autre se substitue à l'égalité politique et les droits sont considérés comme des privilèges donnés par l'autorité (aujourd'hui l'état des partis), tandis que la responsabilité envers l'état et les autres (vu la méfiance généralisée) est considérée comme une imposition externe sur une supposée liberté personnelle (mystique, anarchique) ²⁸. Le manque de foi en la parole de l'Autre (à cause du manque de la loi) domine aussi les rapports de la nation grecque envers les autres nations. Bien sûr ce manque est brisé périodiquement par des périodes de confiance totale et aveugle, qui conduit nécessairement au malentendu et au désenchantement. Le nationalisme communaliste est ici cause et effet de l'échec de la modernisation, et en ceci il a partie liée avec le conservatisme orthodoxe.

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The Image of Greece in the European and the International Press, 1992-1994

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article élabore la question de la construction de l'image de la Grèce dans la presse étrangère. Il essaie de mettre en relief les faits historiques nés dans les conditions internationales, au sortir de la Guerre Froide dans leur concomitance avec les éléments de continuité appartenant au niveau des mentalités collectives. Dans une telle perspective, les articles et les éditoriaux sur la Grèce sont examinés en tant que tels mais aussi comme une partie de la propagande occidentale concernant les Balkans et la guerre dans l'ex-Yougoslavie. Cet article tend aussi à évaluer implicitement le discours de la presse à travers l'analyse de la thématique et du contenu des articles.

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the image of Greece as it is formed in the foreign press. I shall hereby attempt not only to expose the critical convergence of historical events occurred after the end of the Cold War but also to put into perspective those elements of continuity that reside in the realm of collective mentalities. Thus, the writing of articles and the editorial line concerning Greece are examined both independently and as a part of Western propaganda with regard to the Balkans in general as well as the war in former Yugoslavia. This paper also aims at evaluating briefly those articles with respect to their viewpoint and subject-matter.

In the space of these notes, I shall attempt to expose the image of Greece, as it has been formed in the international press, by means of the methodology that the historian of the present applies with the purpose of reconnecting meanings and of revealing the underlying system through the evident nature of facts. Neither the acceptance nor the rejection of the resulting image of Greece are included in the objectives of this study. Thus, the way in which the foreign and domestic policy and the interweaving political interests - as concurring factors - affect the publicity of the said image, would be the objective of yet another study regarding the international relations, and not the images, as well as the collective attitudes and mentalities which are the main concern of this essay.

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The nationalistic nature of the rhetoric against FYROM that prevailed in Greece from 1991 until recently, along with the policy of non-recognition, the trade embargo as well as the trappings of the Greek foreign policy, gave rise to a series of comments and articles where the Greek stance was described as foolish and stubborn. Greece has also been criticized whenever there was a reference to Greek nationalism, irredentism, and the alleged territorial claims forwarded by Greece as far as smaller Balkan countries were concerned. In 1994, *Le Monde* accused Greece of violation of the human rights and oppression of the religious minorities while the "racial and anti-semitic" aspects of the Greek society were underlined. In the same year, *The London Times* demanded that Greece should be relieved of the presidency of the European Union due to the fact that, because of the application of the trading embargo, the treaty, legislation, and wider interests of the E.U. were violated. The "aggressive" policy of Athens towards "Macedonia" was specifically considered to be incompatible with its status as a member of the European Union. However, there have been repeated references to the scheduled partition of "Macedonia" by Serbia, Greece and eventually other Balkan countries.

The incident of Episkopi that took place in April 1994, the flight of Thomas Vrakas over Albania and the trial of the five members of "Omonia", also gave rise to certain comments in the Western press regarding the "Greek provocativeness". *Le Figaro*, being ironic to the threat of Skopje, referred to the new "Balkan orthodoxy" and the isolation experienced by the Greeks because of the "superiority complex" that characterized them. It will be a rather common place if we suggest that the foreign press treated with mistrust Andreas Papandreou's administration after the general elections of 1993 as well as the assumption of the European Union's presidency by Greece later on that year. Yet, certain remarks that appeared in articles of that period, such as those of *The Economist* are quite interesting. It has been suggested that Greece no longer presented the interest it used to during the Cold War as a pluralistic cell within the communist southeastern Europe, but it was still the potential channel through which the former communist Balkan countries could communicate with modern life. The columnist ventures also the prediction that Papandreou, being a genuine socialist leader, would appear uncompromising but would finally agree to share the name of Macedonia with the neighbouring country from the North, provided that there would be no change of borders. The columnist went on considering Papandreou as a third-world-type nationalist and attributed the "chauvinism" that caused the "Macedonian turmoil" to the Right. As for the incident of Episkopi, most newspapers adopted the accusations against Greece launched by Albania; even *The European* which was rather

sympathetic towards the fears of Greece on the issue of Skopje, objected to the sending of Turkish peacekeepers to Bosnia, and, at length, it falls under the category of the moderately-disposed-towards-Greece newspapers - along with *The Herald Tribune* and *The Independent*. However, this does not necessarily mean that they adopted the Greek positions, since *The Independent* criticized the Greek foreign policy and was ironic towards the Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos. *The European* maintained a negative attitude towards Greece on the matter of the royal property and the way the Greek government behaved towards Constantine.

Indeed, there was plenty of criticism in the foreign press on the "rigid" Greek policy during Constantinos Mitsotakis's administration as well. For example, *Le Figaro* demanded that there should be sanctions against Greece on the ground that it did not fully apply the measures against Serbia whereas it blocked the recognition of Skopje. In his notorious article, Strobe Talbott wrote about the resurgence of the Greek "expansionist aspirations" in the previous century. Talbott also accused Mitsotakis's government of "paranoia and myopia", because they could not see that the "financial strangling" they imposed on Macedonia could cause nationalistic conflicts - even worse than those that took place in Bosnia - and Greece would eventually be caught in a war with Turkey and other Balkan countries. In January 1993, President Clinton appointed Talbott as special adviser for the newly established independent countries, a leading position in the State Department. In his articles, which backed the policy of intervention, Talbott also suggested that if the Western Alliance could not handle the crisis in former Yugoslavia, its existence would be pointless after the end of the Cold War. Supporting his view he referred to the Gulf War and claimed that the worldwide outcry in combination with diplomatic and financial means did not manage to keep Saddam Hussein away from Kuwait, which only the massive multinational expeditionary forces achieved.

The similarities of the Western propaganda practiced during the war in former Yugoslavia and the propaganda promoted just before and during the Gulf War are as many as the divergences. In 1990-91, public opinion was influenced by the negative metaphor of the Vietnam war, whereas for the period under discussion here, the Western propaganda could make excellent use of the positive aspects of the Gulf War. Although this war signified an instant mutation of East/West conflict to a new cold war of North against South, propaganda was founded on a familiar, explicit and clear, ideological background: the fight for freedom and democracy. The main argument was that the USA were fighting against the "totalitarian Iraqi dictatorship" that had invaded Kuwait with the purpose of destroying this "freely elected democratic state". Through that

type of ideological propaganda the enemy was identified with the leader, and it was directly intended for the people of Iraq, urging them to drive the tyrant out. Although contemporary historical and social factors of the post-Cold War era have established modern conditions for the development of propaganda, the logic of cold war propaganda discourse is still evident in certain cases, since propaganda operates in a context determined by social as well as historical factors. The emphasis has remained though focused on the "humanitarian purposes" and the assumption that a "secure environment" should be established.

For example, the image of the nationalist leader is constructed on the basis of the archetype of the communist leader. Also, as the "small and helpless" Kuwait, and the Bosnian Muslims needed international aid to secure their freedom against the "invader", so did the "nationalist" (*ethnikofron*) Greece during the Cold War, in order to safeguard the "endangered civil liberties of the free world". The repetition of this discourse on the protection of the weak against the violence inflicted by the powerful, gave the opportunity to the American post-Cold War propaganda to promote and legitimize the role of the U.S. as the major world power following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that, although the dominant image of Greece was that of the poorest and the most chaotic country in the European Union, Talbott presented it as one with considerable influence on both sides of the Atlantic, despotic and uncompromising that put an impediment to the progress of Skopje - this new country with a democratic and pluralistic political system established in spite of its multiethnic identity.

However, the logic of the good and bad nations as well as that of the old rivalries amongst nations, which had not been promoted during the Cold War when Greece was considered to be a faithful ally and a victim of the communist conspiracy, reemerged together with the mutations due to the war in former Yugoslavia and with a certain image of the Balkan environment and of Greece itself. For many thinkers of the 19th and 20th century, Greece was a liquid, unsteady and explosive region that had nothing in common with Western societies as far as rationalism, sense of order and harmony were concerned. Many held the view that the future of Greece was mainly determined by its geographical position, and also that the Balkans were a political and cultural region, very different from Western Europe.

The contemporary image of Greece and the Balkans is often formed under the heavy shadow of history in a way that its reliability can be questioned. We can establish the conservation of old stereotypes when we compare two articles written within a forty-nine year spell. The French *Carrefour* wrote: "Macedonia - the country of the political hatred and the tradition of endless guerilla wars", while forty-nine years later, Xavier

Raufer, under the headline "Macedonia: a long tradition of terrorism" wrote in a similar mood about the very tradition which defined Macedonia as a land of cruelty and terrorism and the history of Balkans as an affair of hostility and intolerance, adding that never before in the history of Europe did a group of states, entirely and jointly, denied the existence of a neighbouring country.

Yet, after the collapse of state socialism, the challenge in this historical moment was the radicalization of the democracy; accordingly, Greek nationalism was interpreted as a "nationalism of the centre" fighting against peripheral nationalisms, while Greek positions were considered as violating the right of the small countries to self-determination. General Charles G. Boyd, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, from November 1992 to July 1995, shifted the terms of the debate on the war in former Yugoslavia, expressing the heretic opinion that the war was neither a fight of good versus evil, of aggressor against aggrieved, nor the inevitable product of centuries of ethnic hatreds, but rather a result of ambition, fear and incompetence - local and international. He noted that history was used as a pretext so that the responsibilities which the major powers bore for the war could be concealed. The opposite, dominant version of the war was that of the exclusive responsibility of the Serbs. Jean Daniel advocated the military solution and considered the argument that nothing could break the resolution of these people, to be an excuse for the legitimization of the American inertia. Yet, there were various critics of Clinton administration's unwillingness to commit America to fight for The Bosnia; and various sceptics questioning the credibility of the U.N. and the Atlantic Alliance.

The question to what extent these collective representations that are a result arise from impulsive or prefabricated proceedings, cannot be partially answered. However, the impulsive creation of collective attitudes can depend on the weight of the past and the realization of an unconscious - up to then - disposition or stance. Attitudes are sure to change just like the social and cultural framework that defines these changes. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of the belief-system and the multiplicity of the social differentiations are taken for granted. Still, these do not rule out the existence of common perceptions and a shared mentality in the Western world, which can be conveyed through attitudes, cognitive or affective, on various notions such as democracy and freedom.

Thus, we could suggest that the dominant image of Greece is fragmentary and lacks autonomy, since it is mostly a product of how the attitude of Greece towards both the belligerents of former Yugoslavia and the Balkan neighbours is perceived. It should be noted parenthetically that the way newspapers judge Greek policy also depends on the image

they have constructed for themselves (auto-image) by the countries that control information. Greece is represented in the press in terms of a limited set of topics which are dealt with in such a way as to emphasize "the problematic and fragile economy" of Greece, "the inefficiency of the government", the "failure" of the Greek presidency of the E.U., and the divergence of Greece from the policy of her fellow members, the progress and the European culture. Other topics relevant to contemporary Greek institutes or civilization have low priority or do not even exist.

Overall articles concerning Greece can be divided into two categories. The first one includes pieces that reach the boundaries of political mythology and are aiming at shaping perceptions and a certain imagery based on a small number of slogans such as "Greece is the bully of the Balkans" (*Spectator*) or "the worst fly behind the ear of working Europe" (*El País*). The share of these kind of articles - apart from the needs of the propaganda it promotes - echoes the views of a part of the public opinion which, after the collapse of the dividing lines of the Cold War, appreciates its "differentia" in a way that heterogeneity is excluded. In these image-oriented articles, the features differentiating the Greeks from the rest of the Europeans are of "anthropologic" and "anthropomorphic" nature: the Greek people are governed by the Dionysian element, and are unconcerned with the serious problems they face, such as pollution and traffic. Namely, the Greeks are innocently pleased, arrogant towards their neighbours and, according to some other characterizations, "shorter and uglier than the average European".

The second category consists of articles about Greece appearing in the quality press. The keystone of these analyses is often an ideologically explicit, negative view on nationalism held by the writers. The article of professor Mark Mazower - "Classic errors in the Balkans" - falls under the same category. Here, the average Greek is drawn as a man overwhelmed by nationalistic feelings but not aware of his past. In addition, the story by Christophe Chiclet and Philippe Lobjois concerned with the Greek right-wing extremists, the action of the Front for the liberation of North Epirus, two other secret organizations aiming at the liberation of Slavonic Macedonia, as well as the role of the Greek Orthodox Church. However, the tendency for generalization becomes obvious in this article as this is reflected in the final remark of the writer, according to which, all said above took place in a state-member of the NATO and the European Union. Even quality press often covered these issues in a way that reproduced an already constructed image; the main difference in this type of issue-oriented journalism relies on the discourse, seen rather as "a form of language use and communication" and not as "social meaning and socio-cultural, political, and ideological practice". Its racial discourse is enacted in a form of "subtle and indirect discrimination". The phenomena of grey

propaganda also fall under the same category of articles: the information that appeared in *Le Monde* and reported that the five of "Omonia" who were on trial in Tirana had been amongst the commandos that attacked Albanian quarters on April 10, 1994. There was also the caption of a photograph published in the *Historia* magazine which was taken during the demonstration held in Athens on the 10th of December, 1992 and said that Greek nationalists demanded the annexation of Skopje to Greece.

Conclusively, we could suggest that is the age of *fin-de-millennium* politics when the stability, order and orthodoxies of the Cold-War era have come to an end and have been discredited, the image of Greece - a country regarded as anachronistic and with an anti-Western perspective - is constructed around notions of unfamiliarity with the ideals of the new era, of attachment to the past, intolerance and arrogance.

NOTES

1. *Time*, 12-10-1992 (article by Strobe Talbott)
2. *Newsweek*, 1-6-1992 (article by Scot Sallivan)
3. *El Pais*, 2-1-1994, *Newsweek*, 27-1-1992. See also, Xavier Gautier, *L'Europe à l'épreuve des Balkans*, Jacques Bertoin, Paris, 1992, p.16 ("...une Grèce schizophrène") et *Libération*, 12-2-1994.
4. *Time*, 12-10-1992, *Newsweek*, 27-1-1992.
5. See also, *Le Monde*, 29-3-1994 and for the national stereotypes in the Greek press, Roy Panagiotopoulou, "Kataskevi ethnokentrikon stereotipon apo ton typo sto paradigma tou Makedonikou zitimatos" (The construction of ethnocentric stereotypes by the Press in the case of the Macedonian issue), in *The Greek Review of Social Research*, 1996, n 89 (forthcoming).
6. 16-10-1993.
7. 15 to 21-4-1994.
8. 18 to 24-3-1994.
9. 25 to 31-3-1994.
10. 18 to 24-3-1994.
11. 22 to 28-4-1994. See also for the same matter, the similar attitude of the *Sunday Times*, 17-4-1994, *El Pais*, 29-8-1993 and the *Time*, 16-5-1994.
12. *Time*, 12-10-1992.
13. 25-11-1991.
14. Garth S.Jowett, Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, Sage Publications, 1992, 2nd Edition, p.252.
15. Arthur and Marilouise Kroker (eds), *Ideology and Power, in the age of Lenin in ruins*, St.Martin's Press, New York, 1991, p.XIV.

16. *Ibid.*, p.250.

17. John G.Reilly's article about the american public opinion in the nineties, showed that the resultant from the rivalry between the two great powers anxiety had disappeared and public opinion was mainly interested in Russia, while President Yeltsin proved to be one of the most popular European leaders in the U.S.A. (*Foreign Policy Quarterly*, Spring 1995).

18. *El Pais*, 2-1-1994.

19. *Time*, 12-10-1992.

20. *Historia*, Oct. 1995.

21. *Foreign Affairs*, Sept.-Oct. 1995, pp.22-38.

22. *Nouvelle Observateur*, 1 to 7-12-1994. For the french policy on that issue, see *Politique Étrangère*, Hiver 1995/96.

23. *Time*, 7-2-1994 (article by Christopher Ogden).

24. *Time*, 12-12-1994.

25. *European*, 22 to 28-4-1994.

26. *El Pais*, Nov.1993 (special Sunday edition for Greece).

27. *Observer*, 27-3-1994 (article by Helena Smith). The attitude of the French press towards Greek diplomacy has undoubtedly been negative since 1981 when Greece joined the E.U. as a full member. Claude Imbert remarked (*Le Point*, 11-12-1993) on the occasion of the taking over of the U.S. presidency by Greece that Giscard d'Estaing, who was regarded as the main advocate of Greece's accession into the U.S., had taken under his protection a country-agitator (See, Jean Catsiapis, "L'image de la Grèce dans l'opinion publique française", in *Études Helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, Vol.3, No. 2, Automne 1995, pp. 5-16.

28. For the selection and treatment of new topics regarding the political discourse on ethnic affairs in the USA, see Teun A. van Dijk, "Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism", in Rita Kirk Whillock, David Slayden (eds.), *Hate Speech*, Sage Publications, 1995, pp.1-27. See also, Kosta Gouliamos, "Ethnic Media: Breaking the Ghetto Politics", in *Études Helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, Vol.3, No.2, Autumn 1995, pp.25-40.

29. *Nouvelle Observateur*, 26-10 to 3-11-1993 (article by Henri Guirchoun).

30. *The Guardian*, 25-3-1994.

31. *Evenement du Jeudi*, 11 to 17-8-1994. See Brian McNair, *An Introduction to Political Communication*, Routledge, London and New York, 1995, pp.68, 90-91. See Teun A.van Dijk, *op.cit.*, p.4.

Greece and the European Union: The Greek Approach to the Intergovernmental Conference

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine le rôle de la Grèce pendant la conférence intergouvernementale européenne. L'auteur présente la perspective grecque sous une série de questions telle, la dimension sociale de l'Europe, de développement de ses institutions et la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune. Il conclut que la Grèce contribue positivement à sa façon à la construction de l'Europe.

ABSTRACT

This article examines the role that Greece played during the European Intergovernmental Conference. The author gives the Greek perspective by asking a series of questions on Europe's social dimension, the development of European institutions and Common Foreign and Security Policy.

I. Introductory Remarks

On the eve of the 21st century, the European Union (EU) faces acute challenges, demands and controversies caused by the sweeping changes, especially since 1989. During this period, the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), in force since 1993, was a major step forward in the construction of the European edifice.

The series of problems, however, that arose during the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, coupled with the failure to cope effectively with mounting social problems, such as rising unemployment, social exclusion, environmental degradation and lack of economic cohesion, have demonstrated the Treaty's limitations. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that greater priority was given to single market and single currency issues than to real convergence and social cohesion.

In order to discuss these other issues, an IGC was scheduled for 1996. As a result, the IGC took place in a climate of intense social pressure stemming from the citizens' lack of trust *vis-à-vis* the complex European edifice and evident inability of the Union to intervene effectively for the preservation of peace and establishment of a stable system of security and co-operation in Europe. This has revealed the weaknesses of the EU system of external action, and has undermined the credibility of the

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Treaty on European Union and, by extension, of the Union itself. The lack of transparency and the insufficient democratic character of some policy- and decision-making procedures of the system have also contributed to the alienation felt by many of Europe's citizens towards European institutions and policy choices.

As a result of the above developments and circumstances, a considerable segment of the population in the member states has begun to question European integration, while challenging the usefulness of certain institutions, policies and procedures.

Within its immediate external environment, the EU does, however, enjoy a high degree of appeal and acceptance. This is confirmed by the declared wish of all the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a number of the European Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Malta), to become full-fledged members of the EU as soon as possible. The Union represents for these countries the institutional framework within which they aspire to safeguard their external security, to increase their economic and social well-being and to consolidate their democratic political institutions.

The question of expansion is a challenge that should be met positively. Still, it must be ensured that future expansion will not alter the institutional and political character of the Union.¹

II. Greece and the IGC of the EU

The content of the Maastricht Treaty, along with its form, foundation and orientation, has fallen under heavy criticism. It is generally accepted, that the Treaty did not take into account the new circumstances on the continent after the international system changed form in the late 80's. The Treaty has also ignored the crucial influence of the European economy. Neither did it reflect the needs of the general public; hence the average European citizen remained largely unaware of what the Treaty really meant.

The IGC served as an exercise to find new approaches and solutions on institutional problems in the Union. All problems did not find a solution, but, on the other hand, progress has been achieved in many areas, notably progress on the common currency.

Greece stands as a unique case among the member states of the EU in almost every respect. A peripheral country of the EU, Greece is geographically situated at the Union's extreme south-eastern part. Besides being the member furthest from its centre, Greece is also the only country that has no common border with any other EU member.

Furthermore, Greece is located in a turbulent region, the Balkans,² surrounded since 1989 by her neighbours, who are in a stage of nationalistic turmoil. In fact, the crisis in Yugoslavia has evolved into a major destabilising factor for all of Europe. However, Greece's position within a fragile environment does not depend only on the Balkans but also on the critical situation in the Middle East. Yet another factor is that Greece remains the only EU-member state which feels an intense external threat to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.³

Crucial to understanding the situation is the fact that Greece is surrounded by countries with different régimes and cultures. This fact of life really creates communication problems with nearby countries. This reality not easily understood by the country's partners in the E.U., as they live in a different more stable and homogeneous environment.⁴

The fragile environment and potential threat compel the Greek government to spend 7% of its GDP, or the highest percentage of all EU members, on military expenditures. Within the EU context, Greece is the country with the lowest level of development in terms of *per capita* GNP, facing at the same time important structural problems. Since Greece's accession to the Union, the country's economy has steadily diverged from the European economy.⁵

Furthermore, Greece has a distinctive pattern of historical and political development rather different from that of the rest of Europe. In cultural terms, it is the only EU member state that participates in two cultural formations, the Western liberal tradition and the Eastern orthodox tradition.⁶ Nevertheless, Greece, by virtue of its classical cultural heritage, is entitled to the name European more than any other member state.⁷

The evolution of the Greek attitude towards European integration is also unique. In 1961, Greece was the first country to become an associated member of the newly established European Economic Community (EEC). Its association status with the EEC was frozen following the imposition of a dictatorial regime (junta) in 1967. After the return of democracy in 1974, Greece also restored its relations with the EC. The Greek government, after long and tedious negotiations, opted for full E.C. membership in 1975. Greece joined as the tenth member in January 1981. Still, accession to the EC was not a consensual choice for the major opposition party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which came to power ten months after the country's accession to the EC.

During the first decade of membership, the issue of accession turned from rather divisive to strongly consensual. Following three EC Greek presidencies, the principal political forces in national politics, as well as the public at large, with the exception of the Communist Party (KKE),

had turned in favour of the European Community. The strong support fueled efforts for greater political and economic integration, including the goal of full EMU. One example is the overwhelming majority with which the Maastricht Treaty was ratified by the Greek Parliament. Despite great difficulties, the Greek public has demonstrated exceptional support in order to achieve the criteria of economic convergence set out in the Treaty for the country's participation in the second phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999.⁸

Greece's keen pro-integrationist attitude is directly related to the actual and perceived gains the country has obtained due to membership in the European Community. This was, to a large extent, expected from the conservative government which insisted that Greece become a member of the EC as soon as possible. Indeed Greece has achieved considerable gains:

—Greece has gained considerably from the flow of the financial resources from the Community budget, that amount now to almost 5 per cent of the annual GNP of the country,

—Greece has strengthened its regional position, increased its bargaining power in its international relations and, last but not least, enhanced its political status and ability to deal with its traditional adversaries.⁹

Nonetheless, Greece still encounters severe problems in adjusting its economy to the EU environment and specifically to the criteria for the second phase of the EMU. Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of the country's foreign policy position that create tensions with its partners in the EU. These issues explain to a certain extent the reasoning that occasionally makes the country appear a heretic to mainstream European thinking. Still, Greek governments have supported the deepening of European Union even towards a federalist structure.

III. The Greek Approach to the IGC

Greek governments, in general, have followed an increasingly strong pro-European policy since 1984, as seen in Greece's positions in its affairs within the European Community.¹⁰ This is a new approach, since the various Greek governments never decided on a shift in policy toward the EC up to 1984. The policy shift served to increase funding obtained from EC structural funds to enhance the policy of the country's participation in major EC projects.

Greek governments played a crucial role in achieving agreement on the Single European Act in defining the regulations agreed upon as part of the Single Market (1992), as well as in concluding the Maastricht agreement. It had become a common belief in Greece that the ever-broadening scope of co-operation in a vast range of sectors was in the country's interest.

Such was the case of Greece's participating actively in the drafting of the Single European Act with the concept of cohesion and economic convergence between member states. Later on, Greece contributed to drafting the European Community's Social Charter. The Greek Commissioner, Vasso Papandreou played a significant role in the drafting of the Social Charter of the EC, which was part of the negotiations in Maastricht. The concept of Social Area in the EC was the main objective of the Second Greek Presidency of the Community (July-December 1988). Another important contribution was the idea of Yannis Kranidiotis, Junior Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1994, to suggest a Reflection Group, which played a crucial role in preparation of the IGC in 1996.

All the above indicates that Greek governments had discovered that the European Community was not only a structural fund, but mainly a forum where political ideas, platforms and initiatives could be discussed. This attitude steadily created a pro-European profile. Successive Greek governments soon realised that the country was able to use the Community to promote its own interests as well. This concept became policy subsequently followed by both Conservative and Socialist governments.

This is the case with regard to achieving economic convergence with the other member states and reaching the criteria for entering the second phase of the EMU. None of the major parties would like to be responsible for having left Greece behind the other members of the EU or having left the country out of the EMU all together.

Facing a challenging era in Europe, Greece seeks its place and role.¹⁰ The country's answer to the question 'What kind of European Union for Greece?' leads unequivocally to the following type of EU:

- evolving towards the direction of deeper integration;
 - democratically structured with legitimized institutions that will guarantee the institutional equality of all members;
 - prepared with strengthened common policies and actions;
- and sufficient economic resources that will contribute to the strengthening of social cohesion, social justice and solidarity and lead to a «Europe of citizens, development and democracy», and a Community of Law;

Overall this is an EU open to the world and capable of protecting its member-states' and citizens' security and independence.

In particular, Greece wishes Europe to have a strong political and social identity built upon the values of democracy, respect for national identity, cultural particularity, solidarity, cohesion and tolerance. For Greece, political union is a comprehensive set of goals which includes the

development and adjustment of EU institutions, common policies and resources. In addition, the Union's endowment with adequate means, resources and policies is a prerequisite for the successful completion of the forthcoming expansion.¹²

Expansion to the East will be facilitated by the progress of the candidate countries themselves, as well as by the timely increase of the EU's own resources. The same applies to the reform of basic Union policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)¹³, which is driven by the logic of fund-saving beyond the adjustments required by the new World Trade Organisation (WTO) régime.

The IGC provided member states with a good chance to prepare the Union to enter the 21st century with confidence. Hence the Greek approach consisted of the following main objectives:

1. Evolution of the European Union towards a pattern of deeper integration built upon the principles of democracy, solidarity, cohesion and social justice, i.e. *development of «A Europe of Citizens»*.

2. *Enhancement of the European Union's «Social Dimension»* through policies, actions, means and resources designed to solve social problems, especially unemployment and economic cohesion, as well as that of real convergence.

3. *Development of the Union's Institutional System*, so that it becomes more democratic at all levels and more effective in decision-making on the basis of institutional equality for all member-countries.

4. *Endowment of the Union with an efficient Common Foreign and Security Policy* and, ultimately, defence policy, capable of safeguarding the independence, security, external borders and territorial integrity of the Union and its member-states and contribute actively to the preservation of peace and stability, conflict resolution and crisis management.

5. *Enhancement of Co-operation in the Sectors of Justice and Home Affairs* in a way that intergovernmental co-operation between the member states will produce better results in areas directly affecting the free movement of persons, the security of the Union's citizens as well as police and judicial co-operation.

Of course all these objectives haven't been met but significant progress has been achieved. Furthermore, *Active participation, transparency and subsidiarity* remain the keys to gaining support for the EU's goals from the citizens of its member states. Let us now discuss these issues in detail.

1. Active Participation

The most serious challenge facing the European Union is that an increasing number of its citizens question the relevance of the goals and content of European integration.

For Greece, the citizen's active participation in the integration effort constitutes the basis of the EU's legitimization, its «raison d'être». Without the active support of the societies, the member states and their citizens, the European Union will be unable to achieve its goals. Therefore, the European Union should take substantial measures towards solving these problems and allow the citizens to participate actively in the integration process.

The revised Treaty should include provisions that aim to:

- Strengthen and enhance the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Greece supports the incorporation - in the revised Treaty - of a Catalogue of Human Rights or, alternatively, the Union's accession to the Convention on Human Rights.

- Enrich the Treaty with a catalogue of basic social rights, as provided by the European Social Charter and the Protocol on Social Policy.

- Include in the Treaty specific provisions prohibiting any form of discrimination and explicitly condemning racism and xenophobia.

(Enrichment of the Treaty's provisions on equality between men and women and including special actions in favour of disabled persons and other disadvantaged social groups.)

(Enrichment of the Treaty's references to European citizenship, by the expansion, among others, of the catalogue of associated rights.)

2. Transparency

Respect of the principle of transparency should be a fundamental principle of the Union. Democratic procedures are inconceivable without it.

Although the principle of transparency constitutes a legal principle stemming from the Union's law in effect, its explicit enshrinement in the new Treaty would constitute a clear step forward. In addition to increased transparency in the operation of the Union's institutions, consolidation of the Treaties into a single text and legislation simplified to make it easily comprehensible to the average European citizen, will help it regain the lost support of its citizens and reduce the distance between them and Union institutions.

3. Subsidiarity

The principle of subsidiarity must be maximized, as the means of defining how the EU competencies should be applied. Subsidiarity, a fundamental organisational principle ensuring that decisions are made as close as possible to the citizen, should be used as an instrument for strengthening the role of the citizen, the local authorities and the regions within the integration process.¹⁵

V The European Union's Social Dimension

The Union is currently experiencing an acute 'legitimacy' crisis. In order to overcome this crisis the Union should evolve into an institution that makes a positive contribution in solving the day-to-day problems faced by its citizens. Institutional and procedural adjustments, simplifications and clarifications may be important, but these cannot become a substitute for positive action on the part of the Union. This should be manifested through actual policies.

The European Union, therefore, can only win the support of society if it develops visible, credible and effective policies, as well as means and actions needed to achieve basic economic and social objectives in these cases.

1. Social Policy

A revised Treaty should balance the promotion of full Monetary Union with the goals of economic and social development, promotion of a higher level of employment, social protection, as well as improved living standards, as provided for by Article 2 of the Treaty. This is a tall order. Efforts to achieve nominal convergence must not lead to a fracturing of cohesion and solidarity between the Union's member-States. Greece's constant pursuit should be the reduction of inter-regional inequalities through the further promotion of policies of economic and social cohesion, employment and social protection, and through the Union's common policies. Thus, economic imperatives should be balanced with socially acceptable objectives and values.

Greece is in favour of strengthening of the EU's broader social protection policy. A major contribution in this direction would be the incorporation of the social rights included in the Social Charter and the Social Protocol, in the revised Treaty. The new Treaty should formally establish a minimum level of social protection, regulation of employment relations and social welfare in favour of disadvantaged persons and social groups.

2. Employment

The serious problems of unemployment, joblessness and social exclusion have worsened to the point where they threaten the social fabric of the Union's countries. It is imperative to find the means and methods to combat these problems effectively.

Greece would favourably consider the introduction of greater co-ordination in the E.U.'s social actions and the formulation of a more active employment policy than what is currently in place. The Union should further strengthen its strategy on employment, as decided by the European Councils of Essen, Cannes and Madrid. This strategy is based

on a combination of macro-economic policies and structural interventions in labour markets, aiming at the creation of new jobs.

Greece supports the introduction of a special chapter for the promotion, at Community level, of employment issues, in the new Treaty. The establishment of an Employment Committee or the use of Structural Funds to finance employment objectives should be considered as policy actions for the future. National employment policies, however, should be kept sufficiently flexible, as the unemployment problem differs from country to country.

3. New Policies

To help combat the current economic and social problems of its citizens, the European Union should proceed to develop new policies, taking into account the principle of subsidiarity. More specifically, Greece supports the addition of new Titles in the revised Treaty concerning *civil defence, energy, tourism, environment, the union's island regions, public health, culture* and the need for a *demographic policy*.

With regard to *civil defence*, the Greek side proposes an assistance mechanism for member-states hit by natural calamities or disasters as a further expression of solidarity between member states, and a tangible way for the E.U. to come closer to the citizen.

In the field of *energy*, Greece attaches importance to the definition of a «European Energy Policy». Greece stresses the need to add provisions concerning the security of supplies, to associate energy with the goal of cohesion and to include references to the environment, energy conservation and use of renewable sources of energy.

For Greece, *tourism* is a sector that heavily contributes to the international recognition of our common cultural heritage by Europeans being better acquainted with each other and to their common European identity. At the same time, it represents a major economic activity, greatly contributing to the Community GNP and employment, especially in areas with significant seasonal fluctuations in economic activity.

In terms of environment, Greece intends to propose certain amendments promoting sustainable development in the implementation of the environment policy and of encouraging environmental research and technological development. Greece also supports the inclusion of a specific reference to Environmental TransEuropean Networks in Title XII.

A goal to which Greece attaches particular importance is the inclusion in the Treaty of provisions on the Union's *Island Regions* as regions of special cultural, ecological and social significance. The EU's current structural policy has not managed to provide satisfactory solutions to the problems of isolation and economic fragility of such areas, since

inequalities between mainland and island regions of the Union appear to be constantly growing. There is an imperative need to bring exceptional means and considerable efforts to support these areas. If the particular disadvantages these areas are facing are to be overcome and if they are to make full use of their natural wealth and human resources on equal terms with the Union's other regions.

Greece is in favour of strengthening the Treaty's provisions on *Public Health*. This will make possible the adoption of binding acts aimed at the introduction of minimum standards in this area, taking due account of the particular conditions prevailing in each member-state.

Greece will seek improvements regarding the provisions on *culture*, a fundamental common element of the European identity. The development of such provisions must continue to respect and promote the Union's variety of cultures. In addition, Greece considers self-evident the maintenance of the principle of equality of languages in the Union.

Special care will be required for the formulation of a *demographic policy* which will address the problem of low birth rates and an aging population — phenomena with negative repercussions on Europe's social security systems.

VI Development of the Institutions of the European Union.

There is an imminent need to reform and develop the institutional system of the European Union so that it is more democratic, efficient and transparent, while also capable of facing the challenges of the future enlargements.¹⁵ In light of the Political Union's prospective development, Greece's goal must be to provide the EU with institutions that are transparent, democratically structured and capable of making decisions and solving problems efficiently.

The development and adjustment of the institutional system must be based on certain basic principles, such as the following:

- institutional unity and equality of all member states through the reinforcement of a single institutional framework,
- preservation of the basic institutional balance, as this has been shaped by Treaties and historical experience, and
- preservation of the institutional, legal and political *acquis* of the European Union.

The respect of institutional unity and equality dictates, *inter alia*, the avoidance of institutionalised forms of «differentiated» or «flexible» integration, which under any guise or form would introduce permanent discriminations among member states and upset the basic principles of institutional equality.

Greece is opposed to the institution of provisions which would lead to

the fragmentation of the unification process. The notions of «differentiated» or «flexible» integration, of a «multi-speed» Europe, or of a «hard core» Europe cannot be accepted by Greece. These notions are dangerous to the extent that they may lead to new divisions and antagonisms in Europe.

Greece believes that the method of «temporary transitional provisions» which is provided for in the Treaty and has been successfully tested is the answer to the problems posed by the need for deepening of the unification and enlargement processes. This is the method which ensures the unity of goals as well as institutional unity and contributes to the cohesion of the European Union without hindering the acceleration of unification.

VII Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

During the last forty years, the contribution of the European Union to peace and stability in Europe has been significant. Nevertheless, as the Yugoslavian and other recent crises have indicated, the E.U. lacks both the instruments and clearly-defined objectives to deal effectively with the new situation which has arisen on our continent, as well as outside it, after the end of the Cold War.

The EU's external action should aim at upholding the values constituting the essence of European integration and contribute to the security of the continent and its periphery through the prevention and elimination of potential sources of crisis.

1. Common Foreign Policy

A framework for the conduct of a Common Foreign Policy among the Union members is now essential. This should include, as a minimum prerequisite, the recognition, respect, and guarantee of the provisions of international law and treaties. This framework will constitute the single legal system of the CFSP. Within this context, CFSP actions might be undertaken on the basis of statutory principles agreed upon by the institutions and member states of the E.U.

A genuine CFSP presupposes a clear definition of general principles and objectives, having as a guide the gradual formulation of common basic interests, and the development of practical measures of an institutional and procedural nature which will contribute to the deeper «communitarisation» of the current CFSP system and render CFSP capable of protecting the territorial integrity and external frontiers of the EU.

The provisions of the Treaty on European Union concerning CFSP led to high expectations, yet at the same time caused deep disappointment due to their shortcomings. In Greece, it is generally believed that the lack

of political will, essential to the formulation of common positions and the undertaking of common actions, and the actual pillar structure, with all the ensuing defects. Hence Greece supports the concept of bringing the so-called second pillar closer to the first, that is to say, its partial communitarisation. Nevertheless, this would imply:

- more consistency and coherence in all aspects of the Union's external action,
- wider participation of the institutions, and
- inclusion of all CFSP expenditure in the Union's budget, allowing for the possibility of recourse, in exceptional cases, to national contributions.

The creation of an Analysis and Planning Unit is equally essential to an effective CFSP. Such event is proposed within the framework of the General Secretariat of the Council, along with the participation of the member states and Commission. This Unit would contribute greatly to the formulation of common assessments and approaches concerning the problems which at present are still subject to a variety of national approaches and interests. The functioning of this Unit will help promote the achievement of a consensus.

A more effective implementation of a CFSP will require affording wider competencies to the European Commission, while the role of the Council's Secretariat will need to be reinforced. The objectives of CFSP should be clearly defined and broadened to include:

- respect of human rights and democratic freedoms,
- guarantee of the EU's external frontiers and territorial integrity, as well as the adoption of a solidarity and mutual defence assistance clause¹⁶ and
- contribution of the Union to ensure the prevention of conflicts and to seek the consolidation of stability, particularly in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean basin.

In the case of Greece, the shaping of such a security environment is very important as it will facilitate the transfer of substantial resources from the defence area and will further social and economic goals. In other words, there is a clear trade-off between the reinforcement of common security and promotion of cohesion.

Of course given the instability and insecurity in its surrounding region, Greece is obliged to spend a disproportionate share of its national resources for national and collective security purposes. As a percentage of its GNP, this share is the highest in the Union. Unlike the vast majority of member states, therefore, Greece has been unable to reap the so-called «peace dividend».

Decision-making in this key sector is exclusively based on the rule of unanimity. The extension of qualified majority voting to the second pillar

in issues which do not affect the vital national interests of the country should be considered in the light of the shape that this pillar will assume, as well as the degree of solidarity demonstrated. But it should also be based on the adoption of the aforementioned goals. Other means of Union's external action could be examined, provided that the institutional integrity, the coherence of EU policy and the equal status of the member states is not endangered.

2. Common Security and Defence

Common Foreign and Security Policy should be complemented with a common defence policy and common defence in order to become credible, effective and capable of facing the new threats and challenges that have emerged after the end of the Cold War. Since this policy will be complementary rather than antithetical to that of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO remains the key stone to the European security system.

In view of the need to develop an EU defence identity, the Western European Union (WEU) should be incorporated gradually in the E.U., according to a specific timetable. Greece supports the conclusion of a binding agreement between the EU and the WEU (i.e., for as long as the latter functions autonomously), on the basis of which the W.E.U. will be obliged to carry out duties and missions assigned to it by the Union.

In any case, defence policy should be formulated within the institutions of the European Union. For this purpose, it will be necessary to provide for meetings of member states' Ministers of Defence in the framework of the Council.

VIII Concluding Remarks

Greece is simultaneously a member of the European Union and a geographic part of the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Greece can play a major political and economic role in these two areas. Greece's ultimate goal is to integrate the Balkan countries into the European institutions, and to enhance significantly the co-operation of the EU with the Mediterranean countries. At the same time, there is a major effort to combine Greek and EU interests in all sectors.

With reference to Greece's aim regarding the Intergovernmental Conference, Greece has been able to play a significant part in this exercise and contribute in its own way to the future of Europe.¹⁷ However, the Greek government would like better relations with its partners and allies regarding its interests, especially the problems in its external relations. To this extent, Greece would expect more understanding and support from the European Union.

Greece, like other member states, has not been in a position to find perfect answers to all the questions asked by the IGC. A federal

organization like the European Union is an attractive option for Greece. The answer, to the challenges and crisis confronting the European Union can be summed up in the promotion of the political union. This is attractive not only for reasons of philosophical preference, but also for reasons associated with the country's geography and its position within the Union.¹⁸

While supporting the federalist approach, the Greek government will not overlook or ignore each member state's 'particular conditions'. In the case of Greece, this term has been overly used, something that automatically stirs up reaction. Nevertheless, Greek particularities do exist.

Still, the main intention of Greece is to achieve a better balance of rights and obligations for all member states. Greece has finalized the positions which it will advocate during the IGC. Most of which are summarised below!

The role of the European Parliament must be strengthened; here the process of 'co-deciding' has to be simplified and further expanded. The European Parliament must also have a greater say in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in the Co-operation on Justice and Home Affairs. The Parliament should also have greater control over the work of the Commission and should participate more actively in the appointment of the latter's members.

Having carried out these measures, the Commission will enjoy greater status, due to the fact that its appointment will legitimize its power, thus enabling its members to undertake a more active role, not only in the EU, but also in the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as in the Co-operation on Justice and Home Affairs.

Furthermore, the EU field of competence of the should be expanded, in particular culture, education, consumer protection, transport, tourism, and energy, should be given more attention.

Protection of the territorial integrity of the European Union is an issue which should also receive more attention through the building of the appropriate mechanisms for safeguarding and preserving peace. These mechanisms should be included in the objectives of the Common Foreign Policy. Furthermore, the Western European Union should be incorporated into the framework of the Common Defence Policy. This is a very important issue for Greece and it definitely requires careful examination. Issues of defence are quite delicate; not to mention the fact that there are different positions regarding EU and its relationship with the United States and NATO.

There is also the need for an effective decision-making mechanism. Greece will support the principle of equality between member states.

While essential in the European Parliament, the population criterion, cannot apply as easily to the Council. If unanimous decisions are difficult to achieve within an enlarged Union, the Greek government does not overlook the fact that, the country will be confronted with divergences between the common and the national interest for several years to come in the course of integration. In the field of external policy, therefore, Greece should examine the possibility of invoking vital interests.

Greece is in search of allies and common ground among its partners in order to improve its position within the European Union. The country's target is to be able to play a significant role in constructing the new Europe. Within this context, Greece aims to ensure the institutional, political and economic conditions necessary for the EU's successful enlargement to Cyprus, Malta and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Greece is part of Europe for better or for worse and its partners should show the necessary solidarity. Greece contributes to the political operation and physiognomy of the European Union and has always contributed to the joint effort of European unification.

NOTES

1. The promotion of the integration process, the unity and effectiveness of the institutional structure, the preservation of the «acquis communautaire» and «finalité politique» and the achievement of economic and social cohesion should be heavily safeguarded.
2. The Balkans were characterised since the First World War as the "powder-keg" of Europe.
3. The most significant external threat to Greece's interests comes from Turkey. The continued occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, the Army of the Aegean Sea turned against the Greek Islands, and the Turkish claims in the Aegean Sea consist a clear and permanent proof of the hostile position of Turkey towards Greece.
4. For a brief but good analysis, see Yannis Kranidiotis, *Foreign Policy and European Union*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Antonis Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 1994, pp. 7-17, (in Greek).
5. The per capita GNP of Greece, which in 1980 stood at 58 per cent of the EC's average, dropped to 52 per cent in 1992.
6. Greece is the only orthodox member state of the European Union.
7. See the interesting analysis of Nikolaus Wenturis, "Political Culture", in Panos Kazakos and P. C. Ioakimides (eds.), *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*, Pinter Publishers, Guildford, 1994, pp. 225-237, (in English).
8. The only exception to this policy are the affairs related with Greece's foreign policy.

9. See "For a Democratic European Union with Political and Social Content" Part I, (*Greece's Contribution to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference*), Compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ATHENS NEWS AGENCY, Feature Stories, No. 59, April 17, 1996, (in English).

10. The new enlargement is unlikely to provide the political and economic benefits anticipated by the candidate countries, if it results in alterations to the «acquis communautaire» and the E.U. policies, or ends up impeding decision and policy-making.

11. The Common Agricultural Policy will have to continue obeying certain fundamental principles, like the unity and organisation of the markets, recognition of the multi-dimensional role of farmers, definition of prices and specification of the accompanying measures, including the establishment of the system of direct income support, aiming at securing a sufficient income for farmers.

12. Subsidiarity should not be used as a means to alter the «acquis communautaire», to renationalise Community policies, to retard the development of the Union, or as a means to expand unduly the Union's competencies.

13. See "For a Democratic European Union with Political and Social Content" Part II, (*Greece's Contribution to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference*), Compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ATHENS NEWS AGENCY, Feature Stories, No. 60, April 19, 1996, (in English).

14. Currently, the status of Member State of the Union does not provide clear guarantees for its security. This fact constitutes a serious lacuna for an entity that presents itself to the outside world as a "Union",

15. See the speech of Christos Papoutsis, in Stelios Perrakis (ed.), *The European Union After the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, The Role and the Position of the Small and Medium, in Respect of Population, Member States*, Nea Synora Publishers, Athens, 1996, pp. 31-37 (in Greek).

16. For a good analysis, see the speech of Yannis Kranidiotis, in "The Future of the European Unifying Process, Perspectives of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996", *Research Papers*, No. 31, Hellenic Center for European Studies, May 1995, pp. 2-14, (in Greek).

17. See the speech of Michalis Papayannakis, in "The Future of the European Unifying Process, Perspectives of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996", *Research Papers*, No. 31, Hellenic Center for European Studies, May 1995, pp. 29-37, (in Greek).

18. See B. Vila Costa, "The Legalised Contribution of the Small and Medium, in Respect of Population, Member States to the Integrated European Systems", in Stelios Perrakis (ed.), *The European Union After the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, The Role and the Position of the Small and Medium, in Respect of Population, Member States*, Nea Synora Publishers, Athens, 1996, pp. 137-146, (in French), and A. Maurer, *ibid*, pp. 147-162, (in English).

CHRONOLOGIE-CHYPRE

Période du 1er octobre 1997 au 31 mars 1998

1er octobre: Célébration du trente septième anniversaire de l'indépendance de la République de Chypre

12 octobre: Réunion de la Commission parlementaire mixte Chypre - Union Européenne

10 - 12 novembre: Richard Holbrooke, émissaire spécial du président des Etats-Unis effectuée à Chypre sa première visite

12 - 13 décembre: Conseil européen de Luxembourg qui décide de lancer le processus d'adhésion de la République de Chypre à l'Union européenne

23 décembre: Déclaration à Washington du Premier ministre turc estimant que la décision du Conseil européen de Luxembourg conduira probablement à la partition de Chypre

8 janvier: Déclaration du Premier ministre britannique Tony Blair: «Il n'y a pas de pré-conditions pour l'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE»

8 - 15 février: Election du président de la République de Chypre au suffrage universel (Glafcos Cléridès, président sortant)

Premier tour: Iacovou 40,61%, Cléridès 40,06%, Lyssaridès 10,59%, Galanos 4,04%, Vassiliou 3,00%, Koutsou 0,91%, Rolandis 0,78%

Deuxième tour: Cléridès 50,80%), Iacovou 49,20%

Nouveau gouvernement

Iannis Kassoulidès, *Ministre des Affaires étrangères*

Christodoulos Christodoulou, *Ministre de l'Economie et des finances*

Dinos Michailidès, *Ministre de l'Intérieur*

Iannakis Omirou, *Ministre de la Défense*

Lycourgos Kappas, *Ministre de l'Education et de la Culture*

Léonidas Iérodiakonou, *Ministre des Communications et des Travaux Publics*

Nicos Rolandis, *Ministre du Commerce, Industrie et Tourisme*

Costas Thémistocléous, *Ministre de l'Agriculture, Ressources Naturelles et Environnement*

Andréas Moshoutas, *Ministre du Travail et de la Sécurité sociale*

Nicos Koshis, *Ministre de la Justice et de l'Ordre public*

Christos Solomis, *Ministre de la Santé*

Christos Stylianidès, *Porte parole du gouvernement*

Georges Vassiliou est nommé chef de la délégation chypriote chargée de mener les négociations d'adhésion à l'UE

30-31 mars: Ouverture officielle des négociations d'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE

CHRONOLOGIE-GRECE

14 octobre: Protestation des autorités grecques après une série de violations de l'espace aérien hellénique par l'aviation militaire turque

3 - 4 novembre: Réunion à ééraklion en Crète des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de huit pays balkaniques (Albanie, Bosnie, Bulgarie, FYROM, Grèce, Roumanie, Turquie, Yougoslavie).

23 novembre: Inauguration à Thessalonique par le Président Stéphanopoulos d'un monument à la mémoire des victimes de l'éolocauste

11 décembre: Le ministre grec de la Culture, Evangelos Venizelos annonce la prochaine modernisation du Musée archéologique national d'Athènes dont le cout sera de milliards de drachmes

31 décembre: L'inflation qui était de 7,5% en 1996 a été réduite à 4,7% en 1997

9 janvier: Visite à Athenes du ministre français des affaires étrangères éubert Védrine venu plaider la cause de la Turquie qui souhaite s'intégrer à l'UE

23 février: Le ministre grec des affaires étrangères Théodore Pangalos en visite au Caire désapprouve la coopération militaire de la Turquie avec Israël

13 mars: La Grèce demande l'adhésion de sa monnaie, la drachme au Système monétaire européen, première étape devant mener à son adhésion à l'euro qu'elle souhaite adopter le 1er janvier 2001

14 mars: Message solennel à la nation du Premier ministre Costas Simitis qui annonce une dévaluation de la drachme de 13,8% et un plan d'austérité économique

Document:

Letter from Clerides to Kofi Annan

Nicosia, 2 April 1998

Excellency,

I wish to refer to the letter dated 19 March, addressed to you by Ambassador Tuluy Tanc, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Turkey to the United Nations which was circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/52/384, S/1998/255 of 19 March 1998). Annexed to that letter there is a text described by the Turkish Chargé d'affaires as "letter dated 5 March 198 from HE Mr. Rauf Denktash, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" addressed to me, as well as a "summary of the statement made by President Denktash in connection with the peace initiative of the Turkish Cypriot side for the Settlement of the Cyprus Issue".

The transmission and circulation by the Turkish Representative of the aforementioned material is an example of how a Member of the United Nations, by abusing a privilege derived from membership, promotes aims and objectives which are contrary to the United Nations Charter and International Law. The material in question emanates from a secessionist entity proclaimed as illegal by Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) as well as by subsequent resolutions. These resolutions, inter alia, "call upon all States not to recognise the purported state of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" set up by secessionist acts and... not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity". It should be pointed out that this secessionist entity has been recognised only by Turkey, the country which created and maintains it, through the use of military force and in total disregard of the UN Security Council Resolutions.

His Excellency
Mr. Kofi Annan,
Secretary General
of the United Nations Organization,
New York.

Turkey's contempt for international legality is also exemplified by its failure to fulfill its obligations derived from the 1960 Agreements establishing the Republic of Cyprus. Under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey, together with Greece and the United Kingdom recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus. As a result of the 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey and the continuing occupation of the 37% of Cyprus territory by the Turkish troops, Turkey turned from a guarantor power of Cyprus' independence to an aggressive occupying power, violating and threatening what in fact it was mandated to protect and respect under the 1960 Agreements.

The title accorded to Mr. Denktash by Turkey and mentioned in the Turkish Chargé d'affaires' letter is consistent with Turkey's policy attempting to legitimise in international fora the illegal secessionist entity and those purporting to represent it, in order to undermine Cyprus' independence. Mr. R. Denktash's one and only representative capacity is that of the leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community in representing his Community in the efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem under the auspices of the United Nations and your Excellency's good offices mission, as provided for in the pertinent UN resolutions. In this respect your statement made in Geneva on 28 March, after your meeting with Mr. Denktash, by which you expressed the UN position on this very issue is pertinent and timely.

Your Excellency,

I do not consider it proper to comment on the contents of a letter I refused to receive for reasons of principle and order. I do however consider it appropriate to make some general observations relating to the Turkish Chargé d'affaires' document in its totality, irrespective of the signatories or authors of its various parts, since it contains the official position of the Turkish Government on the issues raised in it.

There exists one state in Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus, established under international Agreements, with its fundamental rights to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the continuing occupation of almost 37% of its territory have in no way affected or could affect the international legal status of the Republic of Cyprus.

As provided in the United Nation's Security Council Resolution 939 (2) of 29 July 1994, reaffirmed ever since, "*a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a*

single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions in a bi-communal and bizonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;"

The aforementioned Security Council resolutions are binding on all states including of course the Republic of Turkey.

The parameters of the solution of the Cyprus problem are clearly and unambiguously defined and set in the Security Council resolutions, which, together with the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements, constitute the only basis for any negotiated settlement of the problem.

If the Turkish side sincerely wishes to ally itself with the international community in the efforts to find a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem there is no other way, but to respect and adhere to international legality and to what has already been agreed. The Turkish attempt to change the basis of the negotiations, strikes at the heart of the negotiating process with unforeseen consequences not only for Cyprus but for peace and stability in the region. We feel that the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability, should reconfirm its commitment for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of its own Resolutions, and the High Level Agreements and, in this framework, urge the Turkish side to return to the negotiating process.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus, like any other government, has both the right and duty to ensure the security of its people. As a sovereign and independent state, the Republic of Cyprus takes what steps are needed to protect its territory from further Turkish aggression. The reaction of Turkey to the upgrading of Cyprus' defence capabilities has the sole intention to maintain the largely imbalanced military status quo on the island, which the Security Council has unequivocally considered unacceptable.

The defensive intentions of my Government, with regard to the S-300 missile system, have been made very clear all along. Cyprus has repeatedly stressed that the system is in no way intended against any country or the Turkish Cypriots.

The undisputed proof of Cyprus' intentions lies in my proposal for the complete demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus made in November 1993 and which addresses the security concerns of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

The proposal, if accepted by Turkey, would remove the reason that necessitated the general effort to improve my country's defence capabilities.

Your Excellency,

The people of Cyprus are looking forward to the future. A future with no foreign troops or occupation, a future with no refugees, a future with no missing persons. A future in a united country where all Cypriots, irrespective of religion or ethnic origin can live and work in peace with dignity, mutual respect and security.

The ideas and ways of yesterday will not lead the people of Cyprus towards the realisation of the Cyprus they want to build. Yesterday's ideas and ways are the recipe for new sufferings and even for a total catastrophe.

We all should look to the future. And the future of Cyprus lies with the family of nations of Europe. I take this opportunity, your Excellency, to appeal once again to my Turkish Cypriot compatriots to join this noble effort.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Glafcos Clerides)
President of the Republic of Cyprus

Recensions / Book Reviews

Christos P. Ioannides: *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*. Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991

This book describes Northern Cyprus which Turkey invaded in 1974 and still occupies. It describes how Turkey has illegally changed the cultural and demographic character of the northern part of Cyprus by transforming into a Turkish province.

The book is divided into 11 chapters. Chapter One deals with the issue of Anatolia settlers brought to the Northern part of Cyprus by Turkey to change the ethnodemography of Cyprus. On November 15, 1983, under the umbrella of the Turkish Army, the Turkish-Cypriot «legislative assembly» declared it a Turkish state with Rauf Denktash as its president. The occupied part of Cyprus covers 1,350 square miles (size of Rhode Island) along with the Turkish occupied army of approximately 35,000 Turkish troops, and a Turkish-Cypriot population of about 98,000. «The Ethno-demography of Cyprus» is discussed in Chapter Two.

Despite the lack of reliable census material on the ethnic composition of Cyprus, the author looks at available records starting with the British census of 1881 and 1960. In both cases the author found that the overwhelming majority of the Cyprus was Greek Orthodox. The Turkish Cypriot arguments of Turkish emigration to Cyprus are refuted from the evidence. The author makes the following conclusions: 1) both Greek and Turkish Cypriot emigration patterns paralleled the population ratio between the two communities, 2) both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have emigrated for economic reasons and, 3) no mass Turkish-Cypriot emigration to Turkey occurred, therefore there should not be any massive Turkish-Cypriot return from Turkey after 1974 (p. 22).

In Chapter Three, the author outlines the parallel methods of conquest and colonization of the Ottomans in 1571 and the Turkish invasion, occupation and colonization of Cyprus in 1974. In both cases colonization was carried out as a systematic policy of the Turkish government (p. 27). Since 1974 the author estimates that about 74,000 Turkish settlers have colonized Cyprus, including peasants, civil servants, soldiers, laborers and tourist industry personnel, and retired officers. Through this colonization policy, many Bulgarian Muslims and Kurds are also allowed to settle in the Turkish occupied Northern Cyprus. About 174,700 Greek Cypriots fled from their homes in Northern Cyprus as the Turkish army

advanced in the double invasion of 1974. It is estimated that most of the Turks settlers settled in villages and a few in towns and cities. About 60% of them have settled in the Famagusta district. The majority of these settlers live separate from Turkish Cypriots.

In Chapter Four, the author examines two basic issues: «The Enosis Movement» and «The Pan-Turkish Ideology» in Cyprus. Regarding the «Enosis Movement», or the union of Cyprus with Greece, an intense political mobilization began in the mid-1950s led by General George Grivas known as «Digenis» for the liberation of Cyprus from British rule and the union with Greece. Archbishop Makarios was the political leader of Cyprus who enjoyed overwhelming popular support. The Turkish Cypriots were not mobilized until later. Greece and Greek Cypriots fought side by side with the British during World War II and hoped England after the War (as Churchill had promised) would cede Cyprus to Greece. The struggle for selfdetermination began with the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots were used by the British against the Greek Cypriots. The EOKA movement was against the British colonists and not against the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot leadership did everything to help the colonial government in its military campaign against EOKA. An Anglo-Turkish policy force was formed to fight the EOKA and the Greek Cypriots. The author believes the failure of Greek Cypriot leadership and Greece to anticipate the Anglo-Turkish alliance had disastrous consequences for the Greek Cypriots.

The issue of Pan-Turkism is an extreme form of Turkish nationalism which promoted Turkish irredentism. It has its origins in the 19th century and in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. The author argues that the major objective of Pan-Turkism was to bring all outside Turks under the umbrella of Turkish State. It glorified the ancient symbols of Turkish conquest the mythical grey wolf (bozkurt) of the Asian Steppes which according to Turkish legend, led the early Turkish tribes in their march of conquest, (p. 60). The bozkurt became the symbol of PanTurkism in the 20th century. Pan-Turkism competes with the ideology of Kemal Atatuk whose political ideology was in favor of a homogeneous and secular state and against irredentism. According to the author, since 1960, Pan-Turkism has been the mainstream of Turkish politics (p. 63). The Pan-Turkist ideology reflects the attitudes toward Cyprus and Greece. In general, PanTurkism advances various racial and demographic theories to prove that the Greeks are not the descendants of ancient Greece and Cyprus are more Turkish than Greek.

In Chapter Five, the author examines more closely the activities of Pan-Turkism in the 1950s. In 1946, the establishment of the Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association, as a mouthpiece of Pan-Turkism in Cyprus, was founded in Istanbul. The stated purpose of this Pan-Turkist association was to advance Turkey's irredentist nationalism (p. 77). The Pan-Turkists were active and advanced the idea that Cyprus is Turkish. Furthermore, a number of Turkish newspapers along with this Pan-Turkist cultural organization advocated that the nationalist movement in Cyprus, the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church and EOKA were controlled by communists and an enosis of Cyprus with Greece will jeopardize Turkey's vital interests. The author shows that the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir on September 6, 1955, were organized by this Pan-Turkish group. Both the Menderes government and the leadership of *Kıbrıs Türkleri* (Cyprus is Turkish) were behind the riots against the Greeks in Turkey. Both the government of Menderes, who was convicted and hanged later, and the opposition were implicated in the riots and the support of Pan-Turkist ideology. Three of the most influential members of the organizations central executive committee were Hikmet Bil, Kamil Onal, and Ahmed Emin (p. 84), who were actively involved in anti-Greek Cypriot activities. The Turkish press also had close ties with this organization.

Chapter Six deals more specifically with the «Cyprus Question and the Anti-Greek Riots of September 1955». The riots against the Greek minority in Constantinople and Izmir reached such catastrophic proportions that the Greek community and its institutions were destroyed almost completely. The Turkish government was responsible for these riots which almost obliterated the Greek community from about 100,000 prior to September 1955 to about 3,000 today (p. 97). The Menderes government was found guilty of masterminding the riots. Greece and the armed forces downplayed the extent of destruction because their main concern was their anti-communism hysteria of the 1950s.

In Cyprus proper, EOKA had started its military campaign in April 1955 by attacking British military and police installations. Despite EOKA's assurances that their campaign was not against the Turkish Cypriots but against the British, the Turkish Cypriots sided with the British and adopted the view that Cyprus is Turkish. The British policy in Cyprus was close to that of Turkey. Through rumors and innuendos the Turks accused the EOKA as preparing an all out attack on the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish newspapers helped in spreading false rumors. In the meantime a conference was convened by prime minister Anthony Eden in which he invited Turkey and Greece for talks in London.

Makarios and the Greek Cypriots were against this conference known as the tripartite London Conference. It was this conference along with Zurich that gave Turkey a legitimacy to Cyprus. The rumors of imminent Greek Cypriot massacre against the Turkish Cypriots proved to be a fabrication by the «Kibris Turktur» movement «Cyprus is Turkish» (p. 110). The anti-Greek riots in Turkey were organized and instigated by the Cyprus Turkish Society (Kibris Turktur) and supported by the Turkish government. In their proclamation the Kibris Turktur society made it clear it was the same society that set up the bomb in Atatürk Kemal's home in Thessaloniki in order to justify the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir.

Chapter Seven deals with the role of Turkish officers and a new organization known as Volkan to counter EOKA. It appeared in September 1955, the day of the anniversary of the Greek defeat and evacuation of Smyrna in 1922. The Volkan organization adopted as its symbol the grey wolf. This nationalist Turkish organization was trained and guided by Turkish officers. It urged all Turkish Cypriots to disengage from any cooperation with the Greek Cypriots. The TMT (Turkish Resistance Org.) or Volkan's main objective was to promote separation between the two communities. The TMT was not dissolved even after Cyprus gained its independence. Prior to the invasion the Turkish Cypriots lived in enclaves and had a self-proclaimed administration. The segregation was the prelude to partition following the invasion of 1974. A number of Turkish officers served in Cyprus with TMT between 1955-1974. During the period of 1964-68 Denktash was in Turkey. He returned to Cyprus in 1968 and became the undisputed leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.

In Chapter Eight, the author examines the role of Pan-Turkish and Turkish Islamic groups in Cyprus during the 1960's and 1970's. According to the author, «[T]he Turkish government treated the Cyprus issue as both a nationalist and an Islamic issue» (p. 159). The irredentist goals of Pan-Turkism have been pursued in Cyprus all along. All successive Turkish governments have treated Cyprus as part of Pan-Turkist policy since World War II, the author argues (p. 160). In the last two chapters (Nine and Ten) the author expounds on the politics of the self-proclaimed Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus and TRNC and the turning of the TRNC into a Turkish province by changing the hellenic character of the occupied part of Northern Cyprus. A systematic cultural and administrative Turkification of Cyprus has been going on since even before the Turkish invasion in 1974. Greek villages, and streets have changed into Turkish names. The Greek Orthodox churches have been converted into mosques.

In conclusion, the author believes that Turkey has embarked on an imperial path of possession of territories by altering the actual demographic composition of Cyprus since the Turkish invasion in 1974. In carrying out the demographic alteration of Cyprus, Turkey has followed a policy of systematic colonization of the Northern part of the occupied Cyprus. Indeed, the author documents the transfer of about 74,000 Anatolian settlers to occupied Cyprus. The ideological justification for Turkey's new imperialism is through its ideology of Pan-Turkism and the belief that Cyprus is Turkish. Islam is used by Turkey to win support for Turkey's Cyprus policy in the Arab and Islamic countries and diffuse domestic pressure from Islamic groups (p. 192).

According to the author, by using its military might Turkey follows a policy of coercive diplomacy with regard to Cyprus and Greece. The author believes that the plight of Cyprus is due primarily to the combined blunders of Nicosia and Athens that have contributed to the present situation. On the contrary Turkey's overall policy toward Cyprus is consistent since the 1950s. The most important blunders include: the London Tripartite Conference in 1955; the lack of a determined response by Greece to the anti-Greek riots of 1955 in Turkey; the Zurich-London agreements of 1959; the untimely proposals by Cypriot President Makarios to amend the constitution of Cyprus in November 1963; the lack of a Greek response to the Turkish bombing of northwest Cyprus in August 1964; the withdrawal of the Greek military division from Cyprus in December 1967; and above all, the military coup staged by the Greek junta against Makarios in July 1974, p. 193.

Ioannides believes that the self-proclaimed «Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus» has been by any standards totally dependent and absorbed culturally, militarily, politically, diplomatically, and economically into Turkey. The TRNC, the author argues, has become the 68th Turkish province (p. 194). The incorporation of TRNC into a Turkish province has undermined the concept of «intercommunal» talks under the UN auspices (p. 195). The author ends his book with a rather pessimistic view of Cyprus by believing that Cyprus may very well be swallowed by Turkey if a federal arrangement is agreed upon and Turkey will continue to exert an imperial vision in eastern Mediterranean and its policies toward Greece and Cyprus will continue to be aggressive. In addition, the author has provided two useful appendices of documents, an extensive bibliography, and an index that make his book highly documented (a total of 50 pages).

Ioannides has written a highly readable, fully researched and well argued book. His main conclusion: Cyprus has been transformed into a Turkish province. Although I tend to agree with his basic analysis and conclusions, it seems to me the author has not taken into serious consideration the international factor as one of the most important factors in the Cyprus issue. I recommend this book to all those interested in the Cyprus conflict.

Vahakn N. Dadrian: *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity*, Blue Crane Books, 1996.

Vahakn N. Dadrian, an internationally well-known scholar on the Armenian genocide wrote an exceedingly important and scholarly book, not directly related to the issue of his life-long interest, the Armenian Genocide, but on the *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide*. This book is a review of the historical evidence of German complicity in the Armenian genocide. Indeed, as Hitler contemplated the Jewish extermination he once asked: «Who remembers the Armenians?» The focus of the present study is an examination of the role that German officials (both military and civilian) played in the Armenian genocide by Turkey, then an ally of Germany during World War I.

Using an avalanche of historical sources, both primary and secondary (drawn from diplomatic history, international law, political science, and official German documents), the author has written a book indicting not only Germany but also the Western world—an affront against humanity. In his words, the author «attempts to dissect and expose the lethal role performance of these officials who, for reasons of their own, allowed themselves to be coopted by the Turk Ittihadist leaders to aid the executioners of the Armenian people» (p.94). The author believes, «the study is also an invitation to consider the entire matter as a challenge to historical truth and, therefore, ultimately treat it as a moral issue» (p. 94). Dadrian argues the Armenian genocide is not due to memory amnesia, nor is it a «forgotten genocide,» but it was sacrificed at the altar of political expediency and economic rapaciousness by the victorious Entente powers. Seen in this light, it is more about the distribution of power relations in national and international politics rather than historical truth. In a diabolical sense, the Turkish denial of Armenian genocide served as a shield to Nazi Germany. Despite the overwhelming historical evidence, the author states that the Turks continue to deny the occurrence. In his words, «Turkey has engaged in all forms of public relations and

co-optation, cajoling, and intimidation to influence the western media» (introduction). According to him, there is a systematic effort by modern Turkey to conceal its crime by changing the archives and deleting sentences in a sort of cover-up. The book was written primarily for German audiences and relies a great deal on German State archives and documents. The author also makes clear that German complicity in the Armenian genocide does not in any way exonerate the crime committed by Turkey, which is second only to the holocaust in the 20th century. In his introduction, Dadrian states that «German minor officials and consuls stationed in Turkey had documented the Armenian genocide, sometimes in defiance of their superiors or in secrecy. Most of these reports were classified information and were marked as confidential secret or top secret» (p. 11).

Using a variety of informal and secret methods such as stealth, conspiracy, and clandestine transactions, Turkey bribed German and Austrian newspapers and agents to suppress any trace of Armenian massacres. Turkey also used spies overseas to spy on Armenian nationalists. The author examines the legal and international ramifications of the Armenian genocide. He documents the fact that a number of German (mostly) minor officials risked their lives by objecting to the Armenian carnage in the interior of Turkey. The author strongly believes that the failure to address this international crime against humanity later led to the Jewish Holocaust. Dadrian thinks that the Armenian genocide is also an issue of international law which the West has failed to address. The author found overwhelming evidence of a mass execution of an Armenian labor battalion ordered by the German General Bronsart von Schellendorf, who worked with the Ottoman general staff. The rationale of the mass execution of the Armenians was justified for security reasons. Both civilian and military personnel confirmed as eye witnesses that this crime took place and it was reported in many documents.

A commission on these atrocities, which issued its final report on March 29, 1919, accused Turkey and its allies (the Germans) of using barbarous and illegitimate methods against the Armenian citizens. Again, a committee of jurists in 1920, commissioned by the Council of the League of Nations, concluded that the official order to deport the Armenians en masse «was a violation in international law» (p. 19). Two German generals, Bronsart (on July 25, 1915) and Boetttrich (on October 3, 1915), who served as members of the military mission in Turkey, are said to be responsible for ordering the Armenian deportation.

The author names specific German generals and civilian officials who knew of the destruction of the Armenians, such as Marshal Sanders, the Prussian officer Captain Rudolf Nadolny, German Regimental Commander Colonel Stange, Lieutenant Scheubner Richter, Hauptmann Schwarz, Louis Mosel, Oswald von Schmidt and others. He also mentions Turkish generals and leaders of the Special Organization East led by Dr. B. Sakir, Alihsan Sabis, Omer Naci, Yakub Cemil, Deli Halit, Cerkez Ahmed, and Topal Osman (p. 55). In addition, the author documents the ideological complicity and zealotry of the Baron Oppenheim against the Armenians in order to please the German emperor. The author details Oppenheim's conspiratorial consort in plotting the destruction of the Armenians (p. 77).

Finally, the author examines the issue of legal liability by reviewing the record made by the Allies and issued as a joint declaration on May 24, 1915. This record condemned the Ottoman massacres of the Armenians and those responsible for assisting in the genocide (pp. 89-94).

The book is divided into two major parts. Part One comprises pages 7 to 105 including notes while Part Two covers pages 107 to 198. Each part contains extensive notes and annotations from various primary and secondary sources. In addition, there are four appendices (A, B, C, D, pp. 199-271), and a number of photographs and names of the major architects (both German and Turkish generals) of the Armenian genocide mentioned in the text (pp. 273-281). Pages 283 to 291 include a general bibliography of primary sources of state and national archives and official documents including materials from Austria, Germany, France, Great Britain, Turkey (both Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic), United Nations, United States, and Armenian sources. Also the author includes an extensive list of works on genocide and genocide-related topics (pp. 293-296). Dadrian himself has published extensively on the issue of genocide including 5 books, 3 monographs, 34 articles, and the translation of a book.

The first part deals with Germany's readiness to embrace Turkey's anti-Armenian posture. Germany's relationship with Turkey harkens to Bismark (1878), the German nationalist who was instrumental in the unification of Germany. According to the author, Germany was interested in reorganizing the Ottoman Turkish military and Bismark played the broker at the Congress of Berlin. Within four years following that Congress, the first German military mission arrived in Turkey with the aim of reorganizing the Ottoman Turkish Army. A number of military missions and economic elites arrived, including emperor William II. Germany was the first country to be given the Bagdad Railway Construction Project in 1888 during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamit.

The Bagdad Railway Construction Project was facilitated by the emperor's two trips to Turkey in 1889 and 1898. At the same time, Prussian military officers continued to instruct, train, and rebuild the Ottoman Turkish Army (p. 8). It must be noted that while these events were taking place, the Armenian genocide already had started in the closing decade of the 19th century. The German-Turkish military and economic alliance made the Germans indifferent to ongoing Armenian genocide. Not only did the official German government not protest, but emperor William II visited Turkey for the second time and was welcomed with red carpet treatment by the Sultan himself during the Armenian massacres of November 1896. It was obvious that in the name of German national interests Germany did not raise the issue of Armenian genocide, despite the fact that both Bismark and the emperor William II were dismayed by Turkish barbarities. Yet, despite his knowledge of the Armenian genocide, the German emperor praised Abdul Hamit as a model for other countries to emulate. Moreover, the German emperor was against the young Turk revolution of 1908 which deposed the Sultan. It was this revolution that ended the Ottoman empire in the Balkans.

General Bronsart, in particular, knew in advance about the real purpose of the mass Armenian deportation and did nothing to prevent the mass execution. Not only did he refuse the request to intervene on behalf of the Armenians, but he scolded the German vice-consul for wanting to help them. The name of the consul was Dr. Max Erwin Yon Schenbner Richter (p. 23). In his report, the vice-consul stressed the pitiful and painful condition of Armenian women and children slated for deportation. He also arranged for the distribution of bread to deportees. General Bronsart objected against even this humanitarian help and urged that the bread be sent to the Turkish Army (p. 23). Indeed, the vice-consul risked his life, not only threatened by General Bronsart, but also by General Mahmud Kamil, the commander-in-chief of the Ottoman 3rd Army.

It must be stressed that Turkish war propaganda had accused the Armenians as being against the Turkish war effort. The Turkish high command used this lie as a pretext for the Armenian annihilation. In fact, according to the author, the Turks created an artificial rebellion by Armenians in order to justify the mass deportation (pp. 25-30). In addition, Dadrian documents the critical role that Lt. Colonel Felix Guse (who held the post of Chief of Staff at the headquarters of the Ottoman 3rd Army) played in the extermination of the Armenians concentrated in six Turkish provinces (p. 29). In fact, Lt. Guse's model was General Bronsart.

Pages 35 to 43 summarize the key support role that the German Chief of Staff (the 3rd Army high command) played in the initiation of the Armenian genocide. On pages 44 to 54, the author examines the decisive role the Special Organization East played in the liquidation of the Armenians of Eastern Turkish provinces. Dr. Sakir was the legitimate chief of the Special Organization East who played a pivotal role in organizing and implementing the Armenian genocide (p. 43). The Armenians were viewed as enemies of Turkey, not only because they were heavily concentrated in Eastern provinces, but because they were geographically interposed between Turkey and the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus region (pp. 44-49). Even today this continues to be the case following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of an Armenian independent nation. The German connection to the Special Organization via German secret service agents and surveillance are also discussed. The use of 6 Islamic masses against the Christian populations, especially the Armenians, were used by Dr. Nazim who was one of the principal architects of the Armenian genocide. These special Muslim bands were used by the Special Organization to massacre Armenians. One of the major characteristics of the Armenian genocide was the forced conversion of Armenian women, children, and girls to Islam (pp. 49-54). Step by step, the author documents the collaboration of Turkish-German joint military campaigns against the Ottoman Armenians. The Germans knew too well of the Turkish intention to annihilate the Ottoman Armenians in the Caucasus Trabzon region. Indeed, the Germans accommodated their allies, the Turks, to carry out the Armenian genocide.

In Part Two (pp. 107-198), the author documents the political and ideological determinants for the involvement of the German military in the Armenian genocide. More specifically the author discusses a number of issues including the following:

(1) The revival of the Armenian question and the new Turko-German partnership in the period interposed between the first Balkan War and World War I. Germany was the official ally of Turkey, and emperor William II of Germany had cultivated a new and invigorated partnership with the young Turk regime. This German partnership with Turkey culminated on August 2, 1914 with the secret Turko-German military alliance.

(2) The creation of the German military mission and the inroads into Turkey led by veteran Prussian officers. The purpose was to reform and reorganize the Turkish army. The German-Turkish military relationship dated back to 1882 when then major van der Goltz was commissioned by Sultan Abdul Hamit to reorganize the Turkish army and train its officers corps.

(3) The bearings of the German ideological perspectives, and especially emperor William II, who came to identify with the Turkish/Islamic theocracy and regarded Turkey as the Prussia of the Orient. He compared the Islamic attributes of self-denial to his notions of Prussian puritanism (p. 113).

(4) Dadrian documents the complicity of the military, the order for the deportations, and the roles that high ranking German officers played in the Armenian genocide, especially the roles of General Major Bronsart von Schellendorf, Von Der Goltz, Feldmann, Boettich, Guido von Usedom, Wilhelm Souchon, Seeckt, and Count Eberhard Wolffskeel von Reichenberg (pp. 116-136).

(5) The political indicators of complicity are discussed in pages 137-186. The author examines various indicators of the German complicity in the Armenian genocide including: the role of the emperor William II, the high ranking German officers, ambassador Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim whom American ambassador Morgenthau described as «the perfect embodiment of the Prussian system» (p. 141), and Lt. Commander of the Navy and Marine Attache Hans Humann.

(6) While Turkey denied any German involvement in the liquidation of the Armenians before the war, in the aftermath a number of Turks came forward to implicate Germany, especially the Turkish Interior Minister Grand Vizier Tolat, Turkish publicists, a former Turkish foreign minister, two Turkish deputies, 8 and a Turkish historian.

(7) Incidents of concealment and disclosure, such as, deletions of foreign office documents for financial reasons, injunctions of German military and civilian missions in Turkey not to intervene in the process of extermination of the Armenians (p. 157), the removal by the Germans of Ottoman General Staff of files, a German document of May 4, 1916 indicating the annihilation of the Armenians was ordered by the Germans (p. 160-163) and the disclosure of two veteran Austrian consuls are also examined.

(8) The anti-Russian ideology in the Turko-German partnership and its anti Armenian repercussions are also discussed. A chief exponent of pangermanism and panturkism was Tekin Alp, who argued that the Slavs were the historical common enemy of both the Turks and the Germans, and therefore an alliance between the two nations was «a geographical and historical necessity» (p. 167).

(9) The German political economists were rather tacitly supportive of the Armenian genocide.

(10) The view of German experts in criminal and international law that German complicity was a by-product of militarism is also discussed.

(11) The testimony from a German newspaper editor, who investigated the massacres of the Armenians by going to Turkey (pp. 175-182), is also discussed.

The analysis will not be complete unless a few words are said about the appendixes.

The book includes four appendixes A, B, C, D (pp. 199-271). Each appendix deals with a specific issue and includes its own notes.

Appendix A, examines the transition of prominent German officials from service in Turkey to service in Nazi Germany later. The author mentions by name three such prominent officials who served both the Turkish Army and Nazi Germany. One official was Franz von Papen, who was the Chief of General Staff of the IV Turkish Army in World War I, and served as Hitler's Vice Chancellor and President of Prussia (1933-1934). Later he became Special Ambassador to Austria and helped with the annexation of Austria to the Nazi Reich. Other prominent German officials were: Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath who served as foreign minister in Papen's cabinet. During World War I he served as Councillor at the German Embassy in Constantinople (1915-1916) and was instructed by Chancellor Hollweg to monitor the operations against the Armenians (p. 199). Others who served both in Turkey during the Armenian genocide and in Nazi Germany were: Count F. W. Von der Schulenburg, Privy State Councillor Frederic Hans von Rosenberg, Wilhelm Solf, Albert Ballin, and Lt. General Hans von Seeckt (one of the top Prussian generals who served as Chief of Staff at Ottoman General Headquarters, and who returning to Germany after WWI, laid the foundation for the emergence of the Wehrmacht). In addition, two other prominent German generals who also served in both the Turkish army and Nazi German military were Major General Otto von Lossow and Major General Kress von Kressenstein (p. 201).

Appendix B deals with the indignity of decorating the arch-perpetrators of the Armenian genocide. Both in Berlin and Istanbul, a host of Turkish military and civilian officials in wartime Turkey were decorated with a variety of Prussian and German medals, awards, and honors (p. 205). Some of these honorees who were instrumental in the liquidation of the Armenians were: Huseyin Azmi, Atif, Hacı Adil (Arda), Mustafa Abdulhalik (Renda), Ahmed Muammer, Mehmed Memduh, Tahir Cevdet, and also eight more high ranking Turkish military officers received German decorations. The German decorations reached its apogee of indignity by extending its honors to Dr. Behaeddin Sakir and Ittihad party boss, interior minister and Grand Vizier, Talat Paşa, who by all accounts, were the two architects of Armenian genocide (p. 216).

In **Appendix C** the author deals with the issue of differential treatment of the Greeks and the Jews *vis-à-vis* the background of the Armenian genocide. In the case of the Greeks, the author argues that despite the fact the Turks hated the Greeks even more than the Armenians, the Turks did not use large scale extermination massacres in the deportation of the

Greeks. One of the main reasons was that unlike the Armenians, the Greeks had a government. Moreover, Greek premier Venizelos warned the Turks that in the case of widespread massacres against any Asia Minor Greeks, the Greek government will retaliate against the Turkish subjects of Greece. The Greeks also urged the German and Austrian Ambassadors to warn Turkey. Another reason mentioned was the fact that King Constantine I of Greece was married to Sophia of Prussia, the sister of German emperor William II. In the end, over 1.5 million Greeks were also eliminated or expelled from Anatolia in the GrecoTurkish war of 1922.

In the case of Jews, the Turks did not seriously persecute them. This case contrasts sharply with the Armenian genocide and the expulsion and destruction of Asia Minor Greeks. The author argues that unlike the ongoing conflicts between Turks, and Armenians and the Greeks, the Turks had no ongoing conflict with the Jews. On the contrary, for centuries Turkish-Jewish relations were harmonious. The Jews found Turkey a refuge during the expulsion from England in 1290, France 1329, Portugal 1497, and of course, Spain during the Inquisition.. Other factors mentioned in the differential treatment of the Jews *vis-à-vis* the Armenians and Greeks were the rise of Zionism, the sympathy for the Young Turks Revolution of 1908 by the Jews of Thessaloniki, and the Turkish orientation toward favourable public opinion in the USA.

Appendix D has to do with the appeal of German writer Arwin T. Wegner, an eyewitness to the Armenian genocide and to President Wilson in 1919. The text is in the German original and in English translation and tells of what he experienced as an eyewitness to the horrors inflicted upon the Armenians in Turkey (pp. 273-281). There are also a number of photographs of the major protagonists and architects of the Armenian genocide mentioned in the text. Also included is a bibliography (pp. 283-296) divided into primary and secondary sources.

In his final commentary on the issue of German responsibility, the Dadrian concludes that there is an overwhelming amount of evidence both direct and indirect of German complicity in the Armenian genocide. The author believes «what stands out in that evidence is a central feature of German complicity, namely, the willingness of a number of German officials, civilian and military, to aid and abet the Turks in their drive to liquidate the Armenians» (p.186). The author continues: «They thus qualify to be regarded as coperpetrators and 'accessories to the crime'» (p. 186). He concludes, «perhaps the historians and perhaps even the statesmen of Germany will find it pertinent and seemly to reconsider the central issue raised here. In the final analysis what is at stake here is the triumph of the forces of civilization over a legacy of barbarism that almost succeeded in bringing about the expiration of an ancient nation» (p. 186).

Dadrian's book on the *German Responsibility on the Armenian Genocide* is one of the most researched and documented books I have seen about Armenian genocide. The author has done a superb job of disclosing one of the major crimes in the 20th century, not only against the Armenian people, but against humanity. The purpose of the book was to expose the German officials and the role they played in the Armenian genocide at the turn of the century. It is ironic that after a century, Turkey has denied the occurrence of this crime against the Armenian nation despite overwhelming evidence. Political expediency has taken precedence to this crime which preceded the Jewish holocaust. Dadrian has written his *opus*, and this alone, makes him the pre-eminent scholar who made us all aware of such an enormous crime in the 20th century. This book should be read by all Germans, and should be on all reading lists dealing with Germany and genocide studies. It is not only an indictment of Nazi Germany, but it serves to remind us of the moral responsibility of any civilized nation and the world. For, as the author argues, the full disclosure and knowledge of this heinous crime could have perhaps prevented the Jewish holocaust of World War II.

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Livres reçus / Books Received

"Oil on fire", Text books, Ethnic stereotypes and violence in South-Eastern Europe., Hanovre, december 1996, Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung

Cet ouvrage collectif qui comprend une dizaine de contributions rédigées en allemand ou en anglais s'attache à l'étude de la violence en Europe du sud-ouest. On doit citer en particulier l'article d'Irène Lagani, spécialiste des Balkans, auteur d'une étude sur la "La présentation des guerres dans les livres d'histoire".

Activités académiques/ Academic Activities

Launching of Autumn Issue of *Hellenic Studies* / *Études helléniques*

Friday, June 5, 1998, the Greek ambassador to Canada, Mr. Ioannis Thomoglou, spoke to members and friends of the Greek Studies and Research Centre at Montréal's Hellenic Community Centre. Ambassador Thomoglou's speech, titled "Greece on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century: Thoughts on Greek Foreign Policy" provided much insight into Greece's future as a member of the European Union and an active partner in the international system.

Founding of the Toronto Chapter of the Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research

Academics and members of the Hellenic community of Toronto warmly received Dr. Stephanos Constantinides, director of the Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research (Canada), May 31, 1998. Dr. Constantinides gave a speech on Greek foreign policy and launched the journal's latest issue on the same topic, which he co-edited with reputed scholar and editorial board member Van Coufoudakis. Mr. Constantinides also announced the founding of the Toronto chapter of the Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research. In charge of the new chapter will be Mr. George Stubos, professor at York University, and Mr. Nikos Lioudakis, doctoral candidate at McMaster University.

Fondation de l'équipe torontoise du Centre de recherche helléniques

Dr. Stephanos Constantinides, directeur du Centre de recherches helléniques (Canada), a été bien accueilli par un public académique et des membres de la Communauté hellénique de Toronto le 31 mai 1998. Lors du lancement du dernier numéro du journal auquel a collaboré M. Van Coufoudakis, un spécialiste de renommée internationale, M. Constantinides a fait une communication sur le thème de la politique étrangère grecque. Il a profité de l'occasion pour annoncer la fondation de l'équipe torontoise du Centre de recherches helléniques. À la direction de l'équipe seront MM. George Stubos, professeur à l'Université York et Nikos Lioudakis, étudiant au doctorat à McMaster University.

ADVICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

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