

ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

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in Ancient Spartan Education*

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ETUDES HELLÉNIQUES / HELLENIC STUDIES



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Entretien avec Jacqueline de Romilly

Conduit par Jean Catsiapis*

Dans un entretien avec Jean Catsiapis, Jacqueline de Romilly, helléniste, professeur à la Sorbonne et au Collège de France, deuxième femme à accéder à l'Académie française après Marguerite Yourcenar, sans doute la plus grande spécialiste de l'oeuvre de Thucydide, parle de l'historien ainsi que de son amour de la Grèce, ancienne et moderne.

Dans notre dernier numéro, nous avons publié son point de vue sur Thucydide, entrecoupé de passages significatifs de son oeuvre sur l'historien de la guerre du Péloponnèse.

Nous publions aujourd'hui la partie de l'entretien avec Jacqueline de Romilly dans laquelle elle parle de la Grèce antique et moderne, de l'importance de l'enseignement du grec ancien ainsi que de l'influence de la pensée grecque sur le monde contemporain.

Question: Quelle est aujourd'hui l'importance de Thucydide dans la science historique?

Réponse: L'importance de Thucydide aujourd'hui, ce n'est pas tellement pour connaître la Grèce antique.

Je la situerais par rapport à deux idées. D'abord parce que c'est le premier dans la création du genre historique. Il est vrai qu'Hérodote a été le père de l'Histoire mais Thucydide par opposition à Hérodote invente une objectivité très exigeante, une histoire politique reposant sur des témoignages nombreux de réflexion et se concentre sur les choses qu'il peut connaître et voir de près. Il n'y a plus ni légende ni intervention des dieux ni anecdotes entendues ici ou là, ce que certains regrettent. Mais il y a quelque chose de follement nouveau et qui restera pour l'histoire objective. Cependant son histoire n'est pas du tout moderne au sens de l'histoire telle que nous l'entendons à cause de ce désir d'analyser et de trouver derrière les événements l'aspect essentiel qui pourra se retrouver ailleurs et qui fait réfléchir aux événements.

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Et cela est le second aspect. Quelque chose qui reste et qui reste vraiment, une sorte d'intelligence politique qui tourne à la philosophie politique. On peut encore trouver chez lui des analyses non seulement sur l'état des batailles et comment et pourquoi celui-ci va ou peut gagner mais surtout sur le rapport de l'impérialisme et des résistances qui s'y opposent, sur la démocratie, et la démagogie, le rôle des ambitions sur des problèmes politiques qui sont encore les nôtres et cela c'est ce qu'il y a de plus important dans son histoire. Thucydide a dit lui-même qu'il souhaitait que ses récits soient utiles pour ceux qui voudront voir clair dans ces événements du passé et aussi ceux qui dans la suite, à cause de l'élément humain qui est eux, pourront leur ressembler.

Pour moi il est caractéristique de voir à toutes les époques des gens reconnaître leur présent et voir leur présent s'éclairer grâce aux analyses de Thucydide. Un des exemples est *La campagne de Thucydide* de Thibaudet où il reconnaît la guerre de 1914 dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide. A chaque fois qu'il y a un événement quelqu'un trouve dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide l'explication, le commentaire d'événement tout à fait récent. J'ai fait une thèse sur Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien. C'était au moment d'Hitler, des guerres, de la défaite d'Hitler. On voyait ces problèmes de l'impérialisme athénien. Après cela j'ai fait un livre sur Alcibiade. C'est dans Thucydide qu'on trouve l'analyse des oppositions entre un chef qui se conduit de telle façon et un autre et par conséquent les problèmes de la démocratie. C'est cela qui me paraît le plus important. Cette leçon de philosophie et cette faculté de trouver des schémas intelligibles pour les événements postérieurs. Donc l'étude de Thucydide ce n'est pas pour connaître la Grèce. C'est pour nous connaître nous.

Question: Selon vous quelle est aujourd'hui l'image de la Grèce moderne et contemporaine dans l'opinion publique française?

Réponse: J'ai l'impression que l'image de la Grèce moderne n'est pas toujours aussi bonne qu'elle devrait l'être. Ceci pour deux raisons à mon avis. La première raison est que pendant des décennies ou des siècles la jeunesse française a été habituée au culte de l'antiquité avec des héros extraordinaires, des succès, des auteurs remarquables et qu'elle ne retrouve pas aujourd'hui toujours l'équivalent; le contraste est dur à soutenir. Mais l'autre raison tient à la politique actuelle, aux différents dangers que la Grèce a connus ou connaît maintenant et qui provoquent des réclamations, une inquiétude, un désir de discuter. Ce qui est un peu agaçant vu du dehors quand on ne comprend pas de quelles épreuves récentes ou encore présentes tout cela est le résultat.

Question: Quels conseils pourriez-vous donner pour que la Grèce moderne soit mieux connue de tous?

Réponse: Ceci sort de ma compétence. Je ne peux donner de conseils à la Grèce. Je crois à une possibilité d'une plus grande propagande de culture pour les auteurs actuels, pour les poètes qui ont eu des prix Nobel, pour montrer que les choses continuent; par exemple, j'ai vu le Palais de la Musique à Athènes. J'y ai vu des représentations. J'ai été éblouie. Cela me paraît une réussite des temps modernes si je puis dire. La plupart des gens ne le savent pas. On n'en a pas parlé il n'y a pas eu un lancement suffisant pour une réalisation de ce genre. D'autre part je crois que lorsqu'on est dans une situation difficile et critiquée, comme c'est le cas de la Grèce, qu'il faut essayer d'être modéré dans le ton des revendications même si elles sont tout à fait légitimes. J'ai l'impression que ce serait très important pour les gens mêlés à la politique et pas très au courant de la Grèce. Les Grecs sont victimes de tous côtés. J'ai ainsi appris des choses bouleversantes au sujet des affaires de Chypre. Mais il faudrait que les Grecs s'expliquent plus et avec moins de passion.

Question: Ne pensez vous pas que les Grecs sont trop prisonniers de leur passé auquel ils se réfèrent en permanence?

Réponse: Je ne suis pas du tout choquée quand les Grecs se réfèrent à leur passé. C'est vrai qu'ils ont été les premiers, les inventeurs, qu'ils ont lancé tous les genres littéraires et même les notions de politique européenne. Il n'y a aucune raison qu'ils ne profitent pas de leur passé et qu'ils ne le disent pas. Je pense même que pendant quelques décennies les Grecs ont été un peu jaloux de leur passé et qu'au lieu d'en profiter, d'être portés par lui, ils ont eu une habitude de compétition. Ce qui n'est pas raisonnable. Ainsi même en Grèce l'enseignement du grec ancien a souffert et a été abandonné. Heureusement on revient là dessus depuis quelques années. Donc je suis tout à fait d'accord que la Grèce adopte et assume son admirable passé.

Question: Comment pouvez vous expliquer votre amour de la Grèce? Pourquoi avez vous consacré votre vie entière à l'Antiquité grecque?

Réponse: Le hasard, ma formation m'ont fait connaître des auteurs grecs, Thucydide particulièrement. Quand j'ai commencé je croyais que c'était pour un ou deux ans. Mais j'ai trouvé cela tellement beau, tellement enrichissant, tellement tonique aussi pour la pensée, pour tout, que maintenant j'ai l'impression que c'est un levain, un remède pour tout le monde. Nos espoirs de

bien faire, de progresser, d'ouvrir non pas sur le passé mais sur l'avenir tiennent dans une large mesure à la connaissance de cet élan intérieur qui a porté la Grèce et qui a été unique en son genre. Tout est parti de là. A cause de l'attitude de ces auteurs qui cherchaient toujours l'universel, là reste le moule, la chose vivante qui peut encore nous aider maintenant. Et j'ajouterai une chose qui est moins importante: la Grèce, c'est beau. Je veux dire qu'il y avait le sens de la beauté, de l'expression. Je ne peux plus dire je ne peux plus rien faire mais tout à l'heure j'essayais grâce à ma machine à lire de relire quelques vers de l'Odyssée car je pensais aux larmes d'Ulysse. Chaque fois qu'on reprend un de ces textes on reste saisi de leur portée universelle, de leur simplicité, donc encore valable à tous les moments au lieu de toutes nos complications modernes. A l'heure actuelle peu d'enfants, peu d'étudiants font du grec mais ceux qui en font sont saisis. C'est vraiment une ouverture et pas seulement une connaissance du passé. On parle, on discute, tout est confus; on reprend ces textes, pas seulement Thucydide, mais aussi Platon, Démosthène et tout devient clair et fort. Et on a envie de continuer.

Question: Quelles sont les menaces qui pèsent sur l'enseignement du grec ancien en France ainsi que l'affirmait il y a quelques mois un article du *Figaro*?¹

Réponse: A vrai dire cet article a annoncé une mesure qui a été suivie d'un démenti. Nous avons aujourd'hui un ministre de l'Education nationale², qui n'est pas favorable aux études littéraires et encore moins au latin et au grec. Les menaces sur l'enseignement du grec sont considérables et remontent à une trentaine d'années.

Quand j'ai fait du grec, c'était à un moment de plein essor, on venait d'ouvrir l'enseignement du grec aux femmes. Tout le monde voulait en faire. C'était la formation reconnue même pour les scientifiques. Peu à peu les choses se sont compliquées. On a mis des bâtons dans les roues. Le moment fatal a été quand le grec qui faisait partie du bloc français-latin-grec est devenu matière à option. Car il s'est trouvé en compétition avec toutes sortes de disciplines et le choix étant laissé aux administrateurs, aux proviseurs, ceux-ci très souvent ne connaissaient pas les mérites du grec et considéraient que cette langue n'était pas actuelle, utilitaire. En conséquence, dès qu'il n'y avait pas beaucoup de demandes pour le grec, pour des raisons d'emploi du temps on le supprimait.

Le ministre, l'an passé, qui était favorable aux études classiques, nous a exposé sa politique que nous avons acceptée. On pouvait commencer jusque là le latin ou le grec en classe de quatrième. Il nous a dit que désormais on commencerait le latin en classe de cinquième et le grec en troisième. Nous avons accepté ce recul du grec en pensant en effet que le choix pour les élèves entre le latin et le grec en diminuait le nombre. Mais cette réforme suppose un effort considérable pour introduire le grec en troisième alors que les élèves ont déjà deux options.

Actuellement on peut compter sur deux choses. D'abord la bataille de l'opinion, à mon avis, est gagnée. Vous avez pu remarquer depuis sept ou huit ans le nombre d'auteurs de la Grèce antique en livres de poche chez tous les éditeurs: Platon, Homère et même des auteurs plus rares et difficiles. Il y a donc une demande d'une très grande partie de l'opinion. Je fais des conférences de défense de la Grèce depuis toujours. Maintenant je vois un public très convaincu. L'autre chance que je vois pour le grec c'est le dévouement éperdu de ceux qui l'ont appris, enseigné et en ont mesuré les bienfaits intellectuels. C'est là que notre Association, le S.E.L.³ peut jouer un certain rôle en les maintenant en état d'espérance et de confiance. Malgré les difficultés, il faut qu'ils se cramponnent. On leur met des cours de grec à midi ou six heures du soir, ils l'acceptent. On leur refuse des heures de cours, ils prennent à la fois des débutants et des gens achevés. C'est cela notre chance principale; ceux qui font du grec y tiennent.

Question: Est-ce que les professeurs de grec ancien l'enseignent effectivement?

Réponse: La plupart des professeurs n'enseignent pas le grec puisqu'il y a très peu de cours. Cela n'est pas du tout alarmant. C'était déjà comme cela avant. Nous vivons sous ce régime merveilleux qui est celui d'une Agrégation de lettres c'est à dire de français-latin-grec. Il est bien évident que les professeurs de lettres enseignent plus le français que le latin et plus le latin que le grec. Mais ils l'enseignent autrement, pas forcément mieux mais différemment avec la connaissance des modèles grecs qui ont été imités par Racine ou tout autre. Une grande partie de notre littérature est sortie directement du grec.

Question: Peut-on dire qu'il y a continuité de l'hellénisme de l'Antiquité à nos jours?

Réponse: Scientifiquement, il est exact que la Grèce classique a préparé ce qui a suivi. Certes, les Pères de l'Eglise d'abord se sont complètement détournés de la culture païenne puis y ont eu

recours au III^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle. La continuité de l'hellénisme existe sur le plan de la vraie connaissance scientifique. Elle n'existe pas vraiment du point de vue de l'enseignement formateur en France. Dans notre enseignement secondaire on prend surtout Homère à l'époque classique comme élément de formation. On ne trouve cette continuité que si on fait des études supérieures.

Question: Que reste-t-il aujourd'hui de la Grèce antique dans notre vie de tous les jours?

Réponse: Tout est parti de Grèce et existe encore. Je viens d'achever un livre rédigé à plusieurs sur l'héritage grec actuellement, sur sa survie. J'ai rédigé tout le chapitre sur la politique: le vocabulaire, le nom des régimes, le principe des jurés tirés au sort, le mot de démocratie, de liberté, les mots d'ostracisme, de prytanée. Même si ces termes ont changé de sens, tout cela est parti de là.

Question: Selon vous quel est le poids de l'histoire sur la Grèce d'aujourd'hui?

Réponse: Je ne parlerai pas du poids de l'histoire ni même de l'histoire. Pour moi, la Grèce antique ce sont les textes. L'histoire, c'est du passé. Les textes, c'est encore présent. Et c'est cela la différence: les textes sont toniques, vivants, peuvent nous aider.

L'histoire peut peser mais les textes nous relèvent.

Question: Dans votre livre *Pourquoi la Grèce?* vous évoquez l'universalisme qui caractérise la pensée grecque. Peut-on rapprocher l'universalisme du mondialisme qui domine aujourd'hui la vie des peuples? Que pensez vous de la pensée unique?

Réponse: Je ne le crois pas. Par universalisme il faut entendre le désir d'atteindre une pensée, de la formuler, de façon qu'elle soit très largement accessible et applicable. C'est d'ordre intellectuel et le mondialisme est d'ordre pratique. La pensée unique est contraire à la recherche de l'universel qui est accessible à tous. Je viens d'écrire un livre sur Hector. La mort d'Hector, le deuil d'Andromaque, la visite de Priam c'est quelque chose de privé dit avec tellement de force et de simplicité que, encore maintenant, tout le monde peut se reconnaître dans le courage d'Hector ou l'angoisse d'Andromaque. Je veux vous citer une histoire. Pendant la première année de la seconde guerre mondiale j'étais à Aix en Provence. Il y avait des Juifs allemands qui étaient dans un camp d'hébergement. Le soir ils allaient en ville. J'ai ainsi rencontré dans

un hôtel un bonnetier de Berlin. Je lui ai fait comprendre que j'étais jeune professeur helléniste. Il m'a alors récité les deux premiers vers de l'Odyssée en grec. Ce pont jeté par dessus des gens qui ne comprenaient plus, qui se trouvaient dans une situation déplacée est un petit exemple concret de cette éducation qui a été celle de presque tous les pays cultivés. Elle est belle mon histoire?

Question: On a célébré en 1996 le cent-cinquantième anniversaire de l'École française d'Athènes. Pensez-vous que cette institution exerce toujours les activités qui correspondent à sa mission?

Réponse: Cette école est sous la tutelle de l'Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles lettres. J'ai toujours regretté qu'elle fut exclusivement archéologique. D'abord c'est une mission qui s'épuise et les Grecs veulent aussi s'occuper d'archéologie.

Question: La Grèce vous a accordé de nombreuses distinctions. Quelles sont celles qui vous ont le plus touché ?

Réponse: J'ai d'abord eu la citoyenneté athénienne. Après j'ai eu la nationalité grecque et j'ai un passeport grec. L'attribution de la nationalité grecque a été très solennelle. J'ai prêté serment sur la Bible. J'ai mis presque un an à avoir mon passeport car il a fallu beaucoup d'explications, de papiers, en particulier un certificat de baptême. Puis j'ai été faite citoyenne de Halimos en Attique, c'est la patrie de Thucydide. Ça m'a beaucoup touché.

NOTES

1. Marielle Court, "L'enseignement du grec menacé", **Le Figaro** du 14 novembre 1997.
2. Il s'agit de François Bayrou.
3. Sauvegarde des enseignements littéraires (S.E.L.), Association fondée par Jacqueline de Romilly.

Aux marges des empires, entre diaspora et États-nation: les Grecs d'Abkhazie

Michel Bruneau*

Sergueï Mambetov**

ABSTRACT

Through the centuries, the Greeks have been found all along the coast of the Black Sea. Abkhazia, on the Southern part of Russia, has known the presence of a flourishing Greek Community. Today, this community is on decline and the question is asked if it is condemned to disappear. This article examines the recent history of the Greek population of Abkhazia (Sukhum and surrounding villages), the situation of the refugees in Greece (their reception and their settlement) and the possibility of their return to Abkhazia.

RÉSUMÉ

À travers les siècles, les Grecs ont été présents sur les rivages du Pont Euxin. L'Abkhazie, au sud de la Russie et au pied du Caucase, a connu la présence d'une communauté grecque rayonnante. Aujourd'hui cette communauté se trouve en déclin et la question se pose à savoir si elle est condamnée à disparaître. Cet article se penche sur l'histoire récente de la population grecque de l'Abkhazie (Sukhum et les villages environnants), la situation des réfugiés en Grèce (leur accueil et leur installation) et la possibilité de leur retour en Abkhazie.

Les rivages de la mer Noire sont depuis la haute antiquité (VII^e-VI^e siècle av. J. C.) un espace de circulation colonisé par les Grecs qui y ont fondé des cités, en particulier en Colchide, rendue célèbre par l'expédition en partie mythique des Argonautes. Mithridate et son royaume hellénisé du Pont, Byzance plus tard, en avaient fait un lac grec, phénomène qui se reproduira de nouveau sur le plan économique à la fin du XIX^e et au début du XX^e siècle, à la fin des empires Ottoman et tsariste. Cette implantation

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grecque essentiellement discontinue, du type diaspora, plurimillénaire se situe dans la longue durée et dans un espace constamment pluri-ethnique. Elle n'a constitué qu'à deux instants relativement brefs (royaume de Mithridate et empire de Trébizonde) des États qui n'ont d'ailleurs englobé qu'une partie des rivages du Pont Euxin. Elle a toujours été obligée de composer et de s'insérer dans différentes entités politiques dirigées au profit d'autres peuples dont les plus récentes étaient l'empire Ottoman, la Russie tsariste puis soviétique, la Géorgie. Depuis la Première Guerre mondiale et l'échange des populations du traité de Lauzane (1922), suivie de la période de répression stalinienne (1937-1956), l'hellénisme a connu un recul très sévère dans toute la région, étant même menacé de disparition. Les Grecs d'URSS se sont de nouveau manifestés et ont amorcé une renaissance à partir de la *perestroïka* (congrès de Gelendjik de 1991). Cela s'est traduit par la réapparition d'une vie associative et culturelle, d'activités entrepreneuriales dans le sud de la Russie, mais aussi par un courant plus ou moins régulier de migrations temporaires ou définitives vers la Grèce. La dissolution de l'empire soviétique multi-ethnique a mis de nouveau au premier plan, comme au début du XXe siècle, les États-nations dans lesquels les Grecs du Pont trouvent difficilement leur place.

Sukhum a été à la fin du XIXe et au début du XXe siècles l'un des principaux centres d'activités et de rayonnement des Grecs de la mer Noire. Entourée d'une quarantaine de villages partiellement ou totalement grecs, la capitale de l'Abkhazie et sa périphérie comptaient une vingtaine de milliers de Grecs en 1937. Les événements récents (1992-93) ont ramené ce nombre à un à deux milliers. La communauté grecque aujourd'hui exangue est principalement composée de vieillards restés pour garder les maisons abandonnées par la plus grande partie de leurs occupants. L'hellénisme d'Abkhazie est-il condamné à disparaître comme celui du Pont en 1923? Que sont devenus les Grecs d'Abkhazie? Au delà de ces questions posées en relation avec l'actualité la plus récente, il faut comprendre comment s'est constituée cette diaspora, comment elle s'est développée, a prospéré, puis a connu des phases de repli et a été à plusieurs reprises menacée dans son existence même. Le territoire abkhaze a été tout au long de son histoire un enjeu entre des empires puis des États-nation, aux marges de ceux-ci, mais dans une situation géostratégique de première importance.

Qu'est ce que l'Abkhazie?

Il s'agit d'un territoire étiré sur 190 kilomètres le long de la côte de la mer Noire, situé au pied de la chaîne du Caucase. D'une profondeur variant entre 3 et 25 kilomètres, ce sont des terres de collines ou de moyennes montagnes couvertes par une forêt subtropicale luxuriante dans un climat doux, ensoleillé et pluvieux tout au long de l'année. La beauté exceptionnelle de ce milieu naturel en fait une région particulièrement attractive pour le tourisme qui fut une ressource essentielle pendant la période soviétique. La présence grecque est attestée dans l'antiquité par les cités-emporia de Dioscuria (Sukhum), Pityus (Pitsunda), Zoufi (Lykhno), Nicopia (Neo Athon), Chamcir (Ochemchiri) qui commerçaient avec le nord du Caucase par des passes traversant la chaîne. Les Abkhazes, qui appartiennent au groupe ethno-linguistique du nord-ouest du Caucase avec les Circassiens et les Kabardes, sont mentionnés dans des documents écrits seulement à partir du deuxième siècle de notre ère. A l'époque romaine puis byzantine ils ont été christianisés, si bien que l'évêque Stratophilus de Pitsunda assista au concile de Nicée (325). Après une courte période, à la fin du VIII^e siècle, où ils eurent leur propre État avec les Géorgiens, ils furent ensuite sous la domination de colonies marchandes gènoises et vénitiennes au XII^e siècle puis surtout des Turcs Ottomans qui construisirent des places fortes sur la côte, Sukhum en particulier. La religion musulmane, qui s'était progressivement introduite dans la paysannerie à partir du pays des Kabardes au XV^e siècle, s'est alors trouvée considérablement renforcée. Sous ses maîtres successifs la population rurale abkhaze musulmane restait encadrée par sa propre féodalité restée chrétienne qui au début du XIX^e siècle était regroupée autour de la lignée des princes Chervachidzé. Elle était fidèle à son adat, code de règles traditionnelles non écrites, sans servage et avec une grande tolérance religieuse. Sous un vernis chrétien ou musulman les Abkhazes conservaient leurs croyances traditionnelles de type panthéiste (Antsva) dont les rites étaient confiés aux anciens (Krindatch A. D. 1994).

L'Abkhazie a été conquise par la Russie dans les années 1810 immédiatement après la Géorgie. A l'inverse de Byzance et de l'empire Ottoman ayant respecté les coutumes locales, la Russie tsariste a imposé son administration centralisée, une réforme agraire et son Église Orthodoxe. Les traditions abkhazes de tolérance religieuse étant heurtées de front, une succession de révoltes populaires ont éclaté. La répression et la "pacification"

russe se sont poursuivies jusqu'en 1864 dans tout le nord-ouest du Caucase entraînant une migration massive des Circassiens vers l'empire Ottoman. Un grand nombre d'Abkhazes ont ainsi émigré ou été déportés entre 1860 et 1878 (guerre russo-turque). C'est l'origine de la diaspora abkhaze de Turquie et de Syrie actuellement plus nombreuse que la population restée sur place. Les Abkhazes sont alors devenus peu à peu minoritaires dans leur propre territoire: de 86 % de la population en 1886, ils sont passés à 26% en 1926, puis 18% en 1989, constituant des groupes compacts dans quelques districts, autour de Goudaouta notamment.

L'Abkhazie fait partie de ces territoires du centre et de l'ouest du Caucase que les Russes ont conquis difficilement aux dépens de peuples de langues caucasiennes et de religion musulmane qu'ils ont chassés ou déportés. Ils ont fait appel à des migrants chrétiens de Russie ou d'Ukraine mais, cela ne suffisant pas, aussi à d'autres peuples chrétiens des rivages de la mer Noire ou des régions voisines (Moldaves, Géorgiens, Arméniens, Grecs et même Estoniens ou Allemands). L'implantation de diasporas a donc été systématiquement favorisée par la Russie tsariste dans ces marches frontalières partiellement désertées à la suite des guerres russo-turques qui se sont succédées au long du XIX^e siècle jusqu'à la première guerre mondiale. Le territoire abkhaze a fait partie du gouvernorat de la mer Noire, étant dans le prolongement de la côte du Kouban avec laquelle il est en parfaite continuité. Cependant il se trouve aussi en continuité avec le territoire géorgien, en particulier la Mingrélie voisine au sud. Sa situation charnière entre Russie et Géorgie avec ses 190 km de côte en fait une zone géostratégique de première importance très convoitée, son milieu naturel étant de plus particulièrement attractif.

La diaspora la plus ancienne est celle des Grecs, venus par la mer et ayant maintenu des liens commerciaux et culturels avec les cités de la mer Egée d'abord, puis avec Constantinople à l'époque byzantine. Dans quelle mesure ces liens ont-ils été maintenus lorsque la mer Noire est devenue un lac Ottoman? On ne sait pas très bien s'il subsistait encore des populations grecques le long de la côte aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles mais on pense qu'il y a eu continuité au moins d'une présence commerciale (N. N. Ioanidi, 1990). On retrouve trace de cette présence au début du XIX^e siècle à Sukhum, celle-ci n'ayant cessé de se développer jusqu'au début du XX^e siècle.

Essor et rayonnement d'une diaspora grecque en Abkhazie

Selon N. N. Ioanidi (1990), historien des Grecs d'Abkhazie et sous-directeur des archives nationales abkhazes, très peu de documents attestent de cette présence grecque à Sukhum au début du XIX^e siècle. La présence de marchands grecs s'affirme surtout après la guerre de Crimée (1853-56). En 1874, on commence à disposer d'informations chiffrées: sur 76 bourgeois électeurs, 29 sont Grecs (39 %), sur une population de 1161 habitants à Sukhum, 443 auraient été Grecs (38 %). Ils peuvent occuper des fonctions importantes comme C. P. Asvestopoulo, chef de l'association des marchands depuis 1867, membre du conseil municipal et député de Sukhum de 1872 à 1897. L'assainissement de la ville, la construction du marché, d'un hôpital, d'une école, l'éclairage des rues lui sont dus (N. N. Ioanidi, 1990).

C'est surtout après la guerre russo-turque de 1876 que les migrants Grecs ont commencé à affluer dans le Caucase et en particulier en Abkhazie. En 1886 sur les 1367 habitants de Sukhum 499 étaient Grecs et 300 Arméniens. Les Grecs ont alors largement contribué au repeuplement des campagnes autour de Sukhum. En 1888 le diocèse de Sukhum comptait une population grecque rurale de 2048 personnes qui s'adonnaient principalement à la culture du tabac. Entre 1873 et 1897 sept églises paroissiales ont été construites dans des villages majoritairement ou exclusivement grecs. Cette population rurale grecque venait de Sukhum, de Stavropol par Krasnaïa Poliana (Adler), ces migrants étant eux-mêmes originaires de Crimée ou surtout du Pont. En 1906, sur 12 paroisses de la 4^e circonscription (autour de Sukhum) 7 étaient grecques. Les migrants ont dû défricher totalement les lots de 10 hectares qui leurs avaient été octroyés par le vice-roi du Caucase avec du maïs pour se nourrir et des semences. Les premières années, la vie a été extrêmement dure, à cause notamment de la malaria, et les pertes furent nombreuses. Jusqu'en 1900 la plupart de ces villages eurent une école grecque grâce à l'action d'un prêtre, Kosmas Lambrianidis, et d'un instituteur, Pandeli Papadopoulos. Ensuite les écoles furent russifiées, le grec n'étant plus enseigné qu'une heure par jour.

Une association ou communauté (*kinotita*) des Grecs de Sukhum fut créée en 1905 avec comme objectif de fonder une école et de reconstruire l'église (terminée en 1915). Cette école ouverte en 1909 était la plus importante de la ville avec 209 élèves sur un

total de 917 pour Sukhum. L'évêque russe de Sukhum a donné en 1906 l'autorisation de procéder à la liturgie en grec. Cette communauté grecque de Sukhum, l'une des premières de l'empire russe était dirigée par des médecins et des négociants de tabac.

Le recensement de 1922-23 de Géorgie permet d'avoir une idée relativement précise de la population grecque qui s'élevait à 21 700 personnes environ: 2 490 sur 8 793 habitants à Sukhum (28 %) et 19 222 à la campagne soit 13 % de la population rurale de l'Abkhazie. Après 1925 ces chiffres n'ont cessé de baisser: le recensement de 1926 donne seulement 14 045 Grecs, soit un peu plus de 7 % de la population totale de l'Abkhazie. On trouve un chiffre beaucoup plus élevé au recensement de 1939: 34 621. C'est contradictoire, mais le district de Gagra a entre temps été rattaché à l'Abkhazie. Plus du tiers de cette population grecque a gardé sa nationalité d'origine en grande partie pour conserver ses terres hors des kolkhozes (N. N. Ioanidi, 1990).

Lorsque la révolution de 1917 éclata, les Grecs d'Abkhazie constituaient un groupe ethnique singulier, non homogène socialement. En février 1918, ils sont apparus comme une force politique autonome, ayant formé leur propre soviet à Sukhum. Des groupes armés se sont constitués dans chaque village grec dans un but de protection. Mais ils sont apparus de plus en plus comme des forces antibolcheviques. Les négociants de tabac et armateurs grecs de Sukhum avaient pris le parti des mencheviks contre les bolcheviks. Ils avaient constitué une armée de 100 à 200 hommes dirigée par Charalambos Papadopoulos (Chambos) et basée dans le village de Azanda. Ils ont réussi à entraîner la paysannerie regroupée dans des petites régions ethniquement homogènes (groupes de villages notamment à la périphérie de Sukhum). Cette paysannerie et les Grecs de Sukhum étaient essentiellement mus par un idéal nationaliste en faveur de la Grande Idée, de la création d'une république indépendante du Pont au nord de la Turquie et de régions autonomes grecques en Russie et Transcaucasie. Ce mouvement nationaliste animait la plupart des communautés grecques de l'empire Ottoman et de l'ex-Russie tsariste. Il s'était traduit par la création d'un Conseil National Grec de Transcaucasie qui s'appuyait sur une division armée grecque de 3000 hommes, issue de l'armée tsariste en cours de décomposition; le bataillon le plus proche était basé à Batoum. La présence grecque était renforcée par l'arrivée récente de milliers de réfugiés du Pont fuyant la répression turque et attendant une évacuation vers la Grèce.

Les batailles politiques ont eu également à cette époque un caractère ethnique, car une armée irrégulière d'Arméniens commandée par Chazar qui avait participé au soulèvement bolchévique de Sukhum (avril-mai 1918) à côté d'Abkhazes, de Mingrèles et de Grecs, a attaqué les villages grecs de Constantinovska (Odichi) et de Michailovka (Kouma). Cette attaque fut repoussée grâce à la solidarité de tous les villages grecs des environs et les troupes pro-bolcheviques durent se retirer vers Goudaouta puis Sotchi pourchassée par Charalambos dit Chambos. Pendant une année environ la ville de Sukhum et sa périphérie rurale furent sous le contrôle de ces groupes armés grecs agissant pour le compte des mencheviks de Géorgie (V. Agtsidis, 1994).

Cependant la plupart des partisans de Chambos durent partir en 1920 vers Batoum, puis en Grèce avec nombre de réfugiés. En 1921, les bolcheviks ont conquis toute la Transcaucasie mettant fin aux espoirs d'indépendance des Grecs pontiques par suite de leur alliance avec Kemal Ataturc soutenu également par les Alliés occidentaux. Mais d'autres Grecs qui avaient pris le parti des bolcheviks se sont retrouvés à tous les niveaux des soviets: 7 Grecs ont participé au second congrès des soviets d'Abkhazie, 17 au troisième. Quatre kolkhozes des environs de Sukhum étaient majoritairement grecs, 23 partiellement (N. N. Ioanidi, 1990).

En ce début du XXe siècle Sukhum, ville cosmopolite, était devenue l'un des principaux centres économiques et culturels grecs de la mer Noire. La presse en langue grecque s'y est développée dès 1918 (*Nea Zoi*, *Morphosis*). Elle a connu son rayonnement maximum de 1929 à 1933 avec le journal *Kokinós Kapnos* qui couvrait l'ensemble du Caucase, son tirage étant de 3 000 exemplaires en 1934. Il y avait une imprimerie, une maison d'édition, un théâtre professionnel dirigé par T. Kanonidis qui de 1922 à 1937 monta plus de 40 oeuvres et fit des tournées dans les autres centres grecs de la mer Noire (K. Photiadis, 1994), enfin une école normale d'instituteurs ouverte en 1927 à Sukhum. Il y eut en effet jusqu'à 48 écoles primaires grecques en 1925-26 en Abkhazie. La diaspora n'avait jamais connu une telle florescence culturelle à l'époque tsariste caractérisée par une stricte politique assimilatrice. La constitution soviétique de 1928 reconnaissait la langue grecque pontique comme l'égale des autres langues de l'URSS. Mais l'année 1938 marque la fin de la liberté d'enseignement et de la publication en langue grecque.

Le premier déracinement: les déportations de la période stalinienne

Les premiers départs vers la Grèce remontent à la période révolutionnaire et aux années suivantes. Ioanidi (1990) estime à 1 159 familles, soit 3 905 personnes, les départs de Grecs d'Abkhazie de 1926 à mai 1937. De 1923 à 1939 le total se situerait autour de 9 000 personnes pour l'Abkhazie et 20 000 pour l'ensemble de l'URSS. Un bateau fut envoyé par la Grèce en 1939 dans le port de Sukhum afin de "rapatrier" une partie de la communauté grecque de la ville, comme cela est relaté dans la nouvelle de Dumbadze (1992).

En 1938 un coup d'arrêt est brutalement donné au développement et à la vie culturelle des Grecs comme des autres minorités non reconnues comme nationalités à part entière. Les écoles et les églises sont fermées. Les arrestations et déportations vers la Sibérie et l'Asie centrale commencent. Ce mouvement se poursuit en 1944, mais concerne surtout le sud de la Russie, la Crimée. La déportation systématique des Grecs des côtes de la mer Noire, et en particulier de l'Abkhazie, n'est intervenue sur ordre de Staline et Béria qu'en juin 1949 après la défaite des forces de gauche dans la guerre civile grecque. Tous les Grecs, citoyens soviétiques ou non, membres du parti communiste ou non, durent quitter leur foyer le 14 juin au petit matin en emportant le minimum nécessaire. Ils furent transportés en camion puis entassés dans des wagons à bestiaux pour un voyage à destination du Kazakhstan qui dura deux semaines et au cours duquel périrent les plus faibles. L'installation dans des kolkhozes encore non aménagés dans des zones demi-désertiques fut également très pénible et meurtrière pour une partie de cette population. Ioanidi estime à 34 000 les déportés sur une population totale de 40 à 46 000 Grecs d'Abkhazie. Une enquête menée auprès des réfugiés de Sukhum et de ses environs, évacués en Grèce en août 1993 (V. Agtsidis, 1994) montrait que 73 % des familles avaient en 1949 été déportées au Kazakhstan, les autres en Ouzbékistan, un très petit nombre en Kirghizie et en Sibérie.

Les raisons de cette déportation n'ont jamais été clairement formulées par le régime stalinien, mais on peut donner à titre d'hypothèse les suivantes: la méfiance vis à vis d'un peuple lié culturellement et historiquement à la Grèce qui vient de basculer dans le camp occidental, un nombre non négligeable de ces Grecs n'ayant pas pris la nationalité soviétique, enfin la nécessité de

mettre en valeur les terres d'Asie centrale. Le témoignage de P. Boubouridis, médecin de Sukhum, montre la dureté de cette vie en déportation où les déplacements n'étaient autorisés que dans un rayon de 5 km autour du lieu de résidence, avec nécessité de pointer chaque dimanche au poste de police. Les Grecs d'Abkhazie et d'autres régions de la Géorgie ont été les principaux bâtisseurs des villes minière et industrielle de Kentaou et de Tchimkent au Kazakhstan.

A partir de 1956, après le XXe congrès du PCUS, les Grecs citoyens soviétiques eurent l'autorisation de rentrer dans leurs régions d'origine, au bord de la mer Noire par décision du Soviet Suprême du 17 septembre 1955. La diaspora grecque d'Abkhazie commença alors à se reconstituer peu à peu.

Reconstitution de la diaspora grecque d'Abkhazie

P. Boubouridis (1990) estime à 15 000 le nombre de ceux qui sont alors revenus en Abkhazie. Ioanidi donne le chiffre de 2 000 personnes revenues en milieu rural avant 1959 et de 300 familles en ville. Le recensement de 1959 donne le chiffre de 9101 Grecs pour la république autonome d'Abkhazie, celui de 1989 donne 14 664, ce qui ne représente que 42 % des Grecs présents en 1939 et seulement 3% de la population totale de l'Abkhazie en 1989.

Les biens immobiliers des déportés avaient été attribués soit à des cadres de l'administration et du parti en ville, soit à des Géorgiens dont l'installation avait été encouragée à la campagne (1 000 roubles par famille) par le gouvernement en vue d'augmenter la proportion de la population géorgienne dans une Abkhazie qui était officiellement rattachée à la Géorgie depuis 1931. Il était possible d'obtenir la restitution de ces biens en ville par décision de justice, alors qu'à la campagne cela ne fut pas possible et la plupart durent racheter leur maison ou en construire une nouvelle. Il fallut attendre 1989 puis 1991 pour que le Soviet Suprême reconnaisse le caractère illégal de la déportation des peuples par Staline et proclame la restauration de leurs pleins droits. Mais il n'y a toujours pas eu d'indemnisation pour les biens perdus (K. Photiadis, 1994).

La vie des Grecs a repris à la ville comme à la campagne. Dès 1958, le "théâtre national grec", fermé en 1938, fonctionnait de nouveau jouant des pièces d'auteurs pontiques comme Psatha, Kanonidis ou d'auteurs grecs de l'antiquité. Il connut un grand

succès sous la direction du metteur en scène D. Boubouridis, organisant des tournées dans toutes les villes d'URSS où se trouvait une communauté grecque de quelque importance (K. Photiadis, 1994). Une école pour enseigner la langue grecque aux enfants fut ouverte en 1988, mais eut du mal à fonctionner faute d'instituteurs compétents. Dans les villages, seulement le pontique était transmis dans les familles.

La période de la perestroïka est marquée par la création à Sukhum en 1984 d'une association illégale "Epistrophî", c'est à dire "Retour", dont l'objectif était d'obtenir pour les Grecs d'URSS qui le désiraient le droit d'émigrer en Grèce au nom des droits de l'homme. Elle comptait 5 000 membres de toute l'URSS mais dont la plupart étaient de Sukhum et des environs. Elle participa à Moscou les 22-23 octobre 1988 avec des associations d'Allemands et de Juifs à un banquet international pour obtenir des autorités soviétiques ce droit à l'émigration. En 1989 elle s'associa avec l'Union "Mémorial" fondée à Moscou pour revendiquer la reconnaissance des victimes du terrorisme stalinien et des réparations (V. Agtsidis, 1994). Sukhum était redevenue l'un des principaux centres de l'hellénisme d'URSS quand éclata en 1992 un conflit national entre l'Abkhazie et la Géorgie qui allait de nouveau mettre en cause l'existence de la diaspora grecque et provoquer un second déracinement.

La guerre d'Abkhazie et le nouveau déracinement

L'Abkhazie avait depuis 1931 le statut de république autonome rattachée à la Géorgie. Mais les Abkhazes qui ne représentaient plus que 17,8 % de la population en 1989 alors que les Géorgiens étaient 45,7 % et les Arméniens 15 %, n'ont cessé depuis 1978 de réclamer l'indépendance de leur république et son rattachement à la fédération de Russie. Ces revendications se sont intensifiées lorsque le mouvement national géorgien s'est développé à partir de 1988. L'abolition de la constitution de 1978 et son remplacement par celle de 1925, qui conférait à l'Abkhazie le statut de république de l'URSS, à l'initiative d'une faible majorité de députés abkhazes du parlement local acheva de mettre le feu aux poudres. Les officiels abkhazes s'enfuirent à Goudaouta au nord tandis que des troupes géorgiennes débarquaient à Sukhum en août 1992. L'armée abkhaze reçut le soutien des autres nationalités musulmanes du nord du Caucase (Tcherkesses, Adyghes, Tchétchènes...) qui avaient depuis 1991 le projet de

former une fédération indépendante des peuples du nord du Caucase. La prise de Gagra au nord en septembre 1992 puis celle de Sukhum un an après par cette armée dans laquelle les Abkhazes n'étaient que le tiers, fut possible à cause du soutien plus ou moins indirect des Russes qui avaient conservé leurs bases militaires sur place. Plus de 200 000 réfugiés Géorgiens furent repoussés jusqu'à la frontière sud de l'Abkhazie où s'est stabilisé le front en octobre 1993. Un accord de mai 1994 imposé par la Russie a créé de part et d'autre de la rivière Ingouri un couloir occupé par des troupes russes venues s'interposer entre les armées géorgiennes et abkhazes. La situation est ainsi pour le moment stabilisée.

La diaspora grecque de Sukhum et des environs a beaucoup souffert de cette guerre dans laquelle se sont affrontés le nationalisme géorgien et celui des Abkhazes. Ce dernier était soutenu directement par les peuples musulmans du Caucase du nord désireux de constituer une fédération indépendante, indirectement par la Turquie, cherchant à contourner le bloc des états chrétiens de Géorgie et d'Arménie pour accéder directement aux peuples musulmans turcophones d'Azerbaïdjan et d'Asie centrale, et par la Russie qui était désireuse d'affaiblir la Géorgie pour l'amener à adhérer à la Communauté des États Indépendants et conserver ses bases sur la côte géorgienne de la mer Noire. La communauté grecque d'Abkhazie avait depuis longtemps entretenu de bonnes relations avec les Abkhazes qui avaient, lors des déportations de 1949, respecté les biens des Grecs et qui eux aussi avaient souffert du régime stalinien. Elle se trouvait solidaire des autres peuples russophones d'Abkhazie (Russes, Arméniens, Esthoniens...) confrontés à la politique ultranationaliste géorgienne qui cherchait partout à imposer la langue et la culture géorgienne. Mais la diaspora grecque était également présente dans le centre de la Géorgie et en Adjarie donc dans l'armée géorgienne. Elle s'est donc trouvée dans une position d'autant plus difficile que les Abkhazes ont imposé la mobilisation de tous les hommes de 18 à 45 ans. Beaucoup de jeunes grecs sont alors partis en Russie dès le début du conflit pour échapper à cela. On a d'ailleurs par la suite dénombré des Grecs parmi les victimes des deux armées ennemies.

Il ne restait plus aux Grecs qu'à se tourner vers leur État-nation, la Grèce, pour obtenir sa protection, leur évacuation, leur accueil et installation dans ce pays. En mai 1992, mille quatre cents Grecs de Sukhum ont envoyé au premier ministre grec un rapport sur la

situation critique dans laquelle ils se trouvaient lui demandant de les transférer en Grèce pour les installer dans la région de son choix. En août 1992 le débarquement des troupes géorgiennes a provoqué une intensification de la guerre et un afflux de réfugiés dans le sud de la Russie, certains allant jusqu'à l'ambassade grecque à Moscou. Beaucoup sont partis sur des bateaux russes, le port étant la seule issue par laquelle il était possible de fuir la guerre.

En Grèce, les associations et la presse pontiques ont lancé des appels répétés en octobre et novembre. Le 22 décembre, l'ancien maire de Moscou G. Popov, président de l'Union des Grecs d'URSS, a lui-même lancé un appel au gouvernement grec pour qu'il envoie un bateau à Sukhum en vue du rapatriement de quelques deux cents familles se trouvant dans une situation critique à cause des combats. La première vague de réfugiés attendant à l'ambassade à Moscou fut évacuée en novembre vers la Grèce en cars. Cependant la décision d'envoyer un bateau à Sukhum ne fut prise que beaucoup plus tard à la suite d'une manifestation de 5 000 personnes dans le centre d'Athènes organisée par l'association Argo. En juillet 1992, l'opération "Toison d'Or" fut donc organisée par une secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Étrangères, V. Tsouderou, avec l'appui des autorités gouvernementales géorgiennes de Tiflis et Sukhum. Le 15 août 1013 personnes étaient embarquées sur un bateau dans le port de Sukhum. Elles débarquaient le 18 août à Alexandroupoli en Thrace. Deux mille autres personnes furent évacuées dans les semaines qui suivirent en avion de Sukhum et en car de Sotchi. Il a donc fallu attendre plus d'une année pour qu'à la veille de la prise de Sukhum (27 septembre 1993) l'État grec vienne au secours de la population grecque d'Abkhazie alors qu'Israël, par exemple, avait évacué les Juifs, certes moins nombreux, dès le début du conflit.

Une enquête auprès de 314 chefs de familles effectuée dans le bateau au cours de l'opération "Toison d'Or" permet de se faire une idée plus précise de la situation dans laquelle se trouvaient les Grecs avant leur départ. Une partie d'entre eux a été victime des bombardements d'obus au cours du siège de la ville, beaucoup de maisons étant détruites ou incendiées. En ville et dans les villages environnants, des bandes armées irrégulières de Géorgiens se sont livrées à des pillages, des viols, des tortures et des assassinats en toute impunité. L'aisance relative de beaucoup de familles grecques appartenant aux classes moyennes en faisait des victimes toutes désignées. Leurs maisons et appartements ont été parfois

expropriés de fait pour y installer des familles géorgiennes comme cela s'était produit en 1949 à la suite des déportations. Les exactions se sont poursuivies immédiatement après la prise de Sukhum par l'armée abkhaze, en particulier à la campagne. Dix-huit Grecs, habitants de Georgievka et d'Odichi, cinq de Tsebelda furent massacrés en novembre 1993 à quelques jours d'intervalle par des irréguliers voulant s'installer dans leur village à leur place (purification ethnique). L'armée régulière abkhaze les arrêta par la suite.

Une visite de quatre jours à Sukhum et le long de la route qui rejoint la frontière nord à Gagra nous a permis de constater en juin 1994 les ravages causés par la guerre. A Sukhum où ne vivait qu'une faible partie des 160 000 habitants d'avant la guerre les deux tiers des maisons et appartements avaient été détruits ou très fortement endommagés. Les archives nationales d'Abkhazie, dont le sous-directeur N. Ioanidi est Grec, ont été incendiées et totalement détruites intentionnellement en août 1993 à la fin de la période d'occupation de Sukhum par l'armée géorgienne. Une grande partie de la mémoire de la communauté grecque d'Abkhazie (documents divers et collections de journaux) est ainsi partie en fumée. Dans les villages voisins, en particulier à Odichi (Constantinovskaïa), des trois quart des maisons ne restaient plus que les murs. Une seule famille grecque était encore présente sur les lieux ne subsistant que grâce à son potager.

V. Agtsidis (1990) se fondant sur plusieurs témoignages évalue à plus de deux cents les victimes grecques de la guerre. Des 15 000 Grecs d'Abkhazie de 1989 il ne reste plus aujourd'hui que 2 000 environ, d'après N. Ioanidi. Sur ce nombre 300 à 350 vivraient encore en milieu rural. Ce sont pour la plupart des personnes âgées restées pour garder leurs biens ou ce qu'il en reste. Le gouvernement abkhaze de Ardzinba qui s'est constitué après la prise de la capitale s'est affirmé d'emblée comme multi-ethnique désignant deux de ses ministres parmi les Grecs: N. Mystakopoulo et P. Charalambidis (V. Agtsidis, 1994). Une interview que nous ont accordée N. Mystakopoulo et le ministre des Affaires Etrangères S. Djindjolia a clairement mis en évidence le désir du gouvernement abkhaze de voir revenir la plus grande partie de la communauté grecque. Environ cinq cents personnes parmi les réfugiés en Grèce auraient manifesté par écrit le désir de revenir en Abkhazie, leur terre natale. Ces retours semblent actuellement peu probables lorsqu'on interroge tant les Grecs restés sur place que ceux réfugiés à Alexandroupoli, le principal obstacle étant l'insécurité non encore maîtrisée. Les jeunes reviendront moins facilement que les anciens, malgré une situation difficile pour eux en Grèce.

Accueil et installation des réfugiés en Grèce

Les réfugiés d'Abkhazie dont on ignore le nombre actuel en Grèce ont suivi le chemin des autres réfugiés pontiques de l'ex-URSS qu'on estime être au moins 60 000 fin 1993. Alors que seulement 15 % de l'ensemble des réfugiés sont pris en charge par l'Organisme d'Accueil et d'Installation des Grecs Rapatriés (EIYAPOE) créé en 1990 par le ministère des affaires étrangères, on peut supposer qu'une plus grande proportion peut-être des réfugiés de Sukhum s'y trouve puisqu'ils sont arrivés en Grèce particulièrement démunis.

Ils ont d'abord été pris en charge dans des centres d'accueil dont nous citerons deux exemples dans lesquels nous avons enquêté: une école désaffectée à Naoussa en Macédoine, un hôtel entièrement loué par l'Organisme (EIYAPOE) à Nea Chili, faubourg de Alexandroupolis en Thrace. Les familles disposent au maximum d'une chambre et de la nourriture distribuée quotidiennement. Ce séjour ne devrait durer que 15 jours à 1 mois. En fait, dans les deux cas cités, il a duré pour la plupart des familles au moins un an. Ensuite les familles peuvent être envoyées dans un centre de logement provisoire installé sur un terrain aménagé à cet effet à proximité d'un village d'anciens réfugiés pontiques de 1923 ou d'une petite ville telle que Alexandroupoli ou Kavala. Ces maisons en préfabriqué avec le confort élémentaire sont alignées en blocs, un millier de personnes environ y étant logées pendant six mois à un an en principe, en fait souvent plus d'un an. Les centres de Zygo près de Kavala, Sappès et Palagia abritent, surtout le dernier, des réfugiés de Sukhum. Ils y reçoivent des cours de langue et une formation visant à leur intégration dans la société grecque. Les enfants sont scolarisés dans les écoles voisines.

Un troisième stade dans lequel plusieurs familles entrent directement après un séjour prolongé dans les centres d'accueil (Naoussa et Nea Chili) sans passer par les centres de logement provisoire consiste en la location d'appartements pendant deux ans par l'Organisation (EIYAPOE), l'eau et l'électricité étant à la charge des familles. Les réfugiés de Sukhum n'ont pas encore atteint le stade final de l'installation permanente dans des logements construits à leur intention en Macédoine et surtout en Thrace. Ce système très bureaucratique fonctionne grâce à une dotation de la Communauté Européenne. Il se heurte à de grosses difficultés à cause de mauvaises relations entre l'institution (EIYAPOE) et les réfugiés. Des manifestations à Athènes en avril 1994 et Xanthi en

septembre ont été organisées par les associations pontiques et de réfugiés. Les critiques portaient essentiellement sur la gestion non transparente des fonds alloués par Bruxelles ainsi que sur l'administration à laquelle les associations de Pontiques ne sont pas associées malgré leur expérience et leur représentativité. Les employés de l'Organisation ont souvent des difficultés à communiquer avec les réfugiés et sont trop souvent perçus par ceux-ci comme une bureaucratie peu efficace et en grande partie inutile. L'absence de perspectives d'emploi et de vision de leur avenir est la plus grande cause d'insatisfaction et d'angoisse chez les réfugiés. Les centres de logement provisoire dans lesquels certaines familles restent plusieurs années sont de véritables ghettos perçus comme tels.

Le gouvernement grec a choisi particulièrement la Thrace comme région d'accueil pour des raisons géostratégiques évidentes. Le déficit démographique dû à une émigration vers l'Allemagne et les grandes agglomérations de la Grèce est important: la population a diminué de 7,5 % entre 1961 et 1971 (J. Dalègre, 1994). Il s'agit d'une zone frontière avec la Turquie à l'extrémité nord-est de la Grèce dans laquelle vit une forte minorité musulmane en majorité turcophone: 38 % de la population de Thrace selon une estimation du ministère des Affaires Étrangères. En 1991 la Thrace avait 338 147 habitants; en 1993 on estimait à 10 000 les réfugiés pontiques présents dans cette région dans les centres de l'EIYAPOE et à l'extérieur. L'amélioration des infrastructures routières et portuaires en cours grâce aux financements européens ("paquet Delors"), la création de deux zones industrielles à Xanthi et Komotini n'ont pas pour le moment attiré beaucoup d'investissements grecs ou étrangers. Les Pontiques ne trouvent pas facilement des emplois autres que saisonniers (tourisme, récolte du coton...).

Beaucoup de réfugiés ont donc préféré rejoindre dans les grandes agglomérations des parents plus ou moins proches, ne recevant alors aucune aide de l'État. Les quartiers pontiques de Kallithea et de Menidi à Athènes ont reçu beaucoup de réfugiés de Sukhum. Le marché du travail de l'agglomération athénienne est évidemment plus ouvert que celui de Thrace. Pour les réfugiés d'Abkhazie la voie est étroite. Au départ il leur faut surmonter le lourd handicap de la langue et de l'équivalence des diplômes. D'autre part les fortes incitations de la politique étatique à l'installation des réfugiés en Thrace et Macédoine orientale, si elles sont parfaitement justifiées du point de vue de l'aménagement du

territoire grec, sont une source de difficultés supplémentaires pour eux à cause du retard économique de la région, de son caractère encore trop exclusivement rural. Or les réfugiés des années 1990 ne sont pas ceux de 1923; ils appartiennent davantage à des couches sociales urbaines exerçant des métiers qualifiés, voire d'un haut niveau scientifique et technique. On ne peut donc pas les installer facilement à la campagne ni dans des petites villes dans lesquelles le marché du travail est étroit et pas assez diversifié.

Les Grecs d'Abkhazie réfugiés en Grèce sont venus rejoindre la diaspora pontique intérieure. Ils se trouvent pour une part non négligeable d'entre eux aux frontières nord-est de la Grèce dans une situation difficile, en danger de ghettoisation. Depuis 1994 ils protestent de plus en plus vigoureusement contre le sort qui est le leur au sein de l'institution d'accueil (EIYAPOE). Ils revendiquent une plus grande autonomie et responsabilité. Ils voudraient comme leurs prédécesseurs de 1923 construire leurs propres logements dans des quartiers ou des agglomérations nouvelles où ils pourraient se rassembler et imprimer leur marque; ils désireraient donc reconstruire un territoire à eux un peu comme les Pontiques de la première diaspora dans leurs villages du nord de la Grèce ou dans leurs quartiers urbains: Kallithea ou Menidi à Athènes, Stavroupoli à Thessalonique. Il leur faut retrouver leur esprit pionnier qui s'est manifesté aux diverses étapes de leur histoire dans le Pont et en URSS, c'est pourquoi plusieurs associations proposent le projet de la construction d'une ville portuaire à Petrola sur la côte de Thrace à l'ouest d'Alexandroupoli (Charalambidis M., 1994).

Les Grecs d'Abkhazie dans la longue durée

L'Abkhazie qui est un espace de circulation, débouché sur la mer Noire des vallées nord-ouest du Caucase, portion du littoral mettant en relation le sud de la Russie et la Géorgie, au contact des peuples chrétiens et des peuples musulmans, a toujours attiré les diasporas: Grecs et Arméniens principalement. L'installation de ces peuples en diaspora a été soit tolérée soit encouragée par les deux grands empires qui ont au cours des quatre siècles derniers dominé la région: l'empire Ottoman puis la Russie tsariste. Les Grecs, dont la présence dans la région remonte à l'antiquité, se sont constamment appuyés sur leurs réseaux sociaux, économiques et culturels qui à plusieurs périodes historiques ont


relié les rives de la mer Noire au bassin de la Méditerranée orientale et au reste du monde. En Abkhazie ils n'ont pas seulement développé leurs activités dans le cadre du port cosmopolite de Sukhum dont ils étaient à la fin du XIXe et au début du XXe siècle les principaux animateurs, mais ils ont aussi largement contribué à repeupler les campagnes environnantes à l'initiative de la Russie tsariste alors que la paysannerie abkhaze musulmane partait chez les Ottomans dans les régions d'où venaient ces Grecs. La diaspora abkhaze de Turquie deviendra trois à quatre fois plus nombreuse que la population restée sur place.

Avec l'avènement des États-nation au XXe siècle la diaspora grecque, qui n'a pas réussi à créer le sien dans la région (la république du Pont autour de Trébizonde), recule partout, est même menacée de disparition après sa déportation en Asie centrale par Staline. L'*homo sovieticus* ne réussit cependant pas à venir à bout des minorités ethniques dispersées, si bien qu'après 1956 la diaspora grecque des bords de la mer Noire se reconstitue, reprend possession d'une partie de ses territoires pour réapparaître au grand jour, réaffirmer son identité culturelle au moment de la perestroïka.

L'expansion territoriale de l'État-nation géorgien en Abkhazie encouragée depuis 1931 par Beria et Staline a pu apparaître aux Grecs comme un obstacle dans la mesure où des Géorgiens ont été installés en 1949 dans les maisons de ceux qui étaient déportés en Asie centrale. Ceux-ci appartiennent à une diaspora dont le centre de gravité est dans le sud de la Russie et dont les réseaux s'étendent à une grande partie de l'ex-URSS. Ils ont fait du russe leur langue principale n'ayant pas pu conserver la leur. Se trouvant donc en porte à faux vis à vis du nationalisme géorgien des années 1990, ils ont eu en majorité localement plus de sympathie pour les Abkhazes. Ne voulant donc pas s'engager du côté géorgien ils se sont de plus en plus en 1992 et 1993 retrouvés victimes de bandes armées géorgiennes. Leur seul recours restait l'État grec jouant le rôle de leur territoire d'origine. La faiblesse économique et politique de cet État, plus tourné vers l'Europe occidentale que vers l'Europe orientale, n'a pas permis une évacuation rapide et efficace mais un sauvetage de dernière heure et un rapatriement problématique.

Le gouvernement abkhaze qui s'est auto-proclamé indépendant, avec le soutien indirect non officiel de la Russie, essaie de favoriser au maximum le maintien et le retour des diasporas grecque et arménienne dont il a le plus grand besoin aussi bien du point de

vue démographique qu'économique. Tant que le problème politique posé par l'existence de ce nouvel État ne sera pas durablement réglé entre la Géorgie et la Russie, il est peu probable que les Grecs d'Abkhazie reviennent malgré les difficultés auxquelles ils doivent faire face pour leur intégration en Grèce. La diaspora grecque est cependant toujours présente en Abkhazie, même au gouvernement, et cette présence symbolique peut peut-être dans l'avenir redevenir réelle. Ce déracinement récent a été précédé par d'autres plus anciens, suivis de retours partiels. Il est cependant peu probable que Sukhum redevienne la ville en grande partie grecque du début du siècle. Celle-ci pourra peut-être renaître sur la côte de Thrace à Petrota dont les associations pontiques de Grèce voudraient faire une nouvelle Sukhum ou Dioscouria. L'histoire des diasporas se situe dans la longue durée, à des échelles de temps en tout cas beaucoup plus grandes que celles des États-nation ou des empires multi-ethniques.



PRINCIPAUX VILLAGES GRECS DES ENVIRONS DE SUKHOUM (ABKHAZIE)

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Foreign Policy and Ethnic Tensions in FYROM after the Greek-Skopje Interim Agreement

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article se penche sur l'Accord intérimaire survenu entre la Grèce et Skopje. Il montre que celui-ci a apporté une amélioration substantielle des relations bilatérales de ces deux pays et a accentué la coopération interbalkanique. Ceci a eu pour effet de faciliter l'intégration européenne de l'Ancienne République Yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM). Ainsi, malgré le contentieux entourant la dénomination de cette petite république, les relations Grèce-Skopje demeurent excellentes.

Étant membre de l'OTAN et de l'Union européenne, la Grèce, pays économiquement développé, est bien placé pour aider l'ARYM à redresser son économie. Contrairement à la Bulgarie et la Serbie, la Grèce ne constitue pas une menace à l'identité slavomacédonienne, créée après 1944 pour contrecarrer les visées serbes et bulgares, en autant que l'ARYM n'ait pas de revendications territoriales sur la Grèce et qu'elle n'enfreigne pas l'héritage culturel hellénique.

Enfin, le facteur albanais constitue une force déstabilisante pour l'ARYM, ce qui la rapproche d'Athènes, d'autant plus que la Grèce pratique dans cette région une politique de sécurité et de stabilité.

ABSTRACT

The following article describes how the Greek-Skopje Interim Agreement brought about a noticeable improvement in bilateral relations and interbalkan co-operation. The resulting climate facilitated FYROM's integration into Europe, e.g. admission to certain European organisations, an agreement on co-operation with the European Union. Despite the name issue, Greek-Skopje relations are excellent.

As a member of NATO and the European Union, Greece is not only diplomatically placed but also economically developed and thus in a position to contribute to FYROM's economic recovery and survival. Contrary to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Greece does not challenge the Slavomacedonian identity, created after 1944 to counteract Bulgarian and Serbian aspirations, as long as this new identity does not infringe upon the cultural heritage of Hellenism, or lay territorial claims of any kind on Greece. The Albanian factor in FYROM, a destabilising force, brings Skopje closer to Athens, since Greece applies a policy of stabilisation and regional security.

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The Interim Agreement, signed by Greece and FYROM in September 1995 under the auspices of the United Nations, opened up a new chapter in the relations between the two countries. This rapprochement, the outcome of shuttle diplomacy, assumed by President Clinton's special envoy in the Balkans, Richard Holbrook, and had to be viewed as the aftermath of the scheduled settlement of the Bosnian Crisis as a whole (the Dayton Agreement), after NATO's airstrikes on the Bosnian Serbs early in September 1995.¹ The active involvement of American policy in the Yugoslav Crisis in summer 1995 made effective American mediation possible in the dispute between Athens and Skopje. Since there was no consensus on the name issue, the "small package deal" solution was promoted, namely the taking of confidence-building measures and continued of negotiations about the name, which was left in abeyance.² Compared with the Vance-Owen plan (May 1993), the Interim Agreement may have been less desirable for the Greek side³, but, in general, spirit of both diplomatic acts is the same.

Greece has already realised that the quintessence of the "Macedonian Question" is international recognition of a new state, which calls itself "Republic of Macedonia" and not the change of identity of the Slavic people living in the FYROM in favour of rebulgarisation, reserbianisation or in favour of the thesis that the Slavomacedonians are an "amorphous mass, a flour with which one can bake every cake one wishes", as the Swedish right-wing politician and scholar Rudolf Kjelle'n stated in 1916, describing the ethnopolitical situation in Macedonia. Such a view could rekindle the old Serbo-Bulgarian antagonism over Macedonia, which also affects Greece.⁴ If Skopje-State is to survive, which corresponds to Greek interests, it should have an identity. Through the Interim Agreement, FYROM consented to respect the inviolability of the borders, renounce any territorial claims to Greece, refrain from any hostile propaganda against Greece, interpret article 49 of the Constitution in such a way that no interference in Greek sovereign rights could be permitted and suspend the flag with the "Sun of Vergina". After the signing of this agreement, the Greek-Skopje dispute was allegedly restricted to a tussle about the name Macedonia. The Interim Agreement is an international act, binding for both countries. It should be stressed that the definite settlement of the name issue has to be accepted by both sides, according to Security Council resolutions.⁵

Subsequent to the Greek-Skopje understanding, FYROM's foreign policy has had three keystones: peaceful European integration, renewed ties with America, and Balkan co-operation. National security and recovery of the ailing economy are two matters of great urgency. The political significance of the Interim Agreement for FYROM lay in the fact, that only after this rapprochement with Greece, a member of European Union and NATO, could FYROM begin pursuing its European integration policy. Gligorov was now allowed to apply for admission to European institutions. FYROM was admitted to the European Council and to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in the second half of 1995 without any Greek objection. Only after Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos had visited Skopje in March 1997,⁶ could FYROM sign an agreement on co-operation with the European Union. This agreement, signed 29 April 1997 in Luxembourg, stipulates that FYROM's farm products could be exported to the European market and the European Union must award a loan of 150.000.000 ECU to FYROM that until the year 2000 in order to improve its infrastructure.⁷ The former Yugoslav republic's fears that Greece might obstruct the ratification of the agreement by the European Parliament as a form of revenge for the use of the name did not materialise⁸ and the agreement went into effect on January 1, 1998.⁹ Prior to this agreement, only Slovenia had negotiated on association with the European Union. Similar agreements are not expected in the near future with Croatia and "rump" Yugoslavia. It must be stressed that Skopje was admitted to European institutions under the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It indicates that Europe does consider Greek sensitivity regarding the name issue, which is still an issue in the negotiations.¹⁰ FYROM's long-term target is to become a member of the European Union. Skopje's authorities are aware of the fact that the former Yugoslav republic's access to Europe depends on Greece. The new Coalition Government, formed by VMRO-DPMNE, Democratic Alternative and the Democratic Party of the Albanians at the end of November 1998, after the elections in October- November 1998, is attaching particular importance to Greek-FYROM relations. Despite its former political profile as a proBulgarian and nationalistic party, nowadays VMRO-DPMNE presents itself as a modern, moderate centre-right party, ready to solve all the questions with the neighbours and to facilitate foreign investments.¹¹ The question of FYROM's future association with the European Union was discussed during

Georgievski's visit to Brussels in December 1998 and Gligorov's in France in February 1999. But it will take a long time until Skopje meets the necessary criteria.

Germany stands out as the main central European country trying to boost political, economic and military relations with FYROM. Germany takes first place in the country's investment sector and is an important trade partner. On April 9, 1997, an agreement was signed in Skopje on the training of high-ranking and non-commissioned Slavomacedonian officers in German Military Schools.¹² Two days later Crvenkovski signed two agreements in Bonn. One agreement with Kinkel, regarding construction of the Skopje-Bulgarian railroad, which will be financed by Germany to the tune of 30 000 000 DM. A second agreement was ratified with Waigel. It stipulated that Germany should deposit 170 000 000 DM in order that FYROM's foreign debt be paid off.¹³ Financial matters were also discussed during Kinkel's visit to Skopje in October 1997.¹⁴ Through economic penetration into the South Balkan Peninsula, Germany strives to counteract American political leverage.

On June 17, 1997, Gligorov paid an official visit to the United States with a view to generating American interest in investing in his country (so far no noticeable American business activity in FYROM) and to securing the prolongation of American military presence.¹⁵ He asked President Clinton to not withdraw the 300 American soldiers deployed in FYROM and, rather, to replace them with soldiers from Bosnia, should they pull out of the FYROM. Clinton and Albright did not commit themselves to meeting Gligorov's demands, but limited their remarks to emphasising American interest in the stability of the area, as NATO military manoeuvres (Partnership for Peace) on the soil of FYROM in Krivolak in May 1997 had already proved. UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, had suggested a reduction of UN troops stationed in Macedonia. He argued that there were no external factors which threatened FYROM's integrity, but only internal ethnic tensions.¹⁶ In order to anticipate FYROM's apprehensions, NATO's high commandant in Europe, General Clark, paid an official visit to Skopje at the end of August 1997 and offered a future military co-operation between FYROM and America to counterbalance the possible withdrawal of UN troops.¹⁷ The tense situation in Kosovo, where the underground organisation "Kosovar Liberation Army"¹⁸ was clashing with the Serbian security forces, had placed

FYROM in a precarious position. The likelihood of spillover into FYROM cannot be ruled out. This likelihood is what urges Washington to apply a deterrent policy. At a session of NATO Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg (late May 1998) the prolongation of the UNPROFOR-UNPREDEP mandate, which expired August 31, 1998, had been suggested. Russia was strongly opposed to the deployment of NATO forces in FYROM and demanded Russian participation in the UNPREDEP. It also came out against the imposition of sanctions on the so-called rump Yugoslavia and disapproved of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo, calling on Serbs and Albanians to come to terms. Since 1997, Russia, a country well acquainted with Balkan affairs, has been pursuing an active Balkan policy. Hence it would be a mistake to underestimate Russian involvement. During his visit to Moscow in January 1998, Gligorov suggested that Russia be present in the Balkan Peninsula where it could provide preventive diplomacy so that any potential crisis could be avoided. A relevant agreement was signed between Gligorov and Yeltsin.¹⁹

In late June 1998, Crvenkovski paid an official visit to Washington, where American officials gave him definite assurance of the American commitment to protecting FYROM.²⁰ Not long after Crvenkovski's visit, the UN Security Council ruled on the prolongation of the UNPREDEP mandate to last until the end of February 1999. Their number increased by 300²¹ men and reached the number of 1100 men. Stressing the geopolitics of the South Balkans, NATO embarked on armed manoeuvres in Krivolak in September 1998.²² Also, in December 1998, a NATO Rapid Reaction Force of 1,700 men under French command was deployed in the FYROM to supervise implementation of the Kosovo agreement, signed by Milosevic and Holbrook in October 1998, and to help extract OSCE monitors from Kosovo in the case of massive hostilities, hostage taking, urgent medical problems or land mines.²³ As a reaction to the establishment of diplomatic relations between FYROM and Taiwan in January 1999, China used its Security Council veto to thwart a new extension of the UNPREDEP mandate in FYROM on 25, 1999. But NATO's military intervention on March 24, 1999, has assigned a pivotal role to FYROM. Some might even say that the former Yugoslav republic is being turned into an American protectorate. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether or not NATO can safeguard FYROM's territorial integrity, given the dynamic and unforeseeable developments in the wake of NATO airstrikes against Serbia

(Yugoslavia). This intervention is a violation of international law and could lead to a new Cold War. In Rambouillet, no serious effort was made to solve the Kosovo Question in terms of Yugoslavian sovereignty; instead, Kosovo was turned into a new American protectorate. Serbian reaction was justifiable, but led to a vicious circle from which no one seems able to escape.

The Greek-Skopje interim agreement indirectly promoted inter-balkan co-operation. Gligorov's initial bottom line for a policy of equal distance from all neighbours did not prove functional. After the lifting of embargoes, the Greek economic presence in FYROM has increased greatly.²⁴ Cultural exchanges, development of tourism, mutual visits of politicians to both countries are the first signs of a new era in bilateral relations. As a NATO and EU member with a developed economy and democratic institutions, Greece is more attractive to the FYROM than other Balkan countries. Greece stands up for the former republic's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Albanian factor, which acts as destabilising factor in the FYROM, brings both countries closer. In view of the escalation of the Kosovo crisis with its interbalkan dimensions - spillover into FYROM, stream of Albanian refugees into Greece, dangerous situation for the Greek minority in Albania - Skopje also counts on Greece for assistance. During a visit to Ochrid (late April 1998), the Greek Defence Minister A. Tsochatzopoulos supported the initiative for the establishment of Balkan Multinational Rapid Deployment Forces that could operate as peacemakers in areas of instability. He came in support of FYROM's future admission to NATO and invited Defence Minister Kitanovski to visit Greece.²⁵ Sticking to a constructive Balkan Policy, Greece participated in the Balkan Defence Ministers Meeting, held on September 26, 1998, in Skopje, during which the establishment of a joint peacekeeping force was agreed upon.²⁶ In the wake of this initiative, defence ministers from Italy, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM and Romania signed an agreement in Athens on January 12, 1999 to finalise the relevant arrangements. Because of a government change in Ankara, Turkey, a full member, was represented by its ambassador to Greece. It was agreed that the headquarters would be in Plovdiv (Philippoupolis, Bulgaria) for four years and then rotate among other member states. A Turk would be the initial commanding officer; a Greek, the first head of the Political Secretariat. Both positions would subsequently be rotated among the member states. FYROM inhabitants do not have anti-Greeks feelings and did not even during the embargo. They are eager to

come to Greece for various reasons, such as shopping, tourism, business and medical treatment. The past years of animosity forgotten, Gligorov has often praised Greece's constructive policy in the Balkan Peninsula. Athens-Skopje relations are not seriously affected by demands from the "Aegean-Lobby", e.g., unconditional recognition of a "Macedonian" minority in Greece, recognition of a putative Greek "genocide" during the Greek Civil War, and the restitution of their confiscated property. In fact, Skopje seems to support the above unofficially, although in media mainly for internal consumption.²⁷ In the improving climate, the so called "Aegean Refugees" are allowed to visit Greece if in the passports the place of birth is given with the respective Greek name (for example, Florina instead of Lerin). FYROM will put forth the question of using Salonica's harbour for the shipping trade. In principle, Greece is not against granting a free trade zone in Thessaloniki (Salonica), as FYROM's economy and viability are contingent upon it to some extent, but it is not an item on the agenda.²⁸ Preparations have already been made by both sides to facilitate the railway connection between Thessaloniki and Skopje. On June 23, 1998, Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos and his FYROM counterpart, Handziski, an agreement signed in Athens on border communication and co-operation.²⁹ At a joint press conference, they pointed out that the bilateral relations are excellent and further development is expected within the next few months, despite differences concerning the name issue. They both opposed NATO intervention in Kosovo and favoured a diplomatic solution. Pangalos warned Western countries against meddling in Balkan affairs and said, "enough blood has flown in the Balkans because of amateurism".³⁰ On July 8, 1998, the Greek Minister of Public Order, Romaïos, and FYROM's Minister of the Interior, Cokrevski, signed in Ochrid, an agreement on the co-operation between the police of both countries in fighting criminality, black marketing, arms and drugs smuggling.³¹ Greek-Skopje relations are not yet normal in the diplomatic sense (there are Heads of Liaison Offices, not Ambassadors), but the current developments are irreversible and should result in a climate of good neighbourliness.

On April 8, 1996, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and FYROM signed an agreement on the regulation of relations and the promotion of co-operation between the two countries, which, in fact, meant mutual recognition.³² The so-called "rump" Yugoslavia recognised "the state continuity of Macedonia from ASNOM 1944

and the Republic of Macedonia, the state continuity of Serbia and Montenegro from 1918".³³ Both countries established full diplomatic relations at the level of Ambassadors. Although Belgrade was initially reluctant to recognise Skopje under the name "Republic of Macedonia", it eventually did so. Many politicians speculated that through this political motion Belgrade was aiming to blackmail Greece into a favourable settlement of the question of the Serbian free trade zone in the harbour. But, in fact, Belgrade acted under the pressure of the international factor to recognise the former Yugoslav republics immediately after the Dayton Agreement. Since Skopje did not want to be recognised under any name other than Republic of Macedonia and accepted the State continuity and international legal personality of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Belgrade gave in. Both sides accepted that the question of the succession of the previous Yugoslavia should be solved by agreement in the future. The terms "Republic of Macedonia and Macedonians" do not cause difficulties for many Serbian politicians (especially Socialists) as far as these terms have an antibulgarian connotation. Athens was not amazed at this Yugoslav diplomatic proceeding and the Greek reactions were rather faint. Early in September 1996, Yugoslav Prime Minister Kontic visited Skopje and signed several agreements on economic co-operation and trade, which resulted in a Customs Union between Belgrade and Skopje.³⁴ Early in July 1997, Crvenkovski visited Belgrade and signed other agreements on the abolition of visas, the opening of new consulates, cultural and sport exchanges and the setting up of a mixed commission to examine and correct school books³⁵. Businessmen from both countries met at the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce in Belgrade and discussed the possibility of Yugoslav companies assuming the reconstruction of the power supply network in FYROM, the construction of railway networks and even an oil pipeline from Thessaloniki (Salonica) to Yugoslavia via the FYROM.³⁶ But because of its ailing economy and international isolation, Yugoslavia is not in a position to complete all these ambitious plans in the short term.

Despite the political normalisation and the economic co-operation, there are still outstanding issues that affect the bilateral relations.

1) Borders: Since May 1997 a mixed diplomatic-expert Commission has been working on the demarcation of the borders.

But no agreement has been signed yet. Belgrade lays claims to some strips in the border area between FYROM, Bulgarian, and Yugoslavia, between FYROM, Albania and Yugoslavia and between Kumanovo and Skopska Crna Gora. Skopje considers these points of strategic importance and wants the borders to remain as they were drawn after the war.³⁷

2) Succession of former Yugoslav: No agreement has been reached yet. Skopje takes account of the attitude of the other former Yugoslav republics and stands firm on signing of a multi-lateral agreement and not a bilateral one.³⁸ Recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as successor of the Former Yugoslavia is a matter of principle for Belgrade. It presupposes that the other sides accept that Communist Yugoslavia did not collapse, but some republics seceded from the Federation, which gives rump Yugoslavia all the hereditary rights.

3) Church Relations: The Autocephalous "Macedonian Church" is not recognised by the Serbian Patriarchate, which burdens interstate relations. Property rights of the Serbian Orthodox Church are unsettled. Through the intermediation of the Greek Orthodox Church negotiations were held between the two Churches from December 1998 until February 1999, but without tangible results. Serbian historians demand the preservation of Serbian cultural and historical monuments in the former republic and the security of all rights to free political, educational, cultural and spiritual organising and activities for the Serbs.³⁹ In Serbia there are also factors (some politicians, historians, the Serbian Orthodox Church) that claim that Macedonia is South Serbia and that the "Macedonian nation" is artificially contrived by the Communist International. This discourse causes strong reactions among Slavomacedonian historians.⁴⁰

As far as the future of bilateral relations is concerned, it could be said that Belgrade would try to exert a strong influence on FYROM. Milosevic has been trying to talk Gligorov into incorporating FYROM into Federal Yugoslavia, threatening that otherwise the Serbian army would not come to help FYROM, should an Albanian uprising of great dimensions break out in Tetovo.⁴¹ Gligorov refuses to discuss such an option.⁴² In Skopje one talks about Finland's syndrome when referring to the special relationship of Skopje-Belgrade.⁴³ Contrary to its former anti-Serbian attitude, VMRO-DPMNE as a government party continues the conciliatory policy towards Belgrade, despite the friction caused by NATO deployment in FYROM.

Skopje's relations with Sofia stagnated until February 1999. Both countries were on bad terms and are still squabbling over the boundary between Bulgarism and Slavomacedonianism. Bulgaria was the first country to recognise the "Macedonian state" on February 15, 1992, but not the "Macedonian nation". For the Bulgarian side, the so-called "Macedonians" are ethnic Bulgarians and only through Tito's policy were they estranged from their roots. According to Bulgarian politicians and historians, the "Macedonians" would declare themselves as Bulgarians, if they were given political and democratic freedoms. The Bulgarians will never become accustomed to the idea of a Slavomacedonianism based on an antibulgarian stance. The experience of the years 1944-1963 is still alive in the Bulgarian politics. A driving force of the "Macedonian nation" was the Communist International.⁴⁴ It found recognition in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The revision of the thesis about the existence of a "Macedonian nation" as a historical category by Bulgarian Communists at the March Plenum (1963)⁴⁵ did not meet with a response. In his Memoirs Zivkov clearly notes how isolated Bulgarian was in the socialist world regarding the Macedonian Question, even after 1963.⁴⁶ President Stojanov said in Strasbourg in April 1997 that Macedonian history had been the most romantic part of Bulgarian history to demonstrate that the so-called Macedonians had a Bulgarian national awareness and only after 1944 did they differentiate themselves from the Bulgarians. Nowadays Sofia claims that about 30, 000 Bulgarians were killed by Yugoslav secret police between 1944-1950 as opponents to the forcible antibulgarian Macedonisation policy.⁴⁷ Sofia and Skopje could not sign some 20 draft agreements because of the language barrier. As Bulgaria does not recognise the historical development of a "Macedonian nation", it denies necessarily the existence of a separate standard "Macedonian" language which is qualified by the Bulgarians as a Serbianised Bulgarian dialect. An agreement on cultural co-operation signed by the University of Skopje and that of Veliko Tarnovo had to be cancelled, as it was written in Bulgarian and "Macedonian".⁴⁸ Up to a point, Bulgarian enjoys the support of Russian historical science. Contrary to the former Soviet attitude, the current national Russian position is that for the whole nineteenth century it was impossible to speak about either a distinct "Macedonian nationality" or "Macedonian" culture, which is claimed as Bulgarian heritage. In a "History of Literature of the West and South Slavs", published by the Russian

Institute for Slavonic and Balkan Studies in 1997, no "Macedonian" literature is mentioned for the nineteenth century, which caused strong reactions in Skopje.⁴⁹ Bulgaria supports political parties in FYROM that have an allegedly probulgarian inclination, like VMRO-DPMNE.⁵⁰ Bulgarian historical literature on the Macedonian Question, produced by the Macedonian Scientific Institute after 1989, is impressive. In an open letter, addressed to President Gligorov by the staff of this Institute in September 1997, the Bulgarian point of view is clearly expressed.

Mr. President,

Not long ago, the Macedonian Bulgarians living in the USA, Canada and Australia, as well as those in Germany, addressed you in an open letter on the occasion of your interview of July 23, 1997. In our capacity as Macedonian Bulgarians and members of the Macedonian Scientific Institute -academicians, corresponding members, professors, assistant professors, research associates and public figures- we would also like to express our opinion on the problems treated by you in the interview.

We are pleased with the fact that you recognised a number of facts about the Republic of Macedonia and the relations between our two countries, namely:

1. This was the first time you have declared before the world that the process of "debulgarization" in the Republic of Macedonia has been completed "with the exception of some persons and one or two parties". That statement of yours confirms the historical truth that, until 1944, the Slavonic population of the Republic of Macedonia has been a Bulgarian one. Furthermore, in this way you supported the statement made by President Petar Stoyanov in Strasbourg -that "Macedonian history is a part of Bulgarian history, and one of its most romantic parts-the struggle of the Christian population against the enslavers".

2. You pointed out that the probulgarian attitudes in the Republic of Macedonia were a "standing problem" for you. This, Mr. President, is true only regarding the period since 1944. It is well known that the population of Macedonia has always legitimised itself as being Bulgarian, which is testified by the Ottoman archives, the diplomatic correspondence of the foreign consuls, foreign observers, travellers, eminent scientists, military people and others who had worked in the historical-geographic region on Macedonia, as well as by the written documents left by the most prominent figures of the National Revival period....

3. You finally found the courage to confirm a statement that we have made a number of times, namely that "the recognition of a state, and not of a language or a nation, is a matter of international law". This is exactly the truth, Mr. President, for the state is a political; i.e. legal category, which is subject to recognition, while the language and the nation are scientific categories which are not subject to recognition. The policy of Serbo-Communists in the Republic of Macedonia towards legitimising the Comintern decision of 1934 for the creation of a "Macedonian language" have led to the present situation, i.e. a political decision of the problem....

4. You are right, Mr. President, in stating that the language disputes is "a domestic problem of your own". The Macedonian Serbo-Communists have "conjured up" that language which, according to the *Focus* newspaper, is spoken by less than a half of the people of the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, we dare ask you: since this is a domestic problem of yours, why is your government constantly intruding it onto us and using it to block the normal relations between our states?

Mr President, once upon a time, our great poet Ivan Vazov, who is of Macedonian origin, said, "You cannot quench the unquenchable". You and your follower would not be able, in spite of all efforts made, to quench the Bulgarian spirit of the population of Macedonia. You are afraid that the notion of "One people in two states" might assert itself. You are right to do so because that is an idea that enjoys ever-greater popularity among people from both sides of the Rouen and Belasistsa. That idea has also been part of the programme of the national liberation movement of the Bulgarians in Macedonia for decades now. This is a righteous idea, which has its future.

At present, the attitude of the Republic of Bulgaria towards the Republic of Macedonia is more than a well-wishing one. Namely because of this Bulgaria:

1. Was the first country in the world to recognise your state.

2. Helped you save your economy from a crash (without any signed agreements) and during the double economic embargo.

3. Did not consent to a division of the territory of the Republic of Macedonia.

4. Interceded with Russia and other countries for the recognition of your state, and they listened to the voice of Sofia.

All this testifies to the fact that the Bulgarian state is not an enemy of the Republic of Macedonia and that its people are a real brother to its people. You should also not forget that the Republic of Bulgaria is the home of over 3 million of Macedonian Bulgarians and their descendants who have been driven away by the Turkish, Serbian and Macedonian authorities, i.e. over three times more than the Slavonic population of Macedonia. Therefore, we are not indifferent to the fate of the Republic of Macedonia.

Mr. Gligorov, in our capacity as Bulgarians from Macedonia and as scholars, we are well aware of the complex political heritage left by the Serbo-Communists to the Republic of Macedonia. Yet, the brothers from both sides of the Rouen and Belasitsa mountains, would like to live at peace and with wide open borders, instead of in an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility, imposed by your present government which is servicing interests alien to both the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria.⁵¹

Bulgaria does not conceal its aspirations towards Skopje. The Bulgarian national doctrine, elaborated by Bulgarian intellectuals and submitted to President Stojanov in January 1998, emphasises that Bulgaria is the only state in the world that borders on segments of the Bulgarian population and that the "Macedonian nation" is a communist figment.⁵² The quintessence of the doctrine is "Free, Independent, Democratic and Prosperous Bulgaria, Spiritually Unifying Force of the Bulgarians throughout the world". No territorial claims are laid on the neighbouring countries, but the necessity of a Bulgarian cultural response is highlighted.⁵³ These principles are destined to determine the Bulgarian foreign policy for the next century. The Bulgarian military doctrine stipulates that in the case of an armed conflict between Albanians and "Macedonians" in FYROM, Bulgarian special security forces will be involved,⁵⁴ no matter how desirable or not to Skopje. Obviously, Bulgaria is worried about the likelihood of FYROM's increased dependence on Belgrade in the case of an Albanian riot. Greek-Serbian penetration into FYROM is undesirable for Sofia.⁵⁵ Only a few days after the Greek-Skopje Interim Agreement and immediately after Gligorov's visit to Belgrade, there was an assassination attempt made on his life, probably by agents of the pro-Bulgarian organisation MPO

(Macedonian Patriotic Organisation). This is a bad omen. Bulgaria's long-term objective is confederation with FYROM; i.e., two states of one Bulgarian nation.⁵⁶ Bulgaria paid particular importance to the recent parliamentary elections in FYROM and the victory of VMRO-DPMNE was regarded (wrongly) as a victory of the "latent Bulgarian awareness" of the "Serbomacedonism". There are hopes in Sofia that the problems will be sorted out and that relations will improve noticeably. Urged by the United States to come to terms with Bulgaria's future admission to NATO, Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov and Ljubco Georgievski signed a declaration in Sofia on February 22, 1999. According to the declaration, neither country has any territorial claim on the other and neither will undertake, incite or support actions of a hostile nature against the other.⁵⁷ The declaration was signed in the official languages of both countries, in "Macedonian", according to the Constitution of FYROM and in Bulgarian, according to the Bulgarian Constitution. The language dispute appears to have ended, however, Bulgaria did not recognise a separate "Macedonian" language, as it is perceived in FYROM. It reserves the right to have another approach to the interpretation of the so-called "Macedonian" language.⁵⁸ Both sides found a technical formula to unblock the signing of a series of agreements. Bulgarian donated decommissioned weaponry to FYROM, including Soviet-made tanks and artillery, but in any event, Bulgaria is too weak to play for FYROM a role similar to that of Germany towards the former DDR after 1989. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Sofia will launch a more offensive cultural attack on Skopje to dispel the "myth of Macedonism".

If the Bulgarian factor is a potential factor of destabilisation, the Albanian factor is a real one. The Albanian question in FYROM has a long history dating from the Second World War, when the western parts of Serbian Macedonia with Kosovo were integral parts of Great Albania (1941-1944) and the vast majority of the Albanians, considering themselves to have been liberated from Serbian suzerainty with Italian and German help, joined Albanian nationalist organisations rather than the Yugoslav resistance movement.⁵⁹ Slavs in the western parts of Serbian Macedonia became the victims of Albanisation. Fascist Italy was determinedly cultivating racist anti-Slav sentiments and ethno-political relations between Albanians and Slavs became very strained. Moreover, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia recognised the Albanians as an ethnic minority (*narodnost*), not as a sovereign nation. In the

Federal Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Albanians were officially recognised as a minority and were granted cultural and educational rights, without, however, being integrated.

The disturbances in Kosovo in October 1968 and April 1981 had an immediate impact on the Albanians in Yugoslav Macedonia, who, like the Kosovars, were seeking to establish an Albanian Federal Republic. Illegal Albanian organisations were actively urging secession from Yugoslavia in the Yugoslav territory of Macedonia. After the collapse of Yugoslavia, Albanians in FYROM (over 500,000) have been trying to be recognised as an equal constituent nation,⁶⁰ but their long-term target is secession. FYROM offers the most typical Balkan example of a situation in which the dominant ethnic element is not sufficiently stronger than the minority groups. The ethnic mosaic in the former republic offers all the potential for an extremely fluid situation, ranging from co-existence and tolerance to mutual distrust and isolation in separate areas; from co-operation at a government level and the granting of basic rights to constant strife and paramilitary activity on both sides. The reciprocal effects of all these factors, coupled with FYROM's economic problems, present a picture in which mutual prejudice and negative stereotypes predominate and each community feels threatened by the other.

The greater FYROM's success in consolidating its international positions, the deeper the gap grew between Slavomacedonians and Albanians, who have been striving to create a shadow state. For the time being, they claim the equality of Albanian as a second official state language, the legalisation of the Albanian University in Tetovo, and the right to fly the Albanian flag. Early in February 1995, when Albanians sought to open their own University in Tetovo, FYROM police intervened and cracked down on demonstrators. One ethnic Albanian died, several were arrested and sentenced to prison including the Rector of the University, Fadil Sylejmani. Due to ethnic tensions, political balances are very flimsy. When in January 1997 the moderate Albanian party PDP (Party for Democratic Prosperity) threatened to relinquish the Coalition Government, the Parliament passed a bill which provided that Albanian students in the Faculty of Education could be taught in Albanian language. But not all-Albanian parties represented in Parliament voted for the bill, because they perceived it as a minimal. Slavomacedonian students reacted strongly to this Government concession. They demonstrated in the streets of Skopje against the governmental decision,

using very abusive language against the Albanians, and went on hunger strikes.⁶¹ The political atmosphere in FYROM was further envenomed by the election of the Albanian Alajdin Demiri as Tetovo's mayor in February 1997. Although the two important Albanian parties, the moderate PDP and the radical PDPA had nominated different candidates, at the last moment, in order to prevent the election of the Slavomacedonian candidate, they agreed on a common candidate. After his election, Demiri tried to establish close co-operation with Rufi Osmani, the Albanian mayor in Gostivar, regarding the raising of the Albanian flag on municipal buildings in municipalities where Albanians are the mayors.⁶² Indeed, for some weeks the Albanian and the Turkish flag had flown in the municipalities of Tetovo and Gostivar. Rufi Osmani did not comply with either the Constitutional Court's ruling to lower the Albanian and the Turkish flags or the new law on national minorities, which stipulated that their flags could be hoisted only during national celebrations.⁶³ When on July 9, 1997, police forces forcibly took down the Albanian and the Turkish flags from the municipality in Gostivar, the incident escalated.⁶⁴ In a scuffle with police, two Albanians died; fifteen were injured and over three hundred arrested. Rufi Osmani was detained in custody on charges of dissemination of ethnic hatred. Fears were expressed that the disturbances in Gostivar could spill over into Tetovo and Debar. All Albanian parties, in FYROM and in Albania as well, condemned the police action. Demonstrators in Tirana burnt the FYROM flag in front of the embassy.⁶⁵ The leader of the PDPA, Arben Dxaferi, went to Tirana to give interviews about the situation. On the one hand, he accused Gligorov of having acted in compliance with instructions given by Milosevic, but on the other hand, he revealed that after the collapse of Yugoslavia, all Albanian parties in Kosovo and FYROM had agreed on a common policy to gain independence for Kosovo and autonomy for the western parts of FYROM.⁶⁶ Gligorov, in Madrid to attend a NATO summit conference, was able to decline any responsibility for police intervention, and corroborated Dxaferi's statements in an interview in the Belgrade publication *Ekonomska Politika*.⁶⁷ The parliament in Skopje set up a commission to investigate the events of July 1997 right away, but Osmani and Demiri had been sentenced to 7 and 2 and a half years imprisonment respectively,⁶⁸ before the commission submitted its findings. The conclusion of the commission, which was made known in March 1998, used equivocal language. The police made use of violence in some cases, but all the activities of the Albanians were unconstitutional.⁶⁹

Ethnic tensions in FYROM coincided with insurgence in Albania itself. For the first time FYROM's army was on the alert and in a state of military preparedness.⁷⁰ Soldiers were still patrolling the borders to prevent an influx of refugees from Albania, but also drug and arms smuggling. Severe frontier incidents proved unavoidable. Rumours were rampant that Berisha's followers would try to overthrow the new socialist Albanian government by stirring up trouble in FYROM and Kosovo and by calling on Fatos Nano to take a clear position towards the "unredeemed" Albanians. A large number of Albanians in the former Yugoslav republic possess weapons. On July 6, 1997, the two Albanian parties, the PDPA and the Popular Democratic Party, were merged into one.⁷¹ Its name, "Democratic Party of the Albanians", clearly shows a spirit of solidarity with Berisha's party.

The situation in Kosovo had its repercussions on the Albanians in FYROM. Demonstrators expressed their solidarity with the Kosovar Liberation Army⁷², delivered humanitarian aid to the Albanian refugees and demanded the release of Osmani.⁷³ They called for NATO airstrikes on Serbian targets in Kosovo, but came out against NATO's military presence in FYROM.⁷⁴ They reason that it is supposed to be directed against Albanians, as potential insurgents. On the contrary, Gligorov opposed any military intervention in Kosovo, since it could make the Albanians in FYROM more insolent and radical, but he was looking forward to seeing the deployment of NATO strike forces as peacemakers in his country⁷⁵. The international factor does not consider FYROM to "be part of the Kosovo problem",⁷⁶ however, the Albanians favour a "conclusive solution" and the "Kosovar Liberation Army" (UCK/KLA) does not rule out FYROM from the field of their operations.⁷⁷ The Albanian factor in FYROM is its Achilles' heel and the developments must be monitored. By a series of agreements, the socialist government of Fatos Nano and Panteli Majiko succeeded in improving relations with Skopje noticeably.⁷⁸ However, Albanian socialists can hardly influence Albanians in FYROM, those who back up Berisha's party. Besides, the political situation in Albania is still fluid and Prime Minister Panteli Majiko does not control North Albania, which is the bastion of the "Kosovar Liberation Army". When the FYROM entered an electoral period, the "Albanian syndrome" played a role in the election campaign. Dxaferi threatened abstention from the elections, should the marginal minority status of the Albanians be

perpetuated.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Georgievski, leader of VMRO, pointed out that the "unwritten law" concerning the participation of Albanian parties to the government had to be abolished.⁸⁰ Once in power, the VMRO-DPMNE underwent a change, given the pressure of the political circumstances. Following recommendations from the United States, Georgievski did not oppose the Democratic Party of the Albanians to join the government. On December 29, 1998, parliament passed a draft amnesty law that would end the jail terms of some 800 people, mostly ethnic Albanians, who were convicted for violating the 1997 law on the public display of national symbols. Among them were the Albanian mayor Osmani and Demiri. President Gligorov refused to sign the bill, arguing that interference in the judicial power was inadmissible. But Parliament overrode Gligorov's veto and on 4 February 1999 approved the amnesty law. The government is also planning to recognise Albanian as an official language in the parliament and public services and to legalise the Albanian University in Tetovo. Since President Gligorov will object to these anti-constitutional acts, amending the constitution seems the simplest solution. Frictions between the non-homogenous government and the President proved inevitable, as the government's recognition of Taiwan without Gligorov's knowledge has already demonstrated. Obviously, the United States intends to avert a spillover of the crisis from Kosovo to FYROM and imposes on the new government a policy of openness to the Albanians. But as in Kosovo, these concessions could pave the way for the creation of an Albanian shadow state in the western parts.⁸¹ It is true that Washington is against the creation of such a state in FYROM and Kosovar independence. However, the internal dynamic of events and developments after NATO's intervention in Kosovo might be the most decisive factor, since policy is a continuous readjustment to changing conditions. In June 1991, the American government was initially against Yugoslavia's dissolution and adopted the Greek viewpoint, only to shift its attitude swiftly.

Given all these parameters, it is simplistic to say that the Macedonian Question will be definitely settled if Skopje and Athens come to a compromise solution about the denomination of the new state in the international sphere. Sooner or later the UN Security Council will impose such a compromise solution.⁸² The term Slavomacedonians, required by Greece, has no pejorative connotation and was used in abundance by those heralding the notion of Macedonianism (Krst Misirkov, Dimitri Cupovski and

others). However, a Macedonian question will continue to exist not in the sense of FYROM's real irredentist policy, but in terms of its survival struggle. Skopje-Sofia relations are not without problems, the Albanian factor might spin out of control, and Yugoslavia will try to exert more and more political pressure. Apart from the political dimensions, it will be difficult for the historians of the Balkan countries to come to any understanding of the historical aspects of the Macedonian question.

Under these circumstances, must the FYROM side with Greece? Should the FYROM see Greece as a guarantee of survival and economic development? Greece is taking advantage of its membership in NATO and the European Union to pursue a constructive Balkan policy of regional co-operation and security. Any intransigence by either side in the name issue might inhibit the full normalisation of the bilateral relations. The dispute about Macedonia must be transferred from the politicians to the historians. Greek historians must open a direct dialog with the Skopje's historians to clear up historical misunderstandings over the boundary between Hellenism and Slavomacedonianism. The field of historical prejudices and stereotypes in schoolbooks must be smoothed. Students from Skopje should visit Vergina and the Archeological Museum of Thessaloniki (Salonica). They should become familiar with Greek history. The Slavomacedonian nation was created in a Communist society under greenhouse conditions. Nowadays, in a nascent pluralistic society, there are various trends in Skopje, as found among the new generation of historians who are reappraising their own history. We must contact them. The Slavomacedonian identity is still an identity in evolution. It neutralises the old Serbo-Bulgarian scramble over the identity of the Macedonian Slavs and is not undesirable for the Greeks, as far as it is confined to the framework of FYROM. Minority questions, raised by some circles for internal consumption, cannot hamper the process of normalisation of the bilateral relations, for the simple reason that "Macedonian" minorities do not exist, as this term is defined in the International Law. Bilingualism is a common phenomenon in the border areas of the Balkan Peninsula and the cultural elements (folklore, habits and customs, etc.) of the orthodox Balkan peoples point to a mutual influence. The cultural differentiations are not always too striking to be re-defined into national terms and become characteristics of a new identity as "imagined community", as social anthropologists, unfamiliar with the Balkan reality, pretend. Greek national ideology was shared among the

various autochthonous and refugee elements in Greek Macedonia. Urbanisation, mobility and intermarriage have shaped a society in Greek Macedonia, characterised by national cohesion. In the Balkan Peninsula ethnicity partly overlaps the national identity. For seven years the Movement of Balkan Prosperity-Rainbow and the OMO-Ilinden have been trying to discover "Macedonian" minorities in Greece and Bulgarian respectively. Until now the results are rather negative.

The Slavomacedonian identity will probably demise, if the Skopje-State collapses. Greece is against this option. Skopje's authorities must understand it and draw the relevant conclusions.

NOTES

1. See the relevant chapter from Holbrook's book on the Dayton Agreement, as quoted by Alexis Panatelas in the Greek newspaper, **To Vima**, 3.5.1998.

2. For a juridical approach to the Agreement from the Greek point of view see H. Rozakis, **Politikes kai nomikes diastaseis tis metavatikis symphonias tis Neas Yorkis metaxy Elladas kai FYROM**, ELIAMEP, Athens, 1996.

3. For a comparative analysis see I. Cholevas, I **"Endiamesi Symphonia" Athinon-Skopion. Istoriko-Keimeno-Scholiasmos-Kriseis**, Athens 1995, pp. 51-63.

4. For the Greek side the term "Macedonians" is a geographic one, but for the other side it has an ethnic connotation in the sense of the distinction of the Slavic population in Macedonia from the Bulgarians and the Serbs. This different use causes confusion and so the hoopoe medium must be found to distinguish the Greeks from the Slavs. The most appropriate name could be the term Slavomacedonians. The notion of a "distinct Macedonian nation" goes back to a resolution of the Communist International (January 1934), but the process of its creation began taking place in Yugoslav part of Macedonia only after 1944. Probulgarian feelings among the Slav local population were alive and the Bulgarian occupation forces in the Serbian part of Macedonia in the Second World War were received as liberators. But two factors proved favourable for the Yugoslav Communists and the option of the Slavomacedonism. The subsequent dissatisfaction with the occupation authorities was due to social reasons and the evident

defeat of Germany. Bulgaria would be a defeated country and could not fulfill its national dreams, whereas the new Yugoslavia would be a victorious federal state in which the Slavomacedonians were recognised as an equal nation with the other nations and would have their own state. This solution seemed to be attractive and many who had served the Bulgarian authorities joined the partisans. The main purpose of the "Macedonia policy" was to differentiate the Slavomacedonians from the Bulgarians and to eradicate both Bulgarian and Serbian influence. The task was difficult, because the Bulgarian consciousness was relatively highly developed in considerable segments of population. The Yugoslav authorities broke up all the Bulgarian organisations that were opposed to the notion of Macedonianism on an antibulgarian basis. Statehood, a standard language, a church and national historiography were basic ingredients for the politics of mutation. Official historiography and social sciences in general were systematically employed in a nation-building effort, which, however, flagrantly infringed upon the historical legacy and cultural identity of neighbouring nations. Despite the means that had been used, the political results of the Macedonian experiment are undeniable. Through a forcible educational policy, Skopje's authorities managed to create a new identity, which does not want to be Bulgarian, Serbian or Greek. Greek hard position on the name issue (no use of the terms Macedonia and Macedonians, including derivatives and composite names) was interpreted in Skopje as a challenge to the Slavomacedonian identity. Greece had no alternative solution regarding the identity of FYROM's Slav inhabitants to suggest. For the successful experiment of the "macedonisation" see St. Troebst, "Yugoslav Macedonia, 1944-1953: Building the Party, the State and the Nation", in: **Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte** 2, 1994, pp. 103-139.

5. See Th. Veremis, Th. Kouloubis, **Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki. Dilimmata mias neas epochis**, Athens, 1997, pp.39-40.

6. Pangalos' visit to Skopje coincided with the crisis in Albania and its possible spillover into FYROM. Pangalos came out for the territorial integrity of FYROM and supported its steps towards the European integration. See, "Albanija gi zblizi Skopje i Atina!", **Nova Makedonija**, 20.3.1997.

7. See "Spogodbata so EU ne znaci protekcionizam za Makedonija", **Nova Makedonija**, 5.5.1997.

8. See "Ratifikacija na Spogodbata za soraboka so Makedonija", **Nova Makedonija**, 2.10.1997.

9. See "Evro-makedonskata spogodba stapuva vo sila", **Nova Makedonija**, 1,2,3,4.1.1998.

10. Despite the fact that a lot of countries have recognised Skopje under the name "Republic of Macedonia", President Gligorov comes up with difficulties not only in the international sphere, but also in the bilateral inter-state relations. It was made clear during his visit to Poland, where the polish government insisted on Gligorov signing the relevant agreements under the name "FYROM". See "Potvrda na prijatelstvoto, dogovorite nepotpisani", **Nova Makedonija**, 30.10.1997.

11. The elections in October-November 1998 were held in a quiet atmosphere. The victory of the Coalition VMRO-DPMNE-Democratic Alternative (62 seats) was due mainly to economic reasons. Besides, VMRO possesses well-trained cadres, characterised by party discipline. American involvement in FYROM has a catalytic influence on framing the foreign policy of the new government. The leader of Democratic Alternative, V. Tupurkovski, is believed to promote American interests and to balance any "extreme" tendencies, emanating from the circles of VMRO. He will run for the Presidency in October 1999.

12. See "Zusammenarbeit mit Makedonien", **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung**, 10.4.1997.

13. See "Deutschland sagt Mazedonien Unterstützung zu", **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung**, 12.4.1997.

14. See "Makedonija moze da smeta na germanskata podrška", **Nova Makedonija**, 17.10.1997.

15. See "Makedonija ceka amerikanski kapital", **Nova Makedonija**, 18.6.1998.

16. See "Anan preporacuva namaluvanje na UNPREDEP", **Nova Makedonija**, 16,17.8.1998.

17. See "Intenziviranje na meguarmiskata sorabotka Vasington-Skopje", **Nova Makedonija**, 27.8.1997.

18. For this and other Albanian terrorist organisations in Kosovo see Stephan Lipsius "Untergrundorganisationen im Kosovo. Ein Überblick", **Sudosteuropa**, 1/2, 1998, pp.75-82.

19. See "Kosovo pred eksplozija", **Sega**, 5-11.2.1998.

20. See "Makedonskata politika ima poddrška ot Vasigton", **Nova Makedonija**, 1.8.1998.

21. See **Makedonia** (Greek newspaper), 23.7.1998.

22. See "Demonstracija na silite za mir", **Nova Makedonija**, 12.13.9.1998.

23. This was the main matter, discussed by Georgievski and Solana (early December 1998) in Brussels. See "Nova sorabotka megu NATO i Makedonija", **Nova Makedonija**, 8.12.1998. For this concession, which caused strong reactions in Belgrade, FYROM got American military aid.

24. See M. Vichou "Oi Scheseis Elladas-FYROM", in: **I Ellada kai o Kosmos 1996-97**, ELIAMEP, Athens 1997, pp. 92-94. According to the head of the Greek Liaison Office in Skopje, Alexandros Mallias, the commercial trade between Greece and FYROM surpassed the \$250-million mark in 1998.

25. See "Zaednicki interes za stabilnost vo regionot", **Nova Makedonija**, 27.4.1998.

26. See, "Multinacionalna brigada ke go cuva mirot na Balkanot", **Nova Makedonia**, 28.9.1998.

27. Striving to appease the "Aegean lobby", the new Foreign Minister Aleksandar Dimitrov (from the Party of the Democratic Alternative) raised such questions during Pangalos visit to Skopje on 22 December 1998. Pangalos denied the existence of "Macedonian minority" in Greece according to the terms of the International Law and branded "The Rainbow" as a conglomeration of "Slavomacedonians, stalinists and homosexuals". For the reactions in Skopje see "Pangalos: Vo Grcija nema makedonsko malcinstvo", **Nova Macedonia**, 23.12.1998, "Ostri reakcii na izjavata na Pangalos", **Nova Macedonia**, 24.12.1998. Pangalos statements did not affect the bilateral relations.

28. Vasil Tupurkovski, who is heading an "Agency for Development and Revival", during an unofficial visit to Thessaloniki in December 1998 sounded out the Greek side on this issue and found the freight to expensive.

29. See, **Makedonia** (Greek newspaper), 24.6.1998.

30. *Ibid.*

31. See "Zaednicki protiv organiraniot kriminal", **NovaMakedonia**, 10.7.1998.

32. See **Yugoslav Daily Survey**. Selected and Published by the Press and Information Department of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 8.4.1996.

33. See "Normalizacija odnosa sa Makedonijom. Najzad, nesto prirodno", **Nin**, 12.4.1996.

34. See "Jugoslovensko-makedonski odnosi. Mala, lepa, okretna", **Nin**, 6.9.1996.

35. See "Završi dvodnevna poseta na makedonskiot premier Branko Crvenkovski na SR Jugoslavija", **Nova Makedonija**, 4.7.1997.

36. See **Yugoslav Daily Survey**, 3.7.1997.

37. See "Makedonsko-Jugoslovensko ragračnicuvanje-Igra na zborovi i nervi", **Nova Makedonija**, 27, 28.9.1997. The demarcation of the borders between the two countries came up after the termination of the Second World War, but the borders were administrative within the Yugoslav federation. After 1945 Belgrade incorporated Kacanik, Presevo, Bujanovac and Trgoviste. The Serbian monastery Prohor Pcinški, where the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Macedonia announced on 2 August 1944 the establishment of the People's Republic of Macedonia, was also awarded to Serbia. Nowadays this monastery, which has a historical and political significance for FYROM, is claimed by the Slavomacedonian side, but the Serbs are unyielding. Further Serbian claims were rejected by the Yugoslav federal commissions, which were set up in 1947 to settle the controversial questions between the federal units.

38. See "Granicniot spor megu Makedonija i SPJ moze brzo da bide resen", **Nova Makedonija**, 27.11.97.

39. See S. Terzić, "The Serbs and the Macedonian Question", in: **The Serbian Question in the Balkans, Geographical and Historical Aspects**, Faculty of Geography, University of Belgrade, 1995, p. 75.

40. See I. Katardžiev, **Sosedite i Makedonija, Vcera, Denes, Utre, Skopje 1998**, p. 53-55. Katardžiev assails Dobrica Ćosić, but without persuasive arguments.

41. See "Gripозна diplomacija. Milosevic u nevoljama", **Nin**, 2.5.1997. After the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from FYROM in 1992 Gligorov had supposed that Milosevic was aiming to destabilise FYROM. According to him, Milosevic expected that the Albanians would rise up and so Skopje's authorities had to call on the Serbs for help since they were exploiting FYROM's weakness, and could thus incorporate it into Yugoslavia. See Gligorov interview with Viktor Meier (Oktober 1994) as quoted by V. Meier, **Wie Jugoslawien verspielt wurde**, München 1996, p. 342.

42. VMRO is strongly against this option. The marginal position of Montenegro in the Federation and the rift between Belgrade and Podgorica make Skopje more cautious.

43. See "Makedonia: Sledvastato potencialno ogniste", **Sega**, 16-22.7.1998.

44. For the relationship with the Communist International-Macedonian Question see Sfetas, "The Macedonian Question as viewed by the Comintern between the Wars", in: **Balkan Currents. Studies in the History, Culture and Society of a Divided Land**, edited by Lawrence A. Tritle. The Basil P. Calogeras Center for Modern Greek Studies, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, California 1998, pp. 95-118.

45. About this Plenum see A. Parvanov, "Aprilskata politika na BKP po makedonski vapros i dr. Todor Zivkov", in: **Balgarskata Narodnost i Nacija prez Vekovete. Material OT Nuance Konferencija, Cast Vtora**, Institut po Istorija na BKP pri CK na BKP, Sofija 1988, pp. 320-325. According to Zivkov, the Plenum was held without Chruscov's knowledge and approval. See T. Zivkov, **Memoari**, Sofija 1997, p 455.

46. T. Zivkov, *op.cit.*, p. 456.

47. "Ezikovijat reket", **Sega**, broj18, 15-21 Mai 1997.

48. See "Makite na rektorot od Trnovo", **Nova Makedonija**, 21.10.1997.

49. See "Kliment Ohridski, Pejcinovik, Miladinovci... ne se makedonska literatura!", **Nova Makedonija**, 22.10.1997. For the promotion of this book in Sofia see "Razbiti iljuzii. Makedonskite avtori sa prosto Bulgari", **Duma**, 25.9.1998. It should not be forgotten that Russia decided to recognise Skopje under Bulgarian prodding and on Bulgarian soil. In a Press Conference in Sofia on 3 August 1992 Yeltsin expressed himself as follows: "We call on the European Union to stand up for Macedonia and to recognise it. We are going to rest on the Bulgarian position regarding Macedonia and to uphold it. Should Macedonia be recognised, it would be shed much less blood. Macedonia should decide by itself, how it will be named." See **Makedonija. Put k Samostojatel nosti**. Dokumenti. Moskva 1997, p. 417.

50. Georgievski's following statements point to the umbilical cord connecting Macedonians and Bulgarians. "Why are we ashamed to admit, and attempt to evade the fact, that what we deem the

most positive aspect of the Macedonian revolutionary tradition grew from the Exarchist (Bulgarian) part of the Macedonian people! I would not be revealing anything new if I remind you of the fact that Gotse Delchev and Dame Gruev and Pere Toshev and Giorche Petrov -must I continue to mention all of them- were Exarchist teachers in Macedonia, paid by and carrying out its educational program. I am not revealing any secret if I say that our Ilinden heroes and the mass of the revolutionary organisation was recruited only from the Exarchist part of the Macedonian people...". See L.Georgievski, "If Cotse Delchev was alive in 1945, he would have finished up in Idrizovo", Macedono-Bulgarian Review "**Vardar**", 5, 1996, pp. 21. This journal is published by the Bulgarian Discussion Club of Torodo. Despite this historical background, in no case is Georgievski ready to deny the existence of a Slavomacedonian identity as a living reality nowadays. Krasimir Karakacarov, the leader of the Bulgarian VMRO and Deputy in the Bulgarian Parliament, accused Georgievski of inconsistency. Late August 1997 the Executive Committee of VMRO was forced by L. Georgievski to resign, having been charged with corruption and alleged probulgarian attitude. See "Rakovodstovoto se deli na makedonisti i bugaromani", **Nova Makedonija**, 2.9.1997. Those who identify themselves as Bulgarians in FYROM are a negligible quantity.

51. The letter is published in the institute's Journal **Makedonski Pregled** 4, pp.11-16, 1997.

52. About the Bulgarian national doctrine, see the articles "Trjabva da preodoleem krisata na balgarskija nacionalizam", "Istoriceski romantizam ni e nuzen i dnes" in the Bulgarian newspaper **Makedonija**, 7.1.1998. The following article is also interesting "Neobchodima ili izlisna e Nacionalna doctrina na Balgarija", **Makedonija**, 21.1.1998.

53. Despite its difficult financial situation, Bulgarian opened a cultural centre in Caribrod (Serbia) to demonstrate its interest for the western outlands, where a Bulgarian minority has been living since 1920. Belgrade accused Sofia of state chauvinism, see "Bugarija obvineta za drzaven sovinitizam", **Nova Makedonija**, 10.2.1998.

54. See the interview of Bulgaria's Defence Minister G. Ananiev "Njama da zavladjavame sasedite si", **Casa** (a Bulgarian weekly newspaper), 23-29.1.1998.

55. See, for example, the article "Bulgaria ad se seabed OT dal-bokija zimen san", **Makedonija**, 10.6.1998. Being aware of the potential danger that the Greek penetration into Skopje and the stagnation in the relationship between Sofia and Skopje imply for Bulgarian long-term goals towards FYROM, Bulgarian political analysts stress the need to stop regarding history as a hindrance for the development of bilateral relations and for the resolution of the language problem through negotiations. See the article, written by a group of specialists (A. Lilov, I. Ganev, L. Petrov and D. Dimitrov), "Neophodima e nova politika v otnosenijata mezdru Republika Bulgarian i Republika Makedonia", **Mezdunarodni Otnosenija**, 3, 1998, pp. 67-68.

56. R. Holbrook, the U.S. ambassador-designate to the UN, hinting about Bulgarian aspirations towards Skopje, said that Sofia would not miss the opportunity to grab a piece of "Macedonia", should this state collapse in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis. For the Bulgarian reactions see "Holbruk i romantika", **Sega**, 4-10.6.1998.

57. For the text see "Zaednicka Declaracija", **Nova Makedonija**, 25.2.1999.

58. See the statements of the Leader of the Bulgarian VMRO, Krasimir Karackacarov, "Priznavame constitucijata na Makedonija, a ne ezika", **Makedonija**, 17.2.1999.

59. For a historical approach to the subject from 1918 to 1995, see, Sp. Sfetas, K. Kentrotis, **Oi Albanoi ton Skopion. Themata ethnotikis siniparxis**, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1995.

60. See E. Meta, "The Albanian-Macedonian relations and the Albanians", in: **The Balkan Analyst Quarterly Revue of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies**, Tirana, 1-2, 1977, pp. 27-32. The author qualified FYROM's admission to CSCE and to the Council of Europe as undeserved, due to its failure to meet the Albanian demands.

61. See "Pocna strajkot so glad", **Nova Makedonija**, 5.3.1997.

62. See "Se bara javna upotreba na albanskoto zname", **Nova Makedonija**, 20.6.1997.

63. See "Izborot na znaminjata sloboden-upotrebata ogranicena", **Nova Makedonija**, 11.6.1997.

64. See "Simnati albanskite znaminja vo Gostivar i Tetovo", **Nova Makedonija**, 10.7.1997.

65. See "Makedonskata ulicna vojna", **Sega**, 24-30.7.1997.
66. *Ibid.*
67. See "Intervju na Kiro Gligorov za Belgradeska Ekonomska Politika", **Nova Makedonija**, 27.8.1997.
68. See "Kaznata na Rufi Osmani namalena na 7 godini", **Nova Makedonija**, 20.2.1998 and "Za Demiri i Bedzeti dve i pol godini zatvor", **Nova Makedonija**, 5.3.1998. Before going to prison, Demiri expressed himself in a interview with the newspaper **Fokus** as follows: "Macedonia cannot be a unitarian state... We cannot allow that Macedonia becomes an exclusively Macedonian state because we have been living here as well. If no political solution is to be found, all other options are possible, quoted in "Makedonija vo sveto", 3-16.7.1998.
69. See "Anketata komisija za Gostivar gi podeli pratenicite", **Nova Makedonija**, 26.3.1998.
70. See "Makedonskata armija vo sostojba na borbena gotovnost", **Nova Makedonija**, 5.3.1997.
71. See "Makedonija treba da bide i albanska drzava!", **Nova Makedonija**, 7.7.1997.
72. See "Solidarnost so 'OVK' i 'Kosovo Republika'", **Nova Makedonija**, 7, 8.3.1998.
73. See "Protesten miting na PDPA i NDP vo Gostivar", **Nova Makedonija**, 17.4.1998.
74. See "Miting na Albancite na gradskiot plostad vo Skopje", **Nova Makedonija**, 11.6.1998.
75. However, Gligorov is reluctant to allow to NATO unconditionally to make use of Krivolak for possible airstrikes against the Serbs. See, "Skoplje odbilo zahtev NATO", **Nasa Borba**, 25.6.1998.
76. See "Richard Holbruk vo Skopje. Makedonija ne e del od Kosovskiot problem", **Nova Makedonija**, 24.6.1998.
77. See "Po eksloziite vo Kumanovo i Prilep. Delo na domasni radikalni grupi ili na OAK?", **Nova Makedonija**, 9.1.1998.
78. See "Albanskijot Premier, Fatos Nano vo Makedonija. Golem pottik za megusosedskata sorabotka", **Nova Makedonija**, 16.1.1998 and "Sredba Crvenkovski-Nano vo Ochrid. Makedonija i Albanija pobliski uste za eden cekor", **Nova Makedonija**,

23.2.1998. On January 22, 1999 Georgievski paid an official visit to Tirana, where he discussed mainly economic issues with the Albanian government. Maj. and Georgievski agreed that current relations between Spoke and Tirana are an example of how new relationships can be built in the new Balkans.

79. See "Intervju Arben Dzaferi, Lider na PDPA-NDP. Nema stabilnost bez razresuvanje na etnickiot jazol", **Nova Makedonija**, 15.5.1998.

80. See "Intervju na Ljupco Georgievski, Lider na VMRO-DPMNE. Tri uslovi za predizborna koaliciija", **Nova Makedonija**, 8.5.1998.

81. During an interview with Reuters, Arben Xhaferi expressed himself as follows: "We are asking for progress on rights, in matters of education, language and employment, not making a plea for Greater Albania. If we do not have step-by-step progress we could face the same situation as in Kosovo. I will begin to lose my credibility and my function in society, just like Rugova has. The expectations of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are so high, so long denied, that we cannot manipulate them. We accept living in Macedonia and cultivating our rights with this state, but there must be progress". Commenting on Dxaferis' statements, a Slavomacedonian deputy, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, gave the following replay: "Xzaferi is very clever with his demands. He denies any interest in Greater Albania. We are obliged to wonder if this is not a game to begin to undermine the state. Ask Macedonians if they trust the ethnic Albanians, if they think they are loyal to our state, and most will say no", as quoted in "Kosovo crisis shadows Macedonia's ethnic Albanians", **Australian Macedonian Weekly**, 22.12.98.

82. Prior to his visit to Athens, Handziski in an interview with the Greek newspaper **To Vima** did not exclude the possibility of a double or triple denomination and for the first time a politician from Skopje stressed the historical bonds of Macedonia with the Greek world. See **To Vima**, 21.6.1998. Pangalos and Handziski agreed on the continuation of the procedure embarked by the United Nations.

Heroes of Multilingualism in the U.S.A.

John N. Spiridakis*

RÉSUMÉ

Les efforts de certaines institutions scolaires pour le maintien et la survie de la langue et de la culture grecques se butent à des obstacles majeurs aux États-Unis. Bien que les États-Unis soient un pays multilingue et multiculturel, les Américains ne sont pas bien disposés envers le bilinguisme. Dans cet article, l'auteur explore le paradoxe du bilinguisme chez les Américains -des plus fortunés aux nouveaux arrivés-, et décrit la capacité de la communauté grecque américaine à résister à la vague du "tout anglais".

ABSTRACT

Ethnic language and culture maintenance efforts of certain educational institutions and educators in the U.S. have met with major obstacles. Although in many respects the United States is a multilingual, multicultural nation, many of its citizens hold a negative view of bilingualism. This article explores the paradox of bilingualism among wealthier Americans and the poorest newcomers and describes the potential of the Greek-American community to withstand the "English-only" trend.

Ethnic language and culture maintenance efforts of certain educational institutions and educators in the U.S. have met with major obstacles. Although in many respects the U.S. is a multilingual, multicultural nation, it is apparent that many of its citizens hold a negative view of bilingualism and a multicultural conception of society. The promotion of bilingualism in the U.S. occurs primarily among the wealthiest Americans who recognize the value of bilingualism and support private schools where such language enrichment occurs, and also, ostensibly, among the poorest newcomers, through largely controversial public bilingual schooling. Whatever the shortcomings of public or private bilingual schooling, it can be argued that in a multilingual multicultural world, success in business, as well as satisfaction on a

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personal level, may well be enhanced through the efficacy of programs which stress the learning and respect for second languages and cultures.

Community institutions such as ethnic language private and parochial schools have tenaciously sought to maintain, or instil, a bilingual, bicultural or multicultural ethos and identity in students. This presentation explores the efforts of one U. S. ethnic community institution, Greek-American Day Parochial Schools, to overcome the "English-only", monolingualistic view which seems to characterize American society.

Education has been viewed by many as the key remedy for numerous societal problems such as illiteracy, intercultural/inter-racial conflicts, poverty, and the sense of alienation among America's youth.

For many Greek immigrants in urban areas of America, the transmission of Greek values, history, heritage and religion along with Greek language literacy development has been a priority. Greek-Americans, like Greeks in Greece, highly prize educational achievement. The value on education, coupled with the desire to preserve "Greekness", America, led to the formation of Greek-American "Day Schools", Greek afternoon (after school), and Greek Saturday classes. The first Greek parochial school was founded in Chicago in 1908 (Lagios, 1976). As a result of the entry of a large number of Greeks immigrants between 1966 and 1971, Greek schooling was strengthened. Many arrivals from Greece or Cyprus enrolled their children in the Greek schools or classes.

Most Greek education in the U.S. has involved elementary through middle school levels. Also, the Greek classes have typically been taught by native Greek speakers who have no training in teaching Greek as a second foreign language. In previous decades, the typical Greek student in America could speak Greek before entering the Greek classroom. This is no longer the case, and Greek schools are hard-pressed to accommodate new generations of the offspring of mixed marriages or from homes with little or no Greek usage.

There are still over 400 afternoon/Saturday schools and eleven day schools in the U.S. today. The majority of Greek parochial school students, over 20,000, study in afternoon or Saturday schools, while approximately five thousand study at Day Parochial Schools.

Because of the influx of Greek immigrants in the late 1960's whose English language skills were limited, Greek education also was offered through the public bilingual school programs in urban centers such as New York, Chicago, Boston, Lowell, Manhassetts, and Tarpon Springs, Florida. These public bilingual programs for immigrant students included academic content area instruction in the Greek language, along with an English language learning component.

The Greek day and afternoon/Saturday schools continue to be associated with the local religious community of the Greek orthodox church. The Greek Orthodox church contributed mightily both directly and indirectly to the maintenance of the Greek language in the U.S. Although each local religious community parish administers its own Greek education program, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese established an Education Department to assist the schools in various, non-economic ways, such as making recommendations for textbooks, curricula, and sponsoring occasional teacher-training conferences or symposia.

The Greek immigrants from the first wave of the late of 1880's through today have also formed and maintained topical or regional societies, in addition to ethnic religious and ethnic linguistic community centers. These organizations have all helped to strengthen ethnic identity among Greek-Americans.

In addition, the media of television, radio and press have also helped to preserve a sense of Greek identity as well as a sense of the relevance of the Greek language in the American context. Electronic networks have also allowed for daily publications from Greece as well as the U.S.A. to be made available to Greek-Americans.

Greek-American organizations, idealistic and ambitious in their goal of preserving Greekness in America, both linguistic and cultural, are also experiencing a diminishment in resources and population, as are the U.S. Greek schools. Understandably, the mother tongue of Greek is not expected to survive past the fourth generation of Greek-American ethnic background. In the U. S. there is little value placed on bilingualism or biculturalism, especially outside of urban areas. There is the general policy in American public schools of introducing a foreign language in middle or high school, rather than the early grades. America is one of the few countries which, by and large, does not introduce other language from the early grades, and which, as a practical matter, does not value bilingualism or biliteracy.

In spite of the research which attests to the exemplary cognitive, social, and academic benefits of attaining second language proficiency, American public education relegates the development of bilingualism to a very low priority. The baby is thrown out with the bathwater. In its zeal to assimilate masses of immigrants, American public schools, for the most part, encourage children to forget and even forsake the language of their ethnic grandparents or parents. The misguided and malicious notion promulgated by certain American social scientists at the turn of the twentieth century, that bilingualism was bad for the brain, and emotions as well as the security of society, still lives. These beliefs were supported by "evidence" secured through the administering of I.Q. tests in English to immigrants who had literally just arrived in New York and spoke little or no English! The test was calculated to reinforce the nativist, xenophobic milieu of American society and schools prevalent one hundred years ago.

We know now that formal learning of a second language, if it takes place in an appropriate educational environment, can enrich and enhance first language literacy. This awareness should result in more second language *aka* foreign programs at all grades levels of public schools.

There are also numerous other benefits of becoming and being bilingual. While becoming bilingual, that is, while adding a second language, the first language is simultaneously enhanced as a result of what psycholinguists call "the transfer effect"; a "common underlying proficiency" is enriched which in turn transfers "common" aspects of the second language learned to the development of the first language. There are also "social" benefits of knowing a second language in terms of achieving global awareness, multicultural sensitivity, and a wider array of career options.

The public spheres of American institutional life outside of ethnic homes and communities offer little support for the maintenance of languages other than English. In fact, the pressure to assimilate is so pervasive that even the ethnolinguistic private or parochial community schools such as those which teach Greek, have to justify the inclusion of more than one period of Greek per day. In spite of their success in promoting biliteracy among their students, the Greek parochial schools operate within, and mirror to a great extent, many of the misconceptions of second language learning expressed by the larger American society.

The efforts of Greek teachers to promote Greek literacy around the U.S. are compromised by the lack of clearly defined curricula, materials and elaborated methods for teaching Greek as a first and/or second language in America. Younger generations of Greek-Americans receive reinforcement for use of the language while in schools, but they experience little reason to be biliterate outside the classroom door. Hence, despite the desire, and extensive and expansive effort of the Greek community parochial schools to preserve the Greek language, erosion and language shift continue unabated.

There may come a time when second language learning and literacy achieve a status equal to first language literacy, to mathematics or science literacy, and to social studies. Ethnic in America, are losing ground in efforts to promote biliteracy. Perhaps, given the new economic threat of the European Union, and the growing globalization of the business world, American society and public education will be persuaded to promote bilingualism and multilingualism out of necessity, if not affection.

Part of a movement to include second languages as integral components of the school curriculum for children and youth may also emerge in the perennial search to improve English language literacy. Whether the tenacity of parents and educators will be rewarded by biliterate, bicultural outcomes may well depend on a dramatic shift in the values and goals of American society vis-a-vis bilingualism.

In the words of Ezra Pound,

The sum of human wisdom is not contained in any one language, and no single language is capable of expressing all forms and degrees of human expression.

Studies such as the most recent examination of the condition of Greek schooling for children and youth in the United States (Spiridakis *et al*, 1998) reveal and reinforce certain common issues concerning these schools (Saloutos, Scourby, Costantakos, Spiridakis, Kontantellon, Defanos, Lagios, Fishman *et al*).

A critical issue has emerged from the research which has, for the most part, considered the attitudes of students, parents, teachers, and administrators towards the school, the Greek language, Greek culture, Greek religion, the curriculum, textbook materials, quality of instruction, and the role of the Greek Orthodox Church.

The research continually reveals that:

(a) students and parents are not fully satisfied with the quality of Greek teaching, especially in terms of motivation and relevance, and

(b) teachers and administrators are not fully satisfied with the curricula and materials, if any, available, especially for the early childhood and high schools grades. Teachers and administrators also bemoan the lack of professional development available to help teachers teach Greek more effectively to the increasingly less "ethnic" less Greek proficient student now enrolling in Greek Day, afternoon or Saturday programs.

What needs to be done, at this stage in the evolution of Greek language maintenance efforts through Greek schooling in the U.S. is a drastic revitalization and, therefore, a re-thinking and restructuring of these schools. Such a recommendation does not propose that the schools in their current manifestation, are unsuccessful or unable to promote, in addition to the effective learning of English, and the English academic subjects, some Greek literacy alongside a stronger Greek identity, both cultural and religious. However it is clear that there continues to exist various conflicts that affect the Greek schools from within, such as the perennial financial woes, the feeling of second-class status among the Greek teachers in the day schools, the continual attempts to secure decent materials and curricular to use in teaching, not to mention related classroom resources needed to achieve literacy in any language, as well as intense conflicts from without, in terms of the "English-only" xenophobic attitudes and misconceptions of non-ethnic public, governmental, and educational institutions. The percentage of Greek-Americans of the third, fourth, and fifth generations has grown to the point in American society where fewer Greek-Americans are seeing the need for using the Greek language opting instead to seek cultural, religious and moral outcomes of Greekness for their children rather than linguistic ones which are perceived to be difficult, irrelevant, and boring.

The aspect of the Greek schools today which transcends the problems and which needs to be focused on by educators, administrators, parents and community activists is the ultimate benefit that attaining biliteracy in Greek and English yield for English language literacy, as well as all other cognitive academic learning. There is little likelihood, except on a even smaller scale than the current U. S. Day Greek Parochial Schools, that Greek-

American communities would embrace a curriculum wherein academic subjects are also taught through the Greek language and Greek is utilized for at least fifty percent of the school day. Given the lack of understanding of the efficacy of learning through a second language, as well as learning that language, it is more realistic to expect a resurgence of interest in the Day parochial school only if it can claim benefits which sophisticated parents, Greek ethnic as well as non-Greek, desire for their children.

The United States is currently experiencing a revolution on several fronts in education which may provide a window of opportunity to enhance Greek schooling and the promotion of biliteracy. An essential component of the current movement in American education is to emphasize the articulation and promotion of higher standards on literary and cognitive academic achievement. This movement is creating reforms in public schools and institutions of higher education involved in teacher preparation. As part of the search for true quality in education, alternative educational environments and "cultures" are being considered and funded, under the title "charter schools". State governments in America, traditionally and constitutionally empowered to oversee education, are sponsoring such schools and relaxing many bureaucratic restraints concerning the various components of any school, such as the curriculum, approaches, and teacher backgrounds. Community leaders, parents, concerned citizens and educators interested in improving the education of the monoliterate students are considering alternative means. At the same time, another window of opportunity for private or parochial schools is in the possibility of the establishment of a "voucher-system". Such a system would allow parents to choose the school they desire for their child. Although the constitutionality of such a system has been challenged, especially in terms of the fundamental guarantee of the separation of church and state, the efficiency of such a system may yet be recognized on a certain scale, and the adoption of such a program may well generate the student population level needed for Greek Day schools to operate maximally.

What is needed now for The Day and afternoon/Saturday schools is a unified, forwarded effort which involves parents, administrators and educators from The Day Schools from as many of the numerous afternoon/Saturday schools as possible, from institution of higher education involved in training educators, from community organizations, and from Greek religious leaders. The time has come to fully articulate and address the highest standard of Greek

literacy, and Greek cultural and historical knowledge for children and youth in America. These standards must mirror the standards being promulgated for English literacy and academic achievement in content areas of science, mathematics and social studies. The same rigor must be applied to the development of materials, techniques, approaches, classroom management, and opportunities for professional development.

The roots of a full scale solution to the problem of revitalizing the Greek school system in America is emerging in the ambitious *Paedeia Omogenon* project led by Professor Michael Damanakis, at the University of Crete. The project involves the efforts of several nations where diaspora Greek ethnics are interested in maintaining Greek language and culture. The bold initiative seeks to transcend the various challenges and obstacles confronting Greek schools in countries such as England, Australia, and the United States by preparing strong, quality curricula, materials and culturally relevant resources which can help school improve their effectiveness.

The project also has a key component in the development of professional workshops for Greek teachers, to help them learn to use the new material and resources being produced, in a dynamic, interactive classroom setting. The synergy of the various countries involved, including the leadership and expertise of the University of Crete, is also expected to result in various models of Greek educators which can be considered for implementation in existing on newly developed Greek Schools in the U. S.

Greek schools must be prepared to present an educational program that will benefit the linguistic, cognitive, academic and cultural needs of the non-Greek ethnic background student as well. This challenge is powerful and critical. However, the adaptation of quality modern Greek teaching as well as a quality English academic environment is one key to success.

One current "parochial" mission of many Greek schools, however, which envisions the schools as islands of Greek ethnicity separate from the multicultural mainstream, must change too. Greek language and heritage needs to be promoted for all students, regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. The desire for Greek literacy and promotion of the best in Greek culture requires opening of doors to non-Greeks, to the world, in fact.

The isolationist characteristics of any ethnicity, including that of Greek-Americans has helped reinforce an extending biliteracy and biculturalism. However, that attitude must give way to one which embraces and celebrates "Greekness" and a global, multicultural perspective. The Greek spirit, the Greek truth and knowledge, for self-reflection, for a healthy mind and body, for morality and virtue are to be extolled alongside world cultures.

Calls for reform of Greek-American Day Schools have been made in the past. (Spiridakis, 1990 Hellenic College) In addition, the "afternoon or Saturday" system are also in need of reform insofar as materials and teacher training is concerned. Prior to any successful reform, clearly articulated standards for what to teach to who, how to teach, and why are needed. Moreover, the optimal conditions under which children develop a bilingual or second language capability through schooling should be recognized.

Given the heterogeneous nature of students with regard to their level of Greek proficiency, it is imperative that the teacher employ classroom management to group students and tailor instruction according to levels. The afternoon/ Saturday classes also involve multiple ages which must be managed. The benefits of "peer-teaching" and tutoring are essential and the benefits of such a strategy have been well-documented.

The Day school model can accommodate a more organic school structure wherein Greek language and English language classes are viewed as integral and related. A negative attitude of students towards learning Greek is also engendered by the limited time Greek is actually used in the Day Schools. With few exceptions, such as the Socrates School in Chicago, Greek is relegated to one forty-five minute period per day. There is usually a different teacher for Greek. In many cases, the Greek teacher feels "pressured" to cover areas of language such as vocabulary and grammar in a manner which does not allow adequate time for freer, creative language interaction among the students. Another problem with offering Greek primarily as a language arts subject is the students' perception of the irrelevance of Greek for the balance of the school day.

In 1990 I recommended a "Two-Way" approach to resolving the problem of a negative attitude towards Greek, a sense of its inferiority or "second class" status compared to English. The "Two-Way" model applied to the Day School would involve the inclusion of certain content areas such as science, mathematics, or

social studies to also be taught through Greek. Given the current situation of fewer and fewer Greek-Americans proficient in Greek, such a curriculum would require Greek as a second language (GSL) methods and materials to be infused with the content of the particular subject area. While such an approach may appear controversial, its efficacy has been demonstrated with other language groups. The learning of a new or second language while simultaneously learning content involves challenging linguistic and cognitive skills which can motivate the student and improve Greek proficiency in an effective manner. Students will be exposed to a new dimension of language learning where the purpose of second language learning is now more fully integrated with and more relevant to English language learning activities.

Activities are designed and implemented which stimulate and maintain students' interest and which encourage second language comprehension and production tied to meaningful participation. A crucial aspect of the success of an approach which combines second language learning and content area learning is the careful selection and organization of items of language which reflect the students proficiency levels. Questions by the teacher must also be chosen to encourage and engage students in open, comprehensible inquiry and discourse in the classroom. The *Paideia Omogenon* Project USA has produced a GSL curriculum which can be applied and adopted to the content areas by teachers. The curriculum attempts to organize essential Greek for different levels of proficiency. Techniques to foster natural, free language learning are also included. The Greek language curriculum seeks to supply teachers with clear standards and criteria for Greek as a second language learning. The next phase will seek to develop recommended activities and procedures to help teachers integrate Greek and the content areas. The curriculum represents an important milestone for Greek language classes for the day and afternoon/ Saturday programs. It begins with kindergarten and continues through the eighth grade. As the project's recent research indicated, there has been no articulated curriculum for the day and afternoon / Saturday schools which was promulgated to all communities.

Another promising venture which is just beginning to make an impact in the U.S. as well as Canada, Germany, Australia, England and other countries, is the production of new, structured Greek language curriculum units, activities and resources by the *Paideia Omogenon* Central Team at the University of Crete.

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Attitudes of Greek-Canadians Toward Mental Illness: Pathways and Barriers to Mental Health Care

Penelope Athenaios*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article étudie la relation entre attitudes culturelles envers la maladie mentale et mode d'utilisation des ressources en santé mentale chez les familles canadiennes d'origine grecque de Montréal.

L'information provient de trois sources différentes: a) une revue de la littérature; b) des entrevues personnelles avec dix-huit familles pourvoyeuses de soins; c) des entrevues avec six personnes-ressources de la communauté. Ces données furent analysées pour étudier l'effet des valeurs familiales traditionnelles et culturelles sur les attitudes quant à la recherche et l'utilisation de services psychiatriques.

L'analyse qualitative de l'information tend à montrer que la stigmatisation de la maladie mentale dans la culture grecque ainsi que les valeurs traditionnelles auxquelles adhèrent les canadiens d'origine grecque contribuent de façon déterminante à la sous-utilisation des services psychiatriques.

De plus, l'analyse a permis de mettre en évidence une série de préoccupations majeures, concernant la barrière linguistique et autres besoins de base, tels qu'une approche médicale plus sensibilisée au fait culturel, l'introduction de cours adaptés à la nouvelle donne culturelle pour les divers professionnels de la santé mentale, le besoin de recruter des professionnels provenant de la communauté, le besoin pour la communauté de disposer de ses propres institutions d'hébergement à long terme, etc.

ABSTRACT

This study examined the relationship between cultural attitudes towards mental illness and patterns of utilization of mental health care services and community resources among Greek-Canadian families in Montreal.

Data was collected from three different sources, a) literature review; b) (qualitative) personal interviews of eighteen family care-givers; and c) (qualitative) interviews of six community key informants. Verbatim transcripts were analyzed to explore the effect of cultural and traditional family values on attitudes relevant to seeking psychiatric services.

The qualitative analysis of the data lends support to the contention that the stigmatization of mental illness in the Greek culture as well as the adherence of Greek-Canadians, to traditional values appears to be among the determining factors contributing to underutilization of mental health care services.

Through analysis of the responses there were identified major concerns such as the language barrier, and primary needs such as: a) cultural-sensitive approach by the practitioners; b) introduction of new courses and the modification of the old ones pertaining to mental illness and cultural minorities by the professional schools; c) the need to recruit professionals from the community; d) the need for education and outreach programs within the community; e) the need for the community to have their own chronic health care facility, etc..

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Introduction: Scope and Purpose of this Study

There are three major factors that are considered to have resulted in the mass deinstitutionalization of mentally ill patients that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s. First, the discovery of effective psycho-pharmacological agents for treating psychosis. Second, the increasing emphasis on the civil rights of patients that made it difficult to hospitalize persons and to impose on them medical treatment against their will, unless there is a clear evidence of dangerousness and incapacity to function in the community. Third, the growing feeling that large institutions were antitherapeutic, and that many patients suffered as much from the side effects of hospitalization as they did from the mental illnesses themselves.

Attitudes towards mental illness affect how mentally ill people and their families will be treated within any given society. Subsequently, society's attitudes, affect how the mentally ill and their families view themselves, how adequately they will adapt and how they will use psychiatric services (Rabkin, 1974).

Problems of under-utilization of services and under-detection and treatment of common mental disorders affect many groups in society. However, there is evidence that they are particularly severe for families of immigrants and ethnic minorities who are experiencing additional difficulties in their interactions with health care providers (Kirmayer *et al*, 1997).

Ethnic minorities and immigrants bring with them their "cultural baggage". They tend to express and describe situations concerning health, family, relationships and employment on the basis of their cultural experiences. In spite of this evidence, only a few studies have examined the importance of cultural influences on the attitudes towards mental illness in families of ethnic and racial minorities and in extension the cultural influence in seeking services within the mental health system. Factors which act as deterrents towards using those services, such as language barriers and cultural differences, have not been given the proper attention either.

The present study aims to explore the effect of the ethnicity and culture on attitudes towards mental illness and the kind of services Greek-Canadian families will seek for their mentally ill relative. A special emphasis was given to their attitudes concerning placement of a mentally ill relative to a supervised, group, or

foster home for mentally disturbed people. The purpose is to contribute to the field of cross-cultural understanding in mental health care by discussing the attitudes of these families and to know where those attitudes originated. Unless specialists are capable of understanding the cultural peculiarities of this particular clientele, the quality and efficiency of services are bound to fall short of their objective.

In order to understand how the attitudes towards mental illness and mental health services of Greek-Canadians are influenced by their cultural experiences and their cultural values, it appears appropriate to describe briefly the background of the Greek immigrants in Canada, particularly in Montreal, and the socio-cultural structures of the Greek family.

Greek Canadians and Immigration Patterns

According to official Canadian immigration records Greeks, mostly seamen, started to come sporadically to Canada towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. In the early 1900s the number of Greek immigrants living in Quebec had reached one thousand. Approximately 95% of those had settled in the metropolitan area of Montreal (Constantinides, 1983). In 1906 they had established the first socio-cultural, religious and educational organization under the name of "Greek-Orthodox Community of Montreal" (Chimbos & Agocs, 1983; Bombas, 1985). Today there are a great number of Greek communities that thrive across Canada.

The World War II and the civil war, which lasted from 1945-1949, had left Greece financially devastated and the Greek people had to struggle with high unemployment and poverty. Those were the two "push factors" of the first major wave of immigration of Greek people, mostly young men, to Canada from 1945 up to the middle 1960s. The overwhelming majority came from rural and semi-urban villages and towns. They were mostly unskilled and semi-skilled laborers with limited education and practically no knowledge of Canada's two official languages, French or English (Chimbos & Agocs, 1983; Gavaki, 1991).

They came to Canada with dreams and high hopes of both social and economic mobility. Most of them regarded their move as a temporary one. They were hoping to spend a maximum of three to five years in the "land of opportunity", as Canada was

perceived at the time, "make it" fast and return to Greece financially independent. However, the transition proved to be extremely difficult. They had to deal with great cultural shock and disappointment. Opportunity has not always been fairly or equally distributed and often the lack of domestic acceptance regarding their credentials resulted in many amongst them experiencing initial unemployment or underemployment.

Between 1967-1974 another wave of Greek immigrants, better skilled and more educated with some professionals amongst them, arrived in Canada. This time the "push factor" was the extreme right wing military junta that governed Greece at the time. By the time the second group of immigrants arrived, the Greek Community of Montreal had already organized some information and support services for the newcomers. Thus, they were able to find better jobs and to integrate much easier in the host society (Gavaki, 1991; Chimbos & Agocs, 1983; Vrakas, E., 1990).

Greek immigrants were part of a closely-knit community, where their social life centered around the Church, their extended families, immediate friends and neighbors. Being part of a minority group for first time, not knowing the language, having a different religion, and traditions from the mainstream Canadian society in combination with social inequalities and employment hardships made the process of adaptation and psycho-social integration within the host culture, difficult and painful, if not impossible for some of them. They isolated themselves from the mainstream Canadian culture and for many, their relationship with other Canadians became one that is consisted of us (Greeks) and the *xeni* (the strangers). They clustered around themselves, and they held with desperation to those aspects of their lives that were more stable: their families, values, and traditions of societies that they have left behind (Gavaki, 1991; Chimbos & Agocs, 1983, Bombas, 1985). Some of them are still holding on to their traditional rural values and, to a certain extent, they continue to exist in a cultural vacuum with all the hardships that this isolation entails. This is described by Constantinides (1983) as the "ghettoization" of the Greek family in Montreal.

Over the years Canadians of Greek origin have done well; they have started their own businesses mainly as restaurant owners, and have become more affluent. Second generation Greeks have attained high business or professional achievements and they

have even succeeded to occupy high positions in both the National Assembly of Quebec and the Parliament of Canada. However, a great number, amongst the first generation Greek-Canadians, according to their educational and occupational status, still belong to the lower socio-economic working class. Like most members of other ethnic minorities they go through social struggle everyday caused by structural inequalities and a system that takes little account of how they arrived at where they find themselves, and which often defines in its own terms their needs and the services to offer to them.

The Greek Canadian Family: Structure and Relationships

In this section, the author makes certain comparisons between the North American and the Greek culture. It seems appropriate to point out, though, that each one of these cultures, in its own way, is not homogeneous, but rather there are many variations within them. Therefore, overgeneralizations should be avoided.

The North American mainstream culture tends to value individuality, youthfulness, free expression and relationships that are autonomous and egalitarian. In contrast the Greek culture values interdependent and hierarchical interpersonal relationships, dictates traditional values, reverence for the family, honour for the elders, conservative attitudes and obedience to authority. Thus, while the Anglo-Saxon culture tends to value individualism, Greek families work towards their "in-group's" success. "In-group" is defined in a personal process-manner by the Greek: "family and people concerned with me and with whom I can establish interdependencies" (Vassiliou & Vassiliou, 1974).

The Greek-Canadians are confronted with these two diametrically different value systems. The degree to which one can reconcile these differences may determine his or her psychological adjustment. The second-generation Greeks in Canada are likely to feel the stress to a greater extent. They are socialized to retain their ethnic identity, yet feel compelled to identify with a culture that is alien to their parents and grandparents.

A long-standing tradition, religious values and a dominant ideology have made the *ikogenia* (family) the most fundamental institution in Greece (Vassiliou, 1974; Doumanis 1983). It is close knit, stands at the core of all social networks and its structure reaches as far as the first and second cousins. The Greek families

abroad, oftentimes, include in their broadest peripheries others from the original village, town and/or island as well as their *coumbari*, (Best-men and/or God-parents), and *simpetheri* (affines), (Constantinides, 1983; Gavaki 1983; Tsemberis & Orfanos, 1996).

The traditional Greek family is structured on patriarchal principles; the father is the authority figure. His authority is to be feared and respected by all members of the family. Greek men respect and love their wives but in a way that precludes demonstrative gestures. Greek women's inferior position changes upon "motherhood" (Safilios-Rothchild, 1967; Vassiliou, 1969; Doumanis, 1983).

The criteria for a good loving couple in the Western culture might be seen as one in which the spouses are intimate, affectionate with each other, doing things together, sharing roles and responsibilities. Thus, the Westerners associate mainly emotional states with the concept. In contrast Greeks associate "proper conduct" with it. In the Greek culture the same criteria are: a) if the husband behaves as a proper Greek husband, a good provider and a good protector of the family; and b) if the wife behaves like a proper Greek wife: is faithful and gives her love to her husband without expecting reciprocity; is obedient and never disagrees with her man, particularly in public or in the presence of an outsider; and is devoted to her children (Vassiliou & Vassiliou, 1969; Tsemberis & Orfanos, 1996).

Greek mothers are reported to be nurturant and to have a most intimate relationship with their children. In Canada, Greek mothers are entrusted with the care of the children and the maintenance of the Greek language, customs and values. They are expected to raise well behaved children who are going to stay out of trouble and succeed in adult life. Fathers hardly admit responsibility for their children's inappropriate behaviours, only pride for their accomplishments (Gavaki, 1983; Primpas-Welts, 1982; Xenocostas, 1991).

The Greek-Canadian families are close-knit, child centered, and achievement oriented. The hopes, aspirations and emotional investment of the Greek parents are in their children and they are very protective of them. Since education is perceived to be their children's ticket to a better life and social upward mobility, it is highly valued by the Greek immigrant group (Xenocostas, 1991). Children are expected to do well in school, while parents often work long hours and are unavailable and unable to offer them the assistance they may need. When they are not doing well in school, parents are critical and attribute their difficulties to lack of effort and pressure them to work harder.

Greek parents rarely articulate to their children parental feelings and emotions that imply uncertainty, anxiety, and fear. For, these are perceived to be a sign of weakness that must be hidden. However, they are generous with their advice, often unsolicited, and expect their "children", no matter their age and status or the professional achievements they attain, to honour them. In such a family context, children learn to keep problems they are experiencing to themselves (Vassiliou & Vassiliou, 1969; Tsemberis & Orfanos, 1996; Primpas-Welts, 1982). This may create internal conflict, which can lead to problematic emotional situations since some of those children have very little opportunity to sort out their feelings.

Children are expected to be respectful and obedient to the elders regardless of the content of the communication, simply because "I (the parent) said so" (Tsemberis & Orfanos, 1996; Vassiliou & Vassiliou, 1969). Expression of disagreement is rarely acceptable, as it will be perceived as challenge to parental authority (Vassiliou & Vassiliou, 1969; Primpas-Welts, 1982; Tsemberis & Orfanos, 1996; Xenocostas, 1991). Since Greek parents discourage dialogue with their children, adolescents rarely turn to their parents to discuss thoughts, feelings, emotions or changing life values. Contact remains loving and loyal but often tends to be somewhat superficial and ritualized around meals, holidays, and family gatherings (*Ibid.*).

Since Greece has become more industrialized, there has been an evolutionary trend in family values. However, residual elements of the old values and especially of the male sense of superiority and dominance over the women continue to apply in many rural areas. In Canada, due to the fact that Greek women have entered the work-force and contribute to the financial needs of the family, there is definitely a change that can be observed in the power structure of the Greek family, which gradually moves from a quasi-patriarchal to a more egalitarian form. Hence, the woman's decision-making power is increasing, while the relationship between husband and wife becomes more intimate and westernized (Vrakas, E., 1990).

The relationship with the children is also changing as the values of hierarchy conflicts with the north-American preference (at least in the surface) for equality and democracy. Often, in families who are more rigid and children's behaviour is measured strictly according to traditional values, conflict arises which results in distress and in more serious cases in pathology.

Methodology

This study is based on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include individual (qualitative) interviews that were conducted by the author with a sample of eighteen caregivers of twelve mentally ill family members of Greek origin who live in the area of Greater Montreal and Laval. The names of seven patients were drawn from the medical list of an Ethnic Community Mental Health Clinic in the area and the other five were referred to the author through mutual acquaintances (snow ball). The author approached these patients and sought permission to contact their families.

Secondary source information was collected, a) by searching relevant information in the international and Greek literature and b) by conducting interviews with a group of six community key informants. Five health care professionals were selected on the basis that they provide services in areas of high concentration of Greek immigrants. Amongst them are included two psychiatrists, a family doctor and three social workers. Given the importance and the influence of the church in the Greek family, a member of the clergy of the Greek Orthodox faith was also interviewed.

Semi-structured questionnaires with open-ended questions were used in both sets of interviews. Sociodemographic information about the subjects' age, occupational status, relationship to the patient, migration history, country of birth, language used at home and ethnic identity, was also collected from the subjects by using a structured questionnaire. It is noteworthy that they were eleven subjects who identified themselves as first generation Greek-Canadians, and eight subjects who identify themselves as second generation Canadians.

International Literature Review

In this chapter the author will review some of the classic studies and their findings on attitudes towards mental illness and/or patterns of behaviour in seeking services by family members.

In the early 1950s, the study carried out by Star, cited by the Joint Commission of the Mental Illness and Health (1961), found that the majority of the respondents tended to resist calling anyone "mentally ill", they did so only as a last resort and recognized only the most extremely disturbed behaviour as mental illness.

The Yarrow *et al* study (1955) examined the attitudes and behaviour of the wives of schizophrenic husbands. They reported that the social and psychological situations of these families and their mechanisms of adjustment in many ways parallel the dynamics of minority groups. These families were characterized by feelings of underprivilege and marginality. They displayed hypersensitivity towards mental illness and a need to conceal it because of feelings of stigmatization; one-third adopted a pattern of "aggressive concealment", making drastic changes in order to avoid or cut off former friends, with some going so far as to move to a different part of town. Another third had told only members of the family, or close friends who either understood the problem or had been in similar situation themselves (Yarrow *et al*, 1955).

Nunnally (1961) reviewed various studies which had assessed public attitudes toward the mentally ill. He concluded that: a) a negative halo is associated with the mentally ill and seeking therapy and that s/he is regarded with fear, distrust and dislike by the general public; b) the stigma associated with mental illness is very general across social groups and has no significant relation to demographic characteristics such as age and education; and c) that such negative attitudes may be in part due to a failure to observe and learn about mental health illness in daily life (Nunnally, 1961).

The classic New Haven study conducted by Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) found evidence for an inverse relation between socio-economic status and rates of functional psychosis. The authors had concluded that members of the lowest social class almost never sought psychiatric help for themselves or relatives and they were more likely to see mental illness as a feared somatic disease.

The findings of the Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend (1974) study lends support to the contention that people with lower economic status are exposed to more stressful life experiences than those in higher socio-economic status. This differential exposure accounted for the negative relationship between class and mental illness. Yet, there are others (Levy and Rowitz, 1975, cited in Liem & Liem, 1978) who have disputed those findings.

A classic experimental study of opinions about mental illness was conducted in a small rural agricultural town in the province of Saskatchewan, Canada. They found that the authors' proposition that anyone could become insane under certain circumstances was

in conflict with the community's predominant values and that people of this community feared mental illness and tried to ignore its manifestation as much as possible (Cumming and Cumming, 1957).

Twelve years later, Rootman and Lafave (1969) (cited in Rabkin, 1974), selected another rural town in Saskatchewan, Canada. The authors compared the attitudes of its residents with those reported by Cumming and Cumming in 1957. They found that the respondents were more educated about mental illness and were more tolerant towards mentally ill persons. They concluded that in Saskatchewan rural attitudes toward mental illness had become enlightened and more accepting.

Kirmayer *et al* (1997) studied attitudes towards mental illness and pathways of seeking help amongst cultural communities in Montreal Canada. He concluded that: members of ethnic minorities underutilize the mental health system; the public's tolerance vis-à-vis the mentally ill has remained low; people still respond with fear, dislike and aversion when they encounter the mentally ill; the mentally ill are still greatly stigmatized; and that the stigma attached to psychiatric illness contributes to withdrawal and isolation of the ill persons and their families (Kirmayer *et al*, 1997).

Greek Literature Review

The author was able to find studies, on Greek peoples' perceptions of mental illness, conducted by Greek researchers or by professionals from abroad using a sample of Greek people. However there are very few those who have tried to demonstrate the role of public attitudes and beliefs about mental illness as a foundation of the utilization of psychiatric services.

The ancient Greeks believed that madness was often caused by a God or Gods, usually as punishment for corrupt or undutiful acts. The first to introduce the view of biological causation was Hippocrates who noted that the origin of mental illness is within the person (Milns, 1986).

Skinner (1966), compared attitudes of the modern Greeks and those of the North-Americans. He found that they differ in their perceptions of the locus of the psychic distress. Greeks externalize the causes for everything that is thought to be painful, and the responsibility is placed on forces to be out of the person's control.

North-Americans however, internalize their difficulties and assign responsibility to the individual. Skinner noted that if some misfortune and/or illness occurs in the family, Greek people assume that the cause of the problem comes from outside of the family; the envy and/or the malice of others, or the "evil eye".

In the Western culture mental illness is defined as the kind of illness which bring patients to mental hospitals (Cohen & Struening, 1962). In the Greek culture, mental illness is defined as the kind of illness that entails violent or hallucinatory behaviour; a wide range of symptoms such as "not getting along with people, with one's family", "friends and colleagues", "being unproductive at work", "having no initiative and being unable to make decisions", etc., are often accepted as "normal", albeit, idiosyncratic aspects of one's personality (Safilios-Rothchild, 1968).

The Safilios-Rothchild study (1968) found that reluctance to seek professional help for disturbed relatives by the Greek families is due to negative and stigmatizing cultural attitudes, that, often, result in the loss of friends, social isolation, no chance of getting married and difficulties in finding a job. Thus, most Greeks tend to perceive the cause of mental illness as external to the patient and psychiatric symptoms are often conveyed through a somatic idiom or through a malfunctioning nervous system, which generates less social rejection and self-devaluation of patients and their families and creates expectations that aberrations will be brief and temporary (*Ibid.*)

Alevisatos & Lykestos examined in 1961 the attitudes toward mentally ill patients of 300 families and friends of randomly selected hospitalized chronic schizophrenic patients. The investigators had hypothesized that in the Greek traditional society, where the moral obligations of the family were still strong and where there were few special agencies to treat the mentally ill, patients or former patients would be readily reaccepted into the family. Albeit, they found evidence that many families had ceased to consider the ill person as a family member and felt no obligation for his/her care at all. 88% of the total sample wanted them to remain in the hospital and almost 50% of the sample required total cure as a condition for the patient's return.

An update of this research in 1978 found that 61% of the relatives of newly admitted in-patients wanted their patient home in comparison with 17% in 1961. Only 15% of friends and neighbours compared with 43% in 1961, still stigmatized, mocked

or avoided the mentally ill person and his family. The authors concluded that the attitudes of family and friends of mentally ill patients had improved between the early 1960s and late 1970s (Lykestos et al, 1978). In the same study beliefs such as that the main causes of the onset of mental illness was "poverty" and "bad socio-economic conditions" deriving from structural inequalities were prevalent amongst the respondents (*Ibid.*).

Worries, family situation, and deaths of loved ones, were amongst the most prevalent answers as to what causes mental illness, in another study conducted in Athens Greece by Vassiliou and Vassiliou (1965). Other responses were structural inequalities and poverty, heredity, weak nerves, and *stenohoria* (distress, sadness).

Somatization and Nerves

Somatization is the expression of emotional and psychological problems through bodily, somatic, symptoms. A great number of studies provide evidence for an association between somatization and social class, sex-role segregation, patriarchal structures, and women's subordination to men (Hollingshead and Redlish, 1958; Racy, 1980; White, 1982; Lee, 1986; Guarnaccia et al, 1992). According to Kirmayer et al (1997), somatization is reported to be a common phenomenon, also, among societies where mental illness is considered to be a stigma.

In the Greek culture, where family is structured on patriarchal principles and mental illness is still to a considerable degree socially stigmatized, somatization and *nevra* (nerves) appear frequently among individuals who suffer from emotional problems (Safilios-Rothchild, 1968; Koutrelakos & Zarnari, 1983; Ierodiakonou, 1983; Madianos et al, 1987).

Similarly, according to a number of studies conducted abroad it appears that Greeks in Diaspora tend to report high rates of somatic symptoms that are caused by emotional and environmental problems. In most of those studies, the authors have concluded that willingness to accept physical symptoms rather than to admit emotional problems, reflect the Greek immigrants' cultural attitudes towards mental illness and the stigma that they associate with receiving psychiatric help.

Dinnen (1975) and Staggol (1981) report high rates of somatization among Greek immigrants in Australia. Lykestos *et al* (1979) conducted a study in England between Greeks and British; the results showed higher somatization among Greeks especially among females, who as well preferred to consult their general practitioner and demonstrated a negative attitude toward psychiatric help. Dunkas & Nikely (1972) report comparable findings among Greek immigrant women in Chicago. The authors concluded that "these women felt guilt at having left their families, especially their mothers, and had developed psychosomatic disorders, such as headaches, stomach problems, dizzy spells, etc. as an attempt to rationalize and justify their desire to return to their homeland and to their mothers" (Dunkas & Nikely, 1972).

Vrakas E. (1990) reported high rates of somatic symptoms and nerves amongst a group of Greek immigrant women in the Greek community of Montreal. Likewise, Lock and Dunk (1987) who studied another group of Greek immigrant women in Montreal, found that *nevra* is a common phenomenon amongst them. They concluded that the symptoms of this particular disorder are similar to somatization and that are used by Greek people to express, or camouflage, a diversity of emotional and psychological disturbances. Both authors explain nerves, with regard to Greek immigrant women, as a mechanism that allows them to express emotional problems resulting from environmental stress through physical complaints. In this way, they avoid the embarrassment of being stigmatized by their compatriots.

In terms of seeking help the Vassiliou and Vassiliou study (1965) reports that young people, people with higher education and members of the higher social class, are more likely to seek help from a psychiatrist in case of a major psychological problem. In contrast, the rest of the population is likely to use a medical doctor or other traditional means of help (e.g. a priest, folk, healers, relatives, etc.). This parallels findings of the Hollingshead and Redlich study (1958).

Primpas-Welts (1982) studied Greek-American families and their attitudes in regard to psychotherapy. The author concluded that Greeks rarely seek the services of a psychotherapist. She postulates that members of Greek-American families, and in particular fathers, believe that they alone know the causes of their problems and how to solve them. She argues that if the therapist puts the Greek fathers in a powerless position they will either increase their effort to control their families or they will fall into fatalistic resignation.

Comparable findings were reported by another study conducted in Greece, on the same topic, among rural Greeks, by Ierodiakonou (1983). This study lends support to the contention that Greek people are not willing to seek "non medical" help such as psychotherapy. Ierodiakonou attributed it to stigma that is associated with mental illness in the Greek culture. He concluded, though, that this disposition can be overcome once the Greek people become more familiar with the idea.

Interviews with the Professionals

The professionals who participated in this study acknowledged that they have observed sex differences, amongst their clients, in seeking help and reporting psychological disturbances. According to their statistics the number of women who seek help is nearly double of this of the men and they complain mostly for nerves and depression in contrast to men who seek help for stress and character disorders. They speculate that the socio-culturally fixed role of female obligation, and the changing demands and responsibilities of Greek women's role within the Canadian society are the most possible generators of the higher rates of psychological impairment among Greek-Canadian women. It was attributed, also, to the fact that in the Greek culture it is more acceptable for a woman to complain and be somewhat nervous and temperamental, in contrast to the man who has to hold on to his masculine assertiveness. This is consonant with a survey of the Athenian general population that revealed the same sex differences in manifest of anxiety levels (Vassiliou et al, 1966).

Do Greek people seek help early in the onset of the illness? All the professionals attested that their Greek-Canadian clients rarely refer themselves to the psychiatric services, which they find stigmatizing. Even for emotional or psychological problems they seek the services of the general practitioner much more frequently than any other health specialist.

The group reports that Greek-Canadian families have their own theories pertaining to etiology of mental illness. Their observations lend support that the family initially attributes the change of their relative's behaviour to some character change due to stress and stressful events such as "death in the family", "divorce" or romantic disappointments such as "she broke up with her boyfriend", "influence of bad friends", "too much

work", "loss of employment", or "failure to succeed in school" are also blamed. Socio-political inequalities, effects of their immigrant status, chronic feelings of uprootedness, anxiety, and distress due to living conditions, such as the fast pace of life and climate conditions in Canada, are often used by his clients, especially by the first generation Greeks, attests the psychiatrist.

Reiterating findings in the literature, the professionals attest that that psychiatric symptoms are often conveyed through a somatic idiom. They report that the expression of emotional disturbances or distress through somatic symptoms such as: "headaches", "loss of appetite", "dizziness", "fatigue", "exhaustion due to disturbed sleep patterns", "excessive sweat of their palms", "chest pains", etc., are prevalent amongst their Greek clients. Likewise, *nevra* (nerves), and malfunctioning nervous system, are also used by Greek people to express, or camouflage, a diversity of emotional and psychological disturbances. The general practitioner, in this group, estimates that as much as 80% of his clientele complains about somatic symptoms and/or nerves. "It is easier to accept somatic disorders or nerves", he said, "because they can be cured faster, there is probably no fear of reoccurrence, and moreover they do not entail the same degree of stigma" as mental illness. The respondents believe that although the stigma of mental illness is present in all cultures, it is much more exaggerated in the Greek culture and Greek people show extra sensitivity towards it".

"Greek mentally disturbed persons and their family will deny for a long time that the symptoms are signs of mental illness", report the professionals. The family will decide to visit the clinic or the emergency room in the hospital only when the psycho-emotional symptoms persist. By the time they agree to go to see a psychiatrist they are already in crisis, and they have exhausted all other resources, such as the medical doctor, the church, folk healers, etc.. Those who would go to see the psychiatrist will insist in their theories and try to avoid the label of mental illness by denying that there is any such a problem in the family, which sometimes could be true.

Mental health care professionals expressed their concerns about the help seeking patterns of the Greek families. For postponing seeking help might have a clinical significance as often results in the illness to progress to a more chronic unmanageable state.

Interviews with the Families

Discussions with the care-givers and excerpts of their narratives are provided, in this chapter, to illustrate the influence of cultural attitudes on seeking services. The objective is to give these families the opportunity to describe their own experiences and be heard and understood by the administrators and professionals of various institutions in order to adjust their methods, attitudes and approach to this particular clientele, according to its cultural peculiarities and its own subjective reality.

As it was mentioned in the literature review, mental illness is defined by the Greek public as violent or hallucinatory behaviour; a wide range of deviant behaviour symptoms considered to be normal, in contrast with the Western psychiatry that considers the same behaviour symptoms to be pathological.

How do the participants in this study define mental illness and what do they think about it? Those who were over 50 years of age and had come from Greece around the 1950s and 1960s, defined mental illness as: "madness", "insanity", and "craziness", when one is "mentally abnormal", "sick", "disturbed", or when "something is wrong with his/her mind". Although the attitudes of the younger generation subjects were not that much different, than those of the first generation, one can detect a softer tone and the inclusion of emotional problems under the rubric of mental illness. Some defined it as "deviance", "irrational behaviour", "uncontrollable emotions" and "difficulty with interpersonal relationships". Others mentioned "disturbed thoughts and emotions". They attributed it to genetic factors but also to stress and stressful life events. Findings of the Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend (1974) and the Vasiliou and Vasiliou (1965) studies lend support to those attitudes; these investigators report that there is a significant correlation between life events experienced and psychiatric impairment.

The majority of the caregivers refused to label any but the aggressive paranoid and the most bizarre behaviour as mental illness. This is consistent with earlier findings in the literature that the public has a much broader concept of what constitutes "normal" behaviour than that of the psychiatrists or mental health workers and thus will deny that the given patterns of behaviour are indicative of mental illness (Safilios-Rothchild, 1968). In this study, 72% responded that the behaviour of their relatives does not fall under the mental illness definition. 45% of them identified their family member's problem as an emotional problem related to *nevra* (nerves), and the onset to a stressful event.

Likewise, the mother (born in Greece) of a schizoid male adult child, showing bizarre behaviour but not violent, and the two parents (born both in Greece) of a schizophrenic female adult child with hallucinations refused to say that their children are mentally ill. The former attributed his behaviour to change of character and *nevra* (nerves) that started since "he was fired from his job", the latter attributed their daughter's condition to "psychological problems that started since her first menstruation". In these answers one can detect reflection of broader themes of gender roles in Greek society; traditionally men are expected to play the role of the family protector and provider and women are expected to fulfill the roles of wife and mother. In the Greek culture these sex role patterns have been maintained very strongly.

It is noteworthy that amongst the 28% of the subjects who accepted their relative as mentally ill, there are the parents (born in Greece) of a schizophrenic adult child who demonstrates hallucinatory and aggressive behaviour and the brother (born in Canada) of a schizophrenic young lady who demonstrates auditory hallucinations. The two other subjects who defined their relative as mentally ill are the mother and the sister of a young schizophrenic paranoid man, in spite the fact that he does not have visual or auditory hallucinations. The mother is born in Greece but came to Canada at the age of seven and perceives herself closer to the second generation Greek-Canadians, the sister identifies herself as Greek-Canadian.

What the subjects blamed the most as causing their relatives' behaviour is their malfunctioning nervous system. "Broken nerves", "shattered nerves", "weak nerves", and so on were named repeatedly. It seems that by discussing the illness as *nevra* many of the psychotic symptoms are bracketed out, the label of *trela* (craziness) is avoided and an explicit distinction is drawn between their relative and those who are really crazy. This distinction between nerves, emotional problems and mental disorder, as it was mentioned in the literature review chapter, is a recurrent theme in most of the studies done in Greece and abroad with Greek subjects.

Another theme that reoccurred often during the interviews was immigration, the effects of it and the subjects' nostalgia and wish to visit their homeland. The majority of the participants described immigration as a giant, but also as a very painful step forward. They maintained that it has resulted to an enormous sense of loss, and a culture shock that most of them they have not been able to resolve yet.

Some of the first generation Greek-Canadian subjects indicate that 30-45 years later they still struggle to overcome the language barrier and to "fit" in the host society, when at the same time they aim to "hold-on" to their own language and customs. They attest that in some cases these factors have created chronic feelings of isolation and high levels of stress. Others say that they still find it difficult to adapt to the fast pace of life in Canada and to its long harsh winters. As they said, "the life here (in Canada) is too fast, you always have to run. That gives you *anchos* (anxiety, stress) and your *nevra spane* (your nerves break down)"; or, "the Canadian winters are very long and make everybody depressed".

Likewise, some of the second generation subjects report their own stressful reality deriving from their efforts to try to "fit" between the two cultures. Comparable attitudes have been reported by members of other ethnic groups in Canada (Alodi, 1978; Salvendi, 1983).

The majority, 83% of the participants stated that they do not discuss their problems with friends as a whole, and especially when this is about mental illness. Some first generation subjects still remembered that mentally ill people were mocked and their families were laughed at in Greece. Hence, they wanted to keep such information between a minimum number of people in order to avoid ridicule and stigmatization; the first to approach for advice, concerning their relative's problem, was either other family members or the family doctor and in some cases their priest.

Second generation subjects conceal the presence of mental illness from friends and keep it within the family, too. For example Katherine P. referring to her mother's suicide attempt reports: "I could not confide even to my close friends, about my mother's attempt; I was too conscious of what they will think about my family". They, too, incline to approach other family members for advice, if a relative presents symptoms of mental illness. However, they seem to be more open to consult a mental health specialist.

All the subjects reported that, in the beginning they were denying that their children, spouse, parent, or a sibling might present symptoms of mental illness. They all thought that the symptoms were caused by *anchos* (stress), *nevra* (nerves) or that the person was going through a phase. Most of them admit that today if they were to look back they could identify one or two symptoms that could have alerted them. They reported high

degree of sensitivity and described their reaction as being related to how others in their "in-group" such as friends, neighbours, relatives, etc., would judge them. They attributed it to the social stigma attached to mental illness, which often entails isolation, and rejection. The wife of a manic depressive recounts:

"My husband was an *anchodes typos* (anxious type) all his life. I believed that this was to be expected because he had too many responsibilities. When the family doctor suggested to go and see a psychiatrist, I thought he was wrong and I did not want him to go. Besides, I was thinking: "What the people will say? What effect will it have on our children? Are we going to lose our friends? Is our family going to be stigmatized and/or marginalized?"

Other themes that came up during the interviews, were the "evil eye", possession of demons, and fatalism. The Hollingshead & Redlich (1958) and Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend (1974) report comparable attitudes as prevalent in a study which they carried out with subjects of low socio-economic status.

In this study Barbara S., the wife of a schizophrenic husband, insists that "when the evil eye is cast on someone it can cause him mental illness". Barbara believes that during a visit to Greece few years ago, someone *matiasse* her husband (cast the evil eye on him). "It is only since then that he lacks motivation, shows flat affect and he is withdrawn even from his own family", she said. Skinner (1966) found that beliefs of the evil-eye's special powers transcend all professional, educational, and social class boundaries in Greek life in Greece. Thus, most Greeks attribute a host of physical and mental symptoms to *matiasma* or *mati* (evil-eye), and they believe that there is a whole range of rituals that they can be used for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of it. These beliefs are pervasive among other Mediterranean and Hispanophone people as well (Guarnaccia *et al*, 1992; Rogler & Cortes, 1993).

The presence of hallucinations or bizarre behaviour prompts, often, Greek people to think of demons and search for solace in their religion and their church. They seek their priest's help and ask him to say a prayer to *Panayia* (Virgin Mary), or pray to a Saint that they feel is their protector. The psychiatrist alleged that, in some cases they will go as far as to refuse to follow a medical treatment. To illustrate his point he mentioned a case where the father of a schizophrenic young man refused medication treatment and sought the help of a *kalogeros* (Monk) in a Greek Orthodox monastery near Toronto. The clergyman disclosed that he has come across with similar cases but he believes that are not as prevalent.

In this study, most first generation subjects tended to show *moiolatria* (fatalism). They came up with comments such as, "this is what God gave us", or "it was God's will!... we might as well accept it", or "she was born like that. We cannot change nothing". Comparable attitudes are reported by Rogler *et al* (1984), (cited in Rogler & Cortes, 1993) among first generation Hispanophone immigrants in a study carried out in the United States. It is noteworthy that in both studies second generation caregivers reported substantially less fatalism than their first generation counterparts.

Utilization of Psychiatric Services

a) Medication

Medication can help people with mental illnesses. It can relieve the distress of acute illness by controlling the symptoms. However, medication does not cure the illness and, of course, has side effects. In regards to use of medication, the psychiatrists and the doctor said that they prescribe neuroleptics, antidepressants, and mood stabilizers to their Greek patients as much as to their Canadian counterparts. However, based on the feed-back that they are getting from their clients, they know that often their instructions are not followed. They allege that, often, other members of the family interfere and discourage their disturbed relatives to take their medication. They attributed it to the Greek families' mistrust towards doctors and medication.

As for the caregivers, their responses reveal that their attitudes on the use of medication and its effectiveness are divided. There are those, 25% of the respondents, who maintained that the doctors should impose medication and treatment to mental patients even if s/he refuses. They argued that in times of crisis his or her judgment is impaired and failure to administer useful treatment when symptoms are destructive constitutes neglect.

Yet, 73% of the participants feel that doctors provide limited information as to why a particular medication is described, what the proper dosage should be, what are its therapeutic benefits and what are its side effects. This limited information often leads them to conclusions that when medication is used it rather worsens their relative's condition, which are often justified. Most of them

stated that "taking too many pills is not good". Therefore, when the symptoms subside they incline to encourage their relative to decrease the dosage or stop taking the medication altogether. They made comments such as "if one has no pain why should s/he take medication", or "why continue to take so many pills when they make you feel like a zombie"? Voula K., the mother of a 34 years old schizophrenic son, believes that actually it is the medication that has caused his predicament. Voula K. recounts that:

"As a child, the school officials labeled my son hyperactive and in times uncontrollable. They sent us for psychiatric evaluation. He was hospitalized and overmedicated. It is the overmedication that has damaged his brain and his nervous system. The sad point is that at the time we could not communicate well in English or French and as a result we did not know what exactly was happening or what were our rights. Today, I know better; I ask a lot of questions".

While these attitudes reflect the patient's and/or the family's right to be informed and or to refuse medication, Voula's story implies, also, cultural insensitivity. Voula indicates that she never understood under what criteria her son was labeled as hyperactive. She maintains that a cultural sensitive practitioner would not have diagnosed his behaviour as pathological. She is probably correct. As she said, "in the Greek culture there is a greater tolerance for a wide range of behaviours before a child will be considered as hyperactive. Greek parents believe that children, especially boys, have to be lively. Otherwise, they think that maybe there is something wrong with them". Voula K. believes that she echoes attitudes of other cultures as well.

b) Psychotherapy

Are Greek-Canadian families aware of the array of psychiatric services that are offered at the hospital, or are they aware of the community psychiatric facilities and their services? Do they use those services? And, what do they think about them?

According to their responses, first generation subjects knew of the services in the hospital, but knew little about the community psychiatric facilities and their services. All of them were apt to care about the medication management and the Day Hospital Program, for their relatives. In regards to psychotherapy, only 17% amongst them indicated that it was probably a good idea if their

disturbed relative were to attend psychotherapy sessions and/or to join support groups. Yet, they were not certain that they, as caregivers, could benefit from such a service.

Likewise the key informants reported that it is unusual for Greek-Canadian families (especially the first generation immigrants) to seek services such as psychotherapy, family therapy, psycho-educational therapy, or to join support groups. The social workers, in the group, reported that they have often tried to link Greek-Canadians to these services but only a small number have responded.

The second generation Greek-Canadian subjects were more open to seek a variety of different services that were not necessarily medical in the traditional sense. They knew more on the psychiatric services and rehabilitation programs offered by community agencies. However, only one third of them knew the names of some of those agencies.

The professionals suggested that underutilization of these services is due: first to language barrier; second to cultural interpretations of many traditional Greek men and women, that admitting emotional problems and receiving help from outside the family network, is a sign of weakness and "losing face"; and third cultural perceptions that therapists are stigmatizing to the reputation of the family. They attest, however, that second generation Greek-Canadians tend to be more receptive to those services and as an example cite the case of Mary B. (born in Canada), who is manic depressive and has been in group therapy for more than three years now.

c) Placement in Residential Settings

Without doubt, the burden of caring for a patient at home is considerable. Relatives find it difficult to understand and to come to terms with mental illness-related behaviour. It often affects the caregiver's social and leisure activities, and financial problems arise frequently. The family's obligation to provide long term patient care in the Greek culture may be maladaptive in the nuclear families of Greek-Canadians who have lost their supportive networks.

An important point of this study, was to explore the attitudes of the Greek-Canadian families towards placing their relative in a residential setting. Questions were posed to both: the professionals and the caregivers. The professionals indicate that

they usually have a difficult time convincing Greek families to place one of their members in a group or in a foster home. They attributed it, first, to the strong sense of obligation Greeks have towards their family and second to concerns that people of their close environment, might judge them as "not good" parents or spouses who have relinquished their obligations and abandoned a family member.

Greek parents' tendency to be overprotective was also cited as a deterrent factor. According to the group, Greek parents are concerned if their children will have the kind of services "they" were able to give them, should they place them. For years they were able to show their love towards their children by providing services to them and by fulfilling their needs. In extension, they were able to reassure themselves that they were behaving as "proper Greek parents". Now they have difficulty to believe that someone else can do the same as good as they did.

Financial constraints is another deterrent factor, according to the professionals. The mentally ill person, often, receives some form of income support through the welfare system. Should the person be placed this income will go to the group home and the family would have to manage with less when already it is struggling due to limited financial resources.

Finally, when they have to place their offspring, spouse or parent, two very significant criteria, that were mentioned as influencing or deterrent factors to Greek people, are their language and their food. They, often, insist to find a home where the staff speaks or understands the Greek language and where Greek food is served at least occasionally. For, they want their loved ones to hold onto some aspects of their Greek identity.

Second generation Greeks are depicted by the professionals as being also reluctant to seek placement for a family member (usually the parents). They, too, express concerns as to what their relatives or neighbors will say and they are afraid that they will be perceived as no good sons or daughters and as abandoning, deserting, or even throwing their parents out of their home. Thus, they tend to delay the placement as long as possible.

The majority of the caregivers replied to this question by saying they preferred to keep their ill family member at home as long as possible, in spite the sacrifices that it takes. Most of the first generation subjects stated that it was their obligation to look after their loved one and mentioned cases in Greece where

families were keeping their elderly parents and sick relatives. They all knew of at least one case, as they had grown up in close knit villages or neighbourhoods.

Their answers were converging to statements such as "nobody can take a better care for (relative's name) than his family", "I can never do that to my child (or spouse)", "s/he will think that we abandon her/him". Helen G, the mother of an 18 years old schizophrenic young man, grew up in a very close knit family. Her response is explicit and shows her appreciation for the traditional family values; "It was so nice to have all this family around me. I want my children to have the same chance. I am his mother and I am supposed to help him out". I cannot let him down. My parents have offered to help me out. Everything is going to be O.K."

Second generation subjects were ambivalent. 60% amongst them even though they said that it "might" be better for the disturbed member to be placed in a supervised home, admitted that it is next to impossible for them to make such a decision: "I can not do it; the whole family will be upset". Others said that they were very tired by the unpredictability of their relatives' illness. Yet, they were not convinced that living in a residential unit, away from family, could have a therapeutic effect on their loved ones. As they said, they were afraid that they would have to deal with a worse situation, increased guilt feelings and intensified sense of stigma should the placement proved to be unsuccessful.

Are there any circumstances in which the subjects would considered placement? The replies to this question suggest that the respondents would seek placement for their mentally ill relative, only if the situation was unmanageable for them and only after they had tried hard to deal with it. This is consonant with observations expressed by the professionals who attested that: "there are some mental patients of Greek origin who have been placed in foster homes. However, these patients in their majority were psychotic and often acted violently. Even with medication it was difficult to control their symptoms effectively. Thus, the family could not handle the situation any longer and had to place them.

Barriers to Access to Services

There were five common barriers to access to services that were regularly mentioned by the sample respondents and the key informants throughout this study. They suggest that these barriers may limit those who need psychiatric services in a very serious way.

a) There is no doubt that the language barrier is the number one obstacle to access to services for the Greek-Canadians and for other minority groups. For, there is a great number, amongst the first generation, especially the elders, that even after living 30 to 45 years in Canada have never learned either of the two official languages.

b) Another barrier is the sectorization of health and social services in Quebec. With the sectorization rules, people have no choice but to go to the hospital or the CLSC clinic servicing their residential area. That means that often Greeks have to seek services in French hospitals, while the majority even amongst second generation Greek-Canadians, does not speak or understand the French language.

c) Financial constraints is also a common barrier; caring for a patient with a persistent psychiatric disorder limits opportunities for a decent employment and an adequate income. If the patient was formerly the breadwinner and circumstances prevent other relatives from taking over his/her role, the family might have to depend on social assistance and simply cannot afford the extra financial burden of getting to therapy or other services.

d) Cultural pejorative attitudes toward mental illness present a major barrier to obtaining services, particularly among the first generation Greeks. For, the word "mental" has become to mean "crazy" or "abnormal", for many of these people, and the fear that their relative or even their whole family will be stigmatized, prevents them of seeking help.

e) Lack of easily accessible services, lack of information on community facilities and their services or culturally inappropriate services within these organizations can present also a barrier.

Discussion

A major contentious issue among mental health professionals and others is whether the severe mental illnesses are either organic (biological or physical abnormalities) or functional (caused by environmental, psychological, and social factors) in origin.

Analyzing the literature and the subjects' narratives, the author speculates that Greek-Canadian subjects perceive mental illnesses' causes as functional and much less as biological. These attitudes, coupled with the extreme unwillingness of the subjects to label any but the aggressive paranoid and the most bizarre behaviour as mental illness, and their mistrust towards the use of medication, would probably be seen by many psychiatrists and pharmaceutical institutions as sign of deviance and/or weakness. However, by many feminists and patients' rights activists it would be seen as sign of strength and a necessary resistance to the domination of the psychiatric classification of mental illness through DSM IV (Leonard, 1997).

The findings of this study, suggest an important hypothesis regarding access to mental health clinic care among minority groups in the general population. In our sample, more than two thirds of the relatives seeking help from the psychiatric professionals and agencies were not pursuing their first choice. Instead, they sought help initially from their family and from general practitioners. These findings, together with findings of previous research on minority group patterns (Alodi, 1978; Dinnen, 1977; Guarnaccia *et al*, 1992; Lee, 1986; Lin, & Lin, 1978; Salvendi, 1983; Staggol, 1981), suggest that family members of minority groups enter the professional health clinic and the psychiatrist's office with greater reluctance than the Canadian population. Thus, an initial task of clinicians in these settings may be that of addressing the basis of this reluctance, appeasing concerns and gaining the trust and confidence of minority group families.

Analysis of the literature review and the interview data contemplates that first generation Greek-Canadians' help seeking patterns differ of those of the Canadians and to the lesser degree of those of the second generation Greek-Canadians. When mental illness strikes a family member, first generation Greek-Canadian subjects incline to contact for advice members of the immediate or extended family, the general practitioner, or their priest rather than mental health specialists. Most second generation Greek-Canadian subjects and those who identified themselves as integrated into the Canadian society and culture incline to contact mental health care professionals, and to seek a wider range of psychiatric services.

Why do Greek-Canadian families tend to underutilize psychiatric services such as individual therapy, family therapy, group therapy, psycho-educational programs, etc.? Analysis of the data lends sup-

port to the contention that the cultural perception of the stigma attached to mental illness, the rejection of the mentally ill, and cultural perceptions of family obligations towards the mentally ill member are the main factors. It also contemplates that the experience of mental illness (or distress) among Greek-Canadian families is a culturally shaped phenomenon. These findings have important implications in designing therapeutic programs and choosing therapeutic interventions and approaches.

Implications for Social Work Practice

It is important that social work practice will take into consideration the following two elements. First, due to the continuing trend of downsizing and closing of psychiatric wards in the hospitals, families will increasingly play an important role in the care of the seriously mentally ill. Second, the Greek psychiatric literature indicates that the Greek family is the primary care giver for the mentally ill patients and is viewed as ally and integral component of the treatment process.

Accordingly, understanding the Greek-Canadian families' experiences and shortcomings in dealing with the both the mentally ill family member and the mental health system is essential. Working with Greek-Canadian families an indigenous or a culturally sensitive social worker, psychiatrist, or psychologist, can gain the Greek families' trust if s/he understands their cultural heritage, shows empathy to their social and psychological suffering, listens to their narratives and shows respect to their attitudes and perceptions.

Thereafter, psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers must have a fuller understanding of Greek-Canadian families' conceptions of mental illness, attitudes towards mental health care services and how those affect their help seeking behaviour. This distinction is important because, if the practitioner does not consider it s/he can arrive in an inadequate individual and family assessment and as result inappropriate clinical interventions with Greek-Canadian families. Given the fact that the same holds true for a number of other key concepts covered in a diagnostic-therapeutic interview, the complications are obvious.

This writer would like to point out, though, that while there are common cultural characteristics among Greek-Canadian patients and/or their families there are also some differences that can be attributed to their degree of acculturation along with their age, social status, education, and local culture of their hometown.

Therefore, it is important for the practitioner-social worker to give individualized patient care rather than making the assumption that everyone is similar.

Recommendations

Due to their dual status of chronically mentally ill and member of an ethnic minority, Greek-Canadian patients and their families face a "double stigma" and a special range of stressors. Practitioners who serve them may require more than generalized clinical and rehabilitative skills. It is therefore crucial that professional schools of all pertinent disciplines such as psychiatry, psychology, social work, etc., modify old courses pertaining to mental illness and introduce new culturally sensitive ones and aim to sensitize future professionals towards the cultural minorities and their different attitudes. Culturally sensitive in-training can help professionals, who are already working in the mental health care system, to understand the behaviour of their clients. If practitioners do not acknowledge cultural differences they will risk not fully understanding their clients and their caregivers.

In Quebec, the health and social services have recently incorporated the cultural component in their practice. According to the key informants, although some efforts have been made, Greeks are under-represented in the public and para-public sector. They suggest that greater efforts be made to recruit indigenous professionals from the community. The participants affirm that non-indigenous workers have never lacked in kindness and goodwill. However, due to the fact that the majority of the first generation Greek-Canadians do not speak or understand English or French, the main problem has been communication (in the broadest sense of the term) and lack of the necessary background knowledge of the ethnic group to make sense out of what they see and hear.

Accessibility of mental health services could be increased by forming coalitions and links with other ethnic communities in order to find common solutions and by a long-term community education process. The nature of mental illness should be out in the open to be discussed. Stigma often occurs when something is hidden. If it comes out in the open and many people discuss it, the sense of stigma may subside.

Thus, the Social Services of the Greek Community, in collaboration with the CLSCs and/or other organizations, must invite Mental health care specialists and organize series of lectures in

order to disseminate information on mental disorders, such as manic depression, schizophrenia, phobias, etc., in order to demystify them. They can, also, disseminate information on the behaviour of mentally ill persons, preferred treatments, existing mental health services, and how one can access those services. With better education and information Greek-Canadians will be able to realize that using psychiatric services does not automatically mean that they are "crazy".

Preventive services need to be offered by combining neighborhood satellite clinics with community mental health workers who will locate people with problems, educate them and their families to recognize early signs, and facilitate their getting help by guiding them to appropriate resources before the problem becomes chronic and/or unmanageable. Practical help also need to be provided; existing community health care facilities can arrange to take the mentally disturbed clients from their home for part of the day in order to lighten the burden of burn out families. Care-givers should also be able to get relief part of the night or during crises.

Underutilization of hospital or community psychiatric services and reluctance to use residential homes, observed among the Greek-Canadian families, points to the need for clinics, mental health program planners, and providers of residential services to expand their outreach to minority groups by notifying: a) agencies, such as the Greek Community of Montreal and CLSCs in areas populated heavily by Canadian families of Greek origin; and b) professionals, such as general practitioners that are serving Greek-Canadian families, about their services. Existing agencies need to go beyond the professional level in trying to reach directly families that might need their services by advertising in the existent local Greek-Canadian media that includes four radio programs, five newspapers and two televised programs.

The participants throughout this study maintained that cultural issues affect the accessibility of a variety of services for the mentally ill. Therefore they believe that there is a need for the Greek community to develop its own resources, such as residential settings with indigenous staff who would be able to serve mentally disturbed Canadians of Greek origin. The respondents insisted that, in their opinion, health care facilities with indigenous staff and administration, will encourage family members in placing their relatives. For, it will alleviate the language barrier

problem, it will be judged as minimal adjustment in their ill relative's life and it will lessen the effect of stigmatization regarding abandonment, since they will know that other Greek families have done the same.

Finally, social workers serving the Greek-Canadian families must think of how they function in a socio-cultural sense as well and that Greek mentally ill patients and their families' troubles are often caused by socio-political structures. Hence, lobbying the government, incorporating instructions about social structures, cultural systems and trans-cultural human services into mental health education and in-service programs can be the beginning of our attempt to assist mentally ill persons, and their families, from Greek or other different ethnic backgrounds.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

The small number of subjects, in this study, and the fact that they were not chosen randomly may have resulted in biased and subjective conclusions that might not represent the opinions and help seeking behaviours of the large population (about 80,000) of the Greek community in Montreal. Consequently, the author feels that she cannot make any valid generalizations and that more research on the subject is warranted. The author hopes that the emerged findings of this study will initiate interest and motivation for other similar studies that would provide valuable information on the topic. This information could give new directions on designing effective treatment programs and alternative interventions for the Greek-Canadian family and hopefully for other ethnic minority families.

Given the importance of the subject the author would like to offer the following suggestions for future research: a) To conduct a similar study based on a much larger sample, a control group and combination of quantitative and qualitative principles; b) To conduct multivariate research; while cultural attitudes are important in understanding why Greek-Canadians underutilize mental health services, it is essential to closely research other factors such as socioeconomic status and education, other social factors and their effect in choosing certain pathways of seeking help, the effect of social networks, etc.

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"ΑΙΔΩΣ": A Moral and Political Virtue in Ancient Spartan Education

John Dellis*

RÉSUMÉ

La notion de αἰδώς a été considérée comme une vertu morale et politique fondamentale par toutes les sociétés de l'antiquité grecque. Tous les poètes et les philosophes anciens l'ont traitée dans leurs oeuvres et on peut trouver aujourd'hui une série d'études importantes qui traitent de cette notion chez les poètes et les philosophes, surtout chez Homère et Hésiode. Le présent article, malgré sa brièveté, a l'intention d'étudier la notion et la fonction de *aidôs* dans l'éducation des jeunes de la société de Sparte, étude qui n'a pas été faite jusqu'ici, car cette notion s'avère avoir été la fondation du système éducatif et de la loyauté à la vie sociale des Spartiates.

ABSTRACT

The notion of αἰδώς had been considered a fundamental moral and political virtue in all ancient Greek societies. This notion was treated by all ancient Greek poets and philosophers and has been researched today in most of them, especially in Homer and Hesiod. This brief article intends to explore the notion and its function in ancient Spartan education, a study which has not been done so far. For the Spartans, *aidôs* was the foundation of their education and their consequent loyalty to societal life.

C. Erffa¹ was perhaps the first who studied the concept of αἰδώς in ancient Greek philosophy. He researched the use of the term αἰδώς, in general, from Homer to Democritus. Some other scholars, after him, did specific studies in the works of each ancient Greek philosopher or poet.

The interest of scientific research deals mainly with Homer and Hesiod, since the concept of αἰδώς occurs quite often in these two great poets.

In Homer, αἰδώς has different meanings: a) reverence to Gods b) conscience² c) sense of social responsibility³ d) respect to elders and equals⁴ e) social honour⁵ f) bashfulness or cowardice.⁶

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The interpretations which dominate in Hesiod⁷ are: a) αἰδώς as one of the essential conditions of social life and b) αἰδώς as compassion, a regard for others or moral "conscience"⁸.

We find that the word αἰδώς⁹ is often used in Plato's Dialogues, particularly in *Protagoras*. The Sophist Protagoras¹⁰, in his theory of the origins of civilization, said that αἰδώς could be attributed to every human being as a part of right and wrong.

However, the concept of αἰδώς has a special meaning in the moral philosophy of Democritus¹¹. We have proved elsewhere that, in Democritus, αἰδώς and αἰδεῖσθαι εἰωυτόν function as ethical conscience¹².

Generally, the idea of αἰδώς -with the various meanings of respect, conscience, reverence and dignity- has always affected the societies of ancient Greeks and it has been a basic element for the values of their moral culture.

With the above interpretations in mind, our intention in this article is to use the ancient sources to study the function of αἰδώς in ancient Spartan education. As far as we know, there has been no discussion on this problem.

Xenophon¹³ says that αἰδώς, in ancient Sparta, was adored as goddess while Pausanias¹⁴ describes her statue standing there. For the Spartan State, αἰδώς was the foundation of education (*agôgê*) because it was through αἰδώς that the young men were led to: a) the obedience of the laws (*eupeitheia*) and the respect of their fellow-citizens; b) good behaviour, the climax of which is the military virtue, the foundation of Spartan society. So, αἰδώς, improved with education, leads to both the political and the military virtue.

The Spartan general Archidamus confirms our view when he says: "πολεμικοί τε και εὐβουλοι δια το εὐκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, το μεν οτι αἰδώς σωφροσύνη μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δε ευψυχία, εὐβουλοι δε αμαθέστερ ον των νόμων της υπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι..."¹⁵.

Consequently, a young man respects his fellow-citizens, remains constant in his important debt which is the defence of his own country indeed and this is certainly the basic aim of Spartan education (*agôgê*). Plutarch¹⁶ comments that: "ἡ δε παιδεία ἦν αυτοῖς προς το ἀρχεσθαι καλῶς και καρτερεῖν πονοῦντα και μαχόμενον νικάν η αποθνήσκειν".

In order to defend the native land, every young man must have three qualities: a) will b) shame and c) obedience to the authorities. The Spartan general Vrasidas says: "τρία εἶναι το καλῶς πολεμεῖν, το εθέλειν και το αισχύνεσθαι και το τοις ἀρχουσι πείθεσθαι"¹⁷. Military virtue is, consequently, connected with αἰδῶς, which appears as obedience to authorities and laws. Hence the Spartans improved this innate moral emotion to young men starting with their every day behaviour. Plutarch says: "και τους νέους δε ου μόνον τους ιδίους αιδεῖσθαι πατέρας και υπηκόους τούτοις εἶναι, αλλά πάντας τους πρεσβυτέρους εντρέπεσθαι και οδων υποχωρούντας και καθέδρας υπεξισταμένους και παρόντων ησυχάζοντας"¹⁸."

However, the function of αἰδῶς was, first of all, political, social and ethical; and was to be expressed subsequently, as military virtue. Young men were taught to avoid doing anything bad, not on fear of punishment, but on fear of shame and blame by others in case they were wrong in their behaviour or in applying the moral standards of their society. The Spartan king, Agesilaus, who was the personification of the ideal citizen in Sparta and a real model of ἥθος (*moris*) had, as Plutarch says, all these characteristics: "ευπειθεῖα πάλιν αυ και πραότητι τοιούτος ην, οἰος φόβω μηδέν, αισχύνη διε πάντα ποιεῖν τα προσταττόμενα, και τοις ψόγοις αλγύνεσθαι μάλλον η τους πόνους βαρύνεσθαι"¹⁹.

According to Plutarch, the primary aim of education in ancient Sparta was indeed completed with the acquisition of αἰδῶς. So states also Xenophon, in two parts of his work *Republica Lacedaemoniorum*: a) "ἐξ οποτέρας δ' αυτών ευπειθέστεροι και αιδημονέστεροι και ων δει εγκρατέστεροι άνδρες, αποτελούνται"²⁰. b) "τούτο δε ποιήσας διέπραξε και αιδημονέστερους εἶναι τους παῖδας ουδέν γαρ ούτως αιδοῦνται ούτε παῖδες ούτε άνδρες ως τους ἀρχοντες".²¹ Thus, he confirms, once more, that the function of αἰδῶς, as a political virtue, was expressed: a) as obedience of young men to laws and authorities, so that they would be able to acquire moral behaviour, since the laws meant social morality²² and the City-State took care of the moral progress of the citizens to be ἀγαθοί²³ (*boni*); b) as discipline to rules of common life.

So, by means of αἰδῶς, the legislator Lycourgos succeeded in the institution of obedience to the the laws²⁴ and respect for the regime by all Spartans. As a result, the regime remained constant

and immutable for five centuries. This constancy was actually the real aim of education, while αἰδώς was its basic content. Plutarch describes it as: "τῶν πολιτῶν ὅς ἂν μὴ υπομείνῃ τὴν τῶν παίδων ἀγωγὴν οὐ μετείχε τῶν τῆς πόλεως δικαίων"²⁵.

However, αἰδώς was a fundamental virtue, as well as a basic aim of education, for another reason. It is connected directly with σωφροσύνη. This connection is emphasized by Archidamus: "ἡ αἰδώς μετέχει σωφροσύνης". As we have quoted, we believe that σωφροσύνη is a virtue which characterizes the Spartan conception of society as well as the organizational aims of the State, for σωφροσύνη is also defined as knowledge of oneself and of one's own shortcomings, rational control of desires, temperance and awareness of one's specific duties, limited as they may be. So, since αἰδώς leads to σωφροσύνη, the Spartans emphasized αἰδώς for the education of young men.

The aspect that αἰδώς is not only part of σωφροσύνη, but that both these virtues (i.e. αἰδώς and σωφροσύνη) are equal is expressed in the Platonic dialogue *Charmides*²⁶ where σωφροσύνη is "τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν"²⁷, while in other Platonic dialogues σωφροσύνη is a complex Greek virtue²⁸. It is the "γινώσκειν εαυτὸν"²⁹. Thus σωφροσύνη is connected with "γνώθι σεαυτὸν"³⁰. This self-knowledge became the basis of moral life for all ancient Greeks.

Relying on the identification "αἰδώς-σωφροσύνη-γνώθι σεαυτὸν", we can justify the Spartan persistence in teaching the young men αἰδώς when in the prime of their age. The Spartans started from their outward appearance. Young men had to be decent. It is, perhaps, these details which made the children be accustomed to αἰδεῖσθαι. Xenophon said: "πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι ἰσχυρῶς ἐμφυσιώσαι"³¹. All these good habits took roots in the conscience of the young men and became second nature, "δευτέρα φύσις"³². Xenophon says about the behaviour of the young men in Sparta: "ἐκείνων γοῦν ἦττον μὲν ἂν φωνὴν ἀκούσῃς ἢ τῶν λιθίνων, ἦττον δ' ἂν ὀμματα μετατρέψῃς ἢ τῶν χαλκῶν".³³

Perhaps all these rules about behaviour were oppressive and thus could be considered a disadvantage of Spartan education. However, these same rules were in force in Athens, too: although Athens had a more progressive and liberal socio-political

organization. Plato, in *Charmides*, said: "οἱ δοκοὶ σωφροσύνη εἶναι το κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχὴ ἐν τε ταῖς ὁδοῖς βαδίζει καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως ποιεῖν"³⁴. Isocrates³⁵ as well as Aristophanes³⁶ defended this strict education.

In conclusion we can say that the aim of Spartan education was both hard physical exercise and improvement of αἰδώς which was the foundation of moral and political education expressed as: a) self-respect and self-knowledge, b) respect to others, c) self-restriction d) obedience to laws and authorities and e) leading to the military virtue.

NOTES

1. Erffa, C. E., **ΑΙΔΩΣ und Verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwincklung von Homer bis Demokrit** (philol. Suppl. xxx, 2), Leipzig, 1937.
2. Verdenius, W., "ΑΙΔΩΣ Bei Homer", **Mnemos**, Ser III, 12, 1945, p. 49.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 52. See *Iliad*, XV, 656-7.
4. *Iliad.*, X, 238. *Odyssey*, III, 24, 96.
5. See Jaeger, W., **Paideia**, de Gruyter, 1973, pp. 29, 32.
6. Snell, B., **Die Entdeckung des Geistes**, Gottingen, 1975, p. 162. Cf. Adkins, A., **Merit and Responsibility**, Chicago, 1960/rep. 1975, p.43. Clauss, D.B., "Aidos in the Language of Achilles", **Tapha**, 105, 1975, pp.13-28.
7. Hesiod, **Works and Days**, 317-32 and *passim*.
8. Sinclair, I.A., **Hesiod, Works and Days**, London, 1932, p. 35. The problem in Hesiod is also discussed by a) Hoekstra, A., "Hésiode, les travaux et les jours", **Mnemos**, 5.4, III, 1950, pp. 99-106; b) McKay, K., Ambivalent ΑΙΔΩΣ in Hesiod, **Ajph**, 84, 1963, pp. 17-29 (McKay gives a social economical interpretation in the word ΑΙΔΩΣ by Hesiod); c) Livrea Enrico, Applicazioni della Begriffsspaltung negli Erga (αἰδώς, θάρσος, νέμεσις, ζήλος), **Helikon**, 7, 1967, 81-100.
9. See Astius, F., **Lexikon Platonicum**, Bonn, 1956 (Lipsiae 1835), vol. 1, p.50.

10. Plato, **Protag.** 322a-b. See analysis of Kerfed, G., **JHS** 73 (1953), 42-45 and Miller, C.L., "The Prometheus Story in Plato's Protagoras", **Journal of Political Philosophy**, 7.2, 1978, 22-32.
11. Democritus, Frgs B179, B264.
12. Dellis, J., **The Problem of Ethical Conscience in Democritus**, Doct. Dissert. (In modern Greek with Summary in English), pp. 108-123.
13. **Symposium** 8, 35: Θεάν γαρ ου την αναίδειαν αλλά την αιδώ νομίζουνσι (for the goddess they worship is not Imprudence but Modesty).
14. 3, 20, 10: το δε άγαλμα της αιδούς ... (the statue of Modesty, some thirty stades distant...) See Soph. **O.K.** 1267 and 1381: αλλά έστι γαρ και Ζηνί σύνθακος θρόνων αιδώς επ' έργοις πάσιν.
15. Thucyd. I, 84, 3: "Indeed, it is because of our orderly temper that we are brave in war and wise in counsel, brave in war, because self-control is chief element is self-respect, and respect of self, in turn, is the chief element in courage; and wise in counsel, because we are educated too rudely..."
16. **Moralia: Ancient customs of the Spartans**, 4, vol. III, p. 428 (ed. Loeb, transl. F. Babbitt): "All their education was directed toward prompt obedience to authority, stout endurance of hardship, and victory of death in battle". Cf. Plut. **Life of Lycurgus**, ch. XVI.
17. Thucyd., V, 9, 9: "...and bear in mind that the three virtues of a good soldier are real, sense of honour, and obedience to his leaders".
18. *Op. cit.*, p. 430: "Moreover, the young men were required not only to respect their own fathers and to obedient to them, but to have regard for all the older men, to make room for them on the streets, to give up their seats to them, and to keep quiet in their presence". Cf. **Diog. Laert.**, V, Plato **Rep.**, 465a-b.
19. **Life of Agesilaus**, 2: "... that he did whatever was enjoined upon him not at all from a sense of fear, but always from a sense of honour, and was more distressed by censure that he was oppressed by hardships...". Thucydides does not make a distinction between αιδώς and αισχύνη. He considers the words synonymous.

20. **R.L.** II, 14: "...which system turns out men obedient, more respectful, and more strictly temperate..."

21. **R.L.** II, 14: "This had the effect of making the boys more respectful; in fact boys and men respect their rulers above everything".

22. For this E. Barker (**Greek Political Theory**, London, Methuen, 1970, p.40) writes: "...that the Greek state was regarded by the philosophers as an ethical society; and if we push that point of view further, we shall see that the state is necessarily a community in a common spiritual substance, and that the activity of its organs is necessity and activity of education... society is an educational institution..." .

23. Arist., **E. N.**, B1 1103b3-4: "οι γαρ νομοθέται ους πολίτας εθίζοντες ποιούσιν αγαθούς" (by getting them accustomed, the legislators make the citizens good).

24. See Xenophon, **R.L.** VIII, 1: "...ότι μεν εν Σπάρτη μάλιστα πείθονται ταις αρχαίς τε και τοις νόμοις, ίσμεν άπαντες" (everyone knows that in Sparta the citizens obey the authority and the laws).

25. **Moralia**, *op. cit.*, p. 438: "Whosoever of the citizens would not submit to the discipline (*agôgê*) to which the boys were subjected has no participation in civic rights".

26. See Plato, **Charm.** 161b.

27. **Charm.** 161d.: "...temperance is doing one's own business".

28. See Plato's **Rep.** 389d-e and **Laws** 696b-e.

29. Plato **Charm.** 164d: "...for I would almost say that this very thing, self-knowledge, is temperance".

30. Plato's **Tim.** 72a. See Eliza Gr. Wilkins, **Know Thyself in Greek and Latin Literature**, Chicago, 1917 repr. 1979 ed. L. Taran, Garl. Publ. London, pp. 33-40.

31. **R.L.** III, 4: "Moreover, wishing modesty to be firmly rooted in them..." .

32. Lenz, F. W., "ΕΘΟΣ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΗΣ ΦΥΣΙΣ", **Tapha**, 73, 1942, 214-231.

33. **R.L.** III, 5: "At any rate you would expect a stone image to utter a sound sooner than those lads; you would sooner attract the attention of a bronze figure".

34. 159b: "...but presently he said that, to his mind, temperance was doing everything orderly and quitly walking in the streets, talking, and doing everything else of that kind".

35. **Areop.** 48: "ὥστε εἰ καὶ ποτε διελθεῖν ἀναγκασθεῖεν, μετὰ πολλῆς αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης εἰσφαίνοντο ποιοῦντες" ("and so strictly did they avoid the market-place that even when they were at times compelled to pass through it, they were seen to do this great modesty and sobriety of manner".)

36. **Nub.**, 961-964, 993-994.

CHRONOLOGIE-CHYPRE

(1er décembre 1998 - 31 mars 1999)

6 décembre: Élections législatives en zone occupée de Chypre ("République turque de Chypre nord"). Ervis Eroglu "Premier ministre" sortant forme un nouveau gouvernement.

29 décembre: Le Président Clérides annonce que Chypre renonce à déployer sur son territoire les missiles S-300 achetés à la Russie. A la suite de cette décision, le parti socialiste EDEK retire ses deux ministres (Défense nationale et Éducation nationale) du gouvernement.

17 janvier: Le ministre turc des Affaires étrangères Ismail Cem déclare soutenir la proposition de Rauf Denktash de constitution à Chypre d'une Confédération formée de deux États souverains.

1er février : Condamnation à 3 ans de prison de deux agents israéliens arrêtés à Chypre le 7 novembre 1999 et accusés d'espionnage.

2 février: Visite à Chypre du Commissaire européen Hans Van Der Brook qui affirme qu'il y a des progrès dans le processus d'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE.

8 février: Les ministres de la Défense nationale de Grèce et de Chypre annoncent la signature d'un accord sur le déploiement des missiles russes S-300 sur le territoire de la Crète.

17 février: Rencontre à Washington entre le ministre chypriote des Affaires étrangères, Ioannis Kassoulidès et le Secrétaire d'État américain, Madeleine Albright qui déclare que "les États Unis soutiennent fermement les efforts des Nations Unies visant à une solution basée sur une fédération bizonale et bicommunautaire".

25 février: Le Président Cléridès dément la présence à Chypre de camps d'entraînement du PKK et invite les pays européens à vérifier ce fait sur place.

17 mars: Le porte parole du ministère russe des Affaires étrangères, Vladimir Rachmanine condamne l'intention affichée par Rauf Denktash de procéder progressivement au peuplement de Famagouste, ville vide d'habitants depuis l'intervention militaire turque de l'été 1974.

22 mars: Remaniement ministériel suite à la démission du porte parole du gouvernement et du ministre de l'intérieur. Sont nommés: Takis Cléridès, ministre de l'Économie et des finances, Christodoulos Christodoulou, ministre de l'Intérieur et Costas Serezis, porte parole du gouvernement.

CHRONOLOGIE GRÈCE

(1er décembre 1998 - 31 mars 1999)

1er décembre: Avis du Conseil des ministres de l'Union européenne qui constate avec satisfaction que le programme de désinflation et d'assainissement budgétaire mis en place par Athènes devrait permettre à la Grèce de participer pleinement à la zone euro à compter du 1er janvier 2001.

4 décembre: Communiqué du ministère turc des affaires étrangères qui estime que la déclaration en date du 2 décembre du Ministre grec de la défense nationale, Akis Tsohatzopoulos, selon laquelle l'espace aérien grec de la mer Egée serait protégé au cours de l'année à venir par des missiles de courte et longue portée constitue une nouvelle manifestation du rêve grec de faire de cette mer un "lac grec".

21 décembre: Le Parlement grec adopte le projet de budget 1999 proposé par le gouvernement Simitis et dont l'exécution devrait permettre à la Grèce de rejoindre la zone euro le 1er janvier 2001. Ce budget dont le déficit prévu est limité à 1,9% du PIB table sur une croissance de 3,7%.

26 janvier: Publication d'un rapport de l'état-major turc dans lequel il est affirmé que l'extension des eaux territoriales grecques au delà de 6 milles serait "inacceptable". La Grèce est aussi accusée dans ce rapport d'armer, en contradiction avec les traités internationaux, les îles de la mer Egée, et de soutenir le mouvement kurde du PKK.

29 janvier: Dans un débat au Parlement grec, le ministre des affaires étrangères Théodoros Pangalos déclare que la commande par le gouvernement chypriote des missiles russes S-300 a constitué une erreur.

15 février: Arrestation au Kenya du chef du PKK, Abdullah Ocalan qui avait trouvé refuge à l'Ambassade de Grèce.

17 février: Le Parlement grec ratifie le traité d'Amsterdam par 246 voix (PASOK et Nouvelle démocratie) contre 19 (KKE et DIKKI) et 9 abstentions (Coalition de gauche).

19 février: Remaniement ministériel après la démission provoquée par l'affaire Ocalan des ministres des Affaires étrangères, de l'Intérieur et de l'Ordre public. Georges Papandréou devient ministre des affaires étrangères, Vasso Papandréou est nommée ministre de l'Intérieur et cède son ministère du Développement à Evangelos Vénizelos.

19-21 mars: Vème Congrès du PASOK à la présidence duquel est réélu Costas Simitis par 3723 voix, 1708 bulletins blancs et 235 abstentions.

24 mars: Bien que membre de l'OTAN la Grèce ne participe pas aux frappes aériennes contre la Yougoslavie décidées suite à l'échec des négociations sur le statut du Kosovo.

Livres reçus / Books received

Other Landscapes: Greek Language Poetry from Australia and Canada, Edited by Eleni Nikas and Stephanos Constantinides, Owl Publishing, La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia (in greek).

Paysages étrangers, Anthologie de poésie grecque d'Australie et du Canada, sous la direction de Eleni Nikas et Stephanos Constantinides, Owl Publishing, La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia (en grec).

Activités académiques/Academic Activities

Troisième Congrès international des instituts de recherche sur l'hellénisme

Le Troisième Congrès international des instituts de recherche sur l'hellénisme aura lieu à Montréal du 28 au 31 mai 1999. Le Congrès est organisé par le KEEK qui exerce actuellement la présidence du Comité coordinateur des instituts de recherche sur l'hellénisme. Y participeront des universitaires et des chercheurs venant de divers pays. Le Congrès s'articulera autour du thème "L'hellénisme à l'aube de l'an 2000".

Congrès sur "La justice, les vertus et la citoyenneté"

Du 25 avril au 7 mai, le Professeur J. Philippoussis, membre du Conseil d'administration du KEEK, a participé au Congrès (organisé par la Société de Philosophie grecque et des humanités de l'Afrique du Sud à l'Université de Prétoria) sur "La justice, les vertus et la citoyenneté". Sa communication portait sur ces notions chez Périclès.

Third International Conference of the Research Institutes on Hellenism

The Third International Conference of the Research Institutes on Hellenism will take place in Montreal, May 28-31, 1999. The Conference is organized by KEEK which holds the Presidency of the Coordinating Committee of the Research Institutes on Hellenism. Academics and researchers coming from different countries will take part in this Conference which will be on the main theme of "Hellenism in the Twenty-First Century".

Conference on "Justice, Virtues and Citizenship"

Prof. J. Philippoussis, member of the Board of Directors of KEEK, attended a Conference (April 25-May 7) organized by the South African Society for Greek Philosophy and the Humanities at the University of Pretoria on "Justice, Virtues and Citizenship" and he presented a Paper on "The Periclean notions of Justice, Excellence and Citizenship".

ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΕΡΕΥΝΗΤΙΚΩΝ ΙΔΡΥΜΑΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ
ΠΡΟΕΔΡΙΑ
COMITÉ DE COORDINATION DES INSTITUTS HELLÉNIQUES DE RECHERCHE
PRÉSIDENCE

**TROISIÈME CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES
INSTITUTS HELLÉNIQUES DE RECHERCHE**

L'HELLÉNISME AU 21^e SIÈCLE

C'est avec fierté que le Centre de recherches helléniques Canada (KEEK) annonce la tenue du Troisième Congrès international des Instituts helléniques de recherche qui aura lieu à Montréal, du 28 au 31 mai 1999. Le KEEK assume actuellement la présidence du Comité de coordination des Instituts helléniques de recherche (ΣΕΕΙΕ) et organise ce congrès. Le ΣΕΕΙΕ comprend 11 Instituts de recherche (six de la Grèce, un de Chypre et quatre de la diaspora).

Le thème principal du congrès est «l'Hellénisme au 21^e siècle», et comprendra trois sous-thèmes spécifiques, soit:

1. Les relations internationales de la Grèce (avec référence à Chypre et à la diaspora);
2. La modernisation: la Grèce au 21^e siècle
(politique, économie, administration, éducation, culture);
3. Immigration, émigration, éducation, multiculturalisme, relations interculturelles, etc.
(Grèce, Chypre, diaspora);

Des chercheurs des quatre coins du monde y prendront part. Le comité organisateur est déjà très avancé dans la préparation de cet important congrès.

Votre aide est cependant la bienvenue.

Paris Arnopoulos
Président du congrès

Stephanos Constantinides
Directeur du Centre de recherches helléniques Canada (KEEK)
Président du Comité de coordination des Instituts
helléniques de recherche (ΣΕΕΙΕ)

Yiannis Philippoussis
Responsable de la programmation du congrès

ΣΕΕΙΕ
'99

ΚΕΕΚ

ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΕΡΕΥΝΗΤΙΚΩΝ ΙΔΡΥΜΑΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ
ΠΡΟΕΔΡΙΑ
COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF RESEARCH INSTITUTES OF HELLENISM
PRESIDENCY

**THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF HELLENIC RESEARCH INSTITUTES**

Hellenism in the Twenty-First Century

Montreal, Quebec, Canada

The Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research-Canada (KEEK) proudly announces the Third International Conference of Hellenic Research Institutes to be held in Montreal, May 28-31, 1999.

KEEK is the current chair of the Coordinating Committee of the Hellenic Research Institutes (SEEIE) and organizer of the Conference. The SEEIE is comprised of 11 Research Institutes (six in Greece, one in Cyprus and four in the Diaspora).

The main theme of the Conference, Hellenism in the Twenty-First Century, will include three specific thematic issues:

1. International relations of Greece (with reference to Cyprus and to the Greek Diaspora);
2. Modernization: Greece in the 21st century (politics, economy, administration, education, culture, etc);
3. Migration, education, multiculturalism, inter-cultural relations etc. (Greece, Cyprus, Diaspora).

Researchers from around the world will be attending. In order to prepare this important Conference, the organizing Committee is already active.
Your help, however, is most welcome.

Paris Arnopoulos, *Conference President*
Stephanos Constantinides, *Centre Director and SEEIE president*
Yannis Philippoussis, *Program Chairman*

ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΕΡΕΥΝΗΤΙΚΩΝ ΙΔΡΥΜΑΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ
ΠΡΟΕΔΡΙΑ
COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF RESEARCH INSTITUTES OF HELLENISM
PRESIDENCY

1. Le Comité de coordination des Instituts helléniques de recherche (ΣΕΕΙΕ) a été fondé en 1994 par les centres de recherche suivants :

- Centre de recherches helléniques Canada (KEEK), Montréal, Toronto, Canada
- B. B. Vryonis Centre for the Study of Hellenism, Sacramento, États-Unis
- Hellenic Studies Forum, Melbourne, Australie
- Groupe de recherches sur la diaspora hellénique, Université de la Sorbonne, Paris, France
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athènes, Grèce
- Greek Centre of European Studies (EKEM), Athènes, Grèce
- Research & Policy Strategy Institute (INERPOST), Athènes, Grèce
- Panteion University International Relations Institute (IDIS), Athènes, Grèce
- Research Centre of Balkan Peninsula (IMXA), Salonique, Grèce
- Mediterranean Studies Institute, Athènes, Grèce
- Cyprus Research Centre (KYKEM), Chypre.

2. Les principaux objectifs du SEEIE sont :

- de coordonner les membres du SEEIE et d'encourager la coopération dans les domaines reliés à l'hellénisme et ce, par la réalisation de recherches scientifiques, la collecte et l'élaboration d'une documentation s'y rattachant;
- de créer un fichier permanent et de mettre en valeur le potentiel académique de l'hellénisme au niveau international;
- de concevoir, de planifier et de réaliser des programmes de recherche conjoints, des séminaires et des conférences;
- de publier des études conjointes, des monographies, des livres, des revues ainsi que les rapports de conférences;
- d'étudier les thèmes d'intérêt commun pour les communautés grecques du monde entier;
- d'élaborer une stratégie de mobilisation des Grecs de la diaspora afin de promouvoir et de renforcer l'identité et la dimension culturelle de l'hellénisme sur la scène internationale;
- d'encourager la création d'un réseau électronique et l'usage des nouvelles technologies chez les chercheurs;
- d'encourager la coopération avec les pays où se trouve la diaspora hellénique;

3. Les organes du SEEIE sont :

- l'Assemblée des membres
- la Présidence
- le Secrétariat.

ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΕΡΕΥΝΗΤΙΚΩΝ ΙΔΡΥΜΑΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ
ΠΡΟΕΔΡΙΑ
COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF RESEARCH INSTITUTES OF HELLENISM
PRESIDENCY

1.The Coordinating Committee of Research Institutes of Hellenism-ΣΕΕΙΕ was founded in 1994 by the following Research Centres:

- Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research-Canada (KEEK), Montreal Toronto, Canada
- B.B.Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism, Sacramento, Usa
Hellenic Studies Forum, Melbourne, Australia
- Group for Study of Greeks Abroad, Sorbonne University, Paris, France
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, Greece
- Greek Centre of European Studies (EKEM), Athens, Greece
- Research and Policy Strategy Institute (INERPOST), Athens, Greece
- Panteion University International Relations Institute (IDIS), Athens, Greece
- Research Centre of Balkan Peninsula (IMXA), Salonika, Greece
- Mediterranean Studies Institute (IMM), Athens Greece
- Cyprus Research Center (KYKEM), Cyprus

2. The main goals of the SEEIE are:

- to coordinate SEEIE members and encourage cooperation in matters related to Hellenism through scientific research and documentation;
- to record and evaluate the academic and research potential of Hellenism at the international level;
- to design and carry out joint research programs, seminars and conferences;
- to publish joint studies, monographs, essays, reviews as well as conference proceedings;
- to study themes of common interest to Greek communities around the world and of Hellenism in general;
- to formulate strategic proposals and motions for the mobilization of Greeks abroad in order to propound and strengthen the identity and the cultural dimension of Hellenism in the international scene;
- to encourage electronic networking and the use of modern technology among researchers on issues concerning Hellenism.

3. The administrative structure and function of SEEIE:

- Member Assembly
- Presidency
- Secretariat.

ADVICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Three copies of all manuscripts, typewritten on computer, double-spaced should be submitted on paper and disk. Manuscripts should follow the APA Manual, or the MLA Style Sheet or be consistent with practice in the discipline of each particular author.

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