

ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

Jean Catsiapis

Les élections législatives grecques

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*Economic Stability in Balkans
The Role of Greece*

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LES ÉLECTIONS LÉGISLATIVES GRECQUES DU 9 AVRIL 2000

Jean Catsiapis *

ABSTRACT

Greece's PASOK (pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement), governed from 1981 to 1989, was returned to office in 1993 and 1996. The party won the April 9 elections after a close race. This last victory is primarily that of Prime Minister Costas Simitis, who took over from Andreas Papandreou, as head of government in January 1996 and as leader of PASOK in June 1996. What follows is a succinct review of the April elections including the campaign, voting patterns and expectations of the Greek People.

RÉSUMÉ

Revenu au gouvernement en 1993, après avoir exercé le pouvoir de 1981 à 1989, le Pasok (Mouvement socialiste pan-hellénique) déjà vainqueur des élections législatives du 22 septembre 1996, remporte à l'issue d'une campagne électorale très serrée, le scrutin du 9 avril 2000. Mais cette dernière victoire est surtout celle du Premier ministre Costas Simitis, qui succède à Andréas Papandréou à la tête du gouvernement en janvier 1996, puis à celle du Pasok au mois de juin suivant.

La dissolution du Parlement

À la fin de l'année 1999 les rumeurs de dissolution anticipée du Parlement allaient bon train à Athènes. En effet le mandat de ce Parlement arrivait à expiration à l'automne 2000 et le gouvernement Simitis souhaitait être en position forte, c'est à dire avec une confiance du peuple renouvelée au moment où il allait, cette année-ci, demander que la Grèce puisse adhérer à la zone euro. De plus l'élection du président de la République, prévue pour le mois de février risquait de déboucher aussi sur la dissolution du Parlement. En effet, la Constitution hellénique dispose qu'en cas d'impossibilité d'élection du chef de l'État au troisième tour de scrutin à la majorité des trois cinquièmes des députés (la majorité des deux tiers est exigée aux deux premiers tours) le Parlement est automatiquement dissous. Or comme le président, Costis Stéphanopoulos, candidat soutenu par le Pasok se heurtait au cours du dernier trimestre 1999 à des réticences de la part

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de la Nouvelle démocratie (NI), le grand parti de l'opposition de droite, il semblait inévitable que le gouvernement en soit réduit à provoquer des élections anticipées faute de pouvoir réunir la majorité requise pour obtenir l'élection du chef de l'État.

Finalement Constantin Caramanlis, le président de la ND, compte tenu de la grande popularité dont jouissait dans l'opinion publique, selon les sondages, le président Stéphanopoulos, décide de faire voter son parti en faveur de celui-ci. Le 8 février 2000, le chef de l'État, âgé de 74 ans, est ainsi réélu dès le premier tour de scrutin à une écrasante majorité, obtenant 269 voix sur 300, en rassemblant sur son nom les voix des députés du Pasok et de la ND. A cette élection présidentielle, Léonidas Kyrkos, le candidat du Synaspismos (Coalition de la gauche et du progrès) a obtenu dix voix, les députés du KKE (communiste) et de DIKKI (gauche populiste) ne participant pas de façon volontaire, au scrutin.

Dès la réélection du président Stéphanopoulos, le Premier ministre, invoquant notamment la prochaine candidature de la Grèce à faire partie de la zone euro, qui, sera rendue officielle, le 9 mars, annonce la dissolution du Parlement et la tenue des élections législatives pour le 9 avril.

La campagne électorale

La campagne électorale, très brève, n'a pas été l'occasion de débats passionnés. La politique étrangère, compte tenu du rapprochement gréco-turc, approuvé globalement par le Pasok et la ND, a été mise à l'écart des controverses opposant ces deux partis, qui, ont l'un et l'autre concentré leurs efforts de propagande sur les domaines économique et social.

La ND, avec son slogan "Il existe une Grèce meilleure et nous la voulons" a essentiellement promis aux électeurs une économie débarrassée de toutes contraintes et dominée par les principes du libéralisme. Constantin Caramanlis a aussi fait savoir que si son parti remportait les élections, aucune retraite n'aurait un montant inférieur à 150 000 drachmes par mois (soit environ 3000 francs français). Le

Pasok, de son côté a présenté un programme à coloration très fortement sociale pour faire oublier les quatre années de rigueur économique imposées par Costas Simitis depuis sa désignation au poste de Premier ministre. Ainsi a-t-il promis de créer 300 000 emplois dans la période 2000-2004, pour faire face au problème du chômage qui en 1999, était de l'ordre de 10,5% de la population active. Le Pasok a aussi pris l'engagement, que le niveau de vie des Grecs, l'un des plus faibles de l'Union européenne atteindrait en 2004, grâce au développement de l'économie nationale, les quatre cinquièmes de celui de la moyenne de l'Europe des 15.

Pour renforcer leurs chances de succès, le Pasok et la ND ont élargi leur assise électorale en faisant figurer sur leurs listes de candidats des personnalités extérieures à leurs formations. Costas Simitis a ainsi convaincu Vassilis Kontoyannopoulos, un ancien ministre de la ND, d'être candidat à Athènes sous les couleurs du Pasok. Et Constantin Caramanlis dans sa tentative de ramener à la ND plusieurs personnalités politiques, qui l'avaient quittée, a réussi à faire alliance avec Stéphanos Manos, fondateur de la formation I Filelefteri (Parti des Libéraux).

Les petits partis politiques ont dénoncé au cours de la campagne électorale la bipolarité de la vie politique et proposé en vain que pour les élections du 9 avril la représentation proportionnelle simple soit appliquée¹. Trop faible, le parti du Printemps politique (droite nationaliste) ne s'est pas présenté aux élections, son chef Antonis Samaras, appelant à voter pour Constantin Caramanlis. Les petites formations de gauche (KKE, Synaspismos et DIKKI) ont, comme à leur habitude, appelé les électeurs à les aider à atteindre la barre des 3%, seuil indispensable à franchir pour disposer d'une représentation parlementaire.

L'analyse des résultats

Le vote est obligatoire en Grèce, et l'abstention, a été de 25,03% c'est à dire d'un niveau comparable à celle enregistrée lors des élections législatives de 1996, qui a été de 23,65%.

Le premier enseignement des élections du 9 avril 2000 est d'observer que le Pasok, qui devance la ND de seulement un pour cent des suffrages exprimés, (43,79% contre 42,73%) obtient 158 sièges sur 300, ce qui prouve que le mode de scrutin de ces élections permet au parti vainqueur de disposer de la majorité absolue au Parlement pour pouvoir gouverner.

La deuxième leçon à tirer de ces élections concerne la bipolarisation de la vie politique. En effet depuis une vingtaine d'années le combat électoral en Grèce oppose seulement deux partis, le Pasok et la ND, qui à eux deux réunissent les trois quarts des suffrages (79,62% en 1996, 86,52% en 2000).

Résultats des élections législatives du 9 avril 2000

Partis	%		sièges	
	1996	2000	1996	2000
PASOK	41,49	43,79	170	158
Nouvelle Démocratie	38,12	42,73	111	125
KKE	5,61	5,53	11	11
Synaspismos	5,12	3,20	10	6
DIKKI	4,43	2,69	9	-

Il faut aussi noter le recul des petits partis : les communistes du KKE avec un score de 5,53% légèrement inférieur à celui obtenu en 1996 maintiennent un groupe parlementaire fort de 11 députés, le Synaspismos subit un échec certain en ne recueillant que 3,20% des

voix mais sauve sa représentation parlementaire, et le parti DIKKI, est exclu du Parlement avec seulement 2,69% des suffrages exprimés.

On doit enfin remarquer que les partis pro-européens représentent une majorité écrasante du corps électoral alors que les formations politiques très hostiles à la construction européenne comme le KKE et le DIKKI sont ultra minoritaires. Au total si Simitis voit sa position renforcée, Caramanlis, qui au cours de la campagne électorale a su recentrer la ND en s'éloignant des positions d'une droite dure parfois prônée dans le passé par son parti, a réussi à faire progresser la formation qu'il dirige de 4,5% d'une élection à une autre, ce qui constitue pour lui un succès indéniable.

Le nouveau gouvernement

Formé au lendemain des élections du 9 avril 2000, Costas Simitis a formé un nouveau gouvernement, qu'il marque profondément de son empreinte. D'abord il décide de ne pas reprendre au gouvernement des hommes comme Gérassimos Arsénis, qui, élu avec difficulté, s'est rendu impopulaire avec sa réforme de l'éducation nationale, ou comme Evangelos Vénizélos dont l'ambition ouverte est de devenir lui-même Premier ministre à sa place.

Le nouveau gouvernement se caractérise, d'une part, par le maintien de ministres de grande expérience à des postes clés et d'autre part le retour d'hommes politiques écartés du pouvoir en 1999.

Sont ainsi maintenus à l'important ministère de l'Economie nationale et des Finances, Yannis Papantoniou dont l'action efficace a permis à la Grèce de poser sa candidature à la zone de l'euro, et à la tête de la diplomatie hellénique Georges Papandréou, l'artisan du rapprochement gréco-turc. Les ministres contraints à la démission en février 1999 en raison de l'affaire Ocalan font partie à nouveau du gouvernement comme Théodore Pangalos, qui s'est vu offrir le ministère de la Culture.

La féminisation certaine du Parlement grec qui s'est produite aux élections législatives du 9 avril 2000 avec 31 élues contre 17 en 1996

ne se retrouve pas dans le nouveau gouvernement où il y a 36 hommes et seulement 5 femmes. Au cours de son prochain mandat le Gouvernement Simitis doit mettre l'accent à la fois sur la modernisation du pays et sur les réformes sociales. Après l'austérité économique, qui leur a été imposée pendant de longues années, les Grecs aspirent à vivre dans un État attentif à leurs problèmes quotidiens. Ils ne veulent plus être des citoyens de seconde zone et veulent bénéficier de la même qualité de vie que celle dont jouissent les autres Européens.

NOTES

1. La représentation proportionnelle renforcée, qui favorise le parti arrivé en tête, a été utilisée pour les élections législatives du 9 avril 2000, comme elle l'avait déjà été lors des consultations précédentes.

ECONOMIC STABILITY IN BALKANS THE ROLE OF GREECE**

Kostas Vergopoulos *

RÉSUMÉ

Selon une loi bien établie de la géopolitique, l'Europe demeure obsédée par les intensités et les vagues d'incertitude que balayent le continent du nord au sud et de l'est vers l'ouest. Comparativement au sud du continent, la stabilité connue dans l'Europe du nord continue de façon exemplaire et imbattable. On pourrait en dire autant de la relation entre l'est et l'ouest européens. Autre fait reconnu, en tant que plaque tournante d'influences géopolitiques explosives, les Balkans sont devenus « le creuset » de l'Europe.

Le sud-est de l'Europe se trouve dans le mille, situé entre deux sources permanentes d'influence déstabilisatrices. La première, à l'est de la Méditerranée, se résume dans la question sempiternelle du Moyen Orient. La deuxième vient du nord, de la région que forment les Balkans et la Turquie. Ce survol rapide examine la stabilité dans les Balkans et le rôle géopolitique que détient la Grèce.

ABSTRACT

According to certain well-established laws of geopolitics, the European continent has long been obsessed by intensities and waves of uncertainty that moved from east to west and north to south. Stability in Northern Europe when compared to Southern Europe continues to be exemplary and unsurpassable. The same applies to the west of the continent, in comparison to the east. It is also well known that the Balkans, as the crossroads of explosive geopolitical influences, have become the 'boiling pot' of Europe. Southeastern Europe sits exactly in the eye of the storm, situated between two destabilizing influences and running through Europe from south and the east. Two sub-areas of that region are permanent sources of disruption. The first, to the east of the Mediterranean, is the long lasting and unresolvable Middle Eastern issue between Israel and neighbouring Arab populations. The second, to the north of the eastern Mediterranean, is formed by the Balkans and Turkey. This brief review introduces an examination of Balkan stability and Greece's geopolitical role.

Historical, geographic, geopolitical and cultural reasons have created a high degree of variety in the Balkans. Evidence of this variety lies in the multiplication and the expansion of national and "subnational" incidents. The area has always been considered as explosive because of

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these high degrees of variety. They are, therefore, difficult to stabilize and to incorporate, politically and economically, into the international system. Exterior influencing factors further complicate the problem of stability in the area.

In the recent past, instability in South - Eastern Europe intensified as a result of competition among powers on the local level and ignorance of the issues concerning the area, an ignorance that has always characterized their policies. In short, the instability in the South - Eastern area of Europe, springs from the exceptionally high level of cultural variety that characterizes the area while being reinforced in parallel by the intervention of the strong Western powers, who are antagonistic against each other and use unacceptable methods.

In conclusion, the Southern - Eastern strip of Europe constitutes the regional 'grey zone of Continental Europe and, in this respect, can historically be termed the "boiling pot" [rather than the traditional term 'powder keg'] whether we are referring to the Eastern Mediterranean or the Balkans.

Within this context, the Ex-Warsaw Pact operated as a mechanism, even though disputable and undoubtedly, unacceptable. It was nevertheless coercive and it gave stability to the whole area. Today, many more geopolitical problems of a destabilising nature have arisen in the area in comparison to the period when the Soviet Bloc was both active and threatening to the West.

Despite general disorder and lawlessness in the area combined with a major increase in insecurity and in political, economical and social instability, there is one country that has proved to be the only benchmark for the Balkans. That country is Greece.

Given the usual limits of time and space, I have no intention of treating matters dealing with the historical and cultural heritage of Greece, whether it concerns the world, Europe, or the specific area of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. I will instead concentrate on the current situation, the immediate prospects, taking into consideration objective and measurable evidence.

Of all the Eastern Mediterranean countries, Greece is the only full member of two European organisations, the European Union and the West European Union. Whether we like it or not, the aforementioned organizations are considered to be references of quality and an example of economic and social prosperity in the whole area for the up-and-coming classes of the Balkan countries. Likewise, Greece is the only country in the area that is both a member of the European Union and the West European Union, and also already participates in NATO's mechanism as a full member. NATO, too, is considered, whether we like it or not, a reference when it comes to defence and security. In other words, Greece in a way constitutes the "ideal" cross-road, where Europe's expectations for stability lie alongside the equivalent expectations for the rising classes of the Balkan countries and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The historical struggle for freedom of the Greek people in the recent past (19th and 20th century) has contributed to making this country into the symbol of many intangibles including democracy, human rights, self-determination of peoples and nations, minority rights and freedoms and a peaceful *modus vivendi*.

For Victor Hugo, Clemenceau, Churchill and De Gaulle, Greece was always the mother of freedom for nations and individuals. It has never been a symbol of repression. This reputation can explain the reservoir of cultural sympathy that Greece enjoys, not only in the West, but also in Arab and other Balkan countries. Indeed the peoples of these countries are charmed by this vision of prosperity, progress, freedom and dignity.

The ability to penetrate mentalities and unexpected cultural situations is of great importance for anyone on a mission of economic and political stabilization in an area with so many special characteristics. Furthermore, let me add, that in the Greek educational system reference to the term *hellenism* has always referred to a cultural dimension without any nuances of statism, nationalism or racism.

Greece, therefore, appears as the only ground on which any stabilizing effort of the Balkans can be based, whether we refer to econo-

mics, culture or even defence. This prospect is greatly enhanced by the position, demands and expectations of the other nationalities in the area. Today, after the fall of communism, all types of territorial claims (annexions, secessions, unions etc.) have cropped up and they entail rapid and violent changes of existing borders. In the context of the current storm threatening the traditional borders of the area and contesting the International Agreements in effect, Greece seems to be the only beacon of stability even if only because it has no territorial claims over any other country whatsoever. On the contrary, Greece, supported by Europe, can act as a herald, maintaining the local status quo of the borders for the whole area.

European companies have already formed joint-ventures with their Greek counterparts and intend to develop in the Balkan area. Given the economic and social advantages generated for South Eastern Europe alone and in a state of international competition, these joint-ventures are multiplying rapidly.

According to both historians and researchers in Balkan geopolitics, notably Jacques Ancel, Nicolai Iorga, Leften Stavrianos and Trajan Stoianovich, Greek has always been synonymous with merchant, hence the carrier of a lifestyle, language and education. It has never been synonymous with *conqueror*, *oppressor* or *inspector*.

The Greek economy has for decades now committed itself to participating in the development of the European Union. The Greek economy continues to remain open to foreign economies and especially to the economies of its European partners. Greece is definitely focused on Europe, given that 70% of its foreign trade is conducted with countries of the European Union. Furthermore, Greece remains a Mediterranean country, given that 50% of its trade within the European Union is carried out with countries of Southern Europe, namely Italy, France, Spain and Portugal.

Moreover, over the past years Greece's relationships with Eastern European countries have been developing swiftly, if one takes into account that these countries absorb 20% of Greece's foreign trade.

Generally speaking, we could say that the Greek economy remains extroverted, even to a point where one should worry, given that total exports allow the country to cover only one-third of its imports. The fact that the Greek economy remains extroverted, even though it has prolonged trade balance sheet deficits, may be explained through the country's highly positive balance of invisible revenues.

Greece recursively receives European transfers from the EU budget. These transfers equal up to 5% of the Greek Gross National Product (GNP). A second source of invisible revenue is Greece's tourist economy, which expects more than 10 million tourists annually and ensures an income that covers approximately 25% of Greek imports. The third source of invisible income is the remittances of Greek immigrants who work overseas. The fourth source of invisible revenue is the commercial fleet transfers, which, as we know, control 7.7% of world - wide tonnage and 52.4% of the European. The nature of these four sources of invisible inflows shows that Greece is deeply incorporated in the international economy, but especially in the European economy. Greece's income in foreign currency and Greek prosperity have kept pace with the European equivalents or rates. The relationships between Greece and the European Union are no longer antithetical, as in the past; instead they are complementary as they move together in a positive direction. This can be seen from formal figures stating Greece's foreign currency reserves, which over the past years have been developing at such great speeds, that the Greek economy is considered to be one of the most solvent when compared to the economies of the 28 countries-members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Indeed, despite its trade deficit, Greece currently has the highest foreign exchange reserves of the 28 OECD countries, in comparison to its GNP and imports. This explains why the Greek currency, the Drachma, has in fact proved much more stable and is actually used much more than the other Balkan currencies. The Drachma remains not only more stable but also more available, thus it is in a position to support local transactions. The fact that the currency meets this prerequisite institutes the Drachma as the benchmark currency for all

contracting parties inside or outside Greece. In other words, as a result of reality and necessity, there is a "Drachma Zone" for the Balkans.

As of 1994, all available evidence suggested that the Greek economy had repositioned itself with great speed within Europe and the world, despite a general atmosphere of predominant catastrophology, that is encouraged by different sources of power for political and ideological purposes. For the period 1990-94, the economic policies applied were restrictive; the results, disappointing. Intense restrictive income policy unavoidably led to the increase of public sector deficit and therefore to the expansion of public debt. Labour salaries were severely restricted, a measure that pushed the economy into a great recession instead of improving it. Growth rates decreased and foreign debt expanded extraordinarily. From 1994 onwards, economic policy has changed, if not theoretically and verbally, it has changed at least in practice. Even though restrictive income policies and requests for sacrifices remain formally announced policies, in practice applied economic policy has proved to be sensitive to pressure from workers and makes concessions that have not been programmed. The formal restrictive income and expenses policy is systematically broken by organized social groups, which, at the end of the day, transfer the load of restrictive policies to weaker income groups. In this way since 1994, Greece's economy has maintained high liquidity levels, which feed both consumption and savings. Even though the government repeatedly states that it intends to restrict the economy's liquidity, in fact liquidity has become inflated, because of the central bank's flexible policy towards commercial banks, which have increased credit to the economy and surpassed anticipated specifications. However, these specific circumstances have resulted in an economy converging towards *euro* criteria, without losing its vigour. In Europe, the reverse has happened, resulting in increased unemployment. Note that the Greek GNP from 1994 to 1998, increased by 3.5%, on average, while the rest of the EU economies increased by just 2.5%. Besides, the monetary convergence criteria for the entrance into the Single Market, as determined by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Agreements, have been reached by Greece in an exceptionally short timespan. The fairly high increase in

the Greek GNP brought about a fast balancing of the fundamental balance sheets of the national economy. The public deficit, which was 13.8% of GNP three years ago, has now been restricted to 2.7% of GNP. The current accounts balance sheet, which in 1994 presented a deficit equivalent to 4.7% of GNP, today (1999) has decreased to 2.3% of GNP. Inflation, which in 1993 was 14.4%, today has decreased to 2.5% and dragged along with it the decrease in interest rates and the cost of money. The systematic appearance of primary public surpluses has contributed to the de-escalation of public debt. Public debt has therefore substantially decreased as a percentage of GNP.

These developments come in contrast with the cultivated catastrophology, emanating from other sources of power, whose plans are to promote further sacrifices and restrictive income policies on the backs of the workers. In reality though, despite the nihilism and pretentious self-catastrophy of certain groups, Greek capitalism has actually shown remarkable ability for adaptation and reconstruction as it functions in connection with European capitalism. Furthermore, it is worth noting that convergence with the monetary indicators required for the entrance into the Single Market is occurring quickly mainly due to high growth rates and increases in the GNP. It is not due to restrictions and constraints as in the rest of Europe. In practice high growth rates of the Greek economy, characteristic of the Irish economy too, have made rapid convergence of monetary indicators possible. The Greek internal market has grown at a rate of 3.4% in the past years, while the equivalent European market has remained stagnant. Furthermore, capital formation in Greece has boosted at annual rate of 10% in volume in the past four years. As for real time labour salaries the course has also been uphill. For the period 1995-98 average salaries, in real terms, increased at an average annual rate of 3.42%. However, such an increase does not give us any information about the distribution of the increase among workers, which is positively detrimental for lower income levels. For the same period (1995-98), capital formation in the European Union boosted at an annual rate of just 2.4%, while real average salaries have increased at an annu-

al rate of 0 to 0.4%. On the other hand, even though internal demand in Greece has increased impressively, the savings rate of private sector, an important stabilizing factor of the Greek economy, reaches 20% of available private income and is one of the highest in Europe. Despite the confusion and the cunning attempt of certain groups in power to present a situation of poverty, figures suggest that Greece has already been incorporated into the new world economy and especially the European with great success. Naturally this achievement has nothing to do with the course and prospects of the European economy in itself. The fact that European unity has taken a course characterized by high risk and uncertain results does not mean that the Greek economy is not deeply connected to it. Greece is now synchronized with Europe, regardless of the fact that Europe has not yet determined its course, but instead is following a barren and self-destructive course giving exclusive priority or persistence to monetary conversion.

In any event, the fact that Greece is definitely connected to Europe and incorporated in the Union, may prove to be a vested interest of great importance for the rest of Balkans and of the Eastern Mediterranean. The same naturally stands for the interests of the European Union concerning this part of the continent. Modern Greece, even during the period it fought for the "Great Idea" (term applied to the Greek irrendistic expansion during the late 19th and early 20th century until 1922) always had the ambition to act as an intermediary between Western Europe and "our Near East". This vision has always appealed to the Greek upper class more than the vision of economic and social modernization. Today, aided by the events occurring in the Balkans, Greece has the impulsive tendency to respond as the local intermediary within the context of European reconstruction when it comes to the allotment of projects.

The services sector produces two-thirds of the Greek GNP, as it does in the rest of Europe. However, during the 1990s the performance of Greek manufacturing could not to be ignored, despite the difficulties in the international environment. In our times, the international environment is characterized by internationalization of production and

competition, as well as increased liberalization and deregulation. The conditions under which international competition is conducted worsen as time passes and may intensify in the future. As far as Greece is concerned, in addition to compliance with these essential conditions, the country now faces difficulties that arise from its efforts to adapt both its economy and currency to euro convergence criteria.

These factors together can cause a long recession with painful consequences in respect to required working hours and economic performance. In spite of the aforementioned, the restrictive international and European framework, as well as numerable contrary causations, Greek manufacturing, generally open to the European Union and, of course, bound to it, presents performance rates, changes and adaptations, that not even the Greek manufacturing class, for reasons determined by its own policy, admits. During the 1990's the number of large industrial plants, with capital over 1 billion Drachmas, increased by 80%. Companies with capital of 1 billion Drachmas and above constituted 9% of companies in Greece, in 1985. That category now constitutes 25% of all Greek companies. This statistic shows that: a) the average size of industrial companies in Greece is increasing at a fast rate, b) capital concentration is geared towards larger companies at a fast pace. This change has come about due to the mass influx of foreign capital in the form of direct investment and the positioning of European capital in Greek industry. Young Greek-European owned companies are being formed and developing both in Greece and the Balkans.

Equity capital of Greek industry in 1985 comprised 14% of total capital, while in 1998 it increased to 64%. It must be made clear, however, that the influx of foreign capital does not occur in the form of debt – a fact that would increase the economy's loan commitments abroad –, but rather in the form of direct investment. At this point, rate of return on capital in the Greek industrial sector remains among the highest in Europe. Greek exports are developing faster than European and the average annual rate of increase in Greek exports is 5.1% against a 3,8% increase in European exports. Also noteworthy, in 1983 Greece's industries exported 16% of their produce; whereas,

today they export 30%. This element is significant in the fact that it shows the level of extroversion of Greek industry, as well as the dynamics and perspectives of the Greek market.

Moreover, exports of Greek industrial products are developing at impressive rates, spanning from 12% to 28% per year and are following the rapid growth of neighbouring developing markets. The mass influx of foreign capital in Greece is based on the unprecedented technological refurbishment of Greek industry, which has resulted in the speedy modernization of the country's industrial base and the continuous improvement of productivity. Indeed, productivity in Greece is improving at a faster pace in comparison with the other European economies; e.g. 2.7% annually in comparison to 2.4%. Specifically, the adjustment of the Greek economy and the new born, complementary nature of industrial production between the Greek and European economies are concentrated in sectors that are highly extroverted. Extrovert sectors are new textile products, such as the clothing and footwear sectors, which export 75% of their produce, the basic metal industry, which exports 34% of its produce and the engine and machine manufacturing industry, which exports 36% of its produce.

All in all, we must point out that this is the first time in Modern history that Greek industry makes a positive contribution to the increase of the Greek GNP. It is also the first time in Greek history that Greek industrial exports are increasing at a faster pace than industrial imports. In conclusion, despite the crocodile tears of Greek industrialists, Greece is entering the European productive structure and division of labor, as well as the international stock markets with a determined and competitive stance. This hypothesis is confirmed by the unprecedented increase of stock market transactions in the Greek market. Even though the Greek stock market has no depth, there are serious and highly regarded industrial plants, which adhere to developed international criteria and standards.

What we are witnessing today in the productive, commercial and financial sector confirms the decisive role the Greek economy has to play in the stabilization of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean,

within the framework of the new international system and especially the European one. Greece's cultural features give the country the best opportunity to undertake the role of intermediary among the new rising European groups and Europe's periphery, which for the moment is searching for the safest way to incorporate itself into the new international scheme. Even though it is not at all sure that Europe has determined its course to success and it is almost sure that for the moment it is at a dead end and is moving at a very slow pace, it is just as positive that Greece is tied 'organically' to a Europe with a common future, especially when it comes to the Balkans, which are now being reshaped.

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Thucydides on Grand Strategy: Spartan Grand Strategy during the Peloponnesian War

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RÉSUMÉ

On a traditionnellement considéré la Guerre du Péloponnèse comme un match entre l'armée de terre (Sparte) et celle de la mer (Athènes). Assez réducteur, ce point de vue ne tient pas compte du fait que les Spartiates comprirent tôt dans la guerre la nécessité de se doter d'une flotte capable de rivaliser avec celle d'Athènes. Au fait, il est plus exact de voir la guerre en tant que concours entre deux grands desseins stratégiques. Au lieu de poursuivre la stratégie péricléenne de l'épuisement, Sparte avait opté pour l'annihilation. Ainsi les stratèges spartes visait une bataille terrestre décisive mais ils faisaient tout pour rendre la guerre plus chère aux Athéniens surtout lorsqu'ils devastèrent l'Attique. En même temps ils ont incité les alliés d'Athènes à l'insurrection et ils ont exploité au maximum chaque nouveau front ouvert par les troupes athéniennes. Au départ, les rapports de force ne favorisaient point Sparte. Il ne serait qu'après la défaite désastreuse des Athéniens en Sicile que les Spartes ont pu se procurer de l'aide (la Perse) afin de rivaliser avec Athènes au niveau naval. Ainsi Sparte a réussi sa grande stratégie d'annihilation.

ABSTRACT

It is customary to view the Peloponnesian War as a contest between land and sea power. This is a quite distorting position, however, since the Spartans quickly understood the need to match Athenian naval strength, and they eventually did so. It is far more accurate to view the war as a contest between two opposing grand strategic designs. In contrast to the Periclean grand strategy of exhaustion, Sparta followed a grand strategy of annihilation centered around the Spartan military might. Sparta aimed at a decisive land battle, while consistently trying to make the war costlier for the Athenians by devastating Attica, encouraging Athens' allies to revolt, and trying to exploit every secondary front the Athenians had opened. However, at the initial phase of the war the balance of power was so adverse to Sparta that her strategy could simply not work. Only after the Athenian disaster at Sicily were the Spartans able to secure the necessary support (chiefly from Persia) to match Athenian naval strength and pursue their grand strategy of annihilation with success.

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Introduction

Strategy is never conducted in a vacuum; it is always directed against one or more opponents who in turn formulate their own strategy. Consequently, no strategic analysis of the Peloponnesian War — or in fact any other war — can be complete without examining the interaction between the strategic designs of both belligerents; i.e. the “horizontal” dimension of strategy.² Therefore, apart from the highly publicised grand strategy of Pericles and Athens in general, it is also necessary to examine the less publicised but equally important grand strategy of Sparta.

It is customary to regard the Peloponnesian War as a contest between land and sea power.³ However, this is a highly distorting view of the issue, since the Spartans quickly understood the need to match Athenian naval strength, and eventually did so. It is far more accurate to view the war as a contest between two opposing grand strategic designs. For the purposes of this analysis, we will use the ideal types of the strategy of annihilation and exhaustion.⁴ The strategy of annihilation aims at the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces through a decisive battle; whereas in the strategy of exhaustion, the battle goes side by side with the so-called maneuver; i.e., economic damage that comes of such means as territorial occupation, destruction of crops, naval blockade, etc.

The Napoleonic campaigns constitute classical examples of the strategy of annihilation. They culminated in decisive battles such as Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and Wagram, in which the French emperor completely crushed the armed forces of his enemies, forcing them to sue for peace. These campaigns formed the basis of the theory of war that Clausewitz promulgated shortly afterwards. Clausewitz laid emphasis on direct approach; i.e., direction of one’s war effort chiefly towards the main opponent and/or the “center of gravity” of the enemy war effort, and the need to destroy the armed forces of the enemy. In other words, the strategy of annihilation occupies a central position in Clausewitz’s theory. It is no accident that this strategy continues to this day to be associated with him, as well as with Napoleon.⁵

On the other hand, Sir Basil Liddell Hart has argued in favour of the advantages of the indirect approach throughout his works. The term “indirect approach” generally connotes the sidestepping of the enemy’s strong points and the avoidance of attrition warfare.⁶ At the level of grand strategy, the indirect approach may be regarded as the “by-passing” of the main opponent by directing one’s war effort against the secondary opponents, postponing the decisive strike in favour of a more suitable moment.⁷

In the Peloponnesian War, Sparta followed a grand strategy of annihilation, whereas Athens initially, under the direction of Pericles, followed a grand strategy of exhaustion.⁸ The Sicilian expedition (415-413 B.C.) however, marked Athens’ turn to a grand strategy of annihilation, which she was to follow till the end of the war.

Successful planning at the level of grand strategy needs to address four dimensions: a) assessment of the international environment, b) setting policy objectives, c) allocation of resources (means) to meet the objectives (ends), d) legitimacy of the grand strategy both at home and abroad. In the present article, a brief presentation of the domestic structures and the “strategic culture” of Sparta, where the “hegemony” of Sparta is contrasted with the “empire” of Athens, will be followed by an analysis of the Spartan grand strategy according to these four dimensions. Following that, an assessment of the Spartan grand strategy as it evolved during the war will take place.⁹ Bearing in mind what has been mentioned above, we will not confine ourselves to a static analysis of the Spartan grand strategy, but we will also analyse its constant interaction with the grand strategy of Athens.

Spartan “Hegemony” versus Athenian “Empire”: Domestic Structures and Strategic Culture

The clash between Sparta and Athens was a clash between two different power structures, two societies organised in different ways. The domestic structures of each of these two societies exerted a profound influence on what modern analysts call “strategic culture” or “national style” of the two belligerents.¹⁰

As is well-known, Athenian polity was the archetypal democracy. The most important decision-making body was the citizen assembly (*Ecclesia*) where all Athenian citizens were eligible for participation. Although the political organisation of direct democracy often resulted in erratic decision-making, this was more than counterbalanced by the feeling of energetic participation in the city affairs that every citizen experienced. This feeling ensured enthusiastic citizen support in the formulation and implementation of state policy, as well as mobilisation of all available means for the achievement of the various ends set by that policy.¹¹

The domestic structures of Sparta, on the other hand, were completely different.¹² Spartan polity consisted of monarchical elements (two hereditary kings), oligarchic (a council of elders, the so-called *Gerousia*, or senate, consisting of twenty-eight members elected for life plus the two kings) and democratic ones (a citizen assembly).¹³ Another institution with immense powers and steadily increasing importance was that of the five *ephors*, or overseers. The *ephors* were elected for a year, presumably with no right to re-election.¹⁴ Nevertheless, despite the existence of all these elements, Sparta was basically an oligarchic polity. The Spartans had built a reputation for disdaining luxury,¹⁵ and devoted their whole life from the age of seven onwards to military training. The outcome of this long and intensive training was to turn the Spartans into the best soldiers in the world.¹⁶

In fact, they had good reason to become such. When the Spartans originally settled in Laconia (the south-eastern part of the Peloponnese) they enslaved the indigenous population, the so-called Helots. The Helots were forced to cultivate the land and yield part of the harvest to their Spartan masters. This is why the Spartans were able to lead a military life. When Sparta also conquered Messenia (the south-western part of the Peloponnese), the number of the Helots swelled.¹⁷ Both Spartans and Helots acted as if a state of war existed between them.¹⁸ The Helots were looking for an opportunity to rebel while the Spartans were trying to suppress them by every conceivable means.¹⁹ In other words, the Spartans had literally turned their city into an armed camp and lived accordingly.²⁰

As to the “strategic cultures” of Athens and Sparta, one may notice that in contrast to the enterprising Athenians, conservatism and caution were the basic characteristics of the Spartans. As their Corinthian allies put it to the Spartans:

An Athenian is always an innovator, quick to form a resolution and quick at carrying it out. You, on the other hand, are good at keeping things as they are; you never originate an idea, and your action tends to stop short of its aim. Then again, Athenian daring will out-run its own resources; they will take risk against their better judgement, and still, in the midst of danger, remain confident. But your nature is always to do less than you could have done, to mistrust your own judgement, however sound it may be, and to assume that dangers will last for ever. Think of this, too: while you are hanging back, they never hesitate; while you stay at home, they are always abroad; for they think that the farther they go the more they will get, while you think that any movement may endanger what you have already.²¹

The difference in strategic culture between Athenians and Spartans was not so much a result of their different “national characters”, although this undoubtedly played a role,²² as of the different structures of their respective polities. The democratic polity of Athens encouraged citizen participation in the affairs of the state and created a spirit of innovation, which at times bordered on recklessness. In Sparta, on the contrary, the central role of the elders of the Gerousia ensured a relative stability of state policy,²³ but at the same time led to excessive conservatism and an inability to keep up with external developments. The conservatism and caution of the Spartans were also bolstered by the continual fear of a Helot revolt, which made them view external adventures with reluctance.

These different strategic cultures were evident in the security policies of the two cities. It is rather well-known how Athens managed to

create an extensive and lucrative maritime empire in the Aegean: initially, due to her naval power (and following the withdrawal of the Spartans), she assumed the leadership of the anti-Persian struggle of the Greeks and gradually increased her control over her allies, turning them actually into tributary states.²⁴ Sparta, on the other hand, did not undertake such vast schemes. Thus, although the Spartans had been the initial leaders of the Greeks in the struggle against the Persians, they quickly withdrew and ceded the leadership to the Athenians, who, eventually, used it to their own benefit.

Sparta was content with the control of the Peloponnese. This was ensured by a web of alliances which has become fashionable to call the Peloponnesian League (or Alliance), while Sparta also saw to it that her allies were governed by friendly oligarchic regimes.²⁵ The Peloponnesian allies provided valuable manpower which assisted the elite but relatively small Spartan army. A major inhibition in Sparta's quest for complete control of the Peloponnese was the existence of the powerful city-state of Argos — a permanent rival that constantly needed to be kept in check.²⁶

This examination of the two contending states brings to light an important point: although Spartan power rested on solid foundations, it lacked the dynamism Athens possessed. It would seem that the peculiar Spartan system had reached its limits. The system could ensure Spartan independence and control of the Peloponnese, but nothing more than that.²⁷ Sparta remained an introverted city-state whose economy depended on Helots' agricultural production. With the number of Spartans steadily declining, Spartan power was also likely to go downhill.²⁸ On the contrary, Athens, by creating a commercial and maritime empire, had opened new avenues and could confidently expect her power to keep growing.

Michael Doyle has come up with an interesting analysis of the different nature of the power structures of Athens and Sparta. According him, Athens' commercial activities enabled her to acquire immense influence beyond her borders, creating in this way a "periphery" that was controlled by the Athenian "metropolis". On the contrary, the

international influence of Sparta was based exclusively on her military power. The cost of military power was high for the relatively small Spartan warrior community, thus limiting Sparta's international influence. As a result, whereas Athens had created an "empire", where a metropolis controlled a periphery, Sparta had to be content with a "hegemony", where the Spartan metropolis was connected with other, less powerful metropolises.²⁹ It is interesting that, following the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans attempted to substitute the Athenian Empire with an empire of their own. As we have already mentioned, however, their political organisation did not enable them to support such an undertaking, unless they resorted to sheer military force. Since, however, Spartan military power was relatively limited and costly, Sparta was led to overextension. As a result, her empire collapsed and she lost control of the Peloponnese and then of Messenia herself, merely four decades after her victory in the Peloponnesian War.³⁰

Once again, the Corinthians captured the essence of the situation and described it brilliantly to the Spartans: "Your whole way of life is out of date when compared with theirs [the Athenians]. And it is just as true in politics as it is in any art or craft: new methods must drive out old ones."³¹

Sparta and Athens: The Bilateral Balance of Power

This issue has been extensively analysed elsewhere.³² The argument presented there was that Sparta and Athens were the two most powerful states in Greece, that the power of Athens was growing faster than Sparta's (chiefly because of its more developed economic system) and that at the time of the outbreak of the war, the economic power, the navy and the empire of Athens made her at worst immune to Sparta and her allies and at best superior to them. As Archidamus' speech to the Spartan Assembly made clear, Spartan grand strategy had reached a deadlock: whereas Athenian power was growing and Athens was encroaching upon Sparta's allies,³³ undermining in this way a basic pillar of Spartan security, Sparta lacked the means to strike at the sources of Athenian power, namely the navy and the empire.³⁴

The distinguished American historian Donald Kagan has argued that the power of Athens had not grown between 445 and 435 B.C.³⁵ However, he has been led astray by the territorial losses the Athenian Empire sustained in the hostilities that ended in 445 B.C., and by the fact that Athens did not acquire any new allies until the conclusion of the defensive alliance with Corcyra in 433 B.C. At the same time, he has not taken into account the continuous growth of the Athenian economic power during that period. However, Thucydides has pointed out precisely this, namely that the growth of Athens' economic power enabled her to more than counterbalance her recent territorial losses:

Athens [...] had in the course of time taken over the fleets of her allies (except for those of Chios and Lesbos) and had made them pay contribution of money instead. Thus the forces available to Athens alone for this war were greater than the combined forces had ever been when the alliance was still intact.³⁶

For Archidamus, the problem of the growth of Athenian power and the threat that this created for Spartan security could not be solved immediately. Sparta first needed to redress the balance with Athens. Apart from internal mobilization, that is marshalling their domestic resources, Sparta and her allies needed to resort to external balancing, namely securing allies, Greeks or Persians, that could provide the two things the Peloponnesian Alliance lacked — navy and money:

What I do suggest is that we should not take up arms at the present moment; instead we should send to them and put our grievances before them; we should not threaten war too openly, though at the same time we should make it clear that we are not going to let them have their own way. In the meantime we should be making our own preparations by winning over new allies both among Hellenes and among foreigners — from any quarter, in fact, where we can increase our naval and financial resources. No one can blame us for

securing our own safety by taking foreigners as well as Greeks into our alliance when we are, as is the fact, having our position undermined by the Athenians. At the same time we must put our own affairs in order. If they pay attention to our diplomatic protests, so much the better. If they do not, then after two or three years have passed, we shall be in a much sounder position and can attack them, if we decide to do so.³⁷

Unfortunately for Sparta, it was not Archidamus' counsel, but the belligerent speech of ephor Sthenelaidas that carried the day with the Assembly. Sthenelaidas did not counter any of Archidamus' arguments but concentrated instead on the wrongs the Athenians had done to the Peloponnesian Alliance. The closing sentences of his speech are characteristic:

Therefore, Spartans, cast your votes for the honour of Sparta and for war! Do not allow the Athenians to grow still stronger! Do not entirely betray your allies! Instead let us, with the help of heaven, go forward to meet the aggressor!³⁸

This reveals that, although both Archidamus and Sthenelaidas agreed that Athens' power was growing in relation to Sparta's, they differed in their assessment of the current balance of power. While Archidamus evaluated Athens as stronger, Sthenelaidas and, as it turned out, the majority of the Spartans, evaluated Sparta as stronger.³⁹ This misperception was to haunt Spartan grand strategy for the next ten years. It seems that Sthenelaidas and his followers expected a short war, believing that a Spartan invasion of Attica would lead to a quick victory,⁴⁰ while also thinking that Sparta could wage a low-cost war without suffering much herself. Events were to prove them wrong on both counts: the destruction of Attica did not bring about the capitulation of Athens, whereas Sparta was far more vulnerable to Athenian sea power than previously thought.

Thus, the net assessment of the relative balance of power indicated that the situation was not unfavorable to Athens, to say the least.

However, the majority of Spartans thought otherwise. This was a serious handicap for Spartan grand strategy, which faced a great mismatch between the (unlimited) political objectives assigned to it and the (inadequate) means that were available for this purpose.

A change in the balance of power was brought about only after the destruction of the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily in 413. Now, apart from her traditional advantage on land, Sparta had also obtained parity at sea, while at the same time the Athenian Empire was collapsing. Furthermore, the Persians started giving financial aid to Sparta.⁴¹ The only hope for Athens was in a change of Persian policy. As the Athenian statesman Pisander put it to his fellow citizens in 411:

Now that the Peloponnesians have as many ships as we have ready to fight us at sea, now that they have more cities as their allies, and now that the King and Tissaphernes are supplying them with money, while ours is all gone, have you any hope that Athens can survive unless someone can persuade the King to change sides and come over to us?⁴²

As we will soon see, the Persians, far from changing policy, in fact intensified their aid to the Spartans. The massive Persian support had dramatically tilted the balance in favour of Sparta. With the continuation of this support, Sparta's victory was simply a matter of time.

Political Objectives

Regarding the issue of the policy objectives of the two combatants, it has been demonstrated elsewhere⁴³ that Athens, under Pericles' direction, had limited objectives, merely aiming at the preservation of the *status quo*, in contrast to Sparta who had unlimited objectives, namely the dissolution of the Athenian Empire. Nevertheless, having in mind the strategic culture of Sparta, one must point out that resorting to a war with unlimited objectives must have been a novel experience for the Spartans. It has also been pointed out that Athens, the *status quo* power, formed a defensive grand strategy of exhaustion

whose aim was to convince the enemy that Athens was unbeatable in military terms and thus make him give up the effort of overthrowing the Athenian Empire. On the other hand, Sparta, the revisionist power, resorted to an offensive grand strategy of annihilation, centered around the Spartan military might. Initially the Spartans attempted to persuade the Athenians to make concessions under the threat of military defeat or devastation of their land (viz. coercive diplomacy). Following the failure of forceful persuasion, they resorted to actual warfare in which they attempted to secure victory through a decisive land battle.⁴⁴

Archidamus favoured a strategy of annihilation, complete annihilation both on land and at sea.⁴⁵ However, he believed that Sparta lacked the means to pursue such a strategy, and therefore recommended that she make preparations and secure allies. Sthenelaidas too favoured annihilation, but, in contrast to Archidamus, he thought that Sparta *did* have the means to implement it, at least on land.⁴⁶ However, a grand strategy of this kind was highly demanding: whereas Athens had merely to make the Spartans abandon their quest for overthrowing the Athenian Empire, nothing short of a complete victory would suffice for Sparta in order to achieve her policy objectives.⁴⁷

The political objectives of the Athenian grand strategy underwent a dramatic change in 415 when the Athenians, at the instigation of Alcibiades, undertook the Sicilian expedition. All of a sudden, Athens had set unlimited aims, namely domination of the entire Hellenic world plus the western Mediterranean. Alcibiades himself, after treasonably going to Sparta, gave the Spartans the following account of the Athenian war aims:

We sailed to Sicily to conquer first, if possible, the Sicilians, and after them the Hellenes in Italy; next we intended to attack the Carthaginian empire and Carthage itself. Finally, if all or most of these plans were successful, we were going to make our assault on the Peloponnese, bringing with us all the additional Hellenic forces which we should have acquired in the

west and hiring as mercenaries great numbers of native troops [...]. In addition to our existing fleet we should have built many more triremes, since Italy is rich in timber and with all of them we should have blockaded the coast of the Peloponnese, while at the same time our army would be operating on land against your cities, taking some by assault, and others by siege. In this way we hoped that the war would easily be brought to a successful conclusion and after that we should be the masters of the entire Hellenic world.⁴⁸

As a result, Athenian grand strategy was shaped according to the new objectives set by policy. To achieve these objectives, Athens had to revert to a grand strategy of annihilation; i.e., crushing her enemies on the battlefield and then conquering them. In addition, the Athenians followed a direct approach by turning against Syracuse, the strongest city in Sicily.

However, the Sicilian expedition ended in a complete disaster for Athens. Their expeditionary force was completely annihilated in 413 B.C., whereas in Greece the Spartans had reopened hostilities and some of the Athenian allies had revolted. In her attempt first to retain what had not been lost from her empire and then to recover what had been, Athens continued to rely on the strategy of annihilation. Since Sparta's challenge of the Athenian maritime empire had to be beaten off, the Athenians were seeking decisive encounters at sea. Consequently, a war that had started as a clash between a *status quo* and a revisionist power, which employed a grand strategy of exhaustion and annihilation respectively, ended with both combatants pursuing unlimited objectives and employing a grand strategy of annihilation. Still, the approach of both sides continued to be direct: since the enemy's navy was his chief asset, it was this navy that had to be sought and destroyed.

The Means of Spartan Grand Strategy

It has been demonstrated that the grand strategy of Athens employed a variety of means apart from the traditional military ones.⁴⁹

The same was true for Spartan grand strategy, although in the latter case the military means played a comparatively greater role. A constant interaction between the means employed by one side and those employed by the other was taking place. Using the means at one's disposal in order to achieve one's political objectives entailed to a considerable degree countering the means at the enemy's disposal. The analysis that follows will try to capture the interaction between them, the "horizontal dimension" of strategy.

Spartan grand strategy did not necessarily envisage the actual outbreak of hostilities; the Spartans would be perfectly happy if they could achieve their objectives by the mere threat of war. Archidamus, especially, had a masterly understanding of the workings of coercive diplomacy and consistently tried to achieve Spartan objectives through the threat of force, holding the actual use of force in reserve. As he told his fellow citizens:

You must think of their land [the Athenians'] as though it was a hostage in your possession, and all the more valuable the better it is looked after. You should spare it up to the last possible moment, and avoid driving them to a state of desperation in which you will find them much harder to deal with.⁵⁰

Spartan coercive diplomacy featured the issuing of a series of demands towards the Athenians. The revocation of the Megarian Decree was one of these, whereas in their final ultimatum the Spartans stated that "Sparta wants peace. Peace is still possible if you will give the Hellenes their freedom."⁵¹ [A blunt demand for the dissolution of the Athenian Empire.]

What made the Spartans so confident that they could achieve their aims through ultimatums? We have already mentioned that the majority of the Spartans believed that they were holding a trump card, namely their ability, through their superiority in land forces, to invade Attica at will. This ability entailed two potential evils for Athens. The first was a crushing defeat in a major land battle, should the Athenians take the "normal" step of marching to oppose the invading

Peloponnesians. The second was the devastation of Attica. Spartan conventional wisdom had it that these two threats would be enough to cow the Athenians into submission. Actually, there had been a precedent when a similar advance of a Peloponnesian army to Attica in 446 B.C. had quickly made the Athenians sue for peace.⁵²

The last incident and the lessons the Spartans drew from it are extremely interesting. To start with, they make clear that the past behaviour of a state determines to a very great extent the other states' expectations about its future behaviour. Thus, the majority of the Spartans expected that the Athenians would be cowed by the threat of a Peloponnesian invasion in Attica, precisely as they had previously done. This shows clearly how important it is for a state to put a "good face", namely to have a reputation for displaying determination and behaving uncompromisingly in any issue of vital importance to it.⁵³ It is precisely in a failure to retain such a reputation that we can trace the greatest danger of appeasement: if the adversary "gets accustomed" to securing concessions from our side, he will not believe that in a given instance we will be determined not to back down; such a miscalculation may bring about a war.⁵⁴ It is highly probable that Sthenelaidas and the majority of the Spartans committed precisely this mistake.

The mistaken analysis of the Spartans also shows the difficulty of extracting "lessons from the past".⁵⁵ It is true that in 446 Athens asked for a compromise in view of the Peloponnesian invasion, but the international situation in 432 was different. In 446 Athens had suffered serious military defeats in Central Greece and was faced with a revolt in Euboea. Athens' attempt to create a land empire in the Greek mainland had failed and the compromise reached in 446 recognised precisely this: the Athenian Empire would from then on be exclusively confined in the Aegean.⁵⁶ In 432 however, Athens had no reason at all to back down, since her imperial territories were immune to Spartan land power. This important change of the situation was missed by the majority of the Spartans.

Consequently, Pericles, rejecting appeasement, did not submit to the Spartan demands and thus did not allow the Spartans to gain any

advantage from their powerful land forces in peacetime. No such advantage was to be gained in wartime as well, since the walls of Athens completely neutralised the Peloponnesian infantry, whereas the Athenians did not come out to offer battle.⁵⁷ At the same time, Athens was drawing freely from the resources of the Empire and the rest of her allies, while continually escalating her reprisals against Sparta, culminating in the incidents of Pylos, Sphacteria and Cythera. As a result, Sparta sued for peace.⁵⁸

This does not mean that Sparta had merely stood and watched the Athenian naval and financial power unfolding. She kept trying in earnest to thwart the effective employment of these means possessed by Athens. One may recall that Archidamus advised the Spartans that they needed to restore the balance of power with Athens before attempting to go to war; this should be done by seeking allies that could provide the Peloponnesians with money and navy. Although the Peloponnesians would tap their own resources as well, these would clearly be inadequate. Archidamus had just provided the recipe for defeating a maritime power: creating an economic unit that can afford to build a navy equal or superior to that of this power.⁵⁹

However, the premature start of the war by Sparta rendered that plan unlikely to succeed. Simply put, Sparta's chances at sea were not rated particularly high, and consequently few were prepared to risk their naval and financial assets by backing a Peloponnesian navy. Thus, as war was approaching, the Spartans tried to secure naval and financial aid from the Greek colonies in Southern Italy and Sicily.⁶⁰ No help, however, came from that quarter.⁶¹ The Persians, who alone could tilt the balance, were also unhelpful.⁶² Only rebel subjects of the Athenian Empire were willing to provide personnel for the Peloponnesian navy.⁶³ Clearly, Sparta's attempt to match Athens' sources of strength, that is navy and wealth, had failed.

However, this was not the only way Sparta used the various means at her disposal. A central element of Spartan grand strategy was trying to make the war as costly as possible for the Athenians. It has been pointed out that Athens' maritime strategy cost a lot in financial

terms.⁶⁴ In contrast, the Peloponnesian land forces were relatively cheap. As Spartan society was continually being prepared for war, actual warfare made little difference.⁶⁵ For the rest of the Peloponnesian allies, sending their contingents of citizen armies to an excursion in Attica for some two to six weeks a year, also implied little cost.⁶⁶

The crux of the matter, however, was to increase the cost Athens had to incur. This attempt had three dimensions: a) destroy Attica, b) attempt to dissolve the Athenian Empire, c) exploit every secondary front opened by the Athenians. The destruction of the Attic land, apart from the obvious financial cost, also created some social cost to the Athenians; the whole social fabric of Athens was upset, as the farmers and the social strata that were associated with the land were displaced and forced to seek refuge behind the walls.⁶⁷

The second dimension of Sparta's cost-raising strategy was the attempt to bring about the dissolution of the Athenian Empire. This would be done through either encouraging apostasy or aiding revolts of the Athenian allies. The Spartans had been working towards this direction long before the outbreak of the war.⁶⁸

The revolt of Mytilene, an island allied with Athens, in 428-427 B.C. provides an excellent example of Sparta's attempt to raise the cost of war for Athens and subsequently exploit the situation. After the Mytilenians revolted, the Spartans prepared to attack Athens both by land and by sea, while also preparing a fleet to help the rebels. They obviously believed that the Athenians could not simultaneously sustain the blockade of Mytilene, the costly siege of the city of Potidaea, the conduct of raids on the Peloponnesian coast and at the same time be able to defend their city. According to Thucydides:

The Athenians were aware that these [Sparta's] preparations were being made on the theory that they themselves were weak, and wished to make it clear that the theory was a mistaken one and that they could easily beat off any attack from the Peloponnesian fleet without recalling their own fleet from Lesbos. They there-

fore manned 100 ships with their own citizens (excluding the knights and the *Pentacosiomedimni*) and with their resident aliens, sailed out to the Isthmus, where they made a demonstration of their power and carried out landings just as they pleased on the Peloponnesian coast.⁶⁹

Obviously, Athens' resources had yet to be depleted. Nevertheless, a Peloponnesian fleet did eventually sail for Mytilene. Although the island had capitulated before the fleet arrived, there were still plenty of opportunities either to recapture it or to spread revolt all around the Ionian coast. However, Alcidas, the Spartan commander of the fleet, must have been extremely ill-at-ease at sea and declined to exploit these opportunities.⁷⁰ Still, the lesson had been clear: Sparta was keen on undermining the Athenian Empire.

A much more vigorous attempt to destroy Athens was undertaken by the Spartans in 424 B.C., when they sent a force under the dashing general Brasidas to Macedonia and Thrace. Brasidas, using a blend of military prowess and diplomatic skill, proceeded to dismantle the Athenian Empire in that area. This horizontal escalation of the war was embarked upon by the Spartans as a diversion that would make the Athenians more amenable to peace proposals. Not only did it succeed, but it also created the preconditions for the eventual eviction of the Athenians from Macedonia and Thrace.⁷¹

Finally, the third dimension of the Spartan cost-raising strategy was to exploit every secondary front Athens had opened. True to the adventurous and sometimes reckless spirit that their political organisation promoted, the Athenians were eager to exploit opportunities, actual or perceived, in various places. However, wherever the Athenians appeared, the Spartans would sooner or later show up, too. They would simply not let the Athenians make easy gains.⁷²

The greatest of these Athenian adventures was the expedition in Sicily. In this expedition Athens was using her financial and naval power not merely to deter the enemy, as she had been doing until then, but to expand territorially. This expedition also signified, for the

first and last time in the Peloponnesian War, a major Athenian commitment on land forces.

However, Sparta's attempt to counter this aggressive employment of Athenian means did not take long. The Spartans once again resumed their attempt to make the war costlier for the Athenians, albeit in a more systematic fashion. Thus, instead of periodically invading Attica, they established a permanent garrison there by fortifying Decelea in 413 B.C. This had disastrous consequences for Athens.

Ever since Decelea had been first fortified [...] Athens had suffered a great deal. Indeed, the occupation of Decelea, resulting, as it did, in so much devastation of property and loss of manpower, was one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power. The previous invasions had not lasted for long and had not prevented the Athenians from enjoying the use of their land for the rest of the time; now, however, the enemy were on top of them throughout the year; sometimes there were extra troops sent in to invade the country; sometimes it was only the normal garrison overrunning the land and making raids to secure supplies; and the Spartan King Agis was there in person, treating the whole operation as a major campaign. The Athenians therefore suffered great losses. They were deprived of the whole of their country; more than 20,000 slaves, the majority of whom were skilled workmen, deserted, and all the sheep and farm animals were lost. [...] Then the supplies of food from Euboea, which previously had been brought in by the quicker route overland from Oropus through Decelea, now, at great expense, had to go by sea round Sunium. Every single thing that the city needed had to be imported, so that instead of a city it became a fortress.⁷³

A question often posed is why it took the Spartans so long to establish a permanent fort in Attica. The fortification of Decelea is often

attributed solely to the advice of Alcibiades.⁷⁴ However some scholars go as far as to claim that precisely this delay in the creation of a permanent fort shows that Sparta did not have a strategy during the Peloponnesian War.⁷⁵ Both these claims are wrong. The idea of establishing a permanent fort in Attica existed in Spartan strategy right from the beginning. The Corinthians had mentioned it in their speech at the Assembly of the Peloponnesian League in 432, that is, before the outbreak of hostilities; whereas the Spartans during the negotiations that led to the Peace of Nicias threatened the Athenians precisely with the creation of a permanent fort in their territory.⁷⁶ The reason why the Spartans did not embark upon this scheme earlier is simple: they had not felt the need for it. As already mentioned, the majority of the Spartans believed that the war would be short. The establishment of a fort in Athens and its permanent manning — unlike the annual invasions that lasted for a few weeks — was an action entailing serious costs. The commitment of a substantial part of their workforce had important consequences for the economies of the Peloponnesian states (with the exception of Sparta), whereas the logistic support of a numerous army permanently stationed on enemy territory was impossible with the means of fifth century B.C. It was precisely for this reason that the Peloponnesians were forced to “over-run the land and make raids to secure supplies”. The fortification of Decelea was a highly costly measure, suitable for a long war; since the majority of Spartans expected the war to be short, they did not initially feel the need to undertake it.⁷⁷

Furthermore, the Spartans counterbalanced the Athenians in Sicily by offering aid to the city of Syracuse, Athens’ chief enemy in the island. According to Thucydides, this aid was instrumental in preventing Athenian victory and allowing Syracuse to recover from her initial reverses.⁷⁸ From then on, the Athenians were forced to conduct a strategy of “two-and-a-half wars”; one war against Syracuse, another against Sparta, plus a possible allied revolt. As a result, they were soon faced with spiralling financial costs.⁷⁹

The disaster in Sicily put an end to Athenian adventures and, consequently, to Spartan countermoves. However, the other two dimen-

sions of Sparta's cost-raising strategy were working at full force. Decelea was depleting Athenian strength, whereas the empire was but liquidated. Athens had reached the limit of her resources; it only had to sustain a single great defeat at sea for the final collapse to come.

That was not all, however. The Athenian disaster at Sicily enabled Sparta to implement the Archidamian plan of securing allies who could help her to match Athenian naval and economic strength. All of a sudden, everybody rushed to help the Spartans.⁸⁰ Ships and money were at last forthcoming. The Peloponnesian Alliance embarked on an ambitious ship-building program, a powerful contingent of 55 ships came from Sicily to assist the Peloponnesians, whereas the Spartans forcibly collected money from various states of Central Greece.⁸¹

But the real 'coup' was Persia. The Spartans entered into profitable agreements with the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Although the relationship with them, especially Tissaphernes, was not strewn with roses, it marked an important turning point in the war.⁸² Finally, in 407 B.C. the Spartans found a staunch ally in the Persian court in the person of Cyrus, son of the Persian king, who was given an extensive command in Asia Minor.⁸³ Persian money started flowing freely, enabling Sparta to make up for various naval reverses.⁸⁴ Archidamus' scheme was, after all, implemented, and the battle of Aegospotami settled the issue.

The Athenians, on their own part, did try after Sicily to hang on to their empire by rebuilding a fleet and reducing public expenses.⁸⁵ In addition to these traditional means of Athenian grand strategy they also utilised diplomacy, attempting to win the Persians over to their side.⁸⁶ As to the Persians, Thucydides points out that both sides tried to enlist Persian support, already before the outbreak of the hostilities.⁸⁷ However, the price of a Persian alliance was abandonment of the Greek cities of Asia Minor to Persian control. Since these cities were part of the Athenian Empire, it was easier for Sparta and more difficult for Athens to pay this price. Athenian and Persian interests were clearly irreconcilable and, as a result, Athens' attempt to coax the

Persians was doomed. The continuation of Persian support to Sparta ensured that in the long run Athens could not avoid defeat.

This concludes the examination of the means employed by the two competing grand strategies. One can see that the employment of the various means was not a static process, settled once and for all in a grand strategy. Interaction with the opponent was continuous and shaped the means employed accordingly.

The Issue of Legitimacy

Both Athens and Sparta took care of the legitimacy of their grand strategies. It is very interesting that the horizontal dimension of strategy made itself apparent in this issue as well. Once again, there was continuous interaction between the two opponents, each of them trying to ensure the legitimacy of his own grand strategy while undermining that of the opponent's.

International legitimacy played a central role in Sparta's grand strategy in the Peloponnesian War. It has already been demonstrated that the one-time allies of Athens had reverted to the status of tributary states and were looking forward to an opportunity to revolt.⁸⁸ Athens' considerable weakness as far as international legitimacy was concerned, constituted one of the trump cards of Spartan grand strategy. Sparta had built a reputation of being an enemy of tyranny and had often overthrown tyrants of Greek cities, Athens included.⁸⁹ In addition, Sparta had been the leader of the Greeks against the Persians during the crucial, defensive phase of the Persian Wars. Consequently, at the outbreak of the war it was easy for the Spartans to present themselves as the liberators of the Greeks from Athenian oppression, thus gaining widespread support. According to Thucydides:

People's feelings were very much on the side of the Spartans, especially as they proclaimed that their aim was the liberation of Hellas. States and individuals alike were enthusiastic to support them in every possible way, both in speech and action.⁹⁰

It may be recalled that the Spartans had presented the Athenians with an ultimatum demanding that the latter give the Hellenes their freedom. Apart from a statement revealing Sparta's unlimited aims, this was also a shrewd propaganda ploy. Sparta had just gone on record demanding the liberation of Hellas and, most importantly, was willing to fight for that cause. This was a ploy the Spartans would skilfully use throughout the war. Brasidas, for instance, during his brilliant campaign in Northern Greece, repeatedly stressed his role as a liberator; this, coupled with his just and moderate behavior, created a most favorable attitude towards Sparta in that area.

The chief factor in creating a pro-Spartan feeling among the allies of Athens was the gallantry of Brasidas and the wisdom which he showed at this time — qualities which some knew from experience of them and others assumed because they had been told of them. He was the first to be sent out in this way, and by the excellent reputation which he won for himself on all sides he left behind a rooted conviction that the rest also were like him.⁹¹

Besides exploiting the lack of international legitimacy of the Athenian grand strategy, Sparta also tried to undermine its domestic legitimacy. Apart from (or even in contrast to) the direct approach favoured by Archidamus, namely matching Athenian financial and naval strength, the Spartans also followed an indirect approach to their political objectives. Ravaging Attica constituted this indirect approach, which was directed — apart from the economic and social cost that has already been mentioned — chiefly at Athenian morale. Archidamus, showing a remarkable knowledge of the domestic structure of the enemy, tried during his invasions in Attica to exploit the internal divisions of the Athenians so as to undermine the internal legitimacy of the Athenian grand strategy.⁹² His conduct during the first invasion is characteristic:

They say that Archidamus had a planned policy in remaining at Acharnae with his army all ready for bat-

tle, and not on this invasion descending into the plain. [...] When they [the Athenians] had made no move against him at Eleusis or in the Thriasian Plain, he wanted to see whether they would come out against him if he made a camp at Acharnae. Acharnae itself seemed to him a good position for a camp, and at the same time he thought it likely that the Acharnians, who, with their 3,000 hoplites, were an important element in the state, would not allow their own property to be destroyed, but would force all the others as well to come out and fight for it. If, on the other hand, the Athenians did not come out and fight during this invasion, the Peloponnesians would in future invasions have all the more confidence in laying waste the plain and advancing right up to the walls of Athens. By that time the Acharnians would have lost their own property and would be much less willing to risk their lives for the property of other people; *consequently there would be a lack of unity in the counsels of Athens*. This was the policy of Archidamus which accounted for his remaining at Acharnae.⁹³

The blow to Athenian morale was tremendous. Given the erratic decision-making of the democratic Athenian polity, where everything depended on the shifting attitudes in the Assembly of the citizens, the indirect approach of the Spartans might indeed have worked. In fact, Thucydides mentions that after the second Peloponnesian invasion and the total devastation of Attica the Athenians sent ambassadors to Sparta to sue for peace. Presumably Spartan demands must have been excessive, or so they must have appeared to the Athenians, because the ambassadors did not achieve anything.⁹⁴

Pericles, however, did manage to persuade the Athenian public to stick to the unpopular strategy of withdrawing behind the walls. The Athenians remained true to this strategy and neither attempted to offer battle to the Peloponnesians⁹⁵ nor sued for peace again. Moreover, Pericles counterattacked and tried to shape the domestic

environment of Sparta in a way compatible with the Athenian interests: if the Spartans could be convinced that war against Athens was futile, the grand strategy that prescribed war with Athens would lose its domestic legitimacy and moderate leaders would emerge. This was actually how the two opponents reached peace after the tenth year of the war, when king Pleistoanax, a supporter of peace, became the principal figure in Sparta.⁹⁶

The two opponents, apart from the effort to shape the domestic environment of each other according to their interests, also tried to exploit the divisions that existed between democracies and oligarchies in most Greek cities.⁹⁷ However, Sparta was in the unique position to be able to exploit such divisions in Athens herself, while Athens enjoyed no similar opportunity.⁹⁸ The Spartans tried to capitalise on the oligarchic sentiments of some important circles in Athens. When an oligarchic coup took place in Athens in 411 B.C. the Athenian oligarchs tried to reach an accommodation with Sparta, whereas there is at least a possibility that they had conspired in order to lead the Spartan army into the city.⁹⁹ This internal strife aggravated an already difficult strategic situation and, according to Thucydides, drove the final nail into Athens' coffin.¹⁰⁰

To summarise: Sparta formulated a grand strategy of annihilation,¹⁰¹ aiming at the destruction of Athenian power and the dissolution of the Athenian Empire. The threat of a decisive land battle played a central role in Spartan grand strategy, while at the same time there was a continuous effort to make the war as costly as possible for Athens. Great stress was laid on international legitimacy, with Sparta appearing as the liberator of the Greeks from the Athenian oppression, while at the same time the Spartans attempted to undermine the domestic legitimacy of the enemy's grand strategy. Finally, a decisive role was played by diplomacy, which enabled Sparta to conclude an alliance with the Persians and thus balance the naval and financial power of Athens. Although the military dimension was clearly playing the central role in Spartan grand strategy, none of the other dimensions was ignored. What remains to do, is examine how this grand strategy actually worked in practice.

Athenian and Spartan Grand Strategies: Results

During the first phase of the Peloponnesian War, the so-called Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.), the Spartan grand strategy was a failure. The Spartans did invade Attica and wreak havoc in their path, but the Athenians did not submit. In the meantime, Athenian retaliation progressively escalated, culminating in the events of Pylos, Sphacteria and then Cythera.¹⁰² These events were enough to throw the conservative Spartan leadership out of balance, make it abandon its bid for victory, and try to obtain peace at almost any cost. By turning against their primary opponent, the Athenians achieved decisive results. However, at this point they misused their successes and refused to negotiate, thus missing the chance to extract substantial profits.¹⁰³

The Athenian refusal to negotiate made the Spartans embark upon two ploys they had not felt the need to use up to that point: a) the attempt to dismantle the Athenian empire in Northern Greece (viz. Brasidas' expedition) and b) the threat to establish a fort in Attica.¹⁰⁴ These developments did temper the Athenian attitude and bring about peace, but even the Peace of Nikias in 421 B.C. can be regarded as favorable to Athens.¹⁰⁵ Athens retained her profitable empire and discouraged further adventures on behalf of the Spartans, whereas the grievances of Sparta's allies were by and large ignored.¹⁰⁶ Ten years of futile war accompanied by terrible material and psychological setbacks was the price Sparta paid for the mismatch between means and ends in her grand strategy.

During the Peace of Nicias (421-415 B.C.), the most important development was the re-emergence of Argos as a player in the international arena after the expiration in 421 B.C. of the Thirty Years' Treaty between Argos and Sparta. Since Sparta had been forced to ignore the grievances of her allies during the conclusion of peace with Athens, a great number of these allies defected and sought security through an alliance with the Argives. Moreover, Athens seized the opportunity to develop a "continental strategy" by aiding Argos and her allies against Sparta.

All of a sudden the situation became critical for the Spartans, who found themselves in danger of losing control of the Peloponnese. To counter this threat, they once again resorted to the combination of the strategy of annihilation and direct approach. In truly Napoleonic/Clausewitzian fashion, Sparta crushed Argive power in the battle of Mantinea in 418 B.C., regaining pre-eminence in the Peloponnese.

By this one action they [the Spartans] did away with all the reproaches that had been levelled against them by the Hellenes at this time, whether for cowardice, because of the disaster in the island, or for incompetence and lack of resolution on other occasions. It was now thought that, though they might have been cast down by fortune, they were still in their own selves the same as they always had been.¹⁰⁷

The battle of Mantinea provides us with the opportunity to elaborate a bit further on the concept of *Vernichtungsschlacht* (decisive battle), which occupies a central position in the Napoleonic/Clausewitzian concept of war. It has been persuasively argued that this concept has its origins in Ancient Greece. An offensive campaign in Ancient Greece, in order to cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy, had to be conducted during the limited period of the year when the wheat crops were vulnerable to arson. This, combined with the fact that the armies of the Greek city-states consisted of farmers that would soon have to return to their fields, made the Ancient Greeks seek a quick settlement of the issue in a single, decisive battle.¹⁰⁸ Probably the most important of the decisive battles of the Ancient Greeks was the Battle of Plataea in 479 B.C., which led to the expulsion of the Persians from Greece proper.

However, one great problem with battles of this kind is that their outcome is often determined by minor details or unforeseen developments, thus increasing exponentially the risk incurred by those who resort to them.¹⁰⁹ Thus, many of history's decisive battles could have had different outcomes from the actual ones.¹¹⁰ It is probable that the same could have happened in Mantinea, provided the Athenians and

the Eleans had timely intervened at the Argives' side. In general, decisive battles are "high-risk ventures".¹¹¹

The year 415 B.C. proved to be the turning point of the war, since Athens embarked on an attempt to conquer Sicily. The Spartans were quick to perceive this window of opportunity. It was clear to them that Athens had overextended.¹¹² Consequently, they abandoned their earlier caution and renewed hostilities in Greece while sending aid to Athens' enemies in Sicily. These actions contributed to a great extent to the Athenian disaster in Sicily, which changed the whole course of the war. Sparta showed her ability to exploit the enemy's mistakes.

During the final phase of the war, the so-called Decelean War (413-404 B.C.), it was clear that the balance of power had shifted. This new balance made it possible for the Spartans to successfully pursue their initial aim of overthrowing the *status quo*.¹¹³ Now, for the first time, the means at their disposal matched their policy objectives. It is interesting to note that the final phase of the war was chiefly naval, conducted in the Eastern Aegean. In other words, the Spartans were now capable of challenging Athens in her own element and striking at the center of gravity of the Athenian power, namely her navy. Thus, the indecisive clash between the "tiger" and the "shark", turned into a clash between two "sharks", where decisive results could be obtained.

The Athenians, on their own part, immediately understood that they had to cut down on spending, maintain a decent navy, and secure the allegiance of their allies.¹¹⁴ In all this they did quite well. Though the greater part of the empire had gone for good, they managed to preserve some important places like Samos and Euboea, while inflicting severe defeats on the Peloponnesian navy (Cyzicus 410 B.C., Arginusae 406 B.C.).¹¹⁵ However, it seems that their aims were once again unlimited, since they twice rejected Spartan peace proposals.¹¹⁶ Actually, everything was hanging by a thread; one major defeat of the Athenian navy would spell the end. The day of reckoning came when the Spartan admiral Lysander captured the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405 B.C.¹¹⁷ Athens was now blockaded by sea as well. She capitulated the following year, signifying the final triumph of Spartan grand strategy.

Conclusion

Thucydides' text contains the first detailed presentation of a theory of grand strategy. This has been acknowledged, but only insofar as the Periclean grand strategy is concerned. In other words, Pericles is credited with the first detailed grand strategic plan in history, and Thucydides with the presentation of this plan.¹¹⁸ However, this tells only half the story. Thucydides did not present only one, but *two* detailed grand strategic designs that clashed with each other. Athens was not alone in having formulated a grand strategy; she had to contend with the grand strategy formulated by Sparta. Thucydides was fully cognizant that strategy involves the interaction of two opposing wills (viz. the horizontal dimension of strategy).

The fact that this aspect of Thucydides' analysis has not been adequately understood is reflected on the "publicity" that some of the protagonists of his *History* have received. Pericles, for instance, has rightly been praised for the grand strategy he designed and formulated by being called one of the greatest statesmen and military leaders of History.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, Archidamus, this remarkable general and statesman, has been ignored by contemporary scholars.¹²⁰ This is unfair, since he had a profound understanding of strategy, as shown by the "recipe" he provided for dealing with a naval power, as well as by the ingenuous way in which he used coercive diplomacy. It was Sparta's misfortune that Archidamus had less influence on the formulation of Spartan grand strategy than Pericles had on the formulation of the Athenian one. Whereas Pericles managed to achieve the domestic legitimacy of his grand strategy, Archidamus could not achieve the same for the grand strategy he had designed.

Another conclusion is that a grand strategy must correspond to the current balance of power. It has been noted that strategy is always addressed against one or more opponents. The means that can be used against an opponent are determined by the relative balance of power with him. If the means are lacking, certain ends are beyond achievement and must not be pursued (reduction of objectives). The above analysis showed that both Sparta and Athens at certain instances

misjudged the balance of power, setting policy objectives (dissolution of the Athenian Empire, conquest of Sicily, recovery of the Athenian Empire) they could not achieve with the means available to them (overextension). On the other hand, grand strategies that set objectives that were not contrary to the balance of power (Periclean grand strategy, Spartan grand strategy after the Sicilian expedition) were generally successful (strategic sufficiency) (see Table).

Table

Linking Means and Ends of a Grand Strategy

	<u>Political Commitments</u>		
	(Ends)		
	Few	Many	
<u>Available Means</u> (Capabilities)	Few	Passivity	Overextension
	Many	Reduction of Objectives	Strategic Sufficiency

Sparta's grand strategy can still offer valuable lessons to the modern strategist. This strategy is an excellent example of the Clausewitzian approach to war, featuring direct approach and destruction of the armed forces of the enemy. Archidamus knew, and the rest of the Spartan policy-makers eventually understood as well, that decisive results could be obtained only by turning against Athens and the sources of Athenian strength; i.e., what Clausewitz called the "center of gravity" of Athenian power. The center of gravity of Athenian power was the navy, whereas another source of Athenian power was the Empire - which itself depended on the navy. The "indirect approach" of ravaging Attica could not enable Sparta to strike at this center of gravity; only the Persian alliance made this possible. The fact that the Spartans consciously turned against the center of gravity of the Athenian power as soon as they obtained the means necessary to

strike against it, demonstrates that they had a clear knowledge of the advantages of the direct approach.

Basil Liddell Hart has argued extensively in favour of the indirect approach, going as far as attributing every successful military action to the adoption of an indirect approach and every unsuccessful one to the adoption of a direct approach.¹²¹ However, one of the flaws of his argument is that he often does not define the level of strategy within which he contrasts direct and indirect approach.¹²² Thus, he cites the fact that indirect approach was used at the tactical or the operational level as evidence for the superiority of this approach, while at the same time disregarding the fact that at the strategic level the approach was direct. For instance, he has called Lysander's victory at Aegospotami "a tactical indirect approach at sea, which was itself the sequel to a fresh indirect approach in grand strategy".¹²³ The second part of this sentence is, of course, mistaken; we have repeatedly pointed out that Sparta's turn against the Athenian navy is a characteristic case of direct approach.¹²⁴ However, the first part is correct. Generally, the grand strategies of Sparta and Athens seem to provide arguments in favour of a direct approach at the grand strategic and strategic levels of war. Indirect approach may be used and in fact it may even be advisable at lower levels, e.g. at the operational or tactical levels of war.

NOTES

1. Although this is an independent article, it shares a common framework and is organically connected with an article previously published in *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies* by Athanassios Platias, namely "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", in *Thucydides: The Classical Theorist of International Relations*, *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 6, No 2 (Autumn 1998), to which references will be made.
2. For the "horizontal dimension" of strategy see Edward Luttwak, **Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace** (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987).
3. See for instance J.F.C. Fuller, **The Decisive Battles of the Western World** (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954); Colin Gray,

The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York: Free Press, 1992); Chester G. Starr, **The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

4. For the classical analysis of the strategies of annihilation and exhaustion, see Hans Delbrück, **History of the Art of War** (4 Vols.) (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975-1985).

5. The bibliography on Napoleon is immense. See among others Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War", in Peter Paret (ed.), **Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age** (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), pp. 123-142 and David G. Chandler, **The Military Maxims of Napoleon** (New York: Macmillan, 1997). On Clausewitz see Carl von Clausewitz, **On War** [edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret] (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989) and Michael Howard, **Clausewitz** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). For the association of Napoleon and Clausewitz with the strategy of annihilation see Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare", **Foreign Affairs** 74, 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 109-122 and Azar Gat, **The Development of Military Thought: the Nineteenth Century** (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 1-45.

6. For the distinction between attrition and maneuver warfare see Luttwak, **Strategy**, pp. 92-99.

7. For the strategic thought of Liddell Hart see Basil Liddell Hart, **Strategy** (2nd rev. edn.) (London: Meridian, 1991) and Brian Bond, **Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought** (London and New Brunswick, 1977).

8. See Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.

9. For an analysis of the Spartan grand strategy during the initial phase of the war see P.A. Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War", in P.A. Brunt, **Studies in Greek History and Thought** (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 84-111.

10. For the concept of strategic culture see Ken Booth, **Strategy and Ethnocentrism** (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Colin Gray, **Nuclear Strategy and National Style** (London: Hamilton Press, 1986); Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture", **Comparative Strategy** Vol. 10 (January-March 1991) pp. 3-23.

11. Herodotus was the first to point out the beneficial impact of the democratic regime as far as Athenian power was concerned; see V 78. See also Michael W. Doyle, **Empires** (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 66-67.

12. For detailed analyses of the Spartan polity see K.M.T. Chrimes, **Ancient Sparta: A Re-examination of the Evidence** (Manchester University Press, 1949); Humphrey Michell, **Sparta** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952); George L. Huxley, **Early Sparta** (London: Faber, 1962); A.H.M. Jones, **Sparta** (Oxford: Blackwell & Mott, 1967); G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War** (London: Duckworth, 1972). For the Spartan legal system see D.M. MacDowell, **Spartan Law** (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1986).

13. For the original Spartan text, the so-called **Rhetra**, which describes Spartan polity as it was supposedly created by the lawgiver Lycurgus, see Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 6.1-2, 7-8. For the name of the Spartan citizen assembly, which seems to have been **Ecclesia** and not *Apella*, as many people nowadays think, see Ste. Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War**, pp. 346-347.

14. The exact procedure of the ephors' election is not known. See P.A. Rahe, "The Selection of Ephors at Sparta", *Historia* 29 (1980), 385-401; P.J. Rhodes, "The Selection of Ephors at Sparta", *Historia* 30 (1981), 498-502; H.D. Westlake, "Reelection to the ephorate?", **Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies** 17 (1976), 343-52.

15. In fact, things were not so simple. Austerity did not dominate Spartan life until some time in the sixth century. Moreover, there were huge inequalities of wealth in Sparta, which were continually making themselves felt. For a treatise that connects the onset of austerity with the rise of the power of the commoners in Sparta, see L.F. Fitzhardinge, **The Spartans** (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980).

However, Fitzhardinge is completely wrong in claiming that the aristocratic families and the *Gerousia* lost their power in the process. The *Gerousia* and the nobles behind it were in firm control of the destinies of Sparta throughout the city's independent existence.

16. This was unanimously acknowledged in Ancient Greece. See Herodotus, VII 104, VII 204, IX 62, IX 71; Thucydides, I 141, V 72, V 75; Xenophon, *Lacedaimonion Politeia*, 13. For the Spartan military organisation see Chrimes, *Ancient Sparta*, pp. 356-396; Humphrey Michell, *Sparta*, pp. 233-280 (pp. 274-280 deal with the Spartan navy); J.F. Lazenby, **The Spartan Army** (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1985).

17. Thucydides states that in Sparta the ratio of slaves to freemen was greater than in any other city; **Thucydides**, VIII 40. The ratio must have been something like ten to one; see G.B. Grundy, **Thucydides and the History of his Age** (Oxford, 1948), p. 219.

18. In fact, each year upon entering office the ephors formally declared war to the Helots; Plutarch, **Lycurgus**, 28. Consequently, a Spartan could kill a Helot without legally committing a homicide. In practice, however, although the Spartans could be extremely harsh on occasion, their treatment of the Helots must have been tolerably good. Furthermore, there was always a distinction between Laconian Helots, who were normally loyal to Sparta, and Messenian Helots, who were Sparta's greatest enemies; see Michel, **Sparta**, pp. 75-84.

19. See **Thucydides**, I 101, IV 41, IV 80.

20. Plutarch, **Lycurgus**, 24.

21. Thucydides, I 70. All quotations from **Thucydides** are from the Rex Warner translation (London: Penguin, 1972).

22. Thucydides makes much of the difference between Athenian and Spartan national character; see **Thucydides**, I 69, I 84, I 118, IV 55, V 54-55, VIII 24.

23. Spartan foreign policy did occasionally fluctuate violently, but there is an amazing overall consistency in maintaining a high military capability and striving after hegemony first in the Peloponnese and then in the whole of Greece.

24. See Platias, “**Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War**”, **Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.

25. Thucydides, I 19. Some of Sparta's Peloponnesian allies like Elis and Mantinea were democracies and retained their preferred regime as long as they remained loyal to Sparta. For the Peloponnesian League see Donald Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War** (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969/1994) pp. 9-30 and especially Ste. Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War**, pp. 96-124, 333-342.

26. Kagan states characteristically that the allies were bound together by distrust of Argos and the common interest for the preservation of oligarchy; Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, p. 13.

27. This was precisely what Polybius argued a few centuries later. According to him, although Sparta's political organisation was enough to ensure her dominant position in the Peloponnese, her limited economic power which was a result of that very political organisation, did not allow her to extend her influence further. The message was clear: Sparta had to either change her political organisation or confine herself to the Peloponnese. See **Polybius**, I 6. 49-50.

28. The rapid decline of the Spartan population during the fifth and fourth centuries had astonished the rest of the Ancient Greeks; see Aristotle, *Politics* II 9, 1270a 33-34; cf. Xenophon, *Lacedaimonion Politeia*, 1. The subject has received detailed treatment from modern scholars; see among others W.G. Forrest, **A History of Sparta**, 950-192 B.C. (New York: Norton, 1968), pp. 134-137; Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, pp. 331-332; Paul Cartledge, **Sparta and Laconia: a regional history**, 1300-362 B.C. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 307-318. For a less satisfactory account, which tries to minimise the importance of the decline see Chrimes, **Ancient Sparta**, pp. 348-356.

29. Doyle, **Empires**, pp. 54-81.

30. For the idea of the creation of a Spartan Empire and the disastrous consequences this scheme brought about, see Forrest, **A History of**

Sparta, pp. 123-126; Kagan, **The Fall of the Athenian Empire**, pp. 13, 27, 306, 328, 397-426; Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober, **The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Doyle, **Empires**, p. 73. Barry Strauss and Josiah Ober, drawing from Aristotle, claim that Sparta was in no position to conduct an imperialist policy because the strict military-oriented education of the Spartans made them overestimate the role of military power and consequently rendered them unable to conduct successful diplomacy and reach compromise; see Strauss and Ober, **The Anatomy of Error**, Ch. 3. Despite Aristotle's authority, this claim must be rejected. Sparta had been successfully playing the diplomatic game for centuries and can hardly be called incapable of conducting diplomacy. Moreover, the Athenians (and later the Romans and so many others) did not acquire their empire through rhetorical and diplomatic skill, but basically through successful application of military power. Sparta's problem was not excessive emphasis on military power, but lack of adequate military power.

31. **Thucydides**, I 71.

32. See Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.

33. Thucydides makes this point repeatedly; see I 67-68, I 71, I 86, I 118.

34. For Archidamus' speech see **Thucydides**, I 80-85.

35. See Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, pp. 345-374. The same view is advanced in Jones, **Sparta**, pp. 68-69. For a rejoinder see Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.

36. **Thucydides**, I 19. A similar case coming to mind is that of the British Empire after the War of the American Independence (1775-1783). Although the loss of the American colonies was a serious blow, British economic power kept growing at a fast pace, securing the global supremacy of Great Britain.

37. **Thucydides**, I 82. Archidamus' clear reference to an alliance with the Persians ("foreigners") is an interesting predecessor of a number of cases where Realpolitik brought "irreconcilable enemies" together. The alliance of France with the Ottomans against Spain during the Renaissance is the first such example in modern history, whereas the alliance of Catholic cardinal Richelieu with the Protestant states of Europe against the Catholic Holy Roman Empire is another case in point. In the twentieth century, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and Nixon's rapprochement with China constitute similar cases. For a comparison of the Spartan-Persian alliance with the modern diplomatic surprises mentioned above see Strauss and Ober, **The Anatomy of Error**, p. 75. For Richelieu's partnership with the Protestants see J.H. Elliott, **Richelieu and Olivares** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984/1991) pp. 113-142 and Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), Ch. 3. For the concept of diplomatic surprise and an analysis of some modern instances of diplomatic surprise see Michael Handel, **The Diplomacy of Surprise: Hitler, Nixon, Sadat** (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Center for International Studies, 1981) and Constantinos Koliopoulos, **Understanding Strategic Surprise: An Inquiry into the Phenomenon of Strategic Surprise** (Ph.D. Thesis, Lancaster University, 1999), pp. 208-216.

38. **Thucydides**, I 86.

39. Cf. **Thucydides**, IV 18, IV 21, IV 85, V 14. An impossible theory has recently been put forward by Gregory Crane, namely that Sthenelaidas stressed "the fundamental bonds that bind human beings together", grasping that "Sparta's personalized relationships with its allies are its strength"; see Gregory Crane, **Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity: The Limits of Political Realism** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 212-221. Interstate alliances are not built on moral bonds and this was perhaps least of all the case with the Peloponnesian League. Alliances are vehicles through which the states try to enhance their security. As we have already pointed out, for Sparta the Peloponnesian League was a means of extending her influence and increasing her military strength,

whereas for the allies it was a means of warding off external threats and (as far as the ruling classes were concerned) perpetuating oligarchic rule at home. If the League could not perform these tasks, the parties would be inclined to leave it, notwithstanding the "moral bonds" among them. Actually, although Sparta did go to war and suffered some bad defeats in the process, her allies had no scruples about defecting the League en masse after the Peace of Nicias showed that Sparta was not strong enough to guarantee their security. Thus, Sthenelaidas did not appeal to "moral bonds" and the like, but simply misjudged the balance of power.

40. Thucydides, IV 85, V 14. Thucydides states that nobody in Greece expected that Athens would resist more than three years if the Spartans invaded Attica; **Thucydides**, VII 28.

41. For analyses of the balance of power between Athens and Sparta after Sicily see **Thucydides**, VIII 1, VIII 48, VIII 53. For a presentation of Spartan relations with the Persians see D.M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden: Brill, 1977).

42. Thucydides, VIII 53.

43. See Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.

44. We must point out here that Donald Kagan holds a different view regarding the origins of the Peloponnesian War. Having doubted the growth of the Athenian power prior to the war (see above), the American historian claims that the Spartans were reluctant to start a war with Athens but were dragged into it by their allies and their bellicose ephors. See Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, esp. pp. 286-316. Actually, there is no evidence whatsoever to support the view that Spartan citizens wanted peace in contrast to their ephors who wanted war. In addition, Kagan himself claims that the ephors must have initially been supporters of peace, but changed their minds after the incidents of Corcyra and Potidaea (ibid., p. 307, fn. 46). If this had indeed been the case, one may well enquire why it was only the ephors that changed their minds while the majority of the

Spartans continued to favour peace. This does not really make sense and consequently renders Kagan's argument groundless. For analyses that, like the present one, endorse the Thucydidean view that Sparta began the war willingly in order to check Athenian power see Ste. Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War** and Anton Powell, **Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social History** from 478 B.C. (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 118-128. For an analysis of the debate in the Spartan Assembly regarding the issue of war against Athens see A.W. Gomme, **A Historical Commentary on Thucydides**, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), pp. 252-256.

45. A number of scholars have claimed that since the end of the Persian Wars there existed in Sparta a group which they have called the "peace party" or the "doves", in contrast to the "war party" or the "hawks". The only evidence one can find for this is that in two sessions of the Assembly separated by about half a century (475 and 432 respectively), one part favoured war with Athens while the other one disagreed. The effort to explain the whole of Spartan security policy in the meantime as a struggle between these two parties is based on pure conjecture. It is highly interesting, however, that the exponents of this theory have depicted Archidamus as the leader of the "peace party" (Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War", p. 111; Jones, *Sparta*, pp. 63-71; Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, pp. 87, 300-304) or the "doves" (Ste. Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War**, pp. 142-143). However, his speech at the Spartan Assembly should leave no doubt that in principle he was not at all averse to the idea of a war with Athens. If coercive diplomacy failed, Archidamus was ready to go to war on completion of the relevant preparations. In this war, he believed that Sparta ought to follow a grand strategy of annihilation.

46. Sparta's Corinthian allies must have shared this belief as well; see the strategy they outlined in their speech in **Thucydides**, I 120-122. Although this strategy was basically sound and included many of the elements of the grand strategy Sparta actually followed (e.g. naval balancing, creation of a fort in Attica), the balance of power was so

adverse to the Peloponnesians, that this strategy could not be implemented. Most importantly, the strategy outlined by the Corinthians lacked the crucial dimension of external balancing through an alliance with the Persians. The successful balancing of the Athenian naval power through Persian help was the decisive factor which gave victory to Sparta.

47. The same point is made by Brunt; "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War", p. 88.

48. See Alcibiades' speech at Sparta in **Thucydides** VI 90. Some scholars do not accept Alcibiades' account at face value, in the supposition that he was exaggerating so as to alarm the Spartans (see, for instance, Donald Kagan, **The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition** (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981/1992), pp. 254-257. Still, the Athenians had obviously embarked upon the conquest of Sicily. This by itself constituted pursuit of unlimited objectives. For an enthusiastic approval of Alcibiades' "grand scheme" as genuine and viable see Jacqueline de Romilly, **Alcibiades** [Greek transl., 2nd. edn.] (Athens: Asty, 1995), pp. 103-104.

49. See Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.

50. **Thucydides**, I 82; see also II 18-20. For the classical analysis of coercion in international relations see Thomas Schelling, **Arms and Influence**, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). For a general theory of coercive diplomacy see Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, **The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy** (Boston, 1971) and Alexander George, **Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as Alternative to War** (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1991).

51. **Thucydides**, I 139.

52. **Thucydides**, I 114-115. See also Raphael Sealey, **A History of the Greek City States** ca. 700-338 B.C. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 321.

53. See Schelling, **Arms and Influence**. Also, James Alt, Randall Calvert, Brian Humes, "Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game Theoretical Analysis", **American Political Science Review** 92 (June 1988), pp. 445-466; John D. Orne, **Deterrence, Reputation and the Prevention of Cold-War Cycles** (London: Macmillan, 1992).

54. For an analysis of this point see Athanassios G. Platias, "Greek Strategy at Crossroads", in Panayiotis Ifestos and Athanassios Platias, **Greek Deterrence Strategy** (Athens: Papazisis, 1992), p. 172 (text in Greek).

55. See Ernest R. May, **The Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Richard E. Meastand and Ernest R. May, **Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers** (New York: Free Press, 1986); Michael Howard, **The Lessons of History** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

56. See Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, pp. 123-126.

57. For the abortive attempt of the Spartans to preclude the rebuilding of the walls of Athens after the withdrawal of the Persians see Thucydides I 90-92, as well as the analysis in Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", *Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 6, No 2

58. See Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", *Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 6, No 2.

59. This had been the constant nightmare of British policy-makers, and their motivation for preserving the balance of power in Europe. See Paul Kennedy, **The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery** (London: Fontana, 1991).

60. **Thucydides**, II 7.

61. Cf. **Thucydides**, VI 34.

62. **Thucydides**, IV 50. **Thucydides** makes it clear that both sides tried to coax the Persians; **Thucydides**, II 7, IV 50.

63. **Thucydides**, IV 75.

64. See Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.

65. Plutarch has made the startling claim that, since the military training relaxed during wartime, the Spartans viewed war as a respite! Plutarch, **Lycurgus**, 22.

66. See Thucydides, I 121. However, the Peloponnesian citizen armies could not easily campaign during the harvest period; cf. **Thucydides**, III 15.

67. See also Lin Foxhall, "Farming and Fighting in Ancient Greece", in John Rich and Graham Shipley (eds.), **War and Society in the Greek World**, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 142-143.

68. **Thucydides**, I 58, I 97

69. **Thucydides**, III 16.

70. **Thucydides**, III 26-33.

71. For Brasidas' campaign see **Thucydides**, IV 70, IV 78-88, IV 102-117, IV 120-134, V 2-3, V 6-13. This campaign has many similarities with the "southern strategy" proposed to Hitler by Admiral Raeder, namely a massive German move to North Africa with a view to dismantling the British Empire in the Middle East. One might be tempted to pursue this analogy further still, by pointing out to the similarities between Brasidas and another dashing commander, Erwin Rommel. There are at least two important differences, however. First, that Brasidas also had to exercise considerable diplomatic skill apart from operational dexterity. Second, that Brasidas' campaign did conform to a grand strategic design, whereas Rommel's exploits did not, for Hitler had decided to concentrate against the Soviet Union instead of the British Empire. For critical views of Rommel's conduct see Martin van Creveld, **Supplying War** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 181-201 and Luttwak, *Strategy*, pp. 210-221. For an analysis of Brasidas' campaign see Simon Hornblower, **A Commentary on Thucydides**, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), pp. 38-61.

72. See **Thucydides**, III 100, III 114.

73. **Thucydides**, VII 27-28.

74. As recorded in **Thucydides**, VI 91. For a modern treatise that adopts this view see Romilly, **Alcibiades**, pp. 140-143.

75. Angelos Vlahos, **Comments on Thucydides**, Vol. I: Books I - IV (Athens: Estia Bookstore, 1992), pp. 401-408 (text in Greek). Cf. also the comment of A.H.M. Jones that "neither side [Sparta and Athens] showed much intelligence and initiative in their operations"; Jones, **Sparta**, p. 70. It must be obvious that we are in total disagreement with these views.

76. **Thucydides**, I 122, V 17. Alcibiades might have played a role in the selection of Decelea as the locus for the establishment of the fort. However, even this might not have been the case, since the Spartans had since time immemorial been well acquainted with Decelea. According to Herodotus, because of an incident dating since the days of the Trojan War, the Spartans had always held the inhabitants of Decelea in high esteem and granted them special honours. Moreover, Herodotus goes on to say that in the Peloponnesian War the Spartans spared the lands of the Deceleans; **Herodotus**, IX 73. In other words, the Spartans did not need Alcibiades to inform them about the merits of the place.

77. For the problems associated with the creation of a permanent fort in Athens see also Donald Kagan, **The Archidamian War** (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 350-351.

78. **Thucydides**, VI 93, VII 1-7. Some scholars have attributed this Spartan action to Alcibiades; see Romilly, **Alcibiades**, pp. 138-140. In fact, the same measure had been suggested to the Spartans by the Corinthian and Syracusan ambassadors (**Thucydides**, VI 88) and it is difficult to believe that Alcibiades' words carried great weight with the Spartans. Moreover, the aid that was finally sent was much smaller than the one urged by Alcibiades. In general, one should not overestimate the contribution of Alcibiades to Spartan grand strategy. The Athenian exile always remained a controversial figure in the eyes of the Spartans and his influence was correspondingly limited. See also

Kagan, **The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition**, pp. 257-259.

79. Cf. Thucydides, VII 18, VII 28. The doctrine of “two-and-a-half wars” had been suggested as the advisable military strategy of the United States during the Cold War. According to this, the USA ought to be prepared to conduct at the same time a major war in Europe, another one in Asia and retain some additional military capability for dealing with regional conflicts in the Western hemisphere. This doctrine was never implemented. It is interesting that nowadays some Turkish analysts suggest that their country should adopt such a doctrine. According to them, Turkey must be in a position to face at the same time Greece and Syria, plus the Kurdish insurrection. See Sukru Elekdog, “2 War Strategy”, *Perceptions* (Ankara) (March-May 1996), pp. 33-57.

80. **Thucydides**, VIII 2.

81. **Thucydides**, VIII 3, VIII 26.

82. See **Thucydides**, Book VIII. Tissaphernes followed the strategy of “divide et impera”, by providing inadequate help to the Spartans with a view to exhaust both belligerents. See especially **Thucydides**, VIII 46, VIII 87. Pharnabazus, on the other hand, helped the Spartans as much as he could, but the resources at his disposal were limited compared with those of Tissaphernes; see Donald Kagan, **The Fall of the Athenian Empire** (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 34, 247.

83. Xenophon, **Hellenica**, A IV 1-4, A V 1-7; Plutarch, **Lysander**, 4.

84. In the beginning of 406 B.C. a personal feud between Cyrus and the Spartan admiral Callicratidas led to the stoppage of Persian payments. However, the two men quickly came to terms and the payments were resumed; Xenophon, **Hellenica**, A VI 6-7, A VI 10-11, A VI 18; Plutarch, **Lysander**, 6. For Cyrus’ tremendous financial help to the Spartans after their defeat at Arginousae the same year, see Xenophon, **Hellenica**, B I 11-14; Plutarch, **Lysander**, 9.

85. **Thucydides**, VIII 1.

86. **Thucydides**, VIII 48-56; Xenophon, **Hellenica**, A IV 5-7.
87. **Thucydides**, II 7, IV 50.
88. See Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2. However, it must be noted that there was another side of the coin as well. The subjects of the Athenian Empire stood to gain from the Athenian commercial activities, and the empire provided a number of "collective goods" such as integration in a huge market, suppression of piracy, etc. Consequently, international legitimacy was not completely absent from the Athenian Empire; see Doyle, *Empires*, p. 57 and the sources cited there. See also below.
89. **Herodotus**, III 46-56, V 63-65, V 92; **Thucydides**, I 122, VI 53. See also Forrest, **A History of Sparta**, pp. 79-83.
90. **Thucydides**, II 8. See also III 13, III 31. On the other hand, it has already been demonstrated that Sparta did not receive much help of substance until after the Athenian disaster in Sicily.
91. **Thucydides**, IV 81; see also IV 85-89, IV 106-108.
92. See also Foxhall, "Farming and Fighting in Ancient Greece", p. 143.
93. **Thucydides**, II 20, emphasis added. However, the Achatnians continued to be ardent advocates of the continuation of the war even after the devastation of their land; see Kagan, *The Archidamian War*, pp. 51-52.
94. **Thucydides**, II 59.
95. The Athenians did offer battle outside their walls in 410 B.C. Interestingly enough, the Peloponnesians declined; Xenophon, **Hellenica**, A I 33-34.
96. **Thucydides**, V 16-17. See also Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.
97. See **Thucydides**, III 70-86. The existence in most cities of a democratic faction which was looking to Athens for support, was a

factor that increased the international legitimacy of the Athenian grand strategy.

98. The regime and the customs of Sparta enjoyed high legitimacy among the Spartan citizens, at least until the middle of the third century B.C. Thucydides was one of the many Ancient Greek writers who praised the Spartan polity; see **Thucydides**, I 18, VIII 24. For a praise of the Spartan customs and national character from Archidamus, who countered the accusations of the Corinthians presented in the beginning of the present chapter see **Thucydides** I 84. See also Xenophon, **Lacedaimonion Politeia** and Plutarch, **Lycurgus**. It must be pointed out, however, that Xenophon's and especially Plutarch's accounts present a highly idealised picture of Sparta.

99. For the oligarchic coup and subsequent developments see **Thucydides**, VIII 47-98. For the negotiations of the oligarchs with the Spartans and the alleged conspiracy, see VIII 70-71, VIII 86, VIII 90-96. This oligarchic "fifth column" can be regarded as a predecessor of the fascist "fifth column" that was reputedly in action during the siege of Madrid by Franco's troops in 1939.

100. **Thucydides**, II 65.

101. P.A. Brunt says that the Spartans had to adopt a strategy of attrition; Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War", p. 94. However, only the cost-raising aspects of Spartan grand strategy can really be given this name. Annihilation was what the Spartans were chiefly aiming at. Even the annual devastation of Attica primarily aimed at bringing about a decisive land battle. See above, as well as Victor Davis Hanson, **Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) [revised edn.], pp. 131-173.

102. See Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.

103. Arther Ferrill, **The Origins of War from the Stone Age to Alexander the Great** (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985), pp. 127-128.

104. That the Spartans had been thinking the war would be decided swiftly by their invasions of Attica and thus had not felt the need to take these measures, can be seen clearly in Brasidas' speech included in **Thucydides**, IV 85. For the Spartan attempt to obtain peace by threatening to establish a fort in Attica see **Thucydides**, V 17.

105. See Platias, "Thucydides On Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy During The Peloponnesian War", **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 6, No 2.

106. Liddell Hart has stated that "the scales were definitely turned against Athens" by Brasidas' expedition, which he calls an indirect approach; Liddell Hart, **Strategy**, p. 13. Both his points are wrong: Athens could still obtain an advantageous peace after Brasidas' expedition, whereas it has already been demonstrated that this move against the Athenian sources of strength constituted a direct approach, in contrast to the psychological game played by the destruction of Attica.

107. **Thucydides** V 75. For Sparta's strategy against the resurgent Argos, culminating in the battle of Mantinea, see **Thucydides**, V 57-76.

108. See the now classic analysis of Victor Hanson, **The Western Way of War** (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1989).

109. This was the chief objection raised against such battles by two of the greatest 18th-century generals, namely Marshal Maurice de Saxe and King Frederick the Great. See their treatises reproduced in Thomas R. Phillips (ed.), **Roots of Strategy: a collection of military classics** (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1943), Ch. 3, 4.

110. For instance, the outcome could have been different at the previously mentioned battle of Plataea, where both sides committed a number of tactical mistakes; see Fuller, **The Decisive Battles of the Western World**, Ch. 1.

111. For the decisive effects of a timely Athenian and Elean intervention in Mantinea see Kagan, **The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition**, p. 134. Of course, other things could have happened as well: the Spartans could have achieved a crushing victory over the

Argives some months earlier (**Thucydides**, V 59-60) or their Corinthian and Boeotian allies could in turn have timely intervened in Mantinea. All this clearly shows that Alcibiades was right when boasting that with his policy (Athens' alliance with Argos) he forced the Spartans "risk their all on the issue of one day's fighting at Mantinea" (**Thucydides**, VI 16). This was something that happened to the Spartans from time to time. For two earlier instances when they were forced to gamble (and win) their hegemony in the Peloponnese with decisive battles in Tegea and Dipaea during the 470s and 460s see **Herodotus**, IX 35; Jones, *Sparta*, 61; Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, pp. 54-55. It is a pity we do not know more about these battles and their surrounding circumstances.

112. **Thucydides**, VII 18.

113. Gradually the Spartans were brought round to the view that they should succeed the Athenians in creating an empire of their own in Greece. As was mentioned above, this undertaking was contrary to the Spartan political organisation and led to catastrophe.

114. **Thucydides**, VIII 1.

115. For these battles see Xenophon, **Hellenica**, A I 16-18, A VI 28-35.

116. The Spartan peace proposals came after Cyzicus and Arginusae respectively. Both called for recognition of the status quo as it stood at the time (i.e. Athenian recognition of the losses their empire had sustained) and abandonment of the forts each combatant had on the other's territory; see respectively **Diodorus** 13. 52-53 and **Aristotle**, **Athenaion Politeia**, 34. 1.

117. For ancient accounts of this battle see Xenophon, **Hellenica**, B I 22-30 and Plutarch, **Lysander**, 10-11. For an excellent modern analysis collating various ancient sources see Donald Kagan, **The Fall of the Athenian Empire** (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 386-393.

118. See, among others, André Corvisier and John Childs, "Planning/Plans", in André Corvisier (ed.), **A Dictionary of Military History** (London: Blackwell, 1994), p. 654 and Doyne Dawson, **The Origins of Western Warfare**, (Boulder: Westview, 1996).

119. Delbrück, **History of the Art of War**, Vol. 1, p. 137. For different assessments of Pericles and his grand strategy see among others Donald Kagan, "Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War", in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds.), **The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 54 and Strauss and Ober, **The Anatomy of Error**, p. 47.

120. A.H.M. Jones calls him "a patriotic, able and courageous king"; Jones, *Sparta*, p. 71. W.G. Forrest, on the other hand, merely says that Archidamus conducted the invasions of Attica "without alacrity but without obvious incompetence"; Forrest, **A History of Sparta**, p. 112.

121. See Liddell Hart, **Strategy**.

122. For the various levels of strategy see Luttwak, **Strategy**.

123. Liddell Hart, **Strategy**, p. 13.

124. Liddell Hart's attempt to "usurp" all the military successes in History on behalf of the indirect approach seriously weakens his analysis. For a pertinent comment see Martin van Creveld, **Technology and War** (New York: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 5-6.

Identité ethnique et comportement politique: le comportement électoral d'un groupe de tsiganes musulmans de Thrace de l'Ouest en Grèce

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ABSTRACT

Ethnic community and Political behaviour: The electoral behaviour of a group of muslim gypsies in West Thrace in Greece.

This study attempts to relate the notion of ethnic group with that of political-electoral behavior. The empirical field of analysis will be based on a group of Muslim gypsies in Thrace. The theoretical starting point of the present article is the correlation between the characteristics of the ethnic group which are determined by historical circumstances and do not stand for physical or almost physical realities. These characteristics originate from the level of significance of the occurring differences between the ethnic group and other groups as acknowledged by the former, whereas this significance derives from the result of various influences. The residents of Ifestos in the city of Komotini, are Muslims and speak Turkish. These are the elements that define the Muslim minority in Greece. However their electoral behaviour differs from the rest of Komotini's Muslim minority. Concluding this essay will try to trace the reasons for this attitude and proceeds further to interpretations that could become generalized.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce travail a pour but de relier la notion de groupe ethnique à celle de comportement politique/électoral en utilisant comme champ d'analyse expérimentale le cas d'un groupe de tsiganes de Thrace. Le fait que les caractéristiques du groupe ethnique sont déterminées par des circonstances historiques et ne constituent pas des réalités naturelles, ou presque naturelles, est le principe théorique de cette recherche. Ces caractéristiques dépendent du sens que donne le groupe aux différences qui le distingue des autres groupes, et ce sens est le produit d'une variété d'influences. Les habitants du quartier Ifestos de la ville de Komotini sont de religion musulmane et parle la langue turque. Toutefois, leur comportement électoral est distinct de celui du reste de la minorité musulmane de Komotini. Cette recherche vise à déceler les raisons et le fonctionnement de ces différenciations, et donne des interprétations qui semble pouvoir être généralisées.

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La mise en rapport de l'identité ethnique et du comportement électoral est une entreprise difficile car la notion de groupe ethnique est souvent imprécise et peut être confondue avec d'autres notions ou être le produit d'une construction idéologique imposée par l'étatnation (Karakasidou, 1997).

Bien entendu, le débat sur la formation des identités nationales dépasse le cadre de cet article et nous n'avons pas l'intention de le traiter dans son ensemble. Pour les besoins de ce travail, nous nous limiterons aux trois courants principaux qui dominent le débat sur "l'ethnicité".

Ceux qui appartiennent à la première école considèrent que la notion est déterminée par des critères objectifs liés à l'existence même de l'individu. La langue, les pratiques religieuses, les données culturelles ainsi que certaines caractéristiques extérieures sont envisagées comme les composantes des groupes ethniques qui, à leur tour, sont envisagées comme des unités naturelles, prolongation naturelle des relations familiales (Shils, 1957, Van de Bergh, 1979). Les éléments constituant un groupe ethnique sont définis, par cette école, comme des "relations primordiales" (Geertz, 1963) et, selon les *primordialistes*, leur contribution est décisive pour distinguer un groupe ethnique d'un autre.

La seconde approche, refuse d'accepter que la notion de groupe ethnique est déterminée par des critères stables, et constitue un instrument d'analyse fiable de la réalité. Dans ce cadre, il est soutenu que les critères utilisés ne sont pas stables mais changent continuellement dans le temps et dans l'espace. Pour définir *l'appartenance ethnique*, la langue ou la tradition ou la religion peuvent être utilisées; fait qui montre le caractère flou et incertain de la notion. Certains adeptes de cette conception conçoivent les groupes ethniques comme des groupes d'intérêts plus ou moins cachés (Cross, 1978), ou comme reflétant des divisions sociales (Barth, 1969), alors que d'autres soutiennent qu'un "groupe ethnique est un élément auquel un ethnologue a consacré un livre" (M'Bokolo, 1998: 323).

Enfin, un troisième courant de pensée¹ intermédiaire reconnaît l'existence de critères objectifs qui déterminent le groupe ethnique mais relativise leur signification et surtout la façon dont ces critères fonctionnent dans la réalité expérimentale. Ici, le groupe ethnique est considéré comme une production historique (Fox, 1990; Coulon, 1997) et l'ethnicité ne se réfère pas à une essence innée mais à un ensemble d'interactions sociales (Poutignat, Streiff-Feinart, 1995). En fait, l'identité ethnique n'est pas perçue comme une situation immuable mais comme un tissu de relations et d'interactions pouvant changer, même radicalement, suivant les circonstances, le cadre, les initiatives de l'individu ou du groupe. Dans ce travail, nous avons adopté cette troisième approche.

Notre analyse nous conduit à accorder une grande importance aux significations données aux différences ethniques et, en fait, à la construction de ces significations et aux facteurs intervenant au cours de la procédure de construction. Nous devons donc, dans cette optique, nous intéresser à deux autres points essentiels.

Premièrement: La notion de minorité ethnique, d'après J. Rex est souvent utilisée par des groupes dominants à l'égard de groupes dominés et fonctionne comme une caractéristique qui détermine l'infériorité et la soumission (Rex, 1996). Ceci est particulièrement perceptible dans le cas des tsiganes. L'utilisation des mots tsigane, gitan, etc, en Grèce et ailleurs, révèle des relations économiques, sociales et culturelles dominant-dominé et non pas des relations majorité-minorité ou des discriminations ethniques basées sur des caractéristiques culturelles "socialement neutres".

Deuxièmement: Le lien entre le statut social et la détermination ethnique conduit à une autre observation. La classe sociale et le groupe ethnique ne sont pas obligatoirement des catégories distinctes; il peut exister un lien entre l'intégration ethnique, la profession et le niveau de vie (Wallerstein, 1967; Horowitz, 1985). En fait, la perception des éléments culturels (langue, religion, etc) n'est pas indépendante de la position sociale, des conflits d'intérêts et des rapports de pouvoir. Comme en témoignent des recherches précédentes, dans le cas des tsi-

ganes en Grèce, l'identité ethnique est liée à un statut d'exclusion sociale (Kokkinaki, 1983; Mouheli, 1996). Par extension, le terme tsi-gane réfère rarement à la langue ou à la religion mais plutôt à un niveau de vie qui se distingue de l'ensemble, et caractérise des personnes qui se trouvent au bas de la hiérarchie sociale.

En résumé, nous estimons que la perception d'un groupe ethnique n'est pas tant le résultat du fonctionnement de ses caractéristiques ethniques que le résultat de la signification que donnent les membres d'un groupe à ces caractéristiques; signification qui se modèle suivant des critères extérieurs à l'ethnicité (Russel, Ashmore, 1973; Horowitz, 1985: 16). Ces caractéristiques acquièrent plus de poids lorsqu'elles sont corrélatives à une mobilisation politique axée sur l'appartenance ethnique. Dans ce cas - nous pensons le démontrer dans notre recherche - la façon dont les différences ethniques sont perçues joue un rôle décisif dans la mobilisation politique ou non d'un groupe ethnique. A ce stade, nous pouvons aborder le champ expérimental.

En Thrace de l'Ouest, à chaque élection législative, se développe un débat autour des caractéristiques du comportement électoral de la minorité et de l'origine² de ce comportement. Pendant les années 1985-1995, le débat se concentre sur la montée et l'action des formations indépendantes de la minorité.

Malgré les opinions différentes, il semble que le débat soit dominé par la conception selon laquelle les identifications ethniques constituent l'instrument d'interprétation principal pour la compréhension des comportements politiques des minorités. En d'autres termes, il est pensé que l'identité religieuse (en premier lieu) et linguistique (en second lieu) des musulmans et la conscience de cette différence, soit ethnique, soit nationale ("nous sommes turcs"), sont les éléments qui déterminent leur comportement politique et électoral.

A travers ce travail, nous désirons montrer que les origines du comportement électoral des musulmans de Thrace de l'Ouest ne doivent pas être exclusivement recherchées dans la conscience qu'ils ont de leurs principales caractéristiques ethniques, mais surtout dans la

manière dont ces différences sont perçues par le groupe même et par ceux qui sont extérieurs au groupe. Ces différences sont enregistrées dans une situation sociale donnée vécue par les membres du groupe tant au niveau individuel que collectif; elles sont également liées aux rapports qu'entretient le groupe avec l'état et les partis politiques. La prise de conscience de la différence se transforme en un ensemble de conventions qui influencent, de plus en plus, les relations sociales existant autour ou dans un groupe ethnique (Campbel, 1999). Dans le cas de notre hypothèse de travail, l'identité ethnique se transforme de matière première de production d'attitudes et comportements politiques en instrument utilisé au cours de la procédure de production des comportements politiques.

Afin d'aborder les questions posées ci-dessus, nous avons étudié le comportement électoral de la minorité, plus particulièrement celui d'une communauté de tsiganes musulmans turcophones de la municipalité de Komotini, à Ifestos. Le groupe présente, comme nous le verrons ultérieurement, beaucoup plus de différences que de similitudes par rapport au comportement électoral du reste de la minorité musulmane. Notre objectif était, donc, de déceler et décrire ces différences ainsi que les mécanismes qui les créent. Le choix d'une population limitée avec des relations ethniques cohérentes, nous a permis d'approfondir le niveau micro-social afin d'observer des processus qui, nous croyons, peuvent être partiellement généralisés.

Dans notre recherche, nous nous sommes limités aux résultats des élections parlementaires. Nous n'avons pas étendu nos recherches aux élections municipales et régionales car nous aurions été confrontés à un problème méthodologique; les unités de grandeur n'étant pas exactement comparables (individus, espaces politiques, etc). D'autre part, nous avons observé que les tendances politiques se manifestent plus clairement aux élections législatives.

Nous avons focalisé notre intérêt sur les élections des dix dernières années.³ Le choix de cette période a été guidé par le fait que, c'est, pendant ces dix dernières années, que sont apparues les formations indépendantes représentant la minorité. Les élections de 1985,

comme le souligne D. Dodos (1994: 32), établissent une rupture dans le comportement électoral de la minorité musulmane en Thrace car sont apparus pour la première fois, à Xanthi, la formation politique Paix représentant exclusivement la minorité et, à Rodopi, le candidat indépendant Sabachedi Chatzi Chafouz Ali. Les formations issues de la minorité ont pour but d'exprimer et de promouvoir les droits de la minorité musulmane - qu'ils qualifient eux-même de turque -; rôle que ne peuvent tenir, d'après eux, les partis d'envergure nationale qui sont dominés par des chrétiens Grecs.

Tout d'abord, nous avons enregistré et étudié le comportement électoral des musulmans de Komotini puis, nous l'avons comparé à celui des chrétiens. Dans un second temps, nous avons isolé, de l'ensemble des musulmans, et décrit le comportement électoral des habitants de Ifestos puis nous l'avons comparé à celui des autres musulmans.

Avant de continuer notre exposé, nous voudrions préciser que la présentation des résultats électoraux de la municipalité de Komotini n'avait pas pour objectif une étude approfondie des facteurs qui déterminent le vote de la minorité musulmane dans cette municipalité. Ces résultats seront utilisés uniquement afin d'être comparés à ceux de la communauté de tsiganes musulmans de Ifestos. Ces derniers seront analysés et feront l'objet d'une interprétation plus poussée.

LE COMPORTEMENT ELECTORAL DES MUSULMANS À KOMOTINI

La municipalité de Komotini compte quarante milles habitants dont la moitié environ appartiennent à la minorité musulmane.⁴ Aujourd'hui, environ dix mille électeurs⁵ musulmans sont inscrits sur les listes électorales (10.111 en 1996 - 9.005 en 1985). Ils votent dans trois circonscriptions (qui correspondent à des quartiers) exclusivement musulmanes: Idadie, Genitze et Kir Machale.

En observant les résultats des élections législatives des années 1985-1996 de la ville de Komotini, nous notons que les deux communautés (chrétienne et musulmane) se comportent de façon très différentes. Le comportement électoral des chrétiens, en général, suit les tendances

enregistrées au niveau national (tableaux 1 et 2). Les socialistes du PASOK sont le premier parti aux élections de 1985, 1993 et 1996 et, les conservateurs de N.D. ont été le premier choix des électeurs chrétiens de Komotini aux élections de juin 1989, novembre 1989 et avril 1990. La gauche communiste, y compris la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès, atteindra ses meilleurs résultats aux élections de juin 1989. Les électeurs musulmans, quant à eux, s'inscrivent dans une optique différente (tableau 3).

Aux élections de 1985, environ six mille électeurs des trois circonscriptions musulmanes de la municipalité de Komotini votent pour N.D. (58,1%) alors que le candidat indépendant de la minorité arrive en seconde position avec 1.072 voix (18,09%). Le PASOK atteint tout juste 16,55% alors que le Parti Communiste Grec (P.C.G.) et le Parti Communiste Grec de l'intérieur n'atteignent pas les 4% (3,61%).

Aux élections de juin 1989, la scène change radicalement. La formation de la minorité *Confiance* est propulsé à 60% (58,95%) et le député Ach. Sadik est élu. Cette hausse impressionnante s'accompagne de la chute dramatique de N.D. qui arrive tout juste à atteindre 10% (10,30%). Au contraire, le PASOK ne semble pas touché par la présence de la formation politique de la minorité et atteint 25,44%. Enfin, la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès fait sa première apparition et, malgré ses faibles ambitions dans cette région, le résultat est particulièrement mauvais: tout juste 1,73%. Il faut également souligner que le PASOK perd du terrain dans toute la Grèce alors qu'il continue sa progression chez les électeurs musulmans qui, par la suite, continueront à se comporter de façon différente que les chrétiens.

Aux élections de novembre de la même année, la formation politique de la minorité musulmane enregistre une baisse importante. Dans les trois circonscriptions musulmanes de la municipalité de Komotini, elle gagne 2.915 votes, soit 43,65%, ce qui correspond, environ, à une perte de 15 points. Bien que la formation ne perde que 322 voix, la différence provient de l'augmentation importante du nombre de votants (de 5.660 à 6.958). Les causes de cette chute sont,

plus ou moins, dûes aux interventions de l'appareil étatique - le point culminant de ces interventions étant la poursuite pénale et la condamnation de Ahmet Sadik - qui de cette manière réagit à l'élection d'un député représentant la minorité. Le parti N.D. s'avère être le gagnant car il récupère 12 des 15 points perdus par la formation de la minorité. Il atteint 22,35%, s'approchant ainsi du PASOK qui, lui, reste stable à environ de 25% (26,62%) alors que la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès gagne 3 unités (4,53%).

En avril 1990, la situation est, à nouveau, pratiquement la même qu'en juin 1989. La formation de la minorité atteint son plus haut pourcentage (59,95%); fait qui a des conséquences négatives pour les autres partis. Le PASOK tombe à 19,61%, N.D. à 13,95% et la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès à 3,65%. Sadik, dont la candidature avait été retirée en novembre 1989 et remplacée par celle de Molla Ismaïl Rodoplou, est réélu.

Les élections de 1993 présentent un intérêt particulier car le système électoral (minimum de 3%) écarte du Parlement les formations indépendantes de la minorité. Bien qu'elle n'ait aucun espoir d'élire un député, la minorité se tourne, de nouveau, vers le parti *Confiance* qui atteint le même pourcentage (59,95%) qu'aux élections précédentes. Le PASOK gagne quatre unités (23,91%) alors que N.D. tombe, pour la première fois, au-dessous de 10% (9,77%). Enfin, le pourcentage du P.C.G. et de la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès est, à peu près, identique à celui des élections de 1990 (3,47%).

Aux élections de 1996, aucune formation de la minorité ne se présente. Les voix de la minorité se reporte, principalement, sur deux partis: le PASOK et la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès. Le PASOK est propulsé à 42,62%, gagnant ainsi 20 unités, et le député Galip Galip est élu. La Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès atteint un pourcentage record 31,68%; ce pourcentage additionné à celui du P.C.G. fait atteindre à la gauche un pourcentage inédit pour elle. N.D. ne dépasse pas 15% (14,95%) occupant, ainsi, dans une position marginale dans le vote de la minorité.

(Tableau 1)

**Elections parlementaires et principaux partis politiques
en Grèce dans les années 1985-1996 (%)**

Année	Néa Dimokratia Conservateurs	PASOK Socialistes	P.C.G. Communistes prosoviétiques	"Coalition de Gauche"	Extrême Droite	DI.K.KI (Socialistes de gauche)
1985	40.8	45.8	9.8	----	0.6	
1989 (juin)	44.3	39.2		13.1		
1989 (novembre)	46.2	40.7		11.0		
1990	46.8	38.6		10.2		
1993	39.3	46.8	4.5	2.9	4.8	
1996	38.1	41.4	5.6	5.1	2.9	4.4

* Aux élections de juin 1989, la gauche au delà du PASOK présente une liste électorale commune sous le nom de *Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès*. Aux mêmes élections se présente un petit parti de droite, *Rénovation Démocratique* qui gagne 1% (1 député élu).

*** En novembre 1989, se présente un parti écologiste qui gagne 0.6% (1 député élu).

**** Aux élections de 1993, la gauche au delà du PASOK présente deux listes: celle du *Parti Communiste* et celle de la *Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès*, qui s'est formée après la scission du P.C.G.

(Tableau 2)

**Comportement électoral des chrétiens
de la municipalité de Komotini**

Pourcentages (%) des partis aux élections parlementaires

	PASOK	N.D.	Gauche communiste	Parti-Minorité musulmane
1985	46.15	45.41	5.15+1.34*	----
1989 (I)	38.78	49.09	9.06	----
1989 (N)	38.59	51.76	7.68	----
1990	35.80	51.76	6.17	----
1993	45.86	42.38	2.24+2.30**	----
1996	44.15	39.83	2.87+1.98**	----***

Source: Statistiques des élections, Athènes, Ministère de l'Intérieur.

* En 1985, sont additionnées les voix du *Parti Communiste Grec* (KKE) à celles du *Parti Communiste Grec de l'intérieur*.

** En 1993 et 1996, sont additionnées les voix du *Parti Communiste Grec* (KKE) à celles de la *Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès* (SYN).

*** En 1996, aucune formation indépendante représentant la minorité ne se présente.

(Tableau 3)

**Le comportement électoral des musulmans
de la municipalité de Komotini**

Votes et pourcentages (%) des partis aux élections parlementaires

	PASOK	N.D.	Gauche communiste	'Confiance'- Minorité
1985	981 16.55	3.484 58.81	128+43 3.61	1.072 18.09
1989 (I)	1.397 25.44	566 10.30	95 1.73	3.237 58.95
1989 (N)	1.778 26.62	1.493 22.35	303 4.53	2.915 43.65
1990	1.297 19.61	923 13.95	242 3.65	3.965 59.95
1993	1.313 23.91	537 9.77	92+99 3.47	3.292 59.95
1996	2.230 42.67	782 14.96	337+1659 38.20	-----

Source: Statistiques des élections, Athènes, Ministère de l'Intérieur.

En analysant et comparant le comportement électoral des trois circonscriptions musulmanes de Komotini, nous observons que malgré l'homogénéité qui caractérise leur comportement général, nous pouvons déceler quelques variations. Une de ces variations est une montée en puissance de la formation politique de la minorité dans la circonscription Kir Machale (78,39% en 1993 alors que la circonscription de Genitze enregistre 59,44% et celle de Indadie 46,07%). Aux

élections de 1996, cette même circonscription donnera à la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès son pourcentage le plus élevé - peut être de tout le pays - 45,74%, et si on y ajoutait les voix du P.C.G., la gauche aurait dépassé les 50%.

Cependant, la comparaison des résultats obtenus dans les trois circonscriptions musulmanes de la municipalité de Komotini révèle le comportement différent de la circonscription Idadie. Cette différence est due, principalement, aux résultats obtenus dans deux bureaux de vote de cette circonscription où votent les habitants du quartier Ifestos/Kalkantza.⁶ Ce quartier se trouve à l'extérieur de la ville de Komotini mais il est rattaché à l'administration de Komotini et à la circonscription électorale de Idadie.

Nous avons donc observé, jusqu'ici, que la formation politique de la minorité remporte environ 60% des voix de la minorité musulmane de Komotini. Ce choix politique constitue, d'une certaine façon, un trait caractéristique de l'identité turque. En d'autres termes, le fait de choisir de donner sa voix à la formation de la minorité est une identification à des procédures d'homogénéisation et de mobilisation politique axées sur l'appartenance ethnique/nationale.

(Tableau 4)

RÉSULTAT DES ELECTIONS DANS LES CIRCONSCRIPTIONS MUSULMANES DE LA MUNICIPALITÉ DE KOMOTINI

(Votes et pourcentages (%) par circonscription)

1985	IDADIE		GENITZE		KIR MACHALE		TOTAL	
PASOK	565	21.88	209	15.41	207	10.42	981	16.55
N.D.	1425	55.18	746	55.01	1313	66.11	3.484	58.81
Gauche communiste	113	4.3	30	2.21	28	1.40	128+43	3.61
'Confiance'	351	13.59	335	24.70	386	19.43	1072	18.09
1989 (I)	IDADIE		GENITZE		KIR MACHALE		TOTAL	
PASOK	835	34.74	310	25.10	252	13.59	1.397	25.44
N.D.	335	13.94	128	10.36	103	5.55	566	10.30
Gauche communiste	52	2.16	19	1.53	24	1.29	95	1.73
'Confiance'	1087	45.23	732	59.27	1418	76.52	3237	58.95
1989 (N)	IDADIE		GENITZE		KIR MACHALE		TOTAL	
PASOK	968	32.95	395	25.17	415	19.10	1.778	26.62
N.D.	734	24.99	335	21.35	424	19.52	1.493	22.35
Gauche communiste	138	4.69	84	5.35	81	3.72	303	4.53
'Confiance'	1026	34.93	694	44.23	1195	55.01	2.915	43.65
1990	IDADIE		GENITZE		KIR MACHALE		TOTAL	
PASOK	695	25.98	346	21.53	256	10.95	1.297	19.61
N.D.	365	13.64	278	17.35	280	11.98	923	13.95
Gauche communiste	108	4.03	53	3.30	81	3.46	242	3.65
'Confiance'	141	52.93	887	55.36	1.662	71.14	3.965	59.95
1993	IDADIE		GENITZE		KIR MACHALE		TOTAL	
PASOK	853	35.08	311	23.88	149	8.01	1.313	23.91
N.D.	230	9.70	136	10.44	171	9.40	537	9.77
Gauche communiste	108	4.55	41	3.14	42	2.30	92+99	3.47
'Confiance'	1092	46.07	774	59.44	1426	78.39	3.292	59.95
1996	IDADIE		GENITZE		KIR MACHALE		TOTAL	
PASOK	1008	46.09	634	49.53	588	33.44	2.230	42.67
N.D.	398	18.19	150	11.71	234	13.31	782	14.96
Gauche communiste	669	30.58	446	34.84	881	50.11	1.996	38.20
'Confiance'	----		----		----		----	

Source: Statistiques des élections, Athènes, Ministère de l'Intérieur.

LE COMPORTEMENT ELECTORAL A IFESTOS

Aux élections de 1985, dans la commune de Ifestos, N.D. est le premier parti (41,39%), suivi par le PASOK 37,31%. La différence entre les deux partis est infime contrairement à celle qui apparaît - 45 unités - dans le reste de la circonscription. Le P.C.G. et le P.C.G. de l'Intérieur obtiennent 10,78% alors que le candidat de la minorité gagne tout juste 17 voix (2,47%).

Aux élections de juin 1989, le PASOK enregistre une hausse importante et atteint 62,48% (402 voix) alors que N.D. tombe à 22,79%. Nous devons souligner, en ce qui concerne les deux grands partis, que les tendances similaires enregistrées dans l'ensemble de la minorité sont corrélatives à l'apparition de la formation politique *Confiance*. Au contraire, à Ifestos, la formation de la minorité n'atteint pas les 5% (31 voix). Enfin, la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès enregistre 29 voix (4,49%). Les mêmes résultats, à peu près, seront obtenus aux élections de novembre 1989, la formation de la minorité dépassant pas les 5%.

Aux élections d'avril 1990, les résultats de la formation *Confiance* sont en hausse. Le parti gagne 123 voix (20,19%). Ces voix semblent venir de N.D. qui est tombée à 11,98% alors que le PASOK et la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès se maintiennent au même niveau qu'aux élections précédentes (respectivement 60,59% et 4,43%). Pour la première fois, la formation de la minorité crée une dynamique dans la communauté en augmentant son public et montrant, ainsi, qu'elle influence le un cinquième de la population. Ce pourcentage est éloigné de celui atteint par la formation politique *Confiance* dans les autres bureaux de vote musulmans (62,58%), néanmoins, il n'est pas négligeable. Il semble que la mobilisation politique de la minorité en Thrace inspire de la sympathie à une partie des habitants de Ifestos; fait qui a pour conséquence l'apparition d'un "comportement électoral pro-turc".

Cependant, aux élections de 1993, cette tendance s'estompe. La formation politique de la minorité enregistre un pourcentage bas (32

voix, 4,87%), alors que dans le reste de la minorité, elle conserve son dynamisme. La réussite du PASOK dans la communauté peut avoir deux interprétations: d'une part la dynamique créée par son candidat, originaire de Ifestos, Ali Hasan, et, d'autre part, l'efficacité des fortes relations clientélistes instaurées pendant la période de cohabitation du PASOK.

Aux élections de 1996, le comportement électoral des habitants de Ifestos tend à ressembler à celui du reste de la minorité. Le PASOK tombe à 49,91%, N.D. grimpe à 22,73% et la gauche atteint les 20%.

Nous pouvons remarquer que les électeurs de Ifestos qui votent à gauche ne donnent pas leurs voix, contrairement à l'ensemble de la minorité, à la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès, mais au P.C.G. Ces deux derniers partis gagnent 113 voix, soit 84 le P.C.G. et 29 la Coalition de la Gauche et du Progrès.

Ainsi, "l'hellénisation" de la vie politique, due à l'absence de formation politique représentant la minorité musulmane, conduit - avec des variations sensibles - , les habitants de Ifestos, à des comportements électoraux semblables à ceux du reste de la minorité. Au contraire, la présence de formation politique représentant la minorité n'attire pas la majorité des musulmans de Ifestos qui ont continué à exprimer leurs opinions à travers les partis d'envergure nationale.

(Tableau 5)

**Résultats des élections - Circonscription Idadie
(Votes et pourcentages %)**

Circonscription IDADIE (sauf Kalkantzas)					KALKANTZAS/IFESTOS			
	PASOK	N.D.	Gauche communiste	'Confiance'	PASOK	N.D. communiste	Gauche	'Confiance'
1985	309 16.29	1.141 60.17	39 2.05	334 17.61	256 37.31	284 41.39	74 10.78	17 2.47
1989 (I)	432 24.57	188 10.69	23 1.30	1.056 60.06	403 62.48	147 22.79	29 4.49	31 4.80
1989 (N)	545 24.34	541 24.16	99 4.42	994 44.39	423 60.60	193 27.65	39 5.58	32 4.58
1990	326 15.77	292 14.13	81 3.92	1293 62.58	369 60.59	73 11.98	27 4.43	123 20.19
1993	357 20.84	166 9.69	68 3.96	1060 61.87	496 75.49	64 9.74	40 6.08	32 4.87
1996	725 44.64	270 16.62	556 34.23	-----	281 49.91	128 22.73	84+29 20.07	-----

Source: Statistiques des élections, Athènes, Ministère de l'Intérieur.

(Tableau 6)

**Comparaison en pourcentage (%) des voix reçues, aux élections
parlementaires, par les candidats musulmans (membres du PASOK,
N.D. et gauche communiste) dans le quartier Ifestos (1^{ère} colonne) et
dans le reste de la circonscription IDADIE (2^{ème} colonne)**

	PASOK	N.D.	Gauche communiste
1985	-----	-----	-----
1989 (I)	2,2 51,6	6,1 37,7	75,8 39,1
1989 (N)	29,3 40,3	8,8 23,4	76,9 31,1
1990	72 40,4	58,9 16,4	70,3 53
1993	53,8 13,7	7,8 57,8	20 61,7
1996	23,1 86,7	17,9 25	69 98,7

Source: Statistiques des élections, Athènes, Ministère de l'Intérieur.

LE QUARTIER IFESTOS ET SES HABITANTS

Afin d'avancer vers une analyse plus poussée du comportement électoral des habitants de Ifestos, il est nécessaire d'approfondir les caractéristiques de cette communauté.

Le quartier Kalkantza/Ifestos se situe au N.NO de Komotini, à environ 2 kilomètres de la ville. Il est délimité par une rivière et par une route départementale, et constitue un ghetto particulier. Il a été créé en 1938 afin d'héberger certains habitants de Komotini dont les maisons, dans le cadre d'un plan d'aménagement de la ville, allaient être détruites. Plus tard, des populations venant d'autres régions se sont installées à Ifestos. Au recensement de 1981, Ifestos comptait environ 5.000 habitants alors qu'à celui de 1991 ont été enregistrées 1240 personnes. Aujourd'hui, 2.500 personnes vivent dans ce quartier qui est rattaché à l'administration de Komotini et à la circonscription électorale de Indadie.

Les habitants de Ifestos sont, selon des chercheurs, des musulmans tsiganes (Zeginis, 1994; Panayiotidis, 1996). Les chrétiens de la région les appellent "Katsivelous", et les Musulmans "Tsingene". Les intéressés, quant à eux, refusent fanatiquement d'être appelés "tsiganes". Leur argumentation se base d'une part sur la nature de leur langue (la langue turque) et, d'autre part, sur le fait qu'ils sont sédentaires. Nous estimons qu'ils utilisent ces arguments pour se démarquer des tsiganes nomades qui parlent le Romani, et qu'ils considèrent comme inférieurs, et non pour s'intégrer à la communauté "turque". Il faut souligner qu'ils n'utilisent jamais les termes *tsigane* et *romano* quand ils parlent d'eux-mêmes alors qu'ils nomment les turcophones *gatzal*⁷ qui veut dire étrangers.

Les habitants du quartier ne sont pas propriétaires de terres. Dans le temps, ils étaient ferrailleurs, forgerons, musiciens, transporteurs, fabricants d'objets en osier et ouvriers agricoles. Aujourd'hui, la plupart sont ouvriers non spécialisés, sans travail permanent et sans couverture sociale, transporteurs et ouvriers agricoles. Leur seule occupation traditionnelle qui a survécu est la musique. Dans le quartier, il y

a quelques petits commerçants et artisans. Aucun habitant du quartier n'est fonctionnaire ou employé municipal.⁸

Dans le quartier, il y a environ 530 maisons. La plupart sont vieilles, ont un rez-de-chaussée et de 70 m². Pratiquement toutes les maisons ont l'eau courante et l'électricité. Il n'y a pas de baraquements. Dernièrement, ils ont commencé à construire des immeubles de deux ou trois étages.

Le niveau d'éducation des habitants est très bas. Un très grand nombre d'enfants abandonne l'école primaire (44%). Les quelques enfants qui s'inscrivent au collège abandonnent rapidement. Aucun habitant du quartier n'est allé à l'université et quatre sont diplômés d'écoles supérieures. La plupart des hommes ont une bonne connaissance de la langue grecque alors que les femmes ont un niveau très moyen. La majorité des habitants sont incapables de communiquer avec les services publics.

Leurs relations avec le reste de la minorité musulmane (d'origine turque ou des Pomaks) ne sont pas très bonnes. Dans ce cas, la religion et la langue ne tissent pas des liens solides entre cette communauté et la minorité, et elles ne sont pas des moyens d'intégration à la minorité. L'identité ethnique du "tsigane" fonctionnant comme un élément d'exclusion est plus forte que les caractéristiques culturelles pouvant avoir un rôle d'insertion. Ainsi, une langue et une religion communes, qui, dans d'autres cas, sont capables (en tant qu'éléments identitaires) de définir des groupes ou des nations, semblent, ici, incapables d'intégrer un groupe à un autre.⁹

Les habitants de Ifestos ne semblent pas vouloir s'intégrer dans une communauté "ethnique/nationale". Certains aimeraient être considérés comme des Turcs, d'autres comme des Grecs. Les choix d'identité nationale se font, plus, suivant des critères "sociaux" et politiques que "ethniques", c'est-à-dire, comme nous verrons ultérieurement, les choix sont liés à des intérêts, à des protections et à la mobilité.

Cette "fluidité" semble être perçue et enregistrée par des personnes ou des institutions extérieures à la communauté. Dans ce cadre incer-

tain, ils essaient d'attirer des personnes, de créer des alliances dans leur propre intérêt ou pour l'intérêt du parti qu'ils expriment ou servent.

En 1994, une association culturelle, comprenant un groupe de danse et une équipe de foot, a été créée grâce à la donation d'un entrepreneur connu (avec une "sensibilité" particulière à l'égard de la communauté) et à des dirigeants politiques "héliénophones" de N.D. L'association participe au défilé du 28/10/94 (fête nationale) et engage un professeur de danse pour l'enseignement de danses traditionnelles grecques. La réponse ne tarde pas à arriver. Une seconde association culturelle est créée grâce à des donateurs anonymes. Leur première action est de créer un groupe de danse, de commander des tenues traditionnelles en Turquie¹⁰ et d'engager un professeur de danse pour enseigner des danses traditionnelles turques. Par conséquent, au défilé du 28/10/94, deux associations culturelles de Ifestos ont défilé à Komotini: l'une avec des tenues traditionnelles grecques et l'autre turques.

La suite des péripéties de la concurrence gréco-turque de Ifestos a lieu en 1997-98. Une des parties en présence (représentée par la municipalité de Komotini) décide d'agrandir et de subvenir aux besoins de l'école du quartier¹¹, alors que l'autre partie à décider de restaurer et d'agrandir (en réalité reconstruire) la mosquée, à côté de l'école, grâce à une donation de l'imam et aux dons des fidèles.

En fait, les personnes, les institutions et les conceptions sont prêtes à agir non seulement en utilisant "la fluidité" de la situation, mais aussi en entretenant cette "fluidité" et en créant un environnement propice à une perpétuelle négociation.

En étudiant la composition sociale de Ifestos, nous observons qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un groupe homogène (Marantzidis *et al*, 1999). Les individus (il s'agit ici principalement des chefs de famille) se différencient selon leur degré d'intégration sociale. Nous sommes donc en présence de deux groupes distincts.

Le premier groupe, le plus important, présente tous les éléments caractéristiques d'un groupe socialement exclu: ils sont pauvres, sans tra-

vail stable, sans couverture sociale, ils n'ont pas accès à l'éducation, ils communiquent difficilement avec l'environnement social et ils ont peur de l'état et de ses institutions.

L'autre groupe, plus petit, est sur le chemin de l'intégration. La plupart de ses membres ont un travail stable, sont assurés de la meilleure éducation possible pour leurs enfants¹² et ils ont une bonne connaissance de la langue grecque ce qui leur assure un choix politique plus indépendant.

Ce second groupe, bien qu'il soit plus riche et constitue une sorte d'élite locale, n'a pas de pouvoir en dehors des limites de la communauté. Ni le nombre de ses membres, ni son pouvoir économique, ni son niveau d'éducation ne lui permettent de jouer un rôle dans la minorité. Son existence est due à des trajets individuels réussis, et est liée, à un certain degré, à des échanges de type clientéliste ou opportuniste qui ont eu lieu avec le PASOK pendant la première période de la cohabitation.

Les éléments, cités ci-dessus, délimitent le cadre dans lequel agissent les habitants de Ifestos et se développe leur comportement électoral. La base de ce système semble, comme nous le verrons ultérieurement, être les relations clientélistes ainsi que la dépendance et les opportunités que créent ces relations.

A ce stade, il est nécessaire d'introduire, dans notre travail, la notion de clientélisme politique. Cette notion va nous permettre non seulement d'aborder les raisons profondes et la façon dont se construit le dit comportement, mais aussi elle va nous aider à comprendre et à interpréter les relations existant entre l'identité ethnique et le comportement politique/électoral. En général, le terme relation clientéliste se réfère à une relation d'échange, entre des sujets ou des groupes de sujets, basée sur des obligations et des services rendus par les deux parties (Lemarchand, 1972; Lemarchand, Legg, 1972).

La structure de la concurrence politique à Ifestos semble, donc, se caractériser par l'ampleur des relations clientélistes qui sont entretenues par les dirigeants politiques locaux.

Ces personnes entretiennent leur pouvoir et leur influence dans la société locale, non seulement en raison des relations familiales et de leur satisfaisante situation économique, mais surtout grâce à leur bonne connaissance de la langue grecque, à leur réseau de relations et à leur soutien permanent envers les électeurs. Ils s'occupent de problèmes (acheminement du courrier, des retraites, demandes de certificats, etc) et servent d'intermédiaires avec les services publics pour couvrir des illégalités, pour délivrer des permis de conduire, pour être admis à l'hôpital, pour trouver un docteur, un avocat, un ingénieur, etc. De même, ils rendent visite, régulièrement, aux députés, maires et préfets, soit seuls, soit avec leurs protégés afin de promouvoir leurs demandes.

Lors des campagnes électorales, ces dirigeants locaux négocient les votes avec les candidats. Ils échangent les votes contre une somme d'argent importante (35-70.000\$) - une partie est partagée entre les électeurs - et d'autres services importants pour l'intermédiaire ou ses proches (par exemple, une nomination).

Les intermédiaires ne sont pas les seuls dirigeants politiques présents dans le quartier. Quelques professionnels - les seuls chrétiens présents de façon permanente (boulangers, épiciers, etc) - ont des activités politiques et créent des relations de dépendance avec certains habitants du quartier. Ils "rassemblent" quelques votes et les "donnent" à certains candidats. Il semble, également, que certains employeurs aient une influence importante dans le quartier, particulièrement ceux qui offrent un emploi stable. Ces cas ne sont pas nombreux car peu de personnes ont un emploi stable.

Pour les habitants de Ifestos, donner sa voix à un candidat est considéré "traditionnellement" comme un échange. Ces échanges ont évolué dans le temps. Au départ, ils étaient simples et directs (il y a 20 ans, la compensation pouvait être de l'huile, du bois ou encore du pain) puis ils sont devenus plus compliqués, liés aux services, créant ainsi, une relation plus stable avec les institutions et les mécanismes qui produisent et partagent les ressources.

CONCLUSION

Nous observons, d'après les données exposées ci-dessus, que le comportement politique des habitants de Ifestos présente les caractéristiques suivantes:

- Les électeurs de Ifestos semblaient peu influencés par la présence (1985-1993) de formations politiques représentant la minorité. La mobilisation politique de la minorité musulmane n'a pas touché ce groupe précis, et ils ont, donc, choisi des partis d'envergure nationale.
- Les électeurs choisissent, dans l'ensemble, des candidats chrétiens membres des partis d'envergure nationale. Ils soutiennent que c'est dû au fait que c'est avec des chrétiens qu'ils ont des relations quotidiennes et professionnelles. Cependant, la cause profonde de ce comportement provient du fait qu'ils estiment que les députés et dirigeants locaux chrétiens ont une plus grande influence politique sur les mécanismes étatiques, et donc un pouvoir d'intervention supérieur. Ce comportement, toutefois, varie si le candidat musulman est issu de leur propre communauté.

A ce stade de notre analyse, il ressort que la structure des réseaux clientélistes à Ifestos modèle le cadre dans lequel évolue le comportement électoral de ses habitants. Il semble ne pas favoriser l'orientation politique générale et le vote vers le parti de la minorité musulmane.

Ce comportement se caractérise par un rationalisme instrumental car il se construit, exclusivement, dans la perspective d'un intérêt individuel-familial. Le vote se transforme, donc, en ressource économique et/ou politique, et est donné à celui qui offrira la plus importante compensation. Dans le cas étudié ici, il s'agit des partis d'envergure nationale et des candidats chrétiens. Les électeurs de Ifestos considèrent qu'il est plus positif, pour eux, d'entretenir des relations avec les candidats chrétiens qu'avec les candidats des formations politiques représentant la minorité musulmane.

Ce type de comportement électoral peut avoir les origines suivantes:

a) les tsiganes, à cause de leur exclusion par la minorité et par les chrétiens, ont du mal à s'identifier à une communauté nationale. Cette exclusion ne les écarte pas seulement de ressources économiques, mais également, elle leur enlève la possibilité de vivre "sentimentalement" leur intégration à un groupe ethnique/national plus large. Par conséquent, les relations de solidarité qui contribuent à la création d'une identité ethnique ne peuvent pas se développer (Smith, 1986).

b) L'absence, jusqu'à aujourd'hui, d'une élite, à l'intérieur de la communauté, indépendante des mécanismes étatiques, jouissant d'une influence à l'extérieur de la communauté, étant capable d'imposer ses stratégies et sa culture à la masse de la population, augmente l'absence de mobilisation politique. L'élite de Ifestos ressemble plutôt à un groupe d'intermédiaires au service des partis qui ne représentent pas la minorité.

c) L'appartenance des tsiganes de Ifestos au réseau clientéliste, surtout du PASOK, contribue à la transformation de leur identité ethnique et, surtout, modifie la perception des différences ethniques. Le clientélisme a un rôle d'assimilation ou, pire, elle empêche la construction d'une "conscience minoritaire". Ainsi, à travers le clientélisme, nous avons des procédures d'intégration nationale; fait qui a déjà été observé ailleurs.

Il ressort, donc, que, dans le cas de Ifestos, les caractéristiques ethniques générales (langue, religion) du groupe ne peuvent être à l'origine d'une mobilisation politique axée sur ces caractéristiques. De plus, les procédures de clientélisme politique, entre les habitants du quartier et les partis d'envergure nationale, influencent non seulement leurs choix politiques, mais aussi, la façon dont ils perçoivent leurs propres différences ethniques et leur appartenance à une communauté plus large.

La position politique d'une telle communauté à l'égard des partis, des hommes politiques et de l'état, n'est pas le résultat de ses carac-

téristiques ethniques, mais le résultat de sa position sociale et des relations clientélistes. En fait, les relations clientélistes dominantes et les stratégies de l'élite semblent déterminer les perceptions des différences ethniques et influencent radicalement l'intégration d'un tel groupe à une plus large, communauté ethnique ou nationale.

NOTES

1. En réalité, il ne s'agit pas d'un courant uniforme mais d'un espace intermédiaire dont les analyses se rapprochent tantôt de la première école, tantôt de la seconde.
2. L'exemple le plus récent, est le débat public qui a eu lieu à Komotini lors des dernières élections législatives (22/9/96). *Journal Chronos*, Komotini, 10, 11, 13, 23 et 24 septembre 1996.
3. Pour une analyse du comportement politique et électoral concernant les périodes précédentes cf G. Mavrogordatos, (1983), Stillborn Republic, California: California University Press. H. Nikolakopoulos, (1990-91), 'Politikes Dinamis ke Ekloyiki Simperifora tis Mousoulmanikis Mionotitas sti Dytiki Thraki' (Forces politiques et comportement électoral de la minorité musulmane en Thrace de l'Ouest), *Bulletin of Asia Minor Studies Center*, 8: 171-204.
4. Environ un quart de l'ensemble des musulmans vivant en Thrace habitent à Komotini. Il est estimé que la population musulmane vivant en Thrace actuellement compte environ 80.000 personnes.
5. Beaucoup de musulmans de Komotini, bien que la ville de Komotini soit leur résidence permanente, exercent toujours leur droit de vote dans leurs villages d'origine (surtout dans la zone montagneuse). Le nombre exact de personnes concernées ne peut être déterminé.
6. Kalkantza est l'ancien nom du quartier.
7. Type archaïque du Romani, la langue tsigane, pluriel du mot "gadjo". Aujourd'hui, les tsiganes utilisent la forme "gadje".

8. Plusieurs habitants sont devenus fonctionnaires (gardiens, huissiers, etc) quand le PASOK était au gouvernement. Ils ont tous été nommés à Athènes et ont dû transférer leur droit de vote. Bien qu'ils ne résident plus et ne votent plus à Komotini, il est estimé qu'ils influencent un nombre d'électeurs important.

9. Il est intéressant de souligner que les dirigeants de la minorité (en général d'origine turque ou turcophone), dans leurs déclarations officielles, intègrent les musulmans tsiganes de Thrace à la minorité. Ceci n'a pas lieu dans les discussions quotidiennes du musulman moyen de la minorité de Thrace qui souligne toujours, quand il se réfère à un musulman tsigane, la différence ethnique.

10. Cette action a été possible grâce à la subvention de la Préfecture Rodopi; subvention à laquelle a droit toute association culturelle.

11. L'école de Ifestos est peut être la seule école de Thrace à ne pas être une propriété religieuse et donc n'est pas rattaché directement à l'administration de l'imam. C'est pourquoi la subvention et l'agrandissement de l'école ont été décidés par la municipalité et effectués avec des subventions du service public grec.

12. Sans pour autant réussir une amélioration notable.

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DOCUMENT

Audiovisual Archives of Hellenism Two Research Projects**

Gioula Koutsopanagou*

The audiovisual memory of the Greek diaspora (press, radio, television, cinema, photography) is such a vitally important part of the social, cultural, economic and political history of the Greeks abroad that priority must be given to the preservation and utilization of that heritage for research. An integrated preservation policy involves not only restoring and cataloguing the material, but also making it available to the public and therefore more visible and accessible to researchers and producers of audiovisual works.

Over the last decade, interest in the preservation and exploitation of written archives, especially audiovisual archives, has grown. In fact A/V archives have become the theme of many EU-subsidized projects. The poor condition of written and audiovisual archives in Greece recently led to the recognition of an urgent need to preserve the national heritage of Greece and its diaspora. Two research projects: *Encyclopaedia of the Greek Press, 1784-1996* and the thematic proposal *Mediterranean Diaspora: Visions of Multicultural and Multilingual Encounter through the Audiovisual Archives*, which is part of the CapMed project for the preservation and exploitation of the Euro-Mediterranean audiovisual memory, focus on the audiovisual archives of Hellenism.

These two projects are run by the Institute for Neohellenic Research/The National Hellenic Research Foundation (KNE/EIE) and the Hellenic Audiovisual Institute (IOM) of the Greek Ministry for the Press and Mass Media respectively.

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The press, as an expression of the intellectual, social and economic life of those societies, is one of the most interesting and significant phenomena of modern societies. However, in order for there to be a press, there first has to be an organized society with its own particular national lifestyle. In Greece, at least during the period before such a thing as a Greek state existed, the press occupied a rather special position. Indeed, the very fact that it existed in the Greek diaspora goes to show that, although Hellenism did not constitute a specific national framework in any concrete form during the years prior to the revolution, the diaspora was nevertheless made up of a number of social groups, living within an organized social structure.

By the term *Greek* press we mean the newspapers and magazines published in Greece and the diaspora by Greeks for a Greek audience, as well as newspapers and magazines written in Greek or in two languages or even in a foreign language only. The term also refers to the writings of persons of Greek nationality but of foreign origin, e.g. Jewish or Turkish.

The problem facing any student or researcher of the Greek press is that the material is dispersed in various different sources, in libraries, archives and private collections throughout Greece and the diaspora. We therefore need to codify this wealth of dispersed material in order

- to study the history of the creation and development of the modern Greek press,
- to examine the conditions that led to its existence, the circles from which it emerged and the profile of its readers
- to determine its role in portraying but also shaping modern Greek society
- and in order to discover the people and organisations that pioneered in the field.

To address this need, we believe that what is required initially is an easily accessible, user-friendly, reliable guide, an encyclopaedia which will provide users with detailed information about the major events in the history of the Greek press and at the same time allow them to focus on specific problems and issues so that they can get a full pic-

ture of the subject and its development over the years. This encyclopaedia will cover newspapers, magazines, publishers, journalists in Greece and the diaspora, as well as various other sources of information (trade unions, legislation referring to the press, almanacs of the Greek press, etc.). The first edition is expected to cover a cross-section of 3,000 entries which, on the basis of agreed criteria, were selected as being the most significant.

The material collected will also constitute the contents of an open horizon data base, which will be as exhaustive as possible and will be constantly up-dated. The data base will be set up at the Athens News Agency and will be directly accessible to anyone interested.. The whole data base is also due to be issued on CD-ROM.

This is the first time the project has been set up in Greece and it is an important contribution to the study of the history of the Greek press. The programme is being run by the KNE/EIE in the framework of European programs co-financed by the General Secretariat for Research and Technology.

The research team is made up of press researchers and journalists, and has developed an extensive cooperation network with over one hundred external experts in the field, colleagues from Greece and the diaspora. Also working on the project are university undergraduates and postgraduate students, who get an opportunity to take a close look at the material and familiarize themselves with the research project.

The project has completed its first phase, which involved:

- preparing special inventory forms a) for the newspaper/magazine and b) for the journalist/personality from the Greek press, in order to make out a list of entries and enter the material into the data base. Wherever possible inventory forms are inspected as they are filled in to assist in
- drafting instructions for filling in the forms,
- setting selection criteria for newspapers/magazines and personalities in order to write out the Encyclopaedia entries,

- determining the specifications for writing the entries,
- designing the data base,
- tracking down material from indexes of bibliographies, biographies, obituaries and finding other material dispersed in books, periodicals, pamphlets and newspapers,
- compiling four lists of newspaper/magazine titles and lists of names of journalists/press celebrities a) in full detail, ready for entry into the data base and b) in the form in which they will be printed in the Encyclopaedia.

We also cooperated with the following organisations/individuals, who have access to relevant material:

- archives of journalists' associations and other similar organisations,
- private archives and collections,
- central public libraries in Athens and the regions,
- General State Archives,
- journalists' unions,
- publishers of newspapers /magazines. In some cases the newspapers/magazines themselves are invited to help write the entries for their own papers and journalists. In the case of journalists who are alive, we ask them in person, wherever possible, for their biographies.

So far over seven thousand (7,000) inventory forms have been entered into the data base, while work continues on writing the corresponding entries, which is the main objective of the second phase of the program.

* * *

The research proposal of the IOM for the 'Mediterranean Diaspora: Visions of Multicultural and Multilingual Encounter through the Audiovisual Archives', which has been incorporated into the 'CapMed' program, is especially relevant in the context of establishing a permanent record of the audiovisual memory of Hellenism.

A number of European and international audiovisual organisations realised that the preservation and exploitation of the Euro-Mediterranean audiovisual heritage was becoming a necessity.

These organisations include Audiovisual EUREKA, a pan-European audiovisual organisation with 34 member-states, the Permanent Conference for Audiovisual Cooperation in the Mediterranean (Conference Permanente de l'Audiovisuel Méditerranéen, CoPeAM), the largest professional organisation for audiovisual cooperation with 27 member-states, the International Federation of Television Archives (IFTA/FIAT), the International Federation of Film Archives (IFFA/FIAF), the Institut National de l'Audiovisuel (INA), (France).

These organisations joined their efforts and organized the First Conference on the Euro-Mediterranean Audiovisual Memory in Sitges, Spain, 10-11 October 1997. This conference was supported by the European Commission, mainly by the Unit: Measures for the Development of the Audiovisual Industry, UNESCO and the Council of Europe.

The conference unanimously acknowledged the social and economic importance of archives and the need for economic measures enabling the creation of programmes, restoration of archival material and easy access to researchers and professionals. The conference resulted in a proposal for a pilot program, entitled 'CapMed', for the Euro-Mediterranean television archives. Another issue raised was the possibility of expanding the pilot program so as to include the countries of southern and eastern Europe.

The plan for the CapMed programme was introduced as one of the key projects for the Euro-Mediterranean audiovisual archives at the 'Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Audiovisual and TV Cooperation' in Thessaloniki on 14-15 November 1997.

The CapMed programme, finally, was submitted as an INA project, along the lines of the call for proposals by EuroMed Audiovisual of the European Commission, General Directorate 1B(DG1B). The pro-

gram is fully consistent with the conclusions of the European Conference in Sitges, Spain and the conclusions of Thessaloniki.

INA is managing the project, which began in January 2000 and will continue for a duration of forty-two (42) months.

CapMed's object and goal, as mentioned, is the preservation of the Euro-Mediterranean audiovisual memory. To attain this goal the requirements of the program are to design a thematic data base, in order to enable easy and direct access to Euro-Mediterranean audiovisual archives and provide access through the CapMed website. Users of the data base will be able to select information according to subject, place, name of producer, etc. They will also be able to obtain information about the conditions and procedures for acquisition of the archive material entered in the data base.

In order for the data base to function successfully, it is estimated that a critical mass of approximately 5,000 documents, amounting to 3,000 hours, will be necessary.

Audiovisual archives from eleven Mediterranean countries are working together in the program. These are: the Egyptian Radio-Television Union (ERTU), Jordan Radio and Television Corporation (JRTC), Teleliban, Palestine Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), Greek Radio-Television (ERT), Public Broadcasting Services (PBS) Malta, Television Catalina (TVC), RAI of Italy, Morocco Television (2M), Cypriot Radio-Television, Algerian Television. Two research institutes are also participating: the Hellenic Audiovisual Institute (IOM) of the Ministry for the Press & Mass Media and the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme (MMSH), Marseilles, France. IOM's participation in the program focuses on two axes:

The scientific coordination of the partners in the CapMed project, Research on the Mediterranean Diaspora through audiovisual archive records.

The proposal on the Mediterranean Diaspora has been included in the thematic classification categories of the archive material that will

be entered in the CapMed data base. The IOM will observe the phenomenon of the Greek diaspora through the audiovisual archive of ERT and the Euro-Mediterranean audiovisual archives. It will also coordinate the other partners in the program as regards the theme of the diaspora of their respective countries. The Institute has undertaken to set up a team of historians from the eleven countries concerned.

The Mediterranean region is the meeting point of many cultures and civilisations. Its Diaspora constitutes not only a fundamental part of Mediterranean history but also an integral part of European culture as a whole. The archives therefore, and in this case the audiovisual archives, that exist in the countries surrounding the Mediterranean perimeter are of vital importance as a contribution towards the construction of Europe, which makes it imperative that they be preserved and developed for research.

The Mediterranean, as a geographical area with large movements of populations, was an important centre for the social and economic development of ethnic minorities. The presence of immigrants and their societies played a decisive role in shaping the cosmopolitan image of the Mediterranean. Greece is one Mediterranean country with a long history in the migration of peoples. Greek immigrants were extremely enterprising in Egypt, Malta, the Middle East, Italy, France and elsewhere. A major part of a wealth of archive material remains, however, unexplored, and in many instances hidden in basements or warehouses.

The IOM's thematic proposal on the Mediterranean Diaspora seeks to outline the images of the Diaspora as presented a) in documentaries, b) in television series, c) on the news. It examines the following aspects of the Diaspora phenomenon:

- the integration of the Diaspora communities into the social, economic and cultural life of the host countries
- the presence and contribution of these communities within their new-found countries.

This research is expected to result in

- a) the creation of a data base for local images, to complement the central data base of the CapMed programme. This is felt to be useful because it will make it possible to collect thematic images of the local history of those countries taking part;
- b) the promotion of productions/co-productions related to the presence of the Mediterranean Diaspora in the host countries, socially, economically and culturally, its integration into those countries and its contribution to Mediterranean history and culture;
- c) a presentation of the research findings at international conferences;
- d) publication (in edited and electronic form) of the results and their evaluation.

Although visual memory began to be recorded systematically in the 1950s, the research proposed by IOM will cover the chronological period from the beginning of the 20th century up to the present day, so as to enable a better understanding of the phenomenon of the Mediterranean Diaspora.

Apart from its research work, the Institute is the scientific coordinator of the CapMed project. This involves creating a communication network with the other partners in the programme and designing the methodology to be used in the broader data base design of the programme. IOM will also establish a network of historians from each participant country. It will organise regular meetings for cooperation among the operators of the countries involved and will oversee the progress of the work and the results of the research up to the final evaluation phase.

The team will determine collectively the theoretical and historical

boundaries of the research and the main topics of interest (key words) in the classification of the archive material.

As key topics, to study the audiovisual heritage of the Mediterranean Diaspora, the Institute proposes the following:

- The population of the Mediterranean immigrants (total geographical population grouped according to region, age apportionment, time spent in the host country, etc.),
- Professional activities,
- Education,
- Linguistic characteristics (level of knowledge of the mother tongue),
- Religion,
- Information (about the printed and electronic press),
- Immigrant organisations (unions, councils, social groups, etc.)

IOM's research interest in the audiovisual memory of the Mediterranean Diaspora is related to a broader interest in the audiovisual archive sector. It is trying to create a central information system for all Greek audiovisual (especially electronic) archives, starting with those in Greece and, at a later stage, extending its cooperation to the audiovisual archives of the Greek Diaspora.

The CapMed programme can serve as a essential tool in preserving the Euro-Mediterranean audiovisual memory. Its potential is obvious as an aid in the recording and thematic classifying of Mediterranean archival treasures. It facilitates cooperation among a considerable number of audiovisual archives in the Mediterranean and provides networking with a view to the conservation and utilization of the Euro-Mediterranean audiovisual heritage. It supports the creation of new audiovisual productions/co-productions and the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between audiovisual stations and archives. It also contributes towards a better knowledge of the cultural activities of the peoples of the Mediterranean, whose diachronic dimension is enhanced by the Institute's thematic proposal for the Mediterranean Diaspora.

Research into the Greek diaspora, Greeks abroad, emigration and repatriation — a phenomenon of huge significance in the history of Greek emigration — has long been a subject of interest for experienced observers and academics. Important, ground-breaking research has focused on the great centres of the Greek diaspora (Egypt, Vienna, Australia, etc.). Scientific research, however, which mainly stems from individual initiative on the part of researchers, is fragmented and a cohesive research policy is lacking. Thematically, it is dominated by the fields of economics, sociology and education/linguistics, and recently there has been a greater show of interest from the fields of history and political science.

Historical research through audiovisual archives, a fairly recent primary source of research, offers a new approach to studying the phenomenon of the Greek diaspora and lends a new dimension to the pursuit of history.

The two above-mentioned research projects are a contribution towards providing this new dimension since they attempt to record and codify the wealth of existing audiovisual archive material, preserving it in easy-to-use data bases, and thus helping to ensure that it can continue to be used for research and production.

CHRONOLOGIE-CHYPRE

(1er décembre 1999 - 30 avril 2000)

3-14 décembre : Premier tour de pourparlers indirects, sous l'égide de l'ONU entre le Président Cléridès et R. Denktash.

10-11 décembre : Le Conseil européen d'Helsinki admet la Turquie sur la liste des candidats à l'Union européenne et déclare que l'absence de solution à Chypre ne sera pas un obstacle à l'adhésion de cet État.

29 décembre : Le Premier ministre turc, B. Ecevit, déclare qu'il n'a fait aucune concession sur la question chypriote au Conseil européen d'Helsinki et qu'il a dit lors de ce sommet aux dirigeants européens qu'ils devaient reconnaître l'existence de deux États à Chypre.

27 janvier : En visite à Nicosie, le ministre grec de la Défense nationale, Akis Tsohatzopoulos déclare qu'il n'y a pas d'autre solution de la question chypriote que la solution de la fédération.

31 janvier-8 février : Deuxième tour, à Genève, de pourparlers indirects, sous l'égide de l'ONU, entre le Président Cléridès et Rauf Denktash.

15 mars : Rencontre à Paris avec le Président Chirac du Président Cléridès, en visite de travail en France.

28-31 mars : Visite en Israël du Président Cléridès. Il s'agit de la première visite officielle dans ce pays d'un Président de la République de Chypre.

15 avril : En zone occupée de Chypre, R. Denktash obtient 43% des voix aux élections au poste de "Président de la République de Chypre Nord". Dervis Eroglu, chef du Parti de l'Union nationale (centre droit) arrive en second avec 30% des voix. Denktash est proclamé élu à la suite du retrait d'Eroglu avant le second tour de scrutin.

CHRONOLOGIE-GRÈCE

(1er Décembre 1999 - 30 avril 2000)

15 décembre : Débat au Parlement grec sur les résultats du Conseil européen d'Helsinki. Le Premier ministre, Costas Simitis déclare qu'il a défendu les intérêts nationaux à ce sommet de l'Union européenne.

22 décembre : vote du budget par 160 voix contre 133. Le Premier ministre déclare que la Grèce remplit déjà quatre des 5 critères de convergence nécessaires pour adhérer à l'euro. Il ne lui reste encore qu'à satisfaire le critère relatif à l'inflation.

15 janvier : La Grèce réévalue de 3,5% la drachme afin de faciliter sa future adhésion à l'euro.

19 janvier : Visite en Turquie de Georges Papandreou, ministre grec des affaires étrangères, qui va y signer quatre accords de coopération. C'est la première visite dans ce pays depuis 38 ans d'un chef de la diplomatie grecque.

28 janvier : Ouverture d'une nouvelle ligne de métro à Athènes. Cette seconde ligne de métro, attendue depuis 45 ans, a été construite par des entreprises grecques, françaises et allemandes.

3 février : Visite en Grèce d'Ismail Cem, ministre turc des Affaires étrangères, qui vient y signer 5 accords de coopération.

8 février : Réélection par le Parlement du Président de la République, Costis Stéphanopoulos. Celui-ci, qui est élu dès le premier tour de scrutin à la majorité requise des deux tiers obtient 269 voix (PASOK et Nouvelle Démocratie). Léonidas Kyrkos, le candidat du Synaspismos recueille 10 voix. Abstention volontaire des partis KKE et DIKKI lors de cette élection.

9 mars : La Grèce dépose officiellement sa candidature d'adhésion à l'euro.

9 avril : Elections législatives. Le PASOK remporte les élections avec 43,79% des voix et 158 sièges. La Nouvelle Démocratie obtient 42,73% des voix et 125 sièges. Le KKE avec 5,53% des voix dispose de 11 sièges. Avec 3,20% des voix le Synaspismos a 6 sièges. Le DIKKI, qui n'obtient que 2,69% des voix n'est pas représenté au Parlement.

RECENSIONS / BOOK REVIEWS

Paris Arnopoulos

EXOPOLITICS

Polis-Ethnos-Cosmos

Classical Theories and Praxis of Foreign Affairs

255 pages (glossary in appendix)

Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Commack, New York 1999

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Exopolitics, Polis-Ethnos-Cosmos is a book dedicated to exploring the thoughts and practices of the ancient Greeks in a field that we call today "International Relations". Exopolitics, from the Greek words *exo* and *polis*, means external affairs in contrast to internal affairs, for which we could coin another Greek word, *endopolitics*.

As the author aptly points out, the classics may well have been scrutinised and analysed extensively throughout the millennia, but they have not been studied from an exopolitical viewpoint. It may be mentioned that attention has been given only to Thucydides. As a matter of fact, only Thucydides has been viewed as the classic theorist of international relations.

Arnopoulos offers readers and researchers a new perspective by insisting on the importance of other classics of Greek antiquity which refer to the theory and praxis of international relations, e.g. Plato and Aristotle or even poets like Pindar and Aeschylus.

Using a theoretical model based on the trilemma of theory, policy and history, the author goes through the praxis of Ancient Greek external relations and their philosophical/ideological underpinnings. The result is an important study and analysis of the classical theories and praxis of foreign affairs during a unique historical period, the zenith of ancient Greek civilisation. In fact, from Polis to Ethnos and from Ethnos to Cosmos, the author succeeds in integrating classical political thought into modern international theory.

Arnopoulos strikes a chord when he states that despite the little though that classical Greek philosophers apparently gave to exopolitics, the student of international relations may nevertheless benefit from the distilled ideas of the past.

From both a theoretical and practical viewpoint, Arnopoulos' book is a veritable odyssey through a brilliant civilisation, inside and around the history of the genesis of politics. He explores concepts, ideas, utopias, ideals and theories against their historical context. He raises the eternal contradiction of the human condition within the central hypothesis in trilemma form (Polis-Ethnos-Cosmos) before giving readers a magistral exposé of the theoretical notions and historical events.

The importance of this book also stems from its contents, 18 chapters in three sections: Genealogy, Ideography and Philosophy. In the Genealogy section, the author examines the Greek reality and classical philosophy while developing a theoretical model (taxonomy, methodology, ideology). He then presents the political genesis of the Hellenic era and its political dynamics (IR, internal affairs and national entropy).

In the second part, Ideography, Arnopoulos presents what is most important for the humanities, the Platonic and Aristotelian eras. The reader moves from the Polis to the rise of Macedonia and subsequent panhellenism and with Alexander the Great, to the panhellenic movement which leads to cosmopolitanism or what the author calls cosmopolis. This is, or was, a time characterised by a multinational and multilingual superculture in which Greek became the *lingua franca*.

In the third part, Philosophy, Arnopoulos describes political constitutions, statesmanship, foreign policy, and raises the broader theoretical implications of the philosopher's exopolitics to a systemic world order model. The author then develops a synthesis of the comparative study of classical theory and modern reality (chapter 17, Historical Dialectics).

The author continues his conceptual framework to include future anticipation. The present realist nation-state thesis is challenged by

subnational urbanism and transnational continentalism. Nation-states are pressured to share their jurisdiction, which smaller entities — the cities — and larger entities — the international organisations. Under this circumstances, the nation-state is subject to the "stress and strain created by three contradictory tendencies from

- Above, by supranational IGOs (Intergovernmental organizations);
- Beside, by the international TNCs (Transnational corporations);
- Below, by the infranational LOCs (Local ethnic communities)."

Arnopoulos goes on to give scenarios, such as one of "increasing global interdependence which makes the need for stronger international law and tighter supranational organization imperative conditions of maintaining a dynamic world order. For chaos to be avoided, systemic complexity must be directly proportional to cybernetic harmony." He concludes this scenario by saying that "if present integrating tendencies continue unabated, a strengthening of planetary institutions of legislative, executive and adjudicative functions will inevitably accelerate into the next century."

A second and parallel scenario is that of "transnational globalization [which] goes on besides nation-states, interpenetrating their jurisdictions by socioeconomic forces which do not respect national borders or state politics. Multinational institutions and transnational flows of people, goods and money are presently making nation-state divisions anachronistic and meaningless.

Finally, subnational forces emanating from about a thousand provincial governments and five thousand ethnic languages or imagined communities in the world divide nation-state sovereignties among their local constituencies. (The former USSR alone officially recognized a hundred ethnic groups. South America also has a hundred, Indonesia, three hundred, Europe, seventy-five, and China, fifty). If the recent trends of large state breakdown into smaller ethnic components continues unabated, the present hundreds of nation-states could multiply into thousands of city-states."

According to Arnopoulos, the optimistic scenario of international relations in the future combines both realistic and idealistic theories, as well as synchronic and diachronic dialectics; i.e., "by synthesizing ancient philosophy with modern technology, it describes and prescribes a probable future society." He goes on to add that "the classic principles of strong local community, integrity and simplicity, join with modern notions of humanity, equality and liberty to create a peaceful, tolerant, multicultural coexistence; thus avoiding both pessimistic scenarios of either chaotic anarchism or sclerotic totalitarianism."

In conclusion, the author provides us with a timely reminder that, like the ancients, we face the Polis-Ethnos-Cosmos trichotomy and live in a similar trilemma which can only partially and temporarily be resolved. In one way or another, we are condemned to deal with complex issues and seek ways to world peace and freedom, as did the ancient Greeks.

Stephanos Constantinides
Université du Québec à Montréal

Activités académiques / Academic activities

VISITE DU PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE HELLÉNIQUE, M. CONSTANTIN STEPHANOPOULOS AU CANADA.

Le président de la République hellénique M. Constantin Stephanopoulos a effectué une visite officielle au Canada du 26 mai au 2 juin 2000. A Ottawa, il a eu deux entretiens avec le gouverneur général, Mme Adrienne Clarkson, et le premier ministre, M. Jean Chrétien. Avec ce dernier il a discuté de plusieurs sujets d'intérêt commun aux deux pays. Il a aussi rendu visite à la communauté hellénique de la capitale canadienne.

M. Stephanopoulos s'est aussi rendu à Montréal et Toronto où il a été reçu avec grand enthousiasme par les membres des communautés grecques des deux villes. Lors de son passage, le président de la Grèce a rencontré des universitaires ainsi que des hommes d'affaires. C'est dans ce but qu'il était venu d'ailleurs accompagné d'universitaires et d'hommes d'affaires grecs.

Au cours de ses entretiens avec le Gouvernement canadien, M. Stephanopoulos a exprimé son inquiétude au sujet du projet canadien de vendre un réacteur nucléaire à la Turquie. Au fait il a demandé que le Canada exerce son influence afin de trouver une solution à la question chypriote notamment par la retraite de l'armée turque de Chypre conformément aux résolutions de l'ONU et aux principes du droit international.

GREEK HEAD OF STATE ON OFFICIAL VISIT TO CANADA

Mr. Constantinos Stephanopoulos, President of the Hellenic Republic, was on official visit to Canada from May 26 to June 2. In Ottawa, the nation's capital, he met with the Governor General, Adrienne Clarkson, and the Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien. He spoke

with the Prime Minister about issues in which Canada and Greece share an interest. President Stephanopoulos also visited Ottawa's Greek community.

The Greek communities in Toronto and Montreal, the other two cities on the itinerary, also gave Mr. Stephanopoulos a warm welcome. During his stay, the Greek president met with representatives from universities and the business world. In fact he had come with an entourage of Greek academics or university administrators and business people.

During his conversations with representatives from the Canadian Government, Mr. Stephanopoulos expressed his concerns about the Canadian initiative of selling a nuclear reactor to Turkey. He requested that Canada exercise its influence in order to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, namely through the withdrawal from Cypriot soil of the Turkish army in accordance with the UN resolutions and with the principles of international law.

IL Y A UN AN, LE TROISIÈME CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES INSTITUTS HELLÉNIQUES DE RECHERCHE À MONTRÉAL

Il y a un an, du 28 mai au 1 juin 1999 a eu lieu le troisième congrès international des Instituts helléniques de recherche organisé par le Centre de recherches helléniques du Canada (KEEK) à Montréal. Les actes du congrès sortiront bientôt à Athènes aux Editions Papazissi.

ONLY A YEAR AGO, THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN MONTREAL.

Last year, from May 28 to June 1st, the Canadian Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research (KEEK) held an international conference in Montreal with the participation of Hellenic Instituts of Research. The papers presented will be published soon by Papazissi Publications in Athens.

LE PROCHAIN NUMÉRO THÉMATIQUE DE LA REVUE ETUDES HELLÉNIQUES/HELLENIC STUDIES

Le prochain numéro de la revue sera consacré aux décisions prises lors de la conférence d'Helsinki (10-12 décembre 1999).

Rappelons qu'à cette conférence l'Union européenne a accepté d'inscrire la Turquie sur la liste de pays candidats à un futur élargissement de l'Union moyennant un certain nombre de conditions dont

- le respect des droits de la personne
- la démocratisation du régime politique turc
- une solution au différend greco-turc par l'entremise de la Cour internationale de la Haye, si nécessaire.

Concernant Chypre, le Conseil européen a confirmé sa position selon laquelle la solution de la question chypriote n'est pas un prérequis pour l'entrée de l'île à l'Union européenne.

Toutes ces questions, "l'après-Helsinki", seront traitées dans le prochain numéro d'Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies. Avis aux intéressés: nous aimerions recevoir vos manuscrits au plus tard le 15 septembre 2000.

THE UPCOMING THEMATIC ISSUE OF ETUDES HELLÉNIQUES/HELLENIC STUDIES

The upcoming thematic issue of Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies will focus on the Helsinki Conference held last 10-12 December.

At this conference, the European Union agreed to include Turkey on the list of candidate countries awaiting the future enlarging of the Union. Naturally there were certain conditions, including

- respect for human rights
- democratisation of the Turkish political regime
- resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute through the international court in the Hague, if necessary.

With regard to Cyprus, the European Council reiterated its position that a solution to the Cypriot situation is not a prerequisite for the island's entry into the European Union.

All these questions, the 'post-Helsinki' question, will be treated in the next issue of *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*. All those interested should submit manuscripts to the Editor by September 15, 2000.

ADVICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Three copies of all manuscripts, typewritten on computer, double-spaced should be submitted on paper and disk. Manuscripts should follow the APA Manual, or the MLA Style Sheet or be consistent with practice in the discipline of each particular author.

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Les textes doivent être soumis en trois exemplaires dactylographiés à l'ordinateur à double interligne et conformément à la présentation en usage sur papier et sur disquette.

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