ETUDES HELLENIQUES

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Jean Catsiapis
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Vassos Vasiliou
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Gilles Bertrand
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Document
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Recensions/ Book Reviews

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2

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Vol. 3, No. 2, 1995

TABLE DES MATIÈRES / TABLE OF CONTENTS

L'image de la Grèce dans l'opinion publique française....Jean Catsiapis 5

Migrant Writing in Multicultural Australia: the Case of the Greeks .....George Kanarakis 17

Ethnic Media: Breaking the Ghetto Politics .....Kosta Gouliamos 25

Embiricos lecteur de Proust .....Jacques Bouchard 41

Greeks & Barbarians, The Genesis of Hellenic International Thought.....Paris Arnopoulos 51

Greek Identity in Second Generation Montrealers.....Vassos Vasiliou 65

L'ex-République Yougoslave de Macédoine: entre apaisement et déstabilisation .....Gilles Bertrand 91

La politique française sur la question chypriote.....103

Recensions/ Book Reviews

Alexis Politis, Romanticist Years; Ideologies and Mentalities in Greece 1830-1880..by Alexander Kitroeff 105

Paris Arnopoulos, Mediterranean 2000 .....by Stephanos Constantinides 107

Chronologie-Grèce 109

Chronologie-Chypre 110

Livres reçus/ Books Received 111

Activités Académiques/ Academic Activities 111

Documents 68, 90

L'IMAGE DE LA GRECE DANS L'OPINION PUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

Jean Catsiapis*

ABSTRACT

The image of Greece, one of the E.U's least economically developed countries, is in the French public opinion one of a scapegoat. Indeed, the strong have always considered the weak as the cause of their own misfortunes. However, Greece's mediocre image in France's eyes has to do with specific causes related to the heavy weight of ancient Greece as well as to the ignorance of the hellenic reality of today and even to some dysfunctions in the French media.

RÉSUMÉ

L'image de la Grèce, un des pays les moins développés économiquement de l'Union européenne est dans l'opinion publique française celle du bouc émissaire. Les forts ont en effet toujours considéré les plus faibles comme la cause de leurs propres malheurs. Toutefois l'image médiocre de la Grèce aux yeux des Français tient aussi à des causes spécifiques qui relèvent tant du poids très lourd de l'antiquité grecque que de l'ignorance par ceux-ci de la réalité hellénique d'aujourd'hui ou encore de certains dysfonctionnements des médias de France.

"Lorsque la Communauté connaît des difficultés, alors on cherche un bouc émissaire. Très souvent c'est la Commission ; en ce moment c'est un peu la Grèce et je le regrette". Ces propos tenus à Athènes, début 1994, par Jacques Delors alors président de la Commission européenne[1] reflètent parfaitement l'image de la Grèce dans l'opinion publique française, qui est celle du bouc émissaire. C'est parce que la Grèce est effectivement un des pays les moins développés économiquement de l'Europe qu'elle est tout naturellement désignée comme responsable de tous les maux qui affectent l'Union Européenne. Les forts ont toujours considéré les plus faibles comme la cause de leurs propres malheurs. Toutefois l'image médiocre de la Grèce aux yeux des Français tient aussi à des causes spécifiques, qui relèvent tant du poids très lourd de l'histoire de l'antiquité grecque, que de l'ignorance par ceux-ci de la réalité hellénique d'aujourd'hui ou encore de certains dysfonctionnements des médias de France.

La nostalgie de la Grèce antique

La splendeur de l'antiquité grecque constitue encore de nos jours, l'émerveillement de l'écrasante majorité des intellectuels français. La philosophie grecque, l'art grec, et de façon générale le Vème siècle athénien ont façonné la civilisation européenne contemporaine. C'est pourquoi de nombreux écrivains , journalistes, cadres supérieurs, qui forment les élites de la société française connaissent la Grèce contemporaine où ils se rendent pour retrouver les traces des

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auteurs dont ils ont parfois traduit les textes, lorsqu'ils étaient sur les bancs du lycée.

C'est alors que nombre d'entre eux éprouvent à l'issue de leur séjour en territoire héllénique la nostalgie d'une Grèce antique qu'ils ont connue par les livres ou qu'ils imaginent à partir de la découverte de monuments vieux de vingt cinq siècles. Mais ces nostalgiques de la civilisation grecque antique ressentent aussi une grande déception envers la Grèce d'aujourd'hui, à la mesure de l'admiration intense qu'ils nourrissent à l'égard de la Grèce d'autrefois. Pour rendre compte de leur attitude il suffit de citer la définition que donne Régis Debray, de la Grèce actuelle : "Ce coin de tiers monde fiché au flanc de l'Europe."[2]

Le phénomène nouveau de ces vingt dernières années tient en ce que l'admiration de la Grèce antique, que ressentaient les intellectuels français, par opposition à leur dédain de la Grèce contemporaine, a fait place à une remise en cause, pour ne pas dire à un révisionnisme pour certains d'entre eux de l'histoire grecque. C'est Bernard-Henri Lévy dans son livre, "*le Testament de Dieu*", publié en 1979, qui le premier, a entrepris, de démolir, bien qu'il s'en défende, l'image de la Grèce dans l'opinion publique française.[3] Le livre de cet auteur, dont Raymond Aron, dénonçait précisément à propos du chapitre de cet ouvrage intitulé "Athènes ou Jérusalem" l'érudition de pacotille[4] a connu un grand retentissement. Bernard-Henri Lévy pour dénigrer la Grèce antique croit en particulier devoir opposer son polythéisme au monothéisme des Hébreux.

Le fait est que le retour au polythéisme, ou plus généralement, la référence à l'antiquité grecque est parfois prôné par des mouvements de pensée, comme le G.R.E.C.E., situés très à droite sur l'échiquier politique. Toutefois de nombreux intellectuels de gauche ou de droite se réclament toujours de l'héritage grec. C'est ainsi que l'ancien ministre gaulliste, George Gorse, indique dans son livre, *Je n'irais pas à mon enterrement*, publié en 1992, qu'il avait souhaité rédiger un article dans lequel il se proposait "d'agiter l'idée que le polythéisme grec méritait quelque considération, le monothéisme, étant par nature voué à l'intolérance". Mais il précise qu'il a dû y renoncer en raison de l'essai de Bernard-Henri Lévy dont "Vidal Naquet et Castoriadis dénoncèrent avec violence (et quelques bons arguments) les erreurs et la mauvaise foi " [5]. La seconde attaque , d'importance majeure, contre l'antiquité grecque provint de la rédaction, sous la direction du professeur Jean Baptiste Duroselle, de l'ouvrage *L'Europe, histoire de ses peuples* dont la première édition est de 1990. Ce livre, très largement subventionné par les Communautés européennes, passait entièrement sous silence l'apport de la Grèce à l'Europe. Son chapitre 4, pourtant intitulé "L'Antiquité: la sagesse grecque et la grandeur romaine", comprenait quatre parties uniquement consacrées à l'antiquité romaine[6]. Les réactions de l'opisnion publique grecque, à ce livre, furent tellement violentes qu'en 1993 une

nouvelle édition de cet ouvrage ajouta deux parties au chapitre 4 dont l'une avait pour titre "L'éclat de la Grèce avant les Romains". Cette seconde édition fut pire, si on peut dire, que la première, car si celle-ci ignorait la Grèce, la nouvelle mouture du livre la présentait systématiquement de façon négative en soulignant avec une ironie grinçante non ses apports mais tous ce que les anciens Grecs n'avaient pas inventé [7].

La Grèce inconnue des Français.

"Au fait comment va Mgr Makarios?". Cette question posée par Jacques Chirac, le 12 mai 1986, alors Premier Ministre, à Christos Sartzetakis, Chef de l'Etat héllénique en visite officielle à Paris, sur l'état de santé du Président de la République de Chypre, pourtant mort neuf années plus tôt, donne bien la mesure de l'ignorance par la classe politique française de l'évolution de la vie publique en Grèce et des questions qui préoccupent au premier plan ce pays, comme c'est le cas du problème chypriote [8].

A vrai dire les Français, et pas seulement leurs dirigeants, ignorent presque tout de la Grèce. Cependant, contrairement à ces derniers et aux journalistes de leur pays ils éprouvent comme le montrent les sondages, beaucoup de sympathie à l'égard des Grecs [9].

Le fait est que la Grèce apparaît comme un pays très éloigné de la France et pas seulement sur le plan géographique. L'attachement viscéral des Grecs à leur passé, qui les fait passer pour des nationalistes ombrageux ou leur religion, l'orthodoxie, curieusement présentée, comme dangereuse compte tenu des succès militaires en Bosnie de leurs coreligionnaires et alliés Serbes paraît incompréhensible aux Français ou plus précisément à ceux qui forgent leurs opinions.

Les récents développements de la question macédonienne ont contribué à ternir l'image de la Grèce chez les Français. On a souvent à Paris présenté comme puérile l'obstination des Grecs à "confisquer" le nom de Macédoine. Il est vrai que les services gouvernementaux héllèniques de presse, en Grèce ou en France , par une politique maladroite de communication n'ont pas été en mesure d'expliquer simplement que l'appropriation par les autorités de Skopje du terme "Macédoine" masquait des revendications certaines de celles-ci sur le territoire de la Macédoine grecque. Il leur suffisait de rappeler à ceux qui avançaient que la prétention grecque à obtenir la modification de l'appelation de la République de Macédoine était inconcevable que le gouvernement français, lui même, peu avant l'indépendance de la Côte française des Somalis s'était permis, sans même la consulter, d'imposer à ce futur Etat, pour ne pas déplaire à la Somalie voisine, le nom de Territoire français des Afars et des Issas[10].

Le paradoxe dans cette affaire du nom de la "Macédoine yougoslave" est que les journaux français ou les autorités gouvernementales de France n'utilisent

jamais pour la désigner son seul titre reconnu sur le plan international à savoir "Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine" mais préfèrent la désigner par le mot Macédoine ou République de Macédoine. A telle enseigne qu'aujourd'hui le terme "Grèce du nord" est l'expression la plus souvent utilisée pour parler de la Macédoine grecque. Pour éviter la confusion entre les "deux Macédoines", la Macédoine grecque est ainsi escamotée et a disparu des articles de presse ou des textes officiels français.

En 1992 la question des nouvelles cartes, bilingues, d'identité nationale de Grèce, sur lesquelles était maintenue la mention de la religion, a suscité une grande émotion dans la presse française [11]. De fait l'opinion publique de France, qui réprouve à juste titre la discrimination religieuse, telle qu'elle a pu par exemple se pratiquer, pendant le régime de Vichy, au détriment des juifs, a immédiatement imaginé, faute d'information suffisante que le gouvernement héllénique avait décidé de jeter le discrédit sur les minorités religieuses de la Grèce. Or les autorités d'Athènes s'étaient en l'occurrence contentées de poursuivre une pratique, bonne ou mauvaise, qui n'avait dans le passé provoqué aucune protestation. A vrai dire les Grecs, chrétiens orthodoxes dans leur très grande majorité, affichent leur religion moins pour des raisons d'ordre culturel que religieux. Ils veulent avant tout affirmer que l'Eglise orthodoxe est intimement liée au passé de la Grèce. Pendant les quatre siècles de l'occupation turque, la flamme de la résistance a été soigneusement entretenue par l'ensemble du clergé, qui en préservant la foi religieuse héritée de Byzance et l'usage de la langue grecque, a ainsi assuré la survie de l'héllénisme.

On comprend ainsi la très vive émotion d'Athènes à la suite de la proposition avancée par la France, début 1995, au moment où elle a assuré la présidence de l'Union européenne, de prévoir une discussion, lors de la Conférence intergouvernementale de 1996, sur la suppression, comme langues de travail des institutions européennes, des "petites langues" comme le grec. La presse héllénique s'est alors déchaînée contre ce projet visant à supprimer le grec, en soulignant que c'est dans cette langue qu'avaient été écrits les textes les plus sacrés du christianisme.

Cette méconnaissance en France des réalités grecques conduit à des jugements erronés sur les orientations de la diplomatie héllénique. C'est ainsi que le lourd contentieux gréco-turc est souvent présenté à Paris comme un ensemble de litiges concernant deux Etats voisins, qui depuis des siècles agissent comme des frères ennemis [12]. Les guerres ou les tensions entre Grecs et Turcs seraient ainsi inévitables et assimilables en quelque sorte aux sempiternelles querelles opposant dans le monde animal les chats aux chiens. C'est de la sorte qu'est présentée, en particulier la question chypriote. La vérité est que ce problème, en fait, constitue une illustration de la décolonisation inachevée de la Grèce. Longtemps colonie turque, la Grèce au moment de son indépendance, en 1829

s'est alors trouvée dotée d'un triple protectorat, anglais, français et russe, supplanté après la seconde guerre mondiale par une domination des Etats Unis. Le rattachement de Chypre à la Grèce, qui devait logiquement parachever l'indépendance de la nation héllénique, a été mise en échec, à la fin des années cinquante par une machination de la Turquie et de la Grande Bretagne, approuvée par les Etats Unis et l'OTAN dont font partie ces trois pays, ainsi que l'Etat grec lui-même.

Il faut souligner que le Quai d'Orsay, a toujours porté un regard très méfiant sur la question chypriote. En effet la guerre d'indépendance de Chypre a coincidé avec celle d'Algérie. Et à cette époque Athènes, qui souhaitait internationaliser la question chypriote soutenait naturellement les efforts des pays arabes, qui avec succès, ont obtenu malgré l'opposition de Paris l'inscription du problème algérien à l'ordre du jour de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU. Le Quai d'Orsay, fidèle à l'amitié entre la France et la Turquie, dont l'origine remonte à François Ier et Soliman le Magnifique, persiste, de nos jours, à ne pas vouloir compromettre les intérêts français auprès des autorités turques par un soutien trop engagé d'Athènes en politique étrangère . Il convient toutefois de remarquer que la diplomatie du Palais de l'Elysée, moins sujette aux contraintes de la tradition est souvent beaucoup plus philhéllène que celle mise en oeuvre par le ministère français des affaires étrangères. Cette ignorance des données de la vie politique intérieure et des véritables orientations diplomatiques de la Grèce est particulièrement fâcheuse lorsque ce pays traverse une crise grave. Avec la dictature des colonels qui dure de 1967 à 1974, l'opinion publique française, à l'exception fort heureusement de certains intellectuels, s'est montrée, dans l'ensemble indifférente, au sort du peuple grec présenté comme étant habitué depuis longtemps à subir un régime de pouvoir militaire.

Face à cette méconnaissance en France du pouvoir en place à Athènes et au manque d'informations disponibles, il est vrai, en provenance de Grèce, une remarquable agence de presse "Athènes Presse Libre" s'est alors créée à Paris sous la direction de Richard Someritis aidé par des exilés grecs.

Grâce à elle, pendant sept ans, la presse française mais aussi les hommes politiques français ont été parfaitement informés des faits et événements se produisant en Grèce, des échecs de la dictature ainsi que de l'action des mouvements de résistance au régime militaire. Cette information objective a été d'autant plus utile que certains organes de la presse parisienne éprouvaient une sympathie certaine et même déclarée pour les militaires grecs et que d'autres comme le *Monde*, ligoté par les curieux articles de son correspondant "très particulier", Marc Marceau, se sont livrés parfois, à ce qu'il convient d'appeler des opérations de désinformation.

Le fait est que la Grèce est en quasi-permanence la victime de dysfonctionnements des médias français, qui, peu intéressés par le sort de ce

pays, soit l'ignorent systématiquement, se contentant de relater la vie sentimentale de ses armateurs, de ses chanteurs ou même de ses hommes politiques, soit en présentent, pas toujours de très bonne foi, une image déformée et souvent peu reluisante.

Monsieur Marceau

De son vrai nom, Marc Pobanz, le correspondant du *Monde* à Athènes de 1946 à 1986 est certainement le personnage le plus mystérieux de la rédaction de ce grand quotidien. Né le 20 Mars 1912 à Oran, Marc Marceau a été pendant plusieurs années membre actif de la Main Bleue [13] qui constituait le groupe de gardes du corps du parti franciste, formation fasciste dont le chef était Marcel Bucard, condamné à mort et exécuté à la libération pour fait de collaboration . Elevé au grade de Lieutenant général des Cadets francistes il signe dans le *Franciste*, organe de presse de ce parti de nombreux articles, où il vante les mérites du fascisme italien. Il exalte en particulier la guerre d'Ethiopie menée par Mussolini : "l'Italie fasciste, c'est la jeunesse ardente et triomphante. Mussolini récolte avec les lauriers d'Afrique la juste récompense de sa constante foi dans les magnifiques destinées d'une jeunesse animée du plus pur patriotisme".[14]

Un mystère entoure la vie de ce personnage, décédé à Athènes le 30 novembre 1990, comme en convient la très courte notice nécrologique du *Monde* le concernant .[15] Cet homme contrairement à la plupart des correspondants de ce journal à l'étranger a passé la plus grande partie de son existence dans le même poste, en l'occurrence à Athènes où il arrive peu après la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ses premières correspondances reflètent à l'évidence son goût des régimes forts. Sous le titre "Les Versaillais", le quotidien communiste, l'*Humanité* du 6 mai 1948 dénonce la justification que M. Marceau, dans un article du *Monde*, publié la veille et donc daté du même jour, donne de l'exécution de 150 communistes grecs, que ne manque pourtant pas de désapprouver le *Times* de Londres, ainsi que le *Monde* lui-même, le souligne dans un autre article sur le même sujet. Sans entrer dans la polémique que soulève l'*Humanité* on doit toutefois admettre, à sa suite, qu'il est choquant de lire sous la plume de M. Marceau : "la vérité est que ces condamnés ne pouvaient rester indéfiniment en prison. Il s'agissait de sujets assez peu intéressants et aux crimes impressionnants."

Le mystère concernant M. Marceau concerne tant l'objectif réel qu'il visait par ses articles souvent provocants sur la Grèce, que la protection inlassable que lui ont accordé non seulement la direction du *Monde* mais aussi les services diplomatiques français à Athènes. A cet égard il convient d'observer l'intervention auprès du Quai d'Orsay de l'Ambassadeur Vaux de Saint Cyr, après un surprenant article du Monde du 4 juillet 1951, sans la signature de M. Marceau,

mais dont la source est intitulée : "correspondance particulière du *Monde*", et qui a provoqué un profond émoi dans les milieux politiques et journalistiques grecs. Dans sa dépêche [16] l'Ambassadeur, comme si M. Marceau était en fait un subordonné d'un service étatique français, demande au Département d'intervenir auprès de la Direction du *Monde* afin que celle-ci dégage la responsabilité de M. Marceau pour cet article.

Considéré comme un journal officieux, véritable porte parole du Quai d'Orsay, le *Monde* dont les articles sur la Grèce sont souvent cités dans la presse héllénique, ou même traduits in extenso a ainsi souvent donné à Athènes même une image déformée de la réalité grecque au point d'influer sur la politique intérieure héllénique. Les articles déconcertants de M. Marceau ont aussi donné aux lecteurs, en France, de ce journal de référence, des renseignements erronés sur la vie politique de la Grèce.

On doit d'ailleurs légitimement s'inquiéter de la teneur des informations sur la Grèce dont ont disposé dans le passé les dirigeants français lorsqu'on consulte des documents à l'époque confidentiels, mais rendus publics aujourd'hui, de différents services étatiques français.

Par exemple dans un bulletin de renseignements politiques du 12 mars 1955 du S.D.E.C.E.(Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre Espionnage).[17] on relève que Mme Hélène Vlachos "de réputation douteuse" dirige le quotidien *Kathimerini*, "journal le plus systématiquement francophobe de Grèce". Il est indiqué dans ce document que son rédacteur politique K.Zafiropoulos est agent du FBI. Dans ce même bulletin on souligne que le *Vima* est francophile, en regrettant toutefois qu'il soit très lié aux Anglais puisque son "directeur G.Siriotis est agent de l'Intelligence Service". Ainsi est délibérément déformée l'image de deux journaux sans doute les plus sérieux de Grèce.

La dictature des colonels va aussi permettre à M. Marceau de faire croire que ce régime militaire a la faveur des Grecs. Dans deux ouvrages, *La Grèce des colonels* et *le Coup d'Athènes* [18] il décrit sans réel esprit critique le gouvernement de la junte. Mais c'est sa fameuse correspondance dans le *Monde* daté du 23 avril 1969, qui provoquera l'indignation des résistants à la dictature. Son article rédigé, à l'occasion du second anniversaire de la prise de pouvoir des colonels n'est en fait qu'une médiocre apologie d'un régime infâme. Mikis Théodorakis ira même jusqu'à composer sa chanson "Monsieur Marceau"[19] dont le premier couplet disait :

J'ai beau vivre en déportation
J'ai malgré tout la liberté
D'obéir à mes geôliers
C'est monsieur Marceau qui l'affirme

La retraite de M. Marceau n'a pas beaucoup modifié l'image de la Grèce que perçoivent les lecteurs du *Monde*. En effet, si les différents correspondants de ce quotidien qui se sont succédés à Athènes depuis 1986 rédigent des articles moins contestables que ceux de leur prédécesseur, la rédaction parisienne du journal fondé par H. Beuve Méry à travers des articles anonymes, qui prennent souvent la forme de "Bulletins de l'étranger" critique souvent sans aucune justification la politique étrangère du gouvernement héllénique.

Ainsi dans son édition du 12 juillet 1993, le Bulletin de l'agence athénienne de presse ANA, que dirigeait alors Michel Stylianou, notait "les sentiments antigrecs cultivés en toute occasion par les médias français et en particulier le *Monde*". Il soulignait notamment le fait que "les lettres adressées au *Monde* sont jetées au panier et l'article de M. Théodorakis [20] a été publié, amputé du passage où il rappelait la contribution de la Grèce à la chute du nazisme durant la seconde guerre mondiale'.

Pour être juste il faut dire que dans un passé encore récent certains articles remarquables sur la Grèce d'André Fontaine ou d'Eric Rouleau, avant que ces journalistes ne prennent leur retraite, contrebalançaient parfois la ligne générale du *Monde* souvent peu indulgente à l'égard d'Athènes.

Dépourvue de bons spécialistes sur la Grèce la presse française se borne à reproduire les dépêches sur ce pays de l'AFP, qui manquent fréquemment de sérieux et d'objectivité. Très curieusement l'AFP, une des toutes premières agences de presse dans le monde considère depuis longtemps Athènes comme un poste mineur, qui, d'ailleurs est peu convoité par les journalistes de cette très honorable institution. Il est d'usage de dire parmi eux "qu'il ne se passe jamais rien d'intéressant en Grèce". De fait ce ne sont pas les meilleurs journalistes de l'AFP qui sont nommés à Athènes.

Les autorités grecques, depuis près d'un demi siècle dénoncent les inexactitudes des dépêches de l'AFP. Ainsi au cours du premier semestre 1949 les informations tendancieuses et les pronostics hasardeux sur la politique hellénique de Frédéric Coignard, alors correspondant de l'AFP à Athènes ont détérioré les relations gréco-françaises au point que le gouvernement héllénique devait demander son rappel à Paris. Aujourd'hui les rapports de l'AFP avec les autorités d'Athènes ne sont pas excellents. Dans le même numéro du Bulletin de l'ANA suscité sont critiqués "les titres-accablants pour la Grèce de cette agence de presse". Aujourd'hui le contenu hostile à la diplomatie des dirigeants grecs des dépêches de l'AFP en provenance d'Athènes s'explique essentiellement par des raisons d'ordre politique. En effet cette agence, largement contrôlée par le gouvernement français, exprime l'irritation de Paris concernant la politique étrangère hellénique. On peut ainsi mieux comprendre pourquoi le ton des dépêches de l'AFP est rarement bienveillant à l'égard de la Grèce.

La Grèce et l'Europe

Il faut admettre qu'à partir du 1er janvier 1981, date de l'adhésion de la Grèce à l'Europe communautaire, la presse française s'est véritablement acharnée contre la diplomatie héllénique. Souvent jugée comme le résultat d'une des initiatives purement personnelles du président Giscard d'Estaing, cette adhésion est toujours perçue comme une des erreurs majeures de celui-ci. L'idée dominante à Paris dans les milieux journalistiques et aussi politiques est que la Grèce, pays pauvre, n'était pas préparée à faire partie des Communautés européennes. Les Grecs sont perçus comme un handicap pour l'Europe, d'une part, car ils refuseraient souvent d'être solidaires de leurs partenaires et d'autre part, parce qu'ils coûtent cher en raison des aides financières considérables qu'ils reçoivent de Bruxelles. Dans l'hebdomadaire *le Point* du 11 décembre 1993 Claude Imbert salue à sa manière la présidence grecque, pour un semestre, de l'Union européenne à compter du 1er janvier 1994, en écrivant que Giscard d'Estaing "aura parrainé un agité du bocal balkanique, qui met l'argenterie dans sa poche et insulte les convives". Ces propos ont entraîné une réaction très vive de la Communauté héllénique de Paris [21]. L'*Evénement du Jeudi*, pour sa part, en février 1995 [22] s'interroge : "Nationalisme, sous développement économique, corruption, absence de solidarité européenne. La Grèce a-t-elle encore sa place en Europe ?"

Pour expliquer la singularité grecque le quotidien, *Libération*, sous la plume distinguée de l'historienne, Sophia Mappa [23] conclut que "la société grecque est profondément persuadée qu'elle est l'objet de la persécution et du complot de ses voisins macédoniens, albanais, turcs, européens...". Ces considérations, pour le moins simplistes, sont relayées, par des jugements sans nuances de certains hommes politiques français. Ainsi le député François d'Aubert dans son livre *Main basse sur l'Europe* publié en 1994 (Paris, Ed. Plon), dans lequel il dénonce certaines dérives des subventions européennes, croit devoir souligner à longueur de pages que la Grèce est le "cancre de l'Europe" ou que le "PASOK est gourmand et corrompu". Souvent invité par les radios et télévisions, F. d'Aubert ne manque aucune occasion pour caricaturer les rapports financiers de la Grèce avec les institutions européennes.

S'il est vrai que l'Etat grec, comme bien d'autres pays européens viole parfois la législation communautaire, ses autorités judiciaires , elles, n'ont pas hésité à sanctionner, jusqu'à les condamner à des peines de prison, ceux qui sont mêlés à des affaires de détournements d'aides financières accordées par Bruxelles. A vrai dire l'attitude de F. d'Aubert, et d'une certaine presse à l'égard d'Athènes, s'explique par le fait que les dirigeants grecs à l'occasion de plusieurs projets importants de grands travaux ont préféré traiter avec des entreprises allemandes plutôt qu'avec des entreprises françaises. La réalité est que si la Grèce obtient chaque année une aide financière considérable des autorités

européennes, elle restitue régulièrement une grande partie de cette aide aux entreprises de grands pays comme la France dont la présence à Athènes depuis quelques années est de plus en plus importante. Sans manier le paradoxe on peut dire que beaucoup d'entreprises françaises, grâce à la Grèce, ont sauvé beaucoup de leurs emplois, par les parts de marché qu'elles ont conquises dans ce pays. Le dénigrement de l'économie grecque qui est désormais la tarte à la crème de la presse française a, au demeurant ému, certains responsables de banques françaises. L'un d'entre eux, qui connaît bien les réalités helléniques, dans une tribune, que *Liberation* a accepté de publier, souligne que s'ébauche dans le sud des Balkans une zone drachme et que "la Grèce européenne, c'est une chance politique, mais aussi une chance économique" [24].

Sophie Basch, dans son ouvrage *le Mirage grec* [25], étudie ce qu'a été la Grèce moderne devant l'opinion publique française au cours de la période 1846-1946 et conclut dans un dernier chapitre intitulé le "misophilhéllénisme", que "la Grèce n'a pas droit à l'auréa mediocritas: on lui reproche immédiatement de ne pas être la patrie idéale qu'on avait imaginée". Avec elle on doit admettre que le mishéllenisme est dans une certaine mesure un misophilhellénisme, puisque les philhéllènes sont parfois traités d'imbéciles ou de dupes.

Si l'image des Grecs est délibérément ternie en France par beaucoup de ceux qui forment l'opinion des gens, il faut toutefois reconnaître le rôle considérable dans ce pays des enseignants de grec ancien, qui, très nombreux chaque année, organisent pour leurs élèves des séjours en Grèce pendant les vacances scolaires pour leur faire découvrir la continuité de l'héllénisme.

Sans la Grèce actuelle, le message au monde de la Grèce antique serait sans doute ressenti aujourd'hui avec moins d'intensité. Jacqueline de Romilly, de l'Académie Française, qui de façon inlassable, défend le grec et la Grèce, sans doute bien mieux que ne pourrait le faire à Paris, l'Ambassadeur de la République héllénique, résume de façon lumineuse, dans son beau livre *Pourquoi la Grèce?*[25], ce que l'on doit aujourd'hui à la Grèce: "L'héritage grec fondé sur l'aspiration à l'universel est devenu l'esprit même de notre civilisation occidentale. Dans le temps où se crée l'Europe, il peut n'être pas indifférent de reconnaître cette dette, que l'on a trop tendance à oublier".

NOTES

1. Le **Monde** du 7 janvier 1994.

2. Régis Debray, **les Masques**, Paris, Ed. Gallimard, 1992.

3. Dans son ouvrage, **Le Testament de Dieu,** (Paris, Ed. Grasset, 1979) B-H Levy, après avoir dit (p.78) "cette Grèce, dont il faut conjurer les prestiges" croit devoir indiquer au lecteur (p.91) "je n'instruis pas, faut-il le répéter le

procés de la Grèce en tant que telle, traînée au devant d'un imaginaire tribunal de l'histoire achevée".

4. Raymond Aron, **Mémoires**, Paris, Ed. Julliard, 1983, p.706.

5. Georges Gorse, **Je n'irais pas à mon enterrement**, Paris, Ed. Plon, 1992, p.231.

6. Le Chapitre 4 du livre **l'Europe, histoire de ses peuples** (Paris, Ed Perrin, 1990) comprenait les quatre parties suivantes : I. La stupéfiante conquête romaine, II. Le droit romain, l'Etat et la famille, III. L'empire romain, facteur d'assimilation, IV. Vision romaine de l'Europe.

7. J. B. Duroselle, spécialiste des relations internationales et en particulier de la Première Guerre mondiale a lui même rédigé la partie intitulée "L'éclat de la Grèce avant les Romains". Il souligne (p.63) que "les Grecs n'ont pas tout inventé", et plus loin (p.69) que "il va de soi que les Grecs n'ont pas tout inventé. Une affirmation de ce genre est soit chauvine, soit naïve, soit antihistorique". Et il rappelle (p.78) que "ce sont les Romains et non les Grecs, qui ont construit un admirable réseau de routes".

8. Anecdote rapportée dans le **Pli** n°4, du 27 mai 1986.

9. En 1991 la Grèce apparaît comme sympathique à 59% de Français et antipathique à seulement 4% d'entre eux et figure dans le groupe de tête des pays qui ont leur préférence. (SOFRES, Etat de l'opinion 1993,p.109).

10. Finalement après son indépendance, le nom définitif de l'ancienne Côte française des Somalis sera "République de Djibouti".

11. Voir **Libération** des 19-20 décembre 1992.

12. "Frères ennemis en Méditerranée orientale : rivalités et litiges gréco-turcs". **Problèmes politiques et sociaux**, N° 562, 12 juin 1987. Documentation française.

13. Voir **le Crapouillot**, "la gauche dans la collaboration", sept. octobre 1992, p.56-57.

14. le **Franciste**, 10 mai 1936.

15. Le **Monde** du 4 décembre 1990.

16. Archives Quai d'Orsay. Télégramme n°441/44, du 7.7.1951.

17. S.D.E.C.E., Bulletin de renseignements politiques du 12 mars 1955, référence : 21.1 - A.03.339. Le S.D.E.C.E. s'intitule aujourd'hui: D.G.S.E (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure)

18. M. Marceau, **la Grèce des colonels**, Paris, Ed. Robert Laffont, 1967, et **le Coup d'Athènes**, Paris, Ed. Buchet-Chastel, 1974.

19. Le texte complet de la chanson "monsieur Marceau" est reproduit dans le livre de M. Théodorakis, **Journal de résistance**, Paris, Ed. Flammarion, 1971.

20. Le **Monde** du 9 avril 1993 a publié un article de M. Théodorakis, "la Grèce, fidèle à elle-même" sur la politique macédonienne de la Grèce.

21. **Bulletin de la Communauté héllénique de Paris et des environs**, décembre 1993, n°7.

22. **Evénement du Jeudi**, semaine du 9 au 15 février 1995.

23. Sophia Mappa, "le Malentendu grec", **Libération** du 24 octobre 1994.

24. Robert de Bruin, "Pour la Grèce", **Libération** du 18 janvier 1994.

25. Sophie Basch, **le Mirage Grec, la Grèce moderne devant l'opinion publique française,** Athènes, Éditions-Ekdoseis, 1995.

26. Jacqueline de Romilly, **Pourquoi la Grèce ?**, Paris, Ed. de Fallois, 1992.

MIGRANT WRITING IN MULTICULTURAL AUSTRALIA: THE CASE OF THE GREEKS

George Kanarakis*

RÉSUMÉ

A travers les écrits des Grecs de l'Australie, cet article examine la place de la litterature immigrante en relation avec son appartenance soit à la litterature nationale australienne, soit à la litterature nationale du pays d'origine (pour des écrits dans une autre langue que l'anglais). Il est montré que tant et aussi longtemps que cette litterature est classifiée et analysée séparément d'un corpus national -australien ou du pays d'origine -, celle-ci demeurera une sous-catégorie. En outre, cette sous-categorisation diminue non seulement l'importance de la litterature des immigrants mais aussi le corpus littéraire national. Et cela parce que peu importe à quel corpus national appartient un auteur, il sera examiné comme faisant partie d'un noyau central et non pas d'un groupe minoritaire.

ABSTRACT

Through the literary writings of the Greeks in Australia, this paper examines the position of migrants' writing in relation to the national body of literature to which it belongs - whether this be Australian literature or, arguably for works written in languages other than English, to the national literature of the writer's homeland. It is shown that to whichever body the literature belongs it will remain a sub-category as long as it is classified and examined separetely to the main body of the literature. Furthermore, sub-categorization diminishes not only the stature of migrant's literature, but also the central body itself. Thus whichever national literature a writer belongs to, his works must be examined as a part of its central core and not as part of the writing of a minority group.

Although in this article I will use the literature of the Greeks in Australia (first generation migrants and their children) as a paradigm of literature written by migrants, the arguments I will develop can be applied to the literary writings of any migrant group from a non-English speaking background, certainly in relation to Australia and to varying degrees, depending on each country, to the homeland.

The fact that the concept of centres and peripheries has become the theme of conferences, such as that of the Second National Conference of Modern Greek Studies held recently (25-28 September 1994) by the Modern Greek Studies Association of Australia and New Zealand, which included papers on the literature of the Greeks in Australia under this thematic umbrella, shows that there exist, or that people believe there to exist, centres and peripheries either affecting this literature – and by extension, the literatures of other migrant groups – from without or existing within it.

Following and studying the literature of the Greeks in Australia[1] over the last nearly twenty years as it has developed within the social and cultural environment of this country, for example, I have come to believe that one, if not the,

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major problem for this literature, and for multicultural literature in general, is the very existence itself of centres and peripheries.

Opinions are divided on the classification of the literary works written by migrants, but it is not my intention in this article to support either side of this debate, since I have done this in various other publications.[2] What it is my intention to demonstrate here is that whatever way this literature is classified we run the danger of relegating it to a periphery.

Some believe, based on philological criteria, that the language in which a work is written and, consequently, its intended readership, determines its national identity and thus the body of literature to which it belongs.[3] Others, using geographical, social and other criteria, base their decision on a variety of factors, such as where a writer is living at the time when a work is written, the theme of a work, etc.[4], or even the writer's relationship with a person of a migrant background.[5]

Unfortunately, both these forms of classification unavoidably lead to marginalisation. If language is the determining factor for the body of literature to which a work belongs, then the literary works written in English by Greeks or any other migrants in Australia belong to Australian literature and those written in another language belong to the literature of that homeland country; so, for example, those in Greek belong to Modern Greek literature.

The problems here are twofold, because separating the works into two bodies of literature then allows two possibilities for their marginalisation and placement in the periphery.

Those works which fall to Australian literature are too often regarded as "ethnic" or "multicultural" literature – something interesting and perhaps rather exotic, but certainly not of the mainstream, while those which fall to Modern Greek literature, for example, become sub-classified under the literature of the Greek diaspora, something often ignored by both readers and critics in Greece, or viewed with condescension, and again certainly not part of the mainstream.

It is interesting to note here that Australia does not regard its expatriate writers separately and in a sub-category, but as an integral part of Australian literature. Examples which come to mind here are, from earlier decades George Johnston and Charmian Clift who both spent a number of years living on Greek islands and writing there, and of contemporary writers David Malouf and Germaine Greer, both of whom have lived in Italy for some years now, with occasional visits to Australia.

On the other hand, if we decide that geographical, social and other criteria are the determining factors, then everything produced by Greek or other migrant writers in Australia, whether it is written in English, Greek or any other language, belongs to Australian literature.

In this case, all their works can be placed under the banner of "ethnic" or "multicultural" literature, and thus on the periphery of Australian literature. In addition, those works written in a language other than English are doubly marginalised since, accessible as they are to only a very small proportion of the Australian population, they exist, as minority foreign-language works, on the periphery of the periphery! Moreover, if one considers Australian literature to be peripheral to English literature as some academics still postulate, then all these works become further marginalised, with the foreign-language ones so far out in the periphery that they are almost lost in the haze of distance!

So, whether there is one centre, Australia, or two, the homeland and Australia, migrant writers in Australia find their works examined under a separate category from those of the mainstream writers of that country.

In the case of Greece and the literature written in its diaspora, as with other homelands to varying degrees, little attention is paid to the works written beyond the boundaries of the mainland. While some diaspora writers do manage to gain some recognition in Greece, they are very few indeed, and I believe that this lack of recognition is based not on lack of quality in the works written outside Greece, but on the attitude of Greece itself towards the literature of the Greeks of the diaspora. Only rarely or in exceptional cases are Greek writers who live outside Greece, such as Constantine Cavafy of Egypt (1863-1933) and in more recent times Nikos Kahtitsis of Canada (1928-1970), considered worthy of inclusion in works on the history of Modern Greek literature, or included in the curricula of high schools and universities.[6] Moreover, if they do receive attention, however scant, they are often viewed with a paternalistic, even condescending attitude, and judged with different criteria to the writers of Greece itself. This is a grave injustice to the works, as they deserve to be allowed to stand on their own merits and to be judged with the same criteria as works written in Greece – the good placed with the good and the mediocre with the mediocre, to the advantage of the writers of both sides and of the literature overall.

The problem in Australia is somewhat different. While Australia is proud to call itself a multicultural nation, the very term "multicultural" has, in some cases, come to develop almost pejorative connotations.

Multiculturalism, so strongly and enthusiastically promoted and supported from its official inception in 1972 by the Whitlam government, originally applied to all Australians, since all Australians have an ethnic origin, whether they themselves are immigrants or their forebears were. The concept was intended to convey the idea and the practice that every person who lives in Australia, whatever their national or ethnic background, contributes to the rich tapestry that is the Australian nation. Consequently, Americans, New Zealanders, English, Scots, South Africans and others were as much a part of

multiculturalism as the Vietnamese, Greeks, Norwegians, Lebanese and any other group.

Multiculturalism had originally three main concepts, which were a careful balance between social cohesion, cultural identity, and equality of opportunity and access. In 1982, under a later government, a fourth concept was added, that of equal responsibility for, commitment to, and participation in society.

But, as Sam Lipski stated recently[7], voices are now increasingly arguing that while the idea of multiculturalism is still sound, its practice and the political exploitation of it have "gone off the rails".

So, all too quickly "ethnic" and "multicultural" have become synonymous with "different, strange, exotic" or even "non-English speaking", and despite the many policies of multiculturalism which helped to alleviate the disadvantages faced by some ethnic groups and their children, and attempted to bring the people of whatever origin together into a cohesive nation, the very naming of some things as "ethnic" or "multicultural" brought them not into the centre but placed them on the periphery of Australian literature. This, I believe, is what has happened with "multicultural" or "ethnic" literature. It has been set apart as a sub-category of Australian literature, or, as Angelo Loukakis, a writer himself, calls it, a "phony sub-branch"[8] and any national literature which, for any reasons whatsoever, separates some of its works into a special category, and concentrates on them only in that category, unavoidably marginalises them and puts them on the periphery.

Furthermore, in the minds of many readers "ethnic" or "multicultural" literature has erroneously become synonymous not only with writers from a non-English speaking background but also almost exclusively with stories about migrants and their lives. Admittedly, much of the literary production of migrants in Australia has been in this vein in the past, with stories of the difficulties of settling in the new land or the problems of being a child of migrant parents and the psychological and social struggle to live simultaneously in two cultures, all having a strong novelty appeal at first. But increasingly the range of works has widened, as we see, for example, in Fotini Epanomitis' recent prize-winning novel *The Mule's Foal*, which thematically is a Greek story, but has no connection whatsoever with the "migrant experience", or the novel currently being written by Tony Maniaty which is set in, and concerns, Indonesia. Yet despite this, the misconception that "multicultural" literature means "migrant stories" often prevails, while, as with any novelty, the appeal of this type of story is waning. This preconceived idea makes it even harder for a writer with a migrant background to be judged as a serious writer whose works transcend the limitations of his or her own experiences or the experiences of their family and friends, and explore far wider themes and concepts.

It is a sad comment on Australian literature that some English-language writ-

ers reputedly do not wish to receive ethnic literary awards, presumably because they feel that this will take them out of the mainstream of Australian literature *per se* and firmly relegate them to the periphery.

It is also worth reminding ourselves that, before the advent of multiculturalism, writers who were themselves, or whose parents were, migrants from a non-English speaking country, were not marginalised in any way if they wrote in English, but were accepted simply as mainstream Australian writers, even as important figures in Australian literature. Writers which come to mind in this respect are: Henry Lawson (whose father was Norwegian, their surname being changed from Larsen), Judah Waten (a Jew from Russia), David Martin (from Hungary) and Marie Bjelke-Petersen (from Denmark), all significant contributors to Australian literature but whom nobody would ever consider marginalising as "immigrant" writers, or in modern terminology as "multicultural" writers.

In a similar manner, the well-known exponent of American literature Vladimir Nabokov (1899-1977), who was born in Russia, after living in various European countries settled in the United States in 1940 where he began to write in English. Becoming an American citizen in 1945, he stayed in that country until 1959, and his literary works from this period are firmly established in American literature. In addition, Walt Whitman (1819-1892), Theodore Dreiser (1871-1945), Carl Sandburg (1878-1967) and William Carlos Williams (1883-1963) are just a few of the many American writers of immigrant stock – Whitman's mother was Dutch, Dreiser's parents were both German, Sandburg's parents were both Swedish, and Williams' mother was of Spanish and Jewish origin. Who, however, would consider pushing these writers to the periphery of American literature as "ethnic" writers?

Turning to British literature, Joseph Conrad (1857-1924) was Polish born and originally called Josef Konrad Korzeniowski. He moved to England at the age of 20, knowing nothing of the language of that country, but at the age of 21 he began to write novels and short stories in English. He, too, is firmly established as a writer in that national body of literature, but never referred to as an "ethnic" writer.

An even more interesting example is that of the versatile contemporary novelist and playwright Jan de Hartog (1914-) who wrote his first works in his native Holland, including the novel *Hollandse Glorie* which became a symbol of the Dutch Resistance in the Second World War, and who was forced to escape from Holland in 1943. He fled to England, and a few years after his arrival there he began to write literary works in English. Later he moved to the U.S.A., where he continued his writing in English, and he is now back in England again, still writing. The interesting point about this writer is that he can be found in reference books on Dutch, American and English literatures for the works he wrote while living in each of these countries, but in neither the

American nor the British literatures is he labelled as an "ethnic" or "immigrant" writer.

The point I wish to make here is that if the United States and Britain, each with a large immigrant population, do not see any need to place their English-language writers of migrant background into a sub-category and, consciously or unconsciously, put them on the periphery of their national literatures, what is it about the psychology of the Australian nation that we feel the need to do exactly the opposite?

This does not mean, however, that we cannot select certain writers from within a body of literature and examine them together because of certain common characteristics which they share, be these gender, social class, ethnic origin, writing style, genres they use, or many other such characteristics, but to group them together because of a common characteristic, label them accordingly, and examine them only under this label inevitably relegates them to the periphery.

As a result, not only are such writers and their works disadvantaged, being denied a place within the mainstream and allowed to be judged by the same literary criteria as other works, but this also undeniably harms and weakens the overall body of literature by lessening its range and reducing its richness and variety.

Therefore, dealing first with Modern Greek literature as a relevant example of a homeland literature, it is obvious that there has to be a change of attitude by Greece towards writers who live overseas, mainly on two points as I mentioned earlier:

a) familiarisation and full investigation of the breadth and depth of the literature written by Greeks overseas, to the extent to which it exists in each country, and

b) full and equal integration of this literature and the individual works into the mainstream Modern Greek literature, with the result that it will be evaluated and judged without sentimentality, concessions and special criteria, but with the same ones that the works of the rest of their fellow mainstream writers are judged and evaluated. In other words, the view which was held by Greek critics in the past, such as Manolis Yialourakis, the writer and critic from Egypt, who is quoted as stating that "what is mainly needed is that the Modern Greek critics understand the special conditions, the special climate of the so-called literature of the Greek diaspora, and evaluate it according to these factors"[9] has no place in today's literary conditions and thought.

Regarding Australian literature and directions for migrant writers and their works, a number of points could be made, of which I feel two are particularly pertinent.

First, if we accept that those writers who compose their works in a language

other than English belong to Australian literature, then it is important for the writers themselves to accept that if they do not have their works translated into English, not only will they be restricted to a very small readership in this country, but more importantly they will not be known to the general Australian readership. Thus their works will remain inaccessible and unevaluated on a national and objective level.

Second, I am very apprehensive about the sub-categorisation of works by migrants and their offspring into "multicultural" literature, for it is obvious that the outcome of this has been their marginalisation. I am hesitant to state categorically that it would be better if this categorisation were not made, because it does have some benefits for writers in the form of grants, awards, etc. But I feel it would be better for the writers concerned, as well as for Australian literature as a whole, if all our literary works belonged to an integrated centre, free of peripheries. When this time comes it will be a sign of the maturity of Australian literature, as well as of its writers, literary critics and readers.

In conclusion, according to the criteria used, whether we consider that the literary production of migrants in Australia belongs to two centres (the foreign-language works to the homeland literature and the English-language works to Australian literature), or all of it (regardless of language and intended readership) to one centre, Australia, it can be said without doubt that all these writers, like any writers in the world, contribute through their works to a specific national body of literature.

In fact, the particular characteristics which appear in the works of the migrant writers in Australia, that is for Australian literature the element of origin and its social and cultural manifestations, while for homeland literatures the element of country of residence and the resultant influences of that country reflected through their works, increase the richness and the multidimensional character of the specific literature. These should not be seen as elements which give rise to sub-categories and, therefore, to marginalisation, since the creation of peripheries for any literature ultimately harms the literature by diminishing the centre itself. On the contrary, both homeland and Australian literatures will be richer and more robust when the sub-categories of "diaspora" and "multicultural" or "ethnic" have waned, and all the works previously labelled as such constitute inseparable elements of the mainstream of the particular national literature to which they belong.

NOTES

1. For a study of this literature from its first appearance early in this century to the mid-1980s, as well as biographical information on the writers and an anthology of their works, see George Kanarakis, **Greek Voices in Australia: A**

Tradition of Prose, Poetry and Drama, Sydney, Australian National University Press, 1987.

2. For my position in this debate in relation to the literature of the Greeks in Australia see, among other publications, George Kanarakis, "The Greek Literary Presence in Australia", **New Literature Review**, No.15 (1988a): 1-10, and "The Literature of Greeks in Australia: A Study of its Identity and Development", in A. Kapardis and A. Tamis, **Afstraliotes Hellenes: Greeks in Australia**, Melbourne, River Seine Press, 1988b, pp. 41-51.

3. See, for example, Angelo Loukakis, "A National Literature", **The Bulletin** Literary Supplement, Vol.104, No.5372 (5 July 1983): 60, 62; Kanarakis, 1988a; Kanarakis, 1988b; Phaedon Bouboulidis, "The Linguistic National Identity of Modern Greek Writers", **Antipodes** (Melbourne), Nos 33-34 (1993): 32-35 [in Greek]; N.G. Contossopoulos, "Problems of Literary and Language Parentage", **Koinonikes Tomes** (Athens), Vol.6, No.60 (December 1994): 453-455 [in Greek].

4. See, for example, Con Castan, "What is Greek Australian Literature?", **Chronico**, Nos.8-9 (1988): 4-12; Jim Kable, "Multicultural Australian Literature and Me", in Sneja Gunew and Kateryna O. Longley (eds), **Striking Chords: Multicultural Literary Interpretations**, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992, pp. 86-91.

5. An example of this is the awarding of the 1994 Ethnic Writers' Award to Gillian Bouras, an Australian writer from a family of English, Scottish and Irish origin, several generations in Australia, who is married to a Greek.

6. To my knowledge, only at the University of Thessaloniki have some Greek writers of Australia been included for study in the subject on Modern Greek literature, and this in recent years.

7. "Somehow, Our Melting Pot Seems to be Working", **The Sydney Morning Herald**, 16 September 1994, p.13.

8. Loukakis, 1983, p.60.

9. In Yiannis Hadzinis, "The Literature of the Greeks Abroad and Petros Magnis", **Vias**, Vol.13, Nos.110-113 (January 1960):4 [in Greek].

ETHNIC MEDIA: BREAKING THE GHETTO POLITICS

Kosta Gouliamos*

"Dear Father,

All social bonds between us are broken; only those of nature remain"

-Stendhal

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine la notion de *lebenswelt* (lifeworld) et la lie au multiculturalisme. Il considère le multiculturalisme, une condition post-coloniale renforcée par un capitalisme corporatif, la politique du biculturalisme, ainsi que différents évènements exotiques (ethniques) qui conduisent à l'acculturation et à l'apolitisme. Avec cette logique post-coloniale, les media ethniques opèrent comme un totem qui transcrit le discours dominant (du centre et de la périphérie). Tenant compte du cas greco-canadien, cet article montre le processus et la pratique par lesquels les media ethniques transmettent une conscience qui affirme les paradigmes culturels dominants. Enfin, l'article propose une sortie de la politique ghettoisante du multiculturalisme par une synthèse de courants antihégémoniques et au niveau canadien par la création d'une fédération transculturelle.

ABSTRACT

The paper examines the notion of life world and correlates it to the politics of multiculturalism. It further considers multiculturalism to be a postcolonial condition reinforced by corporate capitalism, the politics of biculturalism and various exotic (ethnic) events that lead to acculturation and apoliticization. Within this postcolonial logic, the ethnic media operate as a totem that inscribes the dominant discourse (metropolitan and peripheral). Taking into account the Greek-Canadian case, the paper demonstrates the process as well as the practices by which the ethnic media transmit a consciousness that affirms dominant cultural paradigms. Finally, the paper provides an exit from the ghetto politics of multiculturalism by proposing a synthesis of counter-hegemonic politics and creation of a transcultural federation.

From Public Sphere to Lifeworld

Ever since the dawn of immigration, people have been trying to gather information, primarily that of their homeland. Technology has helped them reach this quest by finding new ways to move, store and process information.

However, in view of immigration, minority policies and practices are being designed by power elites and politicians in such a way that information is intensified by techniques of distortion, suppression and fragmentation.

T. Todorov[1] traced the idea of America as a territory of exchange. An

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exchange that resulted in the interiorization of the *other* (aboriginal people) within the colonial project of the West. This argument tends to raise the complexities of the postindustrial society. Furthermore the question of interiorization of the *other* has been extended to ethnoracial or aboriginal minorities. Clearly, this extension corresponds to the impulses of fragmenting practices associated and reinforced by the politics of Canadian multiculturalism.. In this sense the multicultural arena requires a substantive political diagnosis. In any case, by fragmenting communities, the dominant system cuts out the ground for the possibility of communicatarian emancipatory politics.

When seeking to argue ethnic/racial issues it is necessary to conceptualize the communicative practice within which these issues have taken place.

In this view, if I consider multiculturalism as an institutionalized system of fragmented ethnoracial species then I must clarify the notion of *communicative practice* in which multiculturalism is exercised. Within this context I would consider the communicative practice as an "organized superfluity" that contains activities or information routines which are designed to instigate phantasmagoric representations; in other words commodified information and activities based on sentimentalism, beautification, militant nationalism and customary aesthetics with romantic pictorial stereotypes. Since the dominant system is constantly promoting categories of impression management then the mass media are the territorial army that mediates the practices of mystification (phantasmagoria).

According to Habermas[2] the mass media — among other institutions - were transmitting information regarding the considered common interest of bourgeois society versus the mechanisms of the State. The result of this practice, which took place in early modern Europe, was the emergence of *public sphere*; a rational discursive interaction of public thematology, that worked as a counterweight to the absolutist State.

As Nancy Fraser[3] pointed out "the public sphere, in short, is not the State; it is rather the informally mobilized body of nongovernmental discursive opinion that can serve as a counterweight to the State. Indeed, in the bourgeois conception, it is precisely this extragovernmental character of the public sphere that confers an aura of independence, autonomy and legitimacy on the "public opinion" generated in it." After all, "public sphere" became a constant reference to political participation. However it must be noted that women were excluded from this process as well as plebeian men. Indeed, the issue of marginalization is the conjunctual outcome of existing practices of hegemonic power that defend the interests of technocratic capitalist restructuring. I would argue that the more extreme the imperatives of a capitalist restructuring, the less they

allow the marginals to advance or enter directly into the political arena. This escalation can also be seen on the basis of lifeworld; as a correlated practice of modern public sphere institutions such as multiculturalism.

Habermas[4] borrowed the notion of *Lebenswelt* (lifeworld) from Husserl and connected it to a concept of communicative action in order to provide a critical account on the implications of the Weberian theory of rationalization.

However with the transition from the state-organized societies to modern forms of socio-cultural organization, *lifeworld* is directly linked to the informational mode of development. Contrary to Habermas, I believe that this linkage constitutes, not just a symbolic space within which cultural tradition and social integration are sustained and reproduced but a strategic pattern of state intervention in which the emphasis shifted from political legitimation to cultural fragmentation. Therefore, the emerging needs of multiculturalism are not to be determined by autochtonous requirements of a given society, but by the restructuring patterns of the capitalist system. And when the capitalist system produces a scale of crises, it is compelled either to change its goals or to change its modes, in order to overcome the crisis. In this context, multiculturalism is the institutionalized system of the restructuring process not only of capitalism— which includes historically specific species of contradictions — but also of the restructuring of the dominant racial/ethnic elites in a given society. This sequence definitely contributes to the development of the "inner colonization of the lifeworld" as Habermas contends.

Ethnic Media and Multiculturalism: co-producers of affirmative culture

The so called "colonization of the lifeworld" incorporates the imperatives of national identity and racial harmony as basic ideological discourse to exercise the engineering of hegemony and source the broader strategy of the post-industrial or corporate capitalism.

The mercantilization of multiculturalism was acknowledged a few years ago (1986) in a conference "Multiculturalism means business" by the former Prime Minister of Canada Brian Mulroney and since then has become the ultimate objective of the public agenda. One clear implication of the above is the establishment of the Laurier Institute; an organization based in Vancouver whose mission is to "promote cultural harmony in Canada and encourage understanding among and between people of various cultures"[5]. Members-supporters of the Laurier Institute are corporations such as banks (Royal Bank of Canada, Bank of Nova Scotia or Hong Kong Bank of Canada), chrematistic institutions (The Canadian Maple Leaf Fund, Pacific Canadian Investment) and real estate or development units.

In this context, multiculturalism can be understood as an ideological panoply to distribute the dominant or elite discourse. Indeed, it is an apparatus in which political, economic, social and cultural tensions are controlled through fragmentation, contradictions and bureaucracies. Furthermore, the virtual hegemony of multicultural ideologies, emphasized by the increasing size of fragmentation and discrimination, contributes to the growth of dominated ethno/racial elites. However these elites cannot directly supervise or rule on their own the multicultural apparatus. Therefore, in order to achieve or maintain dominance, they must establish an alliance with various subaltern cultures or cultural factions. This alliance is the systematic engineering of *mass consent* by which socio-cultural conditions must be represented in neutral terms on neutral communicative territories. It is part of the condition of successful *hegemony* to produce a cohesive ideology, a set of commonsensical values and norms through various institutions especially mass media. Consequently it is achieved not by direct coercion but, routinely by "manufacturing consent".

Further, I would argue that the colonial "Founding Nations" heritage is reproduced in the settling of a minority faith in an egalitarian new world of opportunity. In this context, "Founding Nations" land is a territory of potential, promise and opportunity. It is a benefactor land[6]. Thus, an ideology of spectacular illusion transmitted by minority media secures the consent, even the support of the oppressed minority groups.

If the mainstream media maintain the faith in the logic of amelioration (socio-cultural or economic) the minority media transform this logic into ideals. In other words, they trivialize the unequal distribution of power, privilege and wealth by turning this uneven environment into glorification of homeland or idealization of Canada. They proceed to establish a consent and to spell out only organizational or administrative accounts without transforming them into political discourse (political consciousness, counter-hegemonic process, gender/class/race/ethnic stratification etc). Beyond this relatively narrow range of representation that contributes to partial or temporary ethnic scope the media promote the models or patterns of dominant cultural compositions. This central tendency towards formative typology of reference maintains the politics of structural assimilation. Therefore the emergence of an assimilationist environment should not be seen as meaning of social harmony; it simply indicates conformity patterns that can't energize, politicize and radicalize the segmented racial groups in a given society. As a result of this continuous pattern the ethnic media spend considerable time and space dealing with society as a Nation-State instead of society as a Political State. Ethnic media's consensualism is the microcosmic version of the dominant mass media representations. Certainly, they function as an apparatus in a larger depoliticization process of the public sphere by representing or negotiating positions defined overwhelmingly in par-

liamentary context and content. Nonetheless, their representation separates elements of political, social, economic and institutional matters and opens the road towards militant nationalism with populist sensibilities or overtones. In this sense news-stories, for example, about Québec or Ontario elections cannot be discussed in the light of the logic of neo-colonial politics or capitalist Anglo-Franco elites restructuring activity; on the contrary, news-stories see this topic as an overwhelming presence of parties internal conflicts, voters frustrations, public relations or public opinion ranks. Such discourse reinforces the irrational bureaucracy of the capitalist Nation-State and not the need for a direct formation of a Political-State.

Ghetto Media spaces: The Greek-Canadian Symptom

We have already seen that the ethnic media, as a communicative territory, contribute to an assimilationist environment. By employing populist exaltations as a form of public communication, the ethnic media transmit a kind of national consciousness that affirms dominant cultural accounts.

The ethnic media, as a kind of consensual and depoliticized vehicles, speak for the interest of pseudomoral utilitarianism whose features are based on individual effort and achievement or the possessive "credentials" of the homeland.

The emergence of these features have reduced the political discourse into normative condition of a postulated preservation of various antagonistic and persuasive representations. But this preservation lies along the line of the construction of *privatized individuals*[7] (not radicalized forms of life) as correspondence to the capitalist economic ethic; an ethic whose structural properties refer to the mode of exploitation or subordination under the "principle" of plurality. Indeed, the relative success of the dominant ethnic elites in stamping the national political culture depends in part on how ethnic media raise political and class consciousness of their own communities; how they critically engage citizens in a dialogue and action in order to facilitate social responsible change. I assume that neither the mainstream nor the ethnic media provide such competence for critical discourse or radicalized forms of life. Particularly, the ethnic media, because of their strong ties or association with "designated" community leaders, are not unified and will not be until they are able to reject the boundaries that constitute the experience of *ghetto*. Furthermore, the ethnic audience is frequently exposed to features and cases that apply to its own community without being connected to other communities' similar standpoints. The result is that the ghettoized ethnic media become a weak communicative territory — a space that under constant pressure and influence from forces generated through dominant ethnic elites, contributes to the lack of self-determination.

I would argue that ethnic media are rapidly moving to a condition where the

logic of fantasmagoria perpetuates passive participatory pursuits so as to distract ethnic groups from the formal political and economic conditions of ethnic class subordination. Even so, political action, such as counter-colonialization, is transformed into linear routinization of electoral imagery (impression management).

In this context the ethnic media is a web that enmeshes its own community to exemplify the requirements or hallmarks of a disciplinary system. At the core of this web is the practice that the individual community will participate in the regulation and control of "national harmony" by voluntary actions such as festivals or recreational assignments.

If power means the capacity to communicate, package and diffuse information[8] then we must associate this power with the process reduction[9] in which everything that is experienced or observed as dynamic process later is transformed and represented in a static, minimalist or sterilized media form. Thus, ethnic media appear to be assigned as the ideological compensatory in a given post-industrial society. Nevertheless, the practices of these media are not synonymous with pluralism or diversity. On the contrary, they obey or mimetically correspond to mainstream media practices. This formation of cultural association has created an institutional space of the ghetto that is impotent/incapable to provide a counterpublic sphere free from both dominant ethnic elites and the politics of neocolonialism. Nor it is likely to offer connections with any extended marginal group or social change movement. Unfortunately such practices work with, rather than against the classical bourgeois public sphere. The issue then comes to be defined as one of forging new institutional mediations through which ethnic media's function might be commodified instead of developing an alternative transcultural network. The concept that ethnic media should be an emancipatory vehicle that will command the active participation in a transcultural society is still vital to the formation of a political state.

Viewed in this perspective, emancipatory politics are to be posed on lifeworld. This in turn, leads to the formation of ethnic media political *technology* in the light of modern communication practices. In the existing environment the ethnic media, to a great extent, operate as communicative territories for the transmission and elaboration of hegemonic canon. This operation perpetuates passive pursuits so as to distract community members by incorporating them into incredible pervasive and resilient systems of domination.

Let us explore the hegemonic canon by examining the Greek-Canadian media in some detail. In that context, I would like to consider some of the conceptualizations that I have already discussed in order to open up a theoretical space and argue the construction of ghetto.

Greek-Canadian media are themselves information or cultural species that

must necessarily be consumed by members of the Greek diaspora in Canada. Their cultural and, particularly, economic viability relies on three categories — the sale of space or time to advertisers, the sale of information to a specific audience and the "courteous non-profit oriented" service to members of diaspora (community media). From the mid-'50s two print media appeared in Canada, *The Acropolis*, in Vancouver (1956) the *Hellenic Postman* in Montréal (1958). Since then print and electronic media appeared to have been on a continuously upward spiral (see chart below).

Print Media	Frequency	Province
City		
Athenian Toronto	Monthly	Ontario
Community News Montréal	Monthly	Québec
Echo Toronto	Quarterly	Ontario
Edmonton's Hellenic Can. Line Edmonton	Monthly	Alberta
Free Speech Toronto	Weekly	Ontario
Greek Can. Action Laval	Bi-monthly	Québec
Greek Can. Press Hamilton	Monthly	Ontario
Greek Can. Reportage Montréal	Weekly	Québec
Greek Can. Tribune Montréal	Weekly	Québec
Greek Can. Voice Vancouver	Monthly	British Columbia
Greek Can. Weekly Toronto	Weekly	Ontario
Hellenic Can. Chronicles Toronto	Weekly	Ontario
Hellenic Hamilton News Hamilton	Monthly	Ontario

Hellenic Postman Montréal	Weekly	Québec
Hellenic Times Toronto	Monthly	Ontario
Macedonian Echo Toronto	Bi-monthly	Ontario
Opinion Burnaby	Bi-monthly	British Columbia
Orthodox Way Toronto	Monthly	Ontario
Patrides Toronto	Monthly	Ontario
Relay Toronto	Monthly	Ontario
The Acropolis Vancouver	Monthly	British Columbia
The Greek Journal Toronto	Monthly	Ontario
The Greek Press Toronto	Monthly	Ontario
The Hellenic News London	Monthly	Ontario
Greek Macedonia & Thrace Don Mills	Monthly	Ontario

Electronic Media **City**	**Type**	**Province**
CHCR-Greek Radio Program Montréal	Radio	Québec
CFMB-Greek Radio Program Montréal	Radio	Québec
La Voix Hellenique Montréal	TV	Québec
Hellenic Pulse Montréal	TV	Québec

Emission Hellenique de Radio Montréal	Radio	Québec
Centre-Ville Montréal	Radio	Québec
Hellenic Melodies St.Laurent	Radio	Québec
Hellenic Voice of Halifax Halifax	Radio	Nova Scotia
Channel 47-Greek Program Toronto	TV	Ontario
Ontario Voice of Greece Toronto	Radio	Ontario
Ch10-Avramis Greek Show Toronto	TV	Ontario
CIRV-Greek Radio Program Toronto	Radio	Ontario
CHRW-Greek Radio Program London	Radio	Ontario
Greek-Can. Melodies Markham	Radio	Ontario
Echoes from the Valley Belleville	Radio	Ontario
The Mountain		
Hellenic Radio and TV Media Vancouver	Radio-TV	British Columbia
Greek Can. Memories Vancouver	Radio	British Columbia
Greek Can. Program Edmonton	Radio	Alberta
The Greek Radio Show Edmonton	Radio	Alberta
Greek Radio Program Calgary	Radio	Alberta
Hellenic kaleidoscope Ottawa	TV	Ontario

Source: Greek Press & Information Office, Ottawa, Canada

I would argue that the above media are reporting news, events and entertainment that reiterate the dominant political or cultural industries discourse of the homeland (Greece) as well as that of Canada. Furthermore, militant nationalism — within the context and content of news or entertainment — allows us to understand the current media formation as a mechanism of fictionality. Specifically, the mediation of the homeland dominant political or cultural industries discourse diffuses its own fictionality but in conditions that indicate an affective fictionality appeal; in other words as a natural, normal and therefore pleasurable and meaningful organ to community. An organ that manufactures nostalgia and works to position unfulfilled desires or emotions in the name of freedom of expression. Such formation leads to the proclivity of *a privilege account* for those who own or operate the media[10]. In other words, this proclivity by incorporating the gradual organization of dominant discourses (homeland and Canadian) becomes fait accompli to which community members and mainly canadian levels of government accept as legitimate territory for public communication. In this account the dimension of representation regarding political culture is obliterated and reduced to scopophilic representations of : I) fetishized nostalgia II) militant nationalism III) auratic pop culture and IV) assimilated practices or ideologies.

It seems that the material existence of the above representations (electronic, print or visual) loads to engineer a compromise between the discourse of "real" and the language of "sensuous". In turn, the textual or visual compromise corresponds to the recollection of nostalgia (being part of the past) which is controlled by the responsiveness to the exploitable means or interests of the present. Eventually this mediated arrangement produces the condition of *mere illusion* which, nevertheless, attains high status in a given multicultural society. In this respect, the suppression or exclusion of every other refracted or counter-hegemonic discourse plus the illusory satisfaction of scopophilic practices, compose the notion of *Mémoire volontaire* as it was developed by Benjamin[11]; a practice that looks upon the present as a repetition of the past that attempts to defuse the crisis of the present. Despite defusive or illusory props, the use-value of media, as specifically employed for large scale ethnic valorization, feeds back on the idea of pluralism—the arsenal of liberal philosophy. In a space where culture is dominated by mass media, the ideals of liberal philosophies promote the argument that society contains different existences that harmoniously co-exist. However, in practice such a philosophy doesn't take into consideration class conflict, gender politics, ethnic discrimination, counter-hegemonic cultural or political groups, etc. Thus, the enunciation of "Founding Nations" and "ethnic minorities", within the filtration of the media representational system, remains problematic. Apparently, the media dominate the public sphere where either stereotypes or ghettoized practices play a role in negatively affecting conscious-

ness and behavior. Inherent in all this lies a remarkable fragmentation of the ethnic groups.

The practices, for example, of various Greek-Canadian print media forcefully affirm the fact that the politics of fragmentation are also politics of power. These media neglect to convey, and of course aid the foundation of an ethnic interactive paradigm. Therefore, their representations, assumptions or propositions deploy a functionalist type of determination. A closer examination reveals a strong synthesis of passivity based on representational practices that separate transcultural action and neo-colonial culture from the political process. For instance, an investigation of various print Greek-Canadian media leads to the assertion that the ideals of commodified politics (acts of celebration or national exaltation) segregate the community from the material apparatuses of daily struggles against fixation: ghetto management and colonialization. Commenting upon the fixation I would remark that none of these media contain policies or establish interactive communication with other ethnic communities. It is apparent that the fixation is also keen to turn our attention to the system of concealed despotism that constitutes the symptom of the affirmative *character of culture*[12]. By extension, the ethnic media, operating as community despots, keep the practice of phantasmagoria alive and, at the same time, by promoting phantasmagoria as an exchange relation they pacify emancipatory practices; they confirm the social order of the dominant discourse by rejecting any critical role within a corporate society; they fail to broach the question of neo-colonial politics when it comes to federal or provincial elections; they never question the concentration of ownership and therefore power; or the unequal distribution of power. The important point, however, in such formulations is to seek clarification on those exclusionary politics that conceal the interests of dominant discourses. I would argue that exclusionary politics is not a desultory, but a strategic form of narration constructed on social practices that eliminate the degree of autonomy of a given ghetto mediaspace complex.

Out of this mediaspace complex certain information practices are exercised and categorized in six interdependent spheres:

I. Externalization: emphasis on patrimonial or fantasmagoric activities

(e.g. *Opinion* 15.7.94 or *Greek Canadian Tribune* 28 July '94).

II. Abrogation: the media dictate a particular pattern of socio-political pattern that reproduces or mediates issues within parliamentary terms. In this context, they abrogate voices coming from counter-hegemonic environments (e.g. the issue of peacekeeping as a legitimate property of the minister of Defense of Canada. *Patrides*, July 1994).

III. Obscuration: denying the correlation between racism and capitalist interests or the association between ethnic division and racist ideas or class location (None of the media presented in chart 1 offers such an analysis).

IV. Enchantment: a state in which the community is exposed to ethnocentric accounts (e.g. *Hellenic Hamilton News*, July 1994)

V. Annihilation: the roots of urban/city planning can't be seen as a result of economic discrimination or ethno/class location (e.g. *Greek Canadian Tribune*, 4 Aug. '94)

VI. Gentrification: triumphant texts or visual material of community "pioneers" are seeking for community support.

Such media interdependent spheres repeatedly emphasize the consensual, calculable interrogation of lifeworld. In this sense, they become a vital power instrument for maintaining the "Founding Nations'" dominance. Their politics would be absorbed into a simulacrum that denies autonomy and emancipation. On this basis, we should open up a new field for historical delving.

Breaking the Ghetto Reticence

There are grounds for considerable optimism since a lot of minority ethnic groups have started to take a more critical work and action within Canadian society. Indeed, "in the 1980, and 1990s, foreign domestic workers from the Philippines and the Caribbean have been militant in contesting coercive Canadian immigration policies and substandard provincial employment standards"[13]. Lately a group of communities in Ottawa organized a conference on "Ethnic Communities and the Media"[14]. The speakers rejected - quite emphatically - the existing patterns of bicultural power and privilege of "Founding Nations". They challenged the practices of multiculturalism because these practices fail to acknowledge the unequal allocations of resources or detection of injustices. Multiculturalism and its ideological arsenal (pluralism), perpetuate bicultural accommodation practices and therefore ensure the power elites equilibrium. Such practices secure the concentration of power in a very chauvinistic, paternalistic way by treating ethnicity as a sensory or folklore index. In Canadian politics, ethnicity has often lurked behind forms like "food", "folklore" or "tradition". In this conference and particular in our task, we proposed[15] the composition of a *transcultural federation*. This concept doesn't refer to the existing "symbolic interaction" among various ethnic communities; such an interaction promotes silent debates held within the parameters of rhetoric pluralism and therefore multiculturalism. Our concept of transcultural federation betrays a multiplicity of meanings, politics and emancipatory practices.

To begin with, we propose a constitutional appearance of a "transcultural federation" with emphasis on the aspect of ethnic equal *openness* — open public sphere, path, trail — as distinguished from the existing system of "legal" or

"institutional" ethnic hierarchization.

A second meaning can be found in practices that inquire and reject the power structure of corporate capitalism and its consciousness industry[16] as an ideological and educational machine.

The corporate parameter and its systematic techniques of persuasion for hegemony lead to the third imperative practice: decentralization of the dominant ethnic elites. In order to achieve this objective the ethnic communities must be adequately organized. In this view, a fourth way of constructing transcultural federation must be in the light of ethnic community activism. Such activism will address the issue of politicization of the ethnic movement within the particular bodies of direct, and not representational democracy.

Practicing such politics entails the claim that the communities can be associated with other social justice organizations, unions, counter-hegemonic movements and indigenous minorities that give a broader perspective of a long-term social change. Of course, this practice needs to be supplemented by a political forum or social network that would effectively confront the existing hegemonic policies and relations. Confronted with hegemonic operations, the meaning and practices of transcultural federation must be based on the principle of *transparent politics*. Indeed, the secrecy of parliamentary centralism and its repressive, closed and centripetal structure could be the target of a united ethnic political forum or social network. If the State speaks in the name of dominant history or culture then the ethnic movement must fight for the determination of such hegemonic contracts.

At present, however, the prospect of ethnicity is more transcendental as a sociological discussion than a political or social action phenomenon. Thus conceived, Charles Taylor's[17] account of "deed diversity" doesn't relate the power structure of corporate capitalism to the fact that ethnic communities were the systemic invention for maximum profit. He takes the conventional view that "deep diversity is the only formula on which a united federal Canada can be rebuilt". Such apparently artificial diagnosis contributes to political neutralization which is the groundwork for what appeared to be a corporatist strategy for managing immigration along Canadian State lines. The main factor is that today there is an antifederal development that has to be seen in terms of "Founding Nations" nostalgia associated with the neo-colonial practices of protestant reformation and catholic sovereignty.

The ambiguities of "Founding Nations" nostalgia do not provide ethical contribution to history (extermination of native people and land), nor do their politically disastrous tendency to escape from the history through phantasmagoric celebrations. In this context the Canadian state is unauthentic; it is not only untrue to itself, but also fuses history with an absurd united federalism.

What is the responsibility of subaltern ethnic communities in such an environment?

Obviously, it is their responsibility to transform social consciousness into political praxis. They should not be a static and therefore dead category of public sphere but a living predicament—a unifying synthesis that must overcome the deprivation of emancipation. Here is where the issue of counter-hegemonic ethnic class media arises—to avoid or prevent capitulated representations. Without this perspective, ethnicity remains an abstract and marginalized attribute rewriting the "master narrative" and therefore working for the relegitimation of an atavist liberal state. In the light of this I would like to extend the "study" questions conducted by I. Wallerstein[18] and add the *question of immigration*.

Indeed, the last two decades the gradual, deepening intrusion of immigrant crossovers-geographically, culturally and politically—provided to a modern society an ever abundant supply for reconsideration and thus repositioning of power. Yet, the new set of different localities invents new spheres that can posit communicative territories against the manufactured or false history of the atavist state. It is this, that allows the question of immigration to be regarded as vital to the modern politics of nation, class and ethnicity and to the formation of a counter-public sphere that doesn't contribute to the practices of populist or militant nationalism and chauvinism reinforced by the "Founding Nations" ideological management.

It is not surprising that the "Founding Nations'" image (biculturalism) appears to be "natural" — as an internally credible source or point of reference. This "naturalness" is itself an outcome of the nationalisation of history and space according to neo-colonial needs strengthened by immigration policies; policies that exclude, for example, Anglo-Saxon or Franco ethnic media from federal organized ethnic media conferences or studies. If it is accepted that Canadian society is a multi-ethnic society and thus be considered as having consequences in the constitution of immigration policy, then it becomes possible to argue that all ethnic groups — including the "Founding Nations" — belong to the same socio-political structuration without ethnic hierarchisation. This ethnic relocation obliterates the materiality of *otherness* by eroding the hierarchy or dichotomy between "ethnic groups" and "Founding Nations" species. However, the relocation of ethnicity can't be a temporal patterning but a socioethnic struggle against the politics of a corporatist capitalism and its State. The aim of those engaged in the relocation of ethnicity must be, after all, to fight the sources of destabilisation and ghetto management. Thus, the relocation process becomes a strategic power site for various subaltern communities. Hence at all levels, power ultimately cannot be separated from the realm of "lifeworld" — a dialectic that involves the interaction between long-term commitment and socially

responsible practices.

It is clear that this dialectic requires a communicative territory that can construct interactive relations. Therefore, ethnic media can be understood as a counter-cultural interactive territory — a concept that breaks the narratives of despotism and, equally important, the *irrational rationality*[19] of control imposed by neo-colonial capitalist systems. Such a concept must be transformed into collective action for the relocation of ethnicity and thus an awakening political consciousness of "nations without nationalism"[20] must be exercised for the establishment of a new paradigm of social existence. In this sense the relocation of ethnicity also enlivens the argument that the political consciousness must contain the rationalization of sociocultural conditions that (re)produce phenomena of suppressive or destructive human sociality.

FOOTNOTES

1. TODOROV, TZVETAN, **The conquest of America—the question of the other**. Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1985.

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3. FRASER, NANCY, "Rethinking the public sphere—a contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy". **Social Text**. 25/26, 1990 (pp.56-80).

4. HABERMAS, JURGEN, **The theory of Communicative Action**, vol. II, Beacon, Boston, 1987.

5. MITCHELL, KATHARYNE, "Multiculturalism, or the United Colors of Capitalism?" **Antipode** 25:4, 1993, pp.263-294.

6. Speaking to a liberal fundraising dinner, prime minister of Canada Jean Chrétien said that "...Canada is the best country in the world. This is the land of generosity, this is the land of sharing, this is the land that permits all of us to enjoy a very good life...millions and millions of people around the world would give their shirt and their last penny to come..." See **THE OTTAWA CITIZEN**, 30-11-1994, p.A3.

7. HABERMAS examines the concept of privatized individuals regarding the capitalist economic ethic. See J. HABERMAS, **The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society**, Vol. I, Beacon Press, Boston, 1984.

8. BABE, Robert, **Information and Communication in Economics**. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boston/Dordrecht/London, 1994.

9. ELIAS, N., **What is Sociology**. London: Hutchinson, 1978. Elias uses the

term (zustandsreduction-process reduction)

10. For detail accounts see W. ANSELMI- K. GOULIAMOS, **Mediating Culture: the politics of representation**. Guernica. Toronto/Montréal/New York, 1994.

11. BENJAMIN, W., **Illumination**, Fontana Press, London, 1992.

12. I use the notion of affirmative culture as H. MARCUSE stated in his book **Negations**. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972.

13. See STASIULIS DAIVA, "Deep Diversity: Race and Ethnicity in Canadian Politics" in M.WHITTINGTON and G. WILLIAMS, **Canadian Politics in the 1990s**, Nelson Canada, 4th edition, 1994.

14. The conference sponsored by CKCU-FM 93.1, took place at the Regional Municipality of Ottawa- Carleton on September 24, 1994.

15. K. GOULIAMOS-W. ANSELMI, "Redefining Ethnicity"—paper presented at the CKCU-FM 93.1conference.

16. The notion of consciousness industry as it was identified by H.M. ENZENSBERGER in his book **The Consciousness Industry**. Seabury Press, New York, 1974 and D. SMYTHE in **Dependency Road: communications, capitalism, consciousness and Canada**. ABLEX, N. Jersey, 1982.

17. TAYLOR, CHARLES: "Shared and Divergent Values" in R.L. WATTS and D.M. BROWN, **Option for a New Canada**. University of Toronto Press. Toronto, 1991.

18. WALLERSTEIN takes into account just three questions: the "national" of left movements as it came within the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, the "peasant" as a result of the Chinese Revolution and, finally, the decolonization of "Third Worldsim". seeE. BALIBAR and I. WALLERSTEIN, **Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities**, VERSO. London, 1993.

19. CASTORIADIS, breaking with Marxian and Weberian accounts, focused his analysis on despotism and anarchy of capitalism not only in the workplace but also in the market — a phenomenon that is characterised by a constant application of the irrational rationality of control. See CASTORIADIS, C., **Political and Social Writings**, vol. 2. The University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis, 1988.

20. I borrow the phrase "nations without nationalism" from J. KRISTEVA'S book **Nations Without Nationalism**. Columbia University Press, New York 1993.

EMBIRICOS LECTEUR DE PROUST

à Pavlos Matessis

Jacques Bouchard*

ABSTRACT

The personal library of Andreas Embiricos (1901-1975) includes nine volumes of the complete works of Marcel Proust, which were acquired beginning May 17, 1926. Several volumes contain marginal notes and passages underlined by Embiricos. These annotations promise to be of capital importance in the further study of modern Greece's first surrealist poet and psychoanalyst.

RÉSUMÉ

La bibliothèque d'Andréas Embiricos (1901-1975) conserve 9 volumes des œuvres complètes de Marcel Proust, acquis à partir du 17 mai 1926. Certains volumes contiennent des notes marginales et des passages soulignés par l'acquéreur qui présentent un intérêt certain pour l'étude de la formation du premier poète surréaliste et psychanalyste de Grèce.

Lorsqu'un poète ou un prosateur prend place dans le trésor d'une littérature, la critique se doit d'expliciter les forces vives de son œuvre, de mettre en valeur l'originalité de son style et de situer cet apport unique parmi la production de son temps.

L'histoire de la littérature, comme celle de la peinture, ou de tout autre art, nous illustre abondamment la période de formation du créateur, celle pendant laquelle un peintre reproduit les grands maîtres en les copiant, un écrivain se repaît de lectures en assimilant des mots, des tropes, des styles. L'identification des sources n'expliquera jamais le mystère de la création, mais permettra au connaisseur d'apprécier l'écart entre le point de départ et le résultat obtenu, la création originale.

Si, d'ordinaire, la critique procède par déductions, par recoupements qui visent à pallier le manque de sources sûres, dans sa patiente reconstitution de la genèse d'une œuvre, pour certains cas privilégiés, on dispose, en partant, de preuves matérielles irréfutables, dont l'exploitation lève en partie le voile sur la formation d'une conscience — et surtout d'une inconscience — littéraire.

Le cas qui nous occupera aujourd'hui est celui du poète, prosateur et psychanalyste Andréas Embiricos. Il a lui-même livré le nom de beaucoup de prosateurs ou de poètes qu'il estimait ou qui l'ont influencé. Qu'on pense, par exemple, à son poème Οἱ Μπεάτοι ἢ τῆς μὴ συμμορφώσεως οἱ Ἅγιοι, [Les Beati ou les saints confesseurs du non-conformisme] dont deux versions sont connues[1]. Dans ce texte on trouve mentionné le poète belge Henri Michaux, qui a publié en 1944 le recueil *L'Espace du dedans,* dont Embiricos s'est peut-être inspiré pour le titre de son *Ἐνδοχώρα*, paru un an plus tard[2].

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Par contre, à ma connaissance, Embiricos n'a jamais mentionné dans ses poèmes ou dans sa prose le nom de Marcel Proust; son roman Ὁ Μέγας Ἀνατολικός [*Le Great Eastern*] laisserait pourtant supposer, par l'ampleur de son développement, que l'auteur ait eu l'ambition de rivaliser avec le romancier français, dans sa fresque d'un microcosme, stylisée avec l'innocence d'un "moraliste" (ἠθολόγος).

Mais avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet, qu'il me soit permis de remercier ici publiquement madame Vivica Embiricos et monsieur Léonidas Embiricos de l'empressement et de la générosité avec lesquels ils ont mis à ma disposition la bibliothèque de l'écrivain, une immense bibliothèque, générale et spécialisée, qui mériterait une étude exhaustive et réserve sûrement d'autres surprises.

En examinant le contenu d'une des bibliothèques Embiricos, j'ai pu constater que neuf volumes des œuvres de Marcel Proust y sont conservés. Ils portent des marques qui intéressent indubitablement les études littéraires, et peut-être même l'histoire de la psychanalyse en Grèce.

Il s'agit de neuf volumes reliés mi-cuir avec titre or, des œuvres de Proust publiées chez Gallimard. Six d'entre eux portent la signature de l'acquéreur, le lieu et la date de l'acquisition. Ils ont tous été achetés à Nice, en 1926. Sur la page titre, l'acquéreur signe à l'anglaise: Andrew L. Embiricos. Le premier achat s'est fait le 17 mai 1926. Je me propose de décrire brièvement le titre des volumes en ajoutant quelques détails susceptibles d'intérêt; je m'attarderai ensuite sur les remarques personnelles d'Embiricos dont certains volumes gardent la trace.

1. *Les plaisirs et les jours.* La page titre porte la mention: Andrew L. Embiricos, Nice 17/5/26. Embiricos possède la 26e édition, dont l'achevé d'imprimer date du 20 décembre 1924. Sur cet exemplaire, il n'y a ni commentaire manuscrit, ni soulignement; seul un petit trait devant certains intitulés de la page faisant face à la page titre: devant *Les Plaisirs,* puis devant tous les titres de *À la recherche du temps perdu,* sauf devant *Albertine disparue.* Il n'y a pas de marque devant les *Pastiches et mélanges.* Ces "obèles" indiquent qu'Embiricos avait l'intention d'acquérir les volumes en question, ou bien que l'acquisition en a été réalisée.

2. *À l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs.* Il s'agit du premier volume sous ce titre, marqué d'un astérisque (*), mais le tome II de *À la recherche du temps perdu.* Même mention de l'acquéreur, du lieu et de la date. Embiricos possède la 89e édition, de 1925. Cet exemplaire comporte de nombreux passages soulignés, de même que de nombreux traits verticaux dans la marge, accompagnés la plupart du temps d'un signe en forme de M majuscule (= Magnifique?), marquant l'intérêt du lecteur. Par exemple, Embiricos, polyglotte averti, signale d'un trait la remarque suivante, page 143: «Dans une langue que

nous savons, nous avons substitué à l'opacité des sons la transparence des idées. Mais une langue que nous ne savons pas est un palais clos dans lequel celle que nous aimons peut nous tromper, sans que, restés au dehors et désespérément crispés dans notre impuissance, nous parvenions à rien voir, à rien empêcher.»

Un peu plus bas, page 150, Embiricos manifeste son approbation à l'affirmation suivante en la soulignant: "Nous sommes tous obligés, pour rendre la réalité supportable, d'entretenir en nous quelques petites folies."

Puis, à la page 197 de cette édition, une remarque pénétrante de Proust retient l'attention d'Embiricos: "Mais en tout genre, notre temps a la manie de vouloir ne montrer les choses qu'avec ce qui les entoure dans la réalité, et par là de supprimer l'essentiel, l'acte de l'esprit qui les isola d'elle." Il note dans la marge: 1900 περίπου ἕως τώρα, δυστυχῶς. Enfin, dans une page où il est question de "corps conscient", page 216, Embiricos souligne cette dernière phrase: "C'est notre attention qui met des objets dans une chambre, et l'habitude qui les en retire et nous y fait de la place."

3. *À l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs.* Volume second, marqué de deux astérisques (**). La mention de l'acquéreur a été rognée par le relieur; même lieu et même date. C'est aussi la 89e édition. Cet exemplaire ne contient pas de commentaires, mais de nombreux traits verticaux en marge accompagnés du signe M majuscule. On y remarque un seul soulignement, page 196, concernant la finesse des mains féminines.

Malgré la rareté donc de notes marginales, on constate que les deux volumes de ce roman ont fait l'objet d'une lecture attentive d'Embiricos.

4. Le volume suivant contient *Le côté de Guermantes II* et *Sodome et Gomorrhe I.* 27e édition, 1921. Le nom de l'acquéreur est rogné par le relieur; même lieu et même date d'acquisition. Cet exemplaire ne comporte aucun commentaire, aucun soulignement; on ne peut donc affirmer qu'Embiricos a lu ce livre. Remarquons qu'il manque la première partie de *Le côté de Guermantes* dans l'état actuel de la collection Embiricos.

5. Embiricos possède aussi le roman *Sodome et Gomorrhe II* **, dans la 42e édition, 1924. Cet exemplaire est immaculé.

6. Même constatation concernant *Sodome et Gomorrhe II* ***, dans la 48e édition, 1924. Aucun commentaire, aucun soulignement.

7. Même remarque concernant *La Prisonnière* (*Sodome et Gomorrhe III*). Embiricos possède la 32e édition, 1924. Sauf la mention de l'acquéreur, du lieu et de la date d'acquisition en page titre, on n'y trouve aucun commentaire, ni soulignement.

8. & 9. Mais les deux exemplaires de loin les plus intéressants, qui nous apprennent quelque chose sur l'écrivain et le psychanalyste Embiricos, ce sont

les deux volumes du roman *Du côté de chez Swann,* formant le tome I de *À la recherche du temps perdu.* Embiricos a acquis les deux volumes dans leur 71e édition, dont l'achevé d'imprimer est daté du 24 juin 1926. Le premier volume porte la mention: Andrew L. Embiricos, Nice 27/8/1926. Ils ont donc été achetés trois mois après les 7 livres dont j'ai parlé précédemment. Le premier volume comporte de nombreux commentaires en français et en grec, de nombreux soulignements, des traits verticaux, parfois accompagnés du M majuscule ou d'un autre signe en forme d'alpha minuscule. Le second volume, lui, n'a pas d'ex-libris, ni de commentaires, mais contient de nombreux soulignés et traits verticaux.

Commençons par le premier volume. Les quelque 300 pages de cet exemplaire sont couverts de brefs commentaires, de renvois, de soulignés et de signes. Je choisirai les soulignements les plus intéressants, mais je vais tenter de vous donner une idée assez fidèle des commentaires. Ainsi, page 147, le narrateur dit de Bergotte et de Mlle Swann qu'«il cheminait à côté d'elle, inconnu et glorieux, comme les Dieux qui descendaient au milieu des mortels.» Embiricos entoure l'expression «inconnu et glorieux» et ajoute dans la marge περίεργη φρασούλα. Page 149, en marge d'une fine description de la pluie, il note ὄμορφο.

Page 165, là où il est question de M. Vinteuil et de son morceau de musique, Embiricos se fait deux renvois: il écrit κοίτα σελ. 231 et un peu plus bas de la même page κοίτα σελ. 233. De même, aux pages 231 et 233, où le narrateur mentionne le portrait de M. Vinteuil, on trouve en marge κοίτα σελ. 165.

Embiricos manifeste un grand intérêt pour l'analyse du snobisme faite par Marcel Proust: en haut de la page 181, il titre «Mr Legrandin», et page 187 en haut, comme à la page 191, il inscrit le mot «Snobisme». À la page 187, Embiricos exulte à la lecture de la description de Legrandin et souligne l'expression «comme un saint Sébastien du snobisme». Dans la marge, il écrit θαβμάσιο! avec un β, ce qui — à première vue — étonne. Mais cette graphie corrobore une déclaration du poète, faite le 22 mai 1973, à l'Université de Thessalonique:

"Έγραφα ὡς δημοτικιστής ὥσπου ἔφτασα στὸν ὑπερρεαλισμό. (...) Καὶ σὰν νέος ποὺ ἤμουν καὶ παιδί, δὲν ἤμουν κὰν δημοτικιστής, μὲ τὴν ἔννοια ποὺ λέμε σήμερα, ἤμουν μαλλιαρός μαθητής τοῦ Ψυχάρη, κάτοχος τῆς γραμματικῆς του. (...) ἔγραφα ἄβριο μὲ β."[3]

[J'écrivais en démotique avant d'accéder au surréalisme. (...) Dans mon jeune temps, je n'étais pas démoticiste au sens où on le dit aujourd'hui; j'étais un «poilu», un disciple de Psichari, un adepte de sa grammaire. (...) J'écrivais ἄβριο avec un β.]

Plus loin, Embiricos s'intéresse au personnage de Gilberte, dont il écrit le nom page 205, deux fois, puis page 206, avec la mention : «Gilberte - Amour». Il souligne en outre le passage suivant : «Ainsi passa près de moi ce nom de Gilberte, donné comme un talisman qui me permettrait peut-être ...»

Page 223, un trait vertical rehausse la longue remarque de Proust qui va de «Quand j'étais fatigué d'avoir lu toute la matinée dans la salle»... jusqu'à «pour avoir préféré à un lent et difficile éclaircissement, le plaisir d'une dérivation plus aisée vers une issue immédiate». Embiricos marque ce passage d'un alpha dans la marge (α = de première importance?) et ajoute ἐξαίσιο. Dans ce même extrait, où le narrateur évoque «les murs des maisons, la haie de Tansonville, les arbres du bois de Roussainville, les buissons auxquels s'adosse Montjouvain», Embiricos souligne les mots qui suivent: [ils] «recevaient des coups de parapluie ou de canne, entendaient des cris joyeux, qui n'étaient, les uns et les autres, que des idées confuses qui m'exaltaient».

Toute la page 224, une description du paysage de Montjouvain après la pluie, retient l'attention d'Embiricos; il note dans la marge ἐξαίσιο. Il y remarque aussi le passage fameux: «Et voyant sur l'eau et à la face du mur un pâle sourire répondre au sourire du ciel, je m'écriai dans mon enthousiasme en brandissant mon parapluie refermé: "Zut, zut, zut, zut." Mais en même temps je sentis que mon devoir eût été de ne pas m'en tenir à ces propos opaques et de tâcher de voir plus clair dans mon ravissement.» Il souligne l'interjection répétée et ajoute un alpha dans la marge.

Embiricos titre la page 225 des mots «Le désir». Dans cette page il souligne la phrase suivante: «Parfois à l'exaltation que me donnait la solitude, s'en ajoutait une autre que je ne savais pas en départager nettement, causée par le désir de voir surgir devant moi une paysanne, que je pourrais serrer dans mes bras.» Notre lecteur ajoute une flèche (→), un M majuscule et un alpha minuscule dans la marge. Cette page est marquée d'un double trait vertical. Embiricos trace un trait vertical continu tout le long des pages suivantes, 226 et 227. Page 226, Proust écrit: «et mon imagination reprenant des forces au contact de ma sensualité, ma sensualité se répandant dans tous les domaines de mon imagination, mon désir n'avait plus de limites.» À la page 227, le narrateur se met à errer dans les bois de Roussainville à la recherche d'une paysanne à embrasser. Puis il ajoute: «Cette fille que je ne voyais que criblée de feuillages, elle était elle-même pour moi comme une plante locale d'une espèce plus élevée seulement que les autres et [à partir d'ici Embiricos souligne] dont la structure permet d'approcher de plus près qu'en elles, la saveur profonde du pays.» Embiricos ajoute un alpha dans la marge.

En haut de la page 229, Embiricos a écrit «Mll<e> Vinteuil et son ami». Un peu plus bas, Embiricos souligne le mot «sadisme» et note dans la marge: «Mlle Vinteuil et le sadisme». Page 233, en haut, Embiricos a écrit: «Mll<e>

Vinteuil et son amie». Un peu plus bas, à la phrase «Dans l'échancrure de son corsage de crêpe Mlle Vinteuil sentit que [et Embiricos souligne] son amie piquait un baiser», dans la marge, il commente: χαριτωμένη ἔκφραση. En haut de la page suivante, Embiricos écrit les mots «Sur le sadisme». Toute la page est marquée d'un trait vertical. Sur une parenthèse du narrateur concernant la psychologie de Mlle Vinteuil, Embiricos écrit «l'indignation». Les pages 235 et 236 sont coiffées des mots d'Embiricos «Sur le sadisme». Vers la fin de la page 235, Embiricos souligne les mots «et il n'y a guère que le sadisme qui donne un fondement dans la vie à l'esthétique du mélodrame. Dans la réalité, en dehors des cas de sadisme...» Dans la marge il a marqué un Σ majuscule (probablement un sigle pour Σαδισμός). La page 236 porte des soulignés, un M majuscule, un alpha minuscule et un Σ majuscule. Deux M majuscules et deux alphas minuscules signalent l'intérêt de la page 237, coiffée des mots «Analyse de Mlle Vinteuil». Au bas de la page, on lit l'appréciation enthousiaste d'Embiricos «Analyse p[h]sychologique magistrale».

Les pages 250 et 251 portent les mots «Mme de Guermantes». En haut de la page 255, Embiricos a écrit «Mme de Guermantes. Amour». Dans la marge, à la hauteur de la phrase «Alors me rappelant ce regard qu'elle avait laissé s'arrêter sur moi, pendant la messe, bleu comme un rayon de soleil qui aurait traversé le vitrail de Gilbert le Mauvais», Embiricos commente d'un mot: ὄμορφο. Il marque d'un alpha dans la marge la phrase; «Et aussitôt je l'aimai, car s'il peut quelquefois suffire pour que nous aimions une femme (souligné jusqu'ici par Embiricos) qu'elle nous regarde avec mépris comme j'avais cru qu'avait fait Mlle Swann et que nous pensions qu'elle ne pourra jamais nous appartenir, quelquefois aussi il peut suffire qu'elle nous regarde avec bonté comme faisait Mme de Guermantes et que nous pensions qu'elle pourra nous appartenir.» De la page suivante, il souligne l'expression «un épiderme de lumière»; mais la page presque entière est marquée des alpha minuscule et M majuscule.

En haut des pages 272 et 273, Embiricos a écrit «Les Verdurin[s]»; en marge de la première ligne, soulignée, de la page 272 «d'une respectable famille bourgeoise excessivement», Embiricos note «Mme Verdurin».

Les dernières annotations d'Embiricos concernent Swann: en haut de la page 275, il écrit «Swann et les femmes» et il souligne plus bas la phrase «Swann aimait tellement les femmes»; en haut de la page 276, il note «Swann. Vanité - Amour»; en haut de la page suivante «Swann et sa façon d'agir en amour». Dans cette page, il souligne presque tout le premier paragraphe : «Et c'étaient souvent des femmes de beauté assez vulgaire, car les qualités physiques qu'il recherchait sans s'en rendre compte étaient en complète opposition avec celles qui lui rendaient admirables les femmes sculptées ou peintes par les maîtres qu'il préférait. La profondeur, la mélancolie de l'expression, glaçaient ses sens

que suffisait au contraire à éveiller une chair saine, plantureuse et rose.»

Enfin, Embiricos marque les pages 296, 297 et 298, d'un M majuscule, tout en soulignant au bas de la page 297 et en haut de la page suivante la phrase: «Peut-être aussi à force de dire qu'elle serait malade, y avait-il des moments où elle ne se rappelait plus que c'était un mensonge et [298] prenait une âme de malade.» C'est là le dernier souligné du livre.

Le second volume du roman *Du côté de chez Swann* ne comporte pas de commentaires marginaux de la main d'Embiricos. On y constate cependant qu'il l'a lu attentivement, le crayon à la main; il a couvert son exemplaire de soulignements et de traits verticaux, parfois doubles, en général accompagnés du M majuscule. On y trouve soulignées ou marquées d'un M des réflexions de Proust sur le désir, des analyses de sentiments et de sensations, et aussi des descriptions de forêts.

Mentionnons à titre d'exemple qu'Embiricos souligne la dernière ligne de la page 249 et les deux premières de la page 250 où se lit la pensée suivante: «Il y a des jours montueux et malaisés qu'on met un [250] temps infini à gravir et des jours en pente qui se laissent descendre à fond de train en chantant.»

Enfin, les dernières pages, de 292 à 301, sont marquées d'un trait vertical, — double aux pages 292 à 296 —, où Embiricos remarque une magnifique évocation du Bois de Boulogne, qui commence comme suit: «Cette complexité du bois de Boulogne qui en fait un lieu factice et, dans le sens zoologique ou mythologique du mot, un Jardin, je l'ai retrouvée cette année comme je le traversais pour aller à Trianon...» La prose de Marcel Proust chante comme de la poésie imprégnée de couleurs et d'allitérations: «Plus loin, là où toutes les feuilles vertes couvraient les arbres, un seul, petit, trapu, étêté et têtu, secouait au vent une vilaine chevelure rouge.» (page 293). À la page 294, on lit: «Et c'était aussi l'heure. Dans les endroits où les arbres gardaient encore leurs feuilles, ils semblaient subir une altération de leur matière à partir du point où ils étaient touchés par la lumière du soleil, presque horizontalement le matin comme elle le redeviendrait quelques heures plus tard au moment où dans le crépuscule commençant, elle s'allume comme une lampe, projette à distance sur le feuillage un reflet artificiel et chaud...» Un peu plus bas, page 295, Proust esquisse les différentes parties du Bois en ces termes: «Des espaces plus éclaircis laissaient voir l'entrée de presque toutes, ou bien un feuillage somptueux la désignait comme une oriflamme.» [...] «On sentait que le Bois n'était pas qu'un bois, qu'il répondait à une destination étrangère à la vie des arbres, l'exaltation que j'éprouvais n'était pas causée que par l'admiration de l'automne, mais par un désir. Grande source d'une joie que l'âme ressent d'abord sans en connaître la cause, sans comprendre que rien au dehors ne la motive. Aussi regardais-je les arbres avec une tendresse insatisfaite qui les dépassait et se portait à mon insu vers ce chef-d'œuvre des belles promeneuses qu'ils enferment chaque jour

pendant quelques heures.»

Personnellement, il me semble que quelque chose de ces pages se retrouve dans certaines évocations de parcs ou de jardins, chez Embiricos. Par exemple, dans son poème Οἱ Καρυάτιδες [Les Caryatides], écrit en 1935, publié dans son recueil *Ἐνδοχώρα*, le poète évoque un bois en ces termes[4]:

Ἄλσος ἀλκῆς μὲ τ' ἄλικα δέντρα σου

Ἡ νεότης διαισθάνεται τὴν σημασία σου

Ἀναθρώσκει ἤδη στὰς παρυφας σου

[Bosquet de verdeur avec tes arbres écarlates

La jeunesse par intuition saisit ta signification

Depuis tes lisières déjà elle se laisse percevoir]

et plus bas, à propos des jeunes filles:

Ποὺ περπατοῦν ἡμίγυμνες μέσ' στὰ δρομάκια σου

[Qui déambulent à moitié nues dans tes sentiers]

Et la fin majestueuse:

Τὸ βράδυ ἐδῶ εἶναι θερμὸ

Τὰ δέντρα περιτυλίσσονται στὴ σιγαλιά τους

Βράχοι σιγῆς πέφτουν ἀργὰ καὶ ποῦ μέσα στὸ ξέφωτο

Ὅπως τὸ φῶς πρὶν γίνει μέρα.

[Ici la soirée sera chaude

Les arbres se couvrent de leur sérénité

Des blocs de silence s'écroulent par intervalles dans la clairière

Comme la lumière avant qu'il fasse jour.]

Du second volume du roman *Du côté de chez Swann,* Embiricos a souligné les dernières lignes de la page 301, par lesquelles Proust terminait son livre: «le souvenir d'une certaine image n'est que le regret d'un certain instant; et les maisons, les routes, les avenues, sont fugitives, hélas, comme les années.»

Outre les 9 volumes que je viens de mentionner, la bibliothèque d'Andréas Embiricos en conserve 4 autres qui prouvent éloquemment le vif intérêt du lecteur grec pour le romancier français. Il s'agit d'abord de l'*Essai sur Marcel Proust* de Georges Gabory, publié chez Émile Chamontin en 1926. Ce livre porte la mention: Andrew L. Embiricos, Paris 11/6/1926. On y trouve encore une monographie de Léon Pierre-Quint, sans ex-libris, mais qu'Embiricos a dû

se procurer à la même époque, intitulée *Marcel Proust, sa vie, son œuvre,* parue aux Éditions du Sagittaire, en 1925. En outre, Embiricos possède l'ouvrage de Robert Dreyfus, *Souvenirs sur Marcel Proust, avec des lettres inédites de Marcel Proust,* paru chez Grasset en 1926. Ce livre porte la mention: Andrew L. Embiricos, Nice 5/1/1927. Ces trois volumes sont reliés de la même manière que les œuvres de Proust. Enfin la bibliothèque Embiricos conserve un exemplaire, non relié, du livre d'André Germain, *De Proust à Dada,* publié aux Éditions du Sagittaire en 1924. On y trouve la mention: Andrew L. Embiricos, Nice 18/5/1926.

Sans rien présumer de certain concernant la date à laquelle Andréas Embiricos a pu lire Marcel Proust, j'émettrai l'hypothèse qu'il a dû lire de ses romans entre 1926 et 1928, vu la nature de ses annotations, plus psychologiques et esthétiques que psychanalytiques et littéraires. De plus l'orthographe de θαβμάσιο avec un β nous indiquerait qu'il a lu Proust avant son adhésion au surréalisme. Car, c'est alors qu'Embiricos est revenu à la langue qui lui était «naturelle», — puisqu'il avait reçu toute son éducation en langue savante, — c'est-à-dire qu'il est revenu à la langue «mixte», comme il le précise dans sa déclaration de 1973 à l'Université de Thessalonique[5]. Or c'est vraisemblablement en 1929 que le psychanalyste Frois Wittmann a présenté Embiricos à André Breton[6].

Il semble qu'Embiricos ait délaissé par la suite l'œuvre proustienne, sûrement influencé en cela par le discrédit général manifesté par les surréalistes à l'égard de Proust[7]; quoi qu'il en soit, il n'est apparemment pas fait mention de Proust chez Embiricos. Il est pourtant loisible de penser qu'une lecture aussi attentive de ce grand écrivain par le jeune Andréas a dû laisser des traces profondes dans la sensibilité littéraire et professionnelle d'un Embiricos plus mûr.

Je suis persuadé qu'une étude philologique méthodique prouverait certaines réminiscences des écrits de Proust dans l'œuvre romanesque d'Embiricos, et même dans son œuvre poétique. En guise d'exemple, je me bornerai, en terminant, à suggérer un parallèle possible entre la remarque de Proust concernant la duchesse de Guermantes, dont chaque robe était, écrit-il, «comme la projection d'un aspect particulier de son âme» et le poème d'Andréas Embiricos Τὸ χέρι, écrit en 1934, et publié dans *Ἐνδοχώρα.* Le poète y commence sa deuxième strophe par les vers[8]:

Ἡ ρώμη τέτοιου πάθους πιὰ δὲν χάνεται

Μένει δεμένη στὶς ψυχὲς τῶν φορεμάτων...

[La robustesse d'une telle passion ne passe plus
Elle reste imprégnée dans l'âme des vêtements]

NOTES

1. A. Embiricos, ' Οκτάνα, Athènes, Ikaros, 1980, p. 36-38 et 101-103.

2. H. Michaux a aussi publié **Lointain intérieur** en 1938. J'ai traduit le recueil d'Embiricos ' Ενδοχώρα par **Terre intérieure**, plutôt que par «Arrière-pays». J'ai préféré «terre», à «pays» «région» ou «capitale» [d'une île], pour créer une allitération en français. En outre ce mot évoque la terre natale, la terre promise, les terres inconnues, etc. «Terre!», c'est aussi le cri des découvreurs et des marins après une longue traversée.

3. 'Αφιέρωμα στὸν 'Ανδρέα 'Εμπειρίκο, Χάρτης 17/18, novembre 1985, p. 638.

4. A. Embiricos, ' Ενδοχώρα, Athènes, 1945; réédition Agra, 1980, p. 75-76. Ma traduction de ce poème a été publiée dans le numéro bilingue de la revue Συντέλεια, n° 4-5, printemps-été 1991, p. 11.

5. Χάρτης, 17/18, **op. cit.**, p. 638-639.

6. I.M. Vourtsis, Χρονολόγιο 'Ανδρέα Λ. Ἐμπειρίκου (1901–1985), *Χάρτης* 17/18, **op. cit.**, p. 518.

7. Voir l'introduction de Philippe Michel-Thériet dans: Marcel Proust, **À la recherche du temps perdu**, vol. I, (Collection Bouquins), Paris, Éditions Robert Laffont, 1987, p. 235.

8. A. Embiricos, ' Ενδοχώρα, Agra, 1980, p. 38. Ma traduction dans Συντέλεια, n° 4-5, printemps-été 1991, p. 9.

GREEKS AND BARBARIANS

The Genesis of Hellenic International Thought*

Paris Arnopoulos*

RÉSUMÉ

L'univers hellénique antique constituait un microcosme du système socioculturel au sein de l'environnement géopolitique de la Mediterranée. On pourrait dire la même chose de la société européenne dans son contexte mondial actuel. Il est utile alors de savoir comment les Grecs se percevaient face à d'autres nations. Une telle perception révèle les origines de la pensée internationale classique. L'hypothèse qui suivra se base sur la dichotomie primordiale entre les Grecs et les barbares. Cette dichotomie aurait fourni la base même de l'idéologie internationale hellène. De plus, nous croyons que de telles distinctions affectent le raisonnement de l'homme depuis toujours, et par conséquent, encore aujourd'hui. Même s'il ne faut pas aller trop loin dans l'analogie, il existe pourtant des parallèles bien définis entre le monde classique et le monde contemporain que le lecteur saura reconnaître et apprécier. Afin de vous mettre au parfum de l'époque, cet article puise dans les évènements critiques jusq'au Ve siècle avant Jésus-Christ ainsi que dans leur impact sur les philosophes qui suivront. Ainsi, les idéaux humanistes et cosmopolites de ces mêmes philosophes ont influencé la pensée internationale à travers les siècles.

ABSTRACT

The ancient Hellenic world was a microcosm of a sociocultural system existing within the Mediterranean geopolitical environment, much the same as the European society now exists within its global context. It is then instructive to know how the Greeks saw themselves in relation to other nations. Such perspective gives an idea of the origins of classical international thought. It is our thesis here that the primordial dichotomy between Greeks and barbarians served as the foundation of hellenic international ideology. Moreover, we contend that such distinctions always color human reason and still persist in modern times. Although the analogy should not be carried too far, there are definite parallels between the classical and present worlds which the reader will recognize and appreciate. In order to give the flavor of the times, this article is based on the world shaking events up to the Fifth century BC, and the impact they had upon the great philosophers who came later. Their humanistic and cosmopolitan ideals therefore influenced international thinking through the ages.

Initial International Contacts

Hellenic political thought was determined not only by the existence of a plethora of sovereign city-states in Greece itself, but also by the knowledge of other peoples abroad. These foreign nations formed the environment in which the Greek political system operated and interacted. The Greeks not only con-

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templated the relation of each polis among the others, but also the position of them all in the world at large.

Quite early in their history the Greeks learned to separate interstate from international affairs. The development of a national consciousness was directly related to this separation between the Greek system and its encompassing Mediterranean environment. It is therefore necessary to investigate how the Greeks envisaged their place within the ecoumene.

At the beginning of their history the Greeks had very little contact with the surrounding nations of Europe, Africa and Asia. The sparsely populated Mediterranean littoral ensured that even spreading colonization did not involve international contacts. By the end of the seventh century however when most available lands had been settled, contacts and hence friction increased between the Greeks and other nations.

The sixth century ushered in a new era of intercontinental conflicts among the expanding Greek states and the outlying oriental empires. The first major encounters between Greeks and foreigners took place in Asia Minor, when expanding eastern empires attacked and conquered the Ionian colonies of Greece.[1]

These initial events had momentous repercussions for the international relations of the next two centuries.[2] The subjugation of the Ionian Greeks, first by the Lydians and then by the Persians, set off a chain reaction between the continental Greeks who were trying to liberate their compatriots and the Persians who sought to keep their possessions.[3] The idea of a Greek expedition was first proposed around 500, when Aristagoras of Miletos asked the Spartans to invade Asia Minor to help the Ionians revolt.

Afterwards, although Athenian propaganda depicted the Persians as effeminate, it also raised the spectre of a barbarian peril which only a panhellenic union could repulse. Intermittently from then on, Greco-Persian relations centered around this bone of contention, following a vicious circle of insurrections by the Ionians, interventions by the Greeks, and suppressions by the Persians, repeated many times until Alexander finally put an end to it.

From these adverse events the Greeks first began to form their opinions of other nations. In the previous Helladic era, the Greeks had no knowledge and made no distinction of other peoples. In their semi-isolated condition, they took it for granted that all nations were similar to themselves. Different ways of life could not be imagined, so ignorance served as an indiscriminate equalizer.

With the first contacts however, this naive humanism began to change. The initial hostility of these conflicts engendered fear and distrust between the Greeks and their Asiatic invaders. The few facts about the strangers at the gates were augmented by many rumours and exaggerations which opened a chasm

that evolved into the infamous dichotomy of mankind.

Greek Civilization

The origin of the term *barbaros* is unknown. Homer did not use it at all, and it is not until the fifth century that it was firmly established in literature, as distinctive and mutually exclusive term against that of *Hellene*.[4] Its original meaning of a non-Greek-speaking person was gradually broadened to include many connotations, all of them derogatory. Not being able to understand foreign languages, the Greeks could not sympathize with other cultures. So, as a defense mechanism, they fell into undue exaggeration and overestimation of their own way of life.

The fact that they had a single term to designate so many different nations, indicates the self-absorption of the Greeks and the little interest they had in other cultures. In contrast to the modern anthropological view that in order to understand ourselves we need to know others; the Greeks believed in understanding primarily themselves; others were largely irrelevant. This *gnothe s'auton* principle was very congenial to Greek ethnocentrism, if not xenophobia, and contributed to their substantial disinterest and disdain of other people.[5]

The extant writers of the sixth century have not left any record of interexchange of ideas between Greeks and foreigners; so it is hard to estimate the impact and cross-fertilization that any intercultural relations may have had on either side. In spite of the deep concern the Greeks had for man, they had very little for mankind. Until the Hellenic period, no Greek work deals with the concept of humanity as a whole. In their way of life the Greeks emphasized the differences that separate people and underplayed the similarities uniting them. Thus hostility towards foreigners became one of the most marked features of Greek thought.[6]

Being weaker and poorer materially, compared to the powerful and wealthy empires of Asia, the Greeks realized their precarious position and hence clung to their way of life with great tenacity. The envy of the poor for the rich, accentuated Greek pride for their mental acumen and cultural nobility that surpassed all other people. To make up for their lack of material possessions, the Greeks had to emphasize their spiritual and intellectual values in contrast to the luxurious decadence of their adversaries.[7]

Seeing the wealth and magnificence of the contemporary Asiatic empires, the Greeks had to admit that their states were much inferior. Their claim for superiority was that: on the one hand, they were not over-refined to the point of debility, like the Asiatics; and on the other hand, they were civilized, unlike the savagery of northern European tribes. Since both extremes typified barbarism, the Greeks considered themselves as the "golden mean" reflected in their civilization. Their motto "nothing in excess", made a virtue of necessity and kept them

from the "barbarian vice" or lack of proportion which swamped the individual and smothered his personality.

In addition to these general cultural differences, Greece's single most significant distinction was political. The idea that the Greek-barbarian antithesis was primarily political, was propagated by all Greek thinkers as the core of their arguments. The Greek thought of himself as the only "political animal" in the world; on the contrary, barbarians were either isolated *idiotes* or enslaved masses. Their urbanity made Greeks the only truly civilized people on earth and hence strengthened their sense of superiority over both tribal and imperial societies.

A corollary to political life was the idea of freedom: *eleutheria*. Unlike the barbarian who was a subject, the Greek was a citizen: *polites*. The difference between the two was that of liberty and slavery. No matter how rich and powerful a Persian was, he was still the humble servant of his king; while even the meanest of the Greeks was a free member of an independent community. That is why no Greek could exchange his position, however low, with that of the highest barbarian. In comparison to the political way of life, powerful empires were nothing but massive and oppressive leviathans.

Greek freedom was supposed to be obedience to law, not licence to do as one pleased. That law, moreover, was not the arbitrary command of a master, but the result of human reason. Thus the Greek obeyed consciously his own convictions, whereas the barbarian followed blindly someone else's orders. The laws of Greece were based on persuasion by dialogue, whereas those of the barbarians upon the fear of a superior's personal wishes enforced by sanctions.[8]

These attitudes developed gradually among educated Greeks as the pressure from Persia was increasing. By the end of the sixth century the Greeks saw their world as an oasis of order and civilization in the expanding desert of chaos and barbarism. As such they felt themselves as the defenders of the highest values of occidental liberalism from the threat of oriental despotism. So, as the trustees of light against the forces of darkness, the Greeks became the champions of Western civilization and the enemies of Eastern imperialism.[9]

Yet, towards the Greeks, the Persians had none of the race hatred that makes international conflict inexplicable. Although they had no less pride than the Greeks, they managed to combine it with respect for the customs of others, something of a unique synthesis for that time.[10] The main source of their incompatibility with the Greeks was their opposing systems of government. Hellenism was suspect because it undermined the loyalty of their subjects and subverted the *status quo*. Greco-Persian hostility was thus a combination of power politics and political ideology.[11]

World War

The Persians were not the only barbarians who threatened Greece. Along with their Persian encounters, the Greeks met and clashed with another great power: Carthage. As the Ionian Greeks were fighting for their freedom in the East, the Sicilian Greeks were similarly engaged in the West. By the end of the sixth century the lines had been drawn for the decisive battles that were to determine the fate of Hellenism for a century.

Although their enemies were closing in from both sides, the Greeks were confident of the final victory of their cause. Believing that they belonged to a community of gods who sponsored their freedom, they were prepared to fight against any odds to resist foreign subjugation.[12]

Unlike their antagonist however, the Greeks were not united, therefore they could not agree on a single defense or foreign policy.[13] The problem of how to coordinate a united front against the barbarians thus plagued the city-states throughout their history. The same causes that prevented them from political integration also hindered a defense organization, thus increasing their handicap in facing external pressures.

This exaggerated spirit of independence kept Greeks divided, since no one preferred subordination to a central authority over servitude under the barbarians. If anything, the opposite might easily be said, because many of them chose security under the Persians rather than sympolity with other Greeks.[14]

It is perhaps significant that the only extant opinions of the father of philosophy on the subject of politics, deal precisely with Hellenic unity. Thales, the sage of Miletus, thought that the only way for Greeks to keep their freedom was to confederate their defense and foreign policies under a single government. The same principle was reiterated by the historian Hecateus, who told the Ionians that without adequate preparation and coordination, any resistance to Persia was doomed to failure.[15]

The only alternative the Greeks had to federation was emigration. Bios of Priene must have realized the impossibility of union among the Greeks, when he advised them to sail west to Sardinia and there re-establish themselves in a single colony. The good advice of these thinkers, however, went unheeded and so their predictions came true. One colony after another fell to the Persians, until all were subjugated in turn. Theognes of Attica provided the eulogy for these fallen colonies and lamented that Greek disunity would ultimately lead to their slavery (Frags. 756-82).

After the loss of their overseas colonies, which they hardly did anything to prevent,[16] the mainland Greeks waited until the eleventh hour before deciding for the first and last time to unite temporarily to meet their common foe.[17] The

battles of Salamis in Greece proper and Himera in Sicily proved what the Greeks could do all together. Their victory in this two-front war against both Persians and Carthagenians was no mean achievement. It stabilized the balance of power in the Mediterranean and provided the Greeks in the middle sufficient space and time to develop their civilization.

Herodotus, the great historian of these wars, depicted the momentous impact that struggle had for the Greeks. As one of them, he saw the war as a clash of opposites: *hubris* and *sophrosune*, slavery and freedom, tyranny and democracy.[18] He, like the other Greeks, was convinced that their victory was proof positive that their gods chose them as the highest embodiment of human culture. The Hellenic way of life was not only their exclusive prerogative, but also the gift of Greece to the world.[19]

Greek literature abounds with allusions to these ideas. Pindar of Thebes, the last of the great lyric poets, in his *Odes,* glorified the heroic deeds that proved the superiority of Hellenic culture over all others. Aeschylus, the first of the dramaturges, praised the men who defended Greece against the unworthy barbarians, as the most honored of men.[20] His version of the *Persae* represents the first expression of orientalism in European literature, wherein the asiatics are depicted as effeminate and corrupt, in contrast to the brave Greeks whose pride for their achievements knew no bounds and colored their thinking for a long time afterwards.

As a result, the fear and awe which the sixth century Greeks had for the formidable and mysterious barbarians turned into contempt and ridicule by their fifth century epigones. Having come into contact with them in the battlefield and utterly defeating them, the Greeks judged the barbarians on military merits and found them wanting. From that single instance, they generalized and confirmed their earlier suspicions of barbarian inferiority and Greek superiority in all respects.

Greek thinkers tried to explain and rationalize the apparently miraculous salvation of Greece and the cultural renaissance that followed it in terms of natural principles. Heraclitus, the obscure philosopher of Ephesus, was first to generalize on the nature of conflict. Perhaps elated by the outcome of the Persian Wars, he formulated the hypothesis that conflict was the ultimate test of human qualities. War, he said, "is common to all things, the father and king of them all." International conflict is therefore the highest court of justice which decides between superior and inferior, free and slave, its verdict is the life or death of entire states and empires.[21]

This theory of conflict was not one of chaotic violence. The Hereclitian *eris* was tied with the general theory of *logos* through the concept of *nomos*. This cosmic triad of conflict-reason-law, became the core of his philosophy. It implied that even violence should be carried out according to logical and

defined rules. In the external relations of states, these principles helped formulate natural reason, upon which what later became international law was based.

The ideas of Heraclitus were especially influential in the development of a Hellenic code of the law of war. His initial attempts to rationalize and limit violence opened up new fields of speculation among the thinkers of the fifth century. One might even say that Greek thought on international affairs really begins with him.

Supplementing the Heraclitian theory of polemology, another thinker developed a theory of ethnology to explain the differences between Greeks and barbarians. Hippocrates, the father of medicine, proposed that the natural environment determines national character. In a treatise on *Airs, Waters, Lands,* he expounded the physiological theory of climatic and environmental determinism. Asiatics and Africans are stupefied and debilitated because their torrid climate makes them so, whereas Europeans are hardy and rough because of their cold and harsh climate. On the basis of their physis, their nomoi are different, thus compounding the distinctions of nature with nurture.

This Hippocratian doctrine was, of course, a corollary of the Greek principle of the Golden Mean. Both were very appealing to Greeks because they placed them in an enviable position where they had the best of both worlds. By rooting cultural differences on nature, the Greeks came to regard their superiority as permanent and fundamental. Thus, ecological environmentalism became the standard theory of classical anthropology.[22]

The last great thinker who completed the Hellenic concepts on international affairs was Herodotus of Halicarnassus. Not only was he a historian but also an anthropologist. His astute powers of observation made him a great student of social customs and ways of life. Living in Ionia, the crossroads of many civilizations, he could compare many different traditions and thus recognize the cultural relativity of human beliefs and actions.[23]

Being a Persian subject of a cosmopolitan city in Asia Minor, Herodotus developed his unusual interests by extensive travels in the course of which he came in contact with many cultures. His wide experience taught him to respect and even admire many exotic traits. In his writings he showed an extraordinary understanding for what other Greeks considered outrageous and outlandish.[24]

The comparative studies of Herodotus, more than anything else, opened the eyes of Greeks to the outside world. Through his writings, the cultural enlightentment of Ionia spread to the Greek mainland. His many anecdotes of different customs made his readers realize that their own traditions were by no means natural. When Herodotus echoed Pindar's famous epigram: "Naturally, custom rules everywhere" (III,3 8); he implied that what is obvious and unquestionable in one culture may be unheard of and outrageous in another.

By the middle of the fifth century, all these new ideas began to change the simplistic black and white picture that the older Greeks had of foreigners. The widespread ignorance of the past gave way to an insatiable curiosity for the customs of far-away cultures. Following Herodotus, other Greeks gathered and disseminated information about foreign societies, thus dispelling old prejudices and revising hoary stereotypes. The return to peace and the normalization of international relations after the Persian Wars improved the socio-economic conditions of Greece and thus prepared the ultimate flowering of its civilization. The critical outlook that resulted from cultural relativism thus helped set the pattern for later and more sophisticated theories.[25]

One of the most lasting effects of the new ethnographic information was in the development of ethical relativism. By questioning what everyone had taken for granted so far, the educated Greeks of the fifth century started a major philosophical argument which came to be known as the *nomos-physis* controversy.[26]

Natural Principles & Political Laws

Since the Helladic ages the relationship between nature and culture was that the latter represented the explicit order -*taxis* - of humanity, whereas the former reflected an implicit order of the *cosmos*. On that basis, man-made law was coeval with society and existed only within the polis. Outside it, physical nature was chaotic and unpredictable. The *nomos* of the polis reflected human reason and civilized existence in the midst of the wilderness of *physis*.

This idea prevailed when states and nations were isolated and thus thought of themselves as representative of humanity. But with the increase of international relations and the spread of information, state laws came to be seen for what they were: the products of particular cultures and circumstances. It was at this point that the nomos-physis controversy sought to find a new way to explain the authority of law and guide the relations between states.

One of the strongest justifications for any culture was to claim that it was natural; based on universal absolute and necessary principles, rather than human idiosyncracy or local peculiarity. The central purpose of the Greek debate was to find if such absolute principles could be found, in view of the relativity of human laws and customs. The considerable thought given to this problem ultimately reversed the traditional opinions which the Greeks had concerning nature and culture.

By the latter half of the fifth century, the partisans of natural law had largely succeeded in discrediting traditional law as a rational principle. The most advanced thinkers of the time discarded common law as artificial and parochial and in its place they elevated natural law as the superior criterion of ethics. Nature now became the entire process of growth and universal order, while cul-

ture was merely custom and convention. The world thus followed only a single physis within which existed a myriad of nomoi.

This new interpretation coupled with the other novel theories already covered, revolutionized international thought. The fifth century naturalists accepted the Heraclitian doctrine of *logos-eris-nomos* as a view according to which the order of nature was maintained by the resolution of human differences through conflict. This interpretation developed into a sort of natural selection theory of the survival of the fittest which identified might with right and power with justice.

In world affairs, this ethical relativism meant that every state could determine for itself right and wrong, as long as it was able to uphold and enforce its will upon others. The criterion of state conduct became capability. As long as a state could get others to accept its point of view by any means, that view was right. In the final analysis, ethical was whatever could be accepted by public opinion: *koine doxa*.[27]

The classical illustration of this theory is associated with Callicles and Thrasymachos.[28] For them the law of nature applies to two dissimilar realms: the animal kingdom and international affairs. It is because nations, like animals, exist in a state of unmitigated conflict, that self-interest is the only criterion of ethics. This morality allows the strong to attack and subjugate the weak. "A state may do whatever it can" becomes the general principle of action in world affairs.[29]

In a famous example regarding the operation of natural law, Callicles pointed out Greco-Persian relations. The only rule that the kings of Persia recognized was that might makes right. How else could the invasion of Xerxes against Greece or that of Darios against Scythia be justified but by the natural right of the strong over the weak. It was the ultimate success or failure of these enterprises of power politics, and not any moral principles, that decided who was right and who was wrong.

Callicles and Thrasymachus, who were responsible for the development and the propagation of these ideas were early adherents of the notorious school of Sophism, whose first and foremost representative was Protagoras of Abdera. His terse dictum: "Man is the measure of all things," best exemplifies their ethical relativism which characterized sophisticated thinking throughout the centuries.[30]

Basing his argument on his ethical dictum, Protagoras in the *Thetenos (172a)* concluded that no state could claim for its policies a higher right than any other. Only in matters of national interests could one state claim better judgement than the next. In the absence of a higher authority, each state was to judge its own case and set its own standards.

By reiterating the Pindarian epigram, the sophists identified popular morality with conventions and thereby contributed to the development of the classical theory of social contract.[31] Morality, they said, like legality, was a creation of the social contract of each state, hence it did not exist in nature. Since the principles of morality could not be applied to international affairs, true friendship could not exist between Greeks and barbarians. [32]

In spite of their relativism, the sophists admitted the advantage of having some common rules in international relations. Even if morality was only an intrastate phenomenon, the self-interest of each one required orderly intercourse between them. A procedural international law was thus necessary as well as sufficient for interstate order. As Empedocles of Akragas thought: whatever was lawful encompassed the world; and as Hippias of Elis believed: all nations partook in the same international law.[33]

Thus, out of the sophistic arguments grew the idea that Greeks and barbarians, their different customs not withstanding, came under a common international law. From this first step towards world law came the idea of a common humanity, embracing within it all nations.

Sophistic Humanism

The atmosphere of critical and skeptical inquiry developed in Greece after the Persian Wars included the demand for more popular education. The fulfilment of this demand was supplied by the sophists: the itinerant traveling teachers, social researchers and writers. They not only taught practical subjects but also originated many iconoclastic ideas, including ethical relativism and humanism.

Since the sophists were the world travelers of their day, roaming from poleis to ethnoi, they cross-fertilized many cultures with foreign news and notions. Often, they participated officially in international diplomacy by acting as messengers, negotiators and mediators between states. They could thus be seen as the diplomatic corps of the ancient world as well as its foreign correspondents.

Hippias of Elis was perhaps the embodiment of sophism. Among many other things, he was also a politician and a diplomat. In his latter capacity he conducted a good deal of top-level interstate negotiations. As an expert in the art of diplomacy, he only undertook the most difficult or delicate commissions, usually heading large missions to international conferences.

For his many talents, Hippias was extraordinary even among the Sophists. He was familiar with both Greek and barbarian customs, languages, and ideas. Among his works was *The Nomenclature of Peoples,* a comparative anthropological study in which he expressed himself very favorably towards the barbarians.

In his studies, Hippias reasoned that although men differed in their customs and laws, they were of similar nature. All men, he thought, were held together by common bonds due to their common humanity which was stronger than their superficial differences. From that, he concluded, different nationalities could live together in the same community, so heterogeneous states were quite possible.

Here we have then the idea that the polis was not the only way of civilized life, larger political units could be planned on the basis of human equality. In many surviving fragments of sophistic works, one can discern a continuous and pronounced tolerant and humanitarian outlook that is lacking in other Greek writers. In spite of their somewhat negative reputation then, the sophists widened Greek horizons and taught their compartiotes to understand and even appreciate foreigners.[34]

As peacetime contacts with other nations increased through travel and trade, Greek exclusiveness weakened and something of an internationalist movement began to form. The most advanced liberals of the day saw no reason why mankind should end in the frontiers of Greece. The sophistic idea of a common humanity transcending the distinctions of race and culture must have some appeal to the educated public of the fifth century, since we meet it time and again in many quarters.

Unlike the unveiled contempt towards the barbarians that one finds in many philosophical works of the fourth century, most popular writers of the fifth were egalitarians. Callecles thought that slavery went contrary to natural law, Alcidamas claimed that "God made everyone free, nature made none a slave" Archelaus of Miletos, like Hippias, carried out comparative ethnological observations with similar conclusions.

Antiphon of Athens, in his *Truth* denied any differences between Greeks and barbarians altogether, arguing that everybody was alike -*homoios* - by nature. Being a sophisticated anthropologist, he ridiculed many traditional beliefs including the axiom of Greek superiority. Anaxagoras, the friend of Pericles, considered the whole world as his country[35] and Democritus, the great atomist, transcended the limits of his nation by stating that to the wise man every land is open and the whole earth is his home.[36]

Thucydides carried on the work of Herodotos and Hippocrates by combining environmental and evolutionary factors of human development. His theory was that originally by nature all men were similar, living around the same region and under the same conditions. The differences arose as migrations separated them in various environments and thus changed their rates of development.

It was after living in the Mediterranean climate for many generations that the people who settled there evolved into Greeks, whereas the barbarians who

stayed behind remained in their primitive state. ''Ancient Greeks lived like modern barbarians,'' said Thucydides (I, 6, 5); but by an evolutionary process, they perfected themselves. On the other hand some Greeks who lived under the same conditions as the barbarians soon became like barbarians. It is thus the accidents of geography and climate and not any inherent superiority that makes Greeks different from other nations.

The Athenian playwrights, as well, echoed other intellectuals in their cosmopolitanism. Sophocles in the *Antigone* championed a wider view of human rights and duties and in *Ajax* protested against unwarranted prejudice towards the barbarians. Euripides in the *Media,* pointed out that barbarians could also be good and Greeks bad, and in many of his other plays he often depicted some barbarians as being superior to Greeks in many respects. Finally however, the tragedians for all their efforts, failed to instill in their fellow Greeks any other view of humanity than the traditional binary "we-they" taxonomy: i.e. free-slave, citizen-alien, Greek-barbarian.[37]

By the end of the century then Greek concepts on world affairs had come a long way from the naive opinions based on ignorance to the sophisticated theories based on substantial knowledge. From these humanistic and international ideas of the fifth century ultimately grew the cosmopolitan ideas of world unity of the third century. Intermediately, however, during the fourth century, although this tradition was carried on by a few radical thinkers like the cynics, the two main philosophical schools of Plato and Aristotle remained true to the traditional dichotomy.[38]

Although the sophistic ideas ultimately contributed to Alexandrian transnationalism, Hellenistic stoicism and ultimately the *Pax Romana*; their immediate effect was to unsettle venerable traditions, question social values and upset moral principles. Before the new concepts could be transformed into a positive ethic of humanity, they left an ideological vacuum in which naked power devolved as the central criterion. Thus by undermining the foundations of the traditional political system, these laudable ideas contributed to the decay of Hellenic society and helped unleash a century of violence and deprivation.

NOTES

1. The Trojan War was only later characterized as the first encounter when it was used as an excuse by the Persians for their invasion of Greece. (Plato, **Laws,** 685c-e).

2. According to Herodotos (I, 6 & 14) Greek-barbarian relations began in the reign of Croesus (c. 550 BC). The Lydian king had established diplomatic relations with the mainland Greeks and was a great admirer of their culture. He treated his Greek subjects well and left them complete autonomy. Before

Croesos, however, the Persian king Gyges (c. 650 BC), was the first barbarian to consult the Delphic oracle. Yet politically the Persians did not come into contact with the Greeks until after they defeated the Lydians in between.

3. The Persians were hard taskmasters. They abolished the autonomy of the Ionian colonies and incorporated them into their satrapies.(Herodotus, 5, 49)

4. The common disjunctive phrase the Greeks used to indicate the Greek-barbarian antithesis was: *e ellenes, e barbaroi.* (Strabo, XIV,9).

5. Tolerance was never a quality highly esteemed by the Greeks. (Cf. Randal, 2; Toynbee, xxv; Sinclair, 180; Diller, 18).

6. The only negative feelings the Greeks were spared were violent nationalism and racism. (Cf. Zimmern, 372; Baldry,1-4; Oliver, 142).

7. Etymologically, "barbarian" is an onomatopaea, meaning "one who speaks gibberish". Thus the barbarians were without *logos*, i.e. speechless and irrational. (Cf. Arendt, 23, 214; Sabine, 18; Haarhoff, 62; Thompson, 60)

8. Theirs was not to reason why, but only follow orders. This justified them being slaves to the Greeks and subjects to their masters. (Jouguet, 68; Sinclair, 74; Ashley, 15).

9. As early as the seventh century, Anaximander had divided the world into *Europe* and *Asia*. (Livinston, 327; Thompson, 136; Pohlenz,16; Hero. I,4).

10. The Persians treated foreigners as they did their own subjects; and apart from the Persian Wars, their relations with Greeks were continuous and often amicable. For a time, Susa was the meeting place of many Greek expatriates. (Jarde, 267-268).

11. The East-West conflict is illustrated in the famous Darius Vase. On it is depicted the Euro-Asian antithesis as a struggle between western culture and eastern barbarism. (Oliver,120; Thompson,84; Zimmern,268).

12. *Zeus Eleutherios* was worshiped as the Liberator of the Greeks from the barbarians, and along with *Zeus Soter* protected the Hellenic world in international affairs. (Pindar, 305; Oliver, 137).

13. It was said that Persia and Carthage, via Phoenicia, had synchronized their attacks on Greece. The trade competition by the Greeks was beginning to drive them out the Mediterranean, so they had to pool their resources in a concerted action. (Hero.II,39; III,139; IV,103: Pindar, **Pyth**, 175ff; Knorringa, iv).

14. The failure of the Greeks to conceive of representative democracy, hindered them from creating large viable states of extended citizenship. (Pohlenz, 18; Thuc. III,10.3).

15. Thales made his proposal at the Pan-Ionic Congress of 540. The sage is also credited with the discovery of an important principle of international affairs,

when he advised the Greeks to ally with their distant enemies the Persians in order to fight their immediate threat the Lydians. (Anderson, 138; Hero.I,170; Freeman,14; Caldwell, 58).

16. First by diplomatic protests and then by a weak expeditionary force, Greek intervention in Asia Minor did not do anything but arouse the hostility of the Persians who claimed retribution by invading Greece later on.

17. The *Synedrion* of *Probuloi*, or Representative Assembly which met in the Isthmus, 480 BC, was the only pan-hellenic political decision-making body to take such momentous actions as the battle of Salamis, thus ending once and for all the Persian threat to Greece. It should be noted that the Assembly did not represent all Greek states. Many poleis remained neutral and a few even joined the Persians. (Ehrenberg,107; Jarde,279).

18. Some modern scholars agree with the Greeks, that they were indeed fighting for Western civilization. (Sinclair, 39; Thompson, 10).

19. This conviction of the Greeks, seems to have passed on to the Europeans of modern times. (Sabine, 65; Bowra,12).

20. Aeschylos painted stirring pictures of war in Homeric proportions. Having participated in the wars himself, he regarded his deeds as the most worthy of his life in his **Suppliants**. Yet he pitied the tragedy of Xerxes in the **Persae**, whose dream to harness Europe and Asia to his chariot had failed so miserably. (Atossa's Dream, 181-7).

21. "Justice is strife", said Heraclitos, "and all things come through strife and necessity." (Diels, Frs. 53-4; 2; 24; 80; 121; Caldwell, 79; Sinclair, 30; Baldry, 22-23).

22. Hippocrates: **Aeres**, 16; Also Kohn, 114; Diller, 15.

23. Ionia was the birthplace of scientific thought, because, as Aristotle noted, it was the first society to attain leisure. (Toulmin).

24. Herodotos always shows a lively admiration for non-Greeks. (Myres, 121-168; Wells, 95-111; Baldry, 21; Randall, 2; Agard, 155).

25. The Greeks began to learn of the outside world from the writings of Xenophanes in the late sixth century. Anaximander of Miletos at the same time drew up the first atlas of the world. Hecateus of Miletos, early in the fifth century, wrote a **Description of the World** based on the latest information. In it were included references to the political systems of Assyria, Media, and Persia among others. (Anderson,181; Baldry,17,24; Sabine 22).

26. In spite of the disbelief Herodotos created in many quarters and the questioned veracity of his sources, enough people took him seriously to debate the implications of his findings. (Randall,3).

27. On the nomos-physis controversy cf: Barker, 29; Sinclair, 48, 53;

Untersteiner, 304-310; Webster, 56.

28. Our knowledge of these men comes from Plato. Both appear in many dialogues, but the particular example of Callicles is from **Gorgias**, 482e-483d.

29. Thucydides later expressed much the same views (IV,61.5; V,105.2). (Webster, 61).

30. The famous epigram was in Protagoras' book **Peri Politeias**, the first of many other works of the same title including Plato's **Republic**. (Livingstone, 111).

31. Archelaos, the naturalist, thought that right and wrong existed only by convention and not by nature; and Alcidamas concurred with Herodotus in placing custom at the base of morality. Finally Xenophon identified justice only with legality.(Barker,36; Sinclair,51,170).

32. Euripides, **Hecuba**, 1199-1201; Livy, xxxi, 29; Jarde, 246.

33. Fragment 135. Herodotos even castigated the Spartans for breaking international law when they killed the Persian envoys who had been sent to demand their submission.(VII,136; VI48). It was statements like these that earned him the epithet of barbarophile. (See also Note 24). (Baldry 28; Caldwell,47).

34. Although many of the things the sophists said were quite controversial to say the least, they did not always merit the bad reputation they had, nor were they as ruthless as they are often presented to be. Cf. Thucidides V, 86-111. For Plato's opinion see **Hippias Major**, 281a-b; **Timaeus**, 19e; **Protagoras** 337d. Also Anderson, 172; Arendt, 51; Barker, 33; Baldry, 42; Caldwell, 48; Ebenstein, 47; Jaeger, II, 73; Konuitz, 27; Levinson, 215; Pohlenz, 32; Roberts, 256; Webster, 56.

35. Like Herodotos, Anaxagoras was also accused for medism. In his case the Athenian Assembly forced him into exile. (Anderson,155; Baldry,29).

36. Democritos of Abdera, was the only Greek philosopher to praise democracy without reservation. His doctrine of *omonoia* was the harmony of interests that bonded a community and its absence was the reason of wars among them (Fr.250). (Sinclair, 65; Freeman, 124; Baldry, 58).

37. Euripides anticipated later cosmopolitanism by saying that the noble spirit has the world as his country (Fr.1047). Nonetheless, in **Iphigenia in Aulis**, 1400-1, he stated that the Greeks had the right to rule over the barbarians. (Baldry,32-3, 36, 45-50; 52; Morrow, 127; Roberts, 30; Webster, 63).

38. On this subject, see two articles by this author: "Platonic Ideas on International Affairs" **Hellenic Review of International Relations**. Vol. 2, No. 1 (1981); "Aristotelian Thought on World Affairs." **Skepsis**, Athens, 1994.

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DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION 939 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council et its 3412th meeting, on 29 July 1994

The Security Council,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629) and his letter of 28 June 1994 (S/1994/785), concerning his mission of good offices,

Reaffirming, in this context, that the confidence-building measures, while not an end in themselves, nor a substitute for the wider political process, would offer significant benefits to both communities and would facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement,

Recalling the acceptance in principle by both parties of the confidence-building measures, and **welcoming** the acceptance by the leader of the Greek Cypriot Community of the 21 March 1994 "Draft ideas for implementing the package of confidence-building measures" (S/1994/785, annex), and **welcoming also** the considerable progress towards agreement made by the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, as described in the Secretary-General's letter of 28 June 1994,

Noting that there is now a substantial measure of agreement on the substance of the confidence-building measures and the modalities for their implementation, but also **noting with concern** that neither leader is yet prepared to proceed to their implementation on the basis outlined in the Secretary-General's letter of 28 June 1994,

Having studied the options and ideas for future action set out in paragraphs 57 to 62 of the Secretary-General's report of 30 May 1994,

1. **Reiterates** that the maintenance of the status quo is unacceptable;

2. **Reaffirms** its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a state of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;

3. **Requests** the Secretary-General to begin consultations with members of the Council, with the Guarantor Powers, and with the two leaders in Cyprus with a view to undertaking a fundamental and far-reaching reflection on ways of approaching the Cyprus problem in a manner that will yield results, and reiterates its call to the parties to demonstrate their commitment by cooperating fully to this end;

4. **Urges,** in this context, the parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to achieve agreement on the modalities for implementing the confidence-building measures at the earliest possible time;

5. **Also requests** the Secretary-General to submit a report by the end of October 1994 including a program for achieving an overall solution to the issues involved in the Cyprus problem following his consultations referred to in paragraph 3 above and on progress made towards the implementation of the confidence-building measures;

6. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter;

GREEK IDENTITY IN SECOND-GENERATION MONTREALERS

Vassos Vasiliou*

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude qualitative exploratoire de l'identité grecque de la seconde génération des Grecs de Montréal est basée sur quatre entrevues; deux avec des hommes et deux avec des femmes. Les thèmes qui émergent, soit la famille, la religion, la Koinotita (Communauté hellénique), la politique, la langue, les traditions familiales et l'origine ethnique se révèlent primordiaux dans le développement de l'identité grecque. Les résultats de cette étude suggèrent que les thèmes qui donnent un sens positif à l'identité grecque peuvent aussi bien avoir un impact négatif. Les hommes et les femmes tendent vers des rôles plus égalitaires que leurs parents immigrants mais doivent faire face à des problèmes d'identité. Ainsi, malgré ses différences avec la première génération, la seconde génération se développe et affirme directement son identité grecque distincte à travers son expérience propre à Montréal. Enfin, un modèle du "soi" de la seconde génération est présenté et les implications qu'il engendre, ainsi que les conclusions de la présente recherche, utiles aux travailleurs sociaux, sont abordés.

ABSTRACT

This qualitative exploratory social work study on Greek identity in second-generation Greek Montrealers is based on four interviews; two with men and two with women. The emerging themes of parenting, religion, Koinotita (Greek community) politics, language, family tradition and gender issues were identified as central to the development of Greek identity. The findings suggest that the themes that give positive meaning to Greek identity in the second generation may also have a negative impact. Both men and women tend toward more egalitarian gender roles than their immigrant parents and are struggling with feminine and masculine identity issues. Despite the differences between first and second generation, the second generation tends to develop and assert their distinct Greek identity directly through the distillation of their contextual experiences in Montreal. An interactional model of "self" in the second generation is presented and implications of this and the findings for social workers are explored.

Introduction

I believe that good social work practice is ethno-sensitive. Therefore, social workers need to have knowledge and an awareness of their client's cultural background. An ethno-sensitive response to individual and family suffering implies an immersion into foreign symbols and thought-systems. My hope is that the research findings will assist the social worker in conceptualizing and assessing the difficulties of the second generation, and in planning appropriate interventions with them.

I am a thirty-six year old second-generation Greek male whose parents are from Cyprus. My parents arrived to Canada as immigrants in May, 1957 due to civil and political unrest and I was born in July, 1957.

*This article is based on the Master of Social Work Thesis deposited at McGill University October 1993

The soul search for my Greek identity has been convoluted and schizoid in nature. I have been torn between the dominant culture and values, and the Greek culture, heritage, values, language and customs that I have learned at home. If I have arrived at any realization, it is my unequivocal belief that being Greek is first and foremost a personal and emotional identification with my roots and selected aspects of my culture: history, language, religion, the arts or mythology. The point that makes this realization most clear to me is the underlying premise that people cannot deny me my Greekness when I claim it - it is a truism..

The Problem

This research study is devoted to conceptualizing the patterns of behaviour and the notions of Greek identity in second-generation Greek Montrealers. My struggle is in trying to balance personal, social, religious and political views and examine how they have been modified to fit into Montreal society.

Methodology

This exploratory qualitative study is based on four semi-structured interviews (Burgess, 1982a, 1982b; Whyte, 1982). The second-generation Greek subjects are two women and two men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five. A pilot interview was also completed with my thirty-four year old sister. The purpose of the pilot interview was to obtain a woman's perspective of the interview questions and topic. The rationale for choosing this design and sample is based on my belief that since the study is exploratory, extensive interviewing is not necessary to access descriptive in-depth data. In this particular study, I sacrifice breadth for depth in order to gather a sense of the dominant themes (Lofland, 1971).

An Interactional Model


The interactional model illustrated in Figure 1 is partly adopted from Marsella et al. (1985) and was created following the completion of this manuscript. It has been modified to reflect the reality of the second-generation self in general. The purpose of the model is to provide the reader with an overview of the factors and dynamics that influence the identity of the second generation.

The model suggests that the self is a repository of external and internal influences which interacts with any given situation and results in adaptive or non-adaptive behaviour. The manner in which the self interacts with these external and internal factors determines the level of integration into the host society or the level of membership into the culture of origin.

External influences are represented by various institutions (e.g. familial, educational, political, religious and economic) of both the host society and traditional culture, as well as the physical environment (e.g. geography, weather, vegetation and urbanization). These influences interact with each other and have

a combined "push" and "pull" impact on the self. Internal influences are represented by various values, beliefs, attitudes and world-views, as well as biological factors (e.g. race, colour, health and other physical attributes). These influences also interact with each other and have a "push" and "pull" accumulative effect on the self.

Figure 1 An interactional model for understanding the second-generation self



I. Literature Review

A. Immigrating Greeks From Greece: A Brief Historical and Contextual Background

The purpose of this section is to familiarize the reader with the conditions, attitudes, values, behaviour and traditions of the Greeks from Greece. Their social, political, religious and family comportment will form the back-drop against which I will begin to examine the reality of the second-generation Greek Montrealer.

Gavaki (1983) suggests that the conditions that stimulated immigration to Canada arose after the Greek War of Independence from the Turks in 1821. The 400 years of Ottoman rule and subjugation tempered the will of the Greeks and fostered a great love for and dependence on the family and Greek Orthodox Church; these became symbols of the survival of tradition and the integrity of the people.

Between 1900 and 1920, approximately 370,000 (mostly young Greek males) immigrated to the United States looking for a better economic life than the one they had in Greece. Most of these poor immigrants were unskilled and uneducated labourers from rural regions. Due to xenophobic and classist attitudes of American authorities, the entrance of Greek immigrants was curbed; those turned away found an outlet to Canada (Gavaki, 1983; Primpas-Welts, 1982).

It was after World War II and the Civil War in Greece of 1950-1967 that the majority of Greeks immigrated to Canada: 1957 marks the greatest number in the 1950's, totalling 5,631, of which 2,581 went to Quebec; 1967 marks the greatest number in the 1960's, totalling 10,650 of which 3,642 went to Quebec. According to the 1981 official census, the total number of Greeks living in Quebec stood at 49,420. Bombas (1985a) asserts that the total Greek immigrant population by 1981 in Quebec reached approximately 75,000-80,000.

The economic and political conditions in Greece in the 1950's and 1960's were characterized by poverty, destitution and socio-political unrest. The hope of many Greek immigrants was to travel to a host country and earn enough material wealth and money so that they could go back to Greece to live a respectable, proud and comfortable life. Some have managed to complete this objective, but for most this hope of making a fortune and returning to Greece has faded away. The immigrants who have decided to stay are either doing well economically or are struggling to provide for their families. In both cases there is a yearning to go back to the homeland and find spiritual peace and comfort. Greek immigrants of Canada arrived to their host country with a variety of traditions, values, attitudes and beliefs. Chimbos (1980), Primpas-Welts (1982), Gavaki (1983), Constantinides (1983) and Kolyvaki (1985) stress the

importance of the family and the family structure as an integral part of being Greek. The family, according to Chimbos, has been shaped by the Greek Orthodox traditions, the rural nature of Greece and the continuous political instability after 1821. The most important features of the Greek traditional family have been its patrilineal, patriarchal and authoritarian nature. The Greek family and kinship systems were social and political networks whose implicit obligations and responsibilities helped form family solidarity, pride and honour (Primpas-Welts, 1982; Chimbos, 1980; Pinderhughes, 1987).

For the traditional Greek the importance of marriage, baptism, holy communion, the Greek language and sense of community cannot be overstated. Holidays, such as Easter, the annual March 25th Greek Independence parade, and rural community wine festivals revolve around and are sanctioned by the Greek Orthodox Church.

With respect to Greek parents and children, native Greek parents demand and exercise familial control over their children. They perceive that the majority of Canadian children enjoy "unnecessary" freedom and do not have sufficient respect for their parents, elders and persons in authority (Chimbos, 1980). Greek children, although controlled and disciplined in an authoritarian manner, are generally the centre of attention and interest in the family. The child's early life often involves a high degree of interaction, affection and association with parents, grandparents, godparents, relatives and close friends (Chimbos, 1980).

Sex roles for traditional Greeks are highly stereotyped with the division of labour being clearly delineated. Men work to provide and women cater to men's desires, care for their children and are responsible for household chores. Virginity for women at marriage is the norm and is an extension of the father's degree of honour and pride. Young men, however, are generally free to explore their sexuality without accruing family shame or dishonour (Chimbos, 1980; Gavaki, 1983).

B. Historical and Contextual Background of Montreal Greeks

The Greek community of Montreal was established in 1906 with the earliest recorded Greek immigrants arriving in 1843. Between 1843 and 1906 the Greek immigrants established themselves in the Old Port area of Montreal. They were mostly merchants and businessmen who sought a better economic life than they had in Greece (Chimbos, 1980; Constantinides, 1983). Four years after the establishment of the Greek community, Annunciation Church was constructed and inaugurated with the efforts of community labour and funds (Constantinides, 1983; Halkias, 1985).

The split between Monarchists and Democrats in the early 1920's in Greece politically divided the Greeks of Montreal. In likewise fashion, the Democrats of Montreal split from the original Greek community and founded the new Holy Trinity Church in 1925. Although both churches had schools and espoused

essentially the same religious beliefs, the political schism was irreconcilable for approximately six years (Constantinides, 1983; Halkias, 1985).

In 1931 the unity of the communities was re-established through Archbishop mediation; Holy Trinity Church was chosen as the new site due to its larger size and Annunciation Church was sold. By 1951 there were 3,388 Greeks in Quebec compared with 1981 figures of approximately 80,000 (Bombas, 1985a). Their original settlement area in Montreal, known as the Old Port and Chinatown, formed a network of social, residential and employment security. Gradually, they expanded to Saint-Louis-du-Parc in the 1950's and to Park Extension in 1967 (Ioannou, 1983; Constantinides, 1983).

The mass exodus from Greece in the 1950's and 1960's was a post WWII phenomenon. The majority of these immigrants had little, if any, formal education, or knowledge of English or French. The 1967 military Junta in Greece took political power by force. The ensuing political polarization of the entire Greek nation once more had its parallel effects on Montreal's Greek community. The church, backed by the Junta, was pitted against the secular Greek community. Political activism on the part of Montreal Greeks was focused against this alliance and called for a separation of church and community in politics (Bombas, 1985a).

The reconciliation of the church power and community in 1974 marked the beginning period of growth and consolidation. Presently, there are approximately nine Hellenic parish communities with over one hundred associations catering to various needs: motherland regional community organizations, parents and guardians, Greek labourers, Greek writers, Greek women and children, youth and seniors. Greeks of the community have also established an elaborate network of mass media agencies - radio, television, newspapers and magazines (Constantinides, 1983, 1985). Today, the Greek community in Montreal is undergoing a demographic change due to movement by a minority back to Greece, and inter-provincial migration, as well as expansion from Park Avenue and Park Extension to Laval, the South Shore and the West Island (Constantinides, 1983).

The uniqueness of Montreal Greeks lies in two domains. The first is the fact that the city of Montreal is primarily bilingual - French and English. In order to survive and be successful, immigrant and later generations of Greek heritage have had to become proficient in three languages - English, French and Greek, although not necessarily in that order. The influence of the French and English dominant cultures has had both positive and negative impacts on the Greek community. While learning French and English has helped them gain access to the French and English economic markets, their inability to secure power positions in commerce, and their substandard conditions in the service and clothing industries (e.g. sweat shops) reflected racist and discriminatory attitudes of the

prevailing majority.

The importance of learning three languages was quickly integrated into private elementary Greek schools. In order to maintain Quebec government educational accreditation, grants and subsidies, French was taught as a primary language with Greek and English as secondary languages (Bombas, 1985b).

With respect to the public educational system, Komatsoulis (1985) argues that most Greek immigrant parents have little knowledge of how the school system works or how to advise their children about their present or future educational goals. This, combined with the parents' lack of knowledge of English and French, and insufficient outreach by the schools to the parents, has resulted in an increasing rate of high school drop-outs. Consequently, the communication gap between the first-generation parents and the second-generation youth has gone from bad to worse, and troubled second-generation youth have become estranged from the Greek culture and language.

In the early 1960's, when parents wanted their children to be educated in a French Catholic School and did not mind that the children would be taught in French, the French Catholic School Commission turned them away because they were not Catholic, and asked them to enrol their children in English Protestant schools. It is unfortunate that the Greeks were not allowed to pursue French language education for their children, and now must suffer the consequences of legislated French language education and thus forced adaptation. This has angered many Greeks and is echoed by Manolakos (1989).

The second unique aspect of the Greek community of Montreal is that the socio-political climate reflects the change of socio-political events in Greece. Nowhere else in the Greek diaspora - the settling of scattered colonies of Greeks outside Greece, e.g. Canada, England, U.S.A. and Australia - is there a record that parallels the intense reaction of a Greek community to political events in Greece. The intensity of the schism between the Greek Orthodox Church and the secular Hellenic community of Montreal is also, to my knowledge, unprecedented anywhere else in Canada.

Although the majority of the immigrant Greek population is rural and unskilled, their loyalty and love for their motherland makes them a highly politicized group, which may account for the over 100 regional and political associations that decorate Montreal urban streets.

The main struggles identified by Greek immigrants concern integration in and adaptation to the host society. A counsellor from Hellenic Social Services (HSS) of Montreal uses the "culture shock" paradigm to describe the process. This involves:

1. The initial excitement of immigration to a different country. This includes high expectations of the host country, fantasizing about what it might be like,

and believing that their hopes and desires will be realized.

2. Hostility and anger due to disappointments and feelings of betrayal and injustice. Often these feelings are overwhelming, and translate into illness, psychosomatic pains, and a sense of emotional powerlessness and depression. More often than not, the client blames the system and perceives him/herself as powerless, victimized and isolated.

3. Adaptation and information. This is the stage where immigrants finally realize that they must make some changes in their perception of the new environment they live in. This means taking on more responsibility for the situation they are in, actively making decisions and initiating actions which will accommodate and essentially change the relationship they have with their community. This can include enrolling in English and French courses, joining the YMCA, etc.

4. Integration and commitment. This refers to the full participation of the individual in the social, political, economic and recreational aspects of life in "their" host country.Messaris (1985), the HSS counsellor and a social worker from the Centre Local de Services Communautaires (CLSC) Park Extension, believe that many of the socio-personal difficulties and adjustment problems of Greek immigrants stem from their low level of education, rural backgrounds and lack of proficiency in the English and French languages. In essence, the socio-psychological adjustment of the immigrant to his/her host country means several physical and emotional adjustments. Kourvetaris identifies several of these adjustments: "...food, weather, climate, people, habits, attitudes, feelings of well-being, happiness, feelings of alienation and uprootedness, mental and physical health and the like" (Kourvetaris, 1983, p. 29). Kourvetaris states that many immigrants never manage to adjust; younger immigrants adjust more easily than the old, and those from cities are better equipped to make the necessary adjustments than those from rural towns and villages. Those who do not make the adjustment either break down mentally, refuse to adapt, or return to Greece. Generally, it is the warmth, strength and solidarity of the Greek immigrant family that keeps the members vitalized and together. The introduction of the second and subsequent generations transforms this (the second generation being Canadian-born children of Greek immigrant parents), as integration and family conflicts often begin to surface at this point. HSS and CLSC workers interviewed on this problem note a rising divorce rate, as well as an increase in intermarriage, mental illness, delinquency, gambling, violence of husbands against their wives, drug addiction and high school dropping-out. Kourvetaris (1990) supports these findings as well.

The lives of immigrant Greek women, according to Kolyvaki (1985, p. 151) have improved considerably since the 1950's. Traditionally, they were oppressed and subservient to the men. The division of labour was determined

by sex roles; women were responsible for household duties, child-rearing and serving the needs of their husbands; men were responsible for earning a living and providing their families with material wealth. Greek women's experiences and ideologies have since grown to incorporate the feminist ideas and experiences of women of colour/minorities. As a result of these changes, the "Greek Women's Association" was established by politicizing the Greek woman's experience in the general community (Kolyvaki, 1985). Recently, the "Shield of Athena" (a group of Greek women) has been sensitizing the Greek community to violence against women. Changes in Greek women's attitude is seen in urbanized second-generation women, who are questioning and challenging the traditional, patriarchal, and male-dominated culture. I also believe that educated second-generation Greek men are changing to reflect some of the progressive dominant culture views, such as supporting a balanced division of labour and equal pay for equal work.

C. The Second-Generation Greeks in Montreal

The Greeks of Montreal have not yet been assimilated into either of the dominant English and French cultures. "By assimilation we mean the process whereby groups with different cultures come to have a common culture" (Berry, 1958, p. 210). The sense of Greek identity is generally strong among second-generation Greeks. Chimbos (1980) explains that it is within the family that the distinctiveness of the ethnic group is or is not transmitted from one generation to the next. The author suggests that Greeks in Canada are predominantly endogamous (marry within the Greek community) in the ethnic and religious sense; ethnic endogamy is preferred over religious endogamy. The main reason for endogamy is to maintain Greek culture and religion, and the belief that these marriages will be happier than mixed marriages. Chimbos pragmatically reminds the reader that the Greek family is in transition and that the roles, size and relationships in families are beginning to mirror those of English and French Canadian family systems.

Anderson and Frideres (1981) define ethnic identity as largely determined by four essential characteristics: ethnic origin; mother tongue, as spoken by members of a particular ethnic group; ethnic-oriented religion and participation or membership therein; and folkways — the practice of traditions, customs and rituals unique to the group. Conversely, ethnic identity change, as in the case of the second-generation Greek, refers to the following: a de-emphasis on ethnic origin; partial or total loss of mother tongue; deviation from, partial or total loss of interest in ethnic-oriented religion; and failure to practice traditional or folkway customs. Anderson and Frideres assert that "The maintenance or disintegration of an ethnic group is a result of both internal pressures (within the group) and external pressures (from outside the group)" (Anderson and Frideres, 1981, p. 41).

The endurance or maintenance of ethnic identity described by Anderson and Frideres (1981) is highly dependent on the internal and external, or "push" and "pull" factors within and from outside the ethnic community. The push factors include the desire to build or maintain positive intergroup relations, particularly with the dominant culture (Berry, 1986). The benefits to be had are within the social, political and financial realms. The pull factor phenomenon for the Greek-Montreal family, is described by Gavaki (1983) in terms of the Greek community's institutional completeness. That is, the ethnically separate and self-sufficient character of the Greek community in terms of its varied network of organizations, from banks and professionals, to Greek Orthodox Churches, Greek schools, media and regional associations. Gavaki informs us that the Greek community's over one hundred organizations serve the cultural, educational, religious, communications, occupational, economic and social needs of the group. The goals of these organizations are to maintain and transmit the Hellenic culture: Greek Orthodox religion, Greek language, traditions and values; while the Greek family functions as a hub and as a catalyst for the promotion of Hellenism - all that is associated with being Greek. Gavaki (1983) points out that second-generation Greek Montrealers, particularly women, show dramatic changes in their behaviour and attitudes due to the times, education, dominant cultures (English and French) and urban environment. They question the traditional, rural structure of the family and challenge male authority and dominance. In addition, they are more educated, have more skills and linguistic abilities and also tend to mediate between parents and the host society. The second-generation Greek Montrealer also seems to be characterized by more egalitarian sex relations than those of rural Greece, while maintaining other various cultural and religious traditional practices.

The endurance of the Greek culture and its adaptation to the host country is often measured by investigating the attitudes of subsequent generations. Callan and Gallois (1985) compares second-generation Greek Australians with Anglo-Australians with respect to sex-role orientations and stereotypes. They found that the Greek subjects advocated less egalitarian decision-making patterns in marriage and placed greater importance on the practical and familial aspects of marriage than did the Anglos. These researchers suggested that traditional values and attitudes appear to have a major influence on the lives of second-generation Greek Australians. This is not surprising since second-generation children are often caught between two worlds: the values of the host country and the values of the country of origin.

In spite of the seemingly strong influence of the Greek culture on subsequent generations, Kourvetaris (1990) finds conflict and identity crises among second-generation Greek Americans and Greeks of the diaspora. The author suggests that the Greek Orthodox Church, the Greek community and bilingualism are strong sources of ethnic identity, but may interact and conflict with each other.

Kourvetaris finds that ethnic identity is weakened from first to second generation, but often strengthens again in third and subsequent generations. This last point is further substantiated by Anderson and Frideres when they warn the reader to be wary of jumping to the conclusion that ethnic group members of second and subsequent generations do not feel very ethnic, "...because a new ethnicity among the third generation may assume the form of a keen interest in one's genealogical and ethnic history, regardless of one's ability to speak the mother tongue or one's religious inclinations" (Anderson and Frideres, 1981, p. 57).

Demos (1989) summarizes the findings concerning Greek ethnic issues when he examines the maintenance and loss of Greek traditional gender boundaries in Baltimore and Minneapolis. The author finds the following: (a) traditional features of Greek ethnicity and gender differences are attenuated over time, (b) Greek women are more likely than Greek men to marry within the Greek ethnic community, (c) second-generation Greek Americans show gender differences in ethnicity and endogamy, and (d) post high school education tends to erode gender differences in that women are more likely to be exogamous. Demos' findings substantiates Chimbos' (1980) speculations concerning the transitional loss of traditional behaviours and attitudes between the generations.

Transitional loss of traditional behaviour is also true of other cultures. Wakil, Parvez, Siddique and Wakil (1981) study the socialization of children of Indian and Pakistani immigrants. These children are investigated with respect to the values and ideals emphasized by their parents. The children's reactions suggest that immigrant families accept changes to the more pragmatic aspects of their lives, but strongly resist alterations to their core values — respect for elders, observance of religious holidays, participation in traditional and religious events, respect for traditional laws, and obedience to parents. As a result, the generation gap and social differences between first- and second-generation populations has given rise to value conflicts, and has challenged important core values.

Vasta (1980) finds similar trends in the second-generation Italian adolescent living in Australia. The results suggest that second-generation teenagers are not as assimilated as they would like to be. Most prefer to speak English at home, although their parents force them to speak Italian. Many youth resent the authoritarian Italian family structure, which has resulted in about 1/3 of the teenagers feeling estranged from their parents. These teenagers often look to their Australian peers and teachers as role models.

Devore and Schlesinger hone in on trying to understand the ethnic reality - that is the intersection of class (occupation and education) and ethnicity (race, religion and national origin) which they term "ethclass". Their assertion is that, "...social class generates identifiable dispositions and behaviours and beliefs"

(Devore & Schlesinger, 1991, p. 20). This has important implications for conceptualizing the socio-economic and political realities of ethnic groups, such as the Greeks of Montreal.

The relationship between ethclass and generational affiliation is examined by Reed and Florian (1990) in an interesting study of subjective well-being and psychological distress of three generations in the Kibbutz. They state that second-generation subjects report higher social well-being than first- and third-generation subjects. Significant positive correlations are found between social position and social well-being, as well as a significant negative correlation with psychological distress among second- and third-generation subjects: it appears that generational rank may be less important than an individual's position in the social milieu. This is also revealed in Model's (1986) study on constructing ethnic identity when the author examines ethnic aspirations and employment patterns in depth. The author finds that the major route to community prestige and identity of both first- and second-generation East Europeans is through economic achievement, rather than education, length of residency, political connections, or moral character.

A fundamental question by most researchers has not been fully addressed. How do second-generation Greek Montrealers perceive or identify with their culture, and what are the themes that emerge in the construction of their ethnic identity? It is my contention that once this has been explored sufficiently, the new needs and demands described by the second generation will compete with that of the immigrants' because of their different contextual experiences. In addition to the articulated differences between the first and second generations, my hope is that the voice of the second generation will fall upon receptive ears in the Greek community at large. It would be a shame to lose what the immigrants built with pride, honour, hard work and the love of the Greek culture. The second-generation needs to contribute to the wealth of the community by presenting ideas for the future and offering skills in the present, but we need room for debate as well as an arena for celebration. We need to be included in a partnership which will extend beyond our present lives and which will have an impact on many generations after our own. To this end, the communication gap between the generations must be diminished.

II. A Community at Crossroads

The Greek community of Montreal is at a crossroad. The first immigrants and community leaders are not responding to the needs and future of the Greek community. Who will take over once these immigrant leaders step down and what will they be governing?

In an attempt to go beyond the literature and forward my knowledge of the Greek community, I felt it important to seek an updated and informed view of

the socio-political issues that were unclear to me. In particular, I was interested in clarifying and debating the future and role of second and subsequent Greek generations in the socio-political realm of the Montreal Greek community.

Stephanos Constantinides (1983), author of *Les Grecs du Québec* and political science professor at l'Université du Québec à Montréal, was interviewed and the following points emerged from our discussion:

1. The distinction between the respective roles of the Hellenic Community of Montreal or Koinotita, the Greek community, and the Greek Orthodox Community of Laval and other communities.

According to Constantinides, the Koinotita is the oldest and most important Greek organization in Montreal. It has the most assets: four churches, land, elementary, Saturday and afternoon schools. Apparently, it was unable to respond to all the needs of the general Greek community, therefore, many subsequent organizations and Greek regional associations formed.Unfortunately, the Koinotita has incurred a $10 million debt in its effort to promote its visibility in the Montreal community at large. Constantinides questions the Koinotita's management of funds and recent expansion projects. His contention is that the Koinotita made purchases beyond its means during the present difficult economic lag in Quebec and rather than expand as rapidly as it did, it should have done so more cautiously. Unfortunately, the $10 million debt may be one of the many inheritances handed down to the second and subsequent generation Koinotita leaders. In addition to this economic problem, the Koinotita has been taken to court by the Diocese of Toronto because they refused to pay the priests. The Koinotita's argument for not sanctioning the priests was that the priests did not accept the orders and recommendations for change as outlined by the Koinotita - who politically represent the Greek community at large. Constantinides believes that the political battle between the Koinotita and the Greek Orthodox Church is a long-standing one and is a struggle for power and control over the Greek community masses and institutions that are owned by the Koinotita.

When we refer to the general Greek community of Montreal, Constantinides cautions that we should be careful not to confuse it with the formal paid membership into the civil organization of the Hellenic Community of Montreal or Koinotita. The Montreal Koinotita politically represents the general Greek community of Montreal. It has an elected executive whose goals are to respond to the varied social, educational and economic needs of the community, such as schools, organizing bazaars, parades, dances, benefits and programs for seniors; usually, it performs these events in conjunction with the church. The Greek community of Montreal refers to all Greeks living in the Greater Montreal area, as well as various pockets of Greek settlements on and off the Island, such as the South Shore Greek community, Laval Greek community and West Island

Greek community. No political, social or religious association is required, nor is there a paid formal membership. All Greeks are implicitly members of the general Greek community. The same is true of all Greek communities nationally and internationally.

The Greek Orthodox Community of Laval (GOCL), although smaller in wealth, power and prestige, is a sister organization of the Koinotita, but functions independently of it. The difference between the two is that the membership from the Laval community is recognized by the Montreal Koinotita, but not vice-versa unless one lives in Laval. The same is true of other Hellenic communities. The Laval community, according to Constantinides, presently houses the largest community of Greeks on and off the Island and the relations between the GOCL and the church is a balanced one. The goals of the GOCL are essentially the same as that of the Koinotita: to promote Hellenism. They too have a Greek elementary school operating out of the church in Laval. The teaching is in French, with Greek and English taught as second languages. The teaching of French as a primary language of education is true of all provincially accredited educational ethnic institutions since 1970.

2. The implications of the present state of the Greek community and Koinotita for the second and subsequent Greek generations, and planning for the future.

Constantinides points out that Greek immigration to Montreal has substantially diminished over the years, and there is now no pressing need to accommodate newcomers. The general Greek community and the Koinotita are, however, concerned about the future of their organizations and associations. Apparently, there is diminishing interest among the second generation in the socio-political life of the community. There is a need to attract and encourage new membership as well as to change the structure and orientation of the Montreal Koinotita. Presently, the Greek community is undergoing a period of transition, both economically and socio-politically. Today's Greek Montrealers are more prosperous and educated than the first immigrants. The needs of the second and subsequent generations are, therefore, qualitatively different and require specific attention.

It is only a question of time before the immigrant strong-hold on socio-political power in the community is passed on to second and subsequent generations. The hope is that the Koinotita will have the foresight to plan and facilitate this transition in the most painless way possible. A concomitant responsibility also rests with future Greek generations: they need to exercise their political rights to effect change.

It is my belief that second-generation Greek Montrealers have a vested interest in the well-being and prosperity of the Koinotita and Greek community. The gains, however, can only be realized by forging a dialogue based on mutual trust and interest.

I feel that in order to be recognized as serious heirs to the Montreal Koinotita, the second generation, along with subsequent generations, must form a complementary association sanctioned and financed by the Koinotita to research, study and critique the socio-political ideas of the community. In order to establish a strong membership among the second generation we need to examine how our identities have been constructed and how we feel about our "selves". These are crucial questions that must be investigated if our goal is to facilitate in institutional change. With an eye on the future, and armed with the new needs of the present, the recruitment of new members and institutional change is inevitable.

III. Interview Findings: Overview

The categories of Greek identity that emerged from the interviews are varied. The factors that influence Greek identity (see Figure 1) are dependent upon the specific circumstances immigrants were faced with in the immigration process, arrival and settlement experience in the host country. In addition, the socio-economic status, education and traditional values and attitudes of the immigrants have also impacted and shaped the second-generation's world-view. These factors, combined with the influence of the host society's culture and environment, provide a dynamic view of the way elements interact on the identity construction of the second generation.

Greek identity, for the subjects interviewed, has several meanings and shares, to varying degrees, the following themes: Greek history, Greek Orthodox religion, family, community, language, traditional ways and gender roles. Interestingly, these themes cannot easily be separated from each other, but are fused to varying degrees. I venture to say that Greek identity, like any other ethnic identity, takes various forms which are dependent upon the quality and degree of the individual's socialization to the culture in which they were born. Chimbos (1980), Gavaki (1983) and Kourvetaris (1990) echo similar views concerning aspects of Greek culture that influence ethnic identity and pride. An excerpt from the interviews reflects this common view about Greek identity.

> The most important thing, of course, for me is religion because with that you have the second most important thing - and that is family unity. Something I didn't have when I was a kid. With religion and being as a family, I think you can overcome many things. Third most important is communication.
>
> Your blood is Greek, whether you're born in Canada, China, Hong Kong - you're still Greek. Some people tell me I'm Canadian - I was born here and so I am Canadian - but in actuality my blood is Greek. Everything I will learn has to do with the Greek culture.

The theme of family is consistent throughout the interviews. It is generally cited as the most important component in the development of Greek identity in the second generation. This also reflects the findings of Chimbos (1980),

Primpas-Welts (1982), Gavaki (1983), Kourvetaris (1990) and others. Syril, on the other hand, struggles with another common position.

> I see myself as being Canadian because I was born here. I am Canadian but I was brought up in a Greek atmosphere - my parents are Greek 100%. I would say my country comes first - which is Canada and the culture that I followed which was shown to me by my parents is Greek. So I am a Canadian, a Greek Canadian.

The influence of the historical background of immigrants on their ability to adapt to the host country and society cannot be underestimated. Often, their traditional views, folkways, and attitudes are maintained. The second generation, on the other hand, is impacted by traditional values and attitudes and by the culture of the host society. Callan and Gallois (1985) and Kourvetaris (1990) suggest that the struggle of the second generation is characterized as being in conflict with the first generation and as being in an identity crisis. The dynamic of accepting and rejecting aspects of the Greek culture which are imparted to them by their immigrant parents and Greek institutions, such as attitudes toward women, is described by Syril in the following process.

> I find the Greeks, including my brother, sister and all my family, to be traditional. The men don't do the dishes - the men don't mop. The men will ask for a cup of coffee and the women will bring it. I hate to say this but the women are treated like slaves whereas this attitude is unacceptable in my house. My woman, my wife, is treated like a person, like my other half. I try to help her out as she does the same for me. We are a couple. We help each other. This is a Greek way that I strayed away from - that the men and women are so different. By deviating from this, I was called negative names by my brother, my father, and my other relatives.

Callan and Gallois (1985), Gavaki (1983) and Chimbos (1980) support Syril's sentiments that sex-role attitudes and behaviour are one of the major areas which differentiates the second generation from the first generation. The tension between the first- and second-generations concerning sex-role attitudes are primarily influenced by the host society's cultural environment (see Figure 1). The resultant behaviour of the second generation when confronted with traditional sex-role attitudes of their parents, therefore, is a factor that pushes them toward dominant culture norms and values. Chimbos reminds us that the values, attitudes and traditions of the first generation are beginning to transform in the second generation and that the values and norms are increasingly reflecting those of the host society.

The identity of the second-generation Greek Montrealer is also intensely influenced by the growth and development of his or her own psyche. The kinds of existential questions this group is faced with are similar to what the dominant culture experiences, but are qualitatively different in that they experience life in context of living in two worlds: the Greek world, which is institutionally complete and has its own customs, rituals and beliefs; and the dominant culture,

which reflects the values and traditions of Quebecois and English institutions (see Figure 1). The questions of who am I?, and where do I belong? have special significance for the second generation in that the underlying questions they are ultimately faced with are, do I belong to the Greek or dominant culture? What is it about this group that is significant for me? Do I want to identify with this group? The search for identity, then, is being forged in the hope of constructing a new Greek reality, yet one of the obstacles is immigrant parental rejection of dominant culture norms, which is often perceived by the second generation as a rejection of themselves. Consider Dora's dilemma, which is representative of the views held by the interviewees.

> We all go through hell at times with our parents, with growing up and trying to find our sense of identity - where we belong. We can't take it. And then there's the rejection. The rejection causes more anger that it has happened. It didn't have to happen this way. That is, the rejection - that rejection! Totally cut off. One minute you belong somewhere and the next you don't really belong anywhere - really. No matter how much you try to compensate with something else, it's not the same.

IV. Summary and Reflections

My intention is to sensitize the reader to the areas and themes that have emerged as issues for the interviewees, as well as for myself. These themes and issues have merit and are useful in providing the reader with a glimpse into the reality of the second-generation Greek in Montreal.

The content analysis overview reveals that enduring themes, such as parenting, religion, koinotita politics, language, family, tradition and gender attitudes play significant roles in the growth and development of Greek identity in the second generation. For all, these themes are confronted, struggled with, modified and given new meaning by the second generation. This arduous process inevitably reshapes the perception of Greek identity for the second generation, which at times is at odds with first-generation views. This is most emphatically demonstrated in the arenas of parenting, gender roles, religion and koinotita politics. Curiously, French language issues and education did not appear to significantly influence second generation identity for the interviewees.

Despite differences between the generations in their views, attitudes and values, second-generation Greeks tend to maintain and assert their identity by integrating their contextual experiences in Montreal. They acknowledge their world-view as unique and having its due place in society. The struggles for the second generation can be distilled into dialectic questions such as, where do I belong - in the Greek or English/French culture?. With whose eyes am I observing the world - the Greek culture or the dominant English/French culture? As Kourvetaris (1990) suggests, the failure or struggle to reconcile these differ-

ences will lead to conflict and identity crisis. His point is pertinent for therapists and social workers.

An interesting finding in this research study shows a tendency of the second-generation toward egalitarian gender role and gender relations. Men are vocal about struggling with their masculine ethnic identity and are very concerned about modelling a 'good' father and husband image they feel they never had. The absent father was, more often than not, working long hours.

V. Epistemological Concerns and Implications For Social Work

The theoretical implications upon which I would like to focus concern the way we observe and understand the experience of those culturally different from ourselves, particularly as they arise in therapy contacts. Geertz (1977) provides us with the hermeneutic approach and with the concepts of experience-near and experience-distant. These ideas are not only extremely valuable in a theoretical sense, but also in a practical sense. The view that one can approach an understanding of the way the other thinks by identifying a collection of symbols and comparing them with another collection of symbols draws the observer or therapist closer to the reality of the other; while at the same time, errors in perception allow a therapist to navigate through a foreign complex mind-set with the ultimate aim of correcting misperceptions and sharing in a communion of understanding.

In summary, the implications for social work are the following:

1. Respect the hierarchy of the family.
2. Take a one-down position in gathering data about the culture.
3. Help the family to identify both positive and negative factors that influence their lives in the host society (see Figure 1).
4. Help the family to identify the meaning and nature of their culture clash.
5. Always allow an opportunity for the parents to save face.
6. Be aware of psychosomatic complaints and explore their meaning with the client.
7. Allow individual sessions to deal with emotions that may insult or embarrass the parents.
8. Network with the ethnic community and become familiar with prevalent attitudes and values.

VI. Implications For Further Research

There is a need to explore immigrant Greek identity and, more specifically, Greek identity in immigrants who arrived at a young age, e.g. 6 years old and as

students. I believe that the backdrop to launching a more detailed study on second-generation identity would have to include the views and attitudes of these younger arrivees in order to better contrast and compare them with the second generation's views.

Another study on identity issues could explore second-generation couples and families and their attitudes and feelings about their Greek identity. I wonder whether they would perceive themselves as traditional or contemporary, and what kinds of issues and themes would emerge.

Finally, there is the need to research and chronicle the development of the Greek koinotitas, as their values and ideological orientation are currently shifting from a first-generation to a second- and subsequent-generation bias. An understanding of the political, economic and religious implications of this transformation would not only be of historical value, but would help design a prototype for other Greek and ethnic communities experiencing similar transformations. Finally, the role of French language education, its politics and impact on the development of Greek identity in the second generation needs to be explored further.

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Extraits de la lettre adressée le 7 septembre 1994 par le Président de la République de Chypre M. Glafkos Clerides au Secrétaire Général de l'ONU M. Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Un Etat doté d'une souveraineté,d'une personnalité internationale et d'une citoyenneté uniques.

Je souhaite affirmer dès le début et de façon claire et catégorique que la solution pour laquelle je travaille est identique à celle définie dans le paragraphe 2 de la résolution 939 du Conseil de sécurité qui réaffirme que la solution du problème de Chypre doit être basée sur "...un Etat de Chypre doté d'une souveraineté, d'une personnalité internationale et d'une citoyenneté uniques, son indépendance et son intégrité territoriale étant garanties, et composé de deux communautés politiquememnt égales, telles qu'elles sont décrites dans les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de Sécurité, au sein d'une fédération bicommunautaire et bizonale, et selon laquelle un tel réglement doit exclure l'union, en totalité ou en partie, avec un autre pays, ou tout autre forme de partition ou de sécession..."

Proposition de démilitarisation

1) Que les leaders des deux communautés, pendant la durée des pourparlers intercommunautaires fassent une déclaration solennelle auprès du Secrétaire Général de l'O.N.U. au nom de leur communauté respective, par laquelle ils s'engagent à ne pas recourir à la force, l'une contre l'autre et, à prendre les mesures nécessaires afin d'empêcher les agressions entre membres des deux communautés.

2) Que le Gouvernement de la République prenne les mesures suivantes :

- abolir la loi sur la Garde Nationale, dissoudre la Garde Nationale et remettre l'armement de celle-ci à la Force de Maintien de la Paix des Nations-Unies;

- s'engager à maintenir la force de police à son niveau actuel dotée d'un armement léger, uniquement;

- prendre en charge les dépenses globales afférentes au maintien d'une force de maintien de la paix renforcée des Nations-Unies;

- la Force de Maintien de la Paix des Nations-Unies aura le droit d'inspection pour vérifier si tout ce qui est prévu ci-dessus est bien respecté;

- convenir que les véhicules blindés, les véhicules blindés de transport de troupes et les chars de la Garde Nationale qui seront remis à la Force de Maintien de la Paix des Nations-Unies pourront être utilisés par celle-ci pour les besoins de patrouille dans la zone tampon et pour empêcher toute intrusion dans cette zone;

- déposer sur un compte au nom des Nations-Unies tout l'argent qui sera économisé par l'arrêt d'achat d'armement après soustraction du coût d'entretien de la Force de Maintien de la Paix des Nations-Unies, afin que ces sommes soient utilisées, après lasolution du problème de Chypre, au bénéfice des deux communautés.

3) Parallèlement, le Gouvernement turc doit s'engager à retirer ses forces d'occupation de Chypre ainsi que les colons illégaux dont, la présence à Chypre, contrevient non seulement aux résolutions de l'O.N.U. qui invitent les deux parties à respecter la structure démographique de Chypre mais constitue aussi une menace militaire. A cet effet, il est essentiel de procéder à un recensement fiable de la population."Les Chypriotes turcs qui sont armés doivent dissoudre leurs structures miliaires, confier leur armement à la Force de Maintien de la Paix de l'O.N.U. et accepter l'inspection des Nations-Unies."

L'EX-REPUBLIQUE YOUGOSLAVE DE MACEDOINE: ENTRE APAISEMENT ET DESTABILISATION

Gilles Bertrand*

ABSTRACT

As the Greek embargo continues, has the situation in the formerly Yugoslavian Macedonia calmed down or worsened since the events of autumn 1994? That Greek embargo, and the UN embargo against Serbia favour primarily the unofficial economy. The census and elections, promoted by international organizations, were to reinforce the state's credibility. Yet, the census results were contested by the minorities due to the recent law on citizenship. The elections, boycotted by the ORIM, have confirmed the position of the team in power. It seems that these two operations haven't eased the tension. Smuggling, Albanian and Slavo-macedonian clandestine paramilitary groups are threatening the state's existence, but not necessarily in the short term.

RÉSUMÉ

Est-ce l'apaisement ou la déstabilisation qui triomphe en Macédoine anciennement yougoslave après les évènements de l'automne 1994 et tandis que se poursuit l'embargo grec? Cet embargo et celui décrété par l'ONU contre la Serbie favorisent surtout l'économie parallèle. Le recensement et les élections, parrainés par les organisations internationales devaient renforcer la crédibilité de l'État. Les résultats du recensement ont pourtant été contestées par les minorités en raison de la récente loi sur la citoyenneté.Les élections, boycottées par l'ORIM, ont conforté la position de l'équipe du pouvoir. Les deux opérations ne semblent donc pas avoir assez apaisé les tensions. La contrebande, les groupes paramilitaires clandestins albanais et slavomacédoniens menacent l'existence même de l'État, mais pas forcément à court terme.

La fin de l'année 1994 a été marquée dans l'Ancienne République Yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM/FYROM) par la publication, le 14 novembre, des résultats du recensement effectué entre le 21 juin et le 11 juillet d'une part; par la tenue d'élections législatives et présidentielle les 16 et 30 octobre d'autre part. Parallèlement, on a assisté à la poursuite de l'embargo décrété unilatéralement par la Grèce, tandis que les négociations entre les deux pays sous l'égide de l'ONU restaient dans l'impasse.

Il semblerait logique que ce recensement et ces élections, parrainés par l'Union européenne, le Conseil de l'Europe et l'Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (OSCE), aient contribué à apaiser les tensions politiques internes à la République tandis que les effets de l'embargo grec auraient dû, sinon accroître les tensions économiques et sociales, tout au moins mettre l'économie du pays au bord du gouffre et déstabiliser ainsi la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave.

Dans mon précédent article[1], j'émettais l'hypothèse que les risques de désta-

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bilisation du pays venaient davantage de l'intérieur que de l'extérieur. Je m'interrogerai ici sur les événements que je viens de mentionner, leur rôle dans la stabilisation ou la déstabilisation de la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave.

I. L'embargo

L'embargo grec contre la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave a été décrété le 16 février 1994. Constatant que les négociations bilatérales étaient dans l'impasse, le gouvernement grec cherche désormais à aboutir rapidement à la satisfaction de trois de ses revendications: que le "Soleil de Vergina" n'apparaisse plus sur le drapeau de l'ARYM; que la constitution «macédonienne» soit amendée[2]; qu'un traité garantissant l'inviolabilité de la frontière entre les deux États soit signé.

Cet embargo ne peut qu'accroître les difficultés d'une économie qui fait déjà les frais de la disparition du marché intérieur yougoslave, de la guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine et de l'embargo des Nations Unies à l'encontre de la nouvelle Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro). En effet, la situation est actuellement particulièrement préoccupante. Selon les autorités de Skopje, le Produit National Brut par habitant a baissé de 35,5% entre 1990 et 1993 et encore de 8% entre 1993 et 1994 (soit 640 dollars par habitant en 1994); le Produit Intérieur Brut a, quant à lui, baissé de 7,2% en 1994 par rapport à 1993; le taux d'inflation est de 55,4% en 1994. Les exportations ont baissé de 3,8% en 1994 et les importations augmenté de 4,8%. La production industrielle a baissé de 9,5% en 1994 du fait que, toujours selon les estimations gouvernementales, 50 à 70% des entreprises industrielles ne fonctionnent qu'à 30-50% de leur capacité.

Ces mauvais chiffres seraient, d'après le gouvernement, dus à la fermeture des frontières nord et sud du pays. Il faut remarquer cependant que la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave se trouve actuellement dans une phase de transition vers l'économie de marché. Il est donc difficile de faire la part des choses entre les effets de l'embargo et ceux de l'ajustement structurel en cours. Car nous sommes obligés d'observer que la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave n'est pas le seul pays d'Europe de l'Est à connaître inflation, chômage, baisse de la production, hausse des importations et baisse des exportations.

Toutefois, l'interdiction par l'ONU de tout commerce avec la Serbie et le Monténégro et la quasi-disparition du commerce avec la Croatie et la Slovénie - sans parler de la Bosnie-Herzégovine - privent la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave de ses partenaires habituels. Riche en matières premières (bois mais aussi produits miniers: plomb, zinc, cuivre, fer, chrome, nickel, antimoine, manganèse et or), le pays est surtout doté d'industries de première transformation et fournissait le nord de la Yougoslavie, plus industrialisé, à des prix inférieurs à ceux du marché mondial.

A la suite de la fermeture officielle de l'axe autoroutier et ferré Skopje-Nis-Belgrade de la vallée de la Morava, l'axe autoroutier et ferré Skopje-Thessalonique de la vallée du Vardar/Axios était devenu vital pour l'économie de la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave. En effet, le transit de marchandises par l'Albanie (jusqu'au port de Dürres) ne peut s'effectuer que par la route, à travers la montagne qui plus est. De plus, le réseau routier albanais est dans un état déplorable et le port de Dürres n'a pas les capacités de celui de Thessalonique. Par la Bulgarie, le transport ne peut également se faire que par la route. Outre, là encore, des montagnes, le principal handicap de cette alternative est la distance qui sépare la frontière de l'ARYM des ports de Varna et Burgas. Qui plus est, ces ports ont eux aussi des capacités de stockage plus faibles que celui de Thessalonique. Ainsi les coûts de transport *via* la Bulgarie sont de 50% supérieurs à ceux *via* la Grèce[3].

Ceci concerne particulièrement les importations de pétrole. Avant la mise en place de l'embargo grec, près de 100% des importations en pétrole du pays transitaient par Thessalonique pour être ensuite acheminées par voie ferrée. Les autorités de Skopje ont prévu d'importer 822 000 tonnes de pétrole en 1995 pour un montant de 145,3 millions de dollars. Cette prévision va sans doute être modifiée. Le transit du pétrole par la Bulgarie occasionne un surcoût de 57 dollars par tonne dont 46 dollars de transport et 11 dollars de taxes perçus par les Bulgares. Il faudra donc soit réduire les importations soit dépenser plus pour ces importations. La réduction des importations est déjà dramatique: la production de produits pétroliers dérivés a baissé de 80% en 1994 par rapport à 1993 et la raffinerie de Skopje a perdu 6,2 millions de dollars l'an dernier, selon les autorités.

Toutefois, la contrebande d'essence entre la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave et la Serbie continue. Un reporter français a rendu compte récemment (*Le Figaro*, 17 mars 1995) de la prospérité du trafic entre la localité de Lojane et la Serbie. D'après les casques bleus américains, des milliers de litres d'essence passent quotidiennement la frontière, à dos de mulet. Ainsi, indirectement, l'embargo grec devrait nuire aussi à la Serbie[4]. J'écris "devrait" car les contrebandiers ne semblent pas s'inquiéter d'une possible pénurie, ce qui contredit le bilan catastrophique que dresse le gouvernement un an après le début de l'embargo grec...

Il faut aussi noter que cet embargo ne s'applique pas aux livraisons dites "humanitaires" (nourriture et médicaments). Mais pas seulement... L'Agence France Presse annonçait ainsi, le 1er mars 1994, qu'un train de marchandises transportant du matériel pour une scierie avait quitté Thessalonique pour Skopje. L'embargo serait-il sélectif ? Il existe encore un moyen, certes plus compliqué, d'aller d'une Macédoine (grecque) à l'autre (celle du Vardar): passer par la troisième (celle du Pirin) ! Le 13 avril dernier, l'Agence Macédoine-

Presse confirmait une information du *New York Times* selon laquelle 100 camions iraniens à destination de Belgrade avaient été interceptés en Bulgarie et en Grèce, en provenance du port de Thessalonique. Le convoi transportait du matériel de forage pétrolier, officiellement à destination de la Roumanie, et devait en réalité transiter par la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave. Si un convoi de cette importance a tenté de suivre un tel parcours, c'est que cela doit être possible... À condition de ne pas avoir la CIA aux trousses !

Dans cette affaire, comme dans celle de la contrebande d'essence, les autorités de Skopje paraissent observer avec impuissance l'inefficacité et/ou la vénalité de leurs douaniers ainsi que les entreprises illicites de personnes privées. Il faut dire qu'avec un taux de chômage avoisinant les 30% et la baisse continuelle du niveau de vie depuis 1990, il serait très étonnant que des habitants de la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave ne soient pas attirés par une contrebande apparemment très lucrative[5]. Le problème est qu'ils mettent ainsi à mal la crédibilité de leur État.

II. Le problème des minorités

La crédibilité de l'État en Macédoine anciennement yougoslave n'est pas seulement entamée par l'existence de ces trafics avec la Serbie. Elle est mise à mal, de façon plus dramatique, par la persistance du problème des minorités.

Ce problème tient en partie aux controverses concernant les effectifs exacts de chaque communauté. Les leaders des partis ethniques estiment que leurs communautés respectives sont bien plus nombreuses que ce qu'indiquent les recensements[6]:

Recensement	**1981**		**1991**		**1994**		**Revendications ***
Nationalités	en milliers	%	en milliers	%	en milliers	%	en milliers
«Macédoniens»	1 279	67,3	1 328	65,3	1 288	66,5	____
Albanais	377	19,8	427	21,7	443	22,9	1 000
Turcs	86	4,5	97	3,8	77	4,0	200
Roms	43	2,3	55	2,5	44	2,3	220
Serbes	44	2,3	44	2,1	39	2,0	300
Valaques	rubrique	"autres"	8	0,4	8	0,4	185
Autres	70	3,8	65	4,2	37	1,9	____
Total	**1 900**	**100**	**2 034**	**100**	**1 936**	**100**	____

* Revendications émises en 1993 par les leaders de partis ethniques (source: AFP).

Les effectifs revendiqués sont, on le voit, sans rapport avec les effectifs officiellement recensés. Or le "poids" de chaque communauté dans la population est un enjeu de taille pour les partis qui réclament plus de places dans le gouvernement, dans l'administration et à l'université, plus de programmes sociaux et audiovisuels, etc.

L'enjeu est majeur pour la communauté albanaise. Celle-ci, la plus nombreuse

après la communauté slavomacédonienne, entend obtenir le statut de *nation constitutive* au lieu de son actuel statut de *minorité*[7]. Le gouvernement - dominé par les Slavomacédoniens - considère que les Albanais, ne représentant que 22,9% de la population, ne peuvent légitimement prétendre à ce statut de *nation constitutive*. Les Albanais estiment représenter 30 à 40% de la population. Leur boycottage du recensement de 1991 laissait les observateurs dans le doute. C'est ce doute que le recensement de l'été 1994 devait lever.

Le recensement a une dimension symbolique qui ne doit pas être négligée surtout lorsqu'il a lieu dans un pays indépendant depuis aussi peu de temps: le recensement est l'affirmation d'un certain contrôle sur une population et sur un territoire, signes de la souveraineté étatique. Le recensement a aussi une dimension financière et militaire: à l'origine, il s'agit de dénombrer les contribuables et les soldats potentiels. Cette dimension est éminemment importante dans le contexte balkanique actuel et peut expliquer qu'ici plus qu'ailleurs les citoyens soient tentés de se prêter avec mauvaise grâce à l'opération.

Cependant, l'objectif premier du recensement était bien de mettre un terme définitif aux querelles concernant les effectifs réels des minorités. Ce recensement devait donc être un facteur d'apaisement et de stabilisation dans la république. Il devait donc être absolument incontestable. D'où l'appel à la communauté internationale et notamment à l'Union européenne et au Conseil de l'Europe. Il a fallu un an de préparation pour mettre au point la méthode et le questionnaire puis imprimer les formulaires en six langues: le slavomacédonien, l'albanais, le turc, le rom (tzigane), le serbe et le valaque (roumain). 2,3 millions d'ÉCU (un peu plus de 3 millions de dollars) débloqués par les institutions européennes, un groupe de 10 experts présidé par Werner Haug (Office fédéral helvétique de la statistique) et 40 observateurs de 19 pays d'Europe étaient destinés à garantir le sérieux des opérations de recensement.

De fait, «l'impression générale est que les opérations ont été techniquement bien préparées et qu'elles se sont déroulées de manière satisfaisante dans la plupart des régions du pays» indique un communiqué du Conseil de l'Europe (25 juillet 1994). Il ajoute que «les équipes internationales d'observateurs ont été impressionnées par la qualité et la motivation des agents recenseurs ainsi que par la bonne volonté de la population à l'égard du recensement». Les différentes communautés se sont en effet retrouvées le dos au mur: boycotter un recensement présentant de telles garanties aurait fatalement décrédibilisé leurs revendications. D'un autre côté, accepter ce recensement c'est entrer dans le jeu des autorités: si les minorités n'ont pas plus d'importance démographique qu'au recensement de 1991, pourquoi leur accorder plus de droits ?

Car tel est bien le cas. Dans l'ensemble, les effectifs des différentes communautés ont peu varié par rapport aux résultats du recensement de 1991. On peut toutefois faire quelques commentaires: le nombre de Roms et de Turcs a légère-

ment diminué, contre toute attente compte tenu des comportements démographiques de ces deux populations. On peut donc supposer qu'elles ont connu et connaissent sans doute encore une forte émigration, émigration qui existait déjà du temps de la Yougoslavie. Les Turcs en particulier ont certainement plus de facilité à faire des études supérieures à Istanbul qu'à Skopje et de meilleures chances de trouver du travail en Turquie ou en Allemagne.

Le cas des Serbes est également intéressant. Dragisa Miletic, chef du Parti démocratique des Serbes de Macédoine, affirme toujours qu'ils sont 300 000, expliquant que les autorités forceraient nombre d'entre eux à se déclarer (Slavo)Macédoniens. Il "oublie" qu'après 1913 les autorités royales yougoslaves ont contraint les habitants slaves de la Macédoine du Vardar à se déclarer «Serbes du Sud» et que ce n'est que sous Tito que les «Serbes du Sud» sont (re?)devenus les (Slavo)Macédoniens. Cet "oubli" lui permet de prétendre faire jouer aux Serbes un rôle plus important dans la république mais aussi de placer son parti dans la droite ligne des attaques lancées par l'Académie des Sciences de Serbie contre Tito[8]. Ce recensement infirme surtout l'hypothèse selon laquelle la moitié des 44 000 Serbes recensés en 1991 avait quitté le pays avec ou dans les troupes fédérales (mars 1992). Le recensement confirme plutôt la forte implantation serbe au nord du pays, dans la région de Kumanovo. Ce qui confirme également qu'on peut craindre que la Serbie ne cherche à obtenir une modification des frontières permettant de ramener ces 39 000 personnes au sein de la «mère-patrie».

La diminution du nombre de (Slavo)Macédoniens est plus surprenante: 1 328 000 recensés en 1991, 1 288 000 recensés en 1994. Leur nombre a-t-il été surévalué en 1991 ? Faut-il mettre cette diminution sur le compte de l'émigration ? L'état de l'économie du pays et la situation politique balkanique nous incitent à préférer cette deuxième hypothèse.

Expliquer ces diminutions de population par l'émigration semble d'une logique élémentaire. C'est aussi accréditer la thèse selon laquelle le recensement de 1991 s'est correctement déroulé - ce dont personne n'est vraiment sûr, les autorités reconnaissant elles-mêmes que les Albanais ont boycotté ce recensement.

Cette explication (l'émigration) est aussi utilisée par les Albanais pour se sortir de l'impasse dans laquelle le recensement les a conduits. Certes, selon ce recensement, les effectifs de la communauté albanaise ont augmenté par rapport à celui de 1991: de 427 à 443 000 personnes (soit 21,7% de la population en 1991 et 22,9% en 1994). Mais on est encore loin du million de personnes et des 30 à 40 % de la population revendiqués par certains leaders de la communauté...

L'argument des Albanais est simple: leur communauté a été sous-évaluée car un grand nombre de ses membres a pris le chemin de l'émigration. Quant à ceux qui sont revenus, ils auraient pâti de la loi sur la citoyenneté (1993) qui stipule

que 15 ans de résidence ininterrompue en Macédoine anciennement yougoslave sont nécessaires pour bénéficier de la citoyenneté. Cette loi a pour objet évident d'empêcher une émigration massive d'Albanais kossovars donc une modification de l'équilibre ethnique en ARYM au profit des Albanais. Ceux-ci pourraient alors revendiquer avec plus d'assurance le fameux statut de *nation constitutive*.

La loi sur la citoyenneté a ainsi permis aux Albanais de contester le recensement, comme le reconnaît le communiqué du Conseil de l'Europe déjà cité: «des difficultés ont cependant surgi pour la question sur la «citoyenneté», ce point très névralgique n'ayant pas encore été tout à fait réglé au plan administratif. Les experts ne sont pas convaincus de la fiabilité des informations obtenues à partir des réponses à cette question précise». De ce fait, si le recensement a atteint son objectif (être une source d'informations fiables concernant la population de la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave), il reste que les problèmes soulevés par la loi sur la citoyenneté permettent aux Albanais de spéculer encore sur leurs effectifs réels. Car la communauté albanaise est la seule à connaître un double phénomène d'émigration et d'immigration (des Albanais kossovars), donc la seule à vraiment être visée par cette loi.

Ce recensement n'aurait-il servi à rien ? Vu l'enjeu *in fine* (la stabilité de la Macédoine du Vardar), on serait tenté de répondre: "à pas grand-chose". En effet, ce ne sont pas les 4% de Turcs, les 2,3% de Roms, les 0,4% de Valaques et peut-être pas même les 2% de Serbes qui risquent de déstabiliser la république en contestant la légitimité de l'État, mais bien les 22,9% d'Albanais. Ou plutôt les rapports entre les deux principales communautés du pays, les Slavomacédoniens et les Albanais.

Ces deux communautés ne sont certes pas au bord de la guerre. Pourtant leurs relations ne sont pas bonnes. Pas suffisamment bonnes pour écarter tout danger d'une nouvelle tragédie dans les Balkans. Deux événements illustrent l'état de ces relations. Le dernier en date se passe à Tetovo, ville à forte majorité albanaise: cette communauté inaugure, le 16 février 1995, une université autonome. Lorsqu'on sait que 70 000 petits albanais vont à l'école primaire mais qu'ils ne sont plus que 2 900 dans le secondaire, qu'à l'université d'État, l'enseignement est obligatoirement en slavomacédonien alors que l'albanais est parlé par environ 5 millions de personnes dans les Balkans (contre 1,2 millions de Slavomacédoniens), l'ouverture de l'université autonome de Tetovo ne paraît pas illégitime. En tout cas, elle ne paraît pas faire montre d'un particularisme frileux. Pourtant, les autorités font fermer cette université par la police. Motif: il s'agit d'une manifestation de séparatisme et de repliement sur soi qui menace l'unité de l'ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine. L'intervention des forces de l'ordre, le 17 février, a fait un mort (albanais) et 28 blessés.

Le deuxième événement est un film. *Before the rain*, du slavomacédonien

Milcho Manchevski, reçoit le Lion d'Or au festival de Venise 1994. Que raconte *Before the rain*? Principalement un sanglant règlement de compte entre Albanais et Slavomacédoniens. Le cinéaste déclare au journal *La Croix* (17 novembre 1994) «qu'il s'agit plutôt d'un avertissement, de mon regard sur un pays fragile, où règne un calme précaire». Cette histoire restera-t-elle une fiction ?

On peut supposer que la contestation au sein de la communauté albanaise se limitera à la critique verbale des résultats du recensement et de la participation du Parti de la prospérité démocratique au gouvernement, critique qui avait d'ailleurs abouti à une scission au sein du PPD, en février 1994. Mais le danger désormais est de voir certains Albanais passer à l'action terroriste. La découverte en novembre 1993, à Skopje, d'une organisation clandestine baptisée «Armée de tous les Albanais» a constitué un premier avertissement pour le gouvernement. Un autre groupe clandestin albanais, l'Unikom[9], organisé selon les méthodes du Hezbollah moyen-oriental, serait prêt à passer à l'action violente...

La création de groupes clandestins armés et potentiellement terroristes, la non-résolution du problème albanais - à la fois politique, social, économique et... démographique - font peser une lourde menace sur la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave. Et malheureusement, le recensement de 1994 n'a rien arrangé. La remise en question de l'État (unitaire, nation des Slavomacédoniens) par les Albanais est toujours à l'ordre du jour.

III. Les élections

L'événement le plus important de l'année 1994 fut pourtant les élections législatives et présidentielle. L'enjeu, là encore, était de taille: il s'agissait de démontrer que la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave est définitivement engagée dans la voie de la démocratisation. Ce n'étaient pas, assurément, les premières élections multipartites dans le pays. Mais seulement les deuxièmes. En effet, le multipartisme a été instauré par le Parlement en avril 1990. Les premières élections législatives multipartites ont eu lieu les 11 novembre et 23 décembre 1990. Le Président de la République a, lui, été élu par le Parlement le 27 janvier 1991. Les 16 et 30 octobre 1994 a donc été élu, pour la deuxième fois dans l'histoire du pays, mais pour la première fois depuis l'indépendance, un parlement multipartite. Et pour la première fois, le Président de la République a été élu au suffrage universel direct.

Comme pour le recensement, la démonstration de l'honnêteté de ces élections, le caractère incontestable que devaient avoir les résultats, firent que le gouvernement sollicita de nouveau les institutions européennes. L'OSCE envoya des observateurs et le Conseil de l'Europe dépêcha sur place une délégation de

dix parlementaires qui se rendirent dans plus de soixante bureaux de vote dans tout le pays et rencontrèrent la Commission électorale centrale, des membres des partis et du gouvernement.

L'élection présidentielle offrit un suspens très limité: la coalition gouvernementale soutenait Kiro Gligorov (77 ans), candidat à sa propre succession, tandis que l'Organisation révolutionnaire intérieure macédonienne-Parti démocratique pour l'unité nationale de la Macédoine (ORIM-PDUNM) lui opposait Ljubisa Georgijevski, un metteur en scène de 57 ans. K. Gligorov obtint 713 529 voix soit 52,44% des suffrages et son adversaire 196 936 voix soit 14,47% des suffrages. On dénombra également 130 133 bulletins nuls. La victoire de K. Gligorov était acquise dès le premier tour.

Cependant, dès le premier tour, les élections furent contestées. Les parlementaires du Conseil de l'Europe «ont pris acte de nombreuses plaintes relatives à la campagne (accès aux médias, inscription sur les listes électorales, information de la population, etc.)», ont observé des «inexactitudes contenues dans les listes électorales et une certaine confusion concernant les documents exigés des électeurs pour prouver leur nationalité» (communiqué de presse du 18 octobre 1994). Ce communiqué appelle quelques commentaires. En premier lieu, il aurait été un peu surprenant que ces élections se déroulent sans le moindre accroc dans un pays si jeune sur le plan démocratique et dans une telle situation matérielle. Dans un deuxième temps, il faut relever que les plaintes concernant l'accès aux médias recoupent d'autres informations[10] qui font état d'un contrôle, toujours efficace, des anciens communistes sur la radio et la télévision. Enfin, l'un des points importants de la contestation vise la nationalité. Nous voilà de nouveau confrontés à la loi sur la citoyenneté.

Pourtant, la contestation de ces élections n'est pas venue des Albanais ou des autres minorités mais bien de la principale communauté ethnique du pays, les Slavomacédoniens. L'ORIM-PDUNM a dénoncé des irrégularités, demandé l'annulation du premier tour puis boycotté le deuxième tour des législatives que ses partisans ont tenté de perturber. Elle a aussi organisé une manifestation de 20 000 personnes à Skopje, entre les deux tours. Ce boycottage suscite notre interrogation. Il a entraîné l'absence de l'ORIM-PDUNM au sein du nouveau parlement alors que ses chefs savaient, à l'issue du premier tour, que la délégation du Conseil de l'Europe considérait «ces élections comme un pas important dans le sens de la démocratie» (18 octobre). De ce fait, les chefs de l'ORIM-PDUNM ont couru le risque de passer, aux yeux des observateurs occidentaux, pour de mauvais perdants. Car il était évident qu'avec 14,47% des voix à leur candidat à l'élection présidentielle, ils auraient pu difficilement remporter un tiers des sièges au parlement, comme en 1990. Nous pouvons également penser que ses leaders n'ont pas souhaité apporter leur caution à des élections entachées d'«irrégularités potentiellement graves» selon les observateurs de

l'OSCE.

Que conclure alors de ce boycottage ? D'abord qu'il a considérablement nui à la crédibilité de ces élections, pourtant ô combien importantes pour l'avenir du processus démocratique en ARYM. Ensuite que l'absence de représentation parlementaire risque d'être un argument de poids pour les plus radicaux des membres de l'ORIM, lesquels pourraient alors entraîner leur mouvement dans des actions clandestines. A cet égard, il est bon de rappeler l'existence d'un Comité de Défense de l'ORIM, tout aussi bien structuré, armé et déterminé que l'Unikom albanais.

Le boycottage de l'ORIM a donc passablement assombri l'éclatante victoire de l'Alliance pour la Macédoine. Sa principale composante, le parti Social-Démocrate de Macédoine (PSDM), a obtenu 58 sièges alors qu'il en avait 31 dans la précédente assemblée. Le Parti socialiste (PSM) en a obtenu 8 au lieu de 5 précédemment. Le Parti libéral (PL) a remporté 29 sièges alors que sous le nom d'Alliance des forces réformatrices il n'en avait gagné que 16 en 1990. Le bilan est plus décevant pour les partis albanais. Ensemble, ils avaient 25 sièges dans le parlement sortant. Cette fois le PPD a obtenu 10 sièges, ses dissidents (PPDAARYM) 3 et le Parti populaire démocratique (NDP) 3 également. Que sont devenus les électeurs albanais ? Est-ce l'abstention ? La division ? La loi sur la citoyenneté ? Cependant, le parlement compte aussi un député du Parti démocratique des Turcs (à ce sujet, il faut noter que le porte-parole du gouvernement, Güner Ismail, est turc mais affilié au PSDM). Un membre du Parti pour l'émancipation des Roms (PER) et plusieurs indépendants complètent la composition de la nouvelle assemblée.

Répartition des sièges au sein du parlement *(Sobranje)*[11]

Partis Politiques	**Nombre de sièges obtenus...**	
	en 1990	**en 1994**
ORIM-PDUNM	38	0
PSDM	31	58
PSM	5	8
ARF/PL	16	29
PPD	17	10
PPDAARYM	———	3
NDP	5	3
PER	1	1
Indépendants et autres partis	7	8
TOTAL	**120**	**120**

La coalition au pouvoir dispose ainsi de 105 sièges sur les 120 du parlement. C'est donc en toute logique que Branko Crvenkovski, leader du PSDM, a été reconduit à la tête d'un gouvernement qui compte 10 ministres PSDM, 4 PL, 2 PSM et 4 PPD[12]. Cette composition témoigne de la volonté des partis à dominante slavomacédonienne de faire participer les minorités, notamment les Albanais, à la prise de décision. Ceci démontre également le désir des leaders du PPD de ne pas se laisser marginaliser ni de faire le jeu de l'ORIM[13].

La victoire de K. Gligorov et l'écrasante majorité de ses partisans au sein du nouveau parlement leur interdisent désormais l'échec. Bien qu'ils puissent encore mettre d'éventuels échecs sur le compte de la dramatique situation internationale du pays - et ce à tort ou à raison - il n'est pas sûr que la population continuera alors à leur faire confiance, si elle leur fait réellement confiance aujourd'hui.

Le plus grave reste toutefois la frustration accumulée par les plus extrémistes des deux principales communautés en présence: les Slavomacédoniens et les Albanais. Malheureusement, ni le recensement ni les élections ne semblent avoir suffisamment apaisé les tensions - le boycottage des élections par l'ORIM aurait plutôt eu l'effet inverse. L'existence de groupes clandestins armés et prêts au terrorisme prouve que c'est la légitimité même de l'État, à travers sa prétention à exercer «le monopole de la violence physique légitime» (Max Weber) qui est en cause. La responsabilité de cet état de fait n'incombe certainement pas seulement aux seuls citoyens de la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave. Pourtant, eux seuls peuvent prouver que cet État est viable, car c'est à eux seuls de faire la preuve de leur volonté de vivre ensemble.

NOTES

1. Gilles BERTRAND, "Les meilleures intentions: l'ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine face à la guerre dans les Balkans". **Études helléniques,** 3 (1), automne 1994: p. 81-96.

2. La constitution de la «République de Macédoine» a déjà été amendée en 1992 pour satisfaire aux critères de reconnaissance par la CEE présentés par la Commission Badinter. Pour lever toute ambiguïté quant à d'éventuelles revendications de Skopje sur la minorité slavomacédonienne de Grèce, le gouvernement grec a proposé que la constitution de l'ARYM reprenne l'article de la constitution grecque qui concerne la diaspora. Le porte-parole du gouvernement grec affirme que, depuis le début de l'embargo, la position du gouvernement de Skopje est encore plus dure à ce sujet.

3. C'est pourquoi la création d'une liaison ferroviaire et autoroutière entre l'Adriatique et la Mer Noire, prévue par un protocole d'accord signé le 10 mai 1993 par les ministres des transports albanais, «macédonien» et bulgare, con-

tribuera au désenclavement de l'ARYM et de tout le sud des Balkans. Mais pour l'ARYM, on le voit, l'accès au port de Thessalonique reste un enjeu considérable.

4. D'où l'hypothèse d'un accord helléno-américain visant à renforcer l'embargo contre la Serbie. Le gouvernement grec aurait trouvé un moyen de pression sur l'ARYM convenant à son allié américain dont les casques bleus en Macédoine anciennement yougoslave comptabilisent les violations de l'embargo de l'ONU.

5. Au point que certains contrebandiers de Lojane sont, d'après le reporter français, des Albanais, malgré l'oppression que la Serbie fait peser sur les Kosovars, eux aussi albanais.

6. Sources: • 1981: P. GARDE, **Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie,** Paris: Fayard, 1992, p. 117.

• 1991: J. RUPNIK, **De Sarajevo à Sarajevo,** Bruxelles: Ed. Complexe, 1992, p.9.

• 1994: dépêche AFP, 15 novembre 1994 (accessible sur CD-ROM).

7. Voir mon article cité précédemment, p. 84-87.

8. Dans un mémorandum de 1986, l'Académie des Sciences de Serbie dénonçait la politique titiste vis-à-vis de la Serbie et des Serbes, notamment à travers la constitution de 1974. Ce document fut exploité par Slobodan Milosevic, en particulier pour mettre fin à l'autonomie du Kosovo.

9.Unikom, de l'albanais *Bashkuar Komandim* signifie United Comand/Commandement Uni. Lire à ce sujet: Gus XHUDO,"Macedonia: the trouble from within." - **Terrorism and Political Violence**, 5 (23), hiver 1993: p. 312-335.

10. Voir notamment Liliana KOTEVSKA, "La démocratisation macédonienne freinée par l'omniprésence des anciens communistes." - **La Nouvelle Alternative**, n°30, juin 1993: p.30-31 et **Libération** du 18 octobre 1994.

11. Sources: • 1990: C. CHICLET, "La Macédoine en 1992: une laborieuse reconnaissance." Notes et Études documentaires, **L'Europe centrale et orientale- édition 1993**, n°4984-85, 1993.• 1994: dépêche AFP du 3 novembre 1994 (accessible sur CD-ROM).

12. Pour la composition complète du gouvernement, voir: AFP, dépêche du 21 décembre 1994.

13. Voir mon article cité.

LA POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE SUR LA QUESTION CHYPRIOTE

L'**Association des amis de Chypre** (**A.A.C.**), basée à Paris a adressé aux candidats à l'élection présidentielle française un questionnaire portant sur l'occupation du territoire chypriote par l'armée turque ainsi que sur la demande d'adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne. Nous publions ci-dessous les réponses de **Jacques Chirac** qui, entretemps, a été élu **président de la République française.**

A.A.C.- Depuis plus de vingt ans la partie nord de la république de Chypre est occupée par les forces armées de la Turquie en violation des règles du droit international. Quelles sanctions selon vous la France doit-elle envisager contre ce pays qui se refuse à appliquer les résolutions de l'ONU relatives à l'indépendance, à la souveraineté et à l'unité de la République de Chypre ?

Jacques Chirac - La France soutient un processus de règlement conduisant à une fédération bi-zonale et bi-communautaire , conformément aux résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité. C'est pourquoi, je souscris à l'action du Secrétaire général des Nations-Unies en ce sens.

Si les Nations-Unies doivent naturellement jouer un rôle primordial dans la recherche de toute solution globale de la question de Chypre, l'Union européenne, elle aussi, a intérêt à s'impliquer davantage afin d'amener les deux parties à renouer les fils du dialogue. Il faut donc se réjouir que le 6 mars dernier, le Conseil de l'Union européenne ait estimé que les négociations d'adhésion pourraient commencer sur la base de propositions de la Commission, six mois après la conférence de 1996. Il s'agit là d'une chance historique de faire évoluer le dossier chypriote et un espoir d'aboutir un jour à un règlement global.

A.A.C.- Etes-vous d'accord pour que toute solution de la question chypriote implique ainsi que le propose le président Cléridès la démilitarisation de l'île de Chypre et le départ des troupes turques de ce pays?

Jacques Chirac -La démilitarisation demeure un objectif. Dans les circonstances présentes, il demeure difficile à atteindre, compte tenu de l'opposition des Chypriotes turcs.

Il est évident que la sécurité reste une préoccupation commune pour les deux parties et, dans un premier temps, des mesures de nature à faire baisser la tension (par exemple un retrait partiel des troupes turques) contribueraient certainement à une améliortion du climat dans l'île.

A.A.C.- A la suite de l'intervention militaire turque à Chypre de l'été 1974 plusieurs dizaines de Français dont les biens ont été détruits attendent en vain une indemnisation des autorités d'Ankara. D'autre part celles-ci refusent de permettre une enquête sur le sort des 1618 Chypriotes disparus au cours de cette intervention, et dont certains seraient encore en vie dans des prisons de Turquie. Etes-vous d'accord pour subordonner la ratification par Paris du récent accord établissant

l'Union douanière entre l'Union européenne et la Turquie à l'indemnisation des Français de Chypre et à la fourniture par Ankara de renseignements précis concernant les Chypriotes disparus?

Jacques Chirac -Selon les pocédures en vigueur, l'accord d'Union douanière entre l'Union européenne et la Turquie devra être soumis pour avis conforme au Parlement européen seulement.

Les autorités françaises sont intervenues dès la fin de l'opération militaire turque à Chypre en 1974 pour obtenir une indemnisation de nos ressortissants dépossédés à la suite des évènements survenus dans la partie nord de l'île, mais sans succès. Cette question n'a de chance de progresser que dans le cadre d'un règlement global du problème de Chypre.

S'agissant plus précisément du problème douloureux des disparus, je serais prêt, dans le cadre de la reprise des négociations intercommunautaires, à demander aux autorités turques d'inciter les Chypriotes turcs à se montrer coopératifs. C'est aussi l'affaire de la Commission des droits de l'homme des Nations-Unies, notamment sous l'égide du Comité Tripartite sur les disparus.

A.A.C.-Depuis quelques années le ministère français du Tourisme tolère l'organisation par des agences de tourisme ayant leur siège à Paris de séjours dans la zone occupée de Chypre dans des hôtels appartenant à des Chypriotes grecs privés illégalement de leurs biens. Etes-vous d'accord pour faire cesser l'organisation de ces séjours et prévoir l'indemnisation de ces hôteliers?

Jacques Chirac -Je vous rappelle que la France a de façon constante réaffirmé qu'elle ne reconnaissait pas la "République turque de Chypre du nord". Elle ne reconnaît comme autorités légales de l'ensemble du teritoire que le gouvernement de la République de Chypre. En conséquence, la France n'a pas de représentation diplomatique ou consulaire dans cette partie de l'île et ne peut donc assurer à ses ressortissants une protection adéquate.

Je sais que le ministère des Affaires étrangères est intervenu à plusieurs reprises auprès du ministère du Tourisme sur la question des agences de voyages afin de leur rappeler les difficultés que pourraient rencontrer les touristes se rendant sur place.

A.A.C.- Il a été décidé au Conseil européen de Corfou de juin 1994 que le prochain élargissement de l'Union européenne concernerait Chypre. Le 6 mars dernier, le Conseil des Ministres de l'Union européenne a prévu que seront engagées des négociations avec Chypre en vue de son adhésion dans le sommaire suivant la Conférence Intergouvernementale (GIG) de 1998. Soutiendrez-vous la candidature de la République de Chypre à l'Union européenne?

Jacques Chirac -Je voudrais d'abord souligner que c'est sous la Présidence française de l'Union européenne que l'engagement sur l'adhésion de Chypre a été pris.

La candidature de Chypre s'inscrit dans le cadre de la priorité accordée par la France à la dimension méditerranéenne de l'Union européenne.

Dans cet esprit, la perspective d'adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne devrait en outre faciliter le règlement de la question chypriote.

RECENSIONS/BOOK REVIEWS

Alexis Politis, Ρωμαντικά Χρόνια, Ιδεολογίες και Νοοτροπίες στην Ελλάδα του 1830–1880

[Romanticist Years; Ideologies and Mentalities in Greece 1830-1880] Athens: EMNE-Mnemon, 1993 148pp 1760 Drchs

The study of nineteenth century Greece has been augmented recently with the addition of several articles and books that have explored the meaning and the uses of nationalist ideology. The topic of nationalism had been left too long in the hands of diplomatic or literary historical works that either isolated nationalism from the realm of ideas or from its political context. A most interesting "break" with past approaches was made a few years ago by Elli Skopetea's study To "Protypo Vasileio kai E Megale Idea" [The Model Kingdom and the great Idea] that was subtitled "Aspects of the national problem in Greece (1830-1880)" and that appeared in Athens in 1988. The book was well received, although the lack of a systematic book reviewing tradition in Greece precludes any definitive statement about the reactions of the scholarly community and the more general readership. Skopetea's work "broke" with the tradition of literary historiography pioneered by the late K. Th. Dimaras implicitly, by not encasing her analysis within the confines of specific literary genres and currents the way Dimaras has done in his classic studies on the Greek Enlightenment and on Greek Romanticism. Thus Skopetea's approach to her goal, which was to offer an understanding of the evolution of nationalist ideology in Greece followed more closely the contours of political history, though several of the categories she adopted were similar to those Dimaras had worked with, and, moreover, she did not qualify her analysis of ideology with any systematic reference to the political context.

Now, Alexis Politis, a student of K. Th. Dimaras, has come out with a short study of the ideological trends of the same period Skopetea studied that functions, somehow, as a methodological riposte issued from the more literary minded historiographical school in Athens. Unlike the scholarly practices in North America, authors in Greece do not explicitly challenge the work of one another, and the undersigned may be exaggerating the extent to which Politis had any sort of intellectual confrontation in mind. He mentions that he takes a different line from Skopetea once, fleetingly in a footnote. To be sure, despite the prevalence of the Dimaras style and approach - the book, after all is about the "Romanticist years" - Politis' study certainly brings some interesting, fresh insights to the study of Greek nationalism that deserve attention.

The book is divided into five chapters; the "introductory" chapter discusses

the circumstances of the emergence of the independent Greek state. The "first" chapter deals with what the author describes as the crystallization of the national consciousness, and there he deals with the emergence of historiography, folklore studies and also the "Great Idea in a sub-section that is one of the book's strongest points. The "second" chapter, deals with views, meanings and ideologies. There are several short sub-sections that treat topics such as the debate over whether Greece belonged to the East or the West, the concept of the "people", Ancient Greece and, finally, the role of poetry. The "third" chapter is much shorter than the preceding two and deals with "behaviors, attitudes and mentalities." It refers to things such as clothing, dietary habits, the spread of European music and the language question. The concluding chapter deals with "ideologies, mentalities and realities." It deals with how the future was perceived, attitudes towards modernization and the political structures of the country.

Since the book is only 148 pages long, judging from the topics it includes one can appreciate that it is more of a "tour d'horizon" than it is a "tour de force".

Nevertheless, there are interesting insights and new material included in this study, if only briefly and inpassing. Politis combines well the Dimaras like attentiveness to sources stressing the author rather than the text, with a sensitiveness to the fact that statements on, say, the "Great Idea" are not necessarily deeply held beliefs but a way of communicating that may not necessarily be about the "Great Idea" itself but about the particular historical conjuncture. His treatment of the debates over Greece belonging to the East or to the West is similarly sensitive, he qualifies the various quotes by also referring to the particular conditions in which those statements were made.

There is a strong and almost mischievous treatment of how the early nineteenth century views of Greek scholars about Ancient Macedonia were quite different to the subsequent conventional wisdom that had Ancient Macedonians firmly embedded in historical continuum of Greek history.

There are several other very interesting insights that together with the author's obvious mastery of the literary sources of the period offer us an appreciation of the contradictory and "stop-start" nature of ideas and their evolution over time. The extent of the new material the author cites is quite impressive given that there have been several works on the topics he is discussing. The basic message that comes through from the author's analysis is that during this formative period of the ideas about the Greek nation and Greek identity, the protagonists were far less consistent and more unsure about those issues than later generations of ideologies have assumed. It is a welcome reminder that the past and its study are much more complicated than they first appear.

Next to its virtues, this study has its weaknesses. The book's brevity ultimately, becomes a major problem: concepts are not systematically explained, the

reasoning behind the juxtaposition of ideologies, mentalities and behaviours is left unexplained. Even if one makes allowances for the fact that the author himself repeatedly mentions that he is merely sketching out the problems involved in a particular topic, one still feels cheated by the speed at which the author glosses over important, complex issues such as, for example, the wounded pride of the Greeks, an interesting new category he introduces only to skate over it in three or four pages. The level of study of the Greek nineteenth century demands more thorough investigations. One can only hope that the author, true to the Dimaras style, will enlarge on this first approach with a more thorough and systematic work in the near future.

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PARIS ARNOPOULOS, MEDITERRANEAN 2000, VOLUME 1, ATHENS, FOUNDATION FOR MEDITERRANEAN STUDIES, 1992, P. 206

The aim of this book as mentionned in its prologue is "to look into the position of the Mediterranean region in a global perspective and try to forecast its prospects by the year 2000". The book is written by Paris Arnopoulos, but it is the result of research conducted by an interdisciplinary team under the auspices of the Athens based Foundation for Mediterranean Studies. It is divided in three chapters. The first chapter deals with the theoretical framework and presents a model for the study of social systems. The second chapter presents the regional aspects of the Mediterranean world. The third chapter focuses on the economic, cultural and political prospects of the region.

The Mediterranean has been the centre of various civilizations and has a history of more than five thousand years. The Mediterranean world exerted considerable influence on humanity via the Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian and Arab-Islamic cultures.

Furthermore the Mediterranean region qualifies as an international system for three thousand years from a territorial, historical and structural-functional point of view. The author of this study poses the question "whether it will continue to maintain its distinct identity in the face of the revolutionary changes which the world is undergoing presently."

In order to answer this question, the author proceeds with "a geohistorical model of general systems theory, especially constructed for this purpose".

The introduction of a model together with the Delphi technique, enabled the research team to investigate the region as a case study of the Mediterranean world. It's a futuristic investigation which tries to present an overall perspective

of the area in a global context.

The thematic dimension of the model is organized around the three sectors of the social system: economy, culture and polity. In each of these sections the contents are functionally, geographically and historically correlated.

The results of this study may be synthesized as follows:

- the Mediterranean, even today with the centres of the world shifting beyond Europe, remains still "the most important region of the world" from a geopolitical perspective
- nevertheless, from the historical perspective, ("as the cradle of western civilization") the Mediterranean has lost "its centrality in the contemporary world"
- finally one has to note the gap between the countries of the European Union the northern pole of the Mediterranean - and the southern half of the littoral. The author goes further speaking of a "European neo-colonialism" which in the third Millennium might dominate the region's southern half.

There is no doubt that this study is very interesting in that it paints the portrait of a historical region as it evolves towards the third millenium. The theoretical model is also interesting but as the author noted its application "required extensive and contemporary statistical data", that unfortunately were "either incomplete, incorrect, or outdated, making a scientific study almost impossible".

Under these circumstances one may question the specific results of the study. Nevertheless the conclusions of this research seem to correspond to the general picture of the area which we have from various other sources. In addition to the imperfect data, the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, intercommunal conflict in the area and the rise of muslim integrism may change by the turn of the century the whole picture presented in the study. But of course, as the author indicates in his conclusion - and this will always be the weak point of any futuristic study - "reality is not simply deterministic but contains various chaotic elements..." permitting a future always "open ended and full of surprises which no one can predict".

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CHRONOLOGIE -GRECE

10 octobre 1993: Elections legislatives. Victoire de PASOK avec 46,88 % des voix et 170 sièges devant la Nouvelle démocratie (36,30 % des voix et 111 sièges).

12 octobre: Formation du gouvernement du PASOK présidé par M. Andreas Papandréou.

1 janvier 1994: La Grèce préside pour six mois l'Union européenne.

16 février: La Grèce ferme les frontières avec l'ARYM (Ancienne république yougoslave de Macédoine) et décide de la soumettre à un embargo commercial.

6 mars: Décès de Mme Mélina Mercouri, ministre de la Culture.

15-16 avril: Troisième Congrès du PASOK.

18 avril: Cinq membres de la communauté grecque d'Albanie sont arrêtés à la suite d'une attaque meurtrière contre une caserne albanaise près de la frontière avec la Grèce.
22-23 avril: Troisième Congrès de la Nouvelle Démocratie.

25 avril: Décés de M. Georges Yennimatas, ministre de l'Economie nationale.

6 juin: la Grèce bloque l'octroi par l'Union européenne de 35 millions d'ECU à l'Albanie pour protester contre la violation des droits de la minorité grecque de ce pays.

16 juin: Le Parlement héllénique vote le renvoi de l'ancien premier ministre, M. Constantin Mitsotakis devant le Tribunal supérieur spécial sur la base de cinq infractions commises dans le cadre d'une affaire d'écoutes téléphoniques.

24-25 juin: Conseil européen tenu à Corfou sous la présidence de M. Papandréou.

29 juin: La Cour européenne de justice refuse d'émettre contre la Grèce une injonction d'urgence au sujet de l'embargo qu'elle applique à l'A.R.Y.M..

4 juillet: Assassinat à Athènes par l'organisation terroriste du "17 novembre" du diplomate turc M. Haluk Sipahioglu.

13 juillet: Remaniement limité du gouvernement grec. M. Théodore Pangalos quitte les affaires européennes et se voit attribuer le poste des Transports et des Communications.

26 juillet: Le gouvernement grec obtient l'accord de la Commission de Bruxelles pour effacer les dettes d'un montant de 2 milliards de dollars de la Compagnie Olympic Airways.

17 août: le gouvernement grec crée une force spéciale de gardes frontières pour contrôler les points de passage avec l'Albanie.

7 septembre: condamnation des cinq membres de la communauté grecque d'Albanie à des peines de 6 à 8 ans de prison.

11 septembre: M. Papandréou accuse la Turquie d'être à l'origine de la tension entre Athènes et Tirana.

15 septembre: le Parlement héllénique décide de faire comparaître en justice l'ancien Premier ministre Mitsotakis pour avoir touché des pots de vin en 1992 lors de la privatisation d'une cimenterie d'Etat.

19 septembre: Attentat à la bombe contre un car de police dont le bilan est de un mort et onze blessés. Revendication par l'organisation terroriste du "17 novembre".

16 octobre: 1er tour des élections municipales, Dimitri Avramopoulos (ND) emporte la mairie d'Athènes par 54 % des voix en battant l'ancien ministre Théodore Pangalos (PASOK).

24 octobre: M. Soysal, ministre turc des affaires étrangères accuse la Grèce d'avoir installé des Exocet sur des îles grecques proches de la Turquie.

8 novembre: Le banquier Georges Koskotas est condamné à 25 ans de prison pour sa responsabilité dans le plus grand scandale politico-financier de l'après guerre (détournement de 230 millions de

dollars de la Banque de Crète et versement de 75 millions de dollars à son groupe de presse Grammi).

15 novembre: La Grèce annonce qu'elle ne va pas élargir dans l'immédiat, comme elle en a le droit, la limite de ses eaux territoriales en mer Egée de 6 à 12 milles marins.

29 novembre: Le Comité de Prévention de la Torture (CPT) du Conseil de l'Europe accuse la police grecque de pratiquer la torture dans ses services d'Athènes et de Thessalonique. La Grèce rejette les accusations "générales et vagues" du CPT.

10 décembre: l'Eglise catholique de Grèce proteste contre les propos du procureur de Naxos qualifiant les catholiques "d'étrangers commandités par le pape".

19 décembre: Contre l'avis des autres membres de l'Union européenne la Grèce met son droit de veto à la conclusion d'un accord d'union douanière avec la Turquie.

21 décembre: Le parlement adopte le budget 1995, soutenu par les seuls députés socialistes, dont l'objectif est l'assainissement de l'économie héllénique afin de satisfaire les critères de convergence définis au niveau européen.

16 janvier 1995: le Parlement grec suspend les poursuites judiciaires entamées contre l'ancien premier ministre Mitsotakis pour sa participation dans des affaires d'écoutes téléphoniques et de corruption.

8 février: Libération des quatre derniers membres, encore en détention de la communauté grecque d'Albanie condamnés le 7 septembre à de lourdes peines de prison (le 24 décembre le président Berisha avait déjà grâcié un autre Grec également condamné pour la même affaire).

8 mars: Election à la Présidence de la République de Costis Stéphanopoulos, par la Chambre des députés par 181 voix (PASOK + POLA) contre 109 (Nouvelle Démocratie à Athanase Tsaldaris).

18 avril: réunion à Athènes d'une commission gréco-albanaise chargée de résoudre les différents problèmes opposant la Grèce à l'Albanie.

15 juin 1995: Tremblement de terre d'une magnitude de 6,1 sur l'échelle de Richter à Algion sur la côte nord du Péloponnèse: 21 morts, plusieurs disparus et plus de 70 blessés.

CHRONOLOGIE -CHYPRE

20 décembre 1993: Nomination par le Conseil des ministres de l'Union européenne de M. Serge Abou comme observateur aux négociations sur Chypre.

1 janvier 1994: A la suite des élections legislatives du 12 décembre en RTCN ("République turque de Chypre Nord"-partie nord de la république de Chypre occupée par les forces armées de la Turquie) formation d'un gouvernement de coalition présidé par M. Hakki Atun, chef du Parti démocrate (PD) de centre droit et qui comprend aussi M. Ozker Ozgur, le président du Parti républicain turc (PRT), formation de gauche.

17 février: Début des négociations séparées, conduites par M. Joe Clark, représentant spécial du Secrétaire général de l'ONU sur les mesures de confiance (réouverture de l'aéroport international de Nicosie et retour dans leurs foyers des Chypriotes grecs de Famagouste).

25 mai: M. Boutros-Gahli dans un rapport au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU déplore l'échec des négociations sur les mesures de confiance.

30 mai: Déclaration à Ankara de M.Rauf Denktash, chef de la communauté chypriote turque : "Si l'Union européenne ouvrait ses portes aux Chypriotes grecs les Chypriotes turcs choisiraient une intégration à la Turquie".

24-25 juin: le Conseil européen de Corfou déclare que "la prochaine phase de l'élargissement de l'Union inclura Chypre et Malte".

5 juillet: La Cour européenne de justice considère comme illégale les importations en provenance de la "RTCN" (partie nord de Chypre occupée par la Turquie) estimant que le gouvernement du président Cléridés est le seul gouvernement légal de Chypre.

20 juillet: Vingtième anniversaire de l'invasion du territoire de la république de Chypre par les forces armées turques.

2 septembre: Le gouvernement grec critique les accords passés par la Turquie avec l'administration chypriote turque en matière de politique étrangère de défense et de sécurité.

15 novembre: Manifestations à Nicosie de milliers de Chypriotes grecs pour protester contre l'autoproclamation le 15 novembre 1983 de "la République turque de Chypre Nord".

16 février 1995: Nicosie s'appelle désormais Lefkosie. A l'unanimité le conseil municipal de Nicosie, dans le cadre d'une campagne de standardisation des noms visant à ce que ceux ci correspondent à leur prononciation en langue grecque, décide que la capitale de Chypre doit désormais s'appeler Lefkosie.

6 mars: A l'occasion de la conclusion d'un accord d'union douanière entre l'Union européenne et la Turquie, la Grèce obtient que les négociations sur l'adhésion de Chypre commenceront dans les six mois qui suivront la Conférence intergouvernementale convoquée en 1996 pour réformer les institutions européennes.

24 mars: Le ministère chypriote des affaires étrangères dément l'information, publiée dans *l'Express*, selon laquelle la France aurait vendu, via Chypre,des missiles air sol à l'Iran, et déclare que son pays n'accepte pas d'être utilisé comme lieu de transit.

25 mars: Visite à Chypre de M. Gerasimos Arsenis, ministre grec de la Défense nationale, qui confirme le projet "d'espace militaire uni" de la Grèce et de Chypre.

26-27 juin 1995: Conseil européen de Cannes. Participation de la République de Chypre représentée par le président Clérides, pour la première fois, à un sommet des Chefs d'État et de gouvernement de l'Europe des Quinze. Chypre, ainsi que Malte et différents pays d'Europe centrale et orientale ont été invités à la réunion de Cannes dans la perspective de leur adhésion à l'Union européenne.

LIVRES REÇUS/BOOKS RECEIVED

Le regard crétois, *revue de la Société des amis de N. Kazantzaki*, Saint-Genis-Pouilly (France), no 10. décembre 1994

Giannos Kranidiotis et alias, *Chypre-Union européenne, évolution et perspectives des relations de Chypre avec l'Union européenne*, Nicosie, Ed. de la Banque Populaire, 1994

Cyprus Research Centre (KY.KE.M.), *Yearbook 1992 and 1993*

ACTIVITES ACADEMIQUES /ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES

La revue académique ETUDES HELLENIQUES/ HELLENIC STUDIES a été lancée à Montréal le 12 mars 1995 sous l'égide du consul général de Grèce Nikos Vamvounakis, du député provincial et ex-ministre Christos Sirros et de la députée fédérale Eleni Bakopanos.

Kostas Gouliamos, professeur à l'Université d'Ottawa, qui a présenté la revue, tout comme le consul général de Grèce, Nikos Vamvounakis, le député Christos Sirros, et le directeur du Centre de recherches helléniques, Stephanos Constantinides, ont souligné l'importance que revêtait la publication d'une telle revue pour la mise en valeur de l'hellénisme au sein de la communauté académique, du milieu diplomatique, des média et plus généralement de l'opinion publique.

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