ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

CRISE ET DE-EUROPÉANISATION

CRISIS AND DE-EUROPEANIZATION

Edited by / Sous la direction de

Stelios Stavridis, Charalampos Tsardanidis, George Christou

Contributors / Contributions de

George Christou
Anna Bojinović Fenco
George Kyris
Marko Lovec
Carla Monteleone
Ali Şevket Ovali
Rodrick Pace
Stelios Stavridis
Charalampos Tsardanidis

Zenonas Tziarras, George Koukoudakis

Volume 23, No 1, Spring / Printemps 2015

1

ÉTUDES HELLÉNIQUES / HELLENIC STUDIES

Études Helléniques / Hellenic Studies

Published twice a year (Spring - Autumn) by the **Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research Canada, -KEEK, the University of Crete, Centre of Intercultural and Migration Studies-EDIAMME, Department of Primary Education and the University of the Aegean Post-Graduate Program in «Political, Economic and International Relations in the Mediterranean», Department of Mediterranean Studies.**
Articles for publication, books for review and general correspondence should be addressed to Études helléniques/ Hellenic Studies:

Centre for Hellenic Studies
and Research Canada-KEEK
C.P. 48571
1495 Van Horne, Outremont,
(Québec), Canada, H2V 4T3
Tel: (514)276-7333
Fax: (514)4953072
E-mail: keekhellenic.studies@yahoo.com

University of Crete
Department of Primary Education, Centre of
Intercultural and Migration Studies (EDIAMME)
Rethymno Universtity Campus
Rethymno, 74100, Greece
Tel: +28310-77605, Fax: +28310-77636
E-mail: ediamme@edc.uoc.gr
http://www.ediamme.edc.uoc.gr

22Subscription orders, inquires, single orders and back issues should be addressed / could be obtained from this address also. Études helléniques/ Hellenic Studies is an interdisciplinary, bilingual (French - English) journal devoted to the study of issues prevailing among Greeks in both Greece proper and the numerous Greek communities abroad.

Subscription Rates/Frais d'abonnement	One year/Un an	Europe (par virement)*
Individuals/Particuliers	$ 50.00	50 €
Institutions	$ 70.00	70 €
Support/Soutien	$ 100.00	100 €

* Compte chèques postaux à Paris: CCP no 2846134E020
IBAN FR72 2004 1000 0128 4613 4E02 057
BIC PSSTFRPPPAR

Revue publiée deux fois par an (Printemps-Automne) par le Centre de recherches helléniques Canada-KEEK, l'Université de Crète(Centre d'études interculturelles et de l'immigration-EDIAMME du Département d'Education Primaire) et l'Université de la Mer Egée (Programme d'études supérieures de deuxième et troisième cycle, «Sciences politiques, économiques, et relations internationales dans la Méditerranée», Département d'études méditerranéennes).
Tous les articles, les recensions et la correspondance générale doivent être adressés aux **Études helléniques** / **Hellenic Studies,** C.P. 48571, 1495 Van Horne, Outremont, (Québec), Canada, H2V 4T3, Tel: (514) 276-7333, Télécopieur: (514) 495-3072 (E-mail: k12414@er.uqam.ca). Pour les abonnements, les informations, pour tout numéro courant ou ancien de la revue, prière de vous adresser aux **Études helléniques** / **Hellenic Studies** à l'adresse ci dessus.
Études helléniques / **Hellenic Studies** est une revue interdisciplinaire bilingue (français-anglais) consacrée à la recherche: elle a pour objet l'étude de l'hellénisme tant de la Grèce que de la diaspora.

Gutenberg Publishing
Didodou 37
Athens 10680
Tel.: 210-3808334
Fax: 210-3642030
e-mail: info@dardanosnet.gr

Dépôt légal / Legal Deposit
National Library of Canada
Bibliothèque nationale du Québec
2e trimestre 2007
ISSN: 0824-8621

Volume 23, No 1, 2015 Spring / Printemps 2015

Table des matières / Table of Contents

L'impact de la crise financière et économique internationale sur la dé-européanisation des politiques étrangères nationales en Méditerranée

Stelios Stavridis[*], Charalambos Tsardanidis[**] et George Christou[***]

Le concept d'européanisation a été considérablement développé depuis sa phase initiale dans les années 1990, quand l'accent était mis sur l'analyse de l'impact produit par l'adhésion à l'UE (alors CEE) sur ses membres. De nouveaux outils conceptuels comme le "*downloading*" (européanisation), "*uploading*" (intégration européenne), et le "*crossloading*" (coopération intereuropéenne) ont enrichi ce débat particulier, autour de la plupart des domaines politiques et des arrangements institutionnels. La question de l'impact de l' européanisation sur les politiques étrangères nationales fait également désormais pleinement partie de la littérature académique. En effet, à ce jour, il existe une importante littérature académique sur l'européanisation des politiques étrangères et de sécurité des Etats membres de l'Union européenne (UE). Dans l'une des études les plus récentes disponibles, couvrant 10 des 27 Etats membres de l'UE, Hill et Wong[1] ont fourni les conclusions comparatives suivantes en relation avec le degré et le type d'européanisation:

– Européanisation significative: Allemagne, Espagne, Slovénie, France
– Engagée mais partielle / processus lent: Italie, Finlande, Danemark
– Erratique, imprévisible: Royaume-Uni, Grèce
– Instrumentale superficielle: France, Pologne, Danemark
– Résistance mais présentant certains changements
– Dé-européanisation: Allemagne, Italie
– Jamais européanisée

* Universidad de Zaragoza , ** University of the Aegean, *** University of Warwick

Parce que l'européanisation est un processus dynamique il y a plus qu'une seule description possible pour tous les pays étudiés. Ainsi, plusieurs pays apparaissent dans plus d'une catégorie (Allemagne, Italie, France et Danemark). Le facteur temporel est donc également très important. Ceux qui ont analysé l'européanisation de la politique étrangère des États membres de l'UE[2] ont également considéré que l'impact de l'Europe dépend des facteurs de culture, des connaissances, des ressources ainsi que de la force des cadres nationaux; ils ont également mis en évidence le degré selon lequel l'UE peut agir comme contrainte et aussi comme ressource dans la poursuite des objectifs nationaux de politique étrangère.

La crise financière et économique actuelle a, cependant, ajouté de l'huile sur le débat «comment l'Europe frappe à la maison» – généralement lié aux politiques étrangères nationales – en mettant l'accent en particulier sur une possible inversion de tendance dans ce processus, que nous qualifions commodément de «dé-européanisation». En conséquence, nous soutenons que ce numéro spécial arrive opportunément en présentant une analyse des implications de dé-européanisation d'une sélection des Etats membres méditerranéens de l'UE (et la Turquie comme un candidat non-membre) tous affectés négativement, d'une manière ou d'une autre par la crise. Le soi-disant Club euro-méd a vu beaucoup de ses membres-pour ne pas dire la plupart-demander et obtenir des plans de sauvetage, avoir à traiter de graves crises bancaires et être soumis à des pressions fiscales majeures ainsi qu'à des réformes. D'autres Etats demeurent dans une situation positive tandis que des non-membres comme la Turquie visent à conserver stabilité et croissance. La Grèce est l'un des pays de la Méditerranée qui a été le plus durement touché par la crise, avec une perte de 25% de son PIB au cours des cinq dernières années. Dans ce contexte et le milieu plus large d'un euroscepticisme et d'une euro-phobie grandissants avant et après les élections de mai 2014 du Parlement européen, nous avons assisté à l'effondrement général de l'appui du public pour le processus d'intégration européenne dans son ensemble; ce qui représente encore une autre crise de la légitimité démocratique pour le projet européen.[3] Cela a été une conséquence de l'austérité

imposée aux pays méditerranéens, en particulier, caractérisée par la réduction massive et rapide des dépenses publiques et des contrôles budgétaires serrés. Ces coupures ont, peut-être eu inévitablement, aussi un impact sur les budgets de la politique étrangère, de sécurité et de défense, et les programmes de coopération de l'aide internationale.

Ce numéro spécial vise ainsi à évaluer dans quelle mesure les politiques étrangères des pays méditerranéens membres et non-membres de l'UE ont été influencées par la crise financière et économique actuelle. Il est important de souligner ici que ce nouveau contexte a posé un défi aux tendances émergentes et les modèles de dé-européanisation. Alors que beaucoup de travail a vu le jour et est encore en émergence sur les implications de la crise pour l'européanisation continue, en particulier en ce qui concerne les politiques publiques (sociales, économiques, politiques, et ainsi de suite)[4] peu d'attention a encore été donnée à la réorientation des politiques étrangères nationales dans ce contexte. Le point central de ce numéro spécial sera donc de traiter la façon dont la crise économique et financière en cours a eu un impact sur l'européanisation des politiques étrangères nationales, au sens large, des six pays étudiés (Chypre, Grèce, Italie, Malte, Slovénie et Turquie). Une question connexe sera celle d' identifier s'il est possible de faire valoir qu'à la suite de la crise, il existe un processus de dé-européanisation; et si tel est le cas, s'il est de nature substantielle ou superficielle. L'étude de ces questions clés est essentielle pour savoir si un tel processus serait facilement réversible, en particulier dans les temps futurs de croissance économique possible. Pour répondre à ces questions fondamentales les contributeurs à ce numéro ont été autorisés à interpréter la politique étrangère d'une manière souple, en se concentrant sur ses différents aspects (sécurité, défense et politique économique extérieure) dans les pays étudiés. Ceci, nous le croyons, enrichit la contribution de ce volume de recherche collective.

Il est certain ainsi que les articles publiés dans ce numéro spécial le démontrent, que les circonstances politiques à travers les pays étudiés varient considérablement avec des dynamiques différentes à l'oeuvre pour les membres et les non-membres à un moment donné dans le

temps. La situation en Grèce après l'élection d'un parti de la gauche radicale (Syriza) en coalition avec un parti nationaliste de droite (Anel) en janvier 2015 en est la preuve; cette situation a entraîné des implications très différentes pour le modèle dé- européanisation de la politique étrangère grecque de celui observé à Chypre, ou de l'Italie, par exemple. Alors que l'article sur la Grèce dans ce numéro spécial aborde la question de la diplomatie économique grecque jusqu'à l'élection de Syriza, il est pertinent de reconnaître plus largement que dans le cas de la Grèce, même si il n'y a pas le scepticisme fondamental ou global à l'égard de son adhésion à l'UE, dans le milieu post-électoral et post-référendaire, il est possible d'identifier les signes d'une réévaluation de la politique étrangère de ce pays, caractérisée par une remise en cause croissante des politiques extérieures de l'UE: en particulier la question de savoir si la politique étrangère grecque va continuer à soutenir les décisions internationales de l'UE (par exemple sur la Russie et l'Ukraine ou les politiques d'immigration).

Plus de sept ans après la crise financière et économique, et étant donné le contexte ci-dessus, il est particulièrement adéquat, pertinent et important d'évaluer l'impact de celle-ci sur la dé-européanisation (voir articles sur la Grèce et la Slovénie) des politiques étrangères nationales des Etats méditerranéens, tant des membres de l'UE que des non-membres (voir l'article sur la Turquie), afin de nous donner une idée plus claire de la façon dont les modèles de l'européanisation sont en train de changer, et de la forme que cela prend. Autrement dit, si la continuité est à l'ordre du jour (voir les articles sur l'Italie et Malte), nous pouvons observer une dé-européanisation ou encore une re-européanisation (voir l'article sur Chypre) dans le contexte de crise. En effet, la façon dont sont mises en question les explications et les tendances dans l'européanisation de la période précédente sera un élément important de l'analyse dans ce numéro spécial. Cela aura des répercussions sur la nature du projet européen, l'engagement futur ou le désengagement des membres et non-membres à l'égard des normes, des objectifs, des priorités de la politique étrangère de l'UE, et des ambitions de l'UE en tant qu'acteur dans les affaires mondiales.

Le concept d'européanisation

Construite sur une vaste littérature relative au sujet général de l'européanisation qui a commencé avec un accent sur la dimension interne de l'intégration et éventuellement élargie pour inclure les politiques étrangères nationales des Etats membres de l'UE, la définition acceptée de ce concept se compose aujourd'hui de trois dimensions interdépendantes: "*downloading*" (européanisation), "*uploading*" (intégration européenne), et le "crossloading" (coopération intereuropéenne).

Le "*downloading*" représente la première approche de l'européanisation: il est concerné par ce que Kennet Lynggard[5] a récemment appelé les implications nationales de l'intégration européenne. Les premiers signes d'un intérêt académique pour l'européanisation sont apparus dans une série de livres sur «l'impact de l'adhésion à la CEE" publiés par Pinter dans les années 1990[6]. Ses principales questions de recherche étaient les suivantes: quel est l'impact des règles de la CEE / UE, dispositions, principes, etc., sur la manière dont les politiques nationales sont formulées par des instruments institutionnels traditionnels de l'État, des arrangements et des méthodes? Les systèmes économiques, politiques, sociaux et administratifs ont-ils été touchés? Le *downloading* a finalement inclus les affaires étrangères comme l'un des nombreux domaines de politiques publiques à étudier.

L'ajout de l' "*uploading*" est apparu beaucoup plus tard dans la littérature originaire de la dimension du bas en haut qui est finalement venu à compléter les travaux antérieurs sur l'impact de haut en bas. Cet *uploading* représente un système plus complexe car il permet de tenir compte des questions telles que l'utilisation du droit de veto national dans les processus de prise de décision de l'UE, ou pour l' "équilibre" entre les petits et les grands Etats. Cela signifie également que l'européanisation est un processus, qui comme tel ne produit pas seulement l'adaptation institutionnelle et modifie la politique étrangère au niveau national, mais influe aussi sur le processus décisionnel de l'UE. Ainsi, les préférences nationales, les valeurs et les principes, mais plus encore les intérêts seuls ont également transformé les relations extérieures de l'UE d'une manière qui n'a pas été prévue

dans les premières études sur l'impact national de l' européanisation. Les différentes caractéristiques nationales de l'élaboration des politiques sont aussi devenues pertinentes pour toute étude sur la manière dont les politiques de l'UE sont faites.

Le "crossloading" (l'influence transversale - coopération intereuropéenne) offre une approche plus holistique de l'ensemble du concept, en insistant sur les dimensions qui se renforcent mutuellement des deux procédés ci-dessus exposés. Il met l'accent sur sa nature continue (un processus et non seulement un résultat). Pour utiliser le jargon actuel à la mode dans les années 2010, il est préoccupé par l'européanisation profonde ou solidifiée. Il s'agit d'un phénomène qui devrait idéalement être visible à tous les niveaux et entre tous les acteurs de gouvernance de l'UE. Cela signifie une extension pratique de l'«effet de socialisation» qui a été principalement appliquée aux élites à ce jour. Il faut indiquer que dans la pratique le «réflexe de coordination» du début des efforts européens[7] de la politique étrangère pourrait également s'appliquer à tous les segments de l'opinion publique et à d'autres acteurs de la société civile, et encore d'avantage à des institutions non-étatiques de toutes sortes. En conséquence, l'influence transversale a ouvert un vaste éventail d'études universitaires nécessaires concernant le rôle des acteurs non étatiques dans les processus d'européanisation: les ONG, les médias, les partis politiques, et ainsi de suite.

L'européanisation ... et ses limites

Dans une conférence en 2012, Kevin Featherstone[8] a mis en garde contre le réel «risque d'étirer le concept trop loin". En conséquence, cela peut signifier «tout et rien", rendant ainsi son utilité prétendue sans pertinence. Sans nécessairement atteindre des conclusions aussi extrêmes, il est important de garder à l'esprit que le concept lui-même comporte certaines limites.

Le "*dowloading*" se réfère à des politiques nationales qui étaient initialement distinctes des positions générales des EPC /PESC. Tout d'abord, il se produit un processus lent mais stable d'influence à partir de Bruxelles, à savoir une adaptation aux préférences de "Bruxelles"

(ce qui est la raison pour laquelle le processus est également connu comme "UExisation" ou "Bruxellisation"). Deuxièmement, il y a des questions pour lesquelles, avant d'adhérer à la CE / UE, un État donné n'avait pas de politique claire, souvent aucun intérêt réel dans une région, et se trouvait obligé de développer une raison d'adhérer. En d'autres termes, il existe au moins deux types de "*dowloading*",[4] ce qui ajoute à la complexité du concept lui-même. En théorie, alors que la première version peut conduire à plus de problèmes d'adaptation, il peut l'UE.

Pour ce qui est du "*crossloading*" il peut aussi être divisé en au moins deux catégories: d'abord, les questions de politique étrangère où la politique étrangère d'un Etat donné contribue positivement à l'élaboration d'une position européenne commune existante, renforçant ainsi l'influence globale de l'Union. Deuxièmement dans d'autres cas il y a tout simplement un "transfert" jusqu'à Bruxelles des questions nationales problématiques, bloquant souvent une position européenne commune. Ce n'est pas en déplaçant les niveaux qu'il y a une valeur ajoutée au processus d'européanisation[9]. Si le "*uploading*" ne revient qu'à cela, alors il y a aussi un problème fondamental avec le concept lui-même. Ce serait en effet peut-être le reflet d'une contradiction inhérente qui rend le pouvoir explicatif du concept discutable. Cette critique est particulièrement pertinente pour les cas empiriques décrits ci-dessous.

La dimension de "*crossloading*" met en jeu non seulement la nécessité d'un rapprochement des points de vue des élites et ceux des opinions publiques, mais peut-être plus important encore, la façon de combler les écarts existants en général entre les deux. Un tel processus va au-delà de la littérature traditionnelle européenne sur le "déficit démocratique", un déficit connu sous le nom de «double déficit» dans le cas des politiques étrangères et de sécurité (en raison de l'existence de déficits similaires aux niveaux nationaux, contrairement à d'autres domaines des politiques publiques). Pour le "*crossloading*", la vraie question est de savoir si l'européanisation est un processus superficiel ou profondément ancré. Cela en particulier soulève des questions importantes sur l'écart existant souvent entre les élites et les opinions

publiques. Trois domaines spécifiques sont d'importance ici: a) les soi-disant "cas difficiles/problématiques» de la politique étrangère nationale (identifiés par Manners et Whitman aussi loin qu'en 2000) en tant que tests clés pour l'évaluation d'un tel processus;[10] b) l'européanisation despolitiques de sécurité et de défense, avec un accent particulier sur les interventions militaires extérieures (les approches plus "pacifistes" de l'opinion publique pour les relations internationales), mais aussi sur les questions au sujet des armes nucléaires; c) l' "euroscepticisme" plus largement, et aussi l' "europhobie" qui est généralement associée à certains Etats membres (Grande-Bretagne, République tchèque) et qui s'est développée encore davantage depuis la crise économique et financière de 2008, en particulier parmi les opinions publiques[11].

Il est également intéressant de noter que deux études récentes sont parvenues à des conclusions opposées sur la «sophistication» accrue dans la recherche sur l'européanisation: Ainsi, Alecu de Flers et Müller[12] font valoir que «en se concentrant sur les processus de socialisation et d'apprentissage s'améliore notre compréhension de l'européanisation à la fois au niveau du "*uploading*" et du "*downloading*". Au contraire, Moumoutzis[13] souligne que la distinction entre le "*downloading*" et le "*uploading*" "a créé plus de problèmes qu'elle n'en a résolus". Il estime également que le "uploading" "n'est ni un type ni une explication de l'européanisation, mais peut-être l'un de ses résultats".[14] Or même les observateurs et analystes qui ne comprennent pas le "*chargement croisé*" dans leur travail conviennent qu'il y a une différence entre "l'apprentissage mince»[15] et «l'apprentissage d'épaisseur», quelque chose que d'autres ont défini comme "*chargement transversal*" et qui est très proche de la «socialisation» ou européanisation plus profonde.

Toutefois, il est pertinent de souligner pour ce qui suit, que Moumoutzis fait également valoir que le «changement de politique étrangère est guidé par une logique de pertinence–c'est- à-dire par des considérations de ce qui constitue la norme, le normal, juste ou bon comportement dans le cadre de la UE".[16] Brommesson avait déjà développé un argument très similaire quand il a appliqué l' "européanisation normative" à la politique étrangère suédoise. Il fait valoir que procéder à une synthèse du pouvoir normatif de l'Europe

à la Manners avec "une compréhension d'européanisation nous aiderait à appréhender l'effet normatif sur les pays candidats et les Etats membres".[17]

Par conséquent, la littérature plus traditionnelle sur l'européanisation des politiques étrangères nationales peut être divisée en deux grandes thèses. L'une prétend qu'il y a eu une tendance positive du processus d'européanisation dans de nombreux pays de l'UE. L'autre prend une vue beaucoup plus critique en faisant valoir que, même là où il y a une telle preuve, ceci est seulement assez limité et est réellement dû à une européanisation superficielle. Il y a aussi une troisième tendance plus récente, qui affirme que le concept pourrait être assez problématique. Enfin, une quatrième approche peut également être identifiée, arguant que cette fois peut-être même que *plus de sophistication* doit être recherchée: elle appelle à l'ajout d'autres dimensions de la désormais grande littérature européenne sur la politique étrangère (par exemple, le pouvoir normatif de l'Europe). Alors que les deux premières approches étaient fondame- ntalement préoccupées par "trouver" des preuves empiriques pour «confirmer» leurs thèses respectives, les deux approches plus récentes tendent à remettre en cause les fondements mêmes du concept lui-même.

Le numéro spécial: questions centrales

En conséquence de ce qui précède, les articles de ce numéro spécial examineront dans quelle mesure les politiques étrangères des pays inclus dans cette étude font l'expérience de dé-européanisation, en considérant la crise économique comme la principale variable indépendante.

Les principales questions de recherche seront les suivantes:

En ce qui concerne le downloading

– Est-ce que la crise économique a contribué ou non à une réduction significative dans l'adaptation de la politique étrangère des Etats méditerranéens aux politiques et aux décisions communes prises dans le cadre de la PESC ou de la PSDC? Dans quels cas y a t-il une

différenciation et dans quels cas il n'y en a pas? Est-ce que la crise économique est la seule cause de cette position différente ou y a t-il des facteurs supplémentaires ou alternatifs?

– Dans quelle mesure les actions de politique étrangère dans le contexte de PSDC /PESC ont été réduites à la suite de la crise économique? Par exemple en termes d'aide ou des politiques humanitaires ou en référence à la participation à des missions militaires. Une autre question connexe est de savoir si l'intérêt au niveau national pour les questions internationales qui concernent la PESC / PSDC montre des signes de détente ou en revanche devient de plus en plus important et pertinent. Les Etats membres étudiés ont-ils montré des signes de meilleure réponse – ou au contraire de mauvaise réponse et sont donc plus ou moins enthousiastes à adopter des positions communes sur les affaires internationales et à adapter leurs politiques étrangères respectives en conséquence?

Quant à l'uploading

– Dans quelle mesure les Etats méditerranéens ont-ils été disposés à contribuer à l'adoption de positions communes et des actions de la PESC / PSDC? Y a –t- il des preuves du fait que, par suite de la crise économique leurs politiques étrangères montrent des signes d'indépendance, de positions nationalistes qui tentent d'influencer la politique étrangère de l'UE? Dans quelle mesure y a t-il des preuves des efforts (réussis ou non) à bloquer ou à compliquer l'adoption de positions communes et de processus décisionnels?

Quant au crossloading

– Y a t-il des preuves que la crise économique a conduit à un processus de dégradation des capacités de la politique étrangère de l'UE? Dans quelle mesure la crise économique et l'adoption des mesures d'austérité et fiscales ont créé des conditions parmi les opinions publiques, les élites ou les principaux décideurs pour remettre en cause les normes et les valeurs fondamentales qui régissent la politique étrangère de l'UE, et dans quels pays?

– Dans quelle mesure le point de vue que l'UE est incapable de défendre la sécurité de ses Etats membres a commencé à apparaître? Avec la montée de l'euroscepticisme et l'europhobie y a-t-il des preuves que des conditions sont créées pour la dé-européanisation de la politique étrangère nationale? Y a-t-il des conditions émergentes qui peuvent potentiellement saper l'orientation européenne des politiques étrangères nationales?

La structure du numéro spécial

Les contributions qui suivent dans ce numéro spécial prennent en considération les questions de recherche ci-dessus dans les pays respectifs étudiés. Dans le premier article, Christou et Kyris montrent comment la crise financière et économique a eu un effet plutôt pervers sur la politique étrangère chypriote. Ils font valoir que, bien que la crise et les mesures d'austérité imposées qui en découlent ont engendré beaucoup d'euroscepticisme et de désillusion au sein de la société chyprioteà l'égard de l'UE en matière de politique étrangère, les élites, et en particulier les dirigeants chypriotes «europhiles», ont cherché une ré-européanisation accrue plutôt qu'une dé -européanisation. En effet, ces auteurs font valoir que, bien que les dirigeants chypriotes ont essayé d'assurer une approche équilibrée en matière de politique étrangère, en particulier avec l'ouverture vers la Russie, l'UE est restée dans l'ensemble aux yeux des élites comme le partenaire le plus fiable pour mener la politique extérieure; précisément parce que l'UE permet à Chypre de se projeter comme un petit État et lui assure ses besoins de court et long terme en matière de sécurité ainsi que ses besoins économiques.

En se concentrant sur la Grèce dans le deuxième article, Tsardanidis conteste la vision conventionnelle de l'européanisation progressive de la politique étrangère grecque depuis le début des années 1990. En analysant le cas de la diplomatie économique grecque, il montre comment l'européanisation à travers des mesures d'austérité exigeantes avec des réformes structurelles strictes des institutions de la Grèce a été perçue comme une "européanisation imposée". Il soutient par conséquent que la politique étrangère grecque n'a pas été européanisée

dans la forme ou sur le fond par rapport à la diplomatie économique et que, loin d'être un processus terminé ou bien intégré, il y a eu une adaptation plutôt superficielle qui n'a que partiellement affecté la pratique des élites en Grèce et les idées de l'opinion publique grecque. Il fait valoir en outre que, dans ce contexte, la crise économique n'a servi qu'à délégitimer davantage tout progrès réalisé en termes de processus d'européanisation par rapport à la diplomatie économique et a affecté de manière négative la façon dont les Grecs perçoivent l'Union européenne.

Dans le troisième article sur l'Italie, Monteleone prend une nouvelle approche et dirige son analyse sur le comportement électoral italien à l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU afin d'évaluer si des variations significatives dans l'européanisation peuvent être enregistrées en raison de la crise. Accordant une attention particulière à la variation de la distance du comportement électoral italien de la majorité de l'UE et des pays spécifiques qui ont été principalement impliqués dans la crise économique ou représentés comme des alternatives potentielles, l'auteur fait valoir que, bien que des variations ont été enregistrées après la crise, celles-ci étaient limitées et temporaires; il s'agit plus du résultat des difficultés des Etats de l'UE dans la construction et le maintien d'un niveau de gouvernance que du résultat d'un processus de politique étrangère italienne de dé –européanisation.

Bojinovic Fenko et Lovec, dans le quatrième article sur la Slovénie, montrent à travers l'analyse des études de cas de politique étrangère d'avant et après la crise comment un processus de désengagement et dé-européanisation a eu lieu à l'égard de la politique étrangère. En outre, ils soutiennent que, dans le cas slovène le cadre normatif européen a, à la lumière de la crise économique et financière, perdu de son poids sur les politiques étrangères nationales slovènes. Ils démontrent que les résultats de l'européanisation ont changé en profondeur des effets de socialisation liés à des opportunités et à des contraintes offertes par l'encadrement communautaire dans le contexte nouvellement émergé de la crise.

Sevket, en se concentrant sur un Etat non-membre dans le processus d'adhésion (et donc principalement au Downloading), fait valoir que la

Turquie a également montré des signes d'une dérive de positions de politique étrangère de l'UE, dans le contexte de la crise économique et financière. Dans son analyse comparative de la politique étrangère turque d'avant et après 2005, il fait en outre valoir que la crise économique et financière n'a pas seulement modifié le cours des relations Turquie-UE, mais aussi poussé la Turquie à consolider sa position en Orient et à réorganiser ses priorités nationales pour survivre à l'impact potentiellement dévastateur de la crise. En ce sens, l'auteur montre comment la dé-européanisation s'est elle-même manifestée en termes de réorientation de politique étrangère économique turque (en particulier dans la région MENA) et à l'égard de plusieurs questions traditionnelles de politique étrangère (Chypre, les relations gréco-turques, etc.) et à l'insatisfaction à l'égard des approches de l'UE et des Etats-Unis face aux événements d' Egypte et de Syrie. Il démontre aussi comment ces changements ont agi en tant que cause et effet afin d'augmenter l'euroscepticisme dans la société turque; tout cela couplé avec un processus d'adhésion de la Turquie au point mort, soutient-il, ce qui rend la ré-européanisation de la politique étrangère turque très peu probable à court et à moyenterme, sauf si il y a un changement tectonique des contextes «négatifs» qui prévalent.

Dans le sixième article, Pace fait valoir que la crise financière a eu très peu d'effet sur l'orientation de la politique étrangère de Malte à l'égard de l'UE. Pace montre comment un petit Etat dans l' UE, Malte, a intégré l'UE afin d'améliorer et de transformer son propre statut et son identité comme un acteur de la politique étrangère. En outre, il indique aussi comment l'européanisation de la politique étrangère de Malte coïncide avec la «vision du monde» de la majorité de l'élite politique et du public. En mettant l'accent sur certaines questions de sécurité et de défense saillants pour Malte (neutralité, immigration, sécurité énergétique, Libye), il fait valoir que, parce que la crise financière a eu très peu d'impact sur Malte en général, il y a eu peu des changements dans la manière dont Malte s'aligne et se coordonne avec l'UE en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité. En effet, il fait valoir en outre que tous les changements qui sont survenus dans la politique étrangère maltaise peuvent être principalement attribués

non pas à la crise financière, mais à des changements dans les configurations de politique intérieure, les transformations et les crises dans la Méditerranée, et le changement climatique.

Dans l'ensemble, les articles de ce numéro spécial mettent en évidence des changements nuancés et dynamiques en ce qui concerne les processus de ré-européanisation et de dé-européanisation des politiques étrangères nationales étudiées à la loupe dans le contexte de crise financière et économique. La dé-européanisation est certainement à la hausse à travers la Méditerranée en termes d'orientation de la politique étrangère –à la fois dans un sens normatif et stratégique– dans les cas de la Grèce, la Turquie et la Slovénie. S'agissant de l'Italie et de Malte, il y a eu été un cas d'affaire, habituellement sans variation significative dans les modèles de l'européanisation en ce qui concerne l'orientation de leur politique étrangère. Le cas de Chypre est éclairant pour son effet pervers: le scepticisme au sein du public ne s'est pas reflété à travers la politique étrangère, les facteurs clés dans ce processus étant ceux de l'élite dirigeante, mais aussi l'importance continue dans l'arène de l'UE de la réalisation des valeurs et des objectifs de la politique étrangère chypriote. Importants pour ces nouveaux schémas et l'évolution de la Méditerranée, en plus de la crise financière et économique, ont été des processus dynamiques de transition et de crises existentielles - soit régionaux dans la Méditerranée orientale et méridionale et au Moyen-Orient, en Russie et en Ukraine, ou au niveau national, par rapport à l'évolution des acteurs et des institutions de gouvernance au niveau interne.

Ce que nous pouvons conclure de la preuve fournie dans ce numéro spécial –avec une certaine prudence étant donné la fragilité du milieu européen– est qu'il y a eu une certaine quantité d'inertie conduisant à un désengagement et une contestation à l'égard du *crossloading* dans les pays étudiés; mais ceci a été clairement différencié entre les élites et le public, ce qui conduit à des résultats différents (par exemple ré-européanisation à Chypre et dé-européanisation en Grèce). La nature contestée du projet européen ne va probablement pas se dissiper à court terme compte tenu de la longévité de la crise financière et de son impact continu; les conséquences sur les politiques étrangères des Etats examinés ici sont donc susceptibles de rester fluides en termes

de *uploading*,*downloading et crossloading* avec un impact qui sera alimenté par des crises domestiques mais aussi régionales, des événements et des dynamiques pour les années à venir. Pour l'UE, les implications sont plus susceptibles de se manifester dans la «désunion», «l'incohérence» et l'inefficacité potentielle des objectifs de sa politique étrangère, des buts et des politiques si les modèles de dé-européanisation persistent, se propagent et deviennent permanents à travers la Méditerranée. En outre, la nature du projet d'intégration-et ses valeurs sous-jacentes - continuera à être interpellé dans une Europe où la crise financière et économique actuelle possède un tel impact différencié, et où la crise a des implications sur les identités politiques étrangères nationales, les intérêts et les orientations des Etats membres de l'UE et des Etats non-membres de la Méditerranée.

NOTES

1. Wong, R. and Hill, C. (eds.), *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanisation*, London, Routledge, 2011 (Taylor and Francis Group), p. 218.
2. Alecu de Flers, N. and Müller, P. (2012). 'Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues', *Journal of European Integration*, 34 (1): pp19-35; Baun, M. and Marek, D. (2013), *The New Members States and the European Union: Foreign Policy and Europeanization,* London: Routledge; Michalski, A. (2013) 'Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Denmark's and Sweden's Relations with China', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(5): pp.884–900.
3. Torreblanca, J.I. and Leonard, M. (2013) *The continent-wide rise of Euroscepticism,* ECFR:http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf.
4. See, for example, Special Issue of *Journal of European Public Policy*, Issue 3, 2012 or Special Issue of *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Issue Supplement s 1, Volume 48, 2010.
5. Lynggaard, K., "Domestic change in the face of European integration and globalization: Methodological pitfalls and pathways", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 1, February, 2011, pp. 18-37.
6. See Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, "Introduction", in Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (eds.) (2001), *The Foreign Policies of EU Member States,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp1-16.

7. Pijpers, A., Regelsberger, E., and Wessels, W. (eds.), *European Political Cooperation in the l980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?*, Dorfrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988.
8. Inaugural Conference Lecture on "The concept(s) of Europeanization" by Kevin Featherstone (Eleftherios Venizelos Chair in Contemporary Greek Studies and Head of the European Institute and Director of the Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Science), delivered on 14 May 2012, at the International Conference on *Comparing and contrasting "Europeanization": concepts and experiences*, held in Athens.
9. Tsardanidis, C. and Stavridis, S. (2005) ΄The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal΄, *Journal of European Integration,* 27(2), pp. 217-239.
10. Manners, I. and Whitman, R. *The Foreign Policies of EU Member States* (2001), *op. cit*.
11. Torreblanca, J.I. and Leonard, M., *The continent-wide rise of Euroscepticism, op. cit*.
12. Alecu de Flers, N. and Müller, P. (2012). 'Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues', *op. cit*., p.24.
13. Moumoutzis, K. (2011) "Still fashionable yet useless? Addressing problems with research on the Europeanization of foreign policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 49(3), pp. 6-16.
14. *Ibid*, p. 608.
15. Alecu de Flers, N. and Müller, P., 'Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues', *op. cit*., p. 28.
16. Moumoutzis, K., 'Still fashionable yet useless? Addressing problems with research on the Europeanization of foreign policy', *op. cit*., p. 615.
17. Bromussen, D. (2011), 'Normative Europeanization: The case study of Swedish foreign policy reorientation', *Cooperation and Conflict,* 45 (2), p.225.

The Impact of the International Financial and Economic Crisis on the De-Europeanization of national foreign policies in the Mediterranean

Stelios Stavridis*, Charalambos Tsardanidis and George Christou*****

The concept of Europeanization has developed considerably since its initial phase in the early 1990s when the focus was on analyzing the impact of EU (then EEC) membership. New conceptual tools like downloading, uploading, and crossloading have enriched that particular debate dealing with most policy areas and institutional arrangements. The question of the impact of Europeanization on national foreign policies has also now fully become part of the academic literature. Indeed, to date, there exists an important academic literature on the Europeanization of the foreign and security policies of European Union (EU) member states. In one of the latest studies available, covering ten member states of the then 27-EU, Hill and Wong[1] provided the following comparative conclusions in relation to the degree and type of (de) Europeanization occurring:

– Significant Europeanization: Germany, Spain, Slovenia, France
– Engaged but partial/slow process: Italy, Finland, Denmark
– Erratic, unpredictable: UK, Greece
– Instrumental: France, Poland, Denmark
– Resistant but some change
– De-Europeanizing: Germany, Italy
– Never Europeanized

Because Europeanization is a dynamic process there is more than one possible description for any country under study. Thus, several countries appear in more than one category (Germany, Italy, France

* Universidad de Zaragoza, ** University of the Aegean, *** University of Warwick

and Denmark). The temporal factor is also, therefore, very important. Others that have analysed Europeanisation of foreign policy across EU Member States[2] have also elaborated on the degree to which the impact of Europe depends on cultural, knowledge and resource factors and the strength of national executives; and they have also highlighted the degree to which the EU can act as both constraint and resource in the pursuit of national foreign policy goals.

The ongoing financial and economic crisis has, however, added further fuel to the 'how Europe hits home' debate – more broadly and related to national foreign policies – by focusing in particular on a possible reverse trend in that process, which we conveniently label 'de-Europeanization'. As a result we argue that this Special Issue is particularly timely in presenting an analysis of the implications for the de-Europeanization of a selection of Mediterranean EU member states (and Turkey as a non-member applicant), all negatively affected, in one way or another, by the crisis. The so-called EuroMed Club has seen many, if not most, of its members seeking and obtaining rescue packages, having to deal with severe banking crises and being subject to major fiscal pressure and reform. Others remain more positive whilst non-members such as Turkey seek to ensure stability and growth. Greece is one of the Mediterranean countries that has been most severely affected by the crisis, with a loss of 25% of its GDP in the last five years. In this context and the broader milieu of growing Euro-skepticism and Euro-phobia before and after the May 2014 European Parliament elections, we have witnessed the general collapse of public support for the European integration process as a whole – representing yet another crisis of democratic legitimacy for the European project[3]. This has been a consequence of the austerity enforced on Mediterranean countries in particular, characterised by mass, rapid cuts in public spending and tight budgetary controls. Such cuts have, perhaps inevitably, also had an impact on foreign, security and defence budgets, and programmes of international aid cooperation.

This Special Issue thus aims to assess the extent to which the foreign policies of Mediterranean members and non-members of the EU have influenced (and have been influenced) by the ongoing financial and

economic crisis. Importantly here the new context has posed a challenge to emerging trends in and patterns of (de) Europeanization. Whilst much work has emerged and is still emerging on the implications of the crisis for continued Europeanization, in particular with regard to public (social, economic, political, and so on) policies,[4] little attention has yet been given to the (re)orientation of national foreign policies in this context. The central focus of this Special Issue will thus be on addressing the issue of *how the on-going economic and financial crisis has impacted on the Europeanization of the national foreign policies, broadly understood, of the six countries under study* (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Slovenia and Turkey). A related issue will be that of identifying whether it is possible to argue that, as a result of the crisis, there exists a *de-Europeanization* process; and if this is the case, whether it is of a substantial (embedded) or of a superficial (instrumental) nature. Exploring these key issues is critical in any consideration of whether such a process would be easily reversible, in particular in future times of possible economic growth. In addressing these core issues contributors have been allowed to interpret foreign policy in a flexible manner, focusing on different aspects of foreign policy (security, defence, and foreign economic policy) in the countries under study. This, we believe, enriches the contribution of this collective research volume.

For sure, as the papers in this Special Issue show, political circumstances across the countries under scrutiny vary considerably with different dynamics at play for members and non-members at any given moment in time. The situation in Greece following the election of a radical left party (Syriza) in coalition with a nationalist right party (ANEL) in January 2015 is testament to this; and has brought with it very different implications for patterns of de-Europeanization in Greek foreign policy than that of Cyprus, or Italy, for example. Whilst the paper on Greece in this Special Issue discusses the issue of Greek economic diplomacy up until the election of Syriza, it is pertinent to acknowledge more broadly that in the Greek case even if there is no fundamental or overarching scepticism with regard to its EU membership, in the post-election and post-referendum milieu it is

possible to identify signs of a re-evaluation of its foreign policy, characterized by a growing questioning of the EU's external policies, and in particular whether Greek foreign policy should continue to align and support EU decisions on international affairs (e.g. on Russia and Ukraine or immigration policies).

More than seven years into the financial and economic crisis then, and given the above context, it is particularly adequate, relevant and important to assess its impact on the de-Europeanization (see papers on Greece and Slovenia) of the national foreign policies of Mediterranean states, both EU members and non-members (see paper on Turkey), in order to provide us with a more informed idea of how patterns of Europeanization are changing, and the form that this is taking. That is, whether continuity is the order of the day (see papers on Italy and Malta), or we can observe (de) or further (re) Europeanization (see paper on Cyprus) in the context of crisis. Indeed how such patterns challenge explanations and trends in Europeanization that have gone before, will be an important element of the analysis in this Special Issue. This in turn will have implications for the nature of the European project more broadly and significantly, the future engagement or (dis)-engagement of members and non-members alike with the norms, goals and priorities of EU foreign policy, and the ambitions of the EU as an actor in world affairs.

The Concept of Europeanization

Building on a vast literature on the general subject of Europeanization which began with a focus on the internal dimension of integration and eventually expanded to include the EU member states' national foreign policies, the accepted definition consists nowadays of three inter-related dimensions: "Downloading", "Uploading", and "Crossloading".

Downloading represents the initial approach to Europeanization: it is concerned with what Kennet Lynggard[5] has recently referred to as the domestic implications of European integration. First signs of academic interest in Europeanization appeared in a book series on

"the impact of EC membership" that was published by *Pinter* in the 1990s[6]. Its main research questions were as follows: what is the impact of EEC/EU rules, provisions, principles, etc., on the way national policies are formulated through traditional institutional state instruments, arrangements and methods? Have the economic, political, social and administrative systems been affected? It has eventually included foreign affairs as one of the many realms of public policies under study.

Uploading appeared much later in the literature originating in the bottom-up dimension that eventually came to complement the earlier work on top-down impact. It represents a more complex system as it allows for considering issues such as the use of national veto power in EU decision-making processes, or for the "balancing" between small and big states. It also means that Europeanization is a process and that as such the input of downloading does not only produce institutional adaptation and modify foreign policy output at the national level, but also generates in turn new national input into the EU decision-making process and outcome. Thus, national preferences, values and principles, let alone interests, have also transformed EU external relations in a way that had not been anticipated in the early studies on the domestic impact of Europeanization. The various national characteristics of policy-making have also become relevant to any study of the way EU policies are made.

Crossloading offers a more holistic approach to the whole concept, stressing the mutually-reinforcing dimensions of the above two processes. It emphasizes its on-going nature (a process and not only a result). To use current fashionable parlance in the 2010s, it is concerned with "Deep Europeanization", or "embedded" Europeanization. That is to say a phenomenon that ideally should be visible at all levels and among all actors of EU Governance. It would mean a practical extension of the "socialization effect" that has mainly been applied to elites to date. It would also indicate that in practice the "coordination reflex" of the early European foreign policy efforts[7] could equally apply to all segments of public opinions and other civil society actors, let alone non-state institutions of all sorts and types. As

a result, crossloading has opened up a vast array of necessary academic study of the role of non-state actors in the Europeanization processes: NGOs, media, political parties, and so on.

Europeanization …and its Limits

In a 2012 lecture, Kevin Featherstone[8] warned against the real "risk of stretching the concept too far". As a result, it may mean "everything and nothing", thus rendering its purported usefulness quite irrelevant. Without necessarily reaching such rather extreme conclusions, it is important to bear in mind that the concept itself does have some limitations.

Downloading refers to national policies that were initially distinct from the general EPC/CFSP stances. First, there occurs a slow but stable process of downloading from Brussels, i.e. an adaptation to the preferences of "Brussels" (this is why the process is also known as "EUization" or "Brusselization"). Second, there are issues for which, prior to EC/EU membership, a given state did not have a clear policy, often no real interest in a region, a state or an issue-area and was obliged to develop one because of accession. In other words, there are at least two types of downloading, thus adding further complexity to the concept itself. In theory, whereas the first version may lead to more problems of adaptation, it may also occur that, when venturing into new geographical or thematic areas, a given state finds strong objections to a given EU policy.

As for *uploading*, it can, again, be divided into at least two categories: first, foreign policy issues where a given state's foreign policy positively contributes to the shaping of an existing common European stance, thereby strengthening the overall influence of the Union. Second, other issues where there is simply a "transferring up" to Brussels of problematic national issues, often blocking a common European position. It is not by shifting levels that there is an added value to the Europeanization process[9]. If uploading only amounts to that, then there is also a fundamental problem with the concept itself. This would indeed possibly reflect an inherent contradiction that makes the

concept's explanatory power questionable. This criticism is particularly relevant for the empirical cases described below.

The *crossloading* dimension brings into play not only the necessity of an approximation of the views held by elites and those held by public opinions, but perhaps more importantly, how to bridge usually existing discrepancies between the two. Such a process goes beyond the traditional European "democratic deficit" literature, a deficit known as "double deficit" in the case of foreign and security policies (due to the existence of similar deficits at the national levels, unlike other areas of public policies). For "crossloading", the real issue is whether Europeanization is a superficial or a deeply embedded process. This in particular raises important questions on the often existing gap(s) between elites and public opinions. Three specific areas are of relevance here: (i) the so-called "difficult/problematic cases" of national foreign policy (identified by Manners and Whitman as far back as in 2000) as key tests for the evaluation of such a process;[10] (ii) the Europeanization of security and defence policies, with a particular emphasis on external military interventions (the more "pacifist" public opinion approaches to international relations), but also questions about nuclear weapons; the wider "Euroskepticism", let alone "Europhobia" that is usually associated with some member states (Britain, Czech Republic) and which has developed even further since the 2008 economic and financial crisis, especially among public opinions.[11]

It is equally interesting to note that two recent studies have come to opposing conclusions on the increased "sophistication" in research on Europeanization: Thus, Alecu de Flers and Müller[12] argue that "focusing on the processes of socialization and learning enhances our understanding of Europeanization in both its uploading and downloading dimensions". On the contrary, Moumoutzis[13] stresses that the distinction between downloading and uploading "has created more problems than it has resolved". He also considers that uploading "is neither a type nor an explanation of Europeanization but may be one of its outcomes"[14]. But even observers and analysts who do not include "crossloading" in their work agree that there is a difference between "thin learning" and "thick learning"[15] something that others

have defined as "crossloading" and which comes very close to "socialization" or deeper Europeanization.

However, and particularly relevant to what follows, Moumoutzis also argues that "[f]oreign policy change is guided by a logic of appropriateness – that is to say by considerations of what constitutes standard, normal, right or good behaviour within the context of the EU"[16]. Brommesson had earlier developed a very similar argument when he applied "Normative Europeanization" to Swedish foreign policy. He argues that synthesizing *normative power Europe* à la Manners with "an ideational understanding of Europeanization would help us understand the normative effect on candidate and member states"[17].

Therefore the more traditional literature on the Europeanization of national foreign policies can be divided into two broad theses. One claims that there has been a positive Europeanization process trend in many an EU country. The other takes a much more *critical* view. It argues that even where there is some such evidence, this is only rather limited and really amounts to superficial Europeanization. There is also a third, more recent, trend that asserts that the whole concept might be rather *problematic*. Finally, a fourth approach can also be identified, arguing this time that perhaps *even more sophistication* should be sought: it calls for the addition of other dimensions from the now vast European foreign policy literature (for instance, normative power Europe). Whereas the first two approaches were fundamentally concerned with "finding" empirical evidence to "confirm" their respective theses, the two more recent approaches tend to question the very fundamentals of the concept itself.

The Special Issue: Central Questions

As a result of the above, the articles of this Special Issue will examine the extent (degree) to which the foreign policies of the countries under study do experience de-Europeanization; with the economic crisis the main independent variable.

The main research questions will be as follows:

With regard to downloading

- Has the economic crisis contributed or not to a significant reduction in the adaptation of the foreign policy of Mediterranean states to the common policies and decisions taken under the CFSP or the CSDP? In which cases has there been differentiation and in which cases not? Is the economic crisis the only cause of this different stance or are there additional or alternative factors?
- To what extent have foreign policy actions within the CFSP/CSDP context been reduced as a result of the economic crisis? For instance in terms of aid or humanitarian policies or with reference to participation in military missions. Another related question is whether interest at the national level for the international issues that concern the CFSP/CSDP show signs of relaxing or instead becoming more important and relevant. Have the member states under study shown signs of being more responsive (or less responsive) and therefore keener (or less keen) to adopt common positions on international affairs and adapt their respective foreign policies accordingly?

As to uploading

- To what extent/degree have Mediterranean states been willing to contribute to the adoption of CFSP/CSDP common stances and actions? Is there evidence of the fact that as a result of the economic crisis their foreign policies show signs of more independent, nationalistic stances that try to influence EU foreign policy? To what extent is there evidence of efforts (successful or not) to block or complicate the adoption of common positions and stances (decision-making process)?

As far as crossloading is concerned

- Is there evidence that the economic crisis has led to a process of degradation of the capacities of the EU's foreign policy? To what extent have the economic crisis and the adoption of austerity and fiscal measures created conditions among public opinions, the elites or the main decision makers for questioning the basic norms and values that govern EU foreign policy, and in which countries?

- To what extent has the view that the EU is unable to defend the security of its member states began to appear? With the rise of Euroscepticism and of Europhobia is there evidence that conditions are being created for the de-Europeanization of national foreign policy? That is, are conditions emerging that can potentially undermine the European orientation of national foreign policies?

The Structure of the Special Issue

The contributions that follow in this Special Issue consider the above research questions in the respective countries under study.

In the first paper, Christou and Kyris show how the financial and economic crisis has had a rather perverse effect on Cypriot foreign policy. They argue that whilst the crisis and the consequent austerity measures imposed have engendered a great deal of Euroscepticism and disillusionment within Cypriot society relating to the EU more broadly, in relation to foreign policy, elites, and in particular the Cypriot 'Europhile' leadership, has sought further and enhanced re-Europeanisation rather than de-Europeanisation. Indeed they argue that although the Cypriot leadership has tried to ensure a balanced approach in its foreign policy, in particular towards Russia, that overall the EU has remained in the eyes of foreign policy elites the most reliable partner and arena for conducting external policy, precisely because of the value compatibility with the EU and the knowledge that the EU offers Cyprus in projecting itself as a small state and ensuring its short and long term security and economic needs.

Focusing on Greece in the second paper, Tsardanidis challenges the conventional view of the gradual Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy since the early 1990s. Through analysing the case of Greek economic diplomacy he demonstrates how Europeanisation through demanding austerity measures along with strict structural reforms in Greece's institutions has been perceived as an "imposed Europeanisation". He consequently argues that Greek foreign policy has not been Europeanised in form or in substance in relation to economic diplomacy and that, far from being a completed or indeed

embedded process, there has been a rather superficial (instrumental) adaptation which has only partly affected the practices of elites in Greece and the opinions and ideas of the Greek public. He further argues that in this context the economic crisis has served only to further delegitimize any progress achieved in terms of the Europeanisation process in relation to economic diplomacy and has affected in negative terms the way Greeks feel about the European Union.

In the third paper on Italy, Monteleone takes a novel approach and directs her analysis to Italian voting behavior in the UNGA to assess whether meaningful variations in Europeanization can be registered because of the crisis. Focusing particular attention to variation in the distance of Italian voting behavior from the EU majority and from specific countries that were mostly involved in the economic crisis or represented potential alternatives, she argues that whilst variations were registered after the crisis they were limited and temporary; more the result of EU states' difficulties in building and maintaining a level of governance than the result of a process of Italian foreign policy de-Europeanization.

Bojinovi Fenko and Lovec, in the fourth paper on Slovenia, show through analysis of pre and post-crisis foreign policy case studies how a process of disengagement and de-Europeanization has occurred with regard to foreign policy. Moreover, they argue that in the Slovenian case the European normative framework has in the light of the economic and financial crisis lost its weight for Slovenian national foreign policies. They demonstrate that Europeanization outcomes have changed from deep to strategic (instrumental) socialization effects related to changed opportunities and constraints provided by the Community framework in the newly emerged context of the crisis.

Sevket, focusing on a non-member state in the accession process (and therefore primarily downloading), argues that Turkey has also exhibited signs of a drift away from EU foreign policy positions in the context of the economic and financial crisis. In his comparative analysis of Turkish foreign policy before and after 2005, he further argues that the financial and economic crisis did not only alter the course of Turkey-EU relations but also impelled Turkey to solidify its position

in the East and rearrange its national priorities in order to survive the potentially devastating impact of the crisis. In this sense he shows how de-Europeanization has manifested itself in terms of Turkish economic foreign policy re-orientation (in particular in the MENA) and with regard to more traditional foreign policy issues (Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations, etc.) and dissatisfaction with EU and US approaches to events in Egypt and Syria. He further demonstrates how such shifts have acted as cause and effect of increasing Euroscepticism in Turkish society; the above coupled with a stalled accession process for Turkey, he argues, make re-Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy very unlikely in the short to medium term unless there is a tectonic shift in the prevailing 'negative' contexts.

In the sixth paper, Pace argues that the financial crisis has had very little effect on Malta's EU foreign policy orientation. As a small state in the EU Pace shows how Malta has embraced the EU in order to enhance and transform its own status and identity as a foreign policy actor. Moreover he shows how the Europeanisation of Malta's foreign policy coincides with the 'world views' of the majority of the political elite and the public. Focusing on certain salient security and defence issues for Malta (neutrality, immigration, energy security, Libya) he argues that because the financial crisis had very little impact on Malta in general, there has been little change in the way in which Malta aligns and coordinates with the EU in terms of foreign and security policy. Indeed he further argues that any changes that have occurred in Maltese foreign policy can be mainly accounted for not by the financial crisis, but by changes in domestic political configurations, the transformations and crises in the Mediterranean, and climate change.

Overall, the papers in this Special Issue point to nuanced and dynamic changes with regards to the processes of re-Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation of the national foreign policies under scrutiny in the context of financial and economic crisis. De-Europeanisation is certainly on the rise across the Mediterranean it seems in terms of foreign policy orientation – both in a normative and strategic sense in the cases of Greece, Turkey, and Slovenia. In the cases of Italy and Malta, it has been a case of business as usual, with no significant

variation in the patterns of Europeanization with regards to their foreign policy orientation. The case of Cyprus is illuminating for its perverse effect – scepticism within the public domain has not filtered through to foreign policy; key factors in this process being that of elite leadership but also the continued importance of the EU arena to the achievement of Cypriot foreign policy values and goals. Important to these emerging and changing patterns in the Mediterranean in addition to the financial and economic crisis, have been dynamic processes of transition and existential crises – whether regionally in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East or Russia and Ukraine, or domestically, in relation to changing governance actors and institutions at domestic level.

What we can conclude from the evidence in this Special Issue – with some caution given the fragility of the European milieu – is that there has been a certain amount of inertia leading to disengagement and contestation with regards to crossloading in the case study countries – but this has clearly been differentiated between elites and the public, leading to different outcomes (e.g. re-Europeanisation in Cyprus and de-Europeanisation in Greece). The contested nature of the European project is unlikely to dissipate in the short term given the longevity of the financial crisis and its continued impact; the consequences on the foreign policies of the states under scrutiny here are thus likely to remain variegated in terms of uploading, downloading and crossloading – with impact continuing to be mediated by fluid domestic but also regional crises, events and dynamics for years to come. For the EU, the implications are most likely to manifest themselves in the 'disunity', 'incoherence' and potential ineffectiveness of its foreign policy goals, objectives and policies if patterns of de-Europeanisation continue to persist, spread and become embedded across the Mediterranean. Moreover, the nature of the integration project – and its underlying values – will continue to be interrogated in a Europe where the ongoing financial and economic crisis is having such a differentiated impact, and where the crisis has implications for the national foreign policy identities, interests and orientations of EU member states and non-members in the Mediterranean.

NOTES

1. Wong, R. and Hill, C. (eds.), *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanisation*, London, Routledge, 2011 (Taylor and Francis Group), p. 218.
2. Alecu de Flers, N. and Müller, P. (2012). 'Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues', *Journal of European Integration*, 34 (1): pp19-35; Baun, M. and Marek, D. (2013), *The New Member States and the European Union: Foreign Policy and Europeanization,* London: Routledge; Michalski, A. (2013) 'Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Denmark's and Sweden's Relations with China', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(5): pp.884–900.
3. Torreblanca, J.I. and Leonard, M. (2013) *The continent-wide rise of Euroscepticism,* ECFR:http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf.
4. See, for example, Special Issue of *Journal of European Public Policy*, Issue 3, 2012 or Special Issue of *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Issue Supplement s 1, Volume 48, 2010.
5. Lynggaard, K., "Domestic change in the face of European integration and globalization: Methodological pitfalls and pathways", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 1, February, 2011, pp. 18-37.
6. See Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, "Introduction", in Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (eds.) (2001), *The Foreign Policies of EU Member States,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp1-16.
7. Pijpers, A., Regelsberger, E., and Wessels, W. (eds.), *European Political Cooperation in the l980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?*, Dorfrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988.
8. Inaugural Conference Lecture on "The concept(s) of Europeanization" by Kevin Featherstone (Eleftherios Venizelos Chair in Contemporary Greek Studies and Head of the European Institute and Director of the Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Science), delivered on 14 May 2012, at the International Conference on *Comparing and contrasting "Europeanization": concepts and experiences*, held in Athens.
9. Tsardanidis, C. and Stavridis, S. (2005) ΄The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal΄, *Journal of European Integration,* 27(2), pp. 217-239.
10. Manners, I. and Whitman, R., *The Foreign Policies of EU Member States* (2001), *op. cit*.
11. Torreblanca, J.I. and Leonard, M., *The continent-wide rise of Euroscepticism, op. cit*.
12. Alecu de Flers, N. and Müller, P. (2012). 'Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues', *op. cit*., p.24.

13. Moumoutzis, K. (2011) "Still fashionable yet useless? Addressing problems with research on the Europeanization of foreign policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 49(3), pp. 6-16.
14. *Ibid*, p. 608.
15. Alecu de Flers, N. and Müller, P., 'Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues', *op. cit*., p. 28.
16. Moumoutzis, K., 'Still fashionable yet useless? Addressing problems with research on the Europeanization of foreign policy', *op. cit*., p. 615.
17. Bromussen, D. (2011), 'Normative Europeanization: The case study of Swedish foreign policy reorientation', *Cooperation and Conflict,* 45 (2), p.225.

The Financial Crisis and Cypriot Foreign Policy: Re-Europeanisation?

George Christou* and George Kyris**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article vise à étudier l'impact de la crise de la zone euro sur la politique étrangère des Etats membres, en prenant Chypre comme une étude de cas. En s'attachant au débat concernant l'européanisation des politiques étrangères nationales, son auteur soutient que la politique étrangère de Chypre, malgré la frustration générale provoquée par la crise financière au sein de la société en général, a fait l'objet d'une autre ré-européanisation. Ceci s'explique principalement par le changement de gouvernement et de leadership, de l'administration Christofias au penchant idéologique vers la gauche, pro-européenne mais adoptant une position critique, à celle d'Anastasiades penchant vers le centre droit, pro-européenne et orientée vers l'Occident. Cet article explore donc la dynamique de ré-européanisation de la politique étrangère de Chypre durant la crise financière et montre comment les élites chypriotes ont effectivement adopté une approche plus centrée sur l'UE plus ou moins pour les questions et les actions de politique étrangère.

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to investigate the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the foreign policy of member states, taking Cyprus as a case study. Drawing on the debate on Europeanisation of national foreign policies, it is argued that Cypriot foreign policy, despite the general frustration caused by the financial crisis within broader society, has actually undergone a further (re) Europeanisation. This is explained in the main by the change in government and leadership, from the ideologically left leaning, pro-European but policy critical Christofias administration to the (centre) right leaning, pro-European and Western oriented Anastasiades government. This article therefore explores the dynamics of (re) Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy in the financial crisis and demonstrates how Cypriot foreign policy elites have actually adapted a more rather than less EU-centric approach to foreign policy issues and actions.

* University of Warwick, **University of Birmingham

Introduction

Within the European Union (EU) the Republic of Cyprus is the third smallest country after Malta and Luxembourg. As the only divided member state remaining within Europe, it has generally perceived the European integration project in a positive light, in particular given its own search for reunification and integration.[1] Such general support for integration and indeed accession to and membership of the EU has oscillated, at least among the Cypriot public, only at critical moments or moments of crisis, including, for example, the Greek Cypriot 'no' vote on the Annan Plan (2004), which was supported by the EU and, of course, more recently in 2012, with the impact of the financial crisis. In terms of the former, Eurobarometer data[2] demonstrates that in the spring of 2003, prior to the vote on the Annan Plan and Cypriot accession, 87% of Greek Cypriots perceived EU membership to be beneficial to Cyprus, but that this was followed by a dramatic decrease in the spring of 2004, when it fell to 56 percent.[3] In terms of the latter, the Eurobarometer data[4] indicates, as one might expect, high levels of distrust with regard to EU institutions (75% tending not to trust the EU).

Whatever the statistics, that the financial crisis has had devastating consequences for Cypriot society is not a theme for debate, certainly not for the people of Cyprus, with the most important issues dominating their minds being those of economic transformation and the financial situation for individuals and households. The conditions that were constructed by the Eurogroup for Cypriot 'bailout', and the subsequent demands attached to the finance provided by the troika (International Monetary Fund, European Commission, European Central Bank) constituted the most severe among those European Member States that sought assistance when their economies deteriorated under the strain of excessive debt and bankruptcy. For the everyday Cypriot, and Cypriot officials alike, the severity of the reaction by the EU in particular, was and remains difficult to comprehend in what was supposed to be a club that projects and promotes the value of collective solidarity.

In this context then, it might well be logical and reasonable to assume

that the financial crisis and its impact on Cyprus has had negative consequences, not just in terms of the everyday politics of economy and society, but also with regard to how Cyprus orientates itself in its foreign policy; a Cypriot 'pivot' away from Europe and the EU to the east and south, in particular given the discovery of hydrocarbons off the south shores of the island, providing it with a real alternative. However, this is to ignore the gradual Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy that has occurred since the accession of Cyprus to the EU on 1st May 2004, with very few exceptions. Conceptually, it is to omit patterns of adaptation, learning and socialisation that have occurred in relation to the Cypriot foreign policy machinery and elites in Nicosia and Brussels. Moreover, it is to analyse Europeanisation without sufficient attention given to key domestic intervening variables, which despite the crisis and the deeply unpopular externally prescribed medicine, have led to more, rather than less EU and Europe with regard to Cypriot national foreign policy orientation. In this regard, this article relates more to questions of 'downloading' and 'cross-loading' Europeanisation, as outlined in the introduction of this special issue, and how national foreign policies have adapted during the economic crisis but also the impact of public opinion on the de-Europeanisation of foreign policies. Cyprus, one of the few countries at the very heart of the Eurozone crisis and the recipient of 'bailout' assistance from the EU and the IMF, becomes a particularly interesting case to explore this puzzle. Indeed the argument put forth in this article is that the financial crisis has had no de-Europeanisation effects on foreign policy. Rather what we have seen is a re-Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy, explained primarily by the pro-European ideological orientation of the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades (leader of the centre-right party DISY (Democratic Rally), who was elected on 24 February 2013, with his first priority 'to reinstate Cyprus' credibility, and to 'work together with our EU partners, and ... fulfil our responsibilities to the utmost'.[5]

In order to demonstrate the above argument the article will be divided into three sections. Section one will provide a context for understanding the Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy since the accession of Cyprus to the EU on 1 May 2004 (until 2013), to allow

the reader to comprehend, in a more substantive way, elements of continuity and change. The second section will then explore in more detail the direct and indirect impact of the financial crisis on the Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy, before drawing conclusions on the implications of this in the third and final section.

Europeanisation of Cypriot Foreign Policy before the Crisis

Historically, because of the constricted relationships with the major powers in the region (Turkey and Greece as NATO members) and internationally, Cypriot foreign policy was non-aligned (a movement which it helped to found in 1961), seeking to develop relations with countries in Eastern Europe and the Third World that empathised and understood its own predicament. However, it also looked West in its identity, in its membership of international multilateral organisations such as the UN, and in its economic and cultural relations, even though politically, it was often disappointed at Greece's deference to the Western alliance and NATO in the event of domestic crises in Cyprus in the 1960s. Cypriot foreign policy then, was very much shaped by the inter-communal problems on the island, and its turbulent relationship with its immediate neighbours (Turkey, Greece) and the greater powers that were perceived to have strategic objectives in Cyprus and the Mediterranean (Britain, US, Soviet Union). The Turkish intervention in 1974 following a Greek staged coup to remove the Cypriot President Makarios, led to the division of the island and the separation of Turkish Cypriots to the north and Greek Cypriots to the south. Since then, the Cyprus issue has both shaped and dominated the Cypriot foreign policy agenda. Indeed, the Greek Cypriots through the only internationally recognised Government of Cyprus has pursued a strategy of internationalisation of the Cyprus problem, predominantly and successfully through the UN, but also through other multilateral *fora* such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE and the CSCE before that) and the Council of Europe.

The Europeanisation of the Cyprus problem and the Cypriot application to join the EU in 1990 then, was primarily driven by

'security' concerns caused by the division of the island, and was a continuation of the strategy of internationalisation pursued by the Cypriot government historically.[6] Thus, the EU provided another platform and milieu within which Cypriot elites could externalise its national priorities – in this case, primarily the Cyprus issue - as a means to influence the reunification of the island. Both before and in particular after membership, Cyprus found its closest ally in Greece, in its attempts to influence the parameters of the Cyprus issue. Greece was instrumental in securing the beginning of Cypriot accession negotiations in 1995, and whilst in the post-accession period there is evidence of some divergence between the two countries in relation to important national issues[7][8] in their efforts to 'disassociate' and become more independent from each other in the Europeanisation context, they have consistently coordinated policies and Greece has supported Cyprus on issues related to the division of the island inside the EU.

When Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004 under a government led by nationalist President, Tassos Papadopoulos (of DIKO the right wing Democratic Party), the approach taken was confrontational[9] – in particular in relation to realising objectives related to the Cyprus issue. Indeed, one might argue in this initial period that there was a much steeper adaptation curve for Cypriot diplomats than for other member states as they learnt to be more consensual in their approach to interacting with and acting in the EU institutions. This did not mean abandoning their instrumental positions on the Cypriot national problem (ethniko provlima- *εθνικό πρόβλημα*), in particular given the 'no' vote promoted by Papadopoulos and his party on the United Nations proposal for a settlement (the 'Annan Plan'). However, it meant the Europeanisation of the Cyprus problem after membership had to be dealt with in a less aggressive (but not assertive) manner, in line with the practices of the EU machinery rather than traditional diplomacy, even though a certain national logic still prevailed in discussions over any policy which was related or might impact on the established international parameters for its resolution, and in the Papadopoulos interpretation of what this entailed, namely a unitary state.

Under Papadopoulos, if slow in recognising the need for a more

dynamic institutional and administrative system of management for European affairs,[10] including foreign policy, there was a high degree of convergence and policy adaptation. For example, a major change was the Cypriot decision to withdraw itself from the Non-Aligned Movement on joining the EU, which had served it so well in particular in keeping NATO out of Cyprus and facilitating Greek Cypriot efforts to prevent the recognition of the self-declared 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'.[11] Prior to this it aligned its foreign policy with that of the EU on issues such as sanctions against the former Republic of Yugoslavia, which it would have previously seen as implausible given the close religious and historical ties with Cyprus.[12] Cyprus in addition cooperated, integrated itself and participated in various EU ESDP missions (Congo, Darfur, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM), despite the constraints brought about by Turkish opposition to Cyprus' participation in missions that required the EU to utilise NATO assets. In addition to this Cyprus joined other ESDP institutions including the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Union Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). In general, Cyprus aligned itself with most EU CFSP positions in the Papadopoulos era, with very few exceptions (e.g. the recognition of Kosovo, even though it agreed to the creation of the EULEX mission).

The election of Dimitris Christofias in February 2008 (of AKEL, the Communist Party) was viewed in a more positive light in Brussels, in particular in terms of the discussions on the Cyprus problem; AKEL promoted a 'soft' no with regards to the Annan Plan but had a long-standing policy commitment for rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots. The Christofias government also established new institutional and administrative mechanisms for coordinating EU affairs and projecting Cypriot positions in Brussels, the most innovative of which was the establishment of the Secretariat (of the Cyprus Presidency of the EU, hereafter Secretariat), the Director of which reported directly to the President of the Republic. In addition, European Affairs units were established in all ministries (Feb 2010) to manage EU affairs within and across ministries internally and

externally with regard to coordination with the Representation in Brussels. Further changes were made after June 2011 with the aim of decentralising and making more pragmatic the coordination of EU affairs, including the appointment by law of a Deputy Minister to the President of the Republic for European Affairs.[13] However, whilst it might be argued that institutional and administrative progression, and policy alignment and interaction were certainly evident under Christofias at a general level, there was also a certain level of policy scepticism more broadly:[14] this no doubt exacerbated by the economic and financial crisis catalysed by the banking sector in Cyprus and the prospect of having to accept 'neoliberal' medicine that did not sit well ideologically with AKEL. More broadly in the context of the above changes in institutional landscape, leadership and ideology, it can be argued that EU membership has had a significant impact on Cypriot foreign policy in qualitative terms – in particular with regard to policy alignment, adaptation and national projection - even though the nature and pace of Europeanisation has oscillated since accession in May 2004. For example, Cyprus has played an active role bilaterally and within the EU multilateral order on the EU's policies in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood, and contributed to efforts to facilitate the Middle East peace process. In addition Cyprus has, with its new-found political weight and status within the EU, sought to establish bilateral relations with powerful states such as China and Russia[15], in order to intensify their involvement and ensure their continuing and unequivocal support for a solution of the Cyprus problem through established UN parameters. The broader point here, of course, is that Europeanisation has provided a regional platform and brought about added kudos for Cyprus, which has allowed the Cypriot government to engage more intensely with and include powerful international actors as alternative voices in relation to the Cyprus problem. Related to this, of course, has been the aim of counter-balancing the Atlanticist position of the majority of the member states that joined the EU alongside Cyprus, in 2004.[16] There were, again, however, subtle differences with regard to the Papadopoulos and Christofias approaches – the former clearly utilising the EU platform to be much more assertive in his criticism of US

foreign policy and Anglo-American intervention on the island (and British efforts inside the EU to push the case of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey), in particular in relation to the construction of the Annan Plan in 2004. In relation to Christofias, whilst he was certainly not reluctant to criticise Britain (or the US) in relation to Cyprus prior to becoming President (he was educated in Russia as were many AKEL members), there was a certain amount of adaptation once he was in office that no doubt improved the relationship, in particular inside the EU, with Britain.

EU membership, however, under Papadopoulos and also Christofias did not lead to further internationalisation in the form of NATO membership for Cyprus. Although this was obviously not a requirement, of those countries that became part of the EU in 2004 only Cyprus and Malta did not join. Even countries that declared themselves 'neutral' in their foreign policy orientation opted to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme designed to promote cooperation between third countries. Following enlargement there were various reasons why the respective Cypriot governments in power declined to join NATO. The most prominent related to a fundamental and general mistrust of NATO because of the long-standing membership of Turkey within the organisation (since 1952); and the perception therefore that it was biased towards Turkey and its interests. Indeed, for AKEL (Christofias' party), there was no interest in either the PfP or NATO – even though during the period when he was in office this position was increasingly contested by other political parties (in particular DISY, the main opposition party) that whilst sceptical of full membership, favoured joining the PfP programme.[17]

In terms of national projection there is no doubt that the EU arena has been utilised in a significant way to influence the parameters of the national problem. Cyprus has aimed to guard established positions on the Cyprus issue "through its increasing political weight as a new Member State",[18] – with perhaps the only major difference the approach taken by Papadopoulos (aggressive/assertive) and Christofias (pragmatic) in seeking to achieve Cyprus' aims with regard to a solution – and more flexibility shown by the latter in marginally extending the

parameters of existing law such as the Green Line Regulation (GLR).[19] Under Papadopoulos, for instance, the Cypriot government was able to prevent recognition of the so - called 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC) (recognised only by Turkey) by states such as Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, through interventions on the content of their Agreements with the EU. It was also part of a coalition of countries (Spain, Greece, Romania) that refused to recognise Kosovo's independence because of the implications this might have for recognition of the 'TRNC' through setting any precedent in international law.[20] Moreover, for Papadopoulos the EU was an arena which offered additional leverage on changing the Turkish position in the post-Annan Plan era. This included its refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus until the EU fulfilled its promise to bring the Turkish Cypriots out of isolation through the Financial Aid and Direct Trade Regulations – despite the fact that Turkey signed (in July 2005) the Ankara Protocol extending its Customs Union with the EU and its ten new member states (including Cyprus). In turn it allowed Cyprus (along with others that did not support Turkish membership) to call for a suspension of Turkey's accession negotiations until it fulfilled its contractual obligations under the terms of the Protocol – with, in the end, a classic EU compromise concocted that saw the suspension of negotiations with Turkey on eight negotiating chapters.

Thus, whilst the Cypriot national problem was multilateralised through Cypriot accession to the EU, this is not an area where Cypriot governments, whatever the leadership and party affiliation, acquiesced to EU Member States' and EU institutional requests for compromise in all areas. Nowhere has this been more obvious than with the issue of the Direct Trade Regulation (DTR), for which the European Commission has consistently pressed for,[21] supported by a coalition of Member States – which would allow direct trade between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU. On this issue, successive Cypriot governments have remained steadfast in their rejection of any such Directive, which would, from a Cypriot national perspective, imply the recognition of the 'illegal TRNC'. Beyond this, however, and at an overarching level, it is clear that the Cypriot government has recognised the potential

benefits of Europeanisation-supporting the European orientation of both the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey-*albeit* to different degrees and within differing atmospheres with regard to Papadopoulos and Christofias. Although with the caveat that engagement did not contravene either established international (UN) Resolutions on the Cyprus issue, or indeed, EU contractual obligations.

Overall then, it can be summarised that Cyprus has implemented substantive institutional and organisational change to facilitate the process of Europeanisation and aligned itself with and engaged in EU foreign policy activity and policy: whether under the government and leadership of Papadopoulos or Christofias. Whilst they clearly approached Europeanisation in different ways – in particular with regard to the Cyprus issue - Cypriot officials and diplomats gradually learned to play the EU game in a more pragmatic and effective way, across all policy areas – in particular under Christofias. In this sense then, Cypriot foreign policy underwent fundamental transformation as a member of the EU – in its relationships internally and externally, as well as its activities and alignments. However, the financial and economic crisis in Cyprus most certainly had an impact on the popularity of Christofias domestically, and indeed the approach of the Christofias government to policy solutions that were constructed by the Troika – which included the European Commission. This in turn adversely affected the popularity of the EU among Cypriot society, but has not had any such effect on Cypriot foreign policy orientation in the post-Christofias era (February 2013). It is to this issue that the next section turns.

Crisis, Continuity and Change: Re-Europeanisation

In March 2013 and only a few weeks after the election of Nicos Anastasiades (DISY, the centre-right Democratic Rally) to the Presidency, Cyprus witnessed something new: protestors took to the streets, waving banners that wrote 'Out of Euro Now' or 'No to the plans of the EU for the subordination of Cyprus'. The protests were triggered by the discussions between the newly-elected government and the EU

on a rescue package for the crisis-hit EU member state, on the condition of a series of 'painful' measures, including the restructuring of Greek Cypriot banks and a one-off deposit levy (6.7 per cent on bank accounts with balances less than 100,000 euros, 9.9 per cent for the rest). While the deal (slightly revisited to secure a number of depositors) was eventually agreed and implemented, public frustration with the EU did not seize. Almost a year later, just 17 per cent of Greek Cypriots saw the EU in a positive light,[22] the second lowest percentage recorded throughout the EU following the also, crisis-hit Greece (16 per cent). This Greek Cypriot disapproval of the EU came in stark contrast to traditionally very pro-EU feelings. For example, ten years ago and just after the country's EU accession, a majority of Greek Cypriots held a positive image of the EU (51 per cent).[23] For all the public disillusionment that has caused, the financial crisis does not seem to have led to a 'de-Europeanisation' of foreign policy. Quite the opposite, the election of Nicos Anastasiades in early 2013 signalled an ideological and diplomatic step-change; Anastasiades favoured alignment across all dimensions with the EU, including its evolving foreign policy and other Western structures, such as NATO's PfP, even though positions related to the Cyprus issue such as the Direct Trade Regulation (DRT) for the north of Cyprus, remain very much the same. In this regard, the new realities of the Eurozone crisis combined with the change of government have led, directly and indirectly, to a re-Europeanisation of foreign policy, despite increasing feelings of injustice and frustration towards the EU among the general public.

Cyprus' relations to Russia represent a first important aspect of foreign policy that was affected by this process of re-Europeanisation. Indeed this was an indirect effect of the financial crisis, where Cyprus' relations with Russia were tested. Whilst under the Christofias government a loan had been secured (and preferred) from Russia (a sum of 2.5bn) to ease Cypriot liquidity problems caused by the banking crisis, it was reluctant to offer any further assistance to the Cypriot government, in particular given that the rescue deal eventually agreed between the Cypriot government and the EU under Anastasiades, which among other things provided for a 'haircut' of

large bank investors, was considered to bear important consequences for Russian investment in Cyprus. Albeit with certain trepidation, the Greek Cypriot parliament eventually supported the rescue plan agreed by the new government, which was described by the President as a "painful yet, given the circumstances, the best agreement that they could secure".[24]

In this context it is clear that the ideological shift brought about by the election of Anastasiades and his government was a decisive factor in the re-Europeanisation of foreign policy in the context of the Eurozone crisis. Russia did not offer a credible or reliable alternative beyond its initial loan, but more significantly, a clear European and indeed neoliberal orientation meant that for Anastasiades there was no other alternative. As a result, the economic crisis, combined with the election of a government that was Western-oriented and Europhile, served as a starting point for the re-Europeanisation of Cypriot politics and policies, including in its foreign affairs. From a conceptual perspective this observation is not too far from the commonly agreed understanding that national governments (and leaders) and their profile are especially important in the process of Europeanisation of foreign policy.

Perhaps even more telling for the re-Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy and its implications for relations with Russia are the events in Ukraine. In the winter of 2013-2014, the refusal of Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, to agree an Association Agreement with the EU triggered a series of internal protests, which eventually led to his replacement by a new interim government. Following this, separatist efforts from pro-Russian rebels led to the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and ongoing battles throughout the country. The upheaval in Ukraine - which was triggered by the debate on the country's orientation towards the EU and the West or Russia - dealt a blow to the relations between the EU and Moscow. So far, confrontation between the two sides has been mostly rhetorical and diplomatic, with the EU implementing a series of economic sanctions towards Russia. These developments are increasingly becoming a test for Cyprus, which needs to perform a rather delicate

balancing act towards the EU and Russia, as two traditionally important partners. As a result, Cyprus has supported sanctions towards Russia (to a degree)[25] and has aligned with the EU position in the UN vote, which condemned the Russian annexation of Crimea.[26] While the impact of the financial crisis on all these might not be so direct and obvious, Russia and the events in Ukraine can be seen as a good example of how the financial crisis has proven to be a milestone in the Cypriot relationship with the EU: despite the frustration that the 'painful' EU bailout agreement caused both at the public and elite level, the economic crisis, combined with the election of a more pro-EU government, seems to have served as a defining moment, which reaffirmed the European orientation of the country and its foreign policy and in turn bolstered its credibility and influence within the EU foreign policy arena.

Energy is another issue that relates to Cypriot foreign policy with reference to Russia and the EU in the wake of the Eurozone crisis and the Ukraine upheaval. The crisis in Ukraine and the consequent thaw in the relations between Brussels and Moscow retriggered the debate on the EU's energy security and new calls for the need to reduce energy dependency in general and on Russia in particular.[27] These developments seem to have further reinforced the 'Europeanisation' of Cypriot foreign policy: Greek Cypriot officials [28] underline how important Cyprus is for the EU's energy security, also vis-à-vis Russia. At the same time, the economic crisis has become a catalyst for Cyprus' energy agenda, which the government sees as an important step towards economic recovery.[29] In this regard, the economic problems that Cyprus is facing combined with the renewed interest of the EU in developing its own energy sources has had an important impact on the Greek Cypriot energy agenda, which is based on a narrative for the island as a credible energy source for Europe.

In addition, Cypriot efforts on the energy front carry important implications for its wider national foreign policy orientation, in particular given its limited financial resource to exploit in a maximal way, its opportunities. First of all, Cyprus has successfully put the Cyprus gas connection on the EU's energy map, thus embedding and

securing it within EU plans, funds and structures.[30] Second, the issue of energy has fostered new alliances between Cyprus and third countries, especially to the island's south, and the role of the EU and the Eurozone crisis cannot be neglected. The Cypriot government increasingly depicts the island as a potential energy hub in the Eastern Mediterranean, contributing to geopolitical stability and economic growth. The bilateral agreements on energy issues with countries such as Egypt, Israel or Lebanon are promoted by Greek Cypriot elites as an important element of foreign policy, which shows the potential for cooperation in the wider Middle East region. According to Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides, Cyprus' vision "is for hydrocarbons to do for our region, what coal and steel did for Europe... one day something similar will happen in our region, because always the prospect of prosperity for the people supersedes nationalist or other barriers that are created".[31] In pursuing this energy and foreign policy agenda, EU membership has been very helpful. For example, Industry and Tourism Minister George Lakkotrypis, underlines the importance that Cyprus has as a European base for foreign investors, such as China.[32] Other Greek Cypriot officials [33] underline the better understanding that Cyprus has about Middle East countries, in comparison to other EU member states. Most importantly, being an EU member state can be seen as a factor that increases the legitimacy and strategic position of Cyprus. For example, the French oil company Total has expressed its interest in the Cypriot government's 'efforts to promote the development of a gas liquefaction project in Cyprus, whose membership in the EU is a major asset. [34] In this context, the example of Cyprus testifies to how membership is often rationalised as a way through which a state can fulfil its foreign policy objectives: here, membership of the EU is seen as an additional 'weapon' for Cyprus in pursuing energy objectives and this has important implications for its foreign policy, which continues to be within a strong EU context.

The importance of EU membership for Cyprus foreign policy can be seen most clearly in the way Greek Cypriots have pursued their energy objectives despite great opposition from Turkey. Drawing on its position on the Cyprus problem, Turkey (and also Turkish

Cypriots) has repeatedly opposed the Greek Cypriot energy agenda on the grounds that a) Greek Cypriots cannot move to energy explorations, because they are not the legitimate government of Cyprus and b) any energy resources should be exploited by and benefit Turkish Cypriots too.[35] In this context, EU membership seems to have become an important 'shield' for Greek Cypriots against any potential aggressive move from Turkey. In practice, the government of Cyprus has, on many occasions, used EU membership to try and limit Turkish opposition to their attempts for gas exploitation.[36] Indeed, the EU stressed that Cyprus has "all the sovereign rights of EU Member States which include, *inter alia*, entering into bilateral agreements, and to explore and exploit their natural resources in accordance with the EU acquis and international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea".[37] In this sense, Cypriot foreign policy continues to draw on EU membership as an important source of legitimisation, security and a tool for achieving objectives. Reflecting on the discussion on Europeanisation, being a small and comparatively new member state seems to reinforce this rationalisation of EU membership as an important instrument of Cypriot foreign policy.

As for the Cyprus issue and the EU, though the position of the Greek Cypriot government did not change fundamentally once Anastasiades was elected, there has been a shift in the way Greek Cypriots have pursued their aims. Cypriot foreign policy elites came to realise that for Cyprus to retain credibility as an EU member state it needed to pursue its objectives on the 'national issue' in a more productive manner. Thus, the Anastasiades government has advanced a more constructive approach with regards to the EU and the Cyprus issue, without changing fundamental positions. For example, the Greek Cypriot government continues to condition Turkey's EU accession on the implementation of the Additional Protocol and refuses to unblock the implementation of DTR. While this does not directly relate to the economic problems that Greek Cypriots have been facing, there are still aspects of the Cyprus issue that are impacted by the crisis. In particular, the Eurozone crisis is seen as a reason for a renewed interest in Cyprus and the conflict in particular. It can be argued that the

economic crisis, under the more constructive approach taken by the Anastasiades government, has made the EU more open to listening to Greek Cypriots and their foreign policy agenda, in particular in relation to Turkey.

Conclusions

The central argument in this article has been that whilst the financial crisis has had a severe impact on the everyday lives of many Cypriots it has not had a similarly negative effect with regard to Cypriot foreign policy elites. Thus, despite increasing public disillusionment towards Brussels, we have seen institutional and procedural continuity and a reinvigorated Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy. Pivotal to this change has been the emergence of a new government and a Europhile leader that has sought to embed Cyprus further into Western structures – the EU, but also NATO's Partnership for Peace which had been so strongly resisted by previous governments. At the same time, the financial crisis, which sits at the heart of the research puzzle here, has also, indirectly and directly, played its part in this process of re-Europeanisation. The Eurozone crisis has been a learning curve for foreign policy elites that became more self-reflective and more alert to understanding the internal dynamics of the EU and the strategies of larger member states, such as Germany. Moreover, and rather perversely, it has resulted in a perception of the EU as the most reliable partner and arena for conducting its external policy, precisely because of the value compatibility with the EU and the knowledge that the EU offers Cyprus the most effective way of projecting itself as a small state, and indeed, ensuring its short and long term security and economic needs. Rather than creating the conditions and momentum for the de-Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy the financial crisis has actually triggered a Cypriot foreign policy which sees the EU as its main point of reference in even stronger terms.

More generally, it is clear that foreign policy officials in Nicosia and Brussels have undergone a process of learning since Cyprus acceded to the EU, so that continuity and incremental change rather than

radical shifts in foreign policy have resulted following any critical moments, including the financial crisis. In this sense, Cypriot officials continue to have a very positive understanding of the EU, despite their acknowledgement of the mistakes of the EU in the context of the financial crisis. The fact that the crisis is perceived as a 'European problem' that needs a 'European solution' in the eyes of the Anastasiades administration has marked an even stronger Europeanisation of Cyprus policies, including on the foreign affairs front. The adherence of Cyprus to the foreign policy objectives of the EU, even where perhaps there is a difficult balancing act, such as with Russia (but also, for example, on issues such as the Partnership for Peace or sanctions on Iran), demonstrates a step-change towards re-Europeanisation rather than de-Europeanisation. At the same time and as the example of energy shows, EU membership continues to be a source of legitimisation and confidence for Cypriot foreign policy in the international field – which is clearly seen in the fostering of new partnerships and relationships based on Cyprus' EU profile and the ongoing deployment of EU membership towards securing gains vis-à-vis Turkey. Ten years after EU accession, the EU CSDP arena, it can be argued, is perhaps more critical for Cypriot foreign policy than ever before, despite and precisely because of the financial crisis.

NOTES

1. Agapiou-Josephides, K.,"Changing Patterns of Euroscepticism in Cyprus: European Discourse in a Divided Polity and Society', *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.24, No.1, 2011, p. 159.
2. Eurobarometer 2003.2. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/2003.2_full_report_final.pdf (accessed April 2014).
3. Eurobarometer 61, 2004. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/exec_uk.pdf (accessed April 2014).
4. Eurobarometer 79, 2013. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_en.htm (accessed April 2014).

5. Cyprus election: Nicos Anastasiades elected president', *BBC News*, 25 February 2013. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21565606 (accessed April 2014).
6. George Christou, *The European Union and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Joseph S.J., *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999.
7. Most notably the Annan 'Peace' Plan in 2004, which was supported by Greece, despite being rejected overwhelming by the Greek Cypriots.
8. Angelos Sepos, *The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity, policies and Politics,* Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 133; Argyris Passas and Evangelia Katakalou, "The Cyprus EU Presidency: 'Riders on the Storm'", *Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies*, 2012 (3op), pp.30-31.
9. *Ibid,* p. 131.
10. James Ker-Lindsay and Hubert Faustmann and Fiona Mullen, *An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus,* London, I.B. Taurus, 2011, p. 113.
11. Angelos Sepos, *The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity, Policies and Politics, op.cit*, p. 123.
12. Argyris Passas and Evangelia Katakalou, "The Cyprus EU Presidency: 'Riders on the Storm'", *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.
13. On election in February 2008, Christofias declared that he was not a Eurosceptic but a Eurofighter that would not automatically reject everything put forward by the EU. Indeed this is important as whilst he clearly resisted and indeed rejected many of the neoliberal solutions suggested for Cyprus when the financial crisis occurred, he supported the idea of integration in many other areas, including foreign policy.
14. George Christou,"Bilateral Relations with Russia and the Impact on EU Policy: The Cases of Cyprus and Greece", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies,* Vol.19, No.2, pp.225- 236.
15. Angelos Sepos, *The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity, policies and Politics, op.cit*, p. 127.
16. James Ker-Lindsay and Hubert Faustmann and Fiona Mullen, *An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus, op.cit.,* p. 114; Angelos Sepos, A., *The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity, Policies and Politics, op.cit*, p. 133.
17. Angelos Sepos, *The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity, policies and Politics, op.cit*, p. 126.

18. George Christou, "The European Union, Borders and Conflict Transformation: The Case of Cyprus", *Cooperation and Conflict,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2010, pp. 1-24; George Christou,"Bilateral Relations with Russia and the Impact on EU Policy: The Cases of Cyprus and Greece", *op.cit*; George Kyris, "Europeanization beyond Contested Statehood: The European Union and Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51,No.5, 2013, pp. 866–883.
19. James Ker-Lindsay and Hubert Faustmann and Fiona Mullen, *An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus, op.cit.,* p. 114; Angelos Sepos, *The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity, policies and Politics, op.cit*, p. 115.
20. George Christou, "The European Commission as an Actor in the Cyprus Conflict", *Journal of European Integration,* Vol.35, No.2, 2013, pp. 117-135.
21. Eurobarometer 79, 2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_en.htm (accessed April 2014).
22. Eurobarometer 61, 2004. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/exec_uk.pdf (accessed April 2014).
23. Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus, 'Statement of the President Mr. Nicos Anastasiades on the economy 25/03/2013' [Δήλωση του Προέδρου της Δημοκρατίας κ. Νίκου Αναστασιάδη για την οικονομία 25.03.2013], 2013. Available at: http://www.presidency.gov.cy/Presidency/Presidency.nsf/All/21DC987ED80B3B1FC2257B3A002997B6?OpenDocument (accessed May 2014).
24. There is an important caveat here though that demonstrates that Cyprus whilst aligned with the general EU and UN position (instrumentally), was reluctant to support economic sanctions (phase 3) against Russia. Indeed, because Russia has always supported Cyprus in the UNSC on the Cyprus problem, and Russian businesses in Cyprus have been important to Cypriot economic recovery, the events in Ukraine have entailed Cypriot foreign officials maintaining a very difficult balancing act.
25. UN General Assembly. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014, 68/262. Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, 2014.
26. European Council. Conclusions, EUCO 7/1/14 REV 1, 2014.
27. Interview with the authors, March 2014.
28. CCN, Can Cyprus cash-in on gas treasure chest locked beneath the sea?, 2013. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/13/business/cyprus-gas-treasure-chest/ (accessed 7 May 2014).
29. See, for example, Projects of Common Interest: http://www.investment-gateway.eu/investment_gateway_blog.asp?ID=73.

30. “Kasoulides: Hydrocarbons a Tool of Foreign Policy”, *Cyprus Mail*, Available at http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/12/05/kasoulides-hydrocarbons-a-tool-of-foreign-policy/ (accessed May 2014).

31. “China Considered to be Important Economic, Political partner for Cyprus: Minister, *Global Times*, 2013. Available at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/820495.shtml (accessed 8 May 2014).

32. Interviews with the authors, April 2014.

33. “Cyprus in Plan to Develop a Natural Gas Industry”, *New York Times*. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/business/international/cyprus-in-plan-to-develop-a-natural-gas-industry.html?_r=0 (accessed 7 May 2014).

34. See for example Republic of Turkey, No: 43, 15 February 2012, Press Release Regarding the Second International Tender for Off-Shore Hydrocarbon Exploration Called by the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA), 2012. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-43_-15-february-2012_-second-international-tender-for-off_shore-hydrocarbon-exploration-called-by-the-greek-cypriot-administration-_gca_.en.mfa (accessed May 2014).

35. “Cyprus to Block Turkey-EU Energy Talks in Gas Row”, Reuters, Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/14/cyprus-turkey-energy-idUKL5E7KE2WL20110914 (accessed 11. 8.2012).

36. European Union 3362nd Council Meeting, General Affairs, Council of the European Union, Press Release 16936/14, 16.12. 2014, p.12.

Greek Foreign Policy: the De-Europeanisation Impact of the Economic Crisis

Charalambos Tsardanidis*

RÉSUMÉ

La Grèce est un cas particulièrement intéressant et controversé pour la discussion de l'européanisation de la politique étrangère. Le point de vue classique de la politique étrangère grecque soutient qu'un processus achevé d'européanisation, tant dans la forme que dans le fond, a eu lieu. Qu'il y a eu un changement clair des positions "nationalistes", "pessimistes", "défensives" et ethnocentriques "à une européanisation« réaliste» ,« optimiste» « active» . Il est possible que cela a eu lieu peut être dans une certaine mesure, mais, les vues enthousiastes au sujet de l'européanisation de la politique étrangère grecque ne semblent pas prendre en compte un certain nombre de problèmes qui existaient avant la crise économique, mais qui se sont intensifiés depuis. Cet article pose dès lors la question de savoir comment la crise économique a affecté le processus d'européanisation de la politique étrangère de la Grèce. En mettant l'accent sur le cas de la diplomatie économique grecque, il montre comment l'européanisation depuis 2008 à cause des mesures d'austérité imposées avec des réformes structurelles strictes dans les institutions du pays a été perçue comme une "européanisation imposée". Cette étude fait ainsi valoir que la politique étrangère grecque n'a pas été européanisée dans la forme ou sur le fond par rapport à la diplomatie économique. Loin d'être un processus achevé, l'européanisation de la politique étrangère de la Grèce est un développement plutôt superficiel qui a jusqu'ici, et seulement en partie, affecté les élites de ce pays ainsi que l'opinion publique hellénique. La crise économique a encore délégitimé les progrès réalisés jusqu'à présent en termes de processus d'européanisation et a affecté de manière négative la façon dont les Grecs perçoivent l'Union européenne.

ABSTRACT

Greece is a particularly interesting and controversial case for the discussion of foreign policy-Europeanisation. The conventional view of Greek foreign policy contends that a completed process of Europeanisation, both in form and in substance, has occurred. That there has been a clear shift from "nationalist", "pessimistic", "defensive" and ethnocentric" positions to a 'realistic', 'optimistic', 'active' Europeanisation. This may have happened to a certain extent but, enthusiastic views about the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy seem not to take

* University of the Aegean

into account a number of issues that existed before the economic crisis, but which have intensified since then. This paper, therefore asks how the economic crisis has affected the Europeanisation process of Greece's foreign policy. Focusing on the case of Greek economic diplomacy it demonstrates how Europeanisation since 2008 through demanding austerity measures along with strict structural reforms in Greece's institutions has been perceived as an "imposed Europeanisation". It is thus argued that Greek foreign policy has not been Europeanised in form or in substance in relation to economic diplomacy. Far from being a completed process, the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy is a rather superficial development which has only so far, and only partly, affected the elites in Greece as well as Greek public opinion. The economic crisis has further delegitimised any progress achieved so far in terms of the Europeanisation process and has affected in negative terms the way Greeks feel about the European Union.

Background and Theoretical Concept

The great difficult economic situation that the country currently passes through has made clear to many analysts that generally speaking the Europeanisation of Greece has been deficient and unsuccessful; and that it may indeed create further adverse consequences in the foreign policy and security of the country.[1]

Given the above analysis it might be very useful to explain the de-europeanisaton or limited Europeanisation process of Greek foreign policy if we adopt the foreign policy analysis approach and more precisely the model of Nikolaj Petersen which is a revision of what James Rosenau calls 'adaptation model'.[2] Adaptation could be defined as the activity initiated by policy makers with a view towards handling the balance between society and its environment so as to safeguard an adequate performance of their societal structures. Adaptation as a FPA analysis theoretical approach of Europeanisation has the following advantages as it:

- fills the gap between external and domestic factors of foreign policy making;
- provides a more advanced method in comparison with realist, structural and comparative politics explanations;
- permits to focus who are the decision makers and how national

foreign policy-makers defined the policy problem they intended to address;[3]

- gives a comprehensive typology for comparative analysis;
- enriches the theoretical discussion by offering different types of Europeanisation behavior.

According to Nikolaj Petersen's model there are two main important independent explanatory variables:

- *Influence Capability* (IF): it represents the degree to which an actor can affect its external environment; a function of all those negative and positive sanctions which nation A can use to influence nation B.
- *Stress Sensitivity* (SS): it reveals which societal structures are affected by changes in the external environment. In other words, it identifies the increased sensitivity of any domestic structure to international events.[4]

Nikolaj Petersen - like James Rosenau - constructed four models of adaptation or four modes of behavior. Of course they cannot be expected to be found in pure form, but only in approximations. A number of intermediate positions can be imagined, depending on the degree of influence capability and stress sensitivity of the state in question, and modified by the relevant perceptions of decision – makers.[5] These four models of adaptation are:

- *Policy of dominance*. It is characterised by a defence posture with a comprehensive list of functions: compellence, deterrence and defence. A dominant power may beef up its position through an alliance but has also the option of going it alone.
- *Policy of Balance Policy*. It is characterised by a defence posture aiming at deterrence and defence. It relies heavily on alliances and diplomatic coalitions as well as on bilateral diplomacy.
- *Policy of Quiescent*: It denotes a low activity posture. Quiescent states have no high immediate need nor adequate resources for defence and diplomacy, while diplomacy will tend to be conducted in a multilateral framework.

- *Policy of Aquiescent*. It is characterised by policies linked with a 'neutrality defence' posture combined with a general non-alignment line. Multilateral action is preferred. [6]



The Economic Crisis and Greek Foreign Policy: Towards Europeanisation or De-Europeanisation?

The first dimension of Europeanisation (downloading) refers to the extent and manner that the EU process, organisational procedures, principles and values affect the national decision-making process levels. The other two dimensions of Europeanisation refer to uploading and crossloading. In this article we shall concentrate only on the downloading process, which reflects the harmonisation and transformation-adaptation of a member state to the needs and requirements of EU membership and of the overall European unification process.[7] Europeanisation is taking place as Johan Olsen

points out, if the political system of a member country is constantly obliged to take into account and apply EU methods, practices, norms and values that fit within the wider logic of European unification.[8] (See figure 1). As E.Gross, point out, "by 'Europeanising' previously national policies and generalizing them onto a larger stage, a dialectical relationship between the state and the EU level is created, which in turn feeds back to the national level".[9]



Many observers argue that the Europeanisation in terms of downloading of Greek foreign policy has been achieved.[10] This may have happened to a certain extent. Enthusiastic views about the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy seems not to take into account the following issues that were already present before the economic crisis, but which have intensified since then:[11]

First, Greece still suffers from several inferiority complexes in its public opinion and there are a lot of prejudices that consider Europeanisation as a sign of alienation and moving away from traditional Greek and Orthodox values. Some equate the concept of

'Europeanisation' with the old concept of 'foreign protection' and even 'capitulation' and for this reason reject it. Many Greek foreign policy analysts believe that Greece is a victim of an international injustice, often induced by the major powers and that there is plenty of empirical evidence that shows public sympathy and responsiveness to such positions.[12] These considerations have been strengthened even more after the economic crisis and the increase of the recession and unemployment. Overall GDP since 2008 has been reduced by almost 25% and the unemployment rate is more than 25%.

Second, there is a general conclusion that the EU is not able to effectively provide security for Greece. Although it is true to say that, prior to membership, an impression was cultivated that the EU (then EEC) was going to be able to guarantee national security and be a panacea to solve all acute security problems, it has equally quickly become apparent, as in the case of Imia crisis in 1996, that the absence of any defense cover by the EU has not contributed to a growing acceptance in Greece of the EU as a major international actor of the modern international system: and, as such, neither as a reliable factor in ensuring the country's own defense. No other 'older' Member State had expressed so many hopes for the EU to solve its many complex security problems. Nor has there been any other Member State where such prospects have led to so many disappointments.

Third, there is the view that turning Greece into positions that were closer to those of the EU was clearly the result of imposed new conditions (i.e. changing international context), as new challenges arose out of the end of the Cold War. In other words: that they were not necessarily the result of an 'automated' Europeanisation, but had more to do with, wider, systemic changes.

Thus, the great difficult economic situation that the country currently finds itself has contributed in combination with the reluctance of EU to act decisively at least in the early stages of the economic crisis to the emergence of a new discourse: that Europe, and especially Germany, has been deficient and unsuccessful; and that it may indeed create further adverse consequences in the foreign policy and security of Greece. Indeed, some point to the example of the EU having *de facto*

financed an ineffective and corrupt public administration. Instead of the EU helping towards a more effective and less corrupt public administration, quite the opposite has indeed happened: more Community assistance through the Community Support Frameworks has strengthened both inefficiency and corruption in the country.[13]

The paper will seek to answer the basic question by examining the impact of the economic crisis on its foreign policy system and its decision-making process through the many actual changes that have taken place in the period from the beginning of the crisis in 2008 until the parliamentary elections of January 2015.[14] That is to say, how has the crisis impacted on its means, structures and policies? We shall examine only the downloading process of Europeanisation through a characteristic case study: the change of the economic diplomacy administrative system and to what extent the financial crisis has intensified efforts to restructure this important component of the country's foreign policy. The new productive model of Greece will inevitably focus on a strategy for an extroverted economy. Therefore, the re-organisation of economic diplomacy mechanisms is of tremendous importance.

Michael Smith has introduced four indicators of downloading within the domestic arena.[15] These are: elite socialisation, bureaucratic restructuring, and constitutional changes and changes in public perception concerning European foreign policy. A more visible manifestation of the domestic impact of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) involves changes in national foreign ministries. "While these ministries have not fully harmonized their operations to accommodate political co-operation, there is substantial evidence to show that EU membership in general, and CFSP membership in particular, influence the way individual member states organize their pursuit of foreign policy... These requirements in turn tend to encourage more far-reaching changes in national foreign ministries beyond privileging their overall role in the process.[16]

In order to measure the Greek ability or inability to transform its economic diplomacy system due not only to the Europeanisation process (downloading) but also due to the economic crisis, this article

will use a revised model of analysis of the Europeanisation based on the adaptation model of Nikolaj Petersen.



As a result of the above, it is important to raise the question of whether the current economic crisis could lead to a de-europeanisation procedure. That is to say, Athens simply responding exclusively to the demands of its internal environment; and thus producing intransigent foreign policy stances based on the preferences of a de-europeanised public basis moving towards Euroscepticism in the name of defending traditional national ideals and norms.

The Re-Organisation of Greek Economic Diplomacy

Foreign economic policy has become an integral part of the broader foreign policy vision. Economic tools have become increasingly important mechanisms for projecting a country's influence and

increasingly vital components of its foreign policy.[17] Economic Diplomacy could be defined as a set of activities - both regarding methods and processes for international decision making - related to cross border economic activities (export, import, investment, lending, aid, migration) pursued by state actors and non-state actors. Typically economic diplomacy consists of three elements: First, the use of political influence and relationships to promote and/or influence international trade and investments, to improve on functioning of markets and/or to address market failures to reduce costs and risks of cross border transactions (including property rights), but also many activities of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) are relevant under this heading. Second, the use of economic assets and relationships to increase the cost of conflict and to strengthen the mutual benefits of cooperation and politically stable relationships, i.e. to increase economic security. This subfield both contains structural policies and bilateral trade agreements (aimed at achieving specific geographic trading patterns) and the political distortion of trade and investment as in the case of boycotts and embargoes. Third, ways to consolidate the right political climate and international political economic environment to facilitate and institute these objectives. This subfield covers multilateral negotiations and is the domain of the supranational organizations and institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union.[18]

Economic diplomacy is going to become even more important over the following decades for several reasons: First, the world economic crisis and especially the debt crisis of the South countries of eurozone gave the economic dimension of international relations the just and necessary attention that had been missing during the previous years. Diplomats and officials finally got the time and the energy for dealing with economics, considered to be of much more direct relevance for the well being of everyday citizens. Second, developing countries are no longer content to have the rules of the games dictated to them by a few large developed economies. Third, the increasing globalisation of the economy opens up new perspectives for further trade expansion, but at the same time also sharpens the competition in securing countries'

shares in world markets and in advancing new ones. The emergence also of the new regionalism and the emerging inter-regional and bi-regional cooperation schemes like Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) demand new approaches to the multilateral economic diplomacy.[19]

The choice of economic diplomacy as a case study has been taken for three main reasons:

First, the new model of production of the country should be based on the opening of its domestic market, business expansion and the attraction of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). Revising and strengthening the economic diplomacy mechanism is a prerequisite for achieving openness and a successful foreign economic policy. Greece can gain tremendously from transforming into an outward looking economy: to devise a clear strategy and vision for facilitating Greek business in a targeted and coordinated manner. It is therefore highly recommended that the current fiscal measures are supplemented by a common vision on the promotion of exports. The timely implementation of this common vision, backed by modernised and reinforced institutions conducive to international trade and supportive of attracting much needed FDI, is crucial to strengthen the growth potential of Greece's economy.

Secondly, Greek foreign policy and its main tool, economic diplomacy, should, among numerous other goals, serve the interests of Greek businesses, as long as the latter fall in terms with the general Greek foreign economic policy objectives. To put it in another way, not only a general strategic planning of foreign policy is strongly required but also its formulation must take in account the aims and the interests of the business community (stakeholders). The experience of the past was not always a positive one concerning this particular challenge.[20]

Third, making savings is another reason for the need to reduce public spending and deficits. The budgetary cuts in order to reduce public spending and debt as well as help economic recovery have had a major impact on the foreign, security and defence policy in Greece.[21]

Since 1989, Greece's foreign policy has gradually, but radically,

changed from what was a purely political approach for at least fifty years into a politico-economic approach. The post Cold War developments for example in South Eastern Europe have made a great impact on Greece as they contributed to the re-establishment of the country's historical economic and trade relations with all the countries of its immediate vicinity area. Greece's foreign trade -and above all its exports to other Balkan countries- have substantially increased. Furthermore, Greek investment in the Balkans also improved spectacularly. It was becoming clear that Greece had major economic interests in the Balkans and that a new political approach reflecting them had become more than necessary. Furthermore, Greece increased the development aid that was giving in many countries, mostly in Balkan countries under the framework of the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HPERB). It was becoming clear that Greece had major economic interests in the Balkans and that a new political approach reflecting them had become necessary. Therefore, Greek foreign policy priorities and the interests of Greek business have started to come together as never before. Business and government share a vital interest in economic growth and stability in the Balkan marketplace.[22]

For all the above reasons, the main emphasis of the reform in the field of foreign policy lies in the restructuring of the mechanism of economic diplomacy and consolidate all the mechanisms and agencies related to economic diplomacy in a single decision-making center. The question that will be addressed is whether the restructuring of economic diplomacy that was announced in January 2013 actually serves the Europeanisation and harmonization of the country with European practice, or if instead it represents an attempt at de-europeanisation.

The re-organization of economic diplomacy's structure soon became the number one priority as two Ministries, the Ministry of Development and Competitiveness (MDC) (once named Ministry of National Economy) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed both and sometimes disputed the formulation of country's economic diplomacy. The result of this dispute was the emergence of what we

can metaphorically call a 'feverish reform' including continuous reconstructions of economic diplomacy's structural mechanisms: Emphasis was given on the relocation of the Greek Offices of Economic and Commercial Affairs (OEY) from the one Ministry to another. During the nineties these Offices belonged to the Ministry of National Economy. As a consequence, different stakeholders had different views on where the priorities were, there was no defined common goal or target to where the country should be headed for. Still there was no common commitment in terms of trade promotion between the public actors or between the public and private sector actors.

In 2003, they became an integral bod, followed by their staff,of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It should also be noted that it was only one year before, in 2002, that a General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation (DOAS-YDAS) was created, supervising the B's General Directorate of Economic International Relations in order to take over all the competencies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that concerned economic diplomacy. Four years later, in 2007, a law was approved suggesting the gradual abolition of the body of Offices of Economic and Commercial Affairs (OEY) and the replacement of their vital role by diplomats. According to the Law, their positions became personal posts. In addition, the Department of Economic and Commercial Affairs of the National School of Public Administration (ESDD- now called National Centre for Public Administration and Local Government- EKDDA) in which they were fully trained, after their successful candidacy in the relevant competition, ceased its functioning.[23] Thus, the country did not possess the necessary relevant institutions to implement a detailed long-term plan regarding its future social and economic development, including its position in the international, European, and Balkan economic spaces.[24]

After Greece's inability to meet its debt obligations, the Greek government was obliged to implement a National Export Strategy, as part of the Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece and the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (MoU). However, only in 2012 the Greek government started to elaborate some concrete plans for a National Export Strategy.

In this framework, the MDC in January 2013 announced that the personnel and the duties of the OEY as well as all the competences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be moved once more and integrated into the MDC and, in order to keep up with the vital need of creating a unified system of 'economic extraversion', as was suggested by an expert group from the Netherlands,created by the European Commission at the request of the Greek authorities,[25] which had been invited by the so-called Task Force for Greece.The experts group advocated among other things an increase in the government's focus on economic diplomacy. They recommended a new prioritisation within the current public infrastructure to accommodate Greek business through effective economic diplomacy and all parties involved in trade and FDI promotion need to agree on a common vision for a comprehensive trade and FDI strategy that incorporates common objectives. In order to facilitate the smooth functioning of an active economic diplomacy, including trade and investment promotion, they recommended that MFA and MDC merge their current activities related to trade policy, including trade promotion, into a new policy unit dedicated to the design of trade and investment policies, institutionalise the cooperation between this new unit and the two ministries in a Joint Venture. As part of this development, the Ambassadors' tasks should be redefined to include a (much) more active role in facilitating and promoting Greek business abroad and the MFA would consider setting an ambitious target of allocating up to 80% of its staff to economic diplomacy for those countries and markets which are currently important for Greek exporters and where potential foreign investors are. Therefore, economic diplomacy and trade diplomacy should become the number one priority of Greece's MFA and its network of embassies and consulates abroad. The two Agencies HePo (for promoting the exports) and Invest in Greece (for attracting FDI) - as far as their current promotional functions are concerned should be merged into a new single state agency: Greece Trade and Invest. Finally, and this is might the most important point, they recommended a clear distinction between the role of setting policies and that of implementing policies.

However, it soon became apparent that, although adopted by the

government, most of the Netherlands Expert group recommendations in reality led to a lot of difficulties:

First, the MFA and the MDC bureaucracies were not willing to form a strong new policy unit for the formulation of economic diplomacy. Although initially the MFA had not any objection whatsoever, the policy unit to be embedded in the MDC as well as the personnel of Economic and Commercial Offices (OEY-Commercial Attachés), soon second thoughts emerged as the following risks appeared: a) The risk of having two basic Ministries in the field of economic diplomacy. On the one hand the MFA with low powered, and sometimes not clear duties and from the other hand the MDC. Furthermore, the MFA with its B's Directorates that are in charge of the bilateral economic relations were going to lose almost all their human resources. The MDC with the personnel and the competencies of the Offices of Economic and Commercial Affairs from the MFA. The MDC would also supervise not only the new Agency from the unification of the Agency Export and Promotion Agency (OPE) with the Invest in Greece, but the plan was to keep its old duties as inherited since 2007 from the old Ministry of Economy, such as the World Trade Organization's issues and the coordination of Greece's policy in the common commercial policy of the EU as well as the matters of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Therefore, it was strongly recommended by analysts and by Exports Associations that if the desirable political will of the creation of a unified economic diplomacy is sincere and viable, then all services and all competencies of economic diplomacy should be transferred to one Body or one Ministry and this should be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the following reasons:

a) There is undoubtedly a substantial political dimension in economic diplomacy which refers to the modern aspect of foreign policy formulation and implementation: the new economic architecture is a way for a government to project its own power and increase its own influence abroad. For a long time, political influence has been used in order to advance commercial goals. It is now more than ever evident that, in today's international reality, a country's negotiating

power depends more and more on its economical status and power. One step further, a powerful economy constitutes a commanding ground on which the construction of a fruitful foreign policy is based. Economic tools could also be employed to materialize political goals. In other words, to rephrase Von Clausewitz's famous dictum: Economic diplomacy is a mere continuation of policy by other means. The presence of a country's traders, investors, and financiers can be as effective instruments of foreign policy as much as its actual military power. Therefore, economic diplomacy has two general usages: it refers to the use of economic resources or the 'manipulation' of economic activity for diplomatic purposes, and to the use of diplomacy to promote financial or commercial objectives.

b) Due to globalisation and the economic situation of Greece, today's economic diplomacy constitutes a vital field of exercising a country's foreign policy. So, this is the reason why a unified centre, formulating and implementing economic diplomacy, should undoubtedly exist. In these terms, the complete coordination between country's foreign policy and country's economic diplomacy is a necessity which should not be ignored. To put it in simple words, the promotion of extraversion's policy abroad, such as the commercial policy (the exports' promotion) or the investments' attraction, the general economic external policy (development of bilateral economic relations or the multilateral economic diplomacy) and, finally, the realisation of external development aid should be under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For instance, also in the Netherlands economic diplomacy was importantly advanced with the appointment of a Minister for the External Commerce and the Developmental Cooperation and, simultaneously, with the relocation of a whole General Directorate for the external economic policy and the developmental cooperation from the Ministry of Finance to that of MFA.

c) As the international economy evolves day by day, embassies consume most of their time dealing with matters of economic diplomacy. The political diplomacy now sometimes comes in the second place. If Commercial and Economic Attachés leave the Ministry of Foregin

Affairs and go to the MDC, there is the danger of undermining the so far achieved osmosis between the traditional issues of the Greek foreign policy and the emerging vital matters of economic diplomacy that has been accomplished during the last years at the MFA. Even the possibility of signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the MFA and the MDC sounds like a Greek paradox, if one bears in mind that, during the previous years, there was no culture of cooperation between those specific Ministries.

d) At the same time, the European Union has set up the European External Action Service**,** which includes not only the external and commercial relations of the EU but also the matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**.** There was no doubt that the above mentioned move of economic diplomacy to MDC was going to cause difficulties in the MFA regarding its role as the basic player, coordinator and promoter of country's interests in the EU. Besides, it was doubtful if the MDC**,** turning into a super Ministry 'mammoth' or 'Levathian' would be capable enough of handling successfully its competences.

Second there was a great effort of not observing the distinction between the role of setting policies and that of implementing policies. The public authorities need to be held accountable for the effectiveness of their policies and implementing agencies need to be held accountable for their results. There must be a monitoring and evaluation system in place. The initial draft law for setting up a new S.A. company (Public Limited company-Société Anonyme) as the outcome of the merger of the Agency Export and Promotion Agency with the Invest in Greece was given a lot of policy formulation duties-even diplomatic status to its employees-weakening its supervising body: the Policy Unit based in MDC. This created a strong reaction by the Task Force and from the MFA and finally the new Agency Enterprise Greece Invest and Trade was designed only to assist foreign investors and enterprises to do business with Greece, to contribute to the outward looking orientation of the Greek economy, to attract foreign investment, to troubleshoot issues related to the public administration, and to provide key investment and business

information. Meanwhile the coordination of the policy remained in the Policy Unit which remained in the MDC.

Third, to ensure that a comprehensive strategy of economic diplomacy could be consistently implemented, the vision and strategy need to be endorsed by all major stakeholders involved and must have full political backing and support. The vision and strategy must define a coherent set of promotional programs and initiatives with clear political backing and support both in terms of commitment but also in terms of the necessary resources. However, the decision makers' attitude prism was inclined more to support and increase the power and resources of their own Ministries rather than to estimate how to increase the Influence Capability of the Greek economic diplomacy. The decision makers were considering the need for the economic diplomacy mechanism reform as a chance and as a tool of increasing their influence in the decision making body of the foreign economic policy. The key to understanding why this is so cannot be in the origins of the crisis *per se*, as Sofia Vasilopoulou, Dafhne Halikiopoulou and Theofanis Exadaktylos point out, but in the way it was handled by domestic political actors. "The crisis presented Greek party leaders with a catch-22 situation. On the one hand, these actors were subjected to substantial international pressures for implementing reform; but on the other, structural reform would inevitably lead them to compromise their position within the political system".[26]

Fourth, there was a fierce reaction from the Economic and Commercial Affairs personnel, refusing, most of them, to move again to the MDC and finally it was decided although many diplomats wanted to get rid of the issues of economic diplomacy-to remain in the MFA.

Conclusions

The outcome of the last effort to reform the mechanisms of Greek economic diplomacy during a period of economic crisis is disappointing, especially when there is a consensus on the necessity that Greece's economic recovery will be based mainly on increasing its exports and on attracting FDI.

On the basis of the Europeanisation process (downloading) model of adaptation, the case of the Greek economic diplomacy efforts of reform during the economic crisis reveals:

First, that Influence Capability (IC) in our approach as an independent variable refers to the EU's Influence Capability to Europeanise the operational environment of the Greek system of economic diplomacy. According to Petersen economic power is an important tangible factor of IC in an integration context.[27] Economically developed states or actors like the EU are more influential than weakly developed ones. The EU tried to Europeanise the Greek system of economic diplomacy – as we have pointed out – not only under the general pressure exercised by the so-called Memorandum by imposing a strict programme of austerity, fiscal consolidation and structural reforms but also by using more concrete and specific means, like a technical assistance programme provided by the Task Force of Greece through the mission of a group of experts from the Netherlands. As Kevin Featherstone points out, never had the EU been involved in such close investigation of one of its Member States and characterises this process as 'Über Europeanisation'.[28]

Second, the other important independent variable which belongs to the domestic environment of Greece is Stress Sentivity (SS). As Petersen argues SS is a structural variable.[29] In terms of actor characteristics its main feature is probably modernisation, which implies a high sensitivity of societal structures to international events. Although in our case study there is a need for setting up a Europeanised structure of economic diplomacy mechanism, nevertheless, the societal structure of the political system did not permit it. The different interests of the decision makers in the MFA and the MDC, the conflicting interests between the bureaucracies and Agencies were strong enough for another time to ruin any effort of substantial reform and of course the Europeanisation process was extremely limited. As the traditional clientelistic and corporatist interests prevail at the expense of substantial reforms, even a de-europeanising process took place and became very obvious as at the end of the day the Greek administration in practice once again has

two basic Ministries in the field of economic diplomacy with low powered, and not clear duties. As a consequence a high danger exists for the Greek economic diplomacy: to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time!

Finally, from the above analysis it is apparent that the adaptation model of behaviour which Greece followed, even in a period of economic adjustment funded by the troika (European Central Bank, European Commission, International Monetary Fund) in the case at least of the economic diplomacy reform reflected that of Quiescent and not Acquiescence policy. Petersen suggested that, "countries like Ireland, Portugal and Greece may be the closest approximations to an acquiescent policy in the Union", although he also acknowledged that Greece had felt free to demonstrate its nuisance value on several occasions.[30] If the policies of Acquiescent and Balance reflect the europeanisation process, the policy of Quiescent reflects the process of de- europeanisation. Positively attempting actions to rid a member-country of any perceived restraints imposed by the EU's policies.[31] Its main characteristic is a non-commitment strategy expressed in a policy of exemptions that is limited participation to preferred policy areas and being exempted from unrewarding ones.[32] Greek decision makers adopted in the case of the economic diplomacy mechanism reconstruction a policy of Quiescent as they chose to follow a low-key strategy aimed at limiting concessions in the integration process and intending more on avoiding the drawbacks of Europeanisation. Furthermore, the current system of Greek economic diplomacy continues to be fragmented and divided over many institutions. With few exceptions, state actors do not or hardly seek any collaboration with each other (no horizontal cooperation), and there is little cooperation between the public and private sector actors (no vertical cooperation). Moreover, the institutions responsible for export promotion and its implementation mainly seem to follow an *ad hoc* approach. The case of economic diplomacy however should not be considered as an exceptional one. There were delays, as Stella Ladi argues, "in most of the administrative reforms and the incremental nature of the few reforms that were implemented, signifies policy

experimentation in order to avoid harsh governmental decisions and conflict with the organised interests".[33]

The case study of Greek economic diplomacy seems to confirm the two main arguments that have been pointed out in some of the research which has been conducted on Europeanisation to date. First that Foreign Policy Analysis is a useful analytical and theoretical tool for the study of the Europeanisation process and second that Greek foreign policy has not yet been Europeanised, because it highlights the absence of a rational instutionalised collective decision-making process.[34]

NOTES

1. O. Anastasakis, "The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Greece's External Relations: On Foreign Policy "Deficits" in O. Anastasakis and D. Singh, (eds), *Reforming Greece. Sisyphean Task or Herculean Challenge?,* Oxford: South East European Studies at Oxford, 2012, pp.39-42. A. Tziampiris, "Greek Foreign Policy in the Shadow of the Debt Crisis: Continuity and New Directions", The Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Series on European and International Affairs, Greece's Horizons, Heidelberg, 2013, pp.27-40.
2. J. Rosenau, *Study of Political Adaptation,* London: Frances Pinter and Nicholas Publishing, 1981.
3. K. Moumoutzis, "Still Fashionable Yet Useless? Addressing Problems with Research on the Europeanization of Foreign Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 49, No.3, p. 622.
4. N. Petersen, "Adaptation as a Framework for the Analysis of Foreign Policy Behaviour", *Cooperation and Conflict,* Vol.12, No.2, 1977, pp.221-250.
5. N. Petersen, "National Strategies in the Integration Dilemma: An Adaptation Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol.36, No.1, 1998, pp.33- 54.
6. N. Petersen, "Adaptation as a Framework for the Analysis of Foreign Policy Behaviour", *op.cit.,* pp.244-245.
7. S. Stavridis and C. Tsardanidis, "The Cyprus Problem in the European Parliament: a Case of Successful or superficial Europeanisation?", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 14, No.1, 2009, p.134.
8. J. Olsen, "Europeanization and Nation–State Dynamics' in S. Gustavson and L. Lewin (eds), *The Future of the Nation–State,* London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 245–

285. C. Tsardanidis and S. Stavridis, "The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal", *Journal of European Integration/Revue d´Intégration Européenne*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2005, pp. 211.

9. E. Gross, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy. Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management,* Basingstoke: Palgave MacMillan, 2009, p.18.

10. S. Economides, "The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy", *West European Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2005, pp. 471-491. P. Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment" in K. Featherstone and G. Kazamias (eds), *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery,* London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 73–94.

11. *Ibid., and* C. Tsardanidis and S. Stavridis, "Greece" in R. Wang and C. Hill (eds), *National and European Foreign Policies. Towards Europeanization,* London: Routledge, 2011, pp.111-130.

12. V. Coufoudakis, "Greek Foreign Policy Since 1974: Quest for Indepedence", *Journal of Common Market Studies,*vol.6, No.1, 1988, pp. 55 -79. A. Kazamias, "The Quest for Modernization in Greek Foreign Policy and its Limitations", *Mediterranean Politics,* Vol.2,No.2, pp.71- 94.

13. For example, the 2001 GRECO evaluation reports on Greece stated "that one of the most common forms of corruption is the bribery of public officials in return for their assistance in obtaining subsidies or aid from EU funds". See P.Szarek-Mason, *The European Union's Fight Against Corruption. The Evolving Policy Towards Member States and Condidate Countries,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.90.

14. The Radical Left-wing party Syriza won the elections for the first time ever, securing 149 out of the 300 seats and has formed a coalition government with the small right wing party Independent Greeks, thus providing a stable majority in the Greek Parliament.

15. M. Smith, "Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of European Foreign Policy Cooperation", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.7, No.4, 2000, p.617.

16. *Ibid.*

17. S. Economides and P. Wilson, *The Economic Factor in International Relations. A Brief Introduction,* London: I.B. Tauris, 2001, pp.3-15.

18. P.A.G.van Bergeijk and S. Moons, "Economic Diplomacy and Economic Security" in C. Guaro Costa (ed.), *New Frontiers for Economic Diplomacy,* Lisboa Instituto Superior de Ciencas Sociais e Politicas, 2009, pp.38-39.

19. N. Bayne and S. Woolcock (eds), *The New Economic Diplomacy. Decision Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations,* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, (Second Edition).

20. C. Tsardanidis and E. Myssiri, "The Reconstruction of Greek Economic Diplomacy", *Foreign Affairs* (Greek Edition), No.18, 2013 pp.85-104 (in Greek).
21. T. Dokos and C. Kollias, *Greek Defence Spending In Times Of Crisis: The Urgent Need for Defence Reform,* Eliamep Thesis No.1, March 2013. P. Liargovas, "Economic crisis and Greek foreign policy", in M. Gianniou (ed.), *Greek Foreign Policy-Global Trends and Challenges, Vol. I*, Athens: EKEM, 2013, pp. 76-81.
22. C. Tsardanidis, "Economic Diplomacy as a Means of Foreign Policy: Greece and South – Eastern Europe", *Agora without Frontiers,* Vol.6, No.3, 2001, p.322.
23. C. Tsardanidis and E. Myssiri,"Organizing Greece's Economic Diplomacy" in M. Gianniou (ed.), *Greek Foreign Policy-Global Trends and Challenges, Vol.I*, EKEM Athens, 2013, pp.82-93.
24. V. Monastiriotis and A. Tsamis, *Greece's new Balkan Economic Relations: policy shifts but no structural change,* GreeSE Paper No. 1, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, April 2007, p.23.
25. The Task Force for Greece had the duty to provide technical assistance to the Greek authorities by covering ten policy domains, namely: 1) acceleration of EU-funded projects 2) access to finance 3) public administration reform 4) budget and taxation 5) anti-corruption 6) business environment 7) public health 8) reform of the judiciary 9) migration, asylum and borders 10) labour market and social security. Around twenty Member States provided technical assistance, http://insideurope.eu/taxonomy/term/137#sthash.VsQoYjnu.dpuf).
26. Sofia Vasilopoulou and Dafhne Halikiopoulou and Theofanis Exadaktylos, "Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 52, No.2, 2014, p.400.
27. N. Petersen, "National Strategies in the Integration Dilemma: An Adaptation Approach", *op.cit.,*p.38.
28. K. Featherstone, "The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime", *Journal of Common Market Studies,*Vol.49, No.2, 2011, p.207.j, Journal ms, Jou*, Journal* _2139 193..21
29. *Ibid.*, p.40
30. *Ibid.,* p.44.
31. R. Wang and C. Hill, "Many Actors, One Path? The Meaning of Europeanization in the Context of Foreign Policy" in R. Wang and C. Hill (eds), *National and European Foreign Policies. Towards Europeanization,* London: Routledge, 2011, p.211.
32. N. Petersen, "National Strategies in the Integration Dilemma: An Adaptation Approach", *op.cit.,*p.44.

33. S. Ladi., *The Eurozone Crisis and Austerity Politics: A Trigger for Administrative Reform in Greece.*
    GreeSE Paper No.57, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, April 2012, p.26, eprints.lse.ac.uk/43383/1/GreeSE%20No57.pdf
34. C. Tsardanidis and S. Stavridis, "Greece", *op.cit.,*p. 112.

De-Europeanizing at the UN? The Impact of the International Economic Crisis on Italian Foreign Policy

Carla Monteleone*

RÉSUMÉ

Parmi les mécanismes identifiés dans la littérature sur l'européanisation de la politique étrangère italienne, l'idée d'appartenance à un groupe joue un rôle important. En secouant l'idée de la solidarité européenne, la crise économique internationale a favorisé un plus grand euroscepticisme en Italie, ce qui suggère que l'européanisation précédemment enregistrée de la politique étrangère italienne pourrait éventuellement également être affectée. L'article examine si et combien la politique étrangère italienne a été dé-européanisée en comparant le comportement italien à l'ONU d'avant et après la crise. Cette arène a l'avantage de permettre une analyse du comportement italien sur les questions les plus importantes de la politique étrangère. L'ONU est aussi l'une des institutions où les tentatives européennes à parler d'une seule voix ont entraîné les Etats membres à modifier leurs méthodes de travail, obtenant la réalisation des résultats remarquables. Après avoir examiné la littérature sur l'européanisation de la politique étrangère italienne, cette étude présente les données de l'Eurobaromètre sur la croissance de l'euroscepticisme en Italie. Elle s'interroge sur la question de savoir si la crise a eu un impact sur l'habitude italienne de s'aligner sur les autres Etats membres de l'UE à l'ONU, tant à l'Assemblée générale (2004-2013) qu' au Conseil de sécurité (2000-2012). En particulier, cette étude analyse le comportement de vote à l'Assemblée générale et le parrainage de comportement au Conseil de sécurité sur la base d'un ensemble de données, pertinemment construit et mesure les variations de distance de l'Italie par rapport à la majorité de l'UE à l'Assemblée générale aux pays qui ont été le plus impliqués dans la crise ou qui sont particulièrement importants pour la dynamique de l'UE à l'ONU ainsi qu'aux alternatives potentielles. Le document souligne que, bien que la crise économique a conduit à des variations temporaires et a créé un contexte favorable à agir de façon occasionnelle en cavalier seul, pour les Etats membres de l'UE, l'Italie incluse, une comparaison avec la période pré-crise montre une grande continuité dans l'européanisation de la politique étrangère italienne.

* University of Palermo

ABSTRACT

Among the mechanisms identified in the literature on the Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy, the idea of belonging to a group or "we-feeling" plays an important role. By shaking the idea of European solidarity, the international economic crisis has promoted greater euroscepticism in Italy, suggesting that the previously recorded Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy could eventually also be affected. The article explores whether and how much Italian foreign policy has been de-Europeanized by comparing Italian behavior at the UN before and after the crisis. This arena has the advantage of allowing an analysis of behavior on the most important foreign policy issues, but it is also one of the institutions in which greater European attempts at speaking with a single voice have driven member states to change their working methods, achieving remarkable results. After reviewing the literature on the Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy, the study presents Eurobarometer's data on the growth of euroscepticism in Italy. It then assesses whether the crisis has had an impact on the Italian habit to coordinate with the other EU member states at the UN, both in the General Assembly (2004-2013) and in the Security Council (2000-2012). In particular, analysing voting behavior in the General Assembly and sponsoring behavior in the Security Council on the basis of a dataset appositely built, the paper measures variations in Italian distance from the EU majority in the General Assembly; the countries that were involved the most in the crisis or that are particularly important for EU dynamics at the UN; and, potential alternatives. The paper highlights that, although the economic crisis has led to temporary variations and has created a favorable context for occasional free-riding by EU member states, Italy included, a comparison with the pre-crisis period shows great continuity in the Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy.

Introduction

The Italian case has been taken in literature as an example of both Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation. Among the mechanisms explaining the Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy, the idea of 'belonging to a group', the possibility of exploiting the European network for a projection beyond Italy's capabilities (politics of scale) and the creation of a new opportunity structure, play an important role. However, the international economic crisis, and in particular the euro zone crisis, has shaken the idea of European solidarity at the very basis of the existence of a 'group' and has reduced resources to play an active role in foreign policy. This could potentially change the direction of Italian foreign policy.

This article intends to assess whether Italian foreign policy has – or not – de-Europeanised and whether this process can be related to the international economic crisis. In particular, the article will analyze the Italian voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), because the wide range of issues on which that forum is called to express its position allows a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Italian foreign policy over a long period. This enables a comparison between pre- and post- crisis behavior. Moreover, considering the importance of multilateralism in Italian and European foreign policy, it allows us to analyze whether variations can be registered in one of the pillars of Italian foreign policy. Finally, the European attempts at speaking with a single voice in the UNGA have driven member states to change their working methods and have led to remarkable outcomes. It is therefore expected that changes in Europeanisation processes and outcomes should be reflected there.

After describing the Italian case by looking at the Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy and at which factors may have been affected by the economic crisis, this article will evaluate the extent to which Italy experienced a de-Europeanisation of its foreign policy as a result of the crisis looking at its voting behavior in the UNGA, and assess whether changes in the three dimensions of downloading, uploading and crossloading identified in the introduction of this special issue have occurred.

The Europeanisation of Italian Foreign Policy up to the Crisis

The many ways in which Italian foreign policy has been deeply affected by the Europeanisation process have been carefully described by Paolo Rosa.[1] According to Rosa, the Europeanisation process has had consequences on elite socialization, on bureaucratic reorganization, on constitutional changes, on public opinion support for European foreign policy, and on the formulation of political guidelines. From Rosa's interviews, it emerges that officials from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have made regular meetings with their European colleagues a standard procedure, and working together has become a habit that has

changed their own working rules. This socialisation process has had two important effects:

On the one hand, policy-makers get the hang of other countries foreign policy positions, so it has become a consolidated custom for Italian diplomats, when they first analyse an issue, to ask themselves what their European partners position is, and how far Italy can push with its requests without damaging EU cohesion. In addition, knowing its partners position influences the position that Italy finally adopts, as it helps in reducing deviant behavior. Furthermore, a common culture develops over time.

On the other hand, Italian diplomats learn to consider European cooperation as an instrument that helps strengthening their national foreign policy, because nobody really thinks that Italy's weight could be the same without the EU. Accordingly, the EU is an added value for Italian policy-makers. They consider it important to present themselves as 'Europe', even when what the EU does is not fully representative of Italian positions. The case of sanctions against the former Yugoslavia is particularly meaningful. Although Italy thought they were completely wrong, it accepted them in order to avoid damaging EU cohesion and the possibility for the EU to play a role in the crisis.[2]

Paolo Rosa also identified an important factor in the Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy in public opinion support for a European foreign and defense policy that rose from 37 per cent in 1987 to above 70 per cent in the 1990s. This means that Italian public opinion on this issue moved from being well below the EU average, to being well above the EU average. A similar pattern was registered in top decision makers' opinion polls.[3]

Finally, Paolo Rosa registered a change in the formulation of political guidelines as a result of the new opportunities created by multilateral structures, the "alibi function" provided by EU foreign policy cooperation to controversial actions, and the strengthening of Italy's image, reputation and weight abroad. This is interesting in that, despite showing a greater assertiveness in its foreign policy, Italy has tried to

put its interventions within a European framework, even when they concerned its own crucial national interests. Likewise, Italy has at times (for instance in relation to the issue of 'rogue states') chosen to slow down its actions and even change its national choices in order to meet the different positions of its EU partners, as its primary objective was not to break European solidarity.[4] As one of the officials interviewed by Paolo Rosa in 2001 highlights, "it is not only in pursuing the national interest that there is an effect, there is [an effect] in the very formulation of national interest [...]. The EU factor is already built-in during policy-making [...]. We are part more and more of this European framework and this determines the formulation of our policy, not just its implementation".[5] Interestingly, the Europeanisation process has led to an "apparent priority shift in the last years from a preference for the U.S. ally, that in the past was the first to be consulted, to the EU partners, that nowadays are systematically and regularly consulted, even in case of difficult decisions".[6]

Impact of the Crisis on Italy

As pointed out by Donatella Della Porta and Manuela Caiani, however, the perceived increase in EU competences and powers has led to the politicisation of the debate on European institutions and to the growth both in interest in and contestation of choices made by EU institutions.[7] In particular, the common trend adopted by national governments to justify restrictive policies in the name of Europe has focalised attention on the consequences of European integration. This has introduced euro-skepticism in the Italian public debate and has highlighted the end of a permissive consensus toward the EU and the rise of critical attitudes towards the European integration process: the consensual approach based on weak preferences has started involving public opinion.[8] Although their research shows an increasing trend of Europeanisation that tends to grow in Italy more than in other countries, it also indicates a growing 'Italianisation' of the debate on Europe that leads to an increase in both politicisation and polarisation. The debate has been particularly strong on some issues, among which the euro, which has put into question the whole EU structure.

The debate on the euro was stronger after the Eurozone crisis and the response provided by the EU and its member states. The Eurozone crisis has been represented in the main Italian newspapers as the responsibility of the 'grasshopper countries', rather than the result of the systemic crisis in neo-liberal capitalism.[9] However, the German position, in particular, has come under attack both among the public and political leaders under the assumption that it showed lack of solidarity, betraying the very idea behind European integration. On the contrary, solidarity towards the other affected countries, Greece in particular, has been much diffused. In this context the new political formation Movimento 5 stelle (M5S), whose leader repeatedly called for an Italian exit from the euro and vehemently criticized the EU, was elected for the first time in the Italian Parliament in 2013, gaining 23.79% in the Italian Senate and 25.5% in the Italian Lower Chamber, and becoming the leading Italian party. A euro-skeptical attitude was the trademark of the M5S 2014 euro-campaign and, with 21.1% of the votes, the M5S was the second Italian party seating in the European Parliament. Criticism towards Germany and the EU were voiced with remarkably different styles and tones also by the other two main parties, PDL / Forza Italia and the Democratic Party (PD). Leaders of the PDL / Forza Italia opened to the possibility of abandoning the euro and depicted the fall of the Berlusconi government as the result of a 'European plot'. Traditionally more critical towards European integration, PDL / Forza Italia highlighted its Euro-skepticism during the 2014 euro-campaign to regain lost votes. Leaders of the PD considered it crucial for Italy to regain credibility in order to renegotiate criteria related to public debt with the other European partners. It is remarkable that even in the case of the PD, despite keeping its pro-European stance and seeing Europe as a solution more than a problem, a very unusual critical tone towards Europe was adopted after the crisis and the goal of changing European austerity policies was clearly stated. Interestingly, though, as soon as the newly elected secretary of the PD became prime minister in 2014, he changed the framing of the current economic situation and advanced a more assertive posture. Accordingly, the 2014 electoral euro-campaign saw the main political party supportive of the EU, the PD,

adopting a critical and more assertive stance and winning the elections with 40.8% of the votes.

Rather remarkable has been the increase in Euro-skepticism of right-wing formations, among which the Northern League has assumed over time a prominent position. As shown by Manuela Caiani and Nicol Conti, in constructing their social collective self-identity, right-wing formations often identify the EU and European institutions as their main enemy, and they see citizens in danger "due to the anti-democratic nature of the European elites and the EU institutions [...]. The EU process as a whole is represented very negatively as the product of an anti-democratic global ideology aiming at the dismantling of the European system of social rights".[10] In particular, the Northern League criticizes the EU for its negative impact on employment security and social harmony, be it in terms of economic integration or of more permissive immigration policies (the latter issue has been strongly affected by the economic crisis).[11] Indeed, exit from the euro was the main political request advanced by the Northern League in the 2014 euro-campaign.

The debate on the euro and the EU has been reflected in Italian public opinion and registered by the Eurobarometer. As figure 1 shows, the percentage of positive answers dropped after the Eurozone crisis in 2010. Interestingly, though, the decline of the percentage of Italians who answered 'very positive' and 'fairly positive' started decreasing before the crisis and in the case of 'fairly positive' an increase could be registered in 2008 and then again in 2014. On the contrary, the percentage of Italians who had a 'fairly negative' or 'very negative' opinion of the EU had a marked increase. Interestingly, positive opinions often transformed into a 'neutral' one, and this position became prevalent after 2011. Nevertheless, this is a remarkable change for one of the traditionally most Europeanist countries.

Figure 1: EU's Image in Italy (Source: Eurobarometer)[12]



However, it was not only the EU's image that was badly affected, but also the trust of the Italians in the EU (figure 2). Here the potential impact of the crisis is particularly evident, with a marked drop of 'tend to trust' answers after both 2007 and 2010 and the halving of people who tend to trust the EU in ten years (2003-2013). On the contrary, the percentage of Italians who 'tend not to trust' the EU has more than doubled in the same period and since 2011 has become the majority. Interestingly, though, the May 2013 *Standard EB 79* released by the Eurobarometer believes in the EU (25%, that is 3% more than the EU average) as a solution to the effects of the financial and economic crisis, more than in the national government (18%, that is 3% less that the EU average), in the IMF (14%), in the US (13%), or in the G20 (7%, that is almost half the EU average). Moreover, in 2014, the majority of Italian public opinion still did not trust the EU, but the trend of

those who tended not to trust the EU started declining, while the trend of those who trusted the EU started increasing again.

Figure 2: Italians' Trust in the EU (Source: Eurobarometer)[13]



These results may have an impact on the Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy: the questioning of the basic norms and values of the EU and the growing impression that Italian interests may differ from European ones might lead towards stances that are more independent and towards a reduction in the willingness of Italian governments to work towards common European positions. This may ultimately give way to de-Europeanisation.

Italian Foreign Policy de-Europeanizing as a Result of the Crisis?

Analyzing Italian foreign policy in 2011, Elisabetta Brighi noted that "[s]ince 1991, the traditional and absolute (and most of the time passive) reliance on the EC/EU, combined with the accustomed ability

to use European institutions as both a *shelter* and an *instrument* of foreign policy, has paradoxically produced even stronger incentives to free ride, and an increasingly opportunistic and instrumental attitude vis-à-vis the EU."[14] Brighi finds that the alternation of center-right and center-led coalitions has led to fluctuations towards Europe, in terms of style, discourse, and choices. This means that, although all Italian governments have kept their commitment to the two traditional pillars of Italian foreign policy, the US and the EU, they have also exercised more freedom of manoeuvre.

According to Elisabetta Brighi, Italy's 'mode of Europeanisation' is "rather opportunistic and instrumental, despite the country's abstract commitment to federalism. Italian foreign policy seems to be most Europeanised when most convenient for the country. Failing this condition, Italy cautiously, yet determinedly, turns to other options".[15] This also means that, when the EU is divided, Italy strays from EU positions and at times even works to widen the cracks.[16] Despite acknowledging variations in the degree of Europeanisation in different foreign policy areas and issues, Brighi concludes that Italian foreign policy is resistant to substantial change in terms of its objectives and identity and that ultimately it has become a case of de-Europeanisation.

The case of relations with Russia is particularly interesting in order to understand whether downloading has been affected by the crisis. While Paolo Rosa noted that the importance of respecting human rights as a pillar of European foreign policy affected Italian relations with Russia to the point of becoming an obstacle in establishing closer relations,[17] Elisabetta Brighi notes that on Russia "centre-right governments have been more inclined to break the European unity on politically sensitive issues, such as human rights."[18] Indeed, the special relationship of Italy with Russia has become evident on the occasion of the crisis in Ukraine and the appointment of High Representative Federica Mogherini. The soft position Italy adopted towards Russia weighted heavily against Mogherini's appointment, and in all of the meetings Italy was very cautious on the expansion of sanctions against Russia, also because they hurt heavily the still weak Italian economy. Indeed, protests by Italian economic actors trading

with Russia gained space in Italian newspapers. Nevertheless, ultimately the Italian government preferred to align with its European partners to keep European unity, indicating that downloading is still present in one of the most sensitive areas of Italian foreign policy.

Another area in which downloading was evident is the Middle East, and in particular the granting to Palestine of observer status at the UN in 2012. Following the Monti's government strong political resolution to strengthen the European Union as an international actor, Italy actively worked to build a common European position. The effort was not successful. Nevertheless, thanks to strong pressures from Prime Minister Monti on Foreign Minister Terzi di Sant'agata, Italy shifted its position from abstention to a vote in favor of the resolution at the very last moment, explicitly declaring that it was doing that to join the majority of EU member states in order to have a less fragmented European position.[19]

An important area in which the impact of the crisis is evident and may be relevant in downloading and cross-loading processes, is defence. Opposition to any increase in military spending in times of crisis was symbolized by protests against investment on new F-35 aircrafts. This has led to a reduction in the number of aircrafts Italian governments had already committed to buy, but it has also led to a restructuring of Italian defense posture (embodied in the *Libro bianco per la sicurezza internazionale e la difesa*) aimed at reducing defense spending. Opposition to participation in peace operations in times of crisis also became more vocal and widespread in Italian public opinion and in some political parties.

According to the Italian Ministry of Defense,[20] Italian military personnel are currently involved in UN operations (in Cyprus, Mali, India/Pakistan, Lebanon, and Morocco), in NATO operations (in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Lithuania, Somalia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and in the Mediterranean), in EU operations (in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Mali, Somalia, Palestine/Egypt, Horn of Africa, Bosnia, Georgia, and in the Mediterranean), and it is present in eleven other kinds of operation (in Egypt, against ISIS, in Hebron, in Libya, in Malta, in the Antarctic, in the UAE, in Palestine, in Mozambique, in Somalia, and in Lebanon).

This is a very important commitment for Italy, one that has been renewed by the Renzi government who has supported the Italian contribution to operations in Mali and more recently in Libya. In the latter case, Italy even declared that it was willing to lead the operation. Nevertheless, the Italian contribution is more and more often symbolic, and, looking at figure 3, it is evident that the Italian commitment to UN peace operations was heavily affected by the economic crisis. The most important Italian commitment, the one to UNIFIL in Lebanon, for instance, saw a reduction from 2,849 personnel in 2008 to 1,683 in 2011, further reduced to 1,090 in 2013. Considering tensions in the area, it is possible to imagine that economic factors may have played a role in the decision to reduce the Italian presence. This inevitably affects the real capability that Italy has in providing substantial (not only symbolic) military support to EU peace operations that are not of vital interest for Italy.

Figure 3: Italian personnel in UN peace operations.
(Source: United Nations Peacekeeping)[21]



As for uploading, Italy has tried to upload a dispute with India onto the EU agenda. The case of two Italian marines involved in a shooting incident while on an anti-piracy operation in 2012 and arrested by India, sparked nationalistic protests against India in Italy and became an important issue for Italian governments. Incapable of making itself heard by India, Italy looked for support from its EU partners. Following a request from the Italian representative at the Political and Security Committee, in 2012, the then High Representative Ashton released a statement in favor of Italy.[22] This was followed by other positions of support towards Italian authorities and even by the threat that the issue could hurt EU-India relations. Nevertheless, despite formal support from the EU, Italy's negotiating position face to a rising power remains rather weak, so the issue is still not solved, and actually threatens to undermine the perception that EU support can really make the difference.

As for crossloading, changes in the perception of belonging to a European community due to the crisis have had an impact also on Italian public opinion's attitude towards foreign policy. Although available data only cover the 2011-2014 period, the Eurobarometer shows a very stable support at the European level toward a common foreign policy. In Italy (figure 4), public opinion support towards a common foreign policy is very high and represents a vast majority, but figures also demonstrate a more marked declining trend in the years in which Italy was most affected by the crisis. In addition, the percentage of Italians against a common foreign policy increased, reaching 25 per cent in May 2012 and 26% in November 2013, and then slightly declined. Signs of a trend change and new increase in support of a common foreign policy appeared in 2014, when, despite the fact that the crisis was still hitting hard, signs of economic recovery started being announced. Although the Eurobarometer results confirm that Italian public opinion still strongly supports a common foreign policy, they also suggest that the economic crisis may have led Italian public opinion to start questioning more than in the past EU foreign policy and the capability of the EU to defend its member states.

Figure 4: Italian public opinion support towards a common foreign policy 2011-2014 (Source: Eurobarometer)[23]



The economic crisis has been found to have an indirect effect on diffuse support for Europe, as it mostly affected trust and the perception of the benefits deriving from EU.[24] Indeed, data from the Eurobarometer highlights a negative influence of the international economic crisis on the opinion of Italians towards the EU and therefore touch upon a crucial aspect of its sense of belonging to a European community, with the EU now seen more as a problem than an opportunity. However, the crisis has a negative influence also on the resources available to Italy to promote its foreign policy under a very tight budget: while existing commitments have been maintained, Italian governments have made clear that no new missions are possible unless strictly related to core national interests.

In order to understand whether and how these changes following the international economic and financial crisis have had an impact on the Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy, it is useful to analyze Italian behavior at the UN, where the full range of foreign policy issues comes to be analysed and European countries have long acquired the

habit of working together. This allows a more systematic analysis of whether Italian foreign policy has de-Europeanised, by how much and on which issues.

Italian De-Europeanising at the UN?

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) represents one of the most useful *fora* for analyzing in a systematic and comprehensive way continuities and changes in the Europeanisation of EU member states' foreign policies. Katie Laatikainen and Karen Smith have pointed out that three types of Europeanisation can be seen at play at the UN: the development of institutional capability for coordinating the policies of the EU member states; the adaptation of EU member states to ensure consistency and effectiveness to the EU voice; and an external diffusion process of European ideas and institutions.[25]

Acting as a single political group at the UNGA is a choice that creates a new institutional layer for EU states, one that is not formally recognized but that is perceived by the other UN member states.[26] Coordination at the UN, and especially the UNGA, means that "[d]ebate about the particular policy question or agenda item is continued until all members of the EU group without any exception agree to the direction and wording of the policy to be endorsed".[27]

If Europeanisation has been recorded at the UN, there is still considerable variation in the degree of adaptation of EU member states towards a EU diplomacy[28] and remarkable differences have been registered on some issues,[29] reminding us that EU member states tend to defect when it comes to vital national issues. However, the increase in EU member states voting cohesion at the UNGA is generally considered as evidence of coordination results, as it has been repeatedly pointed out that starting from the 1990s coordination efforts at the UNGA drove to a marked increase in EU states voting cohesion. However, voting cohesion should not only to be associated with increasing similar interests among European states, but also as a result of the intense coordination work made in Brussels and by the missions of the member states in New York.[30] As shown by Johansson Nogués,

EU member states since the second half of the 1990s have managed to increase the level of unanimous votes to around 80% and to drastically reduce two-way splits and three-way splits.[31] Moreover, EU cohesion levels are generally higher than those for the full UNGA and differences in cohesion level are not necessarily registered on 'high politics' issues.[32]

The existing analyses on Italian voting behavior indicate a good record of Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy at the UN.[33] Going to the issues on which Italy could be seen as distant from the EU majority, Paul Luif highlighted that the distance Italy had from the EU majority in the UNGA during the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s on crucial issues such as the Middle East, security and disarmament, decolonization and human rights was minimal: Italy did belong to the existing EU majority regardless of the issue.[34] Interestingly, the 1990s even saw an improvement on the already excellent record of Italy as a European country, while the early 2000s saw a minimal (not necessarily meaningful) distance from the EU majority on the issue of human rights, which can be considered of particular importance for the Europeanisation of foreign policy.

Should the economic crisis have affected the Europeanized behavior of Italy at the UN, we would expect it to be reflected in: a) variations in Italian distance from the UNGA majority, because de-Europeanising corresponds to more freedom of maneuver and therefore to reduced efforts at coordinating positions; b) variations in closeness of the Italian vote to the countries that were involved the most in the crisis (such as Germany, on the one hand, the other Southern European countries, on the other) or that are traditionally particularly important for EU dynamics at the UN (such as the United Kingdom and France, because of their permanent seat in the Security Council), as a result of the repositioning. Should the economic crisis have affected the Europeanised behavior of Italy at the UN, it could also be expected that, moving closer to the other traditional pillar of Italian foreign policy, a move away from the EU could lead Italy closer to the USA than to EU states.

In order to see whether the international economic crisis has affected this record and how, an analysis of EU member states voting behavior

in the recorded votes (roll-call) in the UNGA has been conducted on the 59th to the 67th (partial)[35] sessions, i.e. for the period 2004-2013, a period long enough to verify whether the crisis has resulted in variations in Italian behavior.[36] Contrary to some existing literature on UNGA voting behavior, the choice was made to consider all recorded votes taken, not just those pertaining to a resolution, as these votes are at times extremely important to understand divisions within the EU.[37] As literature is divided on how to consider distance in relation to abstention and negative votes, here it has been preferred to focus on the existence of divisions, and therefore to regard 'yes', 'no', 'abstention' and 'absence' as four different positions, considering all of them as political decisions. This choice has been made also taking into account that no EU member state mission at the UN is so small that it cannot afford the presence of a national representative, and taking into account that at times EU member states were absent only for specific votes, but were present both before and after the missed votes.

Before proceeding to look at Italian voting behavior, a consideration of the general context is in order. EU cohesion in the period 2004-2013 had remarkable variations not previously registered, with drops in cohesion that are comparable to a pre-Single European Act situation. Interestingly, the drops in cohesion were registered in the 62nd UNGA session of 2007-2008 (41% of EU divided votes) and in the 65th UNGA session of 2010-2011 (38% of EU divided votes), that is immediately after the two phases of the crisis started to hit Europe. Partial data (from September 2012 to May 2013) regarding the 67th UNGA confirm deep divisions among EU member states and the trend line of EU divided votes is a positive one, pointing towards an increase of the votes on which the EU divides at the UNGA, and therefore towards reduced EU cohesion at the UNGA.

Italy's distance from the EU majority was calculated (table 1). In order to adapt to the enlargement rounds in the period under consideration, the EU majority was determined to be thirteen EU members for the 59th session, fourteen for the sessions from 60th to 66th and fifteen for the 67th session.[38] Although data are not immediately comparable, Italy seems to be slightly more distant from the EU majority than it was in the period

under consideration by Katie Laatikainen and Paul Luif. This is particularly evident in the 60th, 64th and 65th sessions. During the 60th session, pre-crisis, Italy was absent during six votes, five on environmental issues and one on UN operational activities.

Table 1: Italian Distance from EU Majority in the UNGA

UNGA session	59th 2004-05	60th 2005-06	61st 2006-07	62nd 2007-08	63rd 2008-09	64th 2009-10	65th 2010-11	66th 2011-12
I distance from EU majority	2	6	0	3	2	5	8	3
EU divided votes	31	30	32	41	26	28	38	25

More interesting for the purposes of this article, however, is the increased distance in the 64th and 65th sessions, after the crisis. Table 2 shows that during the 64th session, Italy assumed a minority position three times on human rights issues, and twice on the Gaza conflict. During the 65th session, Italy assumed a minority position once on a resolution on decolonization, five times it was absent in votes on armaments, but most importantly it was twice in a minority position in votes on nuclear issues, to the point of being not only the only EU member state, but also a very isolated UN member (only Bosnia and Pakistan voted with Italy) to vote against the inclusion of a paragraph calling for the immediate start of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a fissile-material cut off treaty.

Table 2: Issues on which Italy Distanced from the EU Majority

59th 2004-05	60th 2005-06	61st 2006-07	62nd 2007-08	63rd 2008-09	64th 2009-10	65th 2010-11	66th 2011-12	67th 2012-2013 (partial)
Human rights (2)	Environment (5) UN operational issues (1)	None	Armaments (1) Nuclear (1) Outer space (1)	Armaments (1) Nuclear (1)	Human rights (3) Gaza (2)	Armaments (5) Nuclear (2) Decolonization (1)	Armaments (1) Nuclear (1) Human rights (1)	Armaments (1) Nuclear (1) Human rights (1)

In the period under consideration Italy voted unlike the EU majority fifteen times on disarmament and nuclear issues, seven times on human rights issues, five times on environmental issues, twice on the Middle East, once on decolonization issues and once on UN operational issues and on outer space. While the concentration of defections in relation to disarmament and nuclear issues indicates a constant distance from the EU majority in relation to an issue that is evidently perceived as pertaining to its vital interests and on which Italy wants to preserve its sovereignty, it is more interesting to note the distance on human rights, as this is an issue area that characterizes the EU as a normative power and is considered in the literature as an indicator of Europeanisation. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this trend confirms what had already been observed by Paul Luif [39] regarding the minimal distance of Italy from the EU majority on the Middle East, security and disarmament, decolonization and human rights.

It is also important to note that, if the crisis has had an impact on the Italian willingness to be part of the EU majority in the 64th and 65th sessions, the following sessions indicate that distances have been much reduced. All in all, it is possible to see a temporary and limited impact of the crisis within a longer trend of a more critical and less passive Italian attitude toward the EU, more than irreversible signs of de-Europeanizing as a result of the crisis.

This impression seems to be confirmed by the continuity of Italian voting behavior in the UNGA in Italian closeness to or distance from other EU countries. It is worth highlighting that the distance here calculated concerns of all the EU divided votes and not just the ones on which Italy distanced itself from the EU majority. Calculating distance as the percentage of different voting behavior adopted in EU divided votes, it is remarkable the constant distance Italy has from the United Kingdom and France, who regularly figure on top of the list, before and after the crisis. Among other countries, Malta, Cyprus and Sweden also figure regularly on top positions and no meaningful variations could be registered after the crisis. On the contrary, it is also remarkable to find Germany regularly at the bottom of the list, signaling that the crisis did not make Italian foreign policy more

distant from a country whose position Italy mostly opposed in the economic and financial sector, and therefore that the disagreements in relation to the crisis and its management were not transferred in the foreign policy sector and on Italian Europeanisation.

However, considering that here all different positions are considered as equally distant, it is worth analyzing closeness too, that is which EU states voted exactly like Italy in EU divided votes. Interestingly, a variation in the countries on top of the list can be registered, but it is mostly in relation to small countries among the 'new' EU members. On the contrary, despite the crisis, Italian and German voting cohesion increased and became stable, to the point of putting Germany as the closest country to Italy since the 61st UNGA session. France and the United Kingdom are regularly the least close to Italy.

Figure 5 allows us to better understand variations in the Italian position in relation to the main actors of the crisis. Should the crisis transfer from the economic and financial sector to foreign policy, greater distance between Italy and Germany could be expected, but also a greater closeness between Italy and the other EU countries mostly affected by the crisis and in which a great resentment towards the EU and its measures took place; that is, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. In addition, considering that France distanced itself from Germany in the solutions proposed, a greater closeness to France could be expected. Finally the United Kingdom being the most distant country from the EU, a greater closeness between the two countries could signal a strategic alliance in the direction towards a loss of interest for the EU.

The closeness between Italy and Germany peaked before the crisis and was affected by it. Indeed, during the 65th session, the voting cohesion dropped by seventeen points compared to the previous session and by twenty one points compared to the 63rd, that is when the economic crisis hit the hardest. Moreover, the cohesion level never recovered to the top levels of the 61st, 62nd and 63rd sessions. However, not only cohesion levels dramatically improved during the 66th session, and the trend line in the considered period shows an increase in cohesion, but Germany remained the third EU closest country to Italy.

Should this trend be confirmed in the following years, this would result in a temporary impact of the crisis more than in a permanent change.

Interestingly, cohesion with France followed a similar trend, showing that, despite the different positions between France and Germany on how to deal with the economic crisis, Italy and France maintained and even worsened their distance after the crisis hit. However, as in the case of Germany, its closeness improved starting from the 66th session. Interestingly, also the closeness Italy had with the other affected countries worsened as a result of the crisis. Particularly interesting is the drop in Italian-Greek closeness during the 63rd session. However, the 66th session and the partial 67th session show a great improvement and closeness between the countries that were hit the hardest by the crisis. Interestingly, though, the trend line of relations with Greece is less steep than the one of relations with Germany. This indicates that the countries most affected by the crisis did not form in the UNGA a coalition that is alternative to Germany. As for the closeness between Italy and the UK, it only worsened after the crisis hit, showing that Italy has never looked to the UK as an alternative.

Relations with the US, on the contrary, critically improved after the crisis started and the two countries became much closer (figure 6). The distance between the two countries was reduced from 72% of different votes in the 61st session to 38% in the 66th.. This might confirm that Italy started looking more at the US. However, a comparison with the distance from Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Greece shows that the US is still at a great distance in comparison with the other European countries: Germany, Spain and Greece remain much closer to Italy. Figure 6 also leads to think to the Obama Presidency and its attention toward multilateralism as a more plausible explanation for the variation.

Figure 5: Italian Closeness to the Main Actors of the Crisis in the UNGA (Source: Personal elaboration on UN data)



Figure 6: Italian distance from the US, Germany, France, Greece, Spain and the UK in the UNGA (Source: Personal elaboration on UN data)



To sum up, although Italian voting behavior in the UNGA after the crisis showed a slight reduction in processes that could be associated with downloading, as indicated by the increase in the number of dissenting votes Italy expressed in relation to the EU majority and by the issues on which it expressed it, disarmament and nuclear issues and even more on human rights, the change appears to be rather limited and has to be contextualised as taking place at a moment of increasing fragmentation in EU member states' voting behavior at the UN. Accordingly, Italian stances seem to be related to an EU temporary incapacity to reach a common position more than to domestic factors or to a reduced keenness to adopt common positions and adapt its foreign policy accordingly. On the contrary, Italy tends to appear firmly with the majority of EU member states, even when, as in the 64th and 65th sessions, the effect of the crisis became apparent and Italy voted alone or with the minority of EU member states more often than usual.

As for uploading, not only does the analysis confirm the Italian willingness to contribute to EU common stances, but it also suggests that no nationalistic factor related to the crisis has been in place. Contrary to expectations that Italy might have distanced itself from Germany and become closer to other countries deeply affected by the crisis, translating disagreements on economic policies and nationalistic stances into the field of foreign policy, the initial slight distance from the German position was compensated by the continuity in the position of Germany as one of the EU member states whose voting behavior was closest to the Italian one. And the reduced distance with other affected countries never became an alternative coalition nucleus. Finally, very often the Italian opposition to the EU majority took place on operative paragraphs, indicating the attempt to influence the final version of the resolution to be adopted rather than to stop the adoption of a resolution.

As for crossloading, it is not possible to say that conditions resulting from the economic crisis are introducing changes that undermine the European orientation of Italian foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that the perception of an increased European

fragmentation has increased the freedom of maneuver that Italy perceives, therefore creating new incentives to act independently from the EU majority when Italian interests and values are at stake.

Conclusions

This article intended to assess whether Italian foreign policy has – or not – de-Europeanized in the three dimensions of downloading, uploading and cross-loading, and whether this process can be related to the international economic crisis, both in terms of loss of the internal bonds and in terms of loss of capabilities to contribute due to a reduced availability of resources. In order to do that, an analysis of Italian voting behavior in the UNGA was conducted, to see whether meaningful variations could be registered because of the crisis. Particular attention was paid to variation in the distance of Italian voting behavior from the EU majority and from specific countries that were mostly involved in the economic crisis or represented potential alternatives. Variations were registered after the crisis. However, they seem to be limited and temporary, more the result of EU states difficulties in building and maintaining a level of governance than the result of a process of Italian foreign policy de-Europeanisation. The Italian greater freedom of maneuver seems to be more related to a rather temporary permissive context than to a greater willingness to free ride. However, partial data from the 67th UNGA session remain as a warning that tensions are still present and capable of inflicting more permanent damage not only on the Europeanisation of Italian foreign policy, but also on EU achievements in the realm of foreign policy in general, and at the UN in particular.

NOTES

1. Paolo Rosa, "L'europeizzazione della politica estera: tra sovranazionalismo e transgovernativismo", in Sergio Fabbrini (ed.), *L'europeizzazione dell'Italia*, Roma, Laterza, 2003.

2. Rosa, "L'europeizzazione della politica estera", *op. cit*., p. 223.

3. Rosa, "L'europeizzazione della politica estera", *op. cit*., p. 231.

4. Rosa, "L'europeizzazione della politica estera", *op. cit*., p. 234.

5. Rosa, "L'europeizzazione della politica estera", *op. cit*., p. 233, footnote 40.

6. Rosa, "L'europeizzazione della politica estera", *op. cit*., p. 228.

7. Donatella Della Porta and Manuela Caiani, *Quale Europa? Europeizzazione, identità e conflitti*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

9. Marco Mazzoni and Giovanni Barbieri, "Grasshoppers against Ants or Malfunctions of Capitalism? The Representation of the European Economic Crisis in the Main Italian Newspapers", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014, pp. 238-253.

10. Manuela Caiani and Nicolò Conti, "In the Name of the People: The Euroscepticism of the Italian Radical Right", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014, pp. 188-189.

11. Roxana Barbulescu and Laurie Beaudonnet, "Protecting Us, Protecting Europe? Public Concern about Immigration and Declining Support for European Integration in Italy", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014, pp. 216-237.

12. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showtable.cfm?keyID=2202&nationID=8,&startdate=2003.11&enddate=2014.11 (accessed on 5.4. 2015). The Eurobarometer question was: "In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?"

13. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showtable.cfm?keyID=2193&nationID=8,&startdate=2003.11&enddate=2014.11(accessed on 5.4 2015). The Eurobarometer question was: "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not. The European Union."

14. Elisabetta Brighi, "Resisting Europe? The Case of Italy's Foreign Policy" in Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill (eds), *National and European Foreign Policies. Towards Europeanization*, London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 57-58.

15. Elisabetta Brighi, "Resisting Europe? The Case of Italy's Foreign Policy", *op. cit*., p 69.

16. *Ibid.,*p 70.

17. Rosa, "L'europeizzazione della politica estera", *op. cit*., pp. 235-236.

18. Brighi, "Resisting Europe? The Case of Italy's Foreign Policy", *op. cit*., p. 64.

19. "Dietro il sì italiano, la scelta di Monti per un'Unione Europea più coesa", La

Stampa, 29.11.2012, http://www.lastampa.it/2012/11/29/esteri/dietro-il-si-italiano-la-scelta-di-monti-per-un-unione-europea-piu-coesa-k2hZj6IkYpwTTRmrzBfNBI/pagina.html accessed on 6 April 2015.

20. http://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/Pagine/Operazioni_int.aspx accessed on 5 April 2015.

21. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml both accessed on 5 April 2015. Data refer to February of each year.

22. Camera dei Deputati, http://www.camera.it/leg17/1050?appro=867&La+controversia+con+l%27India+sui+due+mar%C3%B2+imbarcati+sulla+%27Enrica+Lexie%22 (accessed on 5.4 2015), and *Statement by the Spokesperson of the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on the case of two Italian marines involved in an incident off the coast of Kerala in India*, Brussels, 21.12. 2012, A 588/12.

23. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showtable.cfm?keyID=3786&nationID = 16,8,&startdate=2011.05&enddate=2014.11 (accessed on 5.4 2015). The Eurobarometer question is "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common foreign policy of the 27 Member States of the EU".

24. Danilo Di Mauro, "Is the Honeymoon Over? Explaining Italy's Mass Support and Opposition towards Europe", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014, pp. 143-164.

25. Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, "Introduction – The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure?" in Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds), *The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms*, Houndmills , Palgrave, 2006, p. 9.

26. Esa Paasivirta and Dominic Porter, "EU coordination at the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC: a view from Brussels, a view from New York" in Jan Wouters and Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (eds), *The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership*, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, p. 35.

27. Juergen Dedring, "Reflection on the Coordination of the EU Member States in Organs of the United Nations", *CFSP Forum*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, p. 2.

28. Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds), *The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms*, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2006.

29. Paul Luif, *EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly*, EU Institute of Security Studies Occasional Paper, No. 49, 2003.

30. Paul Luif, *EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly*, *ibid.*; Katie V. Laatikainen, "Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and

Autonomy", *CFSP Forum*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, pp. 4-9.; Esa Paasivirta and Dominic Porter, "EU coordination at the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC", *op. cit.;* Madeleine O. Hosli *et al.*"Squaring the Circle? Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform", *Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2011, pp. 163-87.

31. Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, "The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the 'Old' and 'New' Europe?", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004, p. 72.
32. Madeleine O. Hosli *et al* , "Squaring the circle? Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform", *op. cit.*
33. L Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, "Introduction – The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure?", *op. cit*.; Luif, *EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly*, op. cit.
34. Paul Luif, *EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly* , *op. cit.*
35. Please, note that because of data availability regarding the 67th UNGA session only the period until May 2013 was considered, so data regarding the 67th UNGA session are not comparable with data regarding previous periods and were included in the analysis only to provide an idea of the trend.
36. Data were taken from the UN General Assembly website http://www.un.org/en/ga/ in relation to resolutions and from the UN website UNBISNET unbisnet.un.org, and the meeting records and/or press releases were analyzed for each session.
37. In this sense, see also Luif, *EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly*, op. cit.
38. This means that votes on A/RES/59/75 (split 11-3-11-0), A/RES/61/125 (split 13-0-11-4), A/RES/67/36 (split 12-2-13-1) and A/RES/67/19 (split 14-1-13-0) could not be taken into consideration because no EU majority was formed.
39. Paul Luif, *EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly*, *op. cit.*

From a Good to a Poor Student: The De-Europeanisation of Slovenian Foreign Policy in the Light of (European) Economic and Financial Crisis

Ana Bojinović Fenko* and Marko Lovec**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article traite de la question de la dé-européanisation de la politique étrangère slovène à la lumière de la crise financière et économique européenne. Il propose un cadre théorique qui établit une distinction entre l'européanisation comme une variable indépendante / dépendante et l'agence / structure, permettant ainsi d'identifier quatre types de mécanismes facilitant le processus d'européanisation et les résultats de celle-ci. La recherche empirique est réalisée par une étude du processus de la prise de décision au niveau de la politique étrangère slovène, basée sur des entretiens avec les principaux responsables slovènes du ministère des Affaires étrangères et des diplomates, ainsi que sur des documents primaires et de la littérature secondaire. Basé sur les conclusions issues de la recherche empirique cet article soutient que dans le contexte de la crise financière et économique européenne, l'Union européenne est devenue plus une partie du problème qu'une partie de la solution pour les priorités slovènes de la politique étrangère : ce qui explique pourquoi le processus slovène de décision politique étrangère s'est dégagé du niveau de l'Union européenne; la politique étrangère slovène en substance a été écartée considérablement du cadre normatif européen.

ABSTRACT

This article deals with the issue of de-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy in the light of the (European) financial and economic crisis. It proposes a theoretical framework that distinguishes between Europeanisation as an independent/dependent variable and between the agency/structure drivers, thus enabling to identify four types of mechanisms facilitating the Europeanisation process and (its) outcomes. Empirical research is based on a multi-case study of Slovenian foreign policy decision-making which draws on interviews with key Slovenian foreign ministry officials and diplomats, as well as on primary documents and secondary literature. Based on the conclusions stemming from empirical research this article

* University of Ljubljana, ** University of Ljubljana.

argues that in the context of the (European) financial and economic crisis, the European Union (EU) has become more a part of the problem than a part of the solution for Slovenian foreign policy priorities: which is why the Slovenian foreign policy-making process has been disengaged from the European Union level and Slovenian foreign policy in substance significantly departed from the EUropean normative framework.

Introduction: From a Good to a Poor Student

After acquiring full membership to the European Union (EU) in 2004, Slovenian foreign policy underwent a process of Europeanisation. Being a relatively small country, dependent on other EU member states for trade, the process of integration and accommodation to the EU norms, rules and policies was essential for Slovenia's ability to pursue its national preferences. On the other hand, the EU norms, rules and policies played as an opportunity for Slovenian foreign policy makers to enhance their foreign policy instruments.[1]

Apart from influencing the means available to foreign policy makers, the integration into the EU has been influencing Slovenian foreign policy preferences as such. With a short post-socialist history of an independent foreign policy and lacking a particularly developed foreign policy agenda regarding various issues and areas of interests in world politics, Slovenia was inclined to adopt the EU policies.[2] As one of the few analyses of the Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy has demonstrated, Slovenia has downloaded significantly from the EU level in the post-enlargement period.[3] Furthermore, departing from its socialist past, Slovenian foreign policy was in search of a new, western type liberal democratic foreign policy identity, which it sought to establish through the EU membership.[4] In the eyes of Slovenian foreign policy makers, the recognition of Slovenia as a good student bore huge importance and Slovenia did in fact come to serve as a model of a successful Europeanisation for other Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and the countries in Western Balkans.[5]

Since the strengthening of the economic crisis in the Eurozone periphery, which followed the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, the process of the Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy has been on a slowdown. The asymmetrical policy of the member

states from the Eurozone centre, demanding fiscal discipline without recognizing the structural difficulties faced by the EU periphery, increased pressures on Slovenian foreign policy makers to seek alternative opportunities of investment and growth. The search for alternative partnerships, the reorientation of capacities and the engagement in alternative institutional and normative frameworks (e.g. economic partnerships with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) has weakened the drivers of the Europeanisation process. What is more, as perceived by Slovenian foreign policy-makers, the image of the EU has become antagonized and the EU itself began to treat Slovenia as a problematic student. Thus Slovenia went from a 'good student' to (literary) a 'poor student'.

This article addresses the issue of the de-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy in light of the (European) financial and economic crisis. The conceptualizations of the Europeanisation process[6] are facing the problem of being too particular and insufficiently related with the more general theories of the (EU) integration process. The analytical differentiation between Europeanisation as a mean/process (dependent variable) and Europeanisation as a goal/outcome (independent variable), employed by standard conceptualizations are often epistemologically shallow. The conceptual framework proposed by this research establishes the differentiation between the mechanisms facilitating the Europeanisation of the foreign policies (a) as a consequence of governmental choice and (b) as a consequence of EU institutions and norms, as well as the differentiation between Europeanisation (I) as a means of pursuing national foreign policy objectives and (II) as a goal facilitated by the context of integration in which national foreign policies are being formed.

The blurred lines between Europeanisation as a dependent and as an independent variable raise methodological issues as well.[7] In order to establish the mechanisms facilitating the (De-)Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy, this article engages in a comparative analysis of cases from the pre- and post-crisis periods. The case studies draw on various empirical resources including the interviews with foreign policy decision-makers and foreign policy implementers and employ

the triangulation of different methods of empirical and logical reasoning.

Conceptual framework: the Europeanisation in the Period of Crisis

The process of Europeanisation refers to the adoption of the EU norms, institutions and policies by a country, usually as a consequence of its integration and membership to the EU.[8] The conceptualizations of the Europeanisation process have tended to employ very specific abstractions of the mechanisms facilitating Europeanisation. Following Nicole Alecu de Flers, and Patrick Müller[9] various authors, such as Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis, Reuben Yik-Pern Wong and Claudia Mayor and Karolina Pomorska have been more engaged in producing their own conceptualizations of the Europeanisation process than trying to rework the existing ones, which has resulted in a conceptual overspecialisation and duplication slowing down the progress in the field.[10] The problem of particularity in the conceptualizations of the Europeanisation process has had a more general dimension in the lack of attempts to better integrate the Europeanisation process into the general theories of European integration, both by the scholars of the Europeanisation as well as by the scholars of the European integration theory.

This article employs a differentiation between two general types of mechanisms through which the process of Europeanisation in the field of foreign policy of a member state occurs as a consequence of interest-based behaviour of national decision makers. The first mechanism (a) is based on opportunities and constraints provided by the agreements between national governments. Member states can engage in common foreign policy action and pool their sovereign powers, thus decreasing the policy costs and taking advantage of the policy of scale[11]. Small sates which have fewer resources at their disposal and are in the position of an asymmetrical dependence are often under pressure to follow and support foreign policies of bigger countries in order to be able to pursue their own objectives. [12] The second mechanism (b) is

based on opportunities and constraints provided by the institutions, such as rules and procedures, and by the norms that are a part of the EU framework. Although the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is not characterized by a hierarchical type of organization and requires consent of the member states, regular attempts to establish a common EU policy as such, build trust among national policy makers and decrease the transaction costs for an EU policy.[13] Furthermore, when arguing in favour of individual policy propositions, the decision makers employ certain norms, some of which have acquired a more permanent, institutionalized role. By influencing the legitimacy of individual claims, shared norms can facilitate the EU foreign policies.[14] The EU norms, institutions and policies can enable smaller member states to compensate for their lack of other resources when trying to project their foreign policy preferences onto the EU level.[15]

The second problem of the conceptualizations of the Europeanisation process in the field of member states' foreign policies is that national preferences which are the basis for choice of instruments that facilitate the Europeanisation process are not necessarily a consequence of various actors' individual interests; member states' foreign policies can be influenced by the ideational assumptions underlying governmental preferences as such, which can either promote or inhibit the Europeanisation process. The Europeanisation process can thus not be merely treated as a consequence of rational and institutional choice. It can also be a product of change in the preferences originating in various reasons, such as the process of learning or the internalization of preferences through the socialization process. Following Nicole Alecu de Flers, and Patrick Müller,[16] the role of the preferences points out the circularity of the independent and dependent variables in the process of Europeanisation. What is more, this process-based ontology also reflects a larger epistemological issue, since interest-based behaviour and its rationalist implications including institutional ones, are embedded in the perceptions of things that are often taken for granted and that can usually only be changed through a period of time.[17] Based on existing conceptualizations of the Europeanisation process, this article thus differentiates between (I) Europeanisation as a dependent

variable and (II) Europeanisation as an independent variable. In terms of independent variable, Europeanisation is taken as the source of influence on states' foreign policies, whereas in terms of dependent variable, Europeanisation is the object of analysis that has potentially changed due to national foreign policies. Europeanisation type I and II are portrayed in Table 1 in the top two horizontal boxes.

Europeanisation is thus understood as a process of social learning of European norms, whereby norms by definition concern behaviour – they embody rules and roles which channel behaviour (practices).[18] The most prevailing conceptualisations of social learning derive from social theory in International Politics.[19] In terms of preferences-based Europeanisation of national foreign policies, we can establish the differentiation between (a) more individualist and (b) more normative and institutional mechanisms facilitating the Europeanisation; in Table 1 shown in the vertical two boxes on the left. In the case of individualist mechanisms (a) Europeanisation is a product of learning through which foreign policy-makers adopt a certain set of preferences, which influences how they pursue various policy objectives. The individualist type of internalisation of preferences influencing the Europeanisation process is also known as the type 1 internalisation or 'strategic socialization'.[20] In International Relations, the latter is referred to as norm diffusion through the logic of practice as simple learning, i.e. thick rationalism, meaning causal identity formation by logic of consequences.[21] If agents have not deeply internalised norms, they have an instrumental attitude toward them. "They may go along with the group only because they have calculated that it is useful for them as individuals at the moment to do so" – the pathway of culture reproduction is self-interest.[22] In this situation individuals will constantly question the rationality of their rule-driven co-operation, constantly looking for ways to free ride and as such corporate cultures will survive only if they are efficient.[23]

In the case of normative and institutional mechanisms (b) Europeanisation is a product of more or less organised social interaction, through which agency takes over deep assumptions about things that later on influence its preferences-based behaviour. The structural type

of internalisation is also known as the type 2 internalisation or 'deep socialisation';[24] in the social constructivist language referred to as complex learning, i.e. constitutive identity formation by 'logic of appropriateness' (adopted after Alexander Wendt[25] and Finnemore[26]). This behaviour is structure-driven[27]. In Alexander Wend terms[28] it has the highest degree of internalising social structure where the pathway for observing the norm and reproducing the latter is legitimacy, meaning that actors will observe a norm due to their preference formation based on a legitimate identity self-reference to the norm and not due to a strategic calculation of benefits.[29]

Table 1: Mechanisms facilitating the process of Europeanisation as a dependent and independent variable

	Europeanisation as Dependent Variable (Type I)	**Europeanisation As Independent Variable (Type II)**
Europeanisation process	***Process drivers***	***Process outcomes***
a. Agency	Governmental choice (policy of scale; asymmetrical dependence)	Internalization type 1 (learning/strategic socialization, logic of consequences)
b. Structure (institutions, ideas, norms)	Institutional choice (lower transaction costs; shared norms)	Internalization type 2 (deep socialization, logic of appropriateness)

Source: own summary.

The above reflection on the understanding and research of the Europeanisation process as shown in Table 1 does not challenge a more 'conventional' conceptual understanding of Europeanisation, established by processes of the Europeanisation, namely of down-, up-

and cross-loading of norms and practices as summarized by Claudia Mayor and Karolina Pomorska.[30] Down-loading of EU norms and values is represented by the IIa and IIb boxes; in both cases Europeanisation is understood as an independent variable, affecting member states identities, interests (preferences) and thus behaviour. Up-loading can be identified in the top left box (Ia) and cross-loading in bottom left box (Ib), both denoting the research of the Europeanisation process as a dependent variable, subjected to influence from member states' (or other actors') foreign policy actions.

Europeanisation in the field of member states' foreign policies is not a one-way process; the weakening of the mechanisms facilitating the adoption of the EU norms, institutions and policies or the strengthening of alternative mechanisms can produce De-Europeanisation of EU policies.[31] In terms of governmental choice, the changes in opportunities and constraints provided by agreements between the member states' governments as a consequence of events, such as the increased asymmetry of interests between the member states, changed balance of power and increased opportunities provided by the agreements with non-member states, are all factors which facilitate the re-nationalisation of EU policies.[32] The rules, norms and procedures facilitating the Europeanisation process can change as well. In terms of the Europeanisation as an independent variable, the estimation of poor results of pursing the pro-European preferences can produce a more anti-European choice of a set of preferences. What is more, the EU can be viewed as a part of the problem and an antagonistic construction.

In this article, operationalisation of De-Europeanisation is thus two-fold: in terms of Europeanisation as an independent variable, De-Europeanisation means a change in the effects that Europeanisation has on national foreign policy in the form of disrespecting the practices and norms which had previously been internalised but have now changed due to interest-driven governmental preference (change from Europeanisation IIb into IIa). In terms of Europeanisation as a dependent variable, De-Europeanisation will denote any change in the observation of European practices and norms themselves which has resulted as a consequence of national deviations from previously

conducted practices or norms due to governmental (Europeanisation Ia) or institutional choice (Europeanisation Ib). De-Europeanisation in this respect may thus not necessarily refer to 'less' of EUropean practices and norms but to a different manner of the Europeanisation process.

Methodology

The specific nature of the object of research and/or of the conceptual frameworks employed and the blurred line between the Europeanisation as a dependant and as an independent variable produce various methodological obstacles.[33] In order to establish the mechanisms facilitating the De-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy, this article engages in a comparative analysis of various case studies taken from the pre- and post-crisis periods. [34] The global financial and economic crisis broke out in 2008 and turned into an asymmetrical crisis of the Eurozone area in the following years. Being a part of the Eurozone periphery, Slovenia found itself trapped in-between structural pressures and fiscal deficits

Selected cases represent a variety of issues that gained media attention in Slovenia and in the EU, as well as some other issues that are relevant from the perspective of the object of research, i.e. effects of Europeanisation on Slovenian foreign policy before and after the economic/financial crisis and effects of Slovenian foreign policy changes on the Europeanisation process itself. In terms of analysing De-Europeanisation as dependent variable, we concentrate on Slovenian foreign policy substance in the following two selected cases: Slovenian observation of the right of self-determination of peoples before the crisis (act of recognition of Kosovo independence in March 2008 despite potential negative economic effects on trade and investment flows with Serbia) and during the crisis (Slovenia's vote of abstention on the Palestinian observer status in the UN GA in November 2012, which was related with the United States' financial rescue of the high state budget deficit), and Slovenian observation of human rights and democratic principles of governance before the crisis and Slovenian veto during

the economic crisis period on the Council of the EU proposed sanctions in the form of visa blacklist of individuals allegedly related to Belarus undemocratic regime and accused of human rights violations, where one of the listed names was related to a highly valuable Slovenian company's business deal; In terms of analysing changes of the Europeanisation as a dependent variable, which is affected by the measures taken due to (European) economic and financial crisis as reflected in Slovenian foreign policy, we focus on a case of Slovenian foreign policy process in relation to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) issues. The latter was affected by growing rationalisation of Slovenian capital-based experts' participation within the CFSP-related issues and other negative influences affecting the quality of Slovenian foreign policy process related to national representation in the EU, thus also potentially changing the practices of the process of Europeanisation itself.

The case studies draw on various empirical resources including interviews with decision-makers and employ triangulation of empirical and logical methods. Each of the case studies tries to provide for answers on the following questions; how does de-Europeanisation reflect the opportunities and constraints provided to individual governments by the intergovernmental agreements at the EU level (Europeanisation Ia); would the de-Europeanisation be different without the presence of the EU institutions (Europeanisation Ib); how have preferences of the decision makers been changed due to crisis effects (Europeanisation IIa); how have the normative assumptions underlying the choices of the policy makers influenced their preferences despite the crisis (Europeanisation IIb).

Europeanisation as an Independent Variable; De-Europeanisation of the Substance of Slovenian Foreign Policy

In this section we analyse two case studies of the influence of economic and financial crisis on Slovenian substantive foreign policy standpoints and actions. Both cases refer to observation of otherwise highly important normative principles referred to by the Slovenian

national normative framework, European custom law and core EU values; namely the right of self-determination of peoples (case one) and observation of human rights and democratic principles of governance (case two).

The first case of the observation of the principle of right of self-determination of peoples is of a constitutive nature and thus of utmost importance to Slovenian people and the state since the country was formed on the basis of this 1974 constitutional principle of the Socialist Federative Yugoslavia. Nation-and state-building of Slovenians and Slovenia thus hold this principle very dear as it legitimised the break-up of Yugoslavia and enabled independent states to be formed in the early 1990s on the basis of the former Yugoslav republics. The Republic of Slovenia highly values this principle as it is written in the preamble of its constitution as the foundation of its formation.[35] Consistent with this domestic normative framework, Slovenia has been a steady promoter of this principle since it defines it in strategic foreign policy document(s) as its fundamental foreign policy value.[36] When a Serbian province Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, Slovenia recognised Kosovo rather early, on 5 March the same year, as the twentieth state; fifteenth of the EU member states and the first of the states from the post-Yugoslav area.[37] There was much domestic deliberation on this act.

Besides the historically-rooted favourable inclinations of the Slovenian people and government to recognise Kosovo on the basis of the people's self-determination principle, the Slovenian government took into account also that it must act as a responsible EU member state, whose reaction is of extreme importance to the EU as firstly, Slovenia is a post-Yugoslav state which acts as expert bridge-builder between the EU and the Western Balkans and secondly, as Slovenia was at the time holding a six-month Presidency of the Council of the EU.[38] Also, since "the European Community had failed to speak with a single voice over the issue of recognition of Slovenia (and Croatia), Slovenia was determined to do everything in its power to avoid history repeating itself".[39] However, despite this strong historical nation-building and Europeanisation reasons, voices of economic interests were raised by domestic businesses that the act of Kosovo recognition could provoke

the Serbian government to apply negative economic measures towards Slovenian export companies and investors in Serbia.[40] This economic concern was of a realistic nature as at the time, the Serbian Foreign Minister, NAME, raised a strong official negative stance on Kosovo recognition; indeed, Slovenian exports to Serbia in 2008 were 708,5 million EUR yearly[41] and Serbia represented the biggest market for internationalisation of Slovenia with 1.625,5 million EUR (28.7 % of all Slovenian foreign investments abroad).[42] There was also Serbian governmental and popular discontent with Slovenian potential Kosovo recognition. Nevertheless, the Slovenian government decided to persist with its support of Kosovo independence even though it faced the prospect of deterioration in its economic relations with Serbia, quite extensive damage of its Embassy premises in Belgrade in a local popular uprising and even withdrawal of Serbian diplomatic representation from Slovenia. Nevertheless, the Slovenian government believed that Serbia would have to mitigate its negative stance on Kosovo over time also due to Europeanisation pressures/effects and its own economic interest linked to Slovenia.[43]

As an act of De-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy in terms of its substance as a consequence of the economic crisis, we present the Slovenian decision to abstain from following its long-time valued principle of self-determination of peoples in case of the vote in the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) for non-member observer status of Palestinian Authority in the UN at the end of November 2012. As mentioned above, the principle of self-determination is of Slovenian constitutive national importance and Slovenia had up to then firmly supported the Palestinian fight for an independent state, even funding a Slovenian humanitarian project for rehabilitation of Palestinian children. Only a year before the above mentioned vote, Slovenia voted for Palestinian membership in the UN specialised agency, UNESCO. However, as illustrated below by a Senior Official at the Slovenian Permanent Representation to the EU (SPREU)[44], one of the strongest explanations for this sway of normative stance points to economic interests of the government directly related to management of the domestic financial crisis.

Despite the fact that the EU member states vote in the UN as individual states not as a block, there was a strong desire of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to assure a common vote of the EU member states, whatever it would be. Thus, intra-EU coordination on the issue was in due process within the Political and Security Committee (PSC), an ambassadorial level of consultation and decision-making in the EU just below the ministerial level of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). During this time, a Senior Official at SPREU[45] reports that it had been fairly quickly recognised that an EU-wide consensus on the issue was unattainable as three blocks of EU member states emerged on the basis of their positions towards the issue. These positions had been formed mainly according to previous track records of voting in the UN due to historical, political or economic reasons of individual EU member states; the latter being mainly tied to economic relations to Israel. [46] The three groups included: a) supporters of the Palestinian claim, such as Sweden, Portugal, Denmark, Malta, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, including Slovenia b) opponents of the Palestinian claim, most evident being Germany and United Kingdom and c) undecided states with no special interest engaged in the subject (e.g. Hungary). Slovenia thus initially belonged to the group of supporting states, but as the vote in the UN GA was approached, the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) started to inform the SPREU of its changing inclination towards a vote of abstention. [47] A Senior Official at the MFA confirms this was a top political decision as it was the case in other EU member states.[48] This is actually not an unusual practice, pertaining only to Slovenian foreign policy process, but a general *modus operandi* by EU member states; the latter usually resort to this type of top-level decision-making in cases of sensitive foreign policy issues of national importance. As this was definitely the case with regards to Palestinian observer status in the UN GA, the coordination meetings at various 'lower' political levels of representation to the EU in the Council of the EU structures (PSC, FAC) were quite ineffective, as state positions were not finalized until the very end of intra-EU consultations and the vote in the UN GA itself and eventually taken at the top national political levels.[49]

The reason for the eventual abstention from voting by Slovenia in this matter is assessed by interviewees as complex. In addition, as the decision was taken at the very top politically officials were not informed of it in detail despite being professional diplomats of their rank. Thus only speculative assumptions exposed by political analysts and the media reveal that the decision might have been connected to the poor economic and financial situation Slovenia found itself in during the time of the vote. To assure that the intervention of the EU institutions (and troika) would not be necessary in crisis management of the budget deficit, the government was seeking funding in the global market in US dollars to release state bonds.[50] It was the United States which was the potential likely buyer and some have thus indicated that the United States conditioned the purchase of Slovenian state bonds with the Slovenian vote on the Palestinian observer status in the UN. As Slovenian foreign policy-makers have historically demonstrated a tendency to subordinate to American interests, this would not have been entirely surprising.[51] Senior Officials at SPREU and at the MFA were also not aware that the Slovenian vote would in any way be connected to an Israel-related economic interest or business-in progress.[52] Most probably, therefore, the vote was related to the political will of the United States as the most relevant in the critical financial situation of Slovenia. Official explanation, however, holds that Slovenia has always argued for abstention from any unilateral acts that could endanger the two-state-solution through direct negotiation, thus having interpreted the Palestinian claim for the UN GA observer seat as such, and consequently abstained from voting,[53] and the Head of Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Policy has directly denied the Slovenian vote being connected to bilateral relations with the United States.[54]

As a preliminary conclusion based on the above presented cases, we can conclude that Slovenian recognition of Kosovo was a case of IIb type of Europeanisation, where downloading Europeanisation effects and deep socialisation is present in Slovenian argumentation for the act. The government felt responsible as the presiding EU member state and an expert on the post-Yugoslav area. Mostly, it acted consistently with the expected norms of a common EU position; it tried

to achieve a common EU stance on the issue due to previous European failure on the former-Yugoslav states' recognition and the norm that EU external action should strive for a concerted position. Slovenia stuck to the EU internalised norms even in threat of negative economic effects for its businesses. On the other hand, the case of the vote of abstention on Palestinian observer seat in the UN GA represents an act of De-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy, namely interest-based action which led to diminished effects of European norms and thus IIa type of Europeanisation in terms of strategic socialisation. Slovenia accepted the consultation method of EU decision-making as long as its foreign policy interest (and norm) was assured but changed its vote from 'yes' into abstention due to immediate national economic interests. The state could not, however, vote 'no' as this would entirely delegitimize its previously consistent position on the Palestinian cause, its domestic attachment to the self-determination principle and the EU external action related norm on striving for a common EU position.

The second case of normative inconsistency of Slovenian foreign policy actions due to the effects of economic crisis which represents another example of De-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy is the case of Slovenian observation of human rights and democratic principles of governance. As a small state, Slovenia has always highly valued principles of international law, especially those pertaining to human rights observation. Respect for human rights and especially rights of national minorities is a Slovenian constitutional provision,[55] and also Slovenian strategic foreign policy documents expose protection of human rights as the highest of Slovenian foreign policy values e.g. Declaration on Foreign Policy from 1999 refers to Slovenian engagement in "wholesome observation of human rights, as determined by international treaties and other international acts and international custom law."[56] Human rights observation is not only a normative principle in Slovenian foreign policy but there is also a concrete foreign policy action record of Slovenia consistent with foreign policy endeavours related to human rights and human security even from the very early times of establishing Slovenian statehood[57] and also after e.g. Slovenian Fund for demining and help to victims

of land mines (founded originally for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998) and Slovenian humanitarian project of Palestinian children.[58] As for democratisation principles being the core values of the EU itself, Slovenia socialised this principle as a value into its people by popular and political movement in the second half of the 1980s as a republic of the Former Socialist Yugoslavia. By holding a referendum on Slovenian autonomy and independence in December 1990, Slovenian people defined their state-hood on the will to detach themselves from a communist type of political system and to practice democratic governance.[59] Slovenian foreign policy-makers shortly after independence went as far as to define the entire Slovenian national identity on the image of being a western-type democratic state in contrast to the Balkan non-democratic practices of governance and grave breaches of human rights related to the post-Yugoslav conflicts in the region.[60] The state only became active in the post-conflict Southeast European initiatives upon conditionality from the EU and NATO in exchange for progress in respective accession processes.[61]

However, in the case of the early 2012 renewal of EU sanctions against the non-observation of human rights and non-democratic practices of the Belarus government, including travel-ban sanctions against individual Belarus citizens, Slovenia decided not to support the list of names put forward in the Council of the EU. Since the reason for this decision in the time of the economic crisis was entirely related to Slovenian economic interest in Belarus, the European media portrayed Slovenia as "shielding Belarus oligarch", "putting a hotel deal before human rights" [62] and even that Slovenia holds the EU act "unjust" because it targets the Slovenian company thus referring to a Slovenian negative, De-Europeanised, attitude to the above two principles on the account of economic interests.[63]

The problem occurred after Slovenian company Riko Group beat other European bidders (French, German and Dutch companies) in a 200 million real-estate project to build a hotel in Minsk, Belarus. Before this result was known, the individual in question related to the hotel deal, Mr. Yury Chyzh (*Юры Чыж*), was not included on the visa blacklist. However, according to a Senior Official at SPREU (2013),

shortly after the above business agreement was settled with the Slovenian company, Heads of Missions of the EU members states (HOMS) in Minsk[64] held a meeting, producing a new draft visa blacklist with Mr. Chyzh's name added to it.[65] A Senior Official at SPREU reports on two related problems appearing for Slovenia at the time.[66] Firstly, as a small state with limited capabilities, Slovenia does not hold a residential embassy in Minsk and thus a Slovenian diplomat (who would have had to travel to Minsk from Moscow) was not present in the HOMS meeting. Consequently, Slovenia was not part of the agenda-setting phase of the EU decision-making process in this case and had thus found out about the added name of Mr. Chyzh only at the level of CFSP-related council working group, namely in COEST – Eastern Europe and Central Asia.[67] Secondly, another problem for Slovenia was related to improper communication between Ljubljana and Brussels; this is again a consequence of data not being received from the ground as Slovenia does not hold a residential embassy in Minsk.[68] For this reason, it was only after a few meetings at the level of COEST had been held that the Slovenian MFA sent to SPREU an alert on the specific name included on the Belarus visa blacklist. Slovenia thus initially did not react to the list and as such its unfavourable reaction to Mr. Chyzh's name on the list (still at the COEST level) was belated and seen as illegitimate – connected directly to the above mentioned hotel business deal.[69] As there was no progress in the Slovenian attempt to getting the name off the list, the open issue was raised in the PSC, and then – still unresolved – to the FAC where Slovenia still did not manage to omit the unacceptable name and thus it decided to vote with abstention. As achieving unanimity was demanded to be reached as a voting procedure on this matter, the Slovenian decision thus prevented the entire blacklist from coming into force. The official Slovenian explanation for the vote was that Slovenia had always been a proponent of a so called 'review of sanctions', and thus also in this case it claimed that the criteria on the basis of which Mr. Chyzh was put on the blacklist were unclear. Slovenian Foreign Minister, Mr. Erjavec, demanded more transparency in sanctions – determining procedures which would also add more relevant businessmen on the list and not hand-pick only Chyzh.[70] Slovenia did not stand alone in this argumentation, as Latvia,

too, opposed the non-transparent manner of determining sanctions policy, exposing worries over the effectiveness of the proposed coercive measures in terms of what exactly would be achieved by them. Latvia, as Slovenia, claimed that it would be counterproductive to see these sanctions "harm the people of Belarus, businessmen not associated with the ruling regime, as well as EU members themselves" more than the Lukashenka regime.[71]

In the end, the case of De-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy, exposing Slovenian need to give priority to a business deal rather than to the observation of human rights and democratisation, is not such a clear-cut example of crisis effect, as the substantive argument on the need of review of sanctions and criteria for their application is in place. Nevertheless, it was of course of extreme importance to the Slovenian economy to assure the business project not to fail. As a consequence of this action, as mentioned above, Slovenia was in the European media portrayed as an illegitimate state, sheltering a supporter of the Belarus autocratic regime and breaches of human rights; a state which sold its ethical standards for 200.000. This media campaign was extremely harmful to the Slovenian image, changing the otherwise non-problematic, alliance-inclined and in terms of number of particular interests, low-profile record in the EU.

The Europeanisation effects that we have seen in terms of internalising EU democratic principles and human rights values were clearly present before the economic crisis, but in the case of the Belarus business project, the Slovenian government displayed a preference to support the latter rather than the former. This response fits the above explanation of abandoning the practice of internalised EU norms (Europeanisation type IIb) and returning 'them' when it suits the national interest (Europeanisation type IIa). Furthermore, we argue that this case also offers potential conclusions for the Europeanisation process as a dependent variable, as we have seen that the domestic unfavourable economic situation has pushed a small number of EU member states to display more hawkish behaviour in the Council of the EU compared to its previous low-profile, alliance-oriented record. Thus, this may be evidence of a change in the Europeanisation process

as such (type I). Additionally, we may also argue that the mentioned larger EU member states have played by the general norm of sanctions-proposal (Europeanisation type Ib) as long as this suited their interests, but when faced with a lost business deal, they abandoned the norm and acted according to the individual domestic interest of potentially safeguarding the business deal or have applied simple retaliation (change to Europeanisation type Ia).

Europeanisation as a Dependent Variable; Influence of the De-Europeanisation of Slovenian Foreign Policy Process on the Europeanisation Process

As a case study of the influence of the economic and financial crisis on De-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy we have chosen to identify the negative consequences that EU-dictated national government's austerity measures have posed directly to the Slovenian foreign policy process conducted in relation to the EU external affairs. As the most negative influence we can expose the financial limitations imposed on public spending and in this regard on the budgetary provisions of each of the ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The latter has thus as a consequence of fewer available resources started to rationalize[72] the number of national-based experts who participate in foreign policy consultations in CFSP-related working groups.[73] The MFA was economising on the air-tickets due to the fact that the Council of the EU's policy is to refund the travel-related costs to the integral state budget. Due to austerity measures, the government did not return the Council refunds to the MFA but kept the money in the wholesome state budget.[74] This problem was even more present in the issues of COREPER 1 ('low politics) than COREPER 2 ('high politics') as diplomats in Brussels have more leverage in the area of foreign policy due to Slovenian smallness and rather clear foreign policy priorities (Western Balkans, enlargement). In more 'technical' areas, however, where there exists substantial demand for expertise unknown to career diplomats, national experts were of absolute need but could not attend the representation of Slovenia in the Council working groups. [75]

What is more, the negative consequence of this non-attendance of Slovenian capital-based experts in working groups did not led to the immediate deterioration in the quality of Slovenian participation in the EU decision-making processes; indeed there were also more medium-term effects. As the Council plans for the national experts' participation one year ahead, the low quota of Slovenian experts in Brussels in 2010 was then taken into consideration when planning the ceiling for number of participants in 2011.[76] This problem was present from 2010 to 2013 and is now resolved but unfortunately in favour of the Financial Ministry instead of the MFA; as confirmed by the MFA Financial Audit Department, the Ministry of Finance has in January 2013 opened a subaccount of the integral state treasury account to receive refunds from the Council General Secretariat.[77]

This example shows a negative effect on the Slovenian foreign policy process which – in the light of the general limitations of the Slovenian small state, low foreign policy capabilities and narrow availability of foreign policy instruments, of which the state highly favours multilateral diplomacy – bears even more devastating effects on Slovenian performance in EU affairs. In this respect, we have obtained data that shows due to austerity measures, that not only Foreign Service representation was hampered,[78] but the MFA itself needed to cut expenditures on human resources. Firstly, the MFA already operates at an extremely negative ratio of people employed in the Domestic and Foreign Service (60%:30%); in financially well-off states, the ratio is 50%:50%. However, due to austerity measures, the MFA was one of the rare ministries which had to let employees go entirely due to financial restrictions (seven people which adds up to 1% of employees).[79] Secondly, two senior diplomats were retired due to provisions on retirement of public officials in 2012 Fiscal Balance Act. There is, however, eleven more senior diplomats who were supposed to retire, but the latter hold a so called 'federal employees' status, which is in terms of legal interpretation of the above act's applicability still to be resolved at the level of the Constitutional Court.[80] Secondly, for the last five years (2009–13), there has been no junior internship employment at the MFA which means no fresh human resources in terms of young graduates of

International Relations, European Studies or Diplomacy or any other expert field whatsoever.[81] Junior staff (students of above mentioned under- and post-graduate programmes), however, have been invited to participate in SPREU daily work in the form of a two - month voluntary (unpaid) traineeship, but this meant that the junior inexperienced staff sometimes had to cover the areas which had not been contributed to by capital-based experts.[82]

Despite the problem of External Representation and domestic austerity measures related to limited provisions on personnel, a Senior Official at SPREU (2013) reports that in the case of CSFP areas, the MFA's substantive[83] and procedural performance has not failed.[84] MFA has been sending instructions to SPREU with no damage to the substance or timing of the instructions needed, which confirms that the Political Director responsible for CFSP-related issues is highly responsive.[85] If sometimes instructions are not sent to the SPREU on a CFSP issue, this is interpreted as a non-position of Slovenia in the matter (no national interest lies in the matter debated). A Senior Official at the MFA (2013) adds that often a quality policy is made due to good informal relations among people working on the issue and that in a small Foreign Service this is very important.[86]

On the basis of this case we can conclude that rationalized representation of Slovenian national experts in Council working groups has hampered Slovenian performance in COREPER 1-related issues but rather less in CFSP-related issues. However, the long term effects of Slovenian de-Europeanisation by non-participation in EU affairs were negative due to Council yearly planning ahead on the basis of previous quota of visits performed. This means that Europeanisation as a process might have changed since Slovenian performance was not as expected; institutional choice by Slovenia in terms of Europeanisation Ib has become less strong. Also, the very negative trends in functioning and human resources development of Domestic Service (MFA) have continued and become even more obvious which might hamper Slovenian potential for further Europeanisation downloading (of strategic, what else deep socialization).

Conclusions

This article dealt with the issue of de-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy in the light of the (European) financial and economic crisis. Based on existing conceptualizations of the Europeanisation process, we differentiated between (I) Europeanisation as a dependent variable and (II) as an independent variable, adding to the understanding of the ontological dimension of this process, namely agency (a) or structure (b) (Table 1). This conceptualisation is not conflictual with existing prevailing understandings of dimensions of Europeanisation. In terms of drivers of Europeanisation (type I) of national foreign policies, we established the difference between (a) more individualist and (b) more normative and institutional mechanisms facilitating this process. In terms of outcomes of the Europeanisation process (type II), we distinguished between a) strategic socialisation with interest-driven observation of EU rules and norms and b) deep socialisation with legitimacy-driven conformity to European rules and norms. De-Europeanisation was thus understood as any change from outcome b) to outcome a) in type II Europeanisation (independent variable) or any change within individual drivers of the type I Europeanisation process (dependent variable).

In our first two case studies, we focused on the observation of EU norms and principles in the content of Slovenian foreign policy (self-determination of peoples, human rights and democratisation standards) before and after the break out of the crisis. We established that Slovenian recognition of Kosovo was a case of IIb type of Europeanisation. On the other hand, the case of the vote of abstention on Palestinian observer seat in the UN GA represented an act of De-Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy, namely an interest-based action which has led to diminished effects of European norms and thus IIa type of Europeanisation. In the second case, we have seen that the Europeanisation effects in terms of internalising EU democratic principles and human rights values (Europeanisation type IIb) have clearly been present before the economic crisis, but in the case of the Belarus business project Slovenian government displayed preference to support its economic interest, changing the respect of EU principles

only when pragmatically suitable for national interest (Europeanisation type IIa). Furthermore, we argue that this case also offers potential conclusions for Europeanisation as a dependent variable (type I), as we have seen that the domestic unfavourable economic situation has pushed a small EU members state to display a more hawkish behaviour in the Council of the EU compared to its previous low-profile alliance-oriented record. Additionally, we have also shown the changed nature of conducting Europeanisation on the side of the large EU member states (Europeanisation type Ib changed to Europeanisation type Ia).

On the basis of the third case analysis of Slovenian changes in foreign policy process due to the crisis, we have concluded that diminished representation of Slovenian national experts in the Council of the EU working groups has left long term effects of Slovenian de-Europeanisation. This means that Europeanisation itself might have changed since institutional choice by Slovenia in terms of Europeanisation type Ib has by rationalised participation in EU affairs become less strong (Ia). Also, the very negative trends in functioning and human resources development of Domestic Service (MFA) might hamper Slovenian potential for further Europeanisation downloading (of strategic IIa, what else deep socialization IIb).

This article has shown that as far as Slovenia is concerned, the European normative framework has in the light of the economic and financial crisis lost its weight for member states' national foreign policies. The Europeanisation outcomes have changed from deep to strategic socialization effects, which can be related with the changed opportunities and constraints provided by the Community framework in the newly emerged context of the crisis. With regard to the methodologically-theoretical aspect, the study is relevant as it tests both interests-and structure-driven mechanisms of Europeanisation on the levels of Europeanisation as a process and as an outcome. Empirically, the study draws attention to the fact that Europeanisation is a fragile process that is not only dependent on member states' willingness to cooperate but requires sufficient mechanisms of distribution and institutions enacting individual responsibility for the common (EU) good.

NOTES

1. Marko Lovec, "The European Union is no Free Lunch: Reconsidering the Eastern Enlargement of the EU from an Intergovernmental Perspective, *Croatian International Relations Review,* Vol. 17, No. 66, 2012, pp.31-58.
2. Ana Bojinović Fenko and Zlatko Šabič, "From the Balkans to Central Europe and Back: Foreign Policy of Slovenia" in Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl (eds) , *The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States: From Yugoslavia to Europe*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 47–68.
3. Sabina Kajnč, "The Slovenian Presidency: Meeting Symbolic and Substantive Challenges", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.47, Issue Supplement, s1, 2009, pp .89–98.
4. Ana Bojinović Fenko and Jure Požgan, "Regionalisation of Slovenian Foreign Policy: Escape from the Balkans, Return to the Western Balkans", *Studia Historica Slovenica*, Vol.14, No.1, 2014, pp. 55–74.
5. Ana Bojinović Fenko and Ana Urlić, "Political Criteria vs. Political Conditionality: Comparative Analysis of Slovenian and Croatian European Union Accession Processes", *Croatian International Relations Review,* Vol.21, No.72, 2015, pp.107-137.
6. Charalambos Tsardanidis, and Stelios Stavridis, "The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal", *European Integration,* Vol. 27, No. 2 , 2005, pp. 217–239. Reuben Yik-Pern Wong, "The Europeanization of Foreign Policy" in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds), *International Relations and the EU*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 134- 153.Reuben Yik-Pern Wong, *The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy. France and the EU in East Asia.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
7. Nicole Alecu de Flers, and Patrick Müller, *Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms*, Paper prepared for the GARNET Conference 2010 – The European Union in International Affairs,2010, http://www.ies.be/files/M%C3%BCller-B3.pdf (20.8.2013), pp.4-5.
8. Simon Hix, and Klaus H. Goetz, "Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems, *West European Politics,* Vol. 23, No.4, 2000, pp. 1-26.
9. Nicole Alecu de Flers, and Patrick Müller, *Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms, op.cit.*p.2, p.8.
10. Charalambos Tsardanidis, and Stelios Stavridis, "The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal", *op.cit.,* Reuben Yik-Pern Wong, "The Europeanization of Foreign Policy", *op.cit*. Reuben Yik-Pern Wong, *The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy. France and the EU in East Asia, op.cit.* Claudia Mayor and Karolina Pomorska, "Europeanisation: Framework or Fashion?

CFSP Forum, Vol.3, No. 5, 2005, pp.1–4, http://www.academia.edu/191266/Europeanisation_ framework_or_fashion (20.8.2013).

11. Roy H. Ginsberg, *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community - The Politics of Scale.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.
12. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*. Glenview: Scott, Foresman, 1977.
13. Frank Schimmelfennig and Daniel C. Thomas, "Normative Institutionalism and EU Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective," *International Politics,* Vol. 46, No.4, 2009, pp. 491–504.
14. Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization,* Vol. 55, No.1, 2001, pp.47–80. Jeffrey T. Checkel, *It's the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics. Arena*, University of Oslo, Centre for European Studies, Working Paper, No. 26, 2005. Frank Schimmelfennig and Daniel C. Thomas, "Normative Institutionalism and EU Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective", *op.cit.*
15. Annika Björkdahl, "Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU", *Journal of European Public Policy,* Vol. 15, No.1, 2008, pp. 135–154. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP", *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol.47, No.1, 2009, pp. 81-102.
16. Nicole Alecu de Flers, and Patrick Müller, *Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms, op.cit.*
17. Thomas Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration" in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 144-160.
18. Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, pp. 28-29.
19. *Ibid.* Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
20. Nicole Alecu de Flers, and Patrick Müller, *Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms, op.cit.*
21. Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, *op.cit.* ,p.30. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, *op.cit.*
22. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, *op.cit.*, p.220.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Nicole Alecu de Flers, and Patrick Müller, *Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms, op.cit.*

25. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, *op.cit.* Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, *op.cit.*

26. Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, *op.cit.*

27. *Ibid.,*p.30, p.129.

28. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, *op.cit.*

29. Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests; The United Nations and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

30. The process of downloading typically assumes the Community framework as an independent variable. In the case of new EU member states, the Europeanization is usually considered as a top-down process through which a country downloads existing norms, institutions and policies from the EU level. See, Claudia Mayor and Karolina Pomorska, "Europeanisation: Framework or Fashion?", *op.cit.*, p.4, http://www.academia.edu/191266/Europeanisation_framework_or_fashion (20.8. 2013). On the other hand, the countries can as well up-load their norms, institutions and policies to become part of the EU framework. See Tanya Börzel, "Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization, *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol. 40, No.2, 2002, pp. 193–214. The simultaneous and institutionalized process of up-loading provokes the specific effect of cross-loading.

31. Nicole Alecu de Flers, and Patrick Müller, *Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms, op.cit.*p.13.

32. Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement", *East European Politics and Societies,*Vol.17, No.1, 2003, pp. 42–57.

33. Nicole Alecu de Flers, and Patrick Müller, *Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms, op.cit.* pp. 4-5.

34. Alexander L. George, and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.

35. C*onstitution of the Republic of Slovenia*, endorsed on 23.12. 1991 (Uradni list RS, no. 68/06), http://www.uradni-list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=199133& stevilka=1409, (20.8 August 2013).

36. Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia [*Deklaracija o zunanji politiki Republike Slovenije*], endorsed by the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia on 17.12.1999.

37. Of EU member states, Kosovo is not recognized by Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. Out of post-Yugoslav area state, Kosovo remains internationally unrecognised by Bosnia and Herzegovina and by Serbia.

38. Senior Official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Ljubljana, 30.8.2013.
39. Despite the fact that the Council managed to agree only on "Member States to decide on their relations with Kosovo, in accordance with national practice and international law", Slovenian Diplomacy praised achieving this common EU stance". See Sabina Kajnč "Slovenia: Searching for a Foreign Policy Identity via the EU" in Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill (eds), *National and European Foreign Policies*, London: Routledge, 2011, p. 95.
40. Ilinka Todorovski, Dobro obveščeni: Poslanci svarijo: nikar hiteti s priznanjem Kosova! [*Well informed: MP's warn: do not hurry with the recognition of Kosovo!*] 18.2. 2008, http://www.finance.si/204934, (8.9.2013).
41. SURS, Statistični urad republike Slovenije [*Office for statistics of Republic of Slovenia*], http://www.surs.si (8. 9. 2013).
42. Bank of Slovenia, *Eurosystem statistics. Direct investment 2008*, 2009, p.29. http://www.bsi.si/library/includes/datoteka.asp?DatotekaId=3694 (28.8. 2013).
43. Senior Official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Ljubljana, 30.8.2013.
44. Senior Official at the Slovenian Permanent Representation to the EU, interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Brussels-Ljubljana, 28 August 2013.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. In Slovenian political system, the highest executive competence lies with the Head of Government (Prime Minister).
49. Senior Official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Ljubljana, 30.8.2013.
50. Ministry of Finance of Republic of Slovenia, Dodatna pojasnila Ministrstva za finance glede izdaje USD obveznice RS. [*Additional information of Ministry of finance regarding the release of the USD denominated bonds of the RS*]. Press release. 23. 10. 2012, http://www.mf.gov.si/fileadmin/mf.gov.si/pageuploads/sporocila/2012-10-23/Obveznica.pdf (8. 9. 2013).
51. Mladina, Generalna skupščina o palestinski državi [General Assembly on Palestinian state], 2012, http://www.mladina.si/118201/generalna-skupscina-o-palestinski-drzavi/?cookieu=ok (6.9. 2013).
52. *Ibid.*
53. Senior Official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Ljubljana, 30.8.2013.

54. RTV SLO – Radiotelevision Slovenia, Multimedia Port, Odziv Izraela na palestinski status? Pospešena gradnja novih naselbin. [Izrael's Reaction to Palestinian status? Acceleration of new settlement construction], 2012, http://www.rtvslo.si/svet/odziv-izraela-na-palestinski-status-pospesena-gradnja-novih-naselbin/297010 (6.9.2013).

55. Preamble, Art. 5 and the whole section II of the Constitution are devoted to human rights principles.

56. *Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia* [*Deklaracija o zunanji politiki Republike Slovenije*] endorsed by the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia on 17.12. 1999, http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/zakonodaja_in_dokumenti/ podzakonski _akti/deklaracija_o_zunanji_politiki_republike_slovenije/ (29.7.2013).

57. For illustration, we offer the reference to the high importance of human rights observation Slovenian authorities put already in time before international recognition of the state, during the 10-Day independence war (27 June–6 July 1991). As there were a lot of Yugoslav Peoples' Army (YPA) soldiers, during the war considered as Enemy side, who deserted the YPA or surrendered to Slovenian troops, they still had to be ensured security against possible revenge measures of the YPA itself and granted certain legal rights. Information on these and on all prisoners of war related rules and procedures were dispatched by the Slovenian Secretariat for Internal Affairs to all police stations on 29 June 1991 while provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the cooperation with the Slovenian Red Cross, who detached itself from the Yugoslavian Red Cross, were particularly taken into consideration. See Ana Bojinović Fenko and Zlatko Šabič, "From the Balkans to Central Europe and Back: Foreign Policy of Slovenia" *op.cit.,*p.. 50).

58. Saša Vidmajer, *Čas odraščanja; Dvajset let slovenske zunanje politike*. [*Growing-up period: 20 years of Slovenian foreign policy*] Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 2012, pp.187 -190.

59. Ana Bojinović Fenko and Zlatko Šabič, "From the Balkans to Central Europe and Back: Foreign Policy of Slovenia", *op.cit.,* p..49.

60. Ana Bojinović Fenko and Jure Požgan, "Regionalisation of Slovenian Foreign Policy: Escape from the Balkans, Return to the Western Balkans", *op.cit.* pp. 59- 62.

61. *Ibid.*

62. See *EUobserver News*: http://euobserver.com/foreign/115361, http://euobserver.com/foreign/115397.

63. «Nouvelles sanctions européennes contre la Biélorussie», [New European sanctions against Belarus] *Le Monde*.fr avec AFP. 27.2.2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2012/02/27/nouvelles-sanctions-europeennes-contre-la-bielorussie_1649021_3214.html?xtmc= slovenie_sanctions_bielorussie&xtcr=2 (30.8 2013).

64. These are regular meetings held by ambassadors of EU member states not only in Minsk but in other capitals of countries around the world as well.
65. EuObserver explains the decision that "Chyzh, a 48-year-old businessman from Soboli, is a close associate and regular hockey partner of Lukashenko known to EU officials as one of his 'bag-men'. His Triple group of companies is involved in construction, leisure centres, restaurants, supermarkets, tourism, logistics and petroleum products. It also owns an Audi car dealership. It has extensive business links with Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland, making it vulnerable to an EU ban". See, Andrew Rettman, "Slovenia Shields Belarus Oligarch from EU Blacklist", EUobserver, 24.2.2012, http://euobserver.com/foreign/115361 (20 .8. 2013).
66. Senior Official at the Slovenian Permanent Representation to the EU, interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Brussels-Ljubljana, 28 August 2013.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Ibid*
69. *Ibid.*
70. Dnevnik V petek odločitev o sankcijah proti Belorusiji, na seznamu tudi poslovnež Čiž [On Friday, decision on sanctions against Belarus; the blacklist hold the name of businessman Chyzh]. 20.3.2012, p.3, http://www.dnevnik.si/svet/1042517941 (30.8. 2013).
71. Konstanty Gebret, *Shooting in the Dark? EU Sanctions Policies*, European Council on Foreign Affairs Relations Policy Brief, No. 71, 2013, p.3., http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR71_SANCTIONS_BRIEF_AW.pdf (28.8. 2013).
72. This means that there is never an empty seat in Slovenian representation, but for example that one national expert is to cover three working groups events instead of three experts travelling from Ljubljana to Brussels. The other possibility is that MFA asks SPREU to 'cover' the representation at a meeting instead of a national expert (Senior Official at the MFA 2013).
73. Senior Official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Ljubljana, 30.8.2013.
74. National-based experts have to rationalize also other international participations, not only those related to the EU (foreign) policy-making (Senior Official at the MFA 2013).
75. Senior Official at the Slovenian Permanent Representation to the EU, interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Brussels-Ljubljana, 28 August 2013.
76. *Ibid.*
77. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, Financial Audit Department, E-mail correspondence with Mr. Matjaž Longar, Head of Department, by Ana Bojinović Fenko, 12.9.2013.

78. Next to high limitations in its MFA staff travelling abroad, Slovenia closed 5 embassies and 2 consulates.

79. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, Human Resources Department, Telephone interview with Ms. Jana Kvaternik, Head of Department, by Ana Bojinović Fenko, 6.9.2013

80. *Ibid.* Federal employees are Slovenian senior diplomats who had been working within Yugoslav Federal Diplomatic Service and have thus not served all their employment period in Slovenia, thus they remain out of Fiscal Balance Act applicability. Their status is currently regulated by a 2010 Slovenian-Serbian agreement which treats these federal employees as having been working in Serbia, thus withholding them of Slovenian-based pensions for that period to which they oppose at the Constitutional Court.

81. Before 2009, MFA had ten places for internships available yearly. The estimation holds that each year, 1 per cent of employees (for MFA this means five to six people) should be drafted as interns – new employees, which is approximately the annual rate of people leaving the institution. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, Human Resources Department, Telephone interview with Ms. Jana Kvaternik, Head of Department, by Ana Bojinović Fenko, 6.9.2013

82. Trainees, Interview with junior trainees at the Slovenian Representation at the European Union by Ana Bojinović Fenko. Brussels, 7.6/2013.

83. In terms of foreign policy substance, Slovenia has non-crisis related problem since about 2003 when its last foreign policy strategic document became outdated with the closure of legal agreements on EU and NATO accession as primary foreign policy goals. For the last ten years, Slovenian foreign policy has thus been conducted without any domestic long-term plan what else consensus on strategic issues to be achieved by foreign policy and how. The Parliament has been endorsing a government-proposed document on Slovenian priority tasks in the EU for each period of EU presidency (previously six- and now eighteen- month troika related presidencies) but this document according to Senior Official at SPREU and Senior Official at the MFA, in no way replaces the much needed foreign policy strategy.

84. Senior Official at the Slovenian Permanent Representation to the EU, interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Brussels-Ljubljana, 28 August 2013.

85. *Ibid.*

86. There are about seventy people employed at the SPREU. Senior Official at the Slovenian Permanent Representation to the EU, Interviewed by Ana Bojinović Fenko, Brussels-Ljubljana, 28.8.2013.

The Global Financial Crisis and the De-Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy[1]

Ali Şevket Ovalı

RÉSUMÉ

La crise financière mondiale de 2008, que la Turquie a réussi à traverser sans trop de dommages, a équipé Ankara avec un sens de l'excès de confiance qui a conduit à des décisions et des erreurs de jugement dans la mesure où la dé-européanisation est récemment devenue un phénomène plus important dans le domaine de la politique étrangère de ce pays. Nonobstant le rôle des facteurs individuels et autres au niveau de l'Etat, il est soutenu dans cet article que la crise, comme un facteur systémique, a déclenché l'éloignement de la Turquie de l'Europe. À cet égard, cet article est divisé en trois parties. Dans la première partie l'européanisation comme solution est examinée sous trois rubriques: les changements dans la structure institutionnelle et bureaucratique de la politique étrangère, les changements de l'approche de la Turquie dans le traitement des questions de l'ordre du jour de la politique étrangère, et les changements dans les politiques de la politique étrangère. Dans la deuxième partie, cet article évalue la relation causale entre la crise financière mondiale de 2008 et la dérive de la Turquie loin de l'européanisation. Dans la troisième partie, la dé-européanisation comme une sortie de la politique étrangère turque est examinée à travers des études de cas pertinents.

ABSTRACT

The 2008 global financial crisis, which Turkey has managed to sail through with atonable damages, has equipped Ankara with a sense of overconfidence which led to faulty decisions and misjudgments to the extent that de-Europeanization has recently become a more prominent phenomenon in the foreign policy domain. Notwithstanding the role of individual and state-level factors, it is argued in this article that the crisis, as a systemic factor, has triggered Turkey's drift away from Europe. In this regard, this article is divided into three sections. In the first section Europeanization as an output will be examined under three subheadings including the changes in the institutional and bureaucratic structure of foreign policy, the changes in Turkey's approach in handling foreign policy agenda issues, and the changes in the politics of foreign policy. In the second section, the causal relationship between the 2008 global financial crisis and Turkey's drift away from Europeanisation will be evaluated. In the

* University of Malta

third section, de-Europeanisation as an output in Turkish foreign policy will be discussed through relevant case studies.

Introduction

The 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU, when Turkey was granted its candidacy status, was one of the most remarkable points of Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of the Republic. After the Helsinki decision, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem and the subsequent Turkish governments initiated comprehensive structural reforms in almost every policy domain, from agricultural policies to foreign policy. Consequently, rapid transformations in the policy, politics and polity of Turkey began to be witnessed within a couple of years and the outcomes have created a tantalizing atmosphere for a sustainable and lasting reform process.

Despite its Islamic background and reactionary posture, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk nma Partisi, AKP) had also adopted a pro-European stance in the foreign policy domain during the very first years of their government. To comply with the demands of the EU, civilianization of foreign policy making processes, a shift in Turkey's uncompromising stance on problematic issues such as Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations and the government's efforts to initiate a dialogue process between Turkey and Armenia were all the early outcomes of Ankara's attempts to implement EU norms and values in the foreign policy area.

However, the reform process has slowed down since 2005 due to a number of individual, state-level and systemic/sub-systemic factors, and thereby the implementation of the reforms had remained uneven. In terms of foreign policy, Erdoğan's U-turn to a more nationalist position on Cyprus, the collapse of Turkish-Armenian dialogue process, and the failure of Turkish-Greek rapprochement to produce lasting solutions on the current problems, demonstrated Turkey's hesitancy to align itself with the EU positions on certain foreign policy issues. Moreover, disagreement between the EU and Turkey on arming the Syrian rebels

and Turkey's slamming of the EU for its stance on the military coup in Egypt had intensified tensions. The anti-EU sentiment among government circles reached its peak when Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that he did not recognize the decisions made by the European Parliament after the Parliament's non-binding decision urging 'consultation' between the government and environmental activists on the Gezi Park protests in May and June 2013.

In this regard, the Europeanisation/ De-Europeanisation dichotomy offers a valuable conceptual framework for explaining the above-mentioned shifts in Turkish foreign policy. However, using Europeanisation as a framework to examine the foreign policy shifts of a candidate country brings out some pertinent questions. The very first questions in stake are what is meant by Europeanisation and how does it take place? In the literature, there is no agreed single and precise definition of the concept, but it is generally used to refer various structural, institutional and policy changes taking place because of European integration both at the domestic and EU level.[2] How and through which processes Europeanisation takes place has also been a controversial issue.[3] Whereas a group of researchers define Europeanisation as a top down[4] or bottom up process[5], it also refers to a "circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one-off".[6] Considering Turkey's candidacy status, this paper consciously restricts itself to a top-down approach, or downloading, as referred to in the Introduction of this Special Issue. The main logic behind this assumption is that, within the course of European integration of candidate countries, "the EU becomes the only norm maker, generating a stimuli and imposing considerable pressure on the candidates, to adopt certain types of institutional and policy changes".[7] Since each candidate country gradually became a simple EU policy downloader or a 'passive recipient'[8] during the accession talks, this process may even take the form of EUization[9] in particular policy areas. As Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Açıkmeşe argue, "in contrast to the foreign policy changes of member states brought about by the EU dynamics, the transformation of candidates is imposed vertically by the EU through a hierarchical process".[10]

If the dynamics of Europeanisation for a candidate country is formulated as such, the Europeanization/De-Europeanisation dichotomy addresses the consequences of European integration in candidate countries. A uni-dimensional top-down European integration may display a response spectrum ranging from 'absorption' 'transformation' and 'inertia' to "retrenchment".[11] In case of retrenchment, such a reactionary state behavior may either be named as "negative Europeanization"[12] "De-Europeanization" or "re-nationalization".[13] Understood as such, de-Europeanisation refers to partial or complete re-nationalization of domestic politics, policies and polity as the result of a member/candidate country's reaction to adaptation pressures generated by the EU.

The second question is if foreign policy is considered as one of the most problematic areas to observe national adaptation, how may the researchers measure the impacts and limits of such a process? This question deals not only with the ontological problem of studying foreign policy within the context of European integration but also evokes a methodological problem as how to measure its impacts and limits.

Ontologically, studying the impacts of European integration on the foreign policy of a member or candidate country posits the nature of the state as a problem. Even though globalization continues to undermine the Westphalian model of state, foreign policy and national security are still considered as policy areas that should remain within the domestic/national realm of politics. The EU itself through the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty has highlighted similar concerns as well and whereas the principle of unanimity remains as the most essential system for security and defense cooperation, qualified majority voting was excluded from strategic decisions, which involve military and defense implications.[14] Regarding the significance of the Westphalian legacy particularly in the foreign policy domain of a state, it is argued here that, it is for this reason that examining the consequences of European integration in the foreign policy domain can best display the Europeanization/de-Europeanisation dichotomy.

Methodologically, measuring the impact(s) of European integration on the foreign policy of a candidate country is assumed to necessitate the examination of outputs that is mostly based on Hix and Goetz's

identification of European integration as an independent variable and the changes appearing at the domestic level or Europeanisation as the dependent variable.[15] Concordantly, the existing literature on Turkey's bid for EU membership had assumed greater significance to Europeanisation to explain domestic changes due to adaptation pressures.[16] Considering the Turkish case, if Europeanisation is understood as visible changes in the polity, policies and the politics of a candidate country, Turkish foreign policy cannot be immune from the transformative impacts of European integration.

Moreover, the EU's relative weakness on the generation of adaptation procedures in the foreign policy domain does not nullify its transformative impact on the foreign policies of candidate countries but instead forces the researchers to go beyond European integration as the only independent variable for exploring change/Europeanisation at the domestic level. In other words, measuring the scope and limits of change/Europeanisation with reference to 'adaptation pressures' as the only presumed cause ignores the context dependent nature of foreign policy. Thus, together with the adaptation pressures generated by the EU, contextual parameters at the individual, state and sub-systemic/systemic levels may provide new insights to observe shifts in Turkish foreign policy.

Notwithstanding the significance of adaptation pressures generated by the EU as well as individual, state and sub-systemic/systemic level parameters enforcing a certain type of foreign policy behavior, it is argued that a systemic factor, namely the 2008 global financial crisis, is one of the most significant factors that caused Turkey's drift away from Europeanisation to De-Europeanisation in the foreign policy domain. In this regard, this article is divided into three sections. In the first section Europeanisation as an output will be examined under three subheadings including the changes in the institutional and bureaucratic structure of foreign policy,[17] the changes in Turkey's approach in handling the issues on the foreign policy agenda, and the changes in the politics of foreign policy. In the second section, the causal relationship between the 2008 global financial crisis and Turkey's foreign policy preferences will be evaluated. In the third

section, de-Europeanization as an output in Turkish foreign policy will be discussed through relevant case studies.

Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy

Borrowing Tanja Börzel's conventional categorization between politics, polity and policy, [18] three substantive areas can be identified to examine the scope and limits of Europeanisation in Turkish foreign policy. Accordingly, the change in the institutional structures (polity),[19] the change in problem solving approaches and instruments (policy) and the change in interest formation/representation and public discourse (politics) are the areas that are to be dealt with within the framework of Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy.

Democratization of decision making through the civilianization of the National Security Council (NCS)[20] and the emergence of new institutional mechanisms were the very first prominent outcomes of european integration in the foreign policy domain. EU conditionality has undoubtedly necessitated such a structural transformation since the EU in the 2001 Accession Partnership Document urged Turkey to take the necessary steps for reviving such reform.[21] Yet, the AKP's perception about the role of the EU in domestic politics can also be identified as a factor in the transformation of decision-making mechanisms. After declaring its victory in the 3 November 2002 elections the AKP has engaged in a power struggle with the secular ranks of the civilian and military bureaucracies. In the very first years of this struggle, the EU was seen as an anchor for the consolidation of civilian authority.[22]

In conjunction with EU regulations, the Secretariat General for EU Affairs was established on 4 June 2000. The duties and competences of the Secretariat were described as "providing internal coordination and harmonization between public institutions, with a purpose to prepare Turkey to EU membership".[23] In June 2011, the Secretariat was transformed into the Ministry for EU Affairs and Egemen Bağış, Turkey's chief EU negotiator since January 2009, was appointed as the first EU minister.

Turkey's efforts to align itself with EU governance also necessitated

structural changes within already existing institutions. NSC, a military dominated advisory body, has attracted severe criticisms from the EU for its interference in politics that had become a daily routine between 1980 and 2001.[24] After Turkey was given candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the coalition government had initiated an extensive reform program. Within the context of foreign policy, the government's proposal aimed to diminish the significance of military elites in the decision making processes. The parliamentary bill on article 118 of the 1982 constitution changed "the structure and the functions of the NSC by increasing the number of civilian members and declaring that the decisions of the council thereafter to be considered as recommendations".[25] The first NSC meeting with a civilian majority was held on 30 October 2001.[26]

As Turkey undertook comprehensive reforms, the AKP government took further steps to diminish the role of the military in politics. Concordantly, the government sent a seventh reform package to the National Assembly which included structural changes concerning the legal status of the NSC. On 23 July 2003, the National Assembly passed the package with a majority vote and "the consultative nature of NSC was more greatly emphasized" in the new law.[27] On 18 August 2004, for the first time in Turkish political history since 1980, a civilian, senior diplomat, Yiğit Alpogan, was appointed as the Secretary General of the new National Security Council.

Structural changes inevitably entailed the incorporation of civil society into foreign policy making process and elevated strategic foreign policy issues to the level of public debates.[28] The pressure created by public opinion first surfaced during the US intervention to Iraq in 2003. The US demand to deploy troops on Turkish territory undoubtedly sparked a debate among the Turkish people on the risk of an armed clash between Turkish and Iraqi forces. As a result of public pressure, the Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected a draft authorizing the deployment of US troops in Turkish territory.[29] For Philip Robbins, this event demonstrated that "even in a super elite-oriented country like Turkey, public opinion can count for something, even in the arena of foreign policy making".[30]

The incorporation of civil society to foreign policy making[31] was not only limited to business circles such as the TOBB (Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) but also included think thanks such as SETA (The Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) and USAK (International Strategic Research Organization).[32] Moreover, thanks to its conservative structure and unconditional political support to the AKP, MUSIAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) became an influential actor of foreign policy making under Erdoğan governments.[33]

Europeanisation in terms of structural reforms in foreign policy decision making had coincided with the changes in the politics of foreign policy, which means changes in interest articulation, representation and public discourse. In this regard, Turkey transformed itself from 'security state' to 'trading state'[34] and economic interests replaced hard security concerns as the main motivations behind Turkey's activism.

Furthermore, Europeanisation of the politics of foreign policy became more prevalent through the government's discursive shift from its predecessor Refah's (Welfare Party) reactionary anti-western discourse. In the very first year of its governance, AKP certainly avoided the use of anti-western discourse that could hamper Turkey's EU membership process. In its struggle with the secular elites for power, AKP saw the EU anchor as an essential factor for the consolidation of Turkish democracy and an outside source of its legitimacy. Under these circumstances, Tayyip Erdoğan took off the 'national outlook shirt' previously tailored by Turkey's well-known Islamist leader, Necmettin Erbakan, and adopted a liberal discourse towards Turkey's EU membership in its early years.[35]

Finally yet importantly, Europeanisation became more prominent in the foreign policy domain through the adaptation of new problem solving approaches and instruments such as diplomacy, dialogue and the use of economic instruments, towards the problematic issues on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. In the aftermath of 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was compelled to reformulate its instruments and

problem solving approaches on certain issues.[36] The very first outcomes of Turkey's efforts to comply with the EU norms and values were the Turkish-Greek rapprochement and Ankara's retreat from its traditional position towards the long-standing Cyprus problem.

Turkish-Greek rapprochement manifested itself through a dialogue process first initiated by the foreign ministers Ismail Cem and Yorgos Papandreou in the aftermath of 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey. Since then, as Bahar Rumelili argues, "The Greek-Turkish conflicts have de-escalated to issue conflicts, with the as yet unresolved Aegean disputes being to some extent desecuritized, and have begun to be articulated as differences that can be managed, rather than as existential threats".[37] In 2000, an agreement on confidence building measures including prior notification of military exercises was signed and both countries decided to organize seminars, workshops and working groups for further cooperation.[38] In February 2002, exploratory contacts between Ankara and Athens began with an aim to find a sustainable and long lasting solution to Aegean disputes.[39] Moreover, economic relations between the two countries have rapidly expanded between 2002 and 2008.[40]

Europeanisation as a change in problem solving approaches also became visible in Turkey's changing attitude towards the re-unification of Cyprus. In November 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a comprehensive re-unification plan for the island. Annan plan was intended to create a federal state structure with two constituent parts and rotating presidency. Shortly after Annan's declaration of the plan, the EU in December 2002 Copenhagen Summit manifested its position on the issue which can be considered as an early announcement of EU conditionality for Turkey's membership. While the EU openly declared its support to the efforts for the settlement of the dispute under the auspices of the UN, the Copenhagen decision also underlined that in case of a possible failure only the Greek Cypriot part of the island would become a full member of the EU in 2004. The decision of the EU undoubtedly urged Ankara to reconsider its policies towards the re-unification of the island and the Erdoğan government pledged its support for the proposed plan.

For Meltem Müftüler Bac and Aylin Güney, EU conditionality was the main factor behind this policy shift and the AKP's handling of issue was indeed a breakthrough compared with the previous governments' arguments and policy preferences.[41]

As a matter of course, Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy cannot be limited to the aforementioned policy shifts and structural changes. The improvement of relations with neighbors such as Syria and Armenia, erstwhile considered as enemies and the use of economic tools instead of military power as the main instruments of foreign policy are the outputs that can be evaluated within the context of Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy. Yet, this article consciously restricted itself with concrete institutional adaptations as outcomes and case studies where EU conditionality can be observed through a causal link.

Even though the implementation of reforms remained problematic particularly in the area of human rights and freedoms, between 1999 and 2005 Turkey undertook extensive reforms to adjust itself to European norms, values and expectations. However, Ankara's enthusiasm for EU membership remarkably decreased after 2005 and the reform process lost its momentum. More recently, Turkey's changing stance on certain foreign policy issues and Tayyip Erdoğan's rejection of the EU Parliament's resolution during the Gezi Park protests raised concerns among pro-European circles. In this regard, the government's retreat from its pro-European posture on almost every single policy domain brings up a crucial question: which factors seem to explain Turkey's drift away from Europeanisation to de-Europeanization?

The 2008 Financial Crisis and Turkey's Drift away from Europe

A comprehensive analysis of Turkey's policy shift towards the EU requires the examination of individual, state-level and systemic factors.[42] Whereas the AKP's third electoral victory in the 2011 elections, steady economic growth rates and the government's increasing over-confidence after consolidating their power in domestic politics can be accounted for by state level factors, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's personal

preferences, ambitions, perceptions and foreign policy formulations based on their Islamic identity can be indicated as individual factors that seem to shape Turkey's drift away from Europeanization. On the other hand, the EU's mismanagement of the Cyprus problem and uncertainties embedded in Turkey's accession talks together with the opportunities that appeared in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, can all be considered as sub-systemic factors that culminated in Turkey's drift away from Europe.

Admitting that all of these factors more or less shaped Turkey's policy preferences towards the EU, this article aims to discuss the influence of a systemic factor; the 2008 global financial crisis. The rationale behind this approach is the assumption that the 2008 global financial crisis has directly hit the parties of the turbulent Turkey-EU relationship in a significant way.

For Turkey, the financial crisis had two inevitable repercussions for Turkish foreign policy. First, the crisis impelled the decision makers to seek alternative routes in foreign policy at the time where Europe was experiencing a decline. Second, despite its economy's structural weaknesses and fragility, Turkey's capability to sail through the crisis resulted in Ankara distancing itself from Brussels.

For the EU, the shattering impact of the financial crisis inflamed the already existing arguments stressing that enlargement should take a back seat. In other words, member states' concerns on the costs of enlargement in general, and worries on Turkey's full membership in particular, have been doubled by the outbreak of financial crisis.

Though addressing the vulnerabilities and fragility of the Turkish economy is beyond the scope of this study, it is noteworthy to mention that the empirical data addressing an intriguing economic performance is still debated among the academic and economic circles.[43] The alarming current account deficit that reached unmanageable levels, a pseudo growth based on credit expansion and foreign capital flows, a low labor force participation rate (roughly around 50 percent), unequal distribution of wealth and large-scale privatizations that increased Turkey's import dependency, all represent negative aspects of the

Turkish government's approach. In addition the context dependent nature of the global economy, conjunctural developments that may hamper Turkey's foreign trade, like a new recession in EU, the country's dependency on energy sources and the AKP's mismanagement of the regional political crises in the Middle East, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, raise doubts about the sustainability of Ankara's economic performance.

After the outbreak of the crisis, Ankara invested in diversifying its trading partners to cope with its devastating impacts.[44] Such a strategy was adopted and implemented from 2002, even before the outbreak of the crisis, and it produced the expected outcomes for Turkey particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region until the Arab Spring.

Accordingly, whereas the EU's share in Turkey's foreign trade was 53.63 percent in 2003, it decreased to a level of 41.6 percent in 2010.[45] On the contrary, Asia-Near and Middle Eastern Regions' share in Turkey's foreign trade continued to increase throughout the same time periods. The latest data revealed by the Turkish Ministry of Economy demonstrate that the share of Asia, including the Near and Middle East regions in Turkey's foreign trade, reached the levels of 38 percent in exports and 29.1 percent in imports, by June 2012. However, export market diversification strategy should not be interpreted as Turkey's search for an alternative to the EU but indeed an attempt to minimize the negative effects of the crisis. Despite a major setback in 2008, the EU27 still ranks first in Turkey's trade relations. In 2012, Turkey's imports from the EU exceeded 75 billion Euros and exports reached 47.8 billion Euros (27.2 billion Euros in favor of the EU).[46]

Addressing the causal link between the global financial crisis and Turkey's gradual drift away from Europeanisation would be a reductionist approach and previously mentioned individual, state and system level factors should also be taken into account. Yet, it is still plausible to argue that, at the time when the spectre of financial crisis haunted Europe, economic parameters had significant affects over the parties of the volatile Turkey-EU relationship. In this regard, Ziya Öni

explains the affects of the 2008 global financial crisis over Turkish foreign policy as follows:

> "The global economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009 was ultimately a 'crisis of the center', in contrast to the frequent crises which had occurred in the semi-periphery of the global system during the course of the 1990s. From this point of view, the global financial crisis presented a major political economic challenge to the American or Western-dominated globalization. The crisis, moreover, accelerated the shift which had already started, namely a shift of the economic axis of the global system from the 'west' to the 'east' or from the 'north' to the 'south'. BRIC countries in general and China in particular, emerged even stronger from the global financial crisis. In contrast, the EU appeared to be a major loser of the global economic crisis, at least from a short-term perspective. Many countries in the European periphery, notably Central and Eastern European countries and Greece, encountered drastic economic turmoil and downturns in economic performance. The West, especially the EU, turned out to be a less attractive destination in terms of purely economic benefits while the rising 'East' or 'South' appeared to be increasingly more attractive in terms of future trade and investment".[47]

Understood as such, the 2008 financial crisis becomes a crucial factor in explaining Turkey's increasing activism in the East and ongoing estrangement between Ankara and Brussels. Turkey's move from its cooperative stance on the Cyprus issue, the atmosphere of the Turkish-Greek dialogue process that failed to produce any concrete solutions to primary problems and growing Euroskepticism in Turkey inflamed by Erdoğan, are the outputs within which de-Europeanisation can be observed.

De-Europeanisation in Turkish Foreign Policy

De-Europeanisation as an output in Turkish foreign policy became prominent first in Turkey's stance towards the Cyprus issue, particularly after Cyprus' joined the EU in 2004. The EU's response to Turkey's positive stance towards the Annan Plan created disappointment among Turkish political circles. While 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the plan, the plan was rejected by 76 percent of Greek Cypriots. Accordingly, Cyprus' accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, as the sole legitimate representative of the island, without any final settlement of the dispute, was a turning point in the recent history of Turkey-EU relations.

Despite Brussels' unfair approach to the problem, Turkey's immediate response was not reactionary at all since the EU also decided to open accession talks with Turkey in December 2004. This time, Turkey was required to sign the Additional Protocol that would adapt the 1963 Ankara Agreement to the new members of the EU, including Cyprus. This meant Turkey's recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, since Turkey was required to open its ports and harbors to the Greek Cypriots. To start negotiations Turkey signed the Additional Protocol in July 2005, but declared simultaneously that it did not mean an official recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.

In October 2005, the EU decided to start accession talks with Turkey and the peaceful settlement of the border disputes with the neighbors and normalization of relations with Cyprus were declared as the principles that would govern the negotiations.[48] However EU conditionality on Turkey's recognition of the Republic of Cyprus continued to hamper the accession talks. In 2006, the crisis between the EU and Turkey escalated when the EU ministers decided to suspend the accession talks on eight chapters because of Turkey's refusal to implement the requirements of the Protocol.

Between 2006 and 2008, no significant progress was observed with the Cyprus problem. In 2008, the political landscape of the negotiations between Mehmet Ali Talat and Dimitris Christofias were promising since both leaders were assumed to have similar political

backgrounds. Yet, not only this initiative, but also Christofias-Eroğlu negotiations that took place between 2008 and 2010 failed to produce a solution to the existing problems and the island remained divided until now. By early 2011, when a solution looked unlikely to appear, Turkey's approach towards the settlement of the dispute began to change towards adopting a more nationalistic discourse and praxis.

The first significant crisis between Cyprus and Turkey in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis surfaced in the summer of 2011. As Cyprus' presidency for the EU approached, the tone of criticism on the Turkish side was hardened. The following precept from Erdoğan displays Turkey's move towards a nationalistic posture regarding the Cyprus problem:

"This is our final approach... How can we sit at the negotiating table with a Greek Cypriot administration that we do not recognize? We don't care what the EU would think about it. The EU should have thought about it while accepting them [Greek Cypriots] into the EU. The EU has done us wrong. They weren't honest with us... During its [Greek Cypriot] presidency, we will never meet them. Relations with the EU will freeze...There will not be any relation between Turkey and the EU for six months. We will only watch the process from Turkey... It is out of the question for us to meet Greek Cypriots. We don't meet a country that we don't recognize. We consider it degrading to even sit at the same table with the Greek Cypriot administration in the United Nations."[49]

The crisis peaked when a Greek Cypriot licensed international company, Noble Energy, began natural gas and oil explorations on the waters that were unilaterally claimed by Cyprus as its own exclusive economic zone. Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, declared such a move as a "one-sided provocation" and added, "If this fait accompli continues, we have steps of our own we can take".[50] In response, Turkey also signed an energy exploration and exploitation agreement with Turkish Cypriots[51] and sent its warships to the Mediterranean to escort Turkish drilling ship Koca Piri Reis.[52] The recent hydrocarbons crisis between Cyprus and Turkey have inflamed the already existing tension between Ankara and Nicosia and Turkey's changing stance

towards the settlement of the problem manifested itself during Cyprus' EU term presidency, as relations between the EU and Turkey froze.

As far as Turkish-Greek relations are concerned, the general course of the relations is unlikely to renew the antagonistic atmosphere of the 1990s, even at the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis. The mutual visits of Karamanlis to Turkey on 23 January 2008 and Erdoğan to Greece on 22 October 2010 contributed to the improvement of relations and twenty two cooperation agreements were concluded. During Samaras' visit to Turkey on 4 March 2013 a broad range of cooperation agreements from agriculture to disaster relief were signed by both parties.[53] However, despite the intensity of these efforts, it is worth mentioning that Turkish foreign policy towards Greece in the post 2008 period has transformed from a policy approach to be formulated within the context of EU membership to a technical process that could last for decades.

Despite the bilateral endeavors to improve relations, the ongoing dialogue process has failed to provide long lasting solutions on certain disputed issues such as the Aegean problems and the unification of Cyprus. Moreover, mutual allegations of air space violations became a daily routine, particularly between 2012 and 2013.[54]

Besides the EU and system generated factors, state level contextual shifts and sub-systemic imperatives were also influential in the course of the relations particularly after 2008. The sub-systemic imperatives were a crisis led environment in Europe in which Athens was wrecked by economic and political turmoil and the outbreak of Arab Spring that Ankara was trying to adjust itself to. These factors inevitably led Turkish-Greek rapprochement to take a back seat on the foreign policy agendas of both states. On the other hand, state level contextual shifts were the political instability in Greece and the rising Euro-skepticism within Turkish political circles. Taking all of these factors into account, one may easily argue that Turkish foreign policy towards Greece entered the inertia of a standstill period if not precisely De-Europeanization.

If De-Europeanisation of the politics of foreign policy is understood as re-nationalization of interest articulation, interest representation

and public discourse, AKP's recent presentation of the Western world through a reactionary nationalist discourse during the Gezi Park Protests during 2013 should also be examined as a case study. During the protests, the AKP government did not refrain from using the Islamic reactionary discourse of its Islamist predecessor Refah Party against the West in general and the EU in particular. Such an anti-western discourse can be seen as a precise move away from Europeanisation if the liberal discourse adapted by the AKP during their early years of governance is considered.

De-Europeanisation of the politics of Turkish foreign policy has become prevalent during the Taksim Gezi Park protests, which started as a peaceful demonstration of environmental activists against the local government's plan to construct a shopping mall in one of the most well known destinations in Istanbul, Taksim Square. The riot police's excessive use of violence against the peaceful demonstrations resulted in the spread of protests to other cities. The tear gas capsules and water cannons injured thousands of protestors and four protestors were killed. From the very early days of these protests, the Western world has been and still is securitized by Tayyip Erdoğan and by other AKP leaders via reactionary and nationalistic speech acts.[55]

During these protests, the western world, in which the EU is a constitutive part, was continuously accused of organizing such a conspiracy to undermine Turkey's political and economic power by the AKP's leading figures. An imaginary 'interest lobby' together with 'foreign powers' and their 'domestic collaborators' such as non-governmental organizations, political parties, trade associations, student unions and trade unions were presented as the actors behind the nationwide protests. In Erdoğan's words;

"Do you know who emerged as the winner in these incidents? The interest lobby and rivals of Turkey. Yes, our economy suffered from these protests to a little extent. They went out saying they were the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal and they became the interest rate lobby's unpaid soldiers"[56]

Similarly, Egemen Bağış accused the western world of supporting the

Gezi Park protests arguing that "there is no state violence in Turkey... We know the national and international players in this plot".[57]

Understood as such, the government's discursive transformation from the 'EU as the guarantor of democracy' to 'EU as a plotter', which signals a shift towards De-Europeanisation increased the tension between Ankara and Brussels. After the European Parliament's (EP) non-binding resolution expressing the concerns of the government's excessive use of violence against peaceful protests and urging consultation among the parties of the conflict, Erdoğan reacted harshly stating "I do not recognize any decision that the EP will make on Turkey".[58] The crisis between Ankara and Brussels is likely to deepen, as the parties' disagreement on certain policy preferences towards Syria and Egypt continues.

Conclusions

The Europeanization-De-Europeanisation dichotomy offers an analytical framework for explaining the shifts in certain policy domains. For the purpose of this article Europeanisation is taken as an output/change that can be observed in the domestic policy, polity and politics of a state as a result of the adaptation pressures generating from the EU. The rationale behind this preference is the belief that candidate countries simply become policy downloaders during the accession talks.

Such a formulation of the concept entails the examination of state responses to the pressures that are assumed to take place throughout the integration process. However a comparative analysis of Turkish foreign policy before and after 2005, demonstrated that these changes have appeared both on the negative and positive response spectrums. Thus, in this research De-Europeanisation is used to refer to the states' reaction to the pressures generated by the EU and an inclination towards a reformulation of certain policy domains on the basis of national priorities, interests and principles.

Considering the foreign policy of a candidate state, the Europeanization-De-Europeanisation dichotomy becomes more meaningful.

Foreign policy is the most significant policy domain in which a state's manifestation of sovereignty and Westphalian heritage becomes more apparent compared to other areas of European integration requiring mainly technical cooperation. For this very reason the nature of the state enables researchers to observe foreign policy shifts of candidate/member countries through the lens of the Europeanization-De-Europeanisation dichotomy. Yet focusing on European integration as the only independent variable would be a reductionist approach if the context dependent nature of foreign policy is considered.

The context dependent nature of foreign policy requires the examination of a broad range of factors, stemming from individual decision makers, state-level factors and systemic/sub-systemic imperatives, to understand and analyze shifts in a state's foreign policy preferences and orientations. Notwithstanding the significance of these factors, this research restricted itself to revealing the causal relationship between the 2008 global financial crisis and De-Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy. Within this context, it is assumed that the crisis, as a systemic factor, did not only alter the course of Turkey-EU relations but also impelled Turkey to solidify its position in the East and rearrange its national priorities in order to survive the devastating impact of the crisis.

In this regard, the changes in the politics, polity and problem solving approaches within the context of Turkish foreign policy were discussed in the first section. The empirical parts of this section are based on structural/institutional changes, shifts in problem solving approaches and the politics of foreign policy encompassing changes in interest articulation, representation and public discourse.

In the second section the impacts of the global financial crisis on Turkish foreign policy as a factor behind De-Europeanisation has been examined. The empirical findings in this section are addressing the fact that, the recent economic indicators about Turkish economy and opportunities in the MENA region in which Turkey was politically over-engaged resulted with an increasing over-confidence which can be interpreted as one of the main factors behind Turkey's drift away from Europeanization.

In the third section, De-Europeanisation is discussed through a closer examination of Turkey's changing stance on certain foreign policy issues. Accordingly, Turkey's move from its cooperative stance on Cyprus, the inertia of standstill in Turkish-Greek relations and the government's recent securitization of the Western financial circles and the EU in particular, were evaluated as the signs of De-Europeanization.

Finally, yet importantly, Erdoğan's slamming of the EU for remaining idle to the massacres in Egypt and Syria is likely to find resonance among Turkish people. If the societal perceptions on the EU continue to change in such a negative direction, the government may take further steps towards De-Europeanisation in almost all policy domains. In terms of foreign policy, Turkey's drift away from Europeanisation is likely to continue as the contextual shifts take place. Together with the financial crisis and the EU's reluctance on Turkey's membership, rising Euro-skepticism in Turkey may also trigger this process. Under these circumstances, no precise steps from Ankara can be expected towards the settlement of disputes with Greece and Cyprus, the cases in which Europeanisation was previously observed.

NOTES

1. An earlier draft of this study was published in *Studia Europea*, Vol. 3, 2012, pp. 17-38 with the title "From Europeanization to Renationalization: Contextual Parameters of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy". A revised and updated version of the study was presented in the 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations organized by EISA in Warsaw Poland, April 2013.
2. Johan P. Olsen, "The Many Faces of Europeanization", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002, pp. 923-924.
3. For a comprehensive analysis on the conceptualizations and dynamics of Europeanisation, see Kerry Howell, "Developing Conceptualizations of Europeanisation and European Integration: Mixing Methodologies", ESRC Seminar Series / UACES Study Group on the Europeanisation of British Politics, 29.11.2002, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1720/1/Howell.pdf (accessed in April 2015).
4. For Robert Ladrech, Europeanisation is an "an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic

dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making". Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1994, p. 69. Similarly Jim Buller and Andrew Gamble define the concept as "a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics". See, Jim Buller and Andrew Gamble, "Conceptualizing Europeanization" *Public Policy and Administration, Understanding the Europeanization of Public Policy,* Vol. 17, No. 2, 2002, Special Issue, p. 17.

5. According to Kenneth Dyson, Europeanisation refers to the emergence of 'genuine structures' at the EU level. Kenneth Dyson, "Introduction: EMU as Integration, Europeanization and Convergence" in Kenneth Dyson, (ed.), *European States and the Euro*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 3. Similarly Claudia Major defines Europeanisation as a bottom-up process "where states seek to export particular policy models, ideas, and ways of doing things to the EU level". See Claudia Major, *Europe is what Member States Make of it, an Assessment of the Influence of Nation States on the European Security and Defense Policy*, A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, European Research Institute, School of Social Sciences, The University of Birmingham, September 2008, p. 32. Maria Green Cowles, James Caporosso and Thomas Risse Kappen formulate Europeanisation as "the emergence and development at the European level of distinctive structures of governance, that is, of political legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules". See, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporasso and Thomas Risse Kappen, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", in Maria Green Cowles and James Caporasso and Thomas Risse Kappen (ed), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, New York, Cornell University Press,, 2001, p.3.

6. Klaus Goetz, "Four Worlds of Europeanization", Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshop, Turin, Italy, 22-27 March 2002, p.4. Similarly, Claudio Radaelli defines Europeanisation as "processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub national) discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies". See, Claudio M. Radaelli, "The Europeanization of Public Policy", in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.30. Also see Kevin Featherstone, and George Kazamias, "Introduction" in Kevin Featherstone, and George Kazamias (eds.), *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery,* London, Frank Caas, 2001, p. 6.

7. Olivera Djordjevic, "The Limits of Europeanization 'From Without': Is there an EU Driven Democratization Process in Serbia?", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 18, October 2008, p. 83.
8. Scott James, "Europeanization as Projection: Understanding the Changing Face of EU Policy Making within the Core Executive", *Political Perspectives*, Vol.2, No. 3, 2007, p. 8.
9. Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power, Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p.4.
10. Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Açıkmeşe, "Europeanization through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 9, No. 3 2007, p. 267.
11. In the literature, European integration is assumed to bring about changes in domestic politics, namely inertia, transformation, absorption, accommodation and transformation. Tanja Börzel claims that 'inertia' refers to the lack of change that occurs because of member states' resistance to adaptations which are necessary to meet European requirements and 'retrenchment' refers to the "resistance to change may have the paradoxical effect of increasing rather than decreasing misfits between the European and the domestic level". See Tanja Börzel, "How the European Union interacts with its Member States", *Political Science Series,* 93, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, November 2003, p. 15. For Claudio Radaelli, inertia "may take the forms of lags, delays in the transposition of directives, implementation as transformation, and sheer resistance to EU-induced change". Similarly for Claudio Radaelli, inertia "may take the forms of lags, delays in the transposition of directives, implementation as transformation, and sheer resistance to EU-induced change" and "retrenchment" refers to a very paradoxical effect of European integration "in which national policy becomes less European than it was". See Claudio M. Radaelli, "Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change", *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 4, No. 8, 2000, p. 14. Also see Tanjia Börzel and Thomas Risse "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change", *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 4, No. 15, 2000, p. 11.
12. C. M. Radaelli, "Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change", *op.cit,* p. 14.
13. Şevket Ovalı, "From Europeanization to Re-nationalization: The Contextual Parameters of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Studia UBB Europea*, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2012, pp. 17-38.
14. Christian Mölling, "ESDP After Lisbon: More Coherent and Capable?", *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 28, February 2008, p.1.

15. Simon Hix, and Klaus Goetz, "Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems". *West European Politics,* Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, p.27.

16. Ziya Öniş, "Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate", *Insight Turkey,* Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, pp. 35-50, Ziya Öniş, "Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and the Challenges Ahead", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2006, pp. 279-298, Ziya Öniş, and Şuhnaz Yilmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009, pp. 7-24, Ziya Öniş, "The New Wave of Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey, Drifting Away from Europeanization?", *DIIS Report*, No. 5, 2009, pp. 4-39, Ziya Öniş, "Multiple Faces Of The "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics And A Critique", *GLODEM Working Paper Series*, April 2010, pp. 1-23, Nathalie Tocci, "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, pp. 73-83, Ilker Ataç and Andreas Grünewald, "Stabilization through Europeanization? Discussing the Transformation Dynamics in Turkey", *Debate: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2008, pp. 31-54, Kivanç Ulusoy, "The Changing Challenge of Europeanization to Politics and Governance in Turkey", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 30, No. 363, 2009, pp. 363-384, Ozan Örmeci, "The Impact of Europeanization on Turkish Political Party System: Justice and Development Party (2002-2007)", *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, Vol. 3, No. 18, September 2012, pp. 205-212, Faidon Zaras, "Europeanization or Endogenous Institutional Change? The Case of Turkey", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2013, pp. 1-23, Umut Aydin and Kemal Kirişci, "With or Without the EU: Europeanisation of Asylum and Competition Policies in Turkey", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2013, pp. 1-21. Kemal Kirişçi, "The Limits of Conditionality and Europeanization: Turkey's Dilemmas in Adopting the EU Acquis on Asylum", *European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Biennial Conference*, 17-19 May 2007, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/7936/ (Accessed in April 2015), Isik Ozel, "Differential Europe within a Nation: Europeanization of Regulation Across Policy Areas", *Journal of European Public Policy,* Vol. 20, No. 5, 2013, pp. 741-759, H. Tarik Oğuzlu, "Turkey and the European Union: Europeanization Without Membership", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2012, pp. 229-243, Meltem Müftüler Baç, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics", *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2000, pp. 159-179, Bahar Rumelili, "The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict", *Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflict Studies*, No. 6, January 2004, pp. 1-31, Bahar Rumelili, "Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek–Turkish Cooperation", *South European Society and Politics,* Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, pp. 45-56, Meltem Müftüler Baç, "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union", *South*

European Society and Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 2005, pp. 17-31, Meltem Müftüler Baç and Yaprak Gürsoy, "Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2010, pp. 405-427, Meltem Müftüler Baç, "Turkish Foreign Policy, its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European Union", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2011, pp. 279-291, Metin Heper, "The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy", *South European Society & Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, pp. 33–44, Alper Kaliber, "Contextual and Contested: Reassessing Europeanization in the Case of Turkey", *International Relations*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2012, pp. 52–73, Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun, "Europe as Seen from Turkey: From a Strategic Goal to an Instrumental Partnership?", *Perspectives Review of International Affairs*, No. 2, 2012, pp. 83-101, Atila Eralp, "The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU relationship", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, pp. 149-170, Pınar Bilgin, "Clash of Cultures? Differences between Turkey and the European Union on Security", in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (eds), *The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls*, Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004, pp. 25-52, Fuat Keyman, "Modernization, Globalization and Democratization in Turkey: The AKP Experience and its Limits", *Constellations,* Vol. 17, No. 2, 2010, pp. 312-327. Bahar Rumelili and Fuat Keyman, "Enacting European Citizenship Beyond the EU: Turkish Citizens and their European political practices", in Michael Saward (ed.), *Enacting European Citizenship,* Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013, pp. 66-83. Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun, "Europeanization of Turkish Politics and Policies: Past Present and Future", in Belgin Akçay and Bahri Yılmaz (eds), *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Political and Economic Challenges*, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2013, pp. 25-45.

17. For a comprehensive analysis on the impacts of Europeanisation in terms of foreign policy institutions and bureaucracy, see Michael E. Smith, "Conforming to Europe: Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Cooperation", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2000, pp. 619-624.

18. Tanja Börzel, "How the European Union interacts with its Member States", *Political Science Series 93*, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, November 2003, p. 4.

19. For a comprehensive analysis on the impacts of Europeanisation in terms of foreign policy institutions and bureaucracy, see Michael E. Smith, "Conforming to Europe: Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-operation, *op.cit.,* pp. 619-624.

20. NSC was first established by the 1961 constitution as an advisory body with a civilian majority. However particularly after the 12 September 1980 military coup d'état, this body has turned into an instrument that has been used by the military for intervening in politics. NSC with a majority of generals was not only a powerful actor of domestic politics but it was also influential in the foreign policy making

process. For a comprehensive analysis on the role of military in foreign policy making process, see Gencer Özcan, "The Changing Role of Turkey's Military in Foreign Policy Making", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 23, May 2010.

21. Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Açıkmeşe, "Europeanization Through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy", *op.cit.,* p. 269.
22. For an assessment on the instrumental role of the EU within the context of civil-military relations under AKP see, Şule Toktaş and Ümit Kurt, "The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF)", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No.3, 2010, pp. 387-403.
23. Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EU Affairs, available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=44&l=2 (Accessed in April 2015).
24. Ziya Öniş, "Domestic Politics, International Norms nad Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era", in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds), *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*, London, Frank Cass, 2003, p.13.
25. Zühtü Arslan, "Government" in Ümit Cizre (ed.), *Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey*, Berlin, LIT Verlag 2007, p. 28.
26. *Yeni Şafak* (Turkish Daily), "İlk Sivil MGK Toplantısı yapıldı". 31.10. 2011.
27. Ali Resul Usul, *Democracy in Turkey, the Impact of EU Political Conditionality*, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 132. These amendments reduced the number of regular NSC meetings from once a month to once every two months changed the appointment procedures of NSC Secretary General through increasing the government's role in this process and redefined NSC roles, duties and areas of competence. Details on the Law of NSC and Secretariat General are available at http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/kanun.html, Available only in Turkish, (accessed in April 2015).
28. Ziya Öniş, "Recent Foreign Policy Attitudes in Turkey: How to Reverse the Gradual Shift Away from Europeanization?" *Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Brief*, November 2008, p.2, available at www.diis.dk, (accessed in April 2015).
29. For a comprehensive analysis on Turkish people's opinion on US intervention to Iraq see Nasuh Uslu *et al*. "Turkish Public Opinion Towards the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2005, pp. 75-107.
30. Philip Robins, "Between the EU and the Middle East: Turkish Foreign Policy under the JDP Government, 2002-2007", *ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale)* Working Paper -11, 2007, available at www.ispionline.it (Accessed in April 2015).

31. For the roles of civil society and the EU on Turkish-Greek rapprochement see Bahar Rumelili, "Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, pp. 45-56.
32. For the roles of the civil society organizations in Turkish Foreign Policy see Özlem Terzi, "Is a Europeanized Turkish Foreign Policy Possible? The Role of the Contested EU Perspective in Bringing About A Transformation in Turkish Foreign Policy", *IES Conference on The European Union in International Affairs*, pp. 16-18, available at http://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_V_2_Terzi.pdf, (accessed in April 2015). Also see, Paula Sandrin, "The European Union as a Vincolo Esterno and the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Paper presented at ECPR Graduate Conference Dublin 2010*, p. 12, available at http://www.ecprnet.eu/databases/conferences/papers/924.pdf, (Accessed in April 2015).
33. Şevket Ovalı, "From Europeanization to Re-nationalization: The Contextual Parameters of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy", *op.cit*, p.27.
34. Kemal Kirişçi, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives On Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, p. 42.
35. The term 'National Outlook Shirt' refers to Welfare Party's anti-western economic, social and political program based on Islamist values and principles. Tayyip Erdoğan's statement on the 'national Outlook shirt' inflamed a debate between traditional Islamist political circles and reformists around Erdoğan in the early years of AKP governance. See, "Gömlek Kavgası", *Milliyet* (Turkish Daily), 22.5 2003, available at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/05/22/siyaset/asiy.html, (Accessed in April 2015).
36. In this regard, 1999 Helsinki Presidency Conclusions can be evaluated as the manifestation of EU conditionality in the foreign policy domain and such an approach enforced Ankara to reconsider its foreign policy formulations towards Greece and Cyprus. In the document, the EU explicitly stated that Turkey should comply with the EU norms and values and should adapt a new approach towards the peaceful settlement of the disputes both with Greece and Cyprus. *Helsinki European Council: Presidency Conclusions*, 10-11 December 1999, Press Release, Brussels, Nr: 00300/99.
37. Bahar Rumelili, "Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: the Case of Greek-Turkish Relations", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2007, p. 107.
38. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-greece.en.mfa (Accessed in April 2015).
39. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-issues—-aegean-sea—-background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa (Accessed in April 2015).

40. Mustafa Kutlay, "A Political Economy Approach to the Expansion of Turkish-Greek Relations: Interdependence or Not?" *Perceptions*,Vol. 14, No.1-2, 2009, p.101.
41. Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Aylin Güney, "The European Union and the Cyprus Problem", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2,2005, p.290.
42. For an analysis on the factors that are assumed to shape Turkey-EU relations since 2004, see Atilla Eralp, "The Role of Temporality and Interaction on Turkey-EU Relationship", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, pp. 163-166.
43. For such critiques see 'Turkey's Economy: Istanbuls and Bears', *The Economist*, 7.4.2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21552216. (Accessed in April 2015), David P. Goldman, "Ankara's Economic Miracle Collapses", *The Middle East Quarterly*, Vol.19, No.1,2012, p. 25.
44. Ziya Öniş, "The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2012, p. 144.
45. Ziya Öniş, "Multiple Faces of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey,* Vol.13, No.1, 2011, p. 56.
46. European Commission Trade Policy, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/, 3 May 2013 (Accessed in April 2015)
47. Ziya Öniş," Multiple Faces of Turkish Foreign Policy", *op.cit.,* p. 55.
48. Council of the European Union, 12823/1/05 REV I, LIMITE, ELARG 64, p.8. 12.10.2005.
49. Turkish PM Slams EU, Threatens to Freeze Ties, *Hürriyet* (Turkish Daily), 19.7.2011, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-pm-slams-eu-threatens-to-freeze-ties-2011-07-19 (Accessed in April 2015).
50. "Turkey warns Cyprus over oil and gas plans", *Euronews*, 18.9.2011, available at http://www.euronews.com/2011/09/18/turkey-warns-cyprus-over-oil-and-gas-plans/ (Accessed in August 2013).
51. "Turkey and Northern Cyprus Clear Gas Drill Hurdle", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 21.9.2011, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-and-n-cyprus-clear-gas-drill-hurdle-2011-09-21 (Accessed in August 2013).
52. "Turkey-Cyprus Drilling Dispute: Turkish Ship Koca Piri Reis begins Oil, Gas Exploration off Cyprus", *Huffington Post*, 27.9.2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/27/turkey-cyprus-drilling_n_983716.html (Accessed in August 2013).
53. Ayla Jean Jackley, "Greece, in trouble elsewhere, boosts cooperation with Turkey",

Reuters, 4.3.2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/us-turkey-greece-idUSBRE9230V120130304 (Accessed in August 2013).

54. See Turkish General Staff Website, Airspace Violations in 2012 (in Turkish), available at http://www.tsk.tr/11_haberler_olaylar/11_2_hava_ihlalleri/hava_sahasi_ihlalleri_2012.htm (Accessed in August 2013). Also see "Greek Fighters Chase Off Turkish Jets Violating Greek Airspace", *Ekathimerini*, 23 May 2013, available at http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_23/05/2013_500507 (Accessed in August 2013). "Turkish Jets Chased Off after Violating Greek Airspace", *Ekathimerini*, 20 August 2013, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_20/08/2013_514765 (Accessed in August 2013).
55. Securitization simply refers to "presenting an issue as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object". Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p.21. In the Turkish case, especially during the Gezi Park Protests, Europe in particular and the Western world in general, have been portrayed as threats targeting the stability of Turkey, by Tayyip Erdoğan and the leading echelons of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
56. "Erdoğan says interest rate lobby only winner in Turkey protests", *Today's Zaman (Turkish Daily)*, 22.6. 2013,available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-318984-erdogan-says-interest-rate-lobby-only-winner-in-turkey-protests.html (Accessed in August 2013).
57. Ministry for EU Affairs, Press Release, Statement on the Recent Developments by Egemen Bağış, 17 June 2013, available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=49004&l=2 (Accessed in August 2013).
58. "I do not recognize any decision that EU parliament will make on Turkey", *Anadolu Agency,* 13.6.2013, available at http://www.aa.com.tr/en/headline/192705—l-dont-recognize-any-decision-that-eu-parliament-will-make-on-turkey (Accessed in August 2013).

Europeanisation of Malta's Foreign Policy: Defying the Trends or Conforming to Them?

Rodrick Pace*

RÉSUMÉ

L'article commence par une brève discussion de la littérature de l'européanisation suivie par un processus de simple description des changements qui ont eu lieu dans la politique étrangère de Malte d'avant et après l'adhésion. L'analyse porte sur les changements qui ont eu lieu dans la politique étrangère de Malte, petit pays, à la suite des transformations qui ont eu lieu dans le système international depuis que cet Etat a demandé à adhérer à l'UE en 1990. Ainsi sont examinés les changements pouvant être attribués à l'adhésion de Malte à l'UE. Cette partie du document tente de distinguer ce qui peut être imputable aux forces de la mondialisation et ce qui peut être lié à l'européanisation - ou à un mélange des deux. L'article analyse également la politique étrangère de Malte au cours de la crise économique qui secoue l'Europe depuis 2008. Les questions suivantes sont explorées en raison de leur impact significatif sur la sécurité et la politique étrangère de Malte: la neutralité, la migration, la sécurité énergétique et la situation en Libye. La question principale à laquelle cette étude vise à répondre est de savoir comment la crise économique et financière actuelle a eu un impact sur l'européanisation de la politique étrangère de Malte et si il y a des signes de sa dé-européanisation. Pour de nombreux pays d'Europe du Sud, un changement de politique a accompagné leur réponse à la crise, mais des conditions similaires sont absentes dans le cas de Malte. Les changements qui ont eu lieu sont principalement dûs à des modifications dans la configuration politique nationale de Malte et à la nécessité de répondre aux transformations qui ont lieu dans la région méditerranéenne en raison du changement climatique.

ABSTRACT

The article starts with a brief discussion of the Europeanization literature followed by a simple process tracing approach of the changes that have taken place in Malta's foreign policy before and after membership. The analysis focuses on what changes have taken place in Malta's foreign policy, mindful of course of its smallness, as a result of the transformations which have taken place in the international system since Malta applied to join the EU in 1990 and what changes could be attributed to the membership question. This part of the paper tries to

* University of Warwick, ** Hellenic Centre for European Studies.

distinguish what can be attributable to the forces of globalization and what can be linked to Europeanization - or a mixture of both. The article also analyzes Malta's foreign policy during the economic crisis that has gripped Europe since 2008. The following issues are explored because of their significant impact on Malta's security and foreign policy: neutrality, migration, energy security and the situation in Libya. The main question which this study sets out to answer is how the ongoing economic and financial crisis has impacted upon the Europeanisation of Malta's foreign policy and whether there are any signs of its de-Europeanisation. For many southern European states, a shift in policy has accompanied their response to the crisis but similar conditions were absent in the case of Malta. The shifts that have occurred were mainly due to changes in the domestic political configuration in Malta and the need to respond to the transformations taking place in the Mediterranean region as a result of climate change.

Introduction

A common theme in the analysis of the European Union's Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) is that its progress is obstructed by the strength of national foreign policies. For this reason the main expectation is that Europeanisation, as shall be defined further on, is likely to have the greatest impact on policies that have been communitarised (placed under the community method): that is to say where member states are obliged to implement them, with a lesser or negligible effect in the domain of foreign policy, particularly where decisions are taken by unanimity and where member states still enjoy a measure of freedom on whether to implement them or not. However, this article is based on the opposite notion that because a small state depends on external 'alliances' for its broadly defined security, EU policies and decision-making institutions such as the inter-governmental CFSP/CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy), which is credited with impacting the national foreign policy of all states, can have a much more visible effect on small states. In addition, the effect of socialisation and the impact of ideational structures of the CFSP and how these change national foreign policy cannot be overlooked.[1] Lack of space prevents from going deeper into this side of the Europeanisation narrative, although the majority of writers on the Europeanisation of national foreign policy have given it its merited attention. That said, the main question which this article sets out to

answer is how the ongoing economic and financial crisis has impacted upon the Europeanisation of Malta's foreign policy and whether there are any signs of its de-Europeanisation?

Europeanisation – A Conceptual Discussion

Europeanisation–and for that matter 'De-Europeanisation' – are dynamic processes with several drivers, which differ in the member states and may change over time. Europeanisation "is no longer a new concept in European Studies and International Relations literature, but it remains fashionable if ill-defined".[2] The literature on Europeanisation has grown rapidly[3] but its expansion in the study of foreign policy has lagged behind.[4] A discussion of Malta's foreign policy is further hampered by a lack of literature. Only a handful of seminal contributions on the subject were identified in the preparation of this article. The aim of this section is not to provide a comprehensive review of the Europeanisation literature, but to focus on the concepts which are most useful in analysing Malta's foreign policy.

A discussion of Malta's foreign policy needs to begin by establishing the meaning of 'foreign policy'. Michael Baun and Dan Marek ask whether member states' EU policies and policies towards fellow member states should be considered as foreign policy, or whether the term 'foreign policy' should be reserved to policies vis-à-vis third, non-member countries.[5] This issue is crucial in the selection of the empirical data. For the purpose of this article, the definition eventually adopted by Michael Baun and Dan Marek is used, namely that both 'intra-EU' relations with other member states and the EU, and extra-EU relations with the rest of the world, are considered as falling within the meaning of national foreign policy.[6] This is justified by the persistent albeit changing sovereignty of member states, their pivotal role in the EU decision-making process and the continuing existence of several types of internal boundaries separating them. Furthermore, also following Michael Baun and Dan Marek's definition, national foreign policy is taken to consist of three elements: i) preferences and interests; ii) institutions and procedures; and iii) strategies and actions.

Reuben Wong observes that the central focus of Europeanisation in its most rudimentary definition is "the penetration of the EU into the politics, institutions and policy-making of member states".[7] But he adds that there are five schools of thought on Europeanisation: national adaptation, national projection, identity reconstruction, modernization and policy isomorphism.[8] A measure of the Europeanisation of a state's foreign policy can be achieved on the basis of the first three criteria.[9] The co-editors of this special edition subscribe to this definition by focusing on: downloading or national adaptation, uploading or national projection (pursuing foreign policy on the EU level), and crossloading which merges the first two strands. Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux add a fourth which is of marginal importance for the core analysis in this article: EU export of its institutions, norms and values and their embedding in third countries.[10] This is important because these norms as laid down in the treaties since the Maastricht Treaty have been reinforced by the Treaty of Lisbon, though their implementation provides a lot of grist for the mill of controversy. For example, as Stelios Stavridis and Charalambos Tsardinidis caution, it is questionable whether the EU and its institutions are themselves adhering to the norms proclaimed and whether a member state which concurs with the median position adopted by the EU in foreign policy is therefore being more or less European.[11]

Daniel Fiott in what must be the first article on the Europeanisation of Malta's foreign policy applies the three conceptual framework which will be used in this article, namely: adaptation of the Maltese national structures including changes in the interpretation of neutrality; uploading key foreign policy issues on to the EU, where immigration is taken as a case study and lastly identity reconstruction.[12] A simplified 'process tracing' approach developed by Theofanis Exadaktylos is then used.[13] This requires employing a temporal framework identifying significant events originating in the EU and their influence on the Europeanisation process in Malta, i.e. identifying the causal link between an EU or EU-originating event that led to a definite change in Malta's foreign policy.

Small State Foreign Policy

When assessing the Europeanisation process of a state it is also important to keep in sight the size of the state, and whether and how it impacts it. The strongest foreign policy driver is similar for all states: security, national identity, the safety and prosperity of its citizens. Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau defined national power in terms of geography, territorial size, natural resources, industrial capacity, military strength, military leadership, the level of technology attained, population size, national character and national morale (the degree to which a population supports a state's foreign policy) and the quality of its diplomacy.[14] These determinants of power and influence have changed very little over time and in raw terms small states score very low on most of them. Lacking human and material resources, small states have a more limited access to information and the means to pursue their diplomatic goals. Hence a small state in the EU finds the EU institutions and EU policies as a necessary supplement to its national foreign policy. For this reason alone the Europeanisation (downloading) of a small state's national foreign policy is relatively easier when compared to larger states which are able to deploy more of their own resources. However, as Ben Tonra observed the relationship between national foreign policy formulation and the CFSP is reciprocal.[15]

The first generation of writers on small state tended to emphasize that smallness leads to a stronger degree of economic openness in international trade. David Vital pessimistically argued that small states are particularly vulnerable to external economic pressures and that "short of outright military conflict, the weakest spot in the small power's armour is the economic one".[16] More optimistically, Michael Handel referred to some economically successful weak states who were able to transform themselves from mere 'pushovers' to relatively successful foreign policy entrepreneurs. Handel argued that small states can mitigate the negative effects of external economic pressure by diversifying their exports and markets-adding that they should certainly avoid conducting their trade with only one state, "especially not with a great power".[17] Peter Katzenstein adds a deterministic twist to the argument: focusing on some small European states with open

economies. He claims that fear of retaliation forces them to reject protectionist strategies for these would lead to higher prices of intermediate goods. He argues that this is supported by all the elites and mass publics in these small states whatever their political persuasion and economic interests.[18] For him, this was the main reason why small European states support liberal trade policies. Another dimension is added to this by Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, "Openness to trade, and more generally international economic integration, is related to the size of countries. In a world of trade barriers the size of a country determines the size of its market. However, with completely free trade and economic integration, market size and country size are not correlated. Therefore small countries can prosper in a world of free trade but cannot in a world where economies have to be self-sufficient".[19] Free trade becomes more crucial when one considers that economies of scale (and diversity in consumption) are the main drivers of international trade (Paul Krugman's new trade theory).

However, openness also renders small states more vulnerable to exogenous shocks and hampers their efforts at maintaining internal macroeconomic and external trade/Capital balances, two factors which are helpful in allowing them to strengthen their resilience to exogenous shocks. In addition, as Lawrence Schembri has observed, since small states need to specialize to achieve economies of scale they normally produce a limited range of goods and services and are thus dependent on trade to obtain critical imports in exchange for a narrow set of exports. They also rely more on foreign investment and capital flows. "This openness, in terms of both trade and capital flows, renders small states vulnerable to adverse external shocks, thus hindering their ability to maintain external balance. These shocks may also disturb their internal balance as adjustment to external imbalances often requires shifts in domestic aggregate demand".[20]

Examples of small state economic success (e.g. Switzerland, Singapore and Luxembourg) seem to indicate that small state vulnerability is overstated. The Global Competitiveness Report's *Competitiveness Index 2012-13* shows that the top four positions are occupied by small

countries.[21] Small states seem to be better at adapting to adverse economic conditions than larger states. Peter Katzenstein observes that "since the end of World War II, processes of economic growth and decline as well as of industrial obsolescence and rejuvenation have occurred faster in the small industrial states than in large ones. Political leaders of small states with open economies are thus accustomed to accept as normal rates of economic change and dislocation that elites in large countries regard as intolerably high".[22] The question here is whether Katzenstein's observation applies only to some small states or whether it can be considered as a 'law like' theory applicable to all. Lino Briguglio has referred to the 'Singapore Paradox'[23] (or apparent paradox?) i.e. that although Singapore is small, highly exposed to exogenous shocks and lacks natural resources, it has managed to achieve very high rates of economic growth and wealth by strengthening its economic resilience.[24] But Lino Briguglio emphasizes that not all small states react to risks in the same way and some more than others (like Singapore) deliberately choose policies to nurture their resilience to inherent vulnerability. Lino Briguglio discusses four policy scenarios for small states: 'best case', 'worst case', 'self-made' and 'prodigal son': corresponding respectively to those who have few vulnerabilities but adopt resilience-building policies, those who compound their weaknesses by the wrong policy choices, those who have inherent vulnerabilities but are prudent policy entrepreneurs and those who have few vulnerabilities but endanger their own stability by wasteful policies.[25] Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw observe that notwithstanding their vulnerability, small states have shown a capacity to strengthen their resilience through various means.[26] The prudent small state searches for ways to augment its resilience to shock by alliance, bilateral or multilateral with their accompanying advantages and dangers[27] in a given international context where bi-polarity appears to favour them more than multi-polarity.[28] Godfrey Baldacchino points to "the ability of small states to exploit their smaller size in a variety of ways to achieve their intended, even if unlikely policy outcomes" and that they achieve results mostly in diplomatic "adventures" that are essentially bilateral, when they hold the moral high ground, when they manage to use this to whip up domestic support for their policy and

when the issue is essentially financial/economic.[29] Pessimistically, Godfey Baldacchino has less faith in multilateralism, claiming that despite their number on the world stage, small states have been less successful in achieving their collective aims notwithstanding the sympathy generated by their plight.[30]

The arguments on the economic prerogatives of small states can be transposed to the political/security domain. Small states face different security threats and foreign policy challenges depending on the size of their territory and extent (archipelagic states extend over large areas of the ocean e.g. Seychelles, Maldives, etc.), population which also determines their ability to exercise adequate control over their territory including territorial waters, geographical location, geo-strategic relevance, the quality of their neighbours ('contented' versus revolutionary states, peaceful or aggressive, etc.), internal cohesion and the possibilities it offers to external meddling in their internal affairs, the risks they take in foreign policy and the quality of their safeguards as a result of bilateral or multilateral alliances with more powerful states.

Domestic Politics

As Derek Beach observes, "the effect that the system-level context has on state foreign policy goals varies with the level of power of a given state and the nature of the international system".[31] He further argues that the logic of survival dictates that small states are more likely than larger ones to bend to systemic constraints. This does not close the door completely on the effects of other variables, such as domestic politics which as Jeanne A. K. Hey and Michael Handle observe cannot be wholly brushed aside and in certain circumstances can exercise crucial influence.[32]

In a Europeanisation process, national elites, civil societies, organized opposition parties, trade unions and interest groups, collectively or individually, can not only influence the small state's foreign policy, but they can also act as 'veto points' in the implementation of EU policies at national level. Further, as the enlargement process has shown time

and again in many cases, domestic political and social forces determine whether a small state actually joins the EU or not. For example, this is most evident with the referendums on EU membership in Iceland, Norway and Malta.[33]

Malta, the EU and Europeanisation

The discussion of small state theories in the previous sections is henceforth applied to Malta. Since acquiring independence in 1964, Malta has sought to integrate itself in the EU, a goal which was finally achieved in 2004, in order to strengthen its security – through access to a wider market, more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), output and jobs, increased aid, shelter from the Cold War rivalries and the ambitions of more powerful neighbours. The domestic debate on EU membership polarised and divided Maltese society in the 1990s[34] but the political rhetoric that characterised the debate masked the fact that the differences between the two positions adopted by Malta's main political parties, membership or a deeper free trade area, were not as radical as they sounded – although the two visions led to quite different end-points. Extended to the realm of foreign policy, membership implied the maximum constraint namely that Malta would have to merge a fair share of its foreign policy in the CFSP, while the free trade area proposal implied more autonomy in national foreign policy and safeguards for Malta's constitutionally defined neutrality status. The choice is more complex than stated here, for by successfully uploading its foreign policy objectives onto the EU, Malta stood to attain more power in achieving its aims. At the same time, greater independence from the EU deprives Malta from the economic and political alliances that it requires to fend off pressures from more powerful states while the status of neutrality without guarantees from more powerful countries will lead to compromises.

Turning to the specificities of the Europeanisation of Malta's foreign policy, two issues are identified as being the core ones in Malta's foreign policy, namely neutrality and migration. In addition, two other issues are explored because of their significant impact on Malta's

security and foreign policy: energy security and the situation in Libya. It is important to stress that the configuration of domestic political power, weighed by public opinion and significant electoral support levels for the two main political parties each of which has the support of half of the electorate, significantly determine and condition Malta's Europeanisation process. The Nationalist Party, in government from 1987 to 2013, save for a short spell between 1996-1998, has traditionally favoured EU membership. It was a Nationalist government which applied for membership in 1990, led Malta in the EU in 2004, in the Schengen Agreement in 2007 and European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2008. The Europeanisation process started before membership with the reforms that Malta had to introduce to join the EU and continued after membership. The policy restructuring and reorientation necessitated by EU membership also included alignment with European Political Cooperation (EPC) which later developed, following the Maastricht Treaty, into the CFSP. The government had however to take into consideration (i) Malta's Constitutional entrenched neutrality and (ii) the main opposition Labour Party's (LP) strong opposition to any changes in the status of neutrality. For its part, while in opposition the LP had to take into account that more than half the Maltese population favoured membership and for this reason its foreign policy proposals had to pragmatically accept a share of Europeanisation. One of its 1996-98 proposals on a free trade area with the EU proposed a protocol "on security in the heart of the Mediterranean on drug trafficking, terrorism, illegal immigration and money-laundering etc. Political cooperation between the Brussels authorities and the Maltese government and between the Maltese and European Parliaments".[35]

Malta's 1990 membership application led to some member states expressing reservations on whether neutrality would be a series obstacle to her membership commitments. In the September 1992, Malta had indicated its readiness to participate fully in the CFSP. A year later the CFSP went into effect with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The 1993 Commission Opinion on the membership application notes Malta's stand. In 1995, three neutral

states namely Austria, Finland and Sweden, joined the EU and this somewhat eased further the reservations on Malta.

At the eighth meeting of the EU-Malta Association Council held in Luxembourg on 12 June 1995 a 'structured dialogue' started with Malta comprising regular meetings on CFSP issues involving political directors; experts on issues such as human rights, disarmament, security, the OSCE, planning, terrorism and the UN; Malta's alignment with the Union's declarations; the association of Malta with the Union's démarches and with joint actions; cooperation within international organisations and during international conferences; the appointment of an associate Maltese European correspondent; regular talks between the EU and Maltese diplomatic missions in third countries; matters of interest to the Mediterranean.[36] The structured dialogue was interrupted in 1996 when Malta suspended its membership application, but resumed in 1999 after the application's reactivation.[37] These frequent and multiple contacts at various levels of the CFSP between Maltese diplomats and their European counterparts, must have led to 'socialization' of norms and methods, a topic that requires separate and detailed analysis.

Malta also joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995, from which it suspended itself in 1996 and rejoined it in 2008. A Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs was established in the Maltese Parliament in 1995 in line with an effort to introduce permanent committees in the national parliament and to foster a bipartisan dialogue on foreign policy. This initiative put the Maltese Parliament on a par with other EU national parliaments and the European Parliament.

As to Malta's neutrality, developments in international politics and economic pressure from domestic sources also began to undermine its definition as found in the Constitution. The end of the Cold War and the meltdown of the Non-aligned Movement particularly following Yugoslavia's descent into civil war, shifted the ground from under the rigidly defined neutrality in the Maltese Constitution which states that Malta is "a neutral state actively pursuing peace, security and social progress among all nations by adhering to a policy of non-alignment

and refusing to participate in any military alliance".[38] Furthermore, as Maltese shipyards were completing their third decade of economic problems (they relied heavily on state aid), the government was forced to disregard another part of the definition of neutrality in the Constitution wherein it is stated that in accordance with the principles of non-alignment, the shipyards "will be denied to the military vessels of the two superpowers".[39] In December 1999, the Malta and the USA signed an agreement enabling the dock yards to bid for repair and alteration of auxiliary vessels of the US Sixth Fleet. This was followed by similar agreements in later years.

On Malta's insistence, the 2003 Accession Treaty includes Declaration 35 on neutrality which refers to the 1992 Memorandum. In this Declaration, Malta reaffirms its full commitment to the CFSP, while noting that "any decision to move to a common defence would have to be taken by unanimous decision of the European Council adopted by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements".[40]

In 2004, the EU established the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Malta joined it. The LP pledged withdrawal, once in government, but later changed its position. In 2005, Malta ratified the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, but while voting in favour the LP attached some reservations, partly based on Declaration 35, underlining that it was voting in favour of the Constitutional Treaty on the understanding that "The EU Constitutional Treaty does not prejudice Malta's Constitutional neutrality. Malta will not in any matter be legally bound by any commitment to reciprocal defence or common defence".[41] The Lisbon Treaty was also unanimously ratified by the Maltese Parliament in 2008 and the LP maintained the same qualifications.

After the 2008 election, Malta reactivated its participation in NATO's PfP and started participating in ESDP (CSDP) missions. In September two members of the Armed Forces of Malta (AFM) were deployed in the ESDP Monitoring Mission in Georgia, the first time Malta participated in an ESDP mission. In April 2010, a twelve-member AFM contingent was deployed as a Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD)

aboard a Dutch vessel with the NAVFOR mission 'Atlanta' off the coast of Somalia. Earlier, an AFM officer was also deployed at the mission's Operational HQ in Northwood. In April, AFM officers began to participate in the Uganda-based EU Training Mission for Somalia, together with Irish officers. In 2011, an AFM officer was seconded to the EUFOR Libya Operational Headquarters (OHQ) when it opened in Rome, while another Maltese Officer in the EU Military Staff (EUMS), was also deployed to the OHQ. Military officers are also deployed in EU Council bodies such as EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EUMS. Apart from these EU missions, Malta has participated in some OSCE and UN missions, such as UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, together with the Italian contingent, and deployments in the Balkans under the Dayton accords.

Immigration

The arrival of substantive numbers of 'boat people' or 'mixed' migrants from North Africa began in 2002 (prior to membership). Irregular immigration began to be treated by Malta as a security issue mainly due to public concern. It fell within the foreign policy domain, since it comprised co-operation/relations with neighbouring states such as Italy, Libya and Tunisia, but its 'internal' EU policy dimension, particularly the effort to engage the EU's attention also received an impetus from the Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs (2008-13) and the Ministry for Home Affairs and Security (2013 onwards). Malta expects the EU to provide material aid to repatriate migrants who are denied international protection and to support those who are allowed to stay in Malta. The issue has often led to crises with Italy over responsibility for rescue at sea. Malta lobbied for sharing of responsibility for migrants by the rest of the EU member states on the principle of solidarity. A proposal to this effect was first launched by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 2007. Malta also wants a reform of the Dublin II regulation by which member states assume responsibility for the migrants who arrive on their borders.

In September 2008, Malta threatened to block agreement on a new EU Pact on Immigration and Asylum unless her demands were met.[42]

The issue was also pursued in the European Parliament, where the Parliament's Rapporteur on immigration was a Maltese MEP. In 2009, the Council approved a project for the coordination of voluntary measures for internal reallocation of beneficiaries of international protection present in the Member States exposed to specific and disproportionate pressures starting with a pilot project for Malta (EUREMA). The following year the EU agreed to set up the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) which began operating in Malta in 2011.[43] Malta favours the 'supranationalisation' of EU immigration policy – which has already been largely supranationalised. EUREMA was renewed in 2011 following a Commission proposal which highlighted the challenges being faced by all the EU Mediterranean countries.[44]

In the 2013 national election, as in the 2008 one, immigration emerged as one of the main campaign issues, with LP tilting towards push-back, but once in government the policy had to be ditched following EU, local and international criticism at which point Malta returned once again to the path of co-operation. On 25 October 2013, a joint proposal agreed by Malta, Italy and Greece during a meeting between the Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat, the Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta and Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras who visited both Italy and Malta on 21 October, was supported by France, Spain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Slovenia.[45] This initiative took place after the 'Tragedy of Lampedusa' of 3 October, in which an estimated 350 migrants lost their lives when their boat capsised. The 'Lampedusa Tragedy" effect also led to the establishment of the Commission-led 'Task Force for the Mediterranean' and in December, Commissioner Cecilia Malmström issued a Communication outlining measures to deal with five issues: trafficking, smuggling and organised crime, legal ways for migrants to access Europe and cooperation with Third Countries.[46] That same month Italy set up the maritime operation 'Mare Nostrum' mainly to rescue migrants at sea. This mission was discontinued in October 2014 and replaced by a FRONTEX mission 'Triton' which did not however have the same coverage as 'Mare Nostrum'. The pressure on the EU increased in later months as a result of more losses of migrants at sea until finally following the extraordinary European Council of 23 April

2015, the European Commission published its proposal for a European Agenda on Migration.[47] This proposal comprised a number of initiatives summarised here: tripling the capacities and assets for the FRONTEX joint operations Triton and Poseidon in 2015 and 2016; activating the emergency mechanism under Article 78(3) TFEU to propose a temporary distribution mechanism for persons in clear need of international protection; a permanent EU system for relocation in emergency - situations of mass influxes - by the end of 2015; an EU-wide resettlement scheme to offer 20.000 places distributed in all member states to displaced persons in clear need of international protection; a possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean to dismantle traffickers' networks; measures to reduce the incentives for irregular migration; improved border management, a common asylum policy and a new regular migration policy.[48] What is significant and symbolic is that the new EU initiative owes a lot to the '(Jean Claude) Juncker's Five Point Plan on Immigration' announced in Malta by the Commission President on 23 April 2014, as the EPP's *Spitzenkandidaten*.[49] A further proposal on relocation of asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to the other member states (excluding the UK and Ireland), proposes the allocation to Malta of 175 persons from Italy and 117 from Greece out of a total of 40.000.[50] At the time of writing this article (June 2015) there was severe disagreement among key member states on how this plan was to be implemented.

Energy Security

The financial crisis has barely affected Malta and for this reason public opinion is still supportive of the EU, particularly since the only two parties in the national parliament, i.e. the governing Labour Party and the Opposition Nationalist Party both embrace EU membership. The pressure to try to resolve difficult problems domestically by a shift in foreign policy towards non-EU states is non-existent. Hence although one cannot perceive a marked shift or De-Europeanisation, this does not mean that Malta is not seeking to strengthen relations with non-EU states. After a failed bid to conclude favourable energy agreements with Libya, Malta started shifting its attention beyond the EU. Two

important events mark this. The first is an agreement reached with Shanghai Electric of the People's Republic of China in December 2014 opening the way for substantive investment by a Chinese state company in Malta's energy sector, while at the same time strengthening the financial situation of Malta's main energy and sole electricity supplier EneMalta.[51] Shanghai Electric obtained 33% equity stake in EneMalta. The agreement, involving two state corporations was the fruit of a direct China-Malta entente and is more than just a commercial agreement. Similarly, in order to improve the energy situation, Malta has been increasingly turning towards Azerbaijan. In fact two days after the signing of the agreement with Shanghai Electric, the Prime Minister and Energy Minister visited Azerbaijan and there have been frequent other visits since then. Malta's Auditor General has questioned unfavourable hedging agreements for the purchase of crude oil made in 2014 with SOCAR Trading SA, an Azerbaijani company.[52]

Libya

In the case of Libya, Malta has had strong neighbourly relations with the country dating back to the mid-1960s. When the 2011 Libyan revolution started, Malta broke with the Gaddafi regime in Tripoli after some hesitancies and supported the Benghazi based National Transitional Council (NTC). Malta became the centre of operations for international efforts to evacuate foreign nationals, estimated to have number more than 12.000 from the stricken country. In line with its status of neutrality it refused to allow NATO fighters to operate from Malta to enforce a no fly zone over Libya. Following the collapse of the regime, Malta concluded a number of agreements with the new Tripoli government on visas, the provision of medical care and the training of the new Libyan national army. The sacking of the government of Ali Zeidan in March 2014 led to the creation of two governments in Libya and also to two diplomatic representations vying for recognition in Malta. In the meantime the chaotic situation in Libya led to the closure of the Maltese embassy in Tripoli, to the repatriation of practically all Maltese citizens working in the country and the curtailment of most Maltese-led economic activity and investments.

On Libya, Malta supports the international community in recognising the Tobrouk administration as the legitimate representative of the country and favours a peaceful political solution to the problem. Clearly, Malta has every interest in seeing the problem resolved for this also affects the mass movement of people across the central Mediterranean. However, in this case it is fully aware that the magnitude of the problem of stabilising Libya obviates a UN initiative and a joint EU effort. Malta supports EU proposals for a CSDP mission to destroy people smuggling networks, but up to the time of writing it was not clear whether it would deploy military personnel in this mission. The issue of neutrality could become a stumbling block in this case.

National Adaptation, Projection and Identity Reconstruction

Beginning with identity reconstruction, the long-view shows that Malta has gradually shifted ground on the central pillars of its foreign policy as they existed from 1970-1987. These were based mainly on non-alignment, neutrality and an almost exclusive Mediterranean focus while maintaining economic ties with the EU. But from 1987 onwards policy shifted radically towards Europe for two main reasons: the governing Nationalist Party had historically espoused European values while the country needed to adopt EU policies and norms in preparation for membership. Alignment with the CFSP started from the early stages as testified in the 1992 Government memorandum. When Malta eventually joined the EU, the Labour Party – the main proponent and orthodox defender of neutrality – shifted its policy on membership. This made it easier for Malta to integrate itself in the CFSP-CSDP. The Labour Party's pragmatic shift was due to domestic pressures: it risked being punished by voters if it kept up its opposition to membership. In addition, other processes were at work: the changing nature of neutrality and non-alignment after the end of the Cold War.

The CFSP/CSDP allows sufficient space for the participation of neutral states like Malta. But should the EU eventually move to a common defence, then Malta may need to change its constitution

which would require a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The NP and LP both agree on the need to amend the definition of neutrality as enshrined in the Constitution, but so far they have avoided any concrete step in this direction.[53]

One crucial element that affects Malta's foreign policy namely its small size, limited resources and weakness were not changed by EU membership. One of the major attractions of the EU for small states is that it helps them address some of these shortfalls. This can either be considered as a case of instrumentalisation of or uploading on the EU. It is most apparent in the case of immigration: Malta managed to successfully upload the issue onto the EU permitting it to take initiatives which modified the Union's agenda.[54] Malta achieved this in alliance with other EU member states (notably Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, France, Croatia and Slovenia). A permanent responsibility sharing mechanism has not been created as yet, but in the current proposals being discussed in the EU institutions under the broader heading of migration policy, the first 'timid' steps have been taken through the proposal of a limited relocation key.

EUREMA has functioned reasonably well and there is a strong possibility according to some.[55] Smallness works in Malta's favour in this case because its needs can be accommodated at relatively negligible costs. Several countries have responded positively by accepting to relocate immigrants in their countries. UNHCR Data shows that between 2005 and October 2012, 1.740 refugees have been relocated in foreign countries, 1.056 of them in the USA, the rest in Europe (including the EU) and elsewhere. The USA resettlement programme thus served Malta's interests much better than the EU's. According to the UNHCR Office in Malta, 412 were re-settled in 2013 mostly in the USA and in the first months of 2014, the USA had already accepted 170.

On the Libyan issue, Malta is aware that only a big player such as the EU stands a chance of making a strong impact on the situation there. It has therefore joined the EU efforts and supported its policy lines and initiatives while ensuring that it does not become entangled in any military role which would jeopardise its neutrality. Since the 1970s, Maltese governments have successfully tried to put Libya's

mind at peace that Malta would not be used as a spring board for military attacks against it.

On energy security which arguably has a less 'high politics' profile, Malta seems to have shifted positions since the election of 2013 by steering an independent course to ensure energy security. The agreement involving Shanghai Electric is an example. The other consists of the overtures being made to Azerbaijan on which the information is not yet complete. Malta's manoeuvring over energy security shows too clearly that while it has been Europeanising, uploading and downloading, it has not completely refuted its readiness to charter a different course when its interests dictated this.

Conclusions

This study has shown how Malta has transformed its identity from a neutral-non-aligned state to an active EU member state, fully embracing the EU's CFSP/CSDP. Several external and internal factors have worked to facilitate this transformation. But then historically, Malta was never united behind neutrality and non-alignment.[56] The Maltese always considered themselves European, and pro-western sentiments were always very strong among them with very few identifying more with their southern neighbours (though relations with them were always strong) than with their northern European ones. Hence the Europeanisation of Malta's foreign policy coincides with 'world views' of the majority of the political elite and the public. This of course raises the issue as to the source of Europeanisation and the extent to which Europe has been instrumentalised to recast Malta's overall foreign policy orientation.

The effect of the Euro crisis has not influenced the direction of Malta's foreign policy or Europeanisation. It must be kept in mind that the recession has hardly touched Malta while unrest in the Mediterranean Arab states has positively impacted its crucial tourism sector. From 2004-2014, it was only in 2009 that Malta experienced a negative GDP growth (in real terms). For the rest of the years the rate of growth was positive.[57] It is estimated to have reached 3.5 per cent in 2014. This is the main

factor which influences the positive public sentiment in favour of the EU. According to the latest Eurobarometer, 47 per cent of the Maltese have a total positive image of the EU (EU-28 is 39%) and 8 per cent have a total negative image (EU-28 is 22%).[58] This positive sentiment has on the other hand reduced the pressure on the national government to shift its policies from Europe. There are of course other 'drivers' of this Euro-centric line: given Malta's smallness (economic and political) the EU is the power it wants to lean on to address its many weaknesses and insecurities as discussed above. When it ventures out of this 'comfort zone' it does so to address national challenges such as energy security. The crunch may come when these external ties and commitments bring her into conflict with fellow-EU member states' interests and dispositions – say on EU policy towards China or Azerbaijan. How will Malta navigate such conflictual demands?

NOTES

1. B. Tonra, "Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2003,Vol. 41, No 4, pp. 731-756, B. Tonra, "Europeanisation and EU Foreign Policy: A Genealogy and Survey", Paper at the 8th Pan European Conference on International on Relations, Warsaw, 2013, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/ warsaw2013 /Tonra_Europeanization.pdf, C. Hill, and M. Smith, (eds), *International Relations and the European Union*, Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
2. Reuben Wong, "The Europeanization of Foreign Policy" in C. Hill, and M. Smith, (eds), *International Relations and the European Union*, *ibid,* p. 150.
3. K. Featherstone, "Introduction: In the Name of 'Europe' in K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (eds) *The Politics of Europeanisation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, S. Blavoukos and G. Oikonomou, "Is 'Europeanization' Still in Academic Fashion? Empirical Trends in the period 2002-2011", Paper prepared for the Conference *Comparing and Contrasting 'Europeanization': Concepts and Experiences*, 14-16 May 2012, Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens, B. Tonra, "Europeanisation and EU Foreign Policy: A Genealogy and Survey", *op.cit.*
4. R. Wong and C. Hill, "Introduction" in C. Hill and R. Wong (eds), *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization*, London: Routledge, 2011, p.1.

5. M. J. Baun and Dan Marek, *The New Member States and the European Union: Foreign Policy and Europeanization,Foreign Policy and Europeanization*, London: Routledge, 2013, p.2.
6. *Ibid.,* p.3.
7. Reuben Wong, "The Europeanization of Foreign Policy", *op.cit,* p.151.
8. *Ibid.,* p.154.
9. *Ibid.,* p.157, R. Wong and C.Hill, "Introduction", *op.cit.,* p.4.
10. S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Basingstone: Palgrave MacMillan, Second Edition, 2014, p.110.
11. Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis, "Greece: From Special Case to Limited Europeanization" in Hill and R. Wong (eds), *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization*, *op.cit.*, p.128.
12. D. Fiott, "How Europeanized Has Maltese Foreign Policy Become?", *op.cit.*
13. T. Exadaktylos, "The EU Enlargement to the East: Europeanizing German Foreign Policy", Paper presented at the ECPR 5th Pan-European Conference on EU Politics**,** Porto, 23-26 June, 2010.
14. H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* Boston; McGraw-Hill, 1993, pp. 124-165.
15. B. Tonra, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2001, p.279.
16. *Ibid.*, p.55.
17. M. Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, London: Frank Cass, 1990, p. 235.
18. P. J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985, p. 44.
19. A. Alesina and E. Spolaore, *The Size of Nations*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003. p. 218. See also, A. Alesina and E.Spolaore, "Trade, Growth and the Size of Countries" in P. Aghion and S.N. Durlauf (eds), *Handbook of Economic Growth,* Volume 1B, Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V.*,* 2005.
20. L. Schembri, "Macroeconomic Stability and Economic Resilience in Small States: The Role of Macroeconomic Policies" in L. Briguglio *et al.* (eds), *Small States and the Pillars of Economic Resilience*, Malta and London: Islands and Small States Institute, University of Malta and the Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008, pp. 40-42.
21. According to the *Global Competitiveness Index 2012-13,* the first ten most competitive economies are in this order: Switzerland, Singapore, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, USA, UK, Hong Kong and Japan.

22. P. J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*, *op.cit.,* p.44.

23. L. Briguglio, "The Vulnerability Index and Small Island Developing States: A Review of Conceptual and Methodological Issues", Paper prepared for the AIMS Regional Preparatory Meeting on the Ten Year Review of the Barbados Programme of Action, 1 September, Praia, Cape Verde, 2003, L. Briguglio, "Economic Vulnerability and Resilience: Concepts and Measurements" in L. Briguglio and E. J. Kisanga (eds), *Economic Vulnerability and Resilience of Small States*, University of Malta and London: Islands and Small States Institute, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004.

24. L. Briguglio, "Economic Vulnerability and Resilience: Concepts and Measurements", *op.cit.,* L. Briguglio *et al.,* "Economic Vulnerability and Resilience: Concepts and Measurements", Research Paper No. 2008/55, World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University, May 2008.

25. *Ibid.*

26. A.F. Cooper and T.M. Shaw (eds), *The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009.

27. M. Handel, *Weak States in the International System, op.cit.* pp. 119-120.

28. *Ibid.,* pp. 169-216.

29. G. Baldacchino, "Thucydides or Kissinger? A Critical Review of Smaller State Diplomacy' in T. Shaw and A. F. Cooper (eds), T*he Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience in the Global Political Economy,* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.22.

30. *Ibid.,* p. 35.

31. D. Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012, pp.44-45.

32. A.K. Hey, (ed.), *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 185-195, M. Handel, *Weak States in the International System, op.cit.,* pp. 261-263.

33. R. Pace, "Malta's EU Membership: Chapter 1 Concluded, Chapter 2 Just Started", *Mediterranean Politics,* Vol. 9, No 1, 2004, pp. 114-121, B. Thorhallsson, *Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge*, London: Routledge, 2004, B. Thorhallsson, "Iceland's Contested European Policy: The Footprint of the Past - A Small and Insular Society", Jean Monnet Occasional Papers, No. 1, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2013, http://www.um.edu.mt/__data /assets/pdf_file/0007/198529/JMBaldurPaper022013webv6.pdf, M.A. Magnússon, "Taking its Place in Europe – Iceland's Long Road to its EU Application", *Jean Monnet Occasional Papers*, No. 3, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2013, http://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/198528/ jmmagnus

022013webv6.pdf, M.A. Magnússon, *The Engagement of Iceland and Malta with European Integration: Economic Incentives and Political Constraints,* Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iceland, 2013.

34. M. Cini, "A Divided Nation: Polarization and the Two Party System in Malta", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 7, No 1, 2002, pp 6-23, R. Pace, "A Small State and the European Union: Malta's EU Accession Experience", South European Society and Politics, Vol. 7, No 1, 2002, pp. 24-42, J.P. Mitchell,"Corruption and Clientalism in a 'Systemless System': The Europeanization of Maltese Political Culture", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 7, No 1, 2002, pp. 43-61.
35. Malta Elections, *A Collection of Electoral Data for the Maltese Islands*, University of Malta, http://www.um.edu.mt/projects/maltaelections/maltesepolitics /politicalparties /manifestos.
36. Council of the EU-Malta, Joint Press Release, 8th Meeting of EU-Malta Association Council, Luxembourg, 12.6.1995, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/023a0011.htm (accessed 20.04.2014).
37. European Commission, *Regular Report on Malta's Progress Towards Accession*, October 1999.
38. Justice Services, Government of Malta, *Constitution of Malta*, Article 1(3), http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8566.
39. *Ibid.,* Article 1(3) (E).
40. Treaty of Accession, "Declaration on Neutrality", *Official Journal* L236, Vol. 46, 23.9.2003,, 2003, p. 982.
41. Maltese Parliament, *Debates*, Sitting No 288, 6.7.2005.
42. Council of the European Union, *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*, Document from the Presidency, No 13440/08, ASIM 72, 24 September, 2008, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2013440%202008%20INIT.
43. Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office, OJ L 132, 29.5.2010.
44. European Commission, *Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Migration*, Brussels, COM (2011) 248 final, 4.5.2011.
45. Malta's Prime Minister Dr Muscat was reported to have said that Malta, Italy and Greece are calling on Frontex to organise repatriation flights for migrants who were not granted asylum, responsibility sharing among all the countries of the EU, and joint action to stop people from starting their journey across the Mediterranean (Times of Malta, 24 October 2013 at http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20131024/local/cnn-features-maltas-arguments-on-migrations.491784.

46. European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean*, COM (2013) 869 final, Brussels 4.12.2013.

47. European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration*, COM (2015) 240 final, Brussels 13.5.2015.

48. *Ibid.*

49. J.C. Juncker, "My Five Point Plan on Immigration", http://juncker.epp.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/nodes/en_02_immigration.pdf.

50. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and Greece, COM(2015) 286 final, Annexes 1 to 3 Annexes, Brussels, 27.5.2015.

51. Government of Malta (2014), Energy Sector Cooperation and Investor Agreement between EneMalta p.l.c., Shanghai Electric and the Government of Malta, Press Release, Reference Number: PR142914, 12.12.2014, https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Documents/pr142914a.pdf.

52. National Audit Office (NAO) (2014), *Report: An Analysis of EneMalta Corporation's Hedging Activity in 2014*, 2014, http://www.nao.gov.mt/page. aspx? id=38.

53. R. Pace, "Malta: A Lilliputian State's Struggle for Security and Peace", *op.cit.,* R. Pace,(c), "Malta", *op.cit.*

54. D. Fiott, "How Europeanized Has Maltese Foreign Policy Become?", *op.cit.,* pp. 113-114.

55. R. Pace, "Migration in the Central Mediterranean", Jean Monnet Occasional Papers, 2/2013, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2013.

56. D. Fiott, "How Europeanized Has Maltese Foreign Policy Become?", *op.cit.,*p.115.

57. Eurostat, *Real GDP growth rate* – Volume, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1.

58. Eurobarometer, Standard, 2015. EB82-2014, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_first_en.pdf.

Drivers of Turkish Regional Policy Since 1990

Zenonas Tziarras*, George Koukoudakis**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article vise à évaluer les événements les plus saillants de la politique étrangère turque depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Il est divisé en trois sections principales qui, en prêtant attention aux vecteurs de politique étrangère intérieurs et extérieurs, abordent la politique étrangère turque (PTF) dans les années 1990 et les années 2000-en particulier après l'élection du Parti de la Justice et du Développement (AKP)-et au cours de la période qui a suivi le Printemps arabe, avec un accent sur le grand Moyen-Orient. Enfin, la dernière section tire quelques conclusions générales concernant la relation entre les principales tendances de la PTF au cours de ces trois périodes.

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to evaluate the most salient drivers of Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It is divided into three main sections that, by paying attention to domestic and external foreign policy drivers, address Turkish foreign policy (TFP) during the 1990s, during the 2000s – particularly after the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) – and during the post-"Arab Spring" period, with a focus on the greater Middle East. Lastly, the concluding section draws some general conclusions regarding the relationship between the drivers of TFP during these three periods and comments on what might be in store for Turkey in the near future.

Introduction

The way the Republic of Turkey conducts its external relations is influenced by a series of variables related to geographic, historical, cultural, psychological, economic, societal and international factors, as well as by the different personalities of political and military leaders. In this context, this paper aims to evaluate the most salient drivers of

* University of Warwick, ** Hellenic Centre for European Studies.

Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It is divided into three main sections that, by paying attention to domestic and external foreign policy drivers, address Turkish foreign policy (TFP) during the 1990s, during the 2000s – particularly after the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) – and during the post-"Arab Spring" period, with a focus on the greater Middle East. Lastly, the concluding section draws some general conclusions regarding the relationship between the drivers of TFP during these three periods and comments on what might be in store for Turkey in the near future.

TFP drivers in the 1990s

Throughout the 1990s TFP was facing a troubled environment both domestically and internationally. Internal political and social instability combined with a severe economic crisis were posing great impediments for TFP decision makers. At the same time the tectonic changes caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union in its near abroad, mainly in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, had rendered the situation more complex. As a result, TFP was trapped in an identity crisis with regard to its orientation and strategic planning.

Domestic Level

Domestically, political instability was the main feature of Turkish politics in the 1990s. During that period eight coalition governments and two five-month single-party governments were formed. The coalition governments resulted, among other things, in frequent replacements of foreign ministers. Turkey had nine different foreign ministers between July 1994 and June 1997 alone.[1] Under these circumstances, it was very difficult for Turkey to formulate and implement a viable foreign policy strategy. Furthermore, this meant that the National Security Council (NSC), although unelected, was able to direct TFP in terms of hard security thereby preventing a more liberal approach to be realized. This implied that the military was also reluctant to allow the initiation of any democratic and structural reforms that would have enabled Turkey to avoid the severe economic crisis of 2001.[2] Turkish society was also facing the consequences of the

lack of a homogenous economic development. Income disparities within Turkey were great, "with the population in the southeast having less than half the average national income and the large rural population generally being much poorer than the urban population."[3]

The bad condition of Turkish economy throughout the decade, justifies to a large extent the characterization of the 1990s as a "lost decade" for Turkey. Ibrahim Öztürk describes the bad economic environment of the 1990s, that actually led Turkey to its biggest economic crisis in 2001, as characterized by: 1) low and unstable growth; 2) low per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at around 3,400 USD, with a dramatic low productivity across the economic sectors; 3) an unstable fiscal and financial instability at both public as well as private sectors; 4) absence of price stability that fuelled a chronic inflation of almost 70 percent which lasted for more than two decades; 5) and wide spread corruption, lack of competitiveness, and massive unemployment of around 10 percent.[4]

In retrospect, it seems that Turgut Özal's liberal economic policies during the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s did not manage to reverse the negative conditions that led Turkey to the economic difficulties of the 1990s. Turkish economy deteriorated further when two murderous earthquakes hit the industrial region of Marmara. The economic consequences in fiscal terms of the two earthquakes that struck the Marmara region in 1999, according to the provisional estimations of the Turkish government, amounted to one percent of the Gross National Product in 1999 and two percent in 2000; 5,9 billion USD overall.[5]

During the same time, the Kurdish issue and its management by the Turkish state were also causing serious problems to TFP and especially, as it is be argued below, to Turkey's bilateral relations with a host of countries and the European Union (EU). Among the secessionist Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) tactics were the intimidation against the families of local Kurds who had joined the pro-government militia and assassinating Turkish government employees.[6] The response of Turkish security forces was also aggressive. In their effort to deny the PKK potential logistical support,

they had burnt down Kurdish villages while 1.5 million people of Kurdish origin have been displaced "amid widespread allegations of torture and extra-judicial executions of suspected PKK sympathizers."[7]

The situation in South-eastern Turkey had serious negative repercussions on Turkish regional policy. By the mid-1990s Turkey was blaming Iran and especially Syria of supporting PKK militants and their leader, Abdullah Öcalan, while threatening with military action if those policies did not stop. Importantly enough these threat perceptions were largely the reason behind the formation of the Turkish-Israeli alliance after the signing of a number of agreements in 1996. The tentative Turkey-Syria relations peaked in 1998 when Turkey came close to launching a military attack against Syria. Syria was thereby coerced into expelling the PKK leader thus leading Turkey to gradualy improve its relations with Syria and Iran.

The Kurdish issue had also influenced Ankara's relations with Brussels. This was mainly manifested in the European Council's Decisions in the 1997 Luxembourg Summit. The disproportionate use of violence and the low Human Rights record surrounding this particular issue prevented in many respects Turkey from being included in the next round of enlargement. The capture, trial and sentence to death of the PKK leader provoked severe criticism on an EU level and a warning that the implementation of the death penalty would drive Ankara further away from Europe.

In parallel to these developments, the socioeconomic conditions within Turkey contributed to the rise of – the already ascending – political Islam. The electoral appeal of political Islam gained significant momentum since the establishment of the Welfare Party (WP) in 1987, though earlier successes can be mentioned such as the participation of Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party (MSP) in a 1974 coalition and Özal's election to power. The WP's electoral support grew steadily from 7.2 percent in 1987 to 21.4 percent in 1994, thus rendering it the biggest political party in the Turkish parliament.[8] In 1996 the WP formed a coalition government with the True Path Party, and its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, became the first Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey.

The Islamic turn in the internal domain of Turkish politics also influenced TFP. Despite a conscious effort by Erbakan not to deviate from traditional western oriented TFP, he made openings to Muslim states under the banner of a more pro-active foreign policy.[9] The military establishment, however, perceived his foreign policy initiatives and its domestic policy priorities as a challenge to the secular character of the Turkish state and thus staged what has been called the "post-modern" coup of February 28, 1997, after which Erbakan was indirectly forced to step down. Among other things, this incident demonstrated to the international community the desperate need for democratic reforms and especially the need for the Turkish Army to be kept under political control.

All these developments confirmed the mission of the Turkish military to act as a custodian of the Kemalist legacy and to defend the territorial integrity of the Turkish state against internal and external threats. As was stated above, throughout the 1990s, it was the Turkish armed forces that were guiding TFP through their institutionalized role in the NSC. The influence of the military became evident when, as a response to the WP's pro-Islamic foreign policy opening, it "drove forward the emerging strategic relationship with Israel;" similarly, the expulsion of Öcalan from Syria can be attributed to the military's role.[10] Yet, this asymmetry in Turkey's civil-military relations was another obstacle to the country's EU bid for membership throughout the decade. Further, the overthrow of Erbakan's pro-Islamist government and the strategic co-operation with Israel were causing problems to Turkey's relations with other Muslim countries of the region and especially within the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), in which Turkey was a member.

International Level

The abovementioned domestic drivers of Turkish politics were not dissociated from external developments given that the end of the Cold War brought about drastic transformations in Turkey's surrounding environment. The ethnically driven civil war in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, the first Gulf war as a result of the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait,

the drastic transformation of the European Economic Community with the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the emergence of a new security environment with emphasis on low politics issues were the basic characteristics of this new order. Under such conditions interstate co-operation was becoming imperative. In spite of this, however, the increasing focus of TFP on security concerns, after Özal's death, prevented Turkey from successfully adapting to these realities.

Within this environment, due to internal and external threat perceptions regarding its territorial integrity, Turkey was at odds with most of its neighbours throughout the 1990s, while its relations with the EU further deteriorated. For example, Turkey came very close to an armed confrontation with Greece in 1996, as a result of an ownership controversy over two rocky islands Imia/Kardak, while in 1998, as stated above, a war with Syria was also marginally avoided. The Kurdish issue and its management by the military together with the "post-modern coup" against the WP and the general democratic deficit within Turkey were also creating a lot of obstacles to Turkey's EU membership quest.

All in all the domestic identity crisis and the unstable political scene, along with tectonic geopolitical shifts in the wake of the 1990s, led TFP to dead ends on various fronts; Turkey was dealing with problematic diplomatic relations while being on the brink of economic collapse. More specifically, the realities of the new, post-Cold War security environment, along with political instability, deteriorating economic conditions, the Kurdish issue, the rising Political Islam and the dominance of the military over all aspects of Turkish political life, constituted the main drivers of TFP throughout the 1990s.

TFP drivers in the 2000s

The following decade (2000s), has arguably been one of the most important decades in Turkish history, mainly due to the domestic political and ideological developments. At the same time the external geopolitical environment of Turkey underwent significant shifts which put the country in a difficult position and challenged its national

security. As such, changes at the regional and international system, in conjunction with domestic developments, influenced once again the foreign policy-making of Turkey. Although threat perceptions remained an important driver, the character of the threats evolved according to the new – post 9/11 – geopolitics. As well, the rise of the AKP to power gave new impetus to Turkey, not least because of its management of the economy and its alternative ideological outlook.

Domestic Level

Within the above framework, one of the most significant domestic developments of the 21st century in Turkey was the emergence and election of the AKP to power, in 2002. The AKP was a product of the split of the National Outlook Movement, led by Necmettin Erbakan, and appeared as more moderate and reformist than its Islamist predecessors. The political Islamic roots of the party along with its adoption of a pro-Western and pro-democratic rhetoric not only appealed to the majority of the electoral body but also gave the AKP the right political dynamic so as to enable it to challenge the traditional Kemalist-military establishment, which had been dominating Turkey's political scene since the establishment of the Republic.

The reason why this domestic development has had impact on foreign policy is because it gave rise to a different worldview at the political elite level, not necessarily fundamentally different from the previous one, but different enough so that the AKP's transformation of foreign policy became a subject of debate and discussion. Although this foreign policy orientation was not entirely new, but rather a continuation of Turgut Özal's foreign policy, it has admittedly been more successful mainly because of the success the hybrid ideology of the party enjoyed domestically. This ideological mixture of democratic and conservative values (or rhetoric), partly influenced by a modernized version of Turkish political Islam, has had an impact on the government's domestic and foreign policies alike.

The willingness for a change in foreign policy was clear in the speeches and writings of top AKP officials and leaders such as former

President Abdullah Gül, former Prime Minister and current President Tayyip Erdoğan, and former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Apart from the public expression of their ideas in earlier years, a comprehensive vision for Turkey's foreign policy was put forth by Davutoğlu in his book *Strategic Depth* (Stratejik Derinlik) as early as 2001.[11] His ideas have since then been reproduced and developed in other articles and papers of his.[12] Importantly enough, Davutoğlu's, and therefore Turkey's, foreign policy vision was very much informed by a worldview based on Turkish political Islam and the imperial past of the country, which provided a potential geo-cultural and geopolitical sphere of influence for Turkey, though pragmatic interests were not disregarded.

Thus, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as well as the Balkans and Caucasus, seem to have been understood as an Islamic Space with which Turkey could and should have improved relations. On the other hand, according to Davutoğlu, a more cautious and perhaps distant relationship should be sought with Israel; this had a direct appeal to both Turkey's public opinion and the Arab neighbours. Without taking into account regional and international geopolitical developments, this – at least partly – ideologically-driven understanding of TFP by the country's political elites, has undoubtedly played a role in the betterment, for example, of Turkey's relations with its Arab neighbourhood and especially with Syria and Iraq, as well as with non-Arab Iran.

Along with politico-ideological changes within Turkey came economic changes as well. A central notion among scholars is that Turkey's economy has improved as the AKP has proceeded to economic reforms such as fiscal and banking restructuring.[13] As a consequence there has been an increase in the per capita income and the GDP of the country thus having positive impact on sectors like the health and educational system, while rendering Turkey the 17th largest economy of the planet.[14]

Naturally, this economic transformation had repercussions on Turkish foreign economic relations, for Turkey tried to strengthen its economic ties with its neighbours in order to create an export-oriented

economy as well as bring about security and stability through economic interdependence. In addition, over the past two decades in particular, the emergence of "Islamic capital" and related business groups closely associated with the AKP, have influenced the party's economic outlook and called for closer relations with Turkey's historic geo-cultural space.[15] Therefore, the rising interest of the AKP government towards the markets of the Arab and Muslim world is certainly a product of both pragmatic and ideological considerations. The end result, at least for the most part of the 2000s, was that Turkey had moved from being a security focused state to a largely trade focused one.[16]

Additional domestic factors that have influenced Turkish foreign policy under the AKP include the civil-military relations and the Kurdish Issue – much like in the 90s. Both of them are directly related to the country's democratization process while the Kurdish issue is also seen as a national security matter intertwined with regional geopolitical dynamics. Admittedly the power struggle between the political power of the AKP and the dominance of the Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment over the state has been at the epicentre of Turkish domestic politics during the AKP's governance. The AKP, by incorporating the pro-Western rhetoric of the Kemalists into its own, managed to convincingly pursuit an EU membership. In doing so it was supported by the EU in implementing reform packages which aimed, among other things, at restructuring the judiciary and improving the country's human rights record; the latter also concerned the rights of minorities and, therefore, the Kurds as well.

Thereby, the AKP managed to effectively undermine the dominance of the Kemalist establishment and gradually led the country to a transition into civic governance. This meant that the military could no longer impose its own will on decision-making – at least not to the same extent as before – which, in turn, affected the conduct of foreign policy. That is because the Kemalist foreign policy orientation, apart from its pro-Westernism, it kept a distance from the Arab world, it adopted an approach of non-involvement in regional issues and for the most part supported the maintenance of the *status quo*. From that perspective, as the military's influence decreased, the AKP had the opportunity to

become more assertive in its foreign policy by engaging its neighbours economically and diplomatically as well as by getting involved in regional bilateral issues as a mediator.

As far as the Kurdish issue is concerned, it is a complex and multileveled matter; moreover, it is a domestic issue as much as it is a foreign and a transnational one. It is precisely for this reason that the question of the rights of the Kurdish minority and the secessionist guerrilla war of the PKK against the government has been influencing Turkish foreign policy-making. On the one hand the AKP government made efforts to address the problem, through peace processes such as the "Kurdish Opening" and the "Imrali Process," in order to contribute to the democratization of the state, revive its European impetus and prolong its stay to power.[17] On the other hand, however, these efforts also have the goal of minimizing the national security threat that the Kurdish issue poses. For the same reason, Turkey had to rethink its foreign policy towards and approach outside actors which could exacerbate its Kurdish insurgency, such as Northern Iraq, and occasionally cooperate with Iran, Iraq, as well as Syria to contain the PKK. After the 2003 Iraq war, it was the "Arab Spring" and particularly the Syrian conflict that played a central role in revealing once more the regional dimensions of the Kurdish issue, thus forcing Turkey to factor it in its strategic calculations.

International Level

In terms of the impact of the external environment on TFP during this decade, perhaps the most important developments were the Afghanistan and Iraq wars which followed the 9/11 dramatic events, as well as the international economic crisis and the stalemate in Turkey-EU relations.

With particular regard to Iraq, two main consequences of the war had a direct effect on TFP: the strengthening of the Kurdish Regional Government (Iraqi Kurdistan - KRG) and the crippling of Iraq's relative power in the region. This, in turn, created new challenges for Turkey: on the one hand the KRG became a potential actor of high security risk,

as a safe haven for the PKK amidst increasing attacks in Turkey, while, on the other hand, the central government of Iraq became vulnerable to foreign political influence – primarily from Iran and, to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia. The power vacuum in Iraq became gradually more obvious and challenging for Turkey as the United States (US) troops started withdrawing between 2007 and 2011.[18]

At the same time, a rift had developed between Erbil (Kurdistan) and Baghdad over the management of Kurdistan's natural resources and the KRG's constitutional and political autonomy.[19] In responding to these challenges, Turkey tried to approach both the KRG and Baghdad to ask for their support in dealing with the PKK. Yet, in parallel to that, it was reported that Ankara has been politically supportive of oppositional Sunni political powers in Iraq as a counterbalance to the Shiite Iran-backed government of Baghdad. Eventually, this created a rupture in Turkish-Iraqi relations and a relative decline in Turkey-Iran relations, whereas it caused an improvement in Turkey-KRG relations.

Among these and other regional security problems, such as the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli and Turkish-US relations, Turkey also had to deal with the stalemate in its EU accession process as well as with the political and economic consequences of the global –and particularly the European– economic crisis. Indeed, the diachronically problematic relations with the EU reached a deadlock once again by late 2005, despite Turkey's efforts to meet the EU's Copenhagen criteria. Both the difference of opinion within the EU about Turkey's accession and some shortcomings on Turkey's part played a role.

The AKP's disappointment led it to take a step back from its efforts for EU accession although it never gave up on the prospect of membership. The global economic crisis that broke out approximately two years later had a negative effect on the economy of the EU and Eurozone more specifically. In light of this, Turkey's excellent economic and trade relations with the EU deteriorated – especially after 2007 – whereas its already improved economic relations with the Arab world boomed. From that perspective the lack of motivation to further pursuit an EU membership wholeheartedly and the politico-

economic problems of the EU itself played a decisive role in Turkish policy-making.

As far as the 2000s is concerned, it occurs that external developments in conjunction with domestic economic needs and ideological drivers, led the AKP to adopt a less pro-Western and more (Middle) Easternized foreign policy which, especially in the MENA, was supported by its pro-Arab and pro-Islamic rhetoric along with a harsh political stance towards Israel and occasionally the West (US, NATO, EU).

The Impact of the "Arab Spring" and "Islamic State"

The break out of the Arab uprisings in late 2010 has caused significant systemic changes to the Middle East. In this sense, the Turkish regional foreign policy since then has been primarily influenced by geopolitical shifts in its external environment. Due to the "Arab Spring," not only did the insecurity of the early 2000s (Iraq war) return but also the whole foreign policy doctrine – of "Zero Problems" – seemed to be on the verge of collapse mostly because there was uncertainty about what would follow the transition period in the countries that experienced the revolts. As already noted, it is noteworthy that Turkey has been developing very good trade relations with its Arab neighbours over the last decade. For example, in 2008, its exports to Arab countries reached 25,000 million USD and its imports around 12,000 million USD.[20] This was one of the reasons why the overthrow of the traditional authoritarian regimes, along with the hit to economy that these countries took from the uprisings, greatly affected Turkey and its conduct of foreign policy.

A case in point is Turkey's economic relations with Libya and Syria, to mention only two examples. In the case of Libya, Turkey had big profits from construction projects that Turkish companies undertook while the volume of trade between the two countries amounted to millions of dollars per year.[21] Moreover, more than 25 thousand Turkish workers were employed in Libya and had to leave the country after the civil war broke out. In terms of the Syrian case, the increasingly positive relations between the two countries at all levels, which peaked

in 2009, included the singing of a free trade and a visa free agreement. The volume of their bilateral trade reached 2.5 billion USD in 2010.[22] Within this environment Turkey had to be very cautious while trying to make the best out of a bad and unexpected situation.

In its effort to react to these geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, Turkey resorted to two main tactics: on the one hand it tried to capitalize on its popularity in the region, and promote the "model" of its politico-economic system, in order to develop friendly ties with the newly-elected governments anew – even though Davutoğlu tended to downplay Turkey's role as a "model".[23] From that perspective, and given that conservative parties had gained momentum after the uprisings in these countries, Turkey had to also maintain its distance from Israel in order not to disrupt its developing relations with the new Arab governments, thereby hoping that their profitable relations would go back to normal. On the other hand, Turkey had to acknowledge the limits of its "soft power" and its overall foreign policy capabilities, which it had been overplaying by that time thus projecting itself as strengthened and largely autonomous, and to rely (bandwagon) once again on its traditional western allies in order to counter instability and threats that stemmed from the new regional order and specifically the Syrian crisis.[24]

In the almost three years that followed the breakout of the Arab uprisings, the external changes have affected Turkey's domestic politics while domestic developments have also played a role in shaping the country's foreign policy. Starting from the former, the exacerbation of the Kurdish question in particular, as a result of the Syrian crisis, gave rise to the need for decisive steps towards its resolution. In parallel, the resolution of the Kurdish question was also imperative for the success of the AKP's new constitutional reforms, and its re-election in the 2014/15 local, presidential and national elections. What is more, any positive steps towards resolving this decades-old problem, as well as other constitutional issues, would also favour Turkey's prospect for an EU membership.

With regard to the relation between domestic developments and foreign policy, the recent events of the "Gezi Park," in the summer

of 2013,[25] had some effect, although its real extent remains to be seen. Domestically, the intensity and relative massiveness of the anti-government demonstrations, together with the often harsh response from the state through the crackdown of the police, challenged the AKP's hegemony and legitimacy as well as revealed its limits. This, in turn, had a negative impact on Turkey's otherwise pro-democracy regional and international image. In other words, it has, arguably, delegitimized – to some degree – the "Turkish model" and Turkey's ability to support oppressed peoples of the region, while at the same time it worsened its image before the EU. This dynamic manifested again in the 07 June 2015 national elections, when the AKP got 40.8 percent of the votes; an approximate 9 percent drop from the 2011 results.

Although much depend on domestic and external on-going developments, it would be permissible to say that the Arab uprisings have forced Ankara to recalibrate its foreign policy and adopt new tactics in order to adapt to the new and challenging geopolitical order. More importantly, they revealed the fragility and overplayed ambitions of Turkey's "new" foreign policy – under the AKP – and the "zero problems with neighbours" principle, which came to dominate Ankara's discourse.

Likewise, the rise of the self-styled "Islamic State," as a product of both the Iraq war and the Arab uprisings especially in Syria, re-emphasized Turkey's insecurities and threat perceptions as well as its ambiguous role in the region that stems from Ankara's need to deal with multiple and complex foreign policy fronts. The Kurdish issue had once more a central role to these developments, particularly amidst the battle for Kobani – a Kurdish town on the Turkish-Syrian border – where the "Islamic State" was eventually defeated by a coalition of (Syrian and Iraqi) Kurds and secular Arab forces. Turkey's indecisiveness and unwillingness to both actively join the international "Coalition of the Willing"[26] and help the Kurds in Kobani, prompted Kurdish protests in Turkey and had a negative impact on the Kurdish peace process and the AKP's image among Turkey's Kurds. This was reflected in the 13 percent that the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) received

at the June 2015 national elections; a historic victory for Turkey's Kurdish movement that surpassed the 10 percent threshold and entered the parliament as a political party for the first time.[27]

The emergence of various reports claiming Turkey has been collaborating with Islamist movements in Syria made things worse in terms of both the international image of the country and the AKP's domestic legitimacy, while Ankara's post-"Arab Spring" pro-Western shift was once again reversed.[28] Thus, regional instability has also had domestic repercussions which, coupled with the authoritarian turn of the AKP and President Erdoğan, induced social, economic and political turmoil and affected negatively the AKP's (electoral) popularity. The new period that Turkey entered after the June 2015 elections is sooner or later expected to resemble past decades such as the 1970s and 1990s: with early elections, numerous short-lived governments and paradoxical coalitions. As this transition is under way, Turkey's domestic contradictions will lead to difficult foreign policy-making and render Ankara unable to successfully respond to exogenous geopolitical pressures and constraints. At this conjuncture Turkey will continue to be concerned more with security rather than economic issues and, given the systemic shifts that the Middle East is undergoing, its external environment will be playing a central role in its foreign policy calculations.

Conclusions

Through this brief evaluation of the drivers of Turkish regional policy since 1990 two initial observations can be made. First, both the domestic and external level plays a role in shaping Turkey's foreign policy. Second, the negative influence of multiple variables together with the lack of a concrete and effective foreign policy strategy during the 1990s could explain much of the rising need for a foreign policy doctrine such as Ahmet Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth." Similarly, the shifting geopolitical realities of the new millennium made the implementation of that doctrine even more necessary and possible as well as largely successful. Yet the new regional landscape which came

about after the Arab uprisings led Turkey to a more traditional foreign policy which, indeed, diverged from the AKP's approach up to that point. Yet the rise of the "Islamic State" brought back the same doubts among Western states as to whether Turkey is a committed ally or a rising regional power with independent and revisionist aspirations.

From the perspective of these two observations and recent changes in TFP, it can be argued that the external environment, and everything that comes with it in terms of geopolitics, diplomacy, economics, external threat perceptions, etc., has been the most important driver of TFP since 1990. Within this framework, the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 events and the Afghanistan/Iraq wars that followed, as well as the Arab uprisings and the "Islamic State," have been the most important – external, systemic – turning points. Yet, such factors cannot, by themselves, shape the whole of TFP. For example, the role of the dominant ideology at the political elite level also played a significant role since the rise of political Islam, and its clash with the traditional Kemalist establishment, led to the creation of the AKP which would later filter external developments in its own way, thus shaping the outcomes of Turkey's foreign policy. Likewise, the need for economic recovery and development, as well as domestic democratization problems (e.g. Kurdish issue, human rights, etc.), played their own part in the configuration of TFP, especially when it came to the ups and downs of Turkey's relations with the EU.

Today, TFP is once again before the need of striking a balance between its internal and external dynamics; even more so after the most recent increasing domestic polarization at the social and political level. While external developments are, more often than not, hard to control, domestic politics and developments lie at large in the hands of the governments. Therefore, the key for Turkey's security, stability, progress and foreign policy success, relies greatly on the decisive resolution of domestic problems, so as for the country to be able to effectively evaluate external challenges without concerns for domestic repercussions that could in turn become unstable variables and impact the successful conduct of foreign policy. Such an approach would also assist Turkey in dealing with its ever salient identity crisis, recalibrating

its international outlook and successfully finding its place in the global arena.

NOTES

1. Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the End of the Cold War*, London, Hurst & Company, 2003. P. 64.
2. See, Kemal Kirişci, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times", *Institute for Security Studies, European Union* Paris, Challot Paper No. 92, September 2006, available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp092.pdf (accessed in May 2014).
3. Pantelis Sklias, "The Political Economy of Turkey's Accession to the EU: A Comparative Analysis", in Constantinos Arvanitopoulos (ed.), *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy*, Berlin, Springer, 2009, pp. 195-209.
4. Ibrahim Öztürk, "Political Economy of Erdogan's Success Story in Turkey", *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, June 2001, available at: http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2011/7/30/201173012164021673 4Political%20economy%20of%20Erdogans%20success%20story%20in%20Turkey.pdf (accessed in May 2014).
5. Alexandra Bibbe *et al*., *Economic Effects of the 1999 Turkish Earthquakes: An Interim Report*, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 247, Paris, OECSPublishing, June 2000, p. 9, available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5lgsjhvj837f.pdf?expires=1398499559&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=C5BE339682CB8F0D81C5ABA0C40252E1 (accessed in May 2014).
6. Gareth Jenkins, "Turkey's Changing Domestic Politics", in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitris Triantaphyllou (eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, USA, Brassey's, 2001, p. 28.
7. Ibid.
8. Robins, *Suits and Uniforms, op. cit.*, p. 154.
9. Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan", *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 82-100.
10. Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
11. Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position* [Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiye'nin Uluslararasi Konumu], Istanbul, Küre Yayinlari, 2001.

12. Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy: Address by H.E. Foreign Minister of Republic of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu", *SETA* Foundation,Washington, 8 December 2009, available at: http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/14808.pdf (accessed in May 2014) and, Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007". Insight Turkey 10, no. 1, (2008), 77-96.
13. Rahmi M. Koç, "An Evaluation of Turkey's 2023 Targets from the Private Sector Perspective", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2013, p. 17.
14. Ibid.
15. Özbudun, E. & Keyman, F. E. "Cultural Globalization in Turkey: Actors, Discourses, Strategies", in Peter. L. Berger and Samuel. P. Huntington (eds.), *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 302-303; and, Kemal Kirişci, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, 2009, pp. 38-39, 46-47.
16. *Ibid*., pp. 52-54.
17. For the AKP's Kurdish initiatives see, Johanna Nykänen, "Identity, Narrative and Frames: Assessing Turkey's Kurdish Initiatives", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013, pp. 85–101; and, Nikos Moudouros, "Initiatives for Solving the Kurdish Question: A Contradiction or 'an Ideological Consistency' of AKP?", *Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey)* Vol. 2, No. 7, September 2013, pp. 44-54, available at: http://researchturkey.org/?p=4140 (accessed in May 2014).
18. Ephraim Kam, "To Iraq and Back: The Withdrawal of the US Forces", *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 14, No. 4, January 2012, pp. 87-88; Raymond Hinnebusch, "The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2007, pp. 20-23; Gohkan Bacık, "Iraq After the U.S. Withdrawal: Al Maliki Against Turkey", *The German Marshall Fund of the United States*, January 2012, available at: http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/bacik_iraqafterwithdrawl_jan1225.pdf (accessed in May 2014).
19. Robin M. Mills, "Northern Iraq's Oil Chessboard: Energy, Politics and Power", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013, pp. 54-57. Hinnebusch, "The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences", *op. cit.*
20. Nader Habibi and Joshua W. Walker, "What Is Driving Turkey's Reengagement with the Arab World?", *Crown Centre for Middle East Studies*, Middle East Brief No. 49, April 2011, pp. 2-3, available at: http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB49.pdf (accessed in May 2014).
21. "Turkey-Libya Economic and Trade Relations," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-libya.en.mfa (accessed in May 2014).

22. "Relations between Turkey-Syria", *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey%E2%80%93syria.en.mfa (accessed in May 2014).
23. Also see, Zenonas Tziarras, "Turkey-Egypt: Turkish Model, Political Culture and Regional Power Struggle," *Strategy International*, Research Paper No. 4/2013, October 2013.
24. Zenonas Tziarras, "Turkey's Syria Problem: A Talking Timeline of Events", *Turkish Policy* Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2012, pp. 129-138.
25. Nilüfer Göle, "Gezi – Anatomy of a Public Square Movement", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2013, pp. 7-14; and, Nikos Moudouros, "Rethinking Islamic Hegemony in Turkey through Gezi Park", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 181-195.
26. Akbar Shahid Ahmed, "Turkey, Reluctant Partner In Obama ISIS Strategy, Frustrates U.S. Officials", *Huffington Post*, 11 November 2014, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/11/turkey-isis-obama-problems_n_6135856.html (accessed in June 2015).
27. Robert Tait, "Isil attack on Kobane inflames conflict between Turkey and Kurds", *The Telegraph*, 08 October 2014, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/11149981/Isil-attack-on-Kobane-inflames-conflict-between-Turkey-and-Kurds.html (accessed in June 2015).
28. David L. Philips, "ISIS-Turkey Links", *Huffington Post*, 11 September 2014, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html (accessed in June 2015); "Turkey daily accuses authorities of smuggling jihadis to Syria", *The Daily Star*, 05 June 2015, available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jun-05/300735-turkey-daily-accuses-authorities-of-smuggling-jihadis-to-syria.ashx (accessed in June 2015).

Chronologies

Chypre: 1er novembre 2014 – 30 septembre 2015

1er novembre: Christos Stylianides, Porte Parole du gouvernement est nommé à la Commission européenne.

25 novembre: Refus du président Nicos Anastassiades à reprendre les négociations intercommunautaires à l'invitation du Représentant de l'ONU chargé de la question chypriote Espen Barth Eide compte tenu des violations répétées des droits souverains de Chypre par l'envoi du navire militaire turc Barbaros dans sa zone économique exclusive.

4 décembre: Opération chirurgicale cardiaque à New York du président N. Anastassiades.

29 janvier: Le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU vote la Résolution n°2197 qui maintient pour une période de six mois la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre.

26-28 février: Visite en Russie du président N. Anastassiades. Conclusion de plusieurs accords bilatéraux dont un accord de coopération navale autorisant aux navires de guerre russes menant des opérations anti-terroristes un accès au port de Limassol aux fins de ravitaillement en eau et carburant.

1er mars: Election à la présidence du parti socialiste Edek de Marinos Sizopoulos, qui succède à Yannakis Omirou démissionnaire.

18 mars: Le ministre de l'Energie, du Commerce et de l'Industrie Georges Lakkotrypis signe avec Jean Luc Porcheron de Total une extension de l'accord pour des recherches de gaz naturel de cette entreprise dans le bloc 11 de la zone économique exclusive de Chypre.

26 avril: Election de Mustapha Akinci au poste de président de la «République turque de Chypre nord (RTCN)» avec 60,5% des voix face au président sortant Dervis Eroglu.

15 mai: Reprise des négociations intercommunautaires avec une première rencontre entre Nicos Anastasiades et Mustapha Akinci.

10 juin: Le Parlement européen vote une Résolution dans laquelle il «réitère son ferme soutien à la réunification de Chypre, sur la base d'un règlement juste, global et viable pour les deux communautés, négocié sous les auspices du Secrétaire général des Nations unies et conformément aux résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies et aux valeurs sur lesquelles est fondée l'Union, d'une fédération bicommunautaire et bizonale, dotée d'une souveraineté unique, d'une personnalité juridique internationale unique, et d' une citoyenneté unique assortie d'une égalité politique entre les deux communautés et d'une égalité des chances pour tous ses citoyens».

17 juin: Troisième rencontre de N. Anastasiades et M. Akinci «dans une atmosphère constructive».

16-17 juillet: Le président Jean-Claude Juncker en visite à Chypre affirme que l'unité de Chypre était à portée et déclare que «le passé ne doit pas faire obstacle au progrès ni hypothéquer l'avenir».

27 juillet: Nouvelle rencontre Anastasiades-Akinci qui conviennent qu'il faut respecter le droit individuel de propriété.

1er septembre: Onzième rencontre Anastasiades-Akinci.

14 septembre: Douzième rencontre Anastasiades-Akinci.

25 septembre: Le président Obama adresse un message de soutien à Nicos Anastasiades pour ses efforts en vue d'une solution de la question chypriote sur la base d'une fédération bizonale et bicommunautaire.

Grèce: 1er novembre 2014 – 30 septembre 2015

3 novembre: A la suite de la nomination à la Commission européenne de Dimitri Avramopoulos celui-ci est remplacé au ministère de la Défense par Nicos Dendias.

18 novembre: Condamnation à 4 ans de prison de l'ancien ministre socialiste Yannos Papantoniou pour déclaration inexacte de sa situation financière.

12 décembre: Coups de feu à Athènes contre l'Ambassade d' Israël en Grèce. Dégâts matériels.

17 décembre: Vote au Parlement pour l'élection présidentielle: Stavros Dimas candidat présenté par le gouvernement n'obtient que 160 voix.

29 décembre: Dissolution du Parlement après le nouvel échec pour élire le président de la République, Stavros Dimas n'obtenant que 168 voix.

25 janvier: Elections législatives. *Syriza* 36,34% et 149 sièges, *Nouvelle Démocratie* 27,81% et 76 sièges, *Aube Dorée* 6,28% et 17 sièges, *Potami* 6,05% et 17 sièges, *KKE* 5,47% et 15 sièges, *ANEL* 4,75% et 13 sièges, *Pasok* 4,68% et 13 sièges. Mme Zoé Constantopoulou est élue Présidente du Parlement.

26 janvier: Nomination aux fonctions de Premier ministre et prestation de serment d'Alexis Tsipras.

27 janvier: Prestation de serment du nouveau gouvernement composé de 40 membres (Syriza et Grecs Indépendants):

Vice Premier Ministre . . . . . .**Yannis Dragassakis**

Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Restructuration administrative

Ministre: . . . . . .**Nicos Voutsis**

Ministre-adjoint (Réforme administrative): . . .**Georges Katrougalos**

Ministre-adjoint
(Politique en matière d'immigration): . .**Tassia Christodoulopoulou**

Secrétaire d'Etat (Macédoine-Thrace): . . . .**Maria Kollia-Tsaroucha**

Ministère de l'Economie, des Infrastructures, de la Marine et du Tourisme

Ministre: . . . . . .**Georges Stathakis**

Ministre-adjoint
(Infrastructures, Transports et Réseaux): . . . . . .**Christos Spirtzis**

Ministre-adjoint (Marine): . . . . . .**Théodore Dritsas**

Ministre-adjoint (Tourisme): . . . . . .**Elena Kountoura**

Ministère de la Restructuration productive,de l' Environnement et de l' Energie

Ministre: . . . . . .**Panayiotis Lafazanis**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**Yannis Tsironis**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**Vanghelis Apostolou**

Secrétaire d'Etat: . . . . . .**Panos Sgouridis**

Ministère des Finances

Ministre: . . . . . .**Yannis Varoufakis**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .Mme **Nadia Valavani**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**Dimitri Mardas**

Ministère de la Culture, de l' Education et des Cultes

Ministre: . . . . . .**Aristide Baltas**

Ministre-adjoint (Culture): . . . . . .**Nicos Xydakis**

Ministre-adjoint (Education): . . . . . .**Tassos Kourakis**

Ministre-adjoint (Recherche et Innovation): . . . . . .**Costas Fotakis**

Secrétaire d'Etat (Sports): . . . . . .**Stavros Kontonis**

Ministère de l' Emploi

Ministre: . . . . . .**Panos Skourletis**

Ministre-adjoint (Solidarité sociale): . . . . . .**Theano Fotiou**

Ministre-adjoint
(Lutte contre le chômage): . . . . . .Mme **Rania Antonopoulou**

Ministère de la Santé et de la Sécurité sociale

Ministre: . . . . . .**Panayiotis Kouroublis**

Ministre-adjoint (Santé): . . . . . .**Andréas Xanthos**

Ministre-adjoint (Sécurité sociale): . . . . . .**Dimitri Stratoulis**

Ministère des Affaires étrangères

Ministre: . . . . . .**Nicos Kotzias**

Ministre-adjoint (Affaires européennes): . . . . . .**Nicos Hountis**

Ministre-adjoint
(Affaires économiques internationales): . . . . . .**Euclide Tsakalotos**

Ministère de la Défense

Ministre: . . . . . .**Panos Kammenos**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**Costas Isychos**

Secrétaire d'Etat: . . . . . .**Nicos Toskas**

Ministre de la Justice: . . . . . .**Nicos Paraskevopoulos**

Ministre d'Etat chargé de la
lutte contre la corruption: . . . . . .**Panayiotis Nicoloudis**

Ministre d'Etat chargé de la coordination de
l'œuvre gouvernementale: . . . . . .**Alecos Flabouraris**

Secrétaire d'Etat: . . . . . .**Terence Quick**

Ministre d'Etat: . . . . . .**Nicos Pappas**

Secrétaire d' Etat auprès du Premier ministre et
Porte parole du Gouvernement: . . . . . .**Gavriïl Sakellaridis**

18 février: Election à la présidence de la République de l'ancien ministre de droite Procope Pavlopoulos qui obtient 233 voix (*Syriza, Anel, Nouvelle Démocratie),* face à Nicos Alivizatos qui obtient 30 voix (*Potami et Pasok*).

20 février: Accord entre la Grèce et l' Eurogroupe qui prolonge pour une durée de 4 mois le second plan d'aide à ce pays de 130 milliards d'euros - qui arrivait à échéance le 28 février - au prix d'importantes concessions consenties par le gouvernement Tsipras.

17 mars: Violentes manifestations à Athènes dans le quartier Exarcheia contre les lois antiterroristes et les prisons de haute sécurité.

8 avril: Rencontre à Moscou d'Alexis Tsipras avec le président Poutine. Signature de 3 accords de coopération.

29 avril: Rencontre à Nicosie d'AlexisTsipras avec le président chypriote Nicos Anastasiades et le président égyptien Abdel Fattah al-Sisi pour établir une coopération dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.

11 mai: La Russie invite la Grèce à rejoindre les BRICS (Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine, Afrique du sud).

8 juin: La Grèce ne peut rembourser 600 millions d'euros au FMI.

27 juin: Le gouvernement décide d'organiser un referendum sur les mesures d'austérité proposées par les créanciers de la Grèce.

28 juin: Le gouvernement ferme les banques et décide le contrôle des changes.

29 juin: Manifestation «pro Europe» à Athènes.

30 juin: Manifestation à Athènes en faveur du «non» au référendum.

5 juillet: Referendum sur la question: Approuvez-vous le plan proposé par le FMI, la BCE et la Commission européenne ? 61,31% répondent «non» à cette question comme le leur conseillait A. Tsipras. 37,5% d'abstentions.

6 juillet: Démission du ministre des Finances Yannis Varoufakis, qui est remplacé par Euclide Tsakalotos.

13 juillet: Accord de la Grèce avec l'Eurogroupe sur un 3ème plan d'aide d'un montant de 86 milliards d'euros moyennant de très dures conditions.

20 août: Démission du Premier ministre Tsipras, qui appelle à de nouvelles élections.

27 août: Nomination d'un gouvernement de service dirigé par Mme Vassiliki Thanou, Présidente de la Cour de Cassation, chargée d'organiser les élections.

20 septembre: Elections législatives. *Syriza* 35,47% et 145 sièges, *Nouvelle Démocratie* 28,09% et 75 sièges, *Aube Dorée* 6,99% et 18 sièges, *Pasok- Dimar* 6,28% et 17 sièges, *KKE* 5,55% et 15 sièges, *Potami* 4,09% et 11 sièges, *ANEL* 3,69% et 10 sièges, *Union des centristes* 3,49% et 9 sièges. 43,38% d'abstentions.

21 septembre: Nomination aux fonctions de Premier ministre et prestation de serment d'Alexis Tsipras.

23 septembre: Prestation de serment du nouveau gouvernement (Syriza et Anel):

Vice Premier Ministre . . . . . .**Yannis Dragassakis**

Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Restructuration administrative

Ministre: . . . . . .**Panos Kouroublis**

Secrétaire d'Etat: . . . . . .**Yannis Balafas**

Ministre-adjoint (Réforme administrative): **Christoforos Vernadakis**

Ministre-adjoint (Protection du citoyen): . . . . . .**Yannis Toscas**

Ministre-adjoint
(Politique en matière d'immigration): . . . . . .**Yannis Mouzalas**

Secrétaire d'Etat (Macédoine-Thrace): . . . .**Maria Kollia-Tsaroucha**

Ministère de l'Economie, des Infrastructures, de la Marine et du Tourisme

Ministre: . . . . . .**Georges Stathakis**

Ministre- adjoint (Tourisme): . . . . . .**Elena Kountoura**

Secrétaire d'Etat (ESPA): . . . . . .**Alexis Haritzis**

Secrétaire d'Etat (Industrie): . . . . . **Théodora Tsakri**

Ministère de la Défense

Ministre: . . . . . .**Panos Kammenos**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**Dimitri Vitsas**

Ministère de l' Education, de la Recherche et des Cultes

Ministre: . . . . . .**Nicos Filis**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**Sia Anagstopoulou**

Ministre-adjoint (Education): . . . . . .**Tassos Kourakis**

Ministre-adjoint (Recherche et Innovation): . . . . . .**Costas Fotakis**

Secrétaire d'Etat: . . . . . .**Théodore Pelegrinis**

Ministère des Affaires étrangères

Ministre: . . . . . .**Nicos Kotzias**

Ministre-adjoint (Affaires européennes): . . . . . .**Nicos Xydakis**

Secrétaire d'Etat: . . . . . .**Dimitri Mardas**

Secrétaire d'Etat: . . . . . .**Yannis Amanatides**

Ministère de la Justice, de la Transparence et des Droits de l'Homme

Ministre: . . . . . .**Nicos Paraskevopoulos**

Ministre-adjoint chargé de la lutte contre
la corruption: . . . . . .**Dimitri Papangelopoulos**

Ministère de l'Emploi, de la Sécurité Sociale et de la Solidarité Sociale

Ministre: . . . . . .**Georges Katrougalos**

Ministre-adjoint (Solidarité Sociale): . . . . . .**Théano Fotiou**

Ministre-adjoint (Lutte contre le Chomâge): . .**Rania Antonopoulou**

Secrétaire d'Etat (Sécurité Sociale): . . . . . .**Anastassios Petropoulos**

Ministère de la Santé

Ministre: . . . . . .**Andréas Xanthos**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**Pavlos Polakis**

Ministère de la Culture et des Sports

Ministre: . . . . . .**Baltas Aristides**

Secrétaire d'Etat (Sports): . . . . . .**Stavros Kontonis**

Ministère des Finances

Ministre: . . . . . .**Euclide Tsakalotos**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**Tryphon Alexiades**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**G. Houliarakis**

Ministère de l'Environnement et de l'Energie

Ministre: . . . . . .**Panos Skourletis**

Ministre-adjoint (Environnement): . . . . . .**Yannis Tsironis**

Ministère des Infrastructures, des Transports et des Réseaux

Ministre: . . . . . .**Christos Spirtzis**

Secrétaire d' Etat: . . . . . .**Dimitri Kamménos**

Ministère de la Marine marchande et de la Politique insulaire

Ministre: . . . . . .**Théodore Dritsas**

Ministère du Développement agricole et de l'Alimentation

Ministre: . . . . . .**Vanghelis Apostolou**

Ministre-adjoint: . . . . . .**Marcos Bolaris**

Ministre d'Etat: . . . . . .**Nicos Pappas**

Ministre d'Etat chargé de la coordination
du travail gouvernemental: . . . . . .**Alecos Flabouraris**

Secrétaire d'Etat auprès du Premier ministre: . . . . . .**Terence Quick**

Secrétaire d' Etat auprès du Premier ministre et
Porte parole du Gouvernement: . . . . . .**Olga Yerovassili**

30 septembre: La tombe antique exhumée à Amphipolis en 2012 serait probablement un monument dédié à Hephaestion, compagnon d' Alexandre le Grand selon Katerina Peristeri qui dirige les recherches de cette tombe massive, la plus importante découverte en Grèce, construite dans la période 325/300 avant JC.

Remerciements / Thanks to
Panayiotis Constantinides
Jean Catsiapis
Thalia Tassou

CONCEPTION GRAPHIQUE / GRAPHIC DESIGN: Iraklis Théodorakopoulos
COMPOSITION / MISE EN PAGE: Constantina Metaxa

Advice to Contributors

Études helléniques / *Hellenic Studies* welcomes manuscript submissions presenting original research on, and critical analysis of, issues prevailing among Greeks in both Greece proper and the numerous Greek communities abroad.

Manuscripts should be original and should not be under consideration elsewhere. Recommended length is approximately 7000 words. Authors should submit (either by postal mail or by email) three typed and double-spaced copies of manuscripts. Submissions must be either in English or in French, but quotations, terms, and references in other languages (especially Greek) are encouraged, especially if they are considered as supportive to the argument of the manuscript. In such instances, English translations should follow. Manuscripts should also include a 150-word abstract and endnotes. Manuscripts, published or unpublished, are not returned.

For more submission guidelines, please find the style sheet at:
http://www.mediterraneanstudies.gr/hellenicstudies

The Editors and Editorial Board of *Etudes helleniques* / *Hellenic Studies* take no responsibility for the opinions or data presented by contributors to the journal.

Avis aux Collaborateurs

Études helléniques / *Hellenic Studies* accueille des manuscrits présentant des recherches originales et des analyses critiques sur des questions qui prévalent parmi les Grecs de la Grèce métropolitaine ainsi que de ceux se trouvant dans les nombreuses communautés helléniques de la diaspora.

Les manuscrits doivent être originaux et ne pas avoir été proposés à d'autres revues. La longueur recommandée est d'environ 7000 mots. Les auteurs doivent envoyer (par courrier postal ou électronique) trois copies dactylographiées en double interligne de leurs articles. La présentation doit être en anglais ou en français, mais les citations ainsi que les références dans d'autres langues (en particulier le grec) sont encouragées, en particulier si celles-ci favorisent l'argumentation de l'auteur. Dans de tels cas, leur traduction anglaise ou française doit les accompagner. Les manuscrits doivent également inclure un résumé de 150 mots et de notes; publiés ou non ceux-ci ne sont pas restitués.

Vous pouvez trouver des indications plus detaillées, à l'adresse:
http://www.mediterraneanstudies.gr/hellenicstudies

Les éditeurs et le Comité de rédaction de la revue *Études helléniques*/ *Hellenic Studies* déclinent toute responsabilité pour les opinions ou les données présentées par leurs collaborateurs.