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Panayotis J. Tsakonas

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An Assessment of Empirical Evidence*

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(412-485) II*

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Is the Greek-Turkish Conflict a Security Dilemma? An Assessment of Empirical Evidence

Panayotis J. Tsakonas*

The previous volume of *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies* (Autumn 2001) was devoted to the examination of the Greek-Turkish conflict through the use of the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma. In IR literature the security dilemma has proved to be fruitful in analysing relations and explaining conflict emerging between states operating in an anarchic international system.¹ Most recently Robert Jervis — by far the most prolific writer of the security dilemma — has used this particular analytical tool in order to explain the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.²

In order for the Greek-Turkish conflict to be examined, pairs of Greek and Turkish scholars³ examined a variety of cases that fall into the three basic manifestations of the Greek-Turkish conflict in the post-Cold War era. As theory and practice suggest, the security dilemma manifests itself (a) in *arms-race* {as the core of the action-reaction phenomenon characterizing the armaments dynamics}; (b) in *crisis scenarios* {in a low degree of crisis stability evidenced in vicious circles of “reciprocal fears and surprise attack”}, and (c) in *competitive alliance formation* {i.e., a tendency toward a continuous struggle for “preemptive alignment”}.

The first thematic area, devoted to the arms race, was analysed in the contributions of Christos Kollias and Gunlay Gunluk Senesen. Given that even during the post-bipolar period — at a time when other NATO members have been trimming their defense spending — Greek and Turkish military expenditures have continued to grow in real terms, Kollias addressed some methodological issues which hindered the empirical examination of the Greek-Turkish armaments race with the aim of identifying whether the issue of an action-reaction régime between Greek and Turkish military spending can be esta-

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blished and a systematic Greek-Turkish arms race can be empirically verified. Along the same line of reasoning Senesen attempted to identify whether Turkish defense expenditures during 1983-2000 (the choice of the period is based on availability of detailed data on Turkish defense expenditures) and relations with Greece in the same period have a common pattern. Given that recent empirical literature on a long-run arms race between Turkey and Greece was inconclusive Senesen attempted to find out to what extent the continuum of perceived threats, upon which Turkish defense decisions reacted, are attributable to threats emanating from neighbouring Greece.

A particular crisis scenario, namely the Imia (Kardak for Turkey) incident of 1996 has been the focus of the analyses provided by Kostas Ifantis and Gulden Ayman. Structural factors along with the revisionist, predatory — non-security — goals of Turkey were highlighted by Ifantis as the major causes of the Greek-Turkish conflict, while the Turkish conduct in the Imia incident has been explored to verify the above mentioned premise empirically. In her contribution, Ayman explored various crisis models to show how crises lead to conflict and even war. Certain theoretical models were contrasted with the example of the Kardak crisis. Factors such as history, policy, strategy, social pressures, and diplomacy were examined while the impact of the particular crisis on Turkish-Greek relations was also discussed.

The tendency of the states living under the security dilemma toward a continuous struggle for the formation of “preemptive alignment” was another theme considered. Antonia Dimou and Marios Evriviadis explored Turkey’s search for pre-emptive alignments and a hegemonic role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East, as it is reflected on the Turkish-Israeli alliance. The alliance’s background, its modern version, and the motives behind its formation were thus analyzed. The Greek and Cypriot concerns and responses to this partnership were also discussed. The decision by the Greek and Cypriot Governments to deploy the Russian-made S-300 missile system in Cyprus within the context of the two states Joint Defense Doctrine is explored by Gulden Ayman (in an upcoming article still in the manuscript stage) as a pre-emptive move taken by both the Greek and the

Cypriot Government (and being developed as a well-prepared 'brinkmanship crisis') with the ultimate aim to change the *status quo* in Cyprus.

Two additional points of a methodological nature need particular reference. First, the set of aforementioned contributions has only touched on *some* of the issues affecting the Greek-Turkish conflict. By implication, only the issues examined empirically by the particular case studies are the ones from which inferences are drawn as to whether a security dilemma is or it is not at work.

Second, it goes without saying that an objective assessment by a Greek scholar of the empirical examination of the various case-studies examined by both Greek and Turkish scholars is a rather difficult, if not elusive, enterprise. Indeed, misperception is not only apparent although it can be hardly doubted or criticized in decisionmakers assessments on both sides of the Aegean. As the case studies indicate, Greek and Turkish academics and analysts are also carriers of misperception and they often experience major difficulties in assessing accurately the other side's intentions. It is rather easy, given the ambiguous nature of the evidence available, for an academic, whose country faces an inadvertent security dilemma to misperceive it and deal with the other state as facing a deliberate security dilemma, thus providing his/her government with policy options that emphasize a hard 'deterrent' response.⁴ In addition, it should not be forgotten that the 'mainstream' approach which Greek and Turkish 'epistemic communities'⁵ follow in order to analyze the Greek-Turkish conflict is based on the same 'consensual knowledge', a shared set of beliefs about a particular cause-effect relationship. Moreover, this relationship is most often burdened by a set of particular cognitive dynamics, which force almost all members of the 'epistemic communities' on both sides to highlight the structural reasons that make states becoming power-maximizing rational egoists, who define security in zero-sum terms.

Needless to say, not far from the 'mainstream' there is a distinct group of scholars in both Greece and Turkey who strongly believe that the Greek-Turkish conflict is far from carrying even elements of the

security dilemma. As a matter of fact, the Greek-Turkish conflict is seen as ‘an alternative’ to the security dilemma. Greek and Turkish academics view Turkey and Greece, respectively, as *inherently expansionistic* aiming to achieve *non-security goals*. This view is consistent with classical views of human nature viewing humans as harbouring original sin and being driven by the will to dominate. Furthermore, such a view depicts *both sides as seeking to alter the status quo* and it portrays them as *aggressive* or *evil*. By implication, the scholars who belong in this group from both sides of the Aegean offer the very same recipe as to the policies each state should follow vis-à-vis the other, which is based on the dictum “the only language [they] understand is the one of firmness and strength” (!).

Assessing the Empirical Evidence

After thoroughly reading the case-studies at hand, the first general observation one can make is that all analyses clearly and eloquently show the differences in the perceptions of events, policies, consequences and, most importantly, motivations and intentions in the relations between the two countries. Many of these misperceptions often lead to an overestimation of the other’s side hostility. As already noted, academics in both Greece and Turkey, sharing a common set of beliefs about a particular cause-effect relationship that is most often overburden by a set of particular cognitive dynamics, experience major difficulties in assessing accurately the other side’s intentions. The most striking example is the analysis of the most serious among the several near-conflict situations between Greece and Turkey since 1974, namely the conflict over the islets of Imia provided by Ifantis and Ayman. Unsurprisingly, for both Ifantis and Ayman, the conflict over the Imia was a clear case of Turkish and Greek revisionism, respectively (!). Along the same line of reasoning, Dimou and Evriviades perceive the Turkish-Israeli alliance as “a pre-emptive alignment of anti-Hellenic orientation” while Ayman viewed the Greek and Cypriot decision to purchase and deploy the S-300 missile system in Cyprus as part of a well-elaborated strategy on the part of Greece and Cyprus aiming at “enclaving Turkey with a strategic belt from the Ionian sea to the Gulf

of Iskenderum and closing all the naval routes of transportation of Anatolia” thus isolating Turkey and separating it from Cyprus.

The empirical cases provided by the Greek and Turkish scholars also reflect the two states’ dilemmas of *interpretation* (i.e., are the other’s policies defensive or offensive?). Also, to a lesser extent, there are dilemmas of *response* (i.e., should these policies be matched and so risk an arms race, counter-alliances or/and crisis escalation or should a wait-and-see policy be adopted thereby risking exposure to coercion or even attack as a result of relative weakness?). Ayman’s and Ifantis’ analyses of the Imia/Kardak crisis, Dimou’s and Evriviadis’s case of the Turkish-Israeli are representative of both dilemmas of interpretation and dilemmas of response, they provide insights as to the two states characteristics as *status quo*, ‘security-seekers’ and/or ‘power-maximizers’, and they suggest that the Greek-Turkish conflict is a blend of inadvertent and deliberate security dilemmas.

For their part, Kollias’s and Senesen’s analyses concur in the view that data on the Greek and Turkish defense expenditure inconclusively corroborates the presence of a Greek-Turkish arms race. Senesen argues that Turkey’s defense spending was not directly related to that of Greece or to the state of their bilateral relations. Kollias argues that although it is hard to establish an action/reaction relationship to Greek-Turkish military expenditures as governments do not respond instantaneously to the military acquisitions of their rivals, there is a strong, long-term correlation between the growth rate of military spending and policy reactions to armament acquisitions, to the extent that Turkey’s weapons built-up follows an upward trend at a faster rate than Greece’s re-armaments. By extension, this action-reaction pattern incites an awesome security dilemma in the Greek-Turkish relations and potentially sets the stage for a systematic arms race.

Ifantis’ study seeks to reflect on the issue of the Imia crisis through the connection of the anarchic structure of the international system with the expansionist state conduct at the unit level of analysis. Charting the spiral of events that triggered the Imia incident and brought the two countries to the brink of a war, he attributed this cri-

sis to Turkish revisionism. By virtue of his neo-realist assumptions, one is tempted to argue that Ifantis essentially voiced the view that the security dilemma in the Greek-Turkish conflict reflects a blend of inadvertent and deliberate types, being the product of two, seemingly contradictory, factors in combination. These are the Greek inability to consolidate the *status quo* and seek for security without being trapped in a dilemma of response; and the Turkish ability to maximize its power and secure more relative gains. In effect, there exists a 'deep security dilemma', even though the implications could be contained or even ameliorated.

In counterpoint to this argument and entertaining the belief that Turkey is a *status quo* and security seeker state, Ayman perceives in the Imia crisis a Greek effort to present a *fait accompli* with respect to what she calls a Greek expansionist policy in the Aegean. As a result, Turkey was forced to increase its security by arms built up, a fact that, thanks to the Greek 'non-security goals', deepens the security dilemma further. In her article, which is unfortunately not yet published, Ayman sees the initiator of the crisis in both the Imia case and in the S-300 missile issue as Greece (along with the Cypriot Government in the second case) while Turkey acted in both cases as the defender of *the status quo* who drew a line and tested — successfully — the validity of its deterrent strategy.

Ayman's analysis of the S-300 issue also reflects some of Turkey's primary concerns and fears that are integral elements of a security dilemma relationship, namely the domination of nightmares of inferiority, not hopes for gain, as stemming from Turkey's conflict with Greece. It is interesting to note that Dimou and Evriviades' analysis regarding the Turkish-Israeli Alliance also highlights similar Greek nightmares of inferiority due to the consequences of the Turkish decision to form the particular alliance against Greece's and Cyprus's interests. It is interesting to note that in Ifantis's and Ayman's analyses on the Imia crisis, in Dimou/Evriviades's contribution and in Ayman's piece of the S-300 issue there have been episodes — following changes in the perceptions of threat — where Greece and Turkey were experiencing a state of fundamental insecurity, thus drawing

themselves into a ‘deep security dilemma’ where a series of factors (i.e., the fear that the other’s relative power is dangerously increasing, events outside their control, their subjective security requirements) prevented them from being reassured. This was the case even if they were willing to give up the chance of expansion in return of security.

Of particular importance is the fact that the empirical findings of the available case studies do not provide clear indications — not to mention proof — that either Greece or Turkey was willing to pay a high price to gain superiority in order to coerce the other into changing the *status quo* in the Aegean or elsewhere. In other words, neither Greek nor Turkish analysts attributed aggressive behaviour to Turkey and Greece, respectively; i.e., a willingness to undertake high risks and dangerous efforts (even risk the state’s survival) to change the *status quo*, although both have attributed to each other a desire to expand or have accused each other as being revisionist.

Unsurprisingly, Jervis’ analysis of the Cold War conflict provides similar inferences. Indeed, Jervis’ explanation of the US/Soviet rivalry through the use of the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma suggests that Soviet leaders were *not willing to risk what they had achieved in order to get more*, yet they did *want, expect, and seek more*. However, the American belief that the Soviet Union was inherently expansionistic — as Greece mainly views Turkey and *vice versa* — ruled out cooperation, precluded the adoption of a purely defensive posture by the US and led to the conclusion that demonstrations of resolve were crucial while the only way to underscore US resolve was by prevailing in crises.⁶

To sum up, the empirical examination of the basic manifestations of the Greek-Turkish conflict in the post-Cold War era suggests that the conflict contains more than just elements of the security dilemma. As most cases indicated, both the inadvertent and deliberate types of the security dilemma, as well as a ‘deep security dilemma’, were in certain episodes at work. More specifically, it could be argued that the Greek-Turkish conflict reflects a blend of inadvertent (the ‘arms race’ cases) *and* deliberate security dilemma (the ‘crises’ and ‘preemptive alignment’

cases) ending up in certain episodes in a 'deep security dilemma' state of affairs. The unavoidable result has been that even if one of the two states might primarily seek security these efforts were indistinguishable in their effect from expansionism. Indeed, the unintended effect was to preclude mutually acceptable arrangements.

Despite the obvious need of theoretically informed projects to analyse Greek-Turkish relations, the diagnosis of the existence of elements or/and particular types of the security dilemma in the Greek-Turkish conflict is politically attractive and useful. It can contribute to the ongoing debate on both sides of the Aegean as to what constitutes the two states real concerns and interests and how best to pursue those interests. Dealing with the security dilemma in such a critical way reveals the possibility that uncertainty can be transcended and that the Greek-Turkish security dilemma can be ameliorated. Thus, each state may cease assuming — as Rousseau's 'stag-hunt' example suggests — the worst and thus pursuing its 'apparent' interests at the expense of its 'real' interests. The analysis of the Greek-Turkish conflict by using the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma offers valuable insights as to the policies that need to be developed in order for arms competition to be reversed, crisis stability be increased,⁷ and arms reduction be encouraged between Greece and Turkey.

Yet a special volume devoted to the examination of the Greek-Turkish conflict through the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma represents but a first attempt to contribute to the mapping out of the conflict in a theoretically informed way. It also stimulates a shift of scholarly concern, on both sides of the divide, from the influence of individual politicians and the inescapable 'structural' dictates or 'blind' historical processes to the interaction of historically and socially constituted systemic and domestic forces. However, much more remains to be done: the construction of national identity and its impact on the evolution of the conflict; the relationship between the security dilemma and Greece and Turkey's political, social and economic transformation; and the strategies that should be developed to ameliorate the Greek-Turkish security dilemma⁸ are only parts of a future research agenda related to the security dilemma.⁹ Greece and

Turkey do have some choice on the matter of the security dilemma and theoretically informed projects can contribute to the development of a more 'mature anarchy' in Greek-Turkish relations. The challenge for scholars on both sides of the Aegean remains great and as yet ahead of us.

NOTES

1. Past attempts include Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (revised edition, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); and Alan Collins, *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
2. For a recent explanation of the Cold War conflict between the two super powers by using the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?", *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Vol.3, No.1, Winter 2001), pp. 36-60.
3. In analyzing the Greek-Turkish conflict, country representation is considered as necessary: assessments are often formed or influenced by the Greek and Turkish perceptions of the cases under examination. Indeed, behaviour underlying the security dilemma is shaped not simply by the strategic situation or the circumstances that constitute the security dilemma; i.e., anarchy and offensive advantages, but also by the *participants' perceptions* of that situation and their expectations of each others' like behaviour in that situation. Indeed, cognitive dynamics impact on the security dilemma in crucial ways and are thus among the contributors' pursuits when examining a particular case study to capture the way cognitive dynamics can intensify the security dilemma. As theory and practice suggest, cognitive dynamics may include — among others — ethnocentrism, 'doctrinal realism', ideological fundamentalism, strategic reductionism and zero-sum thinking.

4. Although they cannot be criticized because they overestimated the other side hostility, yet they should assess the cost of overestimating the other's hostility (beware of the costs of misperception and the costs of the opposite error).
5. Networks of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular domain.
6. R. Jervis, *op.cit.*, pp. 58-60.
7. As Jervis pointed out "...not only the Cuban missile crisis, but also the conflict over West Berlin could have been avoided by greater understanding and statesmanship". See *Ibid*, p. 41. He cites for that conclusion a phrase by Anatoly Dobrinin (The Soviet Ambassador to the United States) that in 1961 "Moscow ...overlooked a very important point: President Kennedy's readiness to reach an understanding on the status quo in Europe". See Anatoly Dobrinin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995).
8. Although the aim of this special volume of *Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies* was not about how the effects of the security dilemma can be mitigated, the utility of the research findings for future research aiming at the amelioration of that Greek-Turkish security dilemma is self-evident.
9. An 'epistemic approach' to Greek-Turkish relations would also be of particular importance in analyzing the interaction between domestic and international sources of state behaviour as well as the role ideas play in shaping each state policy.

International Law, Human Rights and Realpolitik: the Case of Cyprus

Thalia Tassou*, Stephanos Constantinides**

RÉSUMÉ

Les droits de l'homme sont devenus la nouvelle idéologie dominante des relations internationales. Dans cette communication - en se servant du cas de Chypre - on tentera justement de montrer que la politique des droits de l'homme s'applique de façon sélective en tenant plutôt compte des intérêts du monde occidental - Etats-Unis en tête - que des principes généraux. Il est évident que cette question est très large et par conséquent nous nous limiterons à certains aspects particuliers pour démontrer que l'idéologie des droits de l'homme tout en étant en soi d'une valeur éthique certaine - est à toutes fins pratiques au service des intérêts des pays riches et développés qui la manipulent à dessein.

ABSTRACT

Human rights have become the new dominant ideology in international relations. In this article, taking as an example the case of Cyprus, we try to show that the policy of human rights is applied in a selective manner which takes into consideration the interests of the Western world - the United States playing a leading role - more than the general principles of justice. It is evident that this question is vast and consequently we limit ourselves to certain aspects in order to show that the ideology of human rights, in itself of an unquestionable ethical value, is in reality serving the interests of the rich and developed countries which manipulate it accordingly.

I. Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have put forward a new era for the international system. The dominant ideology of this new era is one of human rights. Incidentally, this new dominant ideology, like all other ideologies which have dominated international relations for two centuries, is also of Western origin: i.e., eurocentrist. Independently of its internal ethical value, the ideology

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of human rights acts above all, as an instrument serving to justify the policies of Western countries towards the rest of the world.

Of course, human rights are not a recent creation. The Greek and Roman worlds had created a philosophy favouring these rights. Indeed, in the Greco-Roman world there existed a certain balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community. It has even been considered that "Greek liberty was consumed in the exercise of civil rights"¹. Thus, the individual could not be dissociated from the citizen in spite of the sophists' effort to oppose the individual to the citizen. In fact, human rights will occupy a central place in the Western vision of the society's political organisation with the liberalism of modern times. Lock's thinking and the philosophy of the enlightenment are important sources in the affirmation of human rights. Contrary to popular belief that the French revolution created the notion of human rights, one must go back to Seventeenth-century England, birthplace of liberalism, - and even further - in order to find their first affirmation. The English pacts, agreements signed between the King and the barons or the chambers established the first individual liberties. These pacts are the Magna Carta (of John 'Lackland') of June 21, 1215, the Petition of Rights of June 7, 1628, the Act of *Habeas Corpus* of 1679 and the Bill of Rights of February 13, 1689. In 1776 followed the American Revolution, another source of human rights declarations and in 1789, the French Revolution. Of course, one must recognise the political repercussions of the French Revolution in this field, ensured by a solemn confirmation of the institution of human rights in its famous declaration of August 1789.

The French Revolution is also credited with the projection of human rights to an international level. For the first time, human rights became an important issue in international relations. In order to prevent the "export" of the French Revolution and its favourite themes, republicanism and human rights, the European monarchies put on an anti-French coalition.

Since then, "the question of human rights has become part of these permanent issues through which are reformulated the relations between States, between human communities"².

II. The Contemporary Period

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations General Assembly constitutes the starting point and the indispensable reference of the contemporary period. But the Cold War rapidly put aside the preoccupation of human rights, so that realpolitik occupied the entire international relations scene. Consequently, violations of individual rights are numerous in Eastern as well as in Western countries.

During decolonization and afterwards, in North-South relations, the Western vision of human rights was violently criticized by Third World countries. According to Third World disciples and a strong leftist movement, economic and social realities can not be isolated from human rights. Economic and social rights thus acquire the importance of civil and political rights.

The neoliberalism of the 1980s will once again push the ideology of human rights towards an extreme individualism at the expense of any social solidarity. Once more, the Western world has tried to impose its vision of human rights as a universal one.

This time, resistance comes mainly from the Islamic world. The Western concept of the individual is contested by Islam, which can in no way separate the individual from faith and religion, contrary to the philosophy of the enlightenment which recognized the liberty of faith and separated the political from the religious.

In fact, it should be stressed here that there was a contradiction between universalism and particularism, as well as the existence of two opposite visions of human rights: one universalist; the other, relativist. The first vision is ethnocentrist-eurocentrist in which the Western values are considered universal and "the western civilization,

champion of progress, is the inevitable destiny of all the world's cultures"³. The second vision negates the existence of universal values. "There would exist as many ethical values as cultures"⁴. Moreover, the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993 has linked, after much insistence of Asiatic countries, "the universalism of human rights to the national and regional particularisms and to the various historical, cultural and religious contexts"⁵.

Besides these problems, there is the question of minorities and their rights, the explosion of diversity in this end of century, the dialectic of uniformisation and differentiation and the right to humanitarian assistance which threatens the sovereignty of nations-States and opens the door to interference⁶.

Can this question of interference for *supposedly* humanitarian purposes "be applied equally to all Nations?" The answer is clear: "All over history, never did a strong country tolerate an external intervention; if it had done so, it would not be any more a part of the Great countries of this planet. The assistance or intervention is applied to the small, the weak or the weakened"⁷.

III. The Legal Aspect

As far as the legal aspect is concerned, it is on the constitutional level that the human rights find a certain consecration. One must be reminded of the *Habeas Corpus* (1679) and the Bill of Rights (1689)⁸, long before the declaration of the French Revolution; in spite of the fact that in most of the cases, this legal consecration remains weak, confined to the preamble of various constitutions. The phenomenon of any extended constitutional protection is relatively recent. In certain cases, articles of the constitution are devoted to rights; sometimes the constitution is accompanied by a charter of rights⁹. Instead of including a charter in their constitution, some other countries simply vote special laws on human rights.

Moreover, adhesion to international organisations or to certain treaties obliges countries to respect the fundamental rights for fear of sanctions. From another point of view, international courts of justice can, in certain cases, sanction the violation of human rights as this was the case at Nuremberg, at the International Criminal Court of Justice for ex-Yugoslavia, or at the European Court of Human Rights.

In spite of this progress accomplished especially since the Second World War, the protection of human rights at the jurisdictional level remains uncertain. Ultimately, the problem is political. It is a question of power struggle, of *realpolitik*, of international context. For instance who can imagine how Germany could ever have been sanctioned at Nuremberg if this country had not been annihilated by the Second World War. Similarly, the United States was not sanctioned for the violation of human rights during the Vietnam War; neither was the Soviet Union, for the non-respect of human rights during the Stalin period. The same may be said of Russia, today, in the case of Tchetchenia. Moreover the United States is refusing to sanction the treaty creating the International Criminal Court in order to avoid condemnation of American citizens in case they would be accused of crimes against humanity.

IV. The Case of Cyprus

The case of Cyprus is a blatant example of the non-respect of human rights by a country, Turkey, which has occupied illegally the north part of the island since 1974. Let us mention that Turkey does not have the strength or the importance of the United-States, Russia, or even Indonesia (for the case of Oriental Timor). In spite of international condemnation, it permits itself, unpunished, to violate human rights in Cyprus, but also elsewhere, especially on its own territory.

In order to understand this situation, we will review the facts.

A. The Facts

Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus, an independent State and UN member in July 1974, using as just cause the *coup d'Etat* organized against the legitimate government of the island. Even if the constitutional order was rapidly reestablished, this did not prevent Turkey from continuing its military operations in order to occupy in the end 37% of the Cyprus territory. Since then, the situation has not changed, despite calls from the UN as well as other international organisations for an end to the occupation. From the Greek point of view, Turkish Cypriots seem to have constituted a strategic minority for Turkey, permitting it to justify an expansionist policy.

Thousands of Cypriots, including numerous civilians were killed or ill-treated. Some have even disappeared without a trace. Turkey has, moreover, been accused of pursuing a policy of ethnic cleansing as was proven by the two-hundred thousand Greek-Cypriot refugees, that is to say 40% of the island's population in 1974¹⁰.

B. Legal Recourses

Of course, on the political level, the violation of human rights in Cyprus has been confirmed by various international instances, but the sole possible jurisdictional recourse against Turkey was to resort to the European Commission for Human Rights as well as to the European Court for Human Rights. Accordingly, Cyprus has called upon the jurisdiction of the European Commission of Human Rights in 1974, in 1975 and in 1977¹¹.

The Commission, after having evaluated the evidence submitted, released two reports¹² in which it found Turkey guilty, considering that it had seriously violated human rights in Cyprus since the island's invasion.

Among other things, the Commission refers to the assassination of civilians by the Turkish army in violation of Article 2 of the European Convention and to the 200,000 Greek-Cypriot refugees expelled by the Turkish army in violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Furthermore, Turkey continues to violate the same article of the Convention by systematically refusing to allow the refugees to return to their homes and properties.

The Commission also decided that Turkey had violated Article 5 of the Convention by imprisoning civilians and soldiers and by treating them in an unacceptable manner in Cyprus or by transferring them to Turkey.

Other atrocities committed by the Turkish army have been denounced; e.g., the kidnapping and assassination of women and other civilians, Turkish forces not having taken the necessary measures in order to prevent them from doing so. On the contrary, these actions have been deliberately committed in order to terrorize the population within the occupied area, and thus force them to leave. These atrocities have been considered by the Commission as an inhuman treatment in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention. The Commission has found that Turkey permitted its army to perpetrate theft and vandalisms on Greek Cypriots' possessions, in violation of Article 1, of Protocol No 1 of the Convention.

Moreover, the Council of Europe's Commission of Human Rights has declared admissible a number of individual motions against Turkey submitted by the victims of the continuing violation of their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property in the zone occupied by Turkey.

Always at the jurisdictional level, the European Court of Human Rights rendered on December 18, 1996, a very important decision in the case *Loizidou* against Turkey. This case involved a Cypriot citizen who was chased away from Kyrenia by the Turkish army and lived as a refugee in the south of the island. The Court decided that the "denial to the applicant of access to property in northern Cyprus falls

within Turkey's "jurisdiction" for purposes of Article 1 of Convention and is imputable to Turkey". The Court considers also that the "continuous denial of access amounts to interference with rights under Article 1, Protocol No. 1".¹³

The Court recognized that Turkey has the real control of the north of Cyprus. Based on a Commission's report dated July 8th 1993, it considers "obvious from large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus that Turkish army exercises effective overall control there. Given the circumstances of the case, this entails Turkey's responsibility for policies and actions of the "TRNC" ("Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus").¹⁴ Concerning "TRNC", the Court adds that it is "evident from international practice and resolutions of various international bodies that international community does not regard "TRNC" as a State under international law and that the Republic of Cyprus remains sole legitimate Government of Cyprus."¹⁵

The importance of Turkey's condemnation by the European Commission of Human Rights goes beyond the sole European frame. In fact, the European Convention prolongates the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Consequently, when Turkey violates the provisions of that Declaration, it also violates the provisions of the 1948 United Nations' Universal Declaration.¹⁶

In the same way, Turkey's sanction by the Commission or the European Court reinforces the condemnation formulated by other international instances which don't have a jurisdictional power. Furthermore, if these instances had a jurisdictional power, one could consider, *mutatis mutandis*, that they would conclude the same way the European Commission or the European Court of human rights did.

C. Various Decisions Regarding Human Rights' Violations in Cyprus.

1. Missing Persons

One of the most painful problems resulting from Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 is that of the missing persons. There is evidence

proving irrefutably that some persons, including civilians were alive in the Turks' hands far after hostilities had stopped.

Various resolutions of the UN General Assembly, of its Third Commission, and of the European Parliament demanding that the families of missing persons be informed about the fate of their relatives, remain unanswered. Following a recommendation of the UN General Assembly's Third Commission, an Inquiry Committee was created on this subject in 1978. Since then, various resolutions of the Third Commission expressing worries about the lack of progress in the Committee's work proved ineffective, the Turkish part refusing to give the necessary information which would permit the Committee to draw convincing conclusions for the families concerned and the international community.

2. The Enclaved

In 1974, some 20,000 Greek Cypriots remained enclaved in the north of the island. Today, only a few hundred remain, the majority in the peninsula of Karpase. The others have been expelled after, according to the Greek point of view presented to international organisations, a continuous campaign of harassment, discrimination and oppression by the Turkish army of occupation.

In spite of international appeals, the fundamental rights of the enclaved are not respected as regards education, religion, health and security. Certain individuals have even suffered physical aggression.

3. The Turkish Settlers

Since 1974, Turkey has followed a policy of colonization. As a result, thousands of settlers from Anatolia have founded communities in the occupied regions. One estimates at 100,000 the number of settlers. Meanwhile, thousands of Turkish Cypriots have migrated abroad because of unemployment and the violation of their fundamental rights and liberties. Out of a total of 100,000, an estimated 30,000

Turkish Cypriots have left the island. Thus the island's population balance is altered to the benefit of Turkey's political projects.

This colonization policy contravenes the 1977 Geneva Convention protocole. Furthermore, the UN, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the Non-Aligned Countries Movement, the Commonwealth and other international authorities have condemned this effort aiming to alter the island's demographic structure.

The Council of Europe and especially the Committee for Migration, Refugees and Demography of its Parliamentary Assembly gave a mandate to Alfonse Cuco, a parliamentarian of Spanish origin, in order to evaluate the colonization of the North of Cyprus by Turkey. In an overwhelmingly accusatory report against Turkey, submitted at the Committee for Migration, Refugees and Demography on November 13, 1991 in Paris, the Spanish parliamentary representative, having held an inquiry on the spot, found out that Turkish colonization had radically altered the demographic composition of Cyprus. He added that the leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot opposition were advancing numbers that even surpassed the estimates of the Government of Cyprus in terms of the numbers of settlers. Moreover, it was noted that the colonization constituted a major obstacle to the solution of the Cyprus question. The Committee approved Cuco's report on April 14, 1992 in Valencia, Spain, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe followed suit on October 7, 1992.

In spite of the recommendation of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly to put an end to the colonization, Turkey has nevertheless continued to install new settlers in the occupied part of Cyprus.

4. The Destruction of the Cultural Heritage in the Occupied Part of Cyprus

From the Greek point of view, "the continuous and persisting Turkey's efforts, directed against the cultural heritage in the occupied

region of Cyprus, are part of a deliberate policy consisting to destroy and eliminate every trace of a history and a culture 9,000 years-old and transform the occupied zone in a Turkish province by a continuous procedure of Turkization"¹⁷. Thus, the Greek part points out the destruction and the pillaging of churches and archeological sites, the conversion of churches into mosques and the illegal export of antiquities sold to private collectors abroad. Indeed, this destruction of the cultural heritage in the island's occupied part has been observed by international authorities.

In at least one case, which became famous, precious and unique frescoes and mosaics from the Church of the Panayia of Kanakaria -in the occupied part of Cyprus- were exported and sold abroad to art dealers by a Turkish trafficker. On August 3, 1989, an American tribunal in Indianapolis rendered a decision forcing the dealer to give four fragments of the Kanakaria mosaics back to the Church of Cyprus, their legal owner. A Court of Appeal from the Seventh District of the United-States confirmed this decision on October 24, 1990¹⁸.

V. Why Does the West Accept the Violation of International Law and Human Rights in Cyprus ?

The question formulated above is pertinent. On the one hand, Cyprus is part of Europe, and more generally of the West, by its civilisation, traditions, economy and institutions. It is linked by customs agreements with the European Union; it is a candidate at the next broadening of the latter, already with a favourable opinion from the Bruxelles' Commission; it is a member of the Council of Europe and has signed the Helsinki conventions of 1975. On the other hand, Turkey pretends also to have a European vocation even if that is not easily accepted by Europeans who fear Islamism and the possibility of a massive migration of Turks towards the European Union. What should be stressed here, however, is the fact that Turkey is part of the Atlantic Alliance, that its army depends upon the Western weapons' supplies -especially American weapons- while it is considered by the

Western countries as a pillar of their defence; back then against the Soviet Union, now against the rising Islam and certain régimes hostile to Western countries' interests in the region: Irak and Iran, for example.

Undoubtedly, the West and, in particular, the United-States exercise considerable influence on this country. They, therefore, could bring it to adopt more conciliatory positions on the Cyprus question. They could exercise this influence in order to oblige Turkey to respect international law and human rights not only in Cyprus but also with the Kurds and even with its own citizens. It is well known that Turkey's assessment in human rights matters is more than negative; this has been shown repeatedly by various international authorities, including the European Union and the American State Department¹⁹.

Why then, do Western countries tolerate this situation? Why in the case of Turkey do they hold a totally different discourse from those they held in the case of Iran, Iraq or of Lybia? The question becomes all the more pertinent since in the case of Cyprus, the American Congress, had imposed, after the Cyprus invasion in 1974, an embargo on the sale of arms to Turkey, even if the American executive persuaded the Congress to lift it in 1978.

The answers one receives to these questions contradict the principles of international law and the respect of human rights. As one specialist noted, "one can't count anymore the situations where elementary human rights principles are violated under the Security Council's nose, which ideally, should coordinate its efforts in order to stop these human dramas"²⁰. Comparing Iraq's case with Turkey's, an observer wrote without hesitation: "even if they do not seem as barbarian as those used by Bagdad, Ankara's repression methods against the autonomist movements may be also bloody: the confrontations between the turkish army and the Labour Party of Kurdistan (PKK) have caused more than a thousand deaths, only for the year 1992. Amnesty International denounces systematically the practice of the Turkish army in the South-East of the country"²¹. One even notes that the West intervened against Irak in order to force this State to respect the rights of Kurds. On the contrary, in the case of Turkey, "the

United-States have even brought their support to Ankara" in its struggle against the Kurds pretexting that it was a case of terrorism"²². Consequently, the following question is asked: why this difference in treatment between Irak, for instance, and Turkey as far as the violations of human rights in Cyprus are concerned? This differentiation hardly finds a moral justification, all the more so since no fundamental difference between Koweit's invasion and that of Cyprus by Turkey exists at the legal level.

We could continue the comparisons between the energetic action of Western countries -America playing a leading role- towards Iraq in order to force that country to respect international law and human rights while they are "far from having discouraged the policy of certain States which continue, unpunished, to occupy by force some territories. A few examples are given: the occupation of Timor for a long time by Indonesia, Western Sahara by Morocco, the north of Cyprus by Turkey, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan, West Bank, and South-Lebanon by Israel. The blatant violation of international law in all these situations needs no demonstration : every time there are the same cardinal fundamental rules of sovereignty, of territorial integrity and of peoples' self determination that are violated"²³.

As Eugene Rossides, jurist and ex-vice-Secretary of the American Treasury Department under the Nixon administration pointed out, "in the case of Cyprus, a double standard has been applied in Turkey's favor in the name of alleged strategic value. American Presidents, for example, pressed for the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Cuban troops from Angola and Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, while supporting Turkish occupation troops and colonists in Cyprus"²⁴. Rossides adds that the United-States, in order to justify their position, "used the national security argument, centering it on Turkey's alleged strategic importance to the defense of the West and the United States"²⁵.

In an article published by *Le Monde Diplomatique* in March 1997, close links between the Western secret services -especially the CIA-, the Turkish extreme right and the mafia were established. The CIA

would repeatedly use for its various missions paramilitary groups such as the Grey Wolves. Thus, it was reported in this article that Emir Deger, "ex-military lawyer and Member of the Turkish Supreme Court of Justice, had proven the collaboration between the Grey Wolves and the antiguerrilla forces of the (Turkish) government as well as the very close links between the latter and the CIA. These secret paramilitary units were appointed to capture and torture the extreme leftists, if one believes Mr. Talat Turkan, a high military official in retirement, author of three books on their activities"²⁶. These paramilitary units would also have been used against the Kurdish people.

We must remind ourselves that the Grey Wolves were authorised by former Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller to lead terrorist activities in Cyprus and to violate human rights with impunity. On August 11, 1996, a group of this paramilitary organisation was brought to Cyprus in order to fight against a demonstration of people who wanted to circulate freely in the occupied part of the island, lynched Tassos Isaak, wounded many other demonstrators and members of the UN peace-keeping force²⁷.

In the case of Cyprus, one could always note that the Western countries controlling the security Council have never imposed sanctions on Turkey, favouring the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary General and their own representatives. Once again, we are far from the action undertaken against Iraq. In this context, one can understand why accusations of a double standard have been formulated.

One could continue the comparisons in order to show that the Western Countries, Americans playing a leading role, intervene in the name of the international law and respect of human rights when their interests are in jeopardy, while they show a definite passivity each time their allies violate the international law and human rights. Turkey constitutes one of these blatant examples. The new international world order proclaimed by the Americans after the Gulf War does not seem to affect Turkey. Nor the "moralisation" of international relations by the reign of law.

Undoubtedly, Turkey remains an important ally for Western countries for their strategy in the Middle East, Balkans and the former Soviet Republics of Caucase. This analysis could always be contested; however, for the United-States and their allies, this is obviously not the case. The West's policy towards Turkey is not without reminding the one followed in the past towards the Shah's Iran.

Nevertheless, between moral, international law, respect of human rights and economic or strategic interests, the latter seem to have much more weight.

Conclusion

The lucid observer who follows current events can not be optimistic about the respect of human rights. Even if this ideological discourse dominates in the States' profession of faith, especially in the United-States one, we must point out that "human rights are violated everywhere in the world, at various degrees, to a bigger or lesser extent, with more or less cynicism"²⁸.

In the case of Cyprus, there is not even the justification of a "cultural specificity", or of a whatsoever specificity in order to justify their violation. Because the "victim" (Cyprus) as well as the "agressor" (Turkey) claim themselves of being part of the Western World and of its values- thus of the universalism in matter of human rights. Furthermore, the occidental allies of Turkey want to present it as a European country and as a secular State rampant against Islamism.

Why then do Western world countries not bother Turkey in human rights matters? In which way is the Turkish occupation of Cyprus different from that of Koweit by Iraq? In which way are the violations of human rights by Iraq different from those perpetrated by Turkey?

As one author said, "the question of human rights is above all eminently political" and in this respect it is "an object of economical and strategic exchange"²⁹.

That's precisely what's happening in the case of Cyprus. The strategic importance of Turkey - contested by various analysts³⁰ - imposes itself against a small State. Thus the cynicism towards the occupation of the north of the island since 1974 and the permanent violation of human rights.

Nevertheless, in spite of the ambient pessimism, Cyprus has received support from the international community, especially from the civil society during this difficult period.

Whether in Cyprus, with Kurdish people or with its own citizens, Turkey will not be able to continue to violate human rights without being punished. In fact, history teaches us that the military-authoritarian régimes always end up collapsing and creating more problems than services rendered to those who bring them support, for economic and strategic considerations.

NOTES

1. Jacques ROBERT, *Libertés publiques*, Paris, Éditions Montchrestien, 1971, p. 33.
2. Philippe MOREAU DEFORGES, *Relations Internationales*, tome II, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1993, p. 217.
3. "Les droits de l'homme", in *Histoire critique du XX^e siècle*, ouvrage collectif, Paris, Éditions Hachette, 1993, p. 142.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
5. Frédérick BERNARD (sous la direction), "Droits de l'homme", *Dictionnaire des questions internationales*, Paris, Les Editions de l'Atelier, 1995, p. 138.
6. Philippe MOREAU DEFORGES, *Relations Internationales*, tome II, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1993, p. 213 et suivantes.
7. Philippe MOREAU DEFORGES, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

8. In the case of Great-Britain, as one knows, there isn't a formal Constitution but simple laws.

9. This is the case for instance of Canada.

10. There exists a riche bibliography on the Cyprus question including dozens of official documents of international organizations easily accessible. In spite of that, in order not to render this text heavy we contented ourselves to references that seemed to us strictly indispensable.

11. Applications nos 6780/74, 6950/75, 8007/77, Chypre contre la Turquie.

12. Repports adopted by the Commission on July 10 1976 and on October 4 1983. They have been rendered by a décision of the Commission's ministers' committee on April 2, 1992.

13. Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (40/1993/435/514), Strasbourg, 18 December 1996, p. 19.

14. Case of Loizidou v. Turkey, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

15. Case of Loizidou v. Turkey, *op.cit.*, p. 15

16. Eugen T. ROSSIDES, "Cyprus and the Rule of Law", *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce*, Syracuse University College of Law, (USA), vol.17, no 1, Spring 1991.

17. Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, *The Cyprus Problem*, Nicosia, 1999, p. 118.

18. Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F. 2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, No. 89-2800 (Nov. 21, 1990).

19. On this subject, see among other sources, the Annual Reports of Amnesty International and those of the American State Department.

20. Barbara Delcourt et Olivier Corten, "La face cachée du nouvel ordre mondial : l'application discriminatoire du droit international" in *A la recherche du nouvel ordre mondial - I, Le droit International à l'épreuve*, Paris, Editions Complexe, 1993, p. 30.
21. *Ibid*, p. 31
22. *Ibid*, p. 31.
23. *Ibid*, p. 23.
24. Eugene T. ROSSIDES, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.
25. *Ibid*, p. 79.
26. Martin A. LEE, "Les liaisons dangereuses de la police turque", *Le Monde diplomatique*, Mars 1997, p. 9.
27. *Etudes helléniques - Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 4, no 2, Automne 1996, Montréal, pp. 192-200.
28. Philippe TEXIER, "Droits fondamentaux, Un combat sans cesse renouvelé", in *L'Etat du monde*, Paris, Editions La Découverte, p. 37.
29. *Ibid*, p. 38.
30. See, for instance, D. BOLLES, "Turkey as an Ally - Myth and Reality", in *The Rule of Law and Conditions on Foreign Aid to Turkey*, Washington, American Hellenic Institute, 1989.

APPENDIX I

EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

APPLICATIONS Nos. 6780/74 AND 6950/75

CYPRUS
AGAINST
TURKEY

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(Adopted on 10 July 1976)

(Excerpts)

PART IV - CONCLUSIONS

The Commission,

Having examined the allegations in the two applications (see Part II above);

Having found that Art. 15 of the Convention does not apply (see Part III);

Arrives at the following conclusions:

I. Displacement of persons

1. The Commission concludes by thirteen votes against one that, by the refusal to allow the return of more than 170,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes in the north of Cyprus, Turkey violated, and was continuing violating, Art. 8 of the Convention in all these cases.

2. The Commission concludes by twelve votes against one that, by the eviction of Greek Cypriots from houses, including their own homes, by their transportation to other places within the north of Cyprus, or by their deportation across the demarcation line, Turkey has equally violating Art.8 of the Convention.

3. The Commission concludes by thirteen votes against one that, by the refusal to allow the return to their homes in the north of Cyprus to several thousand Greek Cypriots who had been transferred to the south under inter-communal agreements, Turkey violated, and was continuing to violate, **Art. 8** of the Convention in all these cases.

4. The Commission concludes by fourteen votes against one with one abstention that, by the separation of Greek Cypriot families brought about by measures of displacement in a substantial number of cases, Turkey has again violated **Art. 8** of the Convention.

II. Deprivation of liberty

1. "Enclaved persons"

(a) The Commission, by eight votes against five votes and with two abstentions, concludes that the curfew imposed at night on enclaved Greek Cypriots in the north of Cyprus, while a restriction of liberty, is not a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of **Art. 5(1)** of the Convention.

(b) The Commission, by twelve votes with two abstentions, further concludes that the alleged restrictions of movement outside the built-up area of villages in the north of Cyprus would fall within the scope of **Art. 2 of Protocol No. 4**, not ratified by either Cyprus or Turkey, rather than within the scope of **Art. 5** of the Convention. It is therefore unable to find a violation of **Art. 5** insofar as the restrictions imposed on Greek Cypriots in order to prevent them from moving freely outside villages in the north of Cyprus are imputable to Turkey.

2. "Detention centres"

(a) The Commission, by thirteen votes against one, concludes that, by the confinement of more than two thousand Greek Cypriots to detention centres established in schools and churches at Voni,

Gypsou and Morphou, Turkey has violated Art. 5(1) of the Convention.

(b) The Commission, by thirteen votes against one, concludes that the detention of Greek Cypriot civilians in Turkey was equally not in conformity with Art. 5(1).

(c) Considering that it was unable to establish the imputability to Turkey under the Convention of the detention of 146 Greek Cypriots at Saray prison and Pavlides Garage in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, the Commission, by ten votes against two with two abstentions, does not consider itself called upon to express an opinion as to the conformity with Art. 5 of the detention of Greek Cypriot prisoners in the north of Cyprus.

(d) The Commission, by 14 votes against none, with two abstentions, has not found it necessary to examine the question of a breach of Art. 5 with regard to persons accorded the status of prisoners of war.

4. Final observation

The Commission, by seven votes against six with three abstentions, decided not to consider as separate issue the effect of detention on the exercise of the right to respect for one's private and family life and home (Art. 8 of the Convention).

III. Deprivation of life

The Commission, by fourteen votes against one, considers that the evidence before it constitutes very strong indications of violations of Art. 2 of the Convention by Turkey in a substantial number of cases. The Commission restricted the taking of evidence to a hearing of a limited number of representative witnesses and the Delegation, during the period fixed for the hearing of witnesses, heard eye-witnesses only

concerning the incident of Elia. The evidence obtained for this incident establishes the killing of twelve civilians near Elia by Turkish soldiers commanded by an officer contrary to **Art. 2**.

In view of the very detailed material before it on other killings alleged by the applicant Government the Commission, by fourteen votes against one, concludes from the whole evidence that killings happened on a larger scale than in Elia.

There is nothing to show that any of these deprivations of life were justified under **paras. (1) of Art. 2**.

IV. Ill-treatment

1. The Commission, by twelve votes against one, finds that the incidents of rape described in the cases referred to and regarded as established constitute "inhuman treatment" and thus violations of **Art. 3**, for which Turkey is responsible under the Convention.

2. The Commission, by twelve votes against one, concludes that prisoners were in a number of cases physically ill-treated by Turkish soldiers. These acts of ill-treatment caused considerable injuries and at least in one case the death of the victim. By their severity they constitute "inhuman treatment" and thus violations of **Art. 3**, for which Turkey is responsible under the Convention.

3. The Commission, by twelve votes against one, concludes that the withholding of an adequate supply of food and drinking water and of adequate medical treatment from Greek Cypriot prisoners held at Adana and detainees in the northern area of Cyprus, with the exception of Pavlides Garage and Saray prison, again constitutes, in the cases considered as established and in the conditions described, "inhuman treatment" and thus a violation of **Art. 3**, for which Turkey is responsible under the Convention.

4. The Commission, by twelve votes against one, concludes that the written statements submitted by the applicant Government consti-

tute indications of ill-treatment by Turkish soldiers of persons not in detention.

V. Deprivation of possessions

The Commission, by twelve votes against one, finds it established that there has been deprivation of possessions of Greek Cypriots on a large scale, the exact extent of which could not be determined. This deprivation must be imputed to Turkey under the Convention and it has not been shown that any of these interferences were necessary for any of the purposes mentioned in **Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1**. The Commission concludes that this provision has been violated by Turkey.

VI. Forced labour

The Commission, by eight votes against three votes and with one abstention, finds that the incompleteness of the investigation with regard to the allegations of forced labour does not allow any conclusions to be made on this issue.

VIII. Other issues

1. The Commission, by twelve votes against one vote and with three abstentions, considers that no further issue arises under **Art. 1** of the Convention.

2. The Commission, by thirteen votes against one vote and with two abstentions, has found no evidence that effective remedies, as required by **Art. 13** of the Convention, were in fact available.

3. Having found violations of a number of Articles of the Convention, the Commission notes that the acts violating the Convention were exclusively directed against members of one of two

communities in Cyprus, namely the Greek Cypriot community. It concludes by eleven votes to three that Turkey has thus failed to secure the rights and freedoms set forth in these Articles without discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, race and religion as required by Art. 14 of the Convention.

4. The Commission, by twelve votes with four abstentions, considers that Art. 17 and 18 of the Convention do not raise separate issues in the present case.

President of the Commission
(J. E.S. FAWCETT)

Secretary to the Commission
(H.C. KRUGER)

APPENDIX II

EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

APPLICATION No. 8007/77

CYPRUS
AGAINST
TURKEY

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(Adopted on 4 October 1983)

(Excerpts)

PART IV - CONCLUSIONS

The Commission,

Having examined the allegations in this application (see Parts II and III above);

Having found that Art. 15 of the Convention does not apply (see Part I, Chapter 4);

Arrives at the following findings and conclusions:

1. Missing persons (para 123 above)

The Commission, having found it established in three cases, and having found sufficient indications in an indefinite number of cases, that Greek Cypriots who are still missing were unlawfully deprived of their liberty, in Turkish custody in 1974, noting that Turkey has failed to account for the fate of these persons, concludes by 16 votes against one that Turkey has violated Art. 5 of the Convention.

2. Displacement of persons and separation of families (paras 135, 136 above)

The Commission concludes, by 13 votes against two with two abstentions that, by her continued refusal to allow over 170,000

Greek Cypriots the return to their homes in the North of Cyprus, Turkey continues to violate Art. 8 in all these cases.

The Commission further concludes by 14 votes against two and with one abstention, that, in the cases of continued separation of families resulting from Turkey's refusal to allow the return of Greek Cypriots to their family members in the North, Turkey continues to violate Art. 8 of the Convention.

3. Deprivation of possessions (para 155 above)

The Commission concludes, by 13 votes against one and with three abstentions, that Turkey has violated Art. 1 of Protocol No 1.

4. Absence of remedies (para 158 above)

The Commission, in its examination of the merits of this complaint, does not find it necessary to add anything to its finding in the decision on admissibility.

5. Discrimination (para 162 above)

Having again found violations of the rights of Greek Cypriots under a number of Articles of the Convention in the present case, the Commission does not consider it necessary to add anything to its finding under Art. 14 in the previous case.

6. Position of Turkish Cypriots (para 165 above)

The Commission, having regard to the material before it, finds that it does not have sufficient available evidence enabling it to come to any conclusion regarding this complaint.

President to the Commission
(C.A. NORGAARD)

Secretary to the Commission
(H.C.KRUGER)

APPENDIX III
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Judgment delivered by a Grand Chamber
Case of *Loizidou v. Turkey*
(Merits)
(40/19993/435/514)

Turkey - denial of access to and interference with property rights in northern Cyprus

I. The Government's preliminary objection *ratione temporis*

Turkish Government claimed *inter alia* that applicant's property had been irreversibly expropriated by virtue of Article 159 of "TRNC" (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus") constitution of 7 May 1985, prior to Turkey's Declaration of 22 January 1990 accepting Court's jurisdiction.

Evident from international practice and resolutions of various international bodies that international community does not regard "TRNC" as State under international law and that the Republic of Cyprus remains sole legitimate Government of Cyprus - Court cannot therefore attribute legal validity for purposes of Convention to provisions such as Article 159 of 1985 Constitution - accordingly, applicant cannot be deemed to have lost title to property - alleged violations are thus of continuing nature.

Conclusion : objection dismissed (eleven votes to six).

II. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

A. Imputability issue

Obvious from large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus that Turkish army exercises effective overall control there — in circumstances of case, this entails Turkey's responsibility for policies and actions of "TRNC" — thus, denial to applicant of access to property in northern Cyprus falls within Turkey's "jurisdiction" for purposes of Article 1 of Convention and is imputable to Turkey - establishment of State responsibility does not require examination of lawfulness of Turkey's intervention in 1974.

B. Interference with property rights

Applicant remained legal owner of land, but since 1974 effectively lost all control, use and enjoyment of it - thus, continuous denial of access amounts to interference with rights under Article 1, Protocol No. 1 - Turkish Government have not sought to justify interference and Court does not find such complete negation of property rights justified.

Conclusion : violation (eleven votes to six).

III. Article 8 of the Convention

Since applicant did not have home on land in question, no interference for purposes of Article 8.

Conclusion : no violation (unanimously).

IV. Article 50 of the Convention

Conclusion : question reserved (unanimously).

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE
COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

Affaire Loizidou c. Turquie

(Fond)

(40/1993/435/514)

Arrêt

Arrêt rendu par une grande chambre

Turquie - déni d'accès et ingérence dans des droits de propriété au nord de Chypre

I. Exception préliminaire du Gouvernement (incompétence ratione temporis)

Le gouvernement turc affirme notamment que la propriété de la requérante a fait l'objet d'une expropriation irréversible par le jeu («République turque de Chypre du Nord»), antérieurement à la déclaration du 22 janvier 1990 par laquelle la Turquie reconnaît la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour.

Il ressort de la pratique internationale et des résolutions de diverses organisations internationales que la communauté internationale ne tient pas la «RTCN» pour un État au regard du droit international et que la République de Chypre demeure l'unique gouvernement légitime de Chypre - la Cour ne peut ainsi attribuer une validité juridique aux fins de la Convention à des dispositions comme l'article 159 de la Constitution de 1985 - la requérante ne peut donc passer pour avoir perdu son droit sur ses biens - les violations alléguées revêtent donc un caractère continu.

Conclusion : rejet (onze voix contre six).

II. Article 1 du Protocole no 1

A. La question de l'imputabilité

Le grand nombre de soldats participant à des missions actives dans le nord de Chypre atteste que l'armée turque exerce en pratique un contrôle global sur cette région - dans les circonstances de la cause, cela engage la responsabilité de la Turquie à raison de la politique et des actions de la «RTCN» - ainsi, le déni de l'accès de la requérante à ses biens dans le nord de Chypre relève de la «juridiction» de la Turquie au sens de l'article 1 de la Convention et est imputable à la Turquie - l'établissement de la responsabilité de l'Etat n'impose pas d'examiner la légalité de l'intervention de la Turquie en 1974.

B. Ingérence dans les droits de propriété

La requérante est demeurée propriétaire légale des biens mais a perdu depuis 1974 toute maîtrise, usage et jouissance de ceux-ci - le refus continu de l'accès constitue une ingérence dans les droits garantis par l'article 1 du Protocole no 1 - le gouvernement turc n'a pas tenté d'expliquer cette ingérence et la Cour considère comme injustifiée la négation totale des droits de propriété survenue.

conclusion : violation (onze voix contre six).

III. Article 8 de la Convention

Le domicile de la requérante ne se trouvant pas sur le terrain dont il s'agit, absence d'ingérence aux fins de l'article 8.

Conclusion : non-violation (unanimité)

IV. Article 50 de la Convention

Conclusion : question réservée (unanimité).

APPENDIX IV
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1987/50 1987

RESOLUTION OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON
PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

Adopted on 2nd September 1987

1987/19 Violations of human rights in Cyprus

The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.

Gravely concerned about the continuation of gross and systematic violations of human rights in Cyprus,

Recalling its resolutions 1 (XXVIII) and 8(XXXI) relating to the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes in safety and the full restoration of human rights in Cyprus, respectively, and regretting the delay in the implementation of these resolutions,

Recognizing that the Secretary-General is seized with the question of resolving the Cyprus problem,

Disturbed by the lack of any success of the Ad Hoc Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, after so many years of deliberations, to discover the fate of the missing persons in Cyprus,

Expressing its concern about the anguish and sorrow of the families of the missing persons of Cyprus, who have the right to know the fate of their relatives.

Further disturbed by the statement made during the consideration of this item at the present session concerning the implantation of thousands of settlers from Turkey in the occupied territories in Cyprus,

Considering that the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus will contribute to the restoration of human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots,

1. Demands the full restoration of all human rights to the whole population of Cyprus, including the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property;

2. Expresses its great concern and anguish about the fate of the missing persons;

3. Expresses its concern also at the policy and practice of the implantation of settlers in the occupied territories of Cyprus which constitute a form of colonialism and attempt to change illegally the demographic structure of Cyprus;

4. Decides that the question of human rights in Cyprus should be considered in the context of item 4 of the agenda for its fortieth session.

Looking Back to See Forward: The 1959 Zurich and London Accords and the Constitutional Order of Cyprus

Petros Liacouras*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article est une tentative de présenter la structure constitutionnelle de la République de Chypre telle qu'elle a résulté des accords de Zurich-Londres de 1959 et les crises politiques successives qu'a connu Chypre, en particulier la crise constitutionnelle de 1963 et l'invasion de l'île par la Turquie en 1974. L'auteur tente de cerner la situation actuelle et les efforts d'inventer un nouvel ordre constitutionnel en se référant à la structure constitutionnelle originale et les difficultés qu'on a rencontré lors de son application.

ABSTRACT

This article attempts to present the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus as it developed following the Zurich and London Accords of 1959 and the successive political crises which ensued in the island, in particular the constitutional crisis of 1963 and the 1974 invasion by Turkey. The author outlines the current situation and the efforts to create a new constitutional order. In doing so, he refers to the original constitutional structure and problems experienced in applying the constitution at that juncture in Cypriot history.

Historical developments impacted heavily on the initial Cypriot arrangement as serious political difficulties and constitutional dysfunction led to the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot community from the organs of the Republic in 1963. Eleven years later the Turkish invasion and the ensuing occupation of the 37 percent of the Cypriot territory by the Turkish military dealt a heavy blow to the body politic of the Cyprus Republic.¹ The constitutional picture of Cyprus was further blurred and distorted with the proclamation of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983.²

* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece. The views expressed in this article are personal and not to be attributed to the institution represented by the author.

Since then the efforts to rebuild the Republic following its first collapse have been intensified. The involvement of the United Nations gave further impetus to these efforts leading to tangible progress.³ Under the circumstances, it seems timely to reassess the size and complexity of the Cyprus problem by looking back to the original constitutional structure of the Republic.

In late 1960, just a year after the signing of the Zurich and London Accords, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514, which granted independence to colonial territories. Through this resolution the right of self-determination was given effect and defined the right of the peoples of each colonial territory to determine their political status. This right was recognised as a universal principle of international law. In this way, the colonial territory was upgraded to an independent, sovereign and integral nation. This resolution not only terminated colonial status of the territory but also recognised self-determination as the right of the majority of the population to exercise authority on behalf of the whole population.⁴ The process of independence of Cyprus differs in comparison to the process followed in the case of independence of colonies that fell under the UN auspices in absolute application of the decolonization resolution of 1960. Cyprus had already been declared an independent country when decolonization was decided under the scheme of the United Nations.

In 1954, the UN General Assembly rejected Greece's application demanding the union with the island as an expression of the wish of the Greek-Cypriot population, as a means of the application of the right to self-determination. In 1955 the General Assembly called upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to convene a tripartite Conference. This policy was regarded as the only way to find a negotiated solution of the Cyprus question. Although the UN General Assembly did not deal with the Cyprus question directly, even after 1955, in several occasions, it expressed its insistence on the principle of self-determination, but it diluted any expectation that the principle of self-determination would apply to Cyprus under its aegis.

In the tripartite Conference, it was agreed that the status of Cyprus would be created through the process of negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. With regard to this unwilling outcome for the expectations of the Greek majority, it has been noted that the activities of the revolting national liberation group, the known EOKA (Armed Organization of Cypriot Liberators), along with Greece's diplomatic efforts for union of the island with Greece forced towards the establishment of the Cypriot state through international settlement.⁵

Establishing independence and the constitutional structure of the Cypriot Republic resulted from the settlement of the conflicting claims which Greece and Turkey had maintained. In spite of the fact that the United Kingdom, as a stepping down colonial administration had an interest in the outcome, it merely expressed a vital interest in maintaining two sovereign military bases on the island.

The initial aim of Greece's diplomacy was to promote the demand for union of the island with Greece. Since Greece was perceived by the Greek-Cypriots as the parental state, union was set as their highest goal. After the rejection of this demand by the UN in 1954, the Greek side was forced to adjust its policy towards the gaining of an independent status of the island. However, according to the Greek expectations it would have been a state controlled by the Greek-Cypriot community. In this perceived state the numerically inferior Turkish-Cypriot community, would have constituted a minority, in its legal term.

Of course Turkey had initially expressed a maximalist attitude toward the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over Cyprus, thus ignoring the Greek demand of union. Their further goal was the disruption of Cyprus and the concentration of the Turkish-Cypriot population in areas that could have been brought under Turkey's control. At the same time Turkey proved a tough negotiator as far as achieving its goals. The Turkish target was to ensure secured status for the Turkish community, which would be constitutionally safeguarded. In this framework, Turkey aimed at the establishment of a partnership in Cyprus in which the Turkish Cypriot Community would be an equal

partner. Turkey also continued to ward off the development of Greek sovereignty in Cyprus and backed up the political and institutional separation of the Turkish-Cypriot community from the Greek-Cypriot counterpart. In order to achieve this goal, Turkey claimed that the right to self-determination should be applied to both communities equally with the aim of creating two separate states in Cyprus, each one of them representing the respective claimant community. This kind of claim would have culminated in either the creation of two states thus dividing the island, or unifying each territorial community with the corresponding state, Greece and Turkey. This claim underlines the so-called model of double union (*taksim*).

The negotiation ranged, on the one hand, between the creation of a single state, through constitutional arrangements, and on the other hand the creation of two states through the policy of dichotomy. The establishment of an agreement became a matter of absolute priority for reasons of security in eastern Mediterranean. In 1959 the initial Agreement was adopted in Zurich and a few days later it was officially signed in London. The texts were endorsed, as a signal of acceptance, by Archbishop Makarios on behalf of the Greek-Cypriot community and by Dr. Kucuk on behalf of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Through these agreements both union and dichotomy were outlawed.

The Agreements of Establishment

The Agreements of Establishment consist of five texts. The first, The Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, specifically concerns the constitutional organisation of the Republic. It is comprised of 27 articles — the final clauses included — which were incorporated verbatim in the fundamental provisions of the Republic's Constitution. As reiterated in the final clauses, the Basic Structure's provisions would constitute non-amendable provisions of the Constitution. The way the Cypriot Republic has been formed as a unitary state was set forth in these fundamental provisions. The Greek-Cypriots (80%) and the Turk-Cypriots (18%) organise themselves in the corresponding com-

munities which constitute the components of the Republic.⁶ As it has been noted by a constitutional law professor, the existing social dualism defined the establishment of the newly born Republic. The structure of the power allocation between the two communities apparently reflected the bi-communal character of the composition of the Republic. In separate elections, each community would elect the constitutive organs that correspond to each community; i.e., the president and the vice-president as well as the deputies of the House of Representatives. The participation of the two communities defined the exercise of authority, in Government and House of Representatives at the percentages of 70%-30%, whereas the ratio of representation was equally shared at the level of the Presidency.

The meaning of *the community* was incorporated into the constitutional text in place of the meaning *people* so that the Turkish demand that the Turkish-Cypriot side should be represented in the executive organs and parliamentary seats could be satisfied. The legislation concerning the Communal Chambers and Township of the five major Towns of the island, which was eagerly demanded by the Turkish-Cypriot community, as provided by the Constitution was the key to the constitutional arrangement. What arises from the totality of the provisions is: firstly, the status of the Turkish-Cypriot community was constitutionally secured as the co-governing, equivalent, co-founding and component community of Cyprus, and secondly, the institutional co-operation of the two communities establishes the legal foundation of the Republic. The partial or total unification with another state or territorial disruption were unequivocally forbidden. In addition to the Basic Structure, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance which were concluded between Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Cyprus form part of the Agreements. Through the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus undertakes the obligation to maintain the territorial integrity of the Republic. Whereas, the three Guarantor Powers undertake the obligation to safeguard the integrity and independence of Cyprus, and to prohibit the unification with any country or the secession of any part of the island. In case of violation of the Treaty or in case the independence of the Republic is at stake, the three coun-

tries are to come to an agreement in order to take collective measures, which are deemed necessary for the restoration of the Republic which was established through the Basic Structure.

Article 4 of the said Treaty provides for the case in which common action can not be achieved, unilateral action would be reserved to each of the three states with a view to restoring the constitutional order and integrity of the Republic.⁷ At first glance, the ultimate goal of this Treaty was to ensure the observance of the arrangement of the Basic Structure under the control of the guarantors. This Treaty came under severe criticism as it militates against the notion of sovereignty and the sovereign equality of Cyprus, to the degree that as a mechanism of control it could permit the intervention of the guarantors. In this regard, we call to mind the fact that in 1974 Turkey invoked Article 4 of the Treaty in order to carry out the first military invasion in Cyprus. Finally, through the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey undertook the obligation to provide support to the defense of Cyprus through the presence of military staff from Greece (ELDYK, 950) and Turkey (TOYRDYK, 650).

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus

As provided for by the treaties, the Constitution was drawn up by the representatives of Greece and Turkey having the predominance of the dualism as a basic axis in the structure of the Constitution. The reality of the bi-communal character determined the organisational basis of the sovereignty and that of government; i.e., the institutional coexistence of the two communities. The Constitution provides for the powers of the executive and legislative branch. According to the Constitution, Cyprus enjoys a presidential system. There is provided a Greek-Cypriot president and Turkish-Cypriot vice-president, each will be elected by the corresponding community. In addition, it is stipulated that both the president and the vice-president should enjoy the right of veto over decisions concerning basically foreign affairs and defense issues. In addition, there were powers provided that would be

exercised by the president and by the vice-president, as well as powers exercised solely by the president and those exercised only by the vice president. The Constitution provides for a single ten-member government, consisting of seven Greek-Cypriots and three Turkish-Cypriots ministers. The president appoints the seven Greek-Cypriot ministers, the vice-president, and the three Turkish-Cypriot ministers. As far as legislative power is concerned, what was provided for was a Parliament of representatives consisting of 70% Greek-Cypriot and 30% Turkish-Cypriot MPs. The election of the members of Parliament is held separately for each community.

The constitutional adoption of the Community Chambers was an element favouring the Turkish-Cypriot community in the legal order of the Republic. According to the constitutional provisions, each community elects its own Community Chamber which exercises local powers in particular with regard to matters of private law as well as religious and educational matters.

As regards judicial powers, there has been a single Supreme Court provided, which consists of a president, a neutral judge, and members: two Greek-Cypriots and one Turkish-Cypriot. The public administration as provided is to be staffed by citizens coming from both communities on a quota basis. The civil service is staffed by Greek-Cypriots at the percentage of 60% and the Turkish-Cypriots at 40%.

Finally, an army was equipped, staffed 60% by Greek-Cypriots and 40% by Turkish-Cypriots. This particular army is different from the ELDYK and TOURDYK armies, which according to the 1959 Treaty of Alliance, were to be sent by Greece and Turkey respectively. In the final clauses the Constitution refers to the fundamental non-amendable provisions. Besides, the Constitution provides that the 1959 Accords form part of it. Further, we refer to two of the non-amendable provisions. First there is the prohibition of the partial or total unification of Cyprus with some other state as well as secession; i.e., the territorial disruption of the island. Second, it is stipulated that the fundamental provisions of the Constitution could not be amended. Both fundamental die-hard provisions targeted the superiority of the Greek-

Cypriot community and rendered it ineffective in the legal order of the Republic. Certainly the imposed Constitution did not correspond to the characteristics of a sovereign State. Finally, what is worth mentioning is a particular provision according to which separate Town Halls were to be founded by the Turkish inhabitants of five large towns.

As mentioned, the Constitution was imposed by the three countries party to the Agreements of Establishment. For that reason, the imposed constitutional legal order was received by the Greek population of the island with some sort of reluctance. In any case authors usually refer to the Constitution with definitions such as "conceded". This kind of constitutional order runs contrary to the practice followed by democratic countries, according to the principle that the state's sovereign authority derives from the expressed will of the population. In Cyprus the Constitution was drafted by the representatives of Greece and Turkey, it entered into force upon the birth of the Republic, but the population elected the state's organs according to the provisions of the draft text, which may amount to its indirect admissibility.⁸

The Constitution was formally in force at the same time as the official birthday of the independent state. Since the Constitution was conceded and the nation was not defined as a source of power, what has been considered is that the population of Cyprus has not exercised the primary power, which is considered fundamental to the sovereign power of the population. However, it has been claimed that the sovereign will of the population was expressly in an indirect manner. The fact that the Cypriot people proceeded to the ballot box for the first time in order to show the authorities according to the draft Constitution is a sign of indirect acceptance and approval of the Constitution.

The Constitution included safety valves. Firstly, the constitutional organisation of the Republic does not stipulate that in the established bi-communal state each of the communities enjoy sovereignty, nor the powers of the Republic are assumed by the communities. It is explici-

tly provided in the Constitution that only a single state can be considered sovereign. Secondly, the two communities were prohibited to proceed to the modification of the hard-shell fundamental provisions; i.e., in the 27 articles of the 1959 Basic Structure of the Agreements, which define the structure and the organisational basis of the polity. This specific regulation confined the sovereignty of the Republic according to the prescribed will of its founders, rendering the nation static. This regulation struck mainly the power of the majority. Thirdly, the 1959 Treaties of the Establishment and Guarantee obtained constitutional power and formally bind the Cypriot state, applying the Basic Structure; i.e., the Constitution, under the control of the guarantors with regard to the Accords' observance.

Fourthly, the unification of Cyprus with another state or any kind of secession was declared legally excluded by all means. It was at this point that the Constitution averted any attempt through which either the Greek-Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot community would attempt to alter the legal nature of the Republic. Moreover, through the Treaty of Guarantee, already incorporated in the Constitution, in order to be binding on the Cypriot Republic, the three Guarantors undertook the obligation to prohibit every activity which would threaten the inviolability of the island's legal charter. Equally, the Turkish Cypriot community was vested with the right to block any decision which would run contrary to the initial legal scheme. The legal ground of the Constitution is the binary principle or otherwise the principle of bi-communalism. This binary principle runs, as the basic concept, the organisation of the State and its organs. The constitutional order founded upon this axiomatic binary principle reflects the reality of the two communities. On purpose population did not constitute the basis of legal organisation, but instead the Turkish population, although a numerical minority, was elevated to a partner with some equal right of veto in cases of high policies. These rights were provided fundamental constitutional safeguards. Accordingly, the population is organised in the corresponding communities. It was for this reason that the people as a source of power were deliberately omitted from the general provisions of the Constitution as well as any explicit or indirect reference to

the notion of people's sovereignty. Through the enactment of the communities the democratic principle, which is considered the foundation of the people's sovereignty, was set aside by the binary principle. The system of diarchy with increased or exclusive competencies, as well as the right of both the president and the vice-president to exercise a veto power, in conjunction with their direct election separately from the corresponding community, prove the establishment of a bi-communal state. Furthermore, the executive power is organised according to the binary principle as well as the principle of the political equality. What is evident from the provisions is that instead of the relation of majority and minority, the binary principle was developed, of which the main expression is the right of exercising a veto power in decision making. The equivalent power of the president and vice-president as a result of the right of veto denotes the political equality of the communities through which these organs come from. Particularly, the executive power is on the one hand allocated between the two communities in percentage but the powers between the president and the vice-president are equally shared, due to the right of veto. From another perspective, the right of veto would precisely result in the malfunction of the Republic, in an institutional impasse as well as in the domination of the majority by the volition of the numerically minor community. However, it was imposed in order to foil any decision made by the president on issues of high political importance without the assent of the vice-president, acting in this way as a safety valve of the constitutional status of the Turkish-Cypriot community. This provision proved to be exceptionally inflexible for the function of the Republic, particularly in issues where a consent of a particular type would play a determinative role in decision making.

Lastly, the institutional co-existence and cooperation of the two communities as far as the administration of power is concerned was not likened, from the point of view of the organisation of the state, to the federal principle. The Turkish-Cypriot side usually claims that the Constitution has established a functional federation. Indeed, the Constitution provides for a bi-communal state, based on checks and balances. However, it must be noted that the established Republic

does not resemble to a federation, since federation presupposes territorial division between the two communities, a fact which did not exist at any time prior to independence, and clear reference to the Constitution, which was absent.

Concluding remarks

The creation of the Cyprus Republic differs from that of states which became independent through the process of decolonization, during the early 1960s. Thus the rule of self-determination, a right reserved to be exercised by the majority of the population, did not apply in the same manner as it occurred with the rest of the colonies. In that sense it has been argued that the population of Cyprus has not exercised self-determination. All the same, as self-determination coincided with the granting of independence to the ex-colonies, it can be argued that in the case of Cyprus this right was exercised in a peculiar and *sui generis* manner. Firstly, the independence was a product of the will of the three contracting countries, namely Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom. Secondly, the people were not considered as the subject of self-determination and they were not allowed to exercise the primary constitutive authority. Otherwise it would have resulted to a right of the majority. On the contrary, the meaning of the notion of community predominated, but this did not mean that every community was equated to the nation, because in this way the result would have been the creation of two states. The fact that the Republic of Cyprus was bi-communal in nature meant that the Turkish-Cypriot community was upgraded through constitutional guarantees and it obtained a status of political equality. Governance was not assigned to the Greek-Cypriot majority, but it was distributed between the two communities.

A system of checks and balances was created between the communities. This complicated system would obligate the two communities to be in continuous constitutional co-existence and cooperation with regard to the exercise of the power of the Republic. In conclusion, the question which arises with regard to this brief reference is whether the legal status of the Republic could have been formed differently. Firstly, the independence of Cyprus was agreed a year before the adoption of

the resolution of the UN General Assembly by which colonial territories were granted independence. It is certain that in the decolonization process under the UN auspices the will of the majority would be dominant in the granting of independence. Union (*Enosis*) would have been a tangible outcome. On the other hand, even if Cyprus did not achieve enosis it would have been led to the creation of a state under majority rule. The Greek policy of the union of Cyprus with Greece had already met with the strong British and Turkish reaction well before the formation of a favourable international environment on the issue of self-determination. The direct involvement of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey led to an imposed solution on the Cypriot people through tripartite negotiations on the future independent status of Cyprus. In these negotiations Turkey played a determining role so that the Turkish-Cypriot community would benefit.

If Cyprus' road to independence had not been different from that of other colonies, the country would have come under the expected application of de-colonization within the framework of the UN. In such a process, had Turkey been involved in the granting of independence, it would have been less successful when vindicating on behalf of the Turkish-Cypriot community than in a tripartite negotiation. In addition, Cyprus would have been regarded as a colony according to the UN. Consequently it would have obtained the status reflecting the wish of the majority. In that case, union would have been the most obvious possibility. Even if the demand for union were not resulted to the satisfaction of the Greek-Cypriot side, the policy which had been applied to other ex-colonies would have prevailed; i.e., the Greek-Cypriot majority would have ruled the Republic. However, the resolution of decolonization was adopted in 1960, after the independence of Cyprus had been established. This outcome has been recorded in history as a lost opportunity. The opportunity would have been won if in the early 1950s the Greek governments had foreseen and evaluated the impending international developments in relation to decolonization as it was shaped within the framework of UN. It was in the early 1950s when the General Assembly expressed its interest and spelled out its obligation towards the independence of the colonies. Specifically, in 1950, the UN General Assembly requested that the

Economic and Social Council carry out a study of the means which would guarantee the application of self-determination with the view that it would include all colonial territories. In 1952, the UN General Assembly adopted a recommendation according to which all the territories should gain independence. With a series of resolutions it gradually formulated the content of self-determination until it would obtain a definite content. The final version of the relevant proclamation rendering the colonies independent was formulated and officially adopted in December 1960. Since the first announcement of intended decolonization was made at the beginning of 1950, ample opportunity was given to successive Greek governments to develop the appropriate strategies and necessary diplomatic manoeuvring, both abroad and domestically, to safeguard and promote Greek and Greek Cypriot interests in Cyprus. Secondly, there was certainly a genuine demand for union with Greece amongst the Greek Cypriot majority. While Greek diplomacy was unable to make positive use of this factor either in international organised arenas or in the negotiating table, the Turkish side took advantage of the union demand in order to safeguard Turkish interests by committing the Greeks to a system of checks and balances as well as to the right of veto of the Turkish-Cypriot community. In this way, Turkey imposed its policy with the pretence that the Greek-Cypriot side should be averted to materialise the old plan of union of Cyprus with Greece. Further to these, Greek policy on Cyprus continued to be contradictory even after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.

In an attempt to placate Greek Cypriot sensibilities, President Makarios publicly paid lip service to the Greek-Cypriot demand for union with Greece both directly or indirectly even after the independence was achieved. And this, when he knew very well that union after independence was diplomatically and politically unattainable. Under the circumstances, inter-communal suspicion and mistrust in the island intensified offering to the Turks the possibility to interfere more actively in Cypriot internal affairs. This was amply demonstrated in 1963 when Makarios proposed the amendment of some fundamental provisions of the Constitution, among which was the Turkish Cypriot right of veto. Prompted by Turkey, the Turkish-Cypriot community

reacted by withdrawing from the bi-communal government causing a prolonged constitutional anomaly that is extended up to the present. The Turkish-Cypriot community justified this withdrawal on the grounds that the proposed Greek-Cypriot amendments intended to realise the union with Greece. In this way it attributed the responsibility for its withdrawal from the government to the Greek-Cypriot side.

The inability of both sides to come to terms with the constitutional arrangement of 1960, coupled with the narrow and rigid framework of the Zurich and London agreements, led to a series of mismanaged crises and lost opportunities for establishing a viable and stable bi-communal system based on coexistence and institutional cooperation. Instead the history of Cyprus is noted by the inter-communal competition either for Greek-Cypriot domination or for Turkish-Cypriot equal partnership status in a separate territorial entity leaving side-by-side with the Greek-Cypriot counterpart. The conflicting interests led to a deadlock. The interference of external factors complicated even more the fragile Cyprus equation causing additional suffering and disruption.

NOTES

Editor's Note We would like to point out that one has to take into consideration the strategic interest which Cyprus holds, as evoked by Turkey, for Turkish insistence in intervening in the Island's affairs. In this sense, the constitutional crisis of 1963, must also be attributed to Turkey. Especially because the British encouraged Archbishop Makarios to propose the constitutional amendments in that year. It has since been documented that Turkey was prepared to impose partition of the island from the very beginning of the establishment of the Republic. On the other hand, speaking of a bi-communal institutional system, one has to remember the demographic realities of the times and of today: Turkish Cypriots constitute 18% of the population; Greek Cypriots, 80%; and others, 2%. Of course in 1963, the population was more mixed geographically since it was only after the Turkish invasion of 1974 that Turkish Cypriots were transferred to the north of the island by force and Greeks expelled from the same area.

1. See A. Mark Weisburd, *Use of Force, The Practice of States Since World War II*, University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, pp. 76, 152, 108.
2. John Dugard, *Recognition and the United Nations*, Hersh Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture, Cambridge, Grotius Publ., 1987, pp.108-111.
3. Thomas Franck, *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 193-195.
4. See Antonio Cassese, *Self-Determination of peoples*, A legal Reappraisal, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 170.
5. Farid Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, London, Hurst & Co., 1998, p.12.
6. G. Papademetriou, *The Constitutional Problem of the Republic of Cyprus* Athens, A Sakkoulas, 1997, pp. 36-40 (in Greek).
7. Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958-1967*, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 61-70.
8. This view is shared by Kypros Chrysostomides, *The Republic of Cyprus, A Study in International Law*, The Hague, Kluwer International, 1999, pp. 58-62.

DOCUMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF CYPRUS

I. THE 13 PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS(1963)

The 13 Proposals put forward by President Makarios were not accompanied by any measures to impose them, nor were any procedures put in motion towards their implementation. As can be seen from official and other records, these proposals were aimed at amending provisions that accentuated the constitutional malfunctioning. What went on behind the scenes whilst these proposals were being drawn up, as well as the participation in their drafting by the then British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Clark, is described first hand by Glafcos Clerides. (in his book, *Cyprus : My Deposition*, Nicosia, 1989).

The 13 Proposals were as follows :

1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abolished.
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for or replace the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not, as at present, the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for or replace the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majority for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
6. Unified municipalities to be established.
7. The administration of justice to be unified.
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a law.
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Services and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
11. The number of Members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five or seven.
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.

Source : Kypros CHRYSOSTOMIDES, *The Republic of Cyprus, A Study in International Law*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Hague, The Netherlands, 2000, p. 33-34.

II. THE TURKISH DOCUMENT OF 1963

(This document signed by the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus and leader of the Turkish Community and the president of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber Rauf Denktaş is setting out the parameters of the Turkish policy on Cyprus)

1. We accepted the Zurich and London Agreements as a "temporary, interim halting place" and for this reason we signed.

If they had not been a "temporary halting place" but a final solution, we would not have accepted them; we would have continued the conflict between the two communities and would have left the question of partition to the United Nations, saying "It cannot work, the agreements are inapplicable".

The reason why we accepted the temporary halting place is that the Zurich Agreements have brought about the following two points in the administration of the Republic:

(a) Turkey's rights on Cyprus have been recognised on an international plane:

(b) We shall profit from the blunders and mistakes of the Greeks and, once we have prepared better in the time gained, we shall wait for the day when they decide to abrogate the agreements, whereupon we shall obtain our full freedom.

During the interim period our position and activities must be in accordance with (a) and (b) above, and we shall proceed directly to the solution which, in our view, is acceptable as a final solution.

2. The reasons why we cannot accept as a "final solution" the Zurich Agreements and the Republic created by these agreements are the following :

(a) An administration based on a 7:3 ratio is a Greek administration, despite existing guarantees, and under such an administration the Turkish element is destined to be dissolved in time.

(b) The Cypriotisation of the Turks, that is co-operation with the Greeks to the maximum degree, being on good terms with them, accepting the caprices of the Greeks and not creating difficulties, co-operating for unity so that there may be no Turkish national claim left, all these mean nothing else but the extermination of the Turks of Cyprus.

(c) Economic weaknesses and materials needs will in a very short time abolish the status of our community.

(d) The agreements were made on the basis that the two communities, because of suspicion and enmity existing between them, would be able to live together as separate and equal communities.

(e) During the 85 years of British rule, the aim of the economists of our community, who did not raise their heads, was to develop a community obedient and loyal to the British Government, so that our community would not be destroyed. And now, those who accept the agreements as a final solution are causing the eternal subjugation of our community to the Greeks at any price.

3. Under these terms, to accept the Zurich Agreements as a final solution means that we ourselves are causing the extermination of the Turks of the island. For this reason and before the agreements came into being, it was agreed with the Turkish Government at the time that during this period we should be given maximum economic and other aid to achieve our final goal.

It is worth mentioning that on the first contacts we had with President Gursel, after the formation of a new government, the same things were agreed and we were told in the most concrete manner that "for us and Turkey the agreements were nothing but a temporary halting place".

4. There is a very important reason why we should keep our eyes open and not fall asleep, because the Greeks too, as a large majority, consider the administration of the Republic temporary and all their efforts have, from the start, been directed towards the abolition of the agreements.

(a) Their newspapers, in their official and unofficial articles, say that the agreements are temporary, that no free man could

accept these agreements and that they were forced to accept them. Foreign correspondents visiting the island swallow this propaganda like a pill and write that the Turks must give up the rights artificially acquired by them.

(b) The Greeks (rightists and leftists) are arming themselves with unimaginable speed.

(c) Police and customs organisations, as well as the administrative machinery, have been so shaped that the Turks cannot breathe.

(d) Almost none of the rights given to the Turks by the Zurich Agreements have been handed over to them. The Greeks are busy trying to wear out, tire and destroy the Turks through delaying tactics and make Turkish leaders accept that the said rights are indeed arbitrary.

(1) Municipalities have not been separated. The fresh demarcation of boundaries may take years. We must rise as a community and not wait for injustice to continue. The attrition tactics going on for a year and a half will wipe out the fighting spirit of the Turks.

The question of separate municipalities and the separate community status form the basis. Thus separation must be proceeded with, although materially it is an arduous and expensive project for the Turks.

Today those in opposition try their best to destroy this separation and unify the municipalities, arguing that because of separation some - a limited number - have suffered losses and they must, at any price, be on good terms with the Greeks. Opposition members Mr. Ahmet Muzafer Gurkan and Mr. Ayhan Hikmet have stated to foreign correspondents that modification of municipalities is indispensable and the reason why Mr. Denktash and Dr Kutchuk want separate municipalities is that partition may thus be advanced.

We request that definite instructions may be given on whether or not legal action should be taken in respect of the separate municipalities question. We are of the opinion that we shall achieve a strong case on which to base "the separate community status".

(2) You are aware of the difficulties we are encountering with regard to the 70:30 ratio. Two and a half months have gone by out of the five months period fixed for the implementation of this ratio.

The Greeks do not intend to finish this job in five months. As can be seen from talks between Makarios and Kutchuk, the mode of implementation and the degree of implementation have been thrown in the wastepaper basket by civil servants. And Makarios has gone as far as to say that these agreements are not binding.

If by the end of the fifth month the 70:30 ratio is not implemented, what should the Turkish community do? Should it apply to the Constitutional Court and fight for another five years? Or could we not go ahead and seize our rights as a community?

Let us not forget the 70:30 ratio, under the London Agreements, should have been implemented by the time of the establishment of the Republic. We have fallen victims to the caprices of the Greeks. If this job is not over by the end of the five months, Dr Kutchuk and his associates, who promised implementation of the ratio within five months, will find themselves in a very difficult position.

(3) Turkish business is being delayed in the ministries because of the Greeks. Greek policemen and employees do everything they can to give us the impression that we live under Greek rule. The principle whereby Turkish villages should be served by Turkish employees, which is one of the conditions of the separate community status, is not applied anywhere. We must insist on its application.

(4) In the Council of Ministers no project for the Turks has been approved. They do all they can not to let the Cyprus army be established. For the Commander and Deputy Commander of the army they suggest salaries even lower than those paid to the Commander and Deputy Commander of the police, while for soldiers they suggest ridiculous salaries.

They do not intend adding a single piastre to the 400,000 cypriot pounds aid guaranteed in the constitution by the Central Government for our community's educational budget amounting to 800,000 cypriot pounds. On the other hand, 6m. cypriot pounds has been given so far to the Greek Communal Chamber. We believe that the mother country, making a maximum financial sacrifice will help us face up to the Greeks, who have set out to extinguish our community, whose only slogan is a separate community status.

(5) Development votes in the budget are spent on Greek villages in a manner hardly noticed. No money is allocated for any purpose deemed useful by Turkish ministers and an effort is being made to use Turkish ministers as puppets.

(6) Appointments in the police have been made in such a way as not to affect Turkish officers. Turkish Cypriots are like puppets in the hands of the Greek leaders.

5. The only way out we see is the following :

(a) We must let it be known throughout the island so that it may be handed from one generation to the other that every Turk, young or old, feels convinced that it is imperative to confirm that the agreements are a temporary halting place and our community is a separate state.

(b) We must oppose to the utmost any activity of the Greeks, who are trying to destroy our separate community status.

(c) Those propagating and writing in a manner likely to disrupt our national struggle must be prevented from doing so and those in opposition within our community must be told that their activities regarding our national struggle are a basic mistake.

Dr Ihsan Ali, who is charmed by the Greeks and whose bonds of friendship with the Enosis leaders of the extremist Greeks and the British have been found out, and his associate Muzaffer Gurkan, whose relations with the communists have also been found out, as well as Ayhan Hikmet, who by his writings and activities is helping the efforts of the Greeks, all these must stop doing so and if they do not believe in our national struggle, they must be silenced.¹

The Turks of Cyprus are at an impasse. Unemployment, lack of credit, lack of room for action, questions as to whether they will be given work by the Greeks and whether theirs is a national struggle, all these have put the Turks in grave doubt and they do not know what to do. In view of this situation and in answer to those who say "why a separate community?", there are no institutions to give us work, there is no credit, relying on the Greeks we can live and the door to life is shut for those turning away from the Greeks, we have this to say: this feeling must be eradicated and, as in the 1955-58 period, we shall confront poverty and shall create a society that has faith in itself.

In brief, a national plan must be given to the organisers so that we are able to regulate our words and activities in accordance with this national plan. If the basic outline of this national plan is given, if the status of a separate community continues and takes root and the day comes when the Turks dominate Cyprus, we could carry on with the struggle and restrain the people. If again this plan takes the following form: "We have reached the limit, see that we keep on good terms with the Greeks, don't be impertinent, Mr. Kutchuk, don't make such a fuss because insignificant rights of yours have been usurped and don't

displease your friends, the Greeks, then we must consider our position afresh and think whether we shall be able to shoulder responsibility in such circumstances".

NOTES

1. Both Muzafer Gurkan and Ayhan Hikmet, were murdered in 1962 ; the Coroner's investigation which followed was particularly revealing. Dr. Ihsan Ali died of natural causes.

Source : Kypros CHRYSOSTOMIDES, *The Republic of Cyprus, A Study in International Law*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Hague, The Netherlands, 2000, p. 515-519.

Greek Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millennium

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This text is adapted from a lecture given at Concordia University, on June 6, 2001, organized by the Centre of Hellenic Studies and Research Canada-KEEK

Introduction

A revolution took place in Greek Foreign Policy in 1981 when Greece joined the EU (then called the EEC). It was in that year that Greece had to depart from her egocentric foreign policy and was obliged to formulate, within European Political Cooperation (EPC), policies on Asia, Africa, South America. Whenever the EU was to make a policy statement or issue a declaration, for example decisions on the situation in El Salvador, Namibia and Laos, Greece had to participate in the formulation of such a policy by taking a position during the drafting exercises. We had to explain to our Ministers, the national considerations behind an EU position which meant that we had to study and scrutinize the internal situation in El Salvador, Namibia or Laos. The same applied to the preparation of the EU speech at the annual General Assembly. It was at this point that Greece started to learn in detail about the domestic problems of the rest of the world and became involved in solving them.

This is simply the general background to the discussion at hand on bilateral relations between Greece and Canada. The article will also describe Greece's present foreign policy.

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Greece and Canada

The relations between Greece and Canada are based on a series of bilateral agreements covering almost all fields of cooperation. High level bilateral contracts are frequent and constructive. Last year's official visit of the President of the Hellenic Republic, Constantinos Stephanopoulos, created a stimulus that strengthened bilateral cooperation even more. This year the Greek embassy and community had the visit of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grigoris Niotis, who had very useful and constructive discussions with Minister Manley, who received an official invitation from George Papandreou to visit Greece.

Greek-Canadian cooperation in the area of defense has also been excellent. In April, Minister Eggleton had made an official visit to Minister Tsochatzopoulos in Athens, during which questions of military procurements were discussed, as well as the exchanges in this field. On the basis of my experience, this area is currently the most active at the moment, since almost every month military delegations from both sides and from all levels visit.

With Canada, we have an ongoing dialogue in Ottawa, Athens and in international *fora* where the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs usually hold brief bilateral meetings and discuss, exchanging information on all issues of mutual concern and more precisely the evolving situation in the Balkans, Middle East, Turkey, and Cyprus. We are also closely cooperating with Canada in some of the initiatives concerning human security. George Papandreou, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is a member of the Advisory Board of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that met in May 2001 in Jordan. Overall, the state of our bilateral political relations is more than satisfactory.

Another area of great importance in the field of bilateral cooperation is trade relations between Greece and Canada. These relations are governed by the rules set in the several agreements that have been signed between the EU and Canada which are the following:

- Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation (1976), which created the Joint Cooperation Committee that meets on the second semester of each year to overview the economic -commercial relations between the EU and Canada. This agreement provides for closer business and commercial links, encouraging exchanges and joint undertakings between companies and industries from both sides. Under this agreement the cooperation and consultation between EU and Canada in a number of fields such as environment, telecommunications and the information society were developed. The agreement facilitates the efforts to manage and resolve trade and investment disputes and encourages joint contributions to multilateral trade liberalization.
- Transatlantic Declaration on EU-Canada relations (1990), which sets out the institutional framework that forms the basis for the Summit meetings (two times per year) and the Ministerial meetings (two times per year)
- Joint Political Declaration on EU-Canada relations and Joint EU-Canada Action Plan (1996)

Other sectoral agreements between EU and Canada complete the legal framework which has also full validity for Greece:

- Agreement on Research in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (1959) and Agreement on Cooperation in Nuclear Research (1998)
- Agreement on Trade in Alcoholic Beverages (1989). In September 2000 the two sides decided to start new negotiations in order to reach a new agreement on wines and spirits
- Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation (1995, expanded in 1998)
- Agreement on Education and Training (1996)
- Customs Cooperation Agreement (1997), which provides the basis for closer cooperation of EU and Canadian Customs administrators to combat fraud and protect and promote legitimate trade

- Mutual Recognition Agreement (1998), which facilitates trade between EU and Canada by allowing each side to certify the conformity of the products with the standards required by the other
- Veterinary Agreement (1998), which facilitates bilateral trade in live animals and animal products and sets the framework for further simplification of trading conditions through recognition of equivalence of sanitary measures applied by the EU and Canada
- Competition Agreement (1999), which entered into force upon signing provides the means for a more effective application of EU and Canadian competition rules in cases of common interest

Regular meetings take place between the European Commission and Canadian officials in various frameworks such as:

- The Joint Science and Technology Cooperation Committee
- The Joint Customs Cooperation Committee
- The Joint Management Committee under the Veterinary Agreement
- The EU-Canada Working Group on Satellite Navigation
- The High Level Consultations on the Environment
- The High Level Consultations on Fisheries
- The Bilateral Biotechnology dialogue
- The Health and Consumer Dialogue

In June 1999 the Canada Europe Round Table for Business (CERT) was formally launched. The European and Canadian Businessmen participating have already submitted recommendations for the improvement of the bilateral trade relationship and the multilateral WTO framework.

Greek exports to Canada last year were 103.43 million Canadian dollars (an increase of 6.9% over 1999) while Canadian exports to Greece amounted to 155.53 million Canadian dollars (a decrease of 21.6%). Both sides are dissatisfied with these figures, and efforts are being made to try to increase them. In mid-June 2001, the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of Canada and the Greek Embassy are organizing a round table in Ottawa to examine ways and means of increasing this cooperation. It is within this framework that Deputy Minister of Communications Mr. Voulgaris visited Canada in March and had contacts with the Canadian high-tech community.

The main products that Greece exported to Canada in the year 2000 were bentonite, canned peaches, aluminum plates, agricultural products like olives, olive oil, cheese, wine, ammonium and nitrate. The main Canadian products exported to Greece were fire-fighting hydroplanes, newsprint paper, wood pulp, and motor vehicles. Trade between the two countries in the last few years has been in Canada's favour, but this trade surplus is partly compensated by the income from Canadian tourists visiting Greece and by the remittances of Canadian citizens of Greek descent.

Greece's investments in Canada increased last year. It has been a few years since the National Bank of Greece and NEOSET, a Greek Company that manufactures ready-to-assemble furniture, were in Canada as investors. Since last December OPTIMUM, a Greek company that produces software has created a subsidiary in Canada called Veltion Inc., while Petzetakis is cooperating with Imperial Plastics Inc. for the joint production of flexible pipes for the Canadian, US and Latin American markets. These last two investments constitute positive developments in our common objective of increasing bilateral economic cooperation.

There are about seven Canadian companies that have invested in Greece. These are National Networks, McCain's whose famous french fries account for 60% of the local market, SNC Lavalin, Bombardier (Thessaloniki Metro), the Bank of Nova Scotia, TVX Gold Inc. and Delcan that in partnership with the Dutch DHV has been awarded the planning for the Egnatia Road in Northern Greece.

There are two basic reasons for the low level of economic cooperation with Greece. One is the structure of Canadian commerce that is orientated towards the US. Eighty-six percent of total Canadian

exports went to the US while only 5% went to the EU. Canadian imports from the US were 74% of the total imports while imports from the EU were only 9%. The other reason concerns Greece and Greek business people who prefer to invest, import and export to neighbouring and the other EU countries. In spite of these reasons, I do believe that it is possible to see a reasonable further increase in our bilateral economic relations with Canada.

The role of the Canadians of Greek descent is a very important component of Greece's bilateral relations with Canada. With their vote, they contribute to the election in federal and provincial parliaments of many members of parliament who may also participate in the Federal Government. They are highly respected by the Canadian Government. At this moment, there are actually three Canadians of Greek descent in the Federal and one in the Provincial Parliament of Quebec. Since the Canadians of Greek descent are very capable, well educated, clever and talented, I strongly encourage them, particularly the younger generation, to participate actively in Canadian politics, so that they may contribute to making Canada even greater than it is today and to face the problems of the future effectively.

The Canadians of Greek descent also play an important role in promoting the bilateral economic relations between the two countries, since many are involved in trade with Greece and send remittances to their country of origin.

Hellenic Studies Programs and Chairs in Canadian universities also play an important role in promoting Greek civilization in Canada and allowing many Canadians to acquire knowledge of Ancient and Modern Greek civilization. The Chair of Hellenic Studies at Simon Fraser University is functioning in a satisfactory way. In the next academic year, the Papachristidis Chair in Modern Greek and Greek-Canadian Studies, the Inter-University Centre of Modern Greek Studies at the University of Montreal recently started operating. Hopefully, we shall soon have another chair at York University while the Centre of Hellenic Studies of the University of Manitoba and the Centre of Hellenic Studies and Research Canada-KEEK are also very active.

Greece and the World

Leaving aside the bilateral relations between Greece and Canada, allow me to develop Greece's foreign policy with emphasis on the EU and the Balkans.

Greece's foreign policy objective is clear: to carry forward fundamental, dynamic initiatives in order to establish a framework of principles and rules, of justice and democracy, which will take effect throughout our region. Greece is, and will continue to be, a model of democracy, stability and cooperation for the region. Greece's regional policy is, in a sense, our answer to the new challenges of globalization.

In recent years, Greece has undergone a continual process of development. Extensive modernization programs and intensive institutional reforms have generated a new self-confidence among the Greek people. At the same time, Greece has gained a new credibility on the world stage.

Greece's vibrant economy has been brought to convergence with the European Monetary Union. Greek investments in South-East Europe are helping to boost regional development. Contemporary Greek culture is thriving in a new, multi-cultural context. While we do not underestimate the importance of maintaining a strong defense, we actively promote a principled policy that supports Greece's long tradition of preserving peace.

Greece has always supported EU enlargement as a means to build a bridge of security, co-operation, and development between nations. There is an inherent logic to Greece's approach. With the harrowing war in Kosovo still fresh in our memories, the Greek people are critically aware of the importance of good neighbourly relations.

We believe that our neighbour's strength is our strength. To exclude a country from participation in the full benefits of international society is a sure path towards the kind of crises we have faced for too long in South-East Europe. Participation in this process has become a democratic demand of the people of this region.

We believe that stability in our region is the pre-requisite for Greek security. We define stability as the practice of democracy, the strengthening of institutions that provide transparency and accountability, the reduction of economic inequalities and the rule of law in our societies and between our countries. Our own security has been established as members of the European Union and of NATO and we work so that countries in the region may benefit from the stabilizing influence of membership in these institutions.

In the next years Greece will build upon this base. We are determined to transform the plight of a war and its brutal memories into an opportunity for the generations to come. Through the process of a neighbouring war, we in the region have managed to inspire in the international community the importance of a consistent, universal and unifying policy towards South-Eastern Europe. From Bosnia to Cyprus, through Yugoslavia, we have the same objectives: we want all the countries in the region to be integral, peaceful and democratic, we want them to remain multi-cultural and we want them to join the European Union. This is our message. Even though simple sounding, our message is a radical break from the past where favouritism, cold war intricacies and double standards, have consistently broken the spirit of the people in the region.

We must stop redrawing borders around ethnically homogeneous communities in the Balkans while compelling them to seek the favours of greater powers. In the next years, we commit Greece to an effort to transform the multitude of races, religions and ethnicities in the region into an instrument of solidarity, stability, a beautiful kaleidoscope of creative multicultural cooperation.

Greece's vision for the Balkans is one of a region in which democracy finally becomes the norm; where citizens' aspirations can finally be realized through peaceful and democratic practices; where the rights of minorities are respected; where governments are accountable, economies are transparent and politics allow for the fullest participation of all elements of society.

I do not say that we will succeed. The situation in FYROM is deteriorating. We have a vision, a policy and we will do everything possible. The world has a responsibility in supporting this vision for our region: First we need to empower the region that has historically been handicapped, dependent and divided by a world community of competing interests and a babble of conflicting signals. This "balkanisation" of the region must be replaced by coordination of international efforts. Secondly, we need to support cooperation within the region. Thirdly we need to invest in the region: in infrastructure and most importantly in education in order to tap into its full human potential.

Faced with the above challenges, Greece has created a comprehensive strategy for the region. A strategy that we term a *Total Balkan Approach*, a regional approach to democracy, security and prosperity. Our objectives are to control potential sources of conflict, and to create the prerequisites for political and financial development throughout the region. Our ultimate goal is regional integration into European institutions. This strategy is founded upon the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect of existing borders, and the dissuasion of separatist tendencies and divisive ideologies. At the same time, we actively promote the establishment of democratic procedures, and the protection of human and minority rights. We firmly abide by these rules, in the strategic framework already mentioned and we consider that these are not confined to our region. We firmly believe that they apply globally, as a potential and constructive answer to the challenges inherent to globalization.

In the framework of the Balkan Stability Pact, Greece is taking important initiatives to promote regional stability, by creating networks of cooperation, and by taking steps to actualize regional reconstruction. Southeastern Europe can be a region unified, reunified with Europe, within the European Union. This vision led more than 40 nations last year to develop a unique contract between the international community and South East Europe: it was coined "the Stability Pact". In short, the Stability Pact can be the incubator of a new contract for the Balkans. For Greece, all this is critical as what

happens in the region and what our allies and partners propose for the region, is central to our own future.

The Greek Policy of committing to embrace all those nations who strive for democracy within their frontiers and peaceful cooperation beyond them, into the European family, applies also to Turkey. We believe that Greece and Turkey have no choice but to explore new avenues for co-operation. We believe our mutual interests can outweigh our political differences. We can and must resolve these differences through peaceful means, through the arbitration of the International Court of Justice and other legal mechanisms. That is why Greece has initiated a process of constructive dialogue with Turkey.

This policy of openness requires courage and determination. While Greek foreign policy is guided by a genuine commitment to regional stability and prosperity, we also have a duty to safeguard our national interests. Our European allies appreciate that Greece has both more to gain — and potentially more to lose — from Turkey's European prospects, than any other EU member state.

That is why Greece has created a window of opportunity for Turkey to move closer to Europe. The time has now come for Turkey to prove that her intentions towards Europe are serious. EU candidacy brings shared benefits, but also mutual responsibilities. If Turkey is willing to play by EU rules, we in Europe must back Turkey's candidacy both in substance and in process.

What does this mean in practice? It means we can not condone double standards: the entry criteria set down in Copenhagen apply equally to all candidate nations. In Turkey's case, this means greater political and religious freedom, independence of judiciaries, and free media. It means guarantees for the protection of human rights and minority rights. It means the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and respect for international law. We remain worried by Turkey's incessant violations of Greek airspace and its practice of placing restrictions on the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople.

Turkish candidacy is not a bilateral question for Greece, but an issue of Turkey adjusting to the democratic principles of the EU; in other words, equal responsibility lies with the EU: Turkey cannot and should not be expected to carry out painful reforms, unless the EU demonstrates an unequivocal commitment to Turkey's European future. Membership in the European Union is a binding contract. It is a contract that requires engagement both within and among countries. A contract that requires economic efficiency and the reduction of military expenditure, in exchange for participation in the greater security provided by the Union. It calls for the renunciation of unilateral action and submission to the multilateral arbitration of differences. Turkey must commit to these values, and Europe must be determined to uphold them and her commitments.

What South East Europe needs most is to achieve a climate of security, democracy, and peace. The acceptance of Turkey's candidate status at Helsinki's European Summit will move us closer to these goals. Bringing Turkey closer to Europe will bring greater security to the region. Helsinki opened up an historic opportunity for Turkey. This does not mean that Turkey's problems have miraculously been solved. The gates to heaven have not opened, but a new path, leading to new prospects, surely has.

Helsinki did not signal the end of Greece's efforts: on the contrary, it represented the starting point for new, and equally courageous, Greek initiatives. Helsinki marked a significant shift in bilateral relations with our neighbor. But the current positive climate is the result of persistent and often painful efforts, despite a number of both domestic and international obstacles and issues, which must be overcome.

The Helsinki summit in December 1999 was also a milestone for Cyprus, which is now firmly on the way to EU membership. Integration with European standards and principles is the surest way to bring about the unification and demilitarization of Cyprus. Likewise, Bulgaria and Romania have moved forward on the road to integration, as have Albania and FYROM.

Recalling the Helsinki conclusions, as mentioned above, we know that all our European partners agree with us that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the EU's decision will be made without the above being a pre-condition. That is our commitment as European Union. We have also told the EU partners and the candidate countries that if there is any attempt by the "14" to reconsider the Helsinki agreements by blocking the accession of Cyprus until a political solution to the Cyprus problem is found, then the accession agreements of the candidate states will not be ratified by the Greek Parliament.

Turkey continues to occupy 38% of the island with over 30,000 troops. Can the EU accept any candidate country, which forcefully occupies the territory of another candidate country? Blatantly disobeying UN Resolutions Turkey maintains that troops are there to protect the Turkish Cypriots. The EU can provide greater security and prosperity than the fragile status quo of Cyprus today. The European Union has a responsibility to help break down the last Berlin Wall dividing a European capital. The legitimate government and innocent population of Cyprus must not be held hostage to the whims of a régime, which is not recognized by the international community. This would tarnish the moral integrity of Europe.

EU membership is the best way to guarantee progress on the Cyprus issue. Cyprus is closest among all EU candidates to fulfilling entry requirements. Entry into the European framework would increase the security, stability, and prosperity of both communities on Cyprus. Indeed, the Turkish Cypriot community, now isolated from the rest of the world, would benefit the most. Indeed we see them as brothers in our wider European family.

EU considers the matter of accession of Cyprus to the EU as of strategic importance for Europe, the Middle East, as for stability in a vital region. The international community appreciates the responsible and consistent stance of the Cypriot government throughout all efforts towards a just solution as well as its will to defend the interests

of the whole population of Cyprus: the interests of both communities in Cyprus. Greece supports the effort and commitment of the Cypriot Government so that proximity talks become substantive; so that they lead to a just and viable solution for Cyprus; so that they secure the essence of the Republic of Cyprus as a modern multi-cultural society, inseparable part of the European Union.

In order to meet our new responsibilities, we have learnt to apply new political practices. Perhaps most importantly, we have introduced the concept of citizen's diplomacy, which is entirely new for Greece. In keeping with global trends, we no longer rely solely on traditional diplomacy. We are democratizing our foreign policy. Citizen's diplomacy effectively means that our citizens themselves are actively involved in shaping foreign policy. Greek citizens have discovered that they have an important role to play in relation to the citizens of other Balkan nations, the people of Turkey, and of Europe as a whole. The power of the people was confirmed by events in our region. During the crisis in Kosovo, the Greek government actively supported the courageous efforts of Greek humanitarian non-governmental organizations. In fact, the government introduced a new law to formalize the role of NGOs.

In a gesture towards our cultural and democratic heritage, we have also revived an ancient ideal that we hope will be powerful in promoting global peace in the future. In preparation for the 2004 Athens Olympics, Greece has revived the tradition of the Olympic Truce. Our dream? To bring about a global ceasefire to coincide with the 2004 Athens Olympics. We believe that if our principles apply to our practices in our immediate geographical vicinity they must also apply globally. The final area of our concentration in our Olympiad for peace is new international initiatives in which our country can play a role. Drawing on our ancient traditions, we are working to reestablish the practice of Olympic Truce. We aspire to the day when the tradition of suspending all hostilities during the Olympic Games becomes the seed of a more lasting peace. To this end and in close co-operation with the International Olympic Committee we have established the International Centre for Olympic Truce in Olympia. It is a worthy

project, upon which we all place high hopes: we aspire in enhancing the relevance of the Olympic message in today's world, in strengthening the bond between contemporary Games and Olympic ideals and in deepening respect for global peace.

Foreign policy reflects a country's domestic dynamism. Greece enjoys a vibrant economy and political stability. However, it is committed to continuing its efforts to modernize other fields — such as education, information society, and public administration. These will be essential for Greece's future role in the region. This is the foundation upon which Greece will continue to build, to further deepen its foreign policy for the benefit of the peoples of our wider region.

NOTES

1. Basic elements and statistics used in this article are based on the archival material from the Greek Embassy in Ottawa.

Methodological Prolegomena to Neoplatonic Proclus (412-485) II

Reference Text: About Plato's Theology (*Peri tês katá Platóna theologías*), H. D. SAFFREY – L. G. WESTERINK,

« Les Belles lettres », Paris 1968, pp. 1,5.6-8.15

Christos Terezis*

RÉSUMÉ

Cette brève étude critique sur quelques mots-clés du texte de Proclus *Peri tês katá Platóna theologías* est la suite de l'article qui a été publié dans *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies* (vol 9, no 1, pp. 169-178).

ABSTRACT

This brief critical examination of a few key terms in Proclus' *Peri tês katá Platóna theologías* is an addendum to a previously published brief article in the *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies* (Vol 9, No 1, pp. 169-178).

The subject of this study could be characterized as primarily, methodological. More specifically, the particular method through which the text in question will be approached more than the content of the text itself, will come to the foreground of our discussion. It should be also noted that we will not make use of the methodology used by the authors of the text but will use another one of our own choice. The writers' content and methodology is of a marginal interest, at least at this point of study conforming to an approach which could be called phenomenological. Thus the general outline of the methodology used by the Saffrey and Westerlink, as well as the relevant sequence of reasoning demonstrated, is not relevant to our pur-

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pose. The text will be approached as a set of words and at a later stage as a system of concepts and meanings formed in partial or whole units.

Within the context of our approach, that means words in their usual linguistic phrasing form the primary scientific and interpretative evidence. These are the points which when released from their broader – however not from their close – interrelation, will direct our thought towards the primary concepts. The latter are concepts which to a certain extent existed before their incorporation into a semantically complicated whole, or just because they are of such a kind, they make their incorporation, or even partly the articulation of the content itself attainable. The ‘individuality’ of this method is pinpointed within the context of transcendence, as far as our text is concerned, or within the context of a notional reconstruction of the text. Nevertheless, it aims by no means to abolish or suppress it.

The text is broken down into its components, namely into the parts that compose the whole. Our motive is a linguistic outlook, which we regard as the most reliable objective yardstick that protects us against the researcher’s subjective estimation or arbitrariness. Furthermore, it protects us against any interpretative carelessness or against any fundamental or preconceived theoretical approach of the text. Therefore, the focus of this article is the language and frequency of each word appearing in the text. These elements form a solid and reliable factor. They are the basis and the reference material, the starting point and its continual recall. Additionally, they form the criterion of the conceptual deductions and they define the semantic nuances of the text. All of this to explain why in the later stage of our research, each word and its relevant frequency will form the basis for the quality content analysis of its meaning.

The words to be examined from the reference text are: a) “*philosophia*” (philosophy), b) “*theôria*” (theory), c) “*mystagôgia*” (initiation), d) “*mustikon*” (mystical) and e) “*aporrêton*” (ineffable).

The selection of the above words was based on their direct or indirect conceptual similarity or difference, in regard to their original sense. In reference to this, this selection has most definitely not taken

place accidentally or as a kind of sampling, but it happened on an easily established, or already acquired from other texts interrelationship. Namely we have already studied other texts of Proclus', which enabled us to incorporate the chosen words in the same notional context, or the same reasoning process. Through this incorporation, we can form an autonomous notional schema, which will not be foreign – within a more profound level of semantics – to the theoretical mediations of Proclus. At the same time, through the relevance on which it will be based, it will fulfill higher systematic demands, since it will be able to offer a suggestion of articulating a reasoning and of founding a cohesive – if not a full-scale – theoretical scheme.

- A. The term “*philosophia*” (philosophy) is reported five times in the text. It is used four times in the historical and one in the systematic level. In other words, it sometimes appears as a theoretical pursuit originated by a certain philosopher, and other times as a unique and cohesive system of thought, that is to say, as a theoretical and methodological already set-up field. Besides, given the outward attribution of this double dimension in which the term “*philosophia*” appears, – something that can be easily noticed in any philosophical text – for the scholar, this specific use should be an exclusive criterion of interpretation and denotation of the reference text, in the sense that he/she is obliged to investigate the particularity of this use. Namely it is important for the scholar to ask two questions: a) Which philosophers does Proclus adduce, in which historical era do they belong, which theoretical views of theirs does he put forward and why? b) On the occasion in which philosophy is systematically approached, is the issue raised about a special way in which it may be examined? The second question is legitimate, as philosophy has gone through a number of approaches and is engaged with many subjects in special ways. Therefore, it is necessary for the scholar to pinpoint the exact sense it acquires each time. The answer to these two questions would be indicative of the influences Proclus has had, of the directions he gives to the

scientific thought, and of his suggestions for approaching the philosophical problems appearing in his text. This answer would most definitely have historic significance, but this very significance will be indicative of how the Neoplatonic thinker approaches specific perennial philosophical problems, in a systematic way.¹

Quotations

1. The significance of Plato's philosophy: "*Apassin men tèn Platônos philosophian, ô philôn emoi philtate Pericleis, kai tèn archên eklampsai nomizô kata tèn kreptonôn agathoeidê boulêsin, ton en autês kekrummenon noun kai tèn alêtheian tèn omou tois ousi sunuphestôsan tais peri genesin streomenais psuchais kath' onon autais themiton tôn outôs uperphuôn kai megalôn agathôn metechein*" (5,6).
2. Metaphysics as a subject of philosophy: "*Tois pollois tôn philosophein epaggelomenôn kai tês ontos thêras antilambanesthai pseudontôn aphanê katastasan, authis eis phos proelthein*" (5, 13-14).
3. The timeless existence of Plato's philosophy: "*Tês te allês apasês êmas metochous katestêse tou Platônos philosophias kai koinônous ôn en aporrêtois para tôn autou presbuterôn meteilêphe*" (7, 5-6).
4. The influence of Plato's philosophy: "*Ei de dei mê monon autous eilêphenai par' allôn to tês Platônikês philosophias exaireton agathon alla kai tois usteron esomenois upomnêmata kataleipein tôn makariôn theamatôn*" (7, 12-13).
5. The teaching of Plato's philosophy: "*Ôn autoi kai theatai genesthai famen kai zêlôtai kata dunamin uph' êgemoni tô tôn kath'êmas teleôtatô kai eis akron êkonti philosophias*" (7, 15-17).

From the quotations above, it is established that the term philosophy is directly associated three times with Plato and once with Syrianos, although his name is not mentioned. Other philosophers are also mentioned, but only as Plato's students. Thus, Plato forms a his-

toric source for Proclus, and he is at the same time a criterion on which the validity of Proclus philosophical references is based. In reference to the 5,3-14 quote, it should be noted that here philosophy is mentioned as a special theoretical field, as a special occupation of some thinkers, who are interested in a specific field of the world of experience and post-experience, and this is a fact which differentiates them from the rest of the thinkers. If these five quotes are examined as a whole, we can be led to the conclusion that philosophy is a special theoretical field, which is prominently expressed in Plato's teaching.²

- B. The term “*theôria*” (theory) appears in the text three times in two basic senses: a) as insights which the meditating subject has on select concepts, which are beyond tangible experience, b) as a systematic articulation of some thoughts aiming at their notional validity and legitimacy, since this is something which enables reasoning to function as a theoretical principle. These meanings preclude the interpretation of knowledge as a simple piece of information, and point to levels where the theoretical conception of archetypical and unalterable ontological conditions is possible. At this point we find ourselves before a situation in which the human mind approaches its reference object in an authentic way, free from various admixtures emanating from the world of the state of constant flux.

Quotations:

1. Platonic teaching and theory: “*Toutous dê tous tês Platônîkês epopteias exêgêtas kai tas panagestatas êmin peri tôn theiôn uphêgêseis anaplôsantas kai tô spheterô kathêgemoni paraplêsian tèn phusin lachontos einai theièn an egôge Plôtinon te ton Aiguption kai tous apo toutou paradexamenous tèn theôrian*” (6, 20-21).
2. The quality of platonic theory: “*Kai podêgetein eis to panteles kai theion kai upsêlon telow tês Platônîkês theôrias*” (7, 10-21).
3. Prerequisites for the understuding of the platonic theory: “*Oi de akousantes ileô te kai eumeneis elthontes agoien ton tês psuchês*”

êmôn noun kai periagoien (eis) tèn tou Platônos estian kai to anantes tês theôrias tautês” (8, 7-10).

Therefore, theory is cognitively or epistemologically valid, as long as it is not influenced by the conditions of the procedure, but defines itself and strictly depends on what remains unchangeable. It is noticeable that here too Proclus connects Plato’s theory and teaching, which is indicative of the precedence he gives to the Athenian philosopher in comparison to the rest of the philosophers.³

- C. The term “*mustagôgia*” appears twice in the text and signifies an internal procedure, an initiation to the utmost truth, that is to say to the truth of Theology. It also signifies a transcendence of the phenomenal in aid of logic – a logic free of the phenomena taking place in the tangible world – and an overall existential participation in ineffable situations. Through “*mustagôgia*” man transcends the usual limits of ordinary life and is led to fields beyond sensuous experience. This reference has serious consequences for human’s moral or is at least attached to him.⁴

Quotations

1. Transcendence of the divine: “*Diapherontôs de oimai tèn peri autôn tôn theiôn mustagôgian en agnô bathrô katharôs idrumenên*” (5, 17).
 2. Moral preconditions for initiation: “*Kai ton prosêkonta tê mustagôgia bion anelomenôn proelthein men eph’ oson ên autê dunaton*” (6, 11-12).
- D. Finally, the terms “*mustikon*” (mystical) and “*aporrêton*” (ineffable) are reported in the text only once and signify a special characteristic of philosophy as theory and initiation. Namely, they are placed within the prospect of a systematic examination of philosophy from a special point of view. They are both connected to Plato’s teaching. Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that this consideration is also determined by the spirit of the era when the text was written, which implies that it has a historic character.⁵

Quotations

1. The initiates of truth: “*Kai dê kai tês peri tôn theiôn mustikês alêtheias sugchoreutas apephêne*” (7, 7-8).
2. A way to assimilate the ineffable: “*Tês te allês apasês koinônous ôn en aporrêtois para tôn autou presbuterôn meteilêphê*” (7, 6-7).

According to the points examined, we can reach the following conclusions about the scientific principle of Proclus:

- A. The concepts we have elaborated on undoubtedly belong to the field of philosophy. Nevertheless, Proclus tends to incorporate them in the field of Theology. They mainly stem from Platonic tradition, but they do not maintain an authentically rational character. These concepts are typical of the trends prevailing throughout the fifth AD, an era dominated by the individual's inclination towards introversion and towards an intention to project an almost absolute dependence of the natural from the metaphysical one. Thus, philosophy acquires its full meaning only in reference to the theory of metaphysical archetypes.
- B. Philosophy excludes any reference to societal action and to the active political life. Everything takes place within the inwardness of the mediating subject and finally consists of a production or reconstruction of the human mind, which should always be directed towards God. Therefore, philosophy lacks its social nourishment and is embodied within a sterile idealism. It is not confirmed through action and it is self excluded from the political institutions. Philosophy lives on its abstractions, and consequently the only thing it has left is to purify the human soul from any admixtures it receives from the world of experience.
- C. The bounds of philosophy are strictly controlled. Plato remains the criterion for the interpretation, the evaluation and, finally, the legitimacy of philosophy. He is considered to be an intellec-

tual authority and consequently, the reference point for every later thinker. Platonic philosophy is the concentration of every truth and thus, the only thing it remains is to be commented and interpreted. From this point of view any new philosophical quest is bounded and every philosopher is obliged to constantly go back to Plato, who is the source of the epistemological directions and axioms. Therefore, any novelties and expectations for theoretical transformations are out of the question.

If we take into account that the text examined is the first of the *par excellence* systematic work of Proclus' *About Plato's Theology*, it is understood that the Neoplatonic thinker outlines from the outset the preconditions of the development of his whole work.

NOTES

1. For a systematic regard on the philosophical system of Proclus, see L. J. ROSAN, *The Philosophy of Proclus. The final phase of Ancient Thought*, New York 1949. W. BEIERWALTES, *Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik*, Frankfurt am Main 1979.
2. On the position of platonic philosophy in the work of Proclus, see H. D. SAFFREY, *Recherches sur le Néoplatonisme après Plotin*, "J. Vrin", Paris 1990, pp. 141-158, and 173-184.
3. On the concept of theory in the work of Proclus, see P. BASTID, *Proclus et le crépuscule de la pensée grecque*, "J. Vrin", Paris 1969, pp. 414-446, where a compound reference to the scientific thought of Proclus is made.
4. On the concept of initiation, and in particular in its broader sense, in the works of Proclus, see J. TROUILLARD, *La mystagogie de Proclus*, « Les belles lettres », Paris 1982.
5. The terms "mystical" and "ineffable" being within the context of negative Theology. On a systematic regard, see the second book of the work of Proclus: *About Plato's Theology* (ed. H. D. SAFFREY – L. G. WESTERINK, "Les belles lettres", Paris 1974).

DOCUMENT

ASSOCIATION DES AMIS DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE CHYPRE (PARIS)

Afin d'éclairer le vote des amis français de Chypre l'A.A.R.C. a publié à la veille des élections présidentielles françaises des extraits significatifs des réponses reçues à un questionnaire adressé aux candidats à l'élection présidentielle portant sur l'occupation depuis 1974 du nord du territoire chypriote par l'armée turque ainsi que sur la demande d'adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne. Nous reproduisons ci-dessous une partie de ces réponses.

Le questionnaire adressé aux candidats était le suivant :

1. Pensez-vous que la solution de la question chypriote doit impliquer une démilitarisation totale de la République de Chypre impliquant le départ de l'armée turque, qui occupe la partie nord de ce pays depuis l'été 1974 ainsi que celui des bases britanniques en place depuis 1960?
2. Depuis le 16 janvier 2002, des négociations intercommunautaires ont recommencé entre le Président de la République de Chypre et le chef de la communauté turque. Depuis plus de 27 ans, ces négociations se sont toujours soldées par un échec en raison de l'intransigeance de la Turquie. Etes-vous d'accord, ainsi que l'a décidé le Conseil européen d'Helsinki de décembre 1999, pour que Chypre fasse partie de l'Union européenne même si la question chypriote n'est pas résolue lors du prochain élargissement de cette entité prévu pour 2004 ?
3. Vingt-deux Français de Chypre ont perdu leurs biens situés dans la partie occupée de ce pays. Depuis 27 ans, ceux-ci attendent en vain une indemnisation de la Turquie, la France s'abstenant curieusement de toute pression sur ce pays candidat à l'adhésion

à l'Union européenne afin d'obtenir la réparation des dommages subis par nos compatriotes, qui à Chypre, jouent un rôle important pour la promotion de la langue française et la défense des intérêts de notre pays.

Pensez-vous possible, si vous êtes élu, d'obtenir de la Turquie l'indemnisation des Français de Chypre, par application du règlement de La Haye de 1907 relatif à la responsabilité des puissances occupantes à l'égard des dommages causés aux ressortissants d'un Etat tiers? Etes-vous d'accord en toute hypothèse, notamment, en cas de refus ou de défaillance des autorités d'Ankara, pour que la France indemnise elle-même nos compatriotes de Chypre dont les droits sont lésés depuis l'invasion turque de 1974?

Réponses reçues

I. Le Président de la République française Jacques Chirac:

- a. Jacques Chirac ne s'est jamais résigné au statu quo qui dure dans l'île depuis trop longtemps. Il soutient sans réserve les efforts déployés par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies. Il continuera d'encourager les deux parties à négocier et de les inciter à un règlement global, juste et durable de la question chypriote dans le respect des résolutions de Nations-Unies.

Jacques Chirac se réjouit donc des discussions inter-communautaires qui se déroulent depuis le 16 janvier dernier pour trouver une solution à la question chypriote. Elles se déroulent en présence de l'émissaire des Nations-Unies et qui ont pour objet de passer en revue tous les problèmes liés à cette solution, tels la sécurité, le futur statut de l'île, le sort des réfugiés ainsi que celui des disparus. La question de la démilitarisation de l'île en fait naturellement partie.

- b. A de nombreuses reprises Jacques Chirac a affirmé son attachement à l'entrée de Chypre dans l'Union européenne. Les conclusions du Conseil européen d'Helsinki des 10 et 11 décembre 1999, à l'élaboration desquelles la France a pris une part active, fournissent le cadre dans lequel s'inscrit la perspective de son adhésion.

Elles soulignent en effet qu'un règlement politique faciliterait l'adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne. Toutefois, si aucun règlement n'était intervenu au moment de l'achèvement des négociations d'adhésion, la décision du Conseil relative à l'adhésion serait prise sans que ce règlement politique constitue un préalable. C'est dans cet esprit que Jacques Chirac abordera ce dossier, étant entendu que le Conseil européen devra tenir compte de tous les éléments pertinents pour arrêter sa décision, puisqu'il ne peut y avoir d'automatisme de l'entrée d'un pays candidat quel qu'il soit, dans l'Union européenne.

- c. Les compensations des pertes subies du fait de la partition de l'île en 1974 sont un des points essentiels des négociations intercommunautaires actuellement en cours. Jacques Chirac continuera de veiller avec la plus grande attention aux suites réservées à la situation des vingt-deux Français de Chypre qui ont perdu leurs biens en 1974, pour que des réponses précises y soient apportées.

A cet égard, il convient de noter que la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, dans un arrêt récent, a condamné la Turquie à indemniser Mme Loizidou, ressortissante Chypriote grecque, spoliée de ses biens en 1974.

II. Le premier ministre de la République française Lionel Jospin :

- a. Depuis près de 30 ans, tous les Chypriotes vivent quotidiennement les conséquences d'une division qu'ils ne peuvent ignorer puisqu'elle se traduit par une séparation physique particulière-

ment choquante, notamment dans leur capitale, Nicosie. Cette situation est - j'en suis convaincu - insupportable pour l'immense majorité de la population qui aspire, comme tous les autres peuples d'Europe, à la paix et à la libre circulation des hommes et des femmes. Bien entendu, la paix doit conduire les adversaires d'hier à ranger les armes et impliquera un processus de démilitarisation dont le principe ne peut qu'être soutenu.

C'est avec l'objectif de parvenir à un règlement que Glafkos Cléridès et Rauf Denktash ont repris, depuis la fin 2001, des pourparlers directs. Dans ce cadre, ils doivent naturellement examiner les questions de sécurité et parvenir, sur ce point comme sur les autres, à des compromis. Les solutions qui favoriseront une paix durable dans une île réunifiée doivent être encouragées par la communauté internationale, sans à priori et avec le souci de contribuer, dans toute la mesure du possible, à un règlement. Il n'est certainement pas dans mon intention de dire à l'avance à ceux qui négocient quel doit être le contenu de leur futur accord, sur quelque aspect que ce soit. Ils peuvent, en revanche, être assurés de mon plein soutien dans leur démarche de paix.

- b. A Helsinki, il a été décidé que la réunification de Chypre n'était pas un préalable à son adhésion à l'Union européenne. Cette décision ne signifie pas que le règlement de la question chypriote perd de son importance, au contraire. Et je constate, d'ailleurs, qu'à l'approche des échéances, les parties ont senti le besoin de revenir à la table des négociations. La réunification de Chypre serait une bonne chose, d'abord pour les Chypriotes, mais aussi pour l'Union européenne et pour l'ensemble de la communauté internationale. Aucun effort ne doit être épargné pour atteindre cet objectif, auquel l'Union européenne attache le plus grand prix, parce que la construction européenne - ne l'oublions pas - a d'abord pour ambition d'enraciner définitivement la paix en Europe.

- c. Comme je viens de le dire, le règlement de la question chypriote n'est pas chose facile. Le rôle des Européens est, à mes yeux, de promouvoir la recherche d'une solution, pas de la compliquer en exerçant des pressions sur les parties qui négocient. Je comprends, le sentiment que peuvent ressentir les familles françaises qui ont été spoliées, il y a vingt-huit ans, à Chypre. En même temps, le seul espoir de pouvoir, un jour, tourner cette page douloureuse se trouve bien dans un règlement de la question chypriote. Je suis persuadé que ces familles le comprennent et qu'elles souhaitent, elles-aussi, que la paix prévale sur une île enfin réunifiée.

III. Le Maire de Belfort Jean-Pierre Chevènement :

J'ai pris connaissance avec intérêt des documents adressés par l'Association des Amis de la République de Chypre.

Je suis comme vous préoccupé par la situation chypriote, qui constitue une anomalie en Europe. La nécessité d'une solution politique négociée n'est plus à démontrer. Dans l'intérêt de toutes les parties concernées, la situation héritée de 1974 doit évoluer.

Certes, la France ne peut se substituer aux parties intéressées, mais sa diplomatie doit agir partout en faveur des droits de l'homme et du citoyen et de la paix. En outre, je considère que tout doit être fait pour que la Méditerranée ne soit pas une ligne de fractures. Nos valeurs républicaines tout comme l'exigence d'une solidarité euro-méditerranéenne plaident en faveur d'une action diplomatique visant le règlement du conflit.

La vocation européenne de l'île est évidente. Quant à la situation particulière des ressortissants Français dépossédés à la suite des événements de 1974, elle ne pourra être réglée qu'à l'issue de la négociation, la France ne pouvant ni ne devant traiter avec la RTCN.

IV. Le Président national du Parti communiste Robert Hue :

La solution du problème chypriote passe dans le cadre du respect de la souveraineté de l'Etat chypriote garantissant les droits des deux communautés par une démilitarisation de l'île et le départ de l'armée turque. Je suis tout à fait d'accord pourqu'il n'y ait aucun préalable à l'adhésion de Chypre à l'UE. Toute autre position de l'UE reviendrait à conférer à la Turquie une sorte de droit de veto quant à cette adhésion, ce qui est inadmissible.

Jean Catsiapis

Chronologie Grèce

1^{er} octobre 2001 - 31 mars 2002

9 octobre : Inauguration de la 53^{ème} édition de la Foire du Livre de Francfort, avec la Grèce comme invitée d'honneur.

11-14 octobre : 6^{ème} Congrès du PASOK, Costas Simitis est réélu président avec plus de 70% des voix et Costas Laliotis devient Secrétaire du Comité exécutif.

23 octobre : Remaniement ministériel : Georges Papandréou reste Ministre des affaires étrangères. Akis Tsohatzopoulos laisse son portefeuille de la Défense nationale à Yannis Papantoniou et devient ministre du Développement. Nicos Christodoulakis est nommé ministre de l'Economie et des finances.

24 novembre : Congrès fondateur à Thessalonique du KEP (Mouvement des Citoyens libres) dirigé par le maire d'Athènes Dimitri Avramopoulos.

6-9 décembre : Visite officielle en Grèce de Vladimir Poutine. Le Président de la Russie a conclu avec le gouvernement grec six accords dont le plus important concerne le domaine de l'énergie (gaz naturel, pétrole, électricité).

8-10 janvier : Voyage à Washington de Costas Simitis. Le Premier ministre grec assure le Président Bush de sa détermination à mettre hors d'état de nuire l'organisation terroriste «17 novembre».

1^{er} janvier : Disparition de la drachme, monnaie de la Grèce, remplacée par l'euro, monnaie unique pour douze pays de l'UE.

24 janvier : L'aviation militaire turque viole à 22 reprises l'espace aérien grec en mer Égée.

19 février : Poursuites judiciaires contre l'important homme d'affaires, Socrate Kokkalis, pour espionnage et escroquerie.

2-9 mars : Visite du Premier ministre grec au Japon.

7 mars : Le ministre de la Défense nationale, Yannis Papantoniou dénonce les multiples violations de l'espace aérien grec par l'aviation militaire turque, qui sont de nature à perturber l'amélioration des relations entre la Grèce et la Turquie.

20 mars : La Grèce et la Turquie ont organisé en commun à l'Hôtel Hilton de Bruxelles une réception à l'occasion du cinquantième anniversaire de leur adhésion à l'OTAN.

23 mars : Réunion à Saragosse des ministres de la défense de l'Union européenne. La Grèce y a bloqué un accord sur la relève de l'OTAN par les troupes des pays de l'Europe des 15 dans l'Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (FYROM), refusant que la Turquie dispose d'un droit de regard sur la politique européenne de défense.

Chronologie Chypre

1^{er} octobre 2001 - 31 mars 2002

5 octobre : Le ministre chypriote des affaires étrangères indique que la République de Chypre accepte l'utilisation par les États-Unis de son espace aérien pour toute intervention de ce pays en Afghanistan.

25 octobre : Le Président de la Commission de Bruxelles, Romano Prodi en visite à Nicosie confirme que Chypre fera partie des premiers pays admis à adhérer à l'Union européenne.

22 novembre : La Chambre des Représentants de Chypre vote une loi destinée à lutter contre le financement d'organisations terroristes et qui ratifie un traité de l'ONU prévoyant la confiscation de fonds suspects.

4 décembre : Rencontre entre le Président Cléridès et Rauf Denktash, chef de la communauté chypriote turque, qui décident la relance du dialogue intercommunautaire.

14-15 décembre : Le Conseil européen de Laeken soutient le processus de l'ONU pour le règlement de la question chypriote et réitère l'engagement de l'Union européenne en faveur de l'adhésion de Chypre.

16 décembre : Elections municipales dans 32 villes. M. Michalakis Zambelas est élu maire de Nicosie en remplacement de M. Lellos Dimitriadès. MM. Andréas Moiscos et Kikis Kazamias ont été élus respectivement maires de Larnaca et de Famagouste (ville actuellement sous occupation turque).

19 décembre : Le Département des antiquités de Chypre annonce l'inclusion de l'église de la Transfiguration du Christ à Palaichori sur la liste du patrimoine mondial de l'UNESCO.

16 janvier : Début des pourparlers directs à Nicosie sur l'avenir de Chypre et sous les auspices de l'ONU, entre MM. Cléridès et Denktash.

6 février : M. Kikis Lazaridès, président du Comité chypriote olympique est le premier Chypriote à être élu membre du CIO.

26 février : Le Premier ministre espagnol, José Maria Aznar, en visite à Nicosie réitère les engagements de l'UE sur l'adhésion de Chypre.

1^{er} mars : Reprise des pourparlers entre MM. Cléridès et Denktash dont le premier cycle s'est achevé le 19 février.

12 mars : Décès de Spyros Kyprianou, Président de la République de Chypre de 1977 à 1988 et fondateur du parti démocratique DIKO.

RECENSIONS / BOOK REVIEWS

Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War:

Edited by CHRISTODOULOS K. YIALLOURIDES AND
PANAYOTIS J. TSAKONAS.

(New York and Athens, Caratzas, 2001.)

This volume brings together a wide range of Greek views on the status of the relationship between Greece and Turkey and the prospects for the future. What is notable for the reader and what makes the volume stand out from others dealing with relevant issues is the way articles are structured in four parts. In order to explain this structure I would like to pay tribute to all contributors in the following lines.

The first part of the book provides a historical approach to Turkey as seen by Christos Iacovou, who elaborates on the development of Turkish politics and people since Kemal Ataturk, and as explained by Gerasimos Karabelias, who expands on the role of the Military institution in Turkey using historical proof from the Ottoman and Ataturk legacy and in later periods since the end of World War II. Keridis' comprehension of the Greek foreign policy on Turkey, with an analysis of Greek domestic politics is also useful in further elaborating the patterns in Greco-Turkish relations. Christodoulos Yallouridis adopts an innovative approach in a compact, pointed analysis that explains a developing Greek perception of the Turkish élite and Greek insecurities about its neighbour's orientation.

The second part of the volume highlights the importance of Turkey's attitude towards its periphery within the context of Greek-Turkish relations. Evridiades' contribution focuses on international implications and the impact of the relationship between Turkey and Israel while Kefalas looks at Turkey's Middle East Policy. Tsardanides deals with Turkey and Central Asia; whereas, Thanos Dokos and Panayotis Tsakonas attempt to relate both countries by projecting Turkey's presence in Greek security policy. The former thoroughly analyses how Turkey has traditionally been Greece's main security concern; the

latter, in an effort to find a 'recipe' for the 'right balancing' for Greece, makes the useful point that given the limits to 'internal balancing' (armed forces), there is a need for Greece to develop a more sophisticated external balancing (foreign policy).

The third part of the book concentrates on two crises that greatly influenced relations between Greece and Turkey. The crisis at Imia is initially treated by Stelios Alifantis, who argues that this particular crisis has mainly projected Greece's weaknesses at a political-strategic level and was further elaborated by Fakiolas and Mavridis who mainly focused on the analysis of the crisis itself and its multiple parameters, such as the lack of Greek crisis management strategy and the role of the US. The Cyprus issue is also skillfully evaluated by all contributors who retained a more superficial approach. Consequently Manolis Ioannou has a profound analysis of UN presence in Cyprus, Theophanous elaborates on the role of the EU in Cyprus and Van Coufoudakis explains the role of US in Cyprus in a historical analysis starting from the early 50's. Furthermore Yiallourides, focuses on the Cypriot Republic limitations on foreign policy as well as on its relations with Greece and Turkey, whereas Sergios Zambouras expresses a Greek view on how Turkey is handling the Cyprus issue, arguing that although the 'expansionist' approach remains the main characteristic, an internal Turkish debate on the best way to deal with Cyprus has gradually emerged.

Lastly, three writers explain the highly significant role of the foreign policy of the US and Russia in the post-Cold War period. Argyrios Pisiotis has an extensive and interesting view of how Russian foreign policy for Greece and Turkey has been affected by the energy policy, geopolitics as well as by culture. Both Marialena Conalis-Kontou and Monteagle Sterns deal with the American foreign policy approach but as their scopes are different, their conclusions are also divergent. The former highlights discrepancies between professed values and the pursuit of narrow American interests while the latter argues that the fact the US has not found a replacement for NATO, still colours Greek-Turkish relations with Cold War assumptions. Last, but not least, there are two contributions which give a different shade

to the volume as they deal with legal and economic aspects that influence Greece and Turkey. Theodoros Tsakiris, using useful data, focuses on the importance of energy policy in the region and the possible role of Greece. Angelos Sirigos offers an interesting legal approach to Greek-Turkish disputes with particular reference to the International Court of Justice, presenting the possibility of all Greek-Turkish cases being sent to that institution.

Having to distance myself from the strict book review effort, which calls for a critique rather than a synopsis, I nevertheless must mention the excellent structure of the book. It should be said, however, that any future volumes should include the evolving significance of the European Security and Defence Policy in the relations of the two countries.

Antonis Tournikiotis

LIVRES RECUS / BOOKS RECEIVED

1. Christos P. Ioannides, *From Kissinger and the Cyprus crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish arms Embargo*, New York, Pella Publishing, 2001.

This is a study in depth of the events leading up to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and how preoccupation with Watergate affected the series of actions Washington took to prevent a Greek-Turkish war over the island republic, including Kissinger's mis-handling of the crisis and his veto of a workable British proposal to deter Turkey from further aggression. The massive Greek American protests throughout the United States and Congress' reaction to these events, culminating in the unprecedented step of imposing an arms embargo against a NATO ally, Turkey, are also detailed in this well-documented work.

The bulk of this study focuses on the explicit promises of presidential candidate Jimmy Carter to maintain the arms embargo until Turkey withdraws its occupation army from Cyprus; and on the sustained campaign led by President Jimmy Carter to persuade Congress to lift the embargo at the end of July 1978. Because the lifting of the embargo had preoccupied President Carter and his foreign policy team during the first eighteen months of the Carter presidency, one wonders why it is a subject condemned to oblivion in the memoirs of Carter and his key foreign policy advisers.

Harry J. Psomiadis

2. Alexandros Yannis, *Kosovo under International Administration : An Unfinished Conflict*, Athens, ELIAMEP, 2001.

3. Aglaïa G. Kalamatianou, *Ta Haractiristika ton Palinostisanton tis Periodou 1986-1993*, Athens, Papazisis Publishers, 2001 (in Greek).

4. Niki Ladaki-Philippou, *Anthology* (1960-1992), Nicosia 1994.

Against the dark night of reality the poet calls on "rain-washed" Aphrodite to take her to a new world of love, a country of "little song hurled like a ball", of "chubby cheeks in abundance", a feminine world, loud with birds "impatiently awaiting to greet the dawn, with their happy mating song".

Alexandre Blokh.

5. Makis Tzilianos, *O Kalogeros kai o Kathreftis*, Athens, Papazisis Publishers, 2001.

6. Christodoulos Papachrysostomou, *Apanta*, Nicosie, 1999 (en grec).

Il s'agit d'une oeuvre monumentale en quatre volumes qui comprend des études littéraires, conférences, discours, articles etc. Theodoros Papadopoulos, ancien directeur du Centre de recherches scientifiques (Chypre) écrit dans une note introductive que Papachrysostomou est le dernier intellectuel de la période de Lumières à Chypre, cette période pendant laquelle les intellectuels Chypriotes ont travaillé pour consolider l'identité hellénique contre les efforts d'assimilation du colonialisme britannique. Intellectuel d'une rare culture, Papachrysostomou prolonge à Chypre la tradition l'Aufklärung hellénique. Cette tradition qui constitue une jonction entre l'antiquité hellénique et la nation grecque moderne, est à la base de revendications nationales de Chypriotes tout au long de la période coloniale britannique. Philologue de formation, enseignant au prestigieux Pankypriion Gymnasion (Lycée Panchypriote), révolutionnaire pendant la lutte de libération nationale de Chypriotes (1955-1960), Papachrysostomou a combiné à la théorie l'action, le politique au social, et a travaillé pour la renaissance chypriote. L'édition de ses écrits, comme le souligne Theodoros Papadopoulos, est un événement marquant de l'histoire intellectuelle chypriote.

Thalia Tassou

ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES-ACTIVITES ACADEMIQUES

Conférence sur les relations greco-turques

En présence du Consul général de la Grèce M. Ioannis Gavriil Papadopoulos et de plusieurs universitaires et étudiants, le Centre de recherches helléniques Canada-KEEK en collaboration avec l'Association hellénique des Etudiants de l'Université de Montréal a organisé une conférence sur *Les relations greco-turques* le jeudi, 21 mars 2002 qui a été donnée par le professeur de l'Université d'Egée Panayotis Tsakonas, conseiller spécial au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la Grèce.

Lecture on the Present State of Greek-Turkish Relations

In the presence of the Consul General of Greece, Mr. Ioannis Gavriil Papadopoulos, many scholars and students, the Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research Canada-KEEK, in cooperation with the Hellenic Students' Association of the University of Montreal, organised a lecture entitled *The Present State of Greek-Turkish Relations*, given by Panayotis Tsakonas, Professor at the Aegean University, and special adviser in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Kathy Radford

Cypriot Culture Week

On April 21, 2002, the Cypriot Culture Week was launched by the Consul General of Cyprus (Toronto) Mr. Eustathios Orphanides at the Mile-End Multicultural Library of the City of Montreal. Also present were the Consul General of Greece (Montreal) Ioannis Gavriil Papadopoulos and various academics and representatives of the local community. This special week of book exhibits and lectures was organised by the Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research Canada

KEEK in cooperation with the Montreal Inter-university Centre for Neo-Hellenic Studies. After brief opening remarks by Mr. Eustathios Orphanides, Professors Jacques Bouchard, Paris Arnopoulos, and Stephanos Constantinides, architect Panos Leventis gave a lecture entitled *Nicosia, Cyprus, 1209-1570: Architecture, Philosophy and Urban Experience*.

Two other lectures followed on Thursday, April 25, and Saturday, April 27, by Professor Jean Catsiapis (University of Paris) and by Professor Thanos Veremis (Tufts University) respectively. Mr. Catsiapis' talk treated *The European Union and the Cyprus Question*. Mr. Veremis animated a lively round table on *The latest developments in the Cyprus Question*. Participants included the Greek Ambassador (Ottawa) Mr. Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos and Professor Stephanos Constantinides.

Kathy Radford

Colloques

Présentation à Paris à l'Ambassade de Grèce en France des Actes du Colloque, organisé à Athènes par la Fondation Constantin Caramanlis, les 5 et 6 octobre 2000 avec pour thème : « De Gaulle et Caramanlis, la Nation, l'Etat et l'Europe ». Au cours de cette présentation ont pris la parole M. Yves Guéna, Président de la Fondation Charles de Gaulle et Mme Photini Caramanlis, membre du conseil d'administration de la Fondation Constantin Caramanlis.

Les Actes du colloque établis sous la direction de Constantin Svolopoulos comprennent les contributions de H. Ahrweiler, N. Alivizatos, G. Alogoskoufis, G. Anastassopoulos, C. Boutsiou, E. Clis, J. Foyer, P-M de La Gorce, P. Lambrias, A. Larcán, A. Makrydimitris, C. Morel, P. Pavlopoulos, J. M. Ripert, J-P. Rioux, M. Vaisse, J. Valinakis, O. Wiewiorka.

Jean Catsiapis

Le Centre de recherches helléniques - Canada (KEEK), en collaboration avec le Centre Inter-universitaire d'études néo-helléniques de Montréal, vous convie à la

SEMAINE CULTURELLE CHYPRIOTE



PROGRAMME

Dimanche 21 Avril 2002 à 15 heures

Inauguration de la Semaine Culturelle

Conférence donnée par l'architecte Panos Leventis, candidat au doctorat à l'Université McGill sur

Nicosie de Chypre, 1209-1570: Architecture, Philosophie et Expérience Urbaine

à la bibliothèque multiculturelle Mile-End de la Ville de Montréal
5434 Avenue du Parc, Montréal.

Jeudi 25 Avril 2002 à 19h 30

Conférence donnée par le professeur Jean Catslapis de l'Université de Paris sur

L' Union Européenne et la question Chypriote

au hall de l'église Sainte Croix de la Communauté Grecque Orthodoxe de Laval,
4865 Chemin du Souvenir, Châteaugay, Laval.

Samedi 27 Avril 2002 à 15 heures

Table Ronde sur les derniers développements de la question Chypriote

avec le professeur Thanos Veremis du Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

à la bibliothèque multiculturelle Mile-End de la Ville de Montréal
5434 Avenue du Parc, Montréal.

Il y aura une **exposition des livres et documents sur Chypre**, du 21 au 27 Avril

à la bibliothèque multiculturelle Mile-End de la Ville de Montréal
5434 Avenue du Parc, Montréal.

DOCUMENTATION SUR LES GRECS DU CANADA
ARCHIVES DU CENTRE DE RECHERCHES HELLENIQUES CANADA-KEEK

Le Centre de recherches helléniques Canada-KEEK dispose d'une importante documentation sur les Grecs du Canada qu'il met à la disposition de chercheurs et du public en général. Dans le but de faciliter l'accès à cette documentation nous commençons à partir de cette édition la publication de certains documents disponibles à nos archives.

ἘΚΛΕΚΤΑ ΜΥΘΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ,

οὕτως ἀρμοσθέντα καὶ διαταχθέντα, ὥστε

ΤΟΙΣ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑΚΟΙΣ

ὁδὸν τέμνειν ἐπὶ τῆν

ἙΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΝ ΓΛΩΣΣΑΝ.



ἘΝ ΜΑΡΙΑΝΟΠΟΛΕΙ·

Παρά Ἰωάννη Ἰωάνσω.

.ΑΟΛΖ·

Ἐκ τῆς Ἱεροσολίμου τοῦ Θάμα Γενεσιῶν

Le premier livre de langue grecque du Québec et probablement du Canada totalement imprimé en grec, publié à Montréal en 1837.

The first volume to be printed entirely in Greek published in Montreal in 1837. This is the earliest greek publication of books in Quebec and probably in Canada.

Jacques Bouchard
Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies
Vol. 1 no. 1,
printemps/Spring 1983

DOCUMENTATION ON THE GREEKS IN CANADA
ARCHIVES OF THE CENTRE FOR HELLENIC STUDIES AND
RESEARCH CANADA-KEEK.

The Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research Canada-KEEK has substantial documentation on the Greeks in Canada available for researchers and the general public. To facilitate access to these important documents, we are starting with this issue to publish texts found in our archives.

ADVICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Three copies of all manuscripts, typewritten on computer, double-spaced should be submitted on paper and disk. Manuscripts should follow the APA Manual, or the MLA Style Sheet or be consistent with practice in the discipline of each particular author.

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