

ETUDES HELLENIQUES

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IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION A L' HEURE DE LA GLOBALISATION

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*La Question des Chypriotes disparus
en voie de solution*

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*Discontent, but also blind? Understanding the
discipline of International Relations in Greece*

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1

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Table des matières / Table of Contents

Les asymétries de la globalisation ou la tyrannie de la réification
 Kostas Gouliamos, Antonis Theocharous, Yannis Sakellis 7

The Asymmetries of Globalization or the Tyranny of Reification
 Kostas Gouliamos, Antonis Theocharous, Yannis Sakellis 15

**A Global Workforce: The Phenomenon of Labour Mobility in the EU
 with Special Reference to Cyprus**
 Kostas Gouliamos, Antonis L. Theocharous 23

**A Commentary on the Relationship
 between Globalization and Democracy**
 Michalis Spourdalakis..... 47

Globalization and Greek Foreign Policy
 Stephanos Constantinides 57

Globalizing Greek Society: An Overview of Immigration to Greece
 Christos Kassimeris 75

**In Pursuit of Utopia: “A Pakistani, an Arab and a Scotsman 'Return'
 to Cyprus...”**
 Christopher Kyriakides..... 95

**Global Thoughtlessness, the Social Contract and the Double Bodied
 Female Other in the Cypriot Imaginary**
 Evi Haggipavlu 113

**Globalization for Whom? The US and Europe: A Light House Project;
 Challenging the Ethics of Neoliberalism**
 Constandinos Tsiourtos 131

La Question des Chypriotes disparus en voie de solution
 Jean Catsiapis 149

**Discontent, but also blind? Understanding the discipline
 of International Relations in Greece**
 Spiros Makris, Kyriakos Mikelis 155

Human Rights in Cyprus and the Myth of Isolation of Turkish Cypriots
 Stephanos Constantinides 181

Chronologies 185

Les asymétries de la globalisation ou la tyrannie de la réification

Kostas Gouliamos*

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La manière avec laquelle Ibn Khaldun aborde l'histoire a influencé l'orientation épistémologique de beaucoup de savants et chercheurs musulmans et occidentaux. Plus particulièrement, nous pouvons affirmer que son étude critique d'avant-garde du monde pré-moderne (14^e siècle) a contribué à faire avancer de façon remarquable la pensée de Hegel et plus tard celle de Marx. En effet, tous les deux sont les instigateurs d'une théorie, qui explique le développement historique en tant que processus dynamique. Le travail d'Ibn Khaldun a jeté les bases de divers domaines de connaissance de façon significative incluant la sociologie et l'économie. Malgré le fait que le philosophe musulman ne soit pas devenu une figure dominante dans les cercles académiques, son étude analytique est considérée comme un exposé lucide et juste des facteurs ayant contribué au développement de la civilisation et les causes de son déclin. Selon Zahoor (1996), quatre points essentiels dans l'étude et l'analyse de l'histoire apparaissent dans la pensée critique d' Ibn Khaldun:

- relier les événements les uns aux autres à travers une relation de cause à effet,
- dresser une analogie entre le passé et le présent,
- prendre en considération l'effet de l'environnement,
- prendre en considération l'effet des conditions préexistantes ainsi que des conditions économiques.

En effet, la conception d'Ibn Khaldun ne se limite pas à cela mais peut être poussée plus loin comme les quatre points plus haut mentionnés présentent et ébauchent avec précision les tendances de la globalisation moderne. Il est

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alors possible, de discerner une certaine progression dans notre compréhension des relations, par exemple, entre conditions économiques et les effets de l'environnement. En suivant le cadre théorique de Khaldun, il serait possible de soutenir que pour beaucoup de membres de la communauté académique (Abu-Lughod 1989, Frank 1993) le terme de globalisation se rapporte à des modèles de division économique du travail, qui ont fait leur apparition après le 15^e ou le 16^e siècle. Il est d'une importance capitale de reconnaître que les structures globales ont été organisées durant ces siècles par les pouvoirs coloniaux avant tout pour répondre à des modes spécifiques d'exploitation des matériaux et de la terre à travers un appareil de déplacements historiques spécifiques. Finalement les trois continents (Afrique, Asie et Amérique) ont vécu une colonisation européenne massive ainsi que de nouveaux modèles de domination impériale (hégémonie).

En prenant en considération qu'Ibn Khaldun a aidé à illustrer l'essence de l'histoire comme une lutte continue pour l'hégémonie, nous pouvons affirmer que la colonisation européenne a donné naissance à un modèle despotique de domination politique et, par conséquent, à un système analogue de gouvernement. Le fait que l'appareil de globalisation ait exercé une domination absolue dans ces années là, est relié en très grande partie à la division économique du travail entre les centres mondiaux, les périphéries et les semi - périphéries (Wallerstein 1974, 1979).

Comme Marx (1976, 283) l'a noté, «le travail est, avant tout, un processus entre l'homme et la nature, un processus par lequel, l'homme à travers ses propres actions, sert de médiateur, règle et contrôle le métabolisme entre lui-même et la nature». «À travers ce mouvement», Marx a postulé, «il [l'homme] agit sur la nature externe et la modifie, et de cette façon il change simultanément sa propre nature».

La recomposition de l'hégémonie capitaliste

Le modèle de développement économique - qui a émergé après le 16^e siècle - présente l'universalité de la réification comme un processus affectant toutes les couches de la société. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui la globalisation est caractérisée par l'interdépendance et l'interaction asymétrique dans la production et le processus d'échanges; de telles asymétries appliquées à la technologie, au mouvement du capital et à l'organisation du travail conduisent à une particularisation accrue de l'activité productive. Un des résultats de la toute puissance de l'interaction asymétrique du globalisme est

la rationalisation des disparités sociales, culturelles et économiques ainsi que la tendance à réduire les citoyens à des unités et des groupes des consommateurs. Dans cette optique, la philosophie de la globalisation qui est orientée vers le capitalisme endosse la tyrannie de la réification comme elle prône «le marché libre» en tant que modèle le plus efficace des relations sociales. Ce modèle se prête à une polysémie des pratiques aussi bien qu'à des formations dominantes, résiduelles et émergentes. Sensible aux aspects indéterminés politiquement de ces formations, Raymond Williams (1983) et Amartya Sen (2002) ont souligné que la dominance hégémonique – la recomposition de l'hégémonie capitaliste – devenait intensément multinationale, devancée par la globalisation du capitalisme et la culture d'une Guerre froide renouvelée. Habermas (1976) a aussi essayé de saisir le concept du capitalisme comme un système de suppression, et de déterminer les caractéristiques qui maintiennent la continuité de la dominance. Pour lui, la période de développement corporatif accru est légitimée à travers l'exercice précisément du genre de «pouvoir normatif» (dominance hégémonique), et qui est exprimée - au nom de l'état corporatif – à travers des formulations et des conditions instrumentales. Dans ce contexte, Gouldner (1976) soutient qu'aussi longtemps que de telles actions capitalistes peuvent être reliées au modèle d'Habermas de la suppression des intérêts des classes subordonnées inférieures, elles doivent aussi impliquer le contrôle de l'état.

Par conséquent, dans le mode de production capitaliste, le niveau économique est aussi bien dominant et déterminant (Althusser et Balibar 1970). Ceci évidemment ne signifie pas qu'ils sont si indépendants l'un de l'autre. Au contraire, la construction par Althusser du concept de mode de production fournit un mode d'articulation déterminé, aussi bien à l'intérieur et entre les niveaux.

De plus, alors qu'on assiste dans les sociétés contemporaines à un déplacement de l'entreprenariat vers la cartellisation, une caractérisation spatiale du mode de production fait son apparition dans le système global.

Selon l'argumentation de M. Castells (1977, pp. 129-130), il existe trois niveaux pertinents du mode de production dans le système global: l'économique, le politique et l'idéologique. En se fondant sur cette catégorisation, il souligne les principales trajectoires au niveau économique.

1. Production: «l'ensemble de réalisations spatiales dérivées du processus social de reproduction des moyens de production et des instruments de travail» (p. 129);

2. Consommation: «l'ensemble de réalisations spatiales dérivées du processus social de reproduction de la main d'œuvre» (p. 130).
3. Échange: «... peut être compris pas en lui-même mais en terme des éléments qu'il relie» (p. 130).

Concernant le niveau de l'Etat, Castells a montré que «l'appareil de l'Etat non seulement exerce la domination de classe mais aussi lutte, aussi loin que possible, pour régler les crises du système afin de le préserver» (1977, 208).

La tâche cruciale analytique de l'idéologie est reliée à l'organisation symbolique de l'espace, que Castells détermine comme «un réseau de signes, dont les signifiants sont faits de formes spatiales et les signifiés sont des contenus idéologiques, dont l'efficacité doit être construite de leurs effets sur la structure sociale comme un tout» (1977, 127).

D'un point de vue idéologique, beaucoup d'universitaires soutiennent que le néolibéralisme - comme une phase de la globalisation capitaliste - a été récemment confronté à une période de crise. Pour Massiah (2007) «la crise est étroitement inter-reliée à l'importance grandissante prise par l'alter-globalisme, qui a renforcé les contradictions internes du système. Ce refus d'accepter les choses comme elles sont, exprimé par le slogan «un autre monde est possible» va également à l'encontre des offensives idéologiques qui ont suivi la chute du Mur de Berlin en 1989: «la Fin de l'Histoire» et la «Guerre des Civilisations». Néanmoins, la crise du néolibéralisme peut aussi être identifiée au sein des pratiques nomologiques des structures institutionnelles globalisées de certaines organisations supra ou hyper-ethniques (P. ex. NAFTA, G8, OTAN, le Forum de Davos, O. M. C, etc.). De telles pratiques institutionnelles impliquent plus que le divorce de «moyens» et des «fins» et, plus qu'une distinction entre «policy relevant» et «policy-forming» les contributions de l'état postmoderne «ayant trait à la politique».

Ce que cet auteur suggère, alors, est que dans le contexte du globalisme contemporain, les relations ou /et les fonctions asymétriques existent d'une façon beaucoup plus déterminante que ce que nous avons connus dans le passé.

De façon similaire, étant au courant des asymétries des informations culturelles, Gouliamos (1977) a mis l'emphase sur la question de la diminution de l'Etat-nation à cause des politiques se référant au capital de l'information (des nouvelles technologies des médias). Sa perspective se penche sur les façons avec lesquelles les narrations fétichistes du capital ont

construit leur propre place. Ceci inclut, tout stade dans le processus de production – à partir des produits de consommation, aux identités, ‘styles’ et moyens – qui souligne la pérennité de la dominance hégémonique des élites hyper-nationales. Comme un système avancé de représentation de cette dominance, les nouvelles technologies de communication – par exemple l’autoroute de l’information – présentent des façons de voir (fantasme voyeuriste) et d’agir (consommation remarquable) dans le microcosme du «village global». Un tel spectre semble toujours demeurer dans la réception de formes tordues de temps et d’espace à l’intérieur d’un réseau plus large de représentation, qui menace d’éclater les limites des identités culturelles. De plus, nous pouvons présumer que l’appareil d’injustice et d’exploitation, le choc violent apparent des sensibilités ou une structure des sentiments d’identités culturelles dans le «village global» post -moderne ont produit un phénomène «néo-raciste», qui – selon Balibar (1991) – se préoccupe de formes culturelles plutôt que biologiques.

De bien des façons, les formes et les pratiques de fétichisation, qui ont procédé dans l’identification - dans la forme de l’immigration- ou du plaisir visuel masquent les construits patriarcaux de la globalisation. Ces construits se trouvent entre l’emphase fortement sociale de la culture topologique/locale et l’emphase forte de la mythologie du «marché libre»; une kyrielle d’images et symboles imaginaires d’interaction ou intégration (cosmopolitisme) visant à consolider l’appareil de l’élite hyper-nationale.

De façon générale, par globalisme «nous entendons les normes, institutions et lois qui supportent l’accumulation globale du capital selon des principes neo-libéraux». Le globalisme défie les hypothèses démocratiques sur la souveraineté des Etats et la citoyenneté nationale. Sous le globalisme, les Etats sont:

- moins orientés vers des demandes extérieures.
- concentrés sur des exportations maximales, en libérant le flux du capital et en enrichissant les droits corporatifs transnationaux comme le «traitement national».
- enfermés dans des principes néo-libéraux par des programmes d’ajustement structurels dans le Sud et par des traités internationaux (par ex. NAFTA), et des institutions internationales» (Laxer, 1995).

En se détournant d’une préoccupation exclusive de production culturelle, échange et consommation, Amartya Sen (2000) nous rappelle que la

globalisation est souvent vue comme une occidentalisation globale.

De plus, en partant de l'expatriation de S. Amin (2000) et de la thèse selon laquelle les dichotomies (marché/démocratie et globalisation/universalisme) sont plus contradictoires que complémentaires, nous fournissons- à travers cette publication spéciale une base de théories englobantes, multidisciplinaires et à jour aussi bien que des concepts «intersectés» sur la nature de plus en plus différenciée d'une société civile particulière (Chypre et Grèce) dans un monde global.

Le but de cette édition spéciale n'est pas de dresser une série sans fin d'exposés détaillés et synoptiques des théories mais d'entreprendre et poursuivre un engagement, une étude critique avec d'autres travaux afin d'établir les paramètres centraux ou/et éléments vers une nouvelle perspective.

Les articles démontrent les problèmes socio-culturels actuels (tels la pauvreté, l'inégalité, le travail, de nouvelles valeurs, le corporatisme, le renforcement du pouvoir public, l'interaction culturelle, l'asymétrie de l'information etc.) en incorporant et /ou synthétisant les nouveaux rôles pour les médias et les appareils d'Etat dans la construction de la réalité de l'ordre moderne.

Les auteurs de cette édition spéciale mettent particulièrement l'accent sur l'analyse des pratiques globales qui ont exploité la démocratie sociale et mobilisé le soutien de la politique pour la prise des mesures économiques et disciplinaires drastiques qui ont davantage d'effets sévères de façon à les rendre plus profondes que les techniques d'élection politique en se concentrant particulièrement sur la lutte idéologique de transformer «le sens commun» ou /et les pratiques sociales de dépendance collectiviste aux vertus de «l'individualisme possessif» et la compétition du «marché libre».

Avant tout, nous considérons cette édition comme une contribution à ce processus, et nous espérons en même temps qu'en fournissant un arrière-plan général à l'étude des relations sociales des phénomènes de globalisation, elle va encourager les universitaires à poursuivre l'étude des sujets spéciaux qui les intéressent plus particulièrement de façon plus approfondie.

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The Asymmetries of Globalization or the Tyranny of Reification

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Ibn Khaldun's account on history has stimulated the epistemological orientation of many Muslim as well as Western scholars. In particular, we can argue that his pioneer critical study of history of the pre-Modern world (14th century) created remarkable impulses in Hegel's and, later, Marx's thought. Indeed, both of them have worked out a theory to explain historical development as a dynamic process. Significantly, Ibn Khaldun's work laid down the foundations of several fields of knowledge, including sociology and economics. Despite the fact that the Islamic philosopher has not become a dominant figure inside modern academic circles, his analytical study is considered as a lucid and accurate exposition of factors contributing to the development of civilization and the causes of decline. According to Zahoor (1996), four essential points in the study and analysis of history occurred in Ibn Khaldun's critical insights:

- relating events to each other through cause and effect,
 - drawing analogy between past and present,
 - taking into consideration the effect of the environment,
 - taking into consideration the effect of inherited and economic conditions
- In fact, Ibn Khaldun's conception can be pressed further as his four points present and schematize with precision the trends of modern globalization. It is possible, then, to discern a certain progression in our understanding of the relations, for instance, between economic conditions and the effect of the environment. Following Ibn Khaldun's theoretical framework, it

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would presumably be possible to argue that for many scholars (Abu-Lughod 1989, Frank 1993) the term of globalization refers to the patterns of economic division of labor that emerged after the 15th or 16th century. It is of utmost importance to recognize that global structures have been organized in those centuries by the colonial powers to primarily correspond to specific modes of material/land exploitation via an apparatus of historically specific displacements. Ultimately, therefore, the three continents (Africa, Asia, and America) have experienced a massive European colonization as well as new patterns of imperial domination (hegemony).

Taking into consideration that Ibn Khaldun has helped to illustrate the issue of history as a continuing struggle for hegemony, we can assert that the European colonization gave rise to a despotic pattern of political domination and, therefore, to an analogous system of government. The fact that the globalization apparatus has exercised absolute domination in those years is very much related with the economic division of labor among world centers, peripheries, and semi-peripheries (Wallerstein 1974, 1979).

As Marx (1976, 283) noted, 'labor is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process, by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature'. 'Through this movement', Marx postulated, 'he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature'.

The recomposition of Capitalism's hegemony

The pattern of economic development - that emerged after the 16th century – presents the universality of reification as a process affecting all strata of society. Up to date, globalization is characterized by interdependence and asymmetric interaction in the production and exchange process; such asymmetries applied to technology, movement of capital and the organization of labor, leading to increasing particularization of the productive activity. One result of the omnipotence of the asymmetric interaction of globalism is the rationalization of social, cultural and economic disparities and the tendency to reduce citizens to consumer units and groups. In view of this, the capitalist-oriented philosophy of globalization endorses the tyranny of reification as it extols 'free market' as the most workable model of social relations. This model lends itself to the polysemy of practices as well as to dominant, residual and emergent formations. Sensitive to the politically indeterminate aspects of

these formations, Raymond Williams (1983) and Amartya Sen (2002) noted that hegemonic dominance - the recomposition of Capitalism's hegemony - was becoming intensively multinational, advanced by the globalization of Capitalism and the culture of a renewed Cold War. Habermas (1976) also attempted to assess the concept of Capitalism as a system of suppression, and to determine the characteristics that maintain the continuity of dominance. For him, the period of increasing corporate development is legitimized through the exercise of precisely the kind of 'normative power' (hegemonic dominance), and that it is expressed - in the name of the corporate state - through instrumental formulations and conditions. In this context, Gouldner (1976) argues that as far as such capitalist actions can be connected to Habermas's model of the suppression of the subordinated classes' interests, they must imply the capture of the state.

Consequently, in the capitalist mode of production, the economic level is both dominant and determinant (Althusser and Balibar 1970). This evidently does not mean that they are so independent of one another. Instead, Althusser's construction of the concept of the mode of production provides a determinate mode of articulation, both within and between the levels.

Moreover, as contemporary societies experience an intense shift from entrepreneurialism to cartelization, a spatial characterization of the mode of production occurs in the global system.

Following M. Castells' argumentation (1977, pp. 129-130), there are three levels pertinent to the mode of production in the global system: the economic, the political and the ideological. Based on this categorization, Castells outlines the main trajectories at the economic level:

1. Production: 'the ensemble of spatial realizations derived from the social process of reproducing the means of production and the objects of labor' (p. 129);
2. Consumption: 'the ensemble of spatial realizations derived from the social process of reproducing labor power' (p. 130);
3. Exchange: '...can be understood not in itself but in terms of the elements it connects' (p. 130).

As far as for the political level, Castells has shown that 'the state apparatus not only exercises class domination but also strives, as far as possible, to regulate the crises of the system in order to preserve it' (1977, 208).

The crucial analytical task of ideology is connected to the symbolic

organization of space, which Castells determines as 'a network of signs, whose signifiers are made up of spatial forms and whose signifieds are ideological contents, the efficacy of which must be construed from their effects on the social structure as a whole' (1977, 127).

From an ideological point of view, many scholars argue that neoliberalism - as a phase of capitalist globalization - has recently been exposed to a crisis stage. For Massiah (2007) "crisis is closely interrelated to the growing importance taken by alter-globalism, which has reinforced the system's internal contradictions. This refusal to accept things as they are, expressed by the slogan "Another world is possible" also goes against the ideological offensives that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989: "the End of History" and the "War of Civilizations". Nevertheless, the crisis of neoliberalism can also be identified within the nomological practices of globalized institutional structures of certain supra- or hyper-national organizations (i. e. NAFTA, G8, NATO, Davos Forum, W. T. O, etc). Such institutional practices involve more than the divorce of 'means' from 'ends', however, more than a distinction between 'policy-relevant' and 'policy-forming' contributions of the postmodern state. What this suggests, then, is that in the context of contemporary globalism, the asymmetric relations or/and functions exist in a far more determining way than is acknowledging the past.

Similarly, aware of the cultural information asymmetries, Gouliamos (1997) has emphasized the issue of the diminution of the nation-state due to neoliberal global policies particularly those referring to information (new media technologies) capital. His perspective is predicated on the ways in which the fetishistic capital narratives have constructed their own allotted locus (place). This includes every stage in the process of production - from commodities to identities, 'styles' and meanings - which underlines the perpetuation of hegemonic dominance of the hyper-national elites. As an advanced representation system of this dominance, the new communication technologies - for instance, information highway - pose also questions of the ways of seeing (voyeuristic phantasy) and acting (conspicuous consumption) in the microcosm of 'global village'. Such a spectrum seems always to reside in the reception of distorted forms of time and space within a much larger network of representation that threatens to burst the limits of cultural identities. Moreover, we can assume that the apparatus of injustice and exploitation and the apparent violent clash of sensibilities or a structure of feelings of cultural identities in the post-Modern 'global village' has (re)produced a "neo-racism" phenomenon, one that-according to Balibar

(1991)- preoccupies itself with cultural rather than biological forms.

In many ways forms and practices of fetishization, processed of identification (in the form of immigration) or visual pleasure mask the globalization's patriarchic constructs. These constructs stand between the strongly social emphasis of topological/local culture(s) and the strongly emphasis of the 'free market' mythology; a constellation of images and imaginary symbols of interaction or integration (cosmopolitanism) which aim at the affirmation of the hyper-nation elite's apparatus.

Overall, by globalism "we mean the norms, institutions, and laws that support global capital accumulation along neo-liberal principles. Globalism challenges democratic assumptions about the sovereignty of states and national citizenry. Under globalism, states are:

- Oriented less to internal demands.
- Focused on maximizing exports, freeing the flow of capital and enshrining transnational corporate rights as 'national treatment'.
- Locked into neo-liberal principles by structural adjustment programs in the South, and by international agreements (i. e. NAFTA), and international institutions" (Laxer, 1995).

Turning from an exclusive concern with cultural production, exchange and consumption, Amartya Sen (2002) reminds us that globalization is often seen as global Westernization.

Furthermore, starting from S. Amin's (2000) expatriation on the thesis that the dichotomies (market/democracy and globalization/universalism) are more contradictory than complementary, we provide - via this special issue - a comprehensive, multidisciplinary and up-to-date baseline of theories as well as intersected concepts about the increasingly differentiated nature of a particular civil society (Cyprus and Greece) in a global world.

The scope of the special issue is not to imprint a series of endless, tedious synoptic reviews of theories but to pursue a critical engagement with other work for purposes of establishing the central accounts or/and elements towards a novel perspective.

The papers demonstrate the current socio-cultural problems (such as poverty, inequality, labor, news values, corporatism, public empowerment, cultural interaction, information asymmetry etc.) by incorporating and/or synthesizing the new roles for the media and the state apparatuses in constructing the reality of modern order.

The authors of this special issue pay particular emphasis in analyzing how global practices exploited the social democracy and mobilized policy support for harsh economic and disciplinary measures in ways that ran deeper than political election techniques, concentrating particularly on the ideological struggle to transform ‘common sense’ or/and social practices from collectivist dependency to the virtues of ‘possessive individualism’ and ‘free market’ competition.

Overall, we consider the issue as a contribution to this process, and we hope that as well as providing a general background to the study of the social relations of globalized phenomena, it will encourage scholars to pursue more deeply specialized topics to particular interest to them.

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A Global Workforce: The Phenomenon of Labour Mobility in the EU with Special Reference to Cyprus

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RÉSUMÉ

La présente étude fournit un aperçu global et une évaluation critique du phénomène de la mobilité de la main d'œuvre au sein de l'Union Européenne en se référant particulièrement au micro-État de Chypre. En même temps l'étude fournit un ensemble de recommandations politiques visant à restreindre les problèmes entravant l'optimization des niveaux de la mobilité vers Chypre en particulier et l'Union Européenne en général.

ABSTRACT

The present study provides a critical overview and assessment of the phenomenon of labour mobility in the EU with special reference to the microstate of Cyprus. At the same time the study provides a set of policy recommendations for curbing the problems hindering the optimization of mobility levels towards Cyprus in particular and EU in general.

Introduction

As the European Union has celebrated its 50th anniversary in March 2007, the free movement of labour, one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Community law, remains at the forefront of the European Commission's agenda; an essential part of the struggle to achieve their long-term dream of a common internal market. In the face of globalization, rapidly advancing technologies and an ageing European population, it is vital to acknowledge that the way people live and work is changing on a daily

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basis. New jobs are being created and existing ones are being modified or replaced. The European Commission believes that Europe's future success depends heavily on the ability of its workforce to respond and adapt effectively to these changes.

One of the crucial goals set by the European Union during the Lisbon Summit in 2000, involved building Europe into a "knowledge-based economy". European policy makers viewed Europe's skilled labour force as a competitive advantage in a "free market" economy, which needed to be simultaneously nurtured and protected against the hundreds of millions of unskilled workers making up the global economy. Currently, Europe faces a shortage of skilled labour in certain regions and sectors and a lack of job opportunities in others. One of the more vibrant solutions to combat this situation is to procure the mobility of European workers. Occupational (or job) mobility involves changing jobs or employer, while geographical mobility involves moving to another region within a country or moving to another country altogether. Workers can be channelled or attracted into regions with specific needs, thereby reducing both the number of excess skilled workers in other regions and the high levels of unemployment in a given economic sector. Ultimately, workers' mobility can serve to establish a genuine European labour market.

By exercising one of their basic freedoms – that of free movement –, European workers are encouraged to take different jobs, in different countries, within the EU. In this way, workers can acquire new skills, adapt to an increasingly fluctuating labour market and attain better living and working conditions.

This paper begins by examining the current state of workers' mobility within the EU. Next, European policies towards workers' mobility are discussed, with particular emphasis being given to the first and second phases of the transitional arrangements. Various existing obstacles, which may prevent, or hinder, workers from moving from one European country to another, are outlined. These are followed by some of the numerous events and initiatives taking place in order to overcome these barriers to workers' mobility. Finally, the case of workers' mobility in Cyprus is presented.

The State of Workers' Mobility in Europe

Although there are currently few reliable statistics on mobility flows in the EU and on the motives underlying them, it appears that mobility rates, both

geographical and occupational, remain extremely low. The European Commission's recent Eurobarometer survey of 24,000 EU citizens, in September of 2005, identified that less than 2% of Europeans who are of working age live in a European country other than their country of origin (*Europeans & Mobility: First Results*, 2006). This percentage has remained stable over the last 30 years, despite the fact that EU nationals have the right to move to another EU Member State to take up employment and to establish themselves fully in the host State with their family members. This low mobility figure is somewhat surprising given that, when asked by the Commission what Europe represents to them, 53% of citizens cited the 'freedom to travel and work in the EU'. This was then followed by 'the Euro' (44%) and 'Peace' (36%).

Geographical and Occupational Mobility

The mobility of workers in the EU is often compared with that of workers in the United States. In terms of geographical mobility, a 2002 study shows that, annually, American citizens (16.2%) change their place of residence approximately twice as often as European citizens (7.2%). However, the reasons for doing so are partly similar, as 15.2% of people in Europe and 17% of people in America move for occupational reasons (*Labour Markets in the 21st Century*, 2002).

Vandamme (2000) notes that throughout Europe, people regularly travel long distances between their home and work. Indeed, it appears that cross-border commuting between Member States, but with no residence change, has increased steadily if slowly over the past few years. This is reinforced by 66% of Europeans, who expressed they would consider leaving their region in search of work. Nonetheless, cross-border commuting remains woefully low as, on average, only 0.2% of the working population of old Member States actually commute between Member States (*Mobility and Migration Update*, 2002).

Occupational mobility varies across the European Union. Europeans, on average, have had up to four jobs to date. This number is higher in countries such as Denmark and the UK and lower in Austria, Slovakia, Malta, Slovenia, Portugal and Italy (*Europeans & Mobility: First Results*, 2006). According to a 2004 Labour Force Survey, 8.2% of Europe's total employed labour force changed jobs after one year. Year-to-year occupational mobility in Denmark and the UK is around 13%, while in Sweden and

Greece it is approximately 5%. Regarding job tenure, around 38% of the European working population has been with the same employer for over 10 years (*Eurostat EU Labour Force Survey*, 2004). Comparing the European situation to that in the United States once again, workers in the EU stay in the same job for an average of 10.6 years, while workers in the US remain in the same job for an average of 6.7 years (*A New European Agenda for Labour Mobility*, 2004).

Workers' Attitudes towards Mobility

Although 70% of Europeans indicated that they had no intention of moving in the near future, the number of people who were willing to move to another EU country for work varied between 25% (in Austria, Hungary and Ireland) to 50% (in Luxembourg and Poland). Moreover, despite the low level of actual workers' mobility, the Eurobarometer survey identified that 46% of Europeans view mobility positively, while only 11% view it negatively. Coincidentally, Denmark and Sweden – the two countries with the highest mobility rates – strongly believe that people benefit from occupational mobility (72% and 79% respectively), while less than 33% of respondents from Germany, Estonia, Belgium and Greece recognised the benefits associated with occupational mobility (*Europeans & Mobility: First Results*, 2006).

In general, respondents of the Eurobarometer study believed that mobility could indeed enhance job prospects. Results from the Eurostat study lend support to this assertion, as 59% of people searching for work outside their home region found work within a year, while only 35% of people searching for work within their region found work within the same time-frame (*Eurostat EU Labour Force Survey*, 2004). Moreover, 25% of mobile workers who changed jobs acquired additional skills during their new job. This compares favourably to the lesser 15% of workers who learned new skills within their present job. In addition to new and varied job skills, 37% of mobile workers experienced improvements in housing and 22% of mobile workers benefited financially (*Europeans & Mobility: First Results*, 2006).

The Eurobarometer study also offered insight into the reasons holding Europeans back from moving to another Member State for work. Falling out of touch with family and friends and losing valuable social support (such as child care and care for the elderly) were cited as the main reasons for not moving abroad. Many respondents expressed that they were already

happy where they were. Interestingly, some of the other reasons holding people back from moving, such as language and culture, were the exact reasons other people cited for wanting to move (*Europeans & Mobility: First Results*, 2006).

European Policies on Workers' Mobility

Despite the fundamental right of free movement, in the run up to the May 1st 2004 enlargement of the EU, several of the existing Member States enforced transitional agreements, enabling them to deny new European citizens the right to live and work anywhere in the EU. These transitional agreements were put into place as certain Western Europeans feared a mass inflow of cheaper Eastern European workers who, it was believed, would come in search of better work opportunities. Such fears were not new to the European Union. Straubhaar (2001) explains that during the southward expansion of the European Community in the 1980's, Northern Europeans similarly worried about the potential South to North migration rates; particularly, when Greece, Portugal and Spain entered the Community.

Their fears proved to be unfounded since an exceedingly limited number of Greeks, Portuguese and Spaniards moved north; most opted to remain in their home country.

In fact, Straubhaar stresses that the southward enlargement of the EU should serve as a valuable lesson with regards to migration flows, stating that "rapid economic integration into a single market area was, and is, [...] a most efficient anti-immigration strategy" (2001, p. 1). Thus, as working and living conditions of Eastern Europeans improve in their own countries, as a direct result of EU accession, more and more citizens will choose to remain where they are. According to Straubhaar (2001, p. 2), staying put is "rational individual behaviour" in that, combined with the hope of further improvement, people prefer to live and work where they have established roots. People need to have a very good reason – such as a work contract – to leave behind the familiar for the unfamiliar.

While policy makers may advocate the free flow of capital, goods and services, when it comes to people, it seems restrictions are still seen as necessary by some governments. As aforementioned, various transitional agreements were imposed by different Member States. The first phase of these transitional arrangements lasted for the first two years after the accession of 8 new European countries (the EU8), as well as Cyprus and Malta (together

making up the EU10), expanding the 15 original Member States (the EU15) to 25 (collectively, the EU25). From 1st May 2004 – 30th April 2006, the access of European citizens into other European countries depended on the national law and policy of each individual Member State. According to these agreements, workers from one of the new Member States often needed a work permit to be employed. However, workers from the Member States that joined the EU on 1st May 2004 were given priority over workers from non-EU countries. Once an EU worker obtained access to the labour market in this way, then he, or she, benefited from equal treatment.

During the first phase of the transitional arrangements, three EU15 Member States (Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) liberalized access to their labour markets under national law. The United Kingdom, however, adopted a mandatory Worker's Registration Scheme. Under this scheme, workers from the EU8 Member States had to register with the UK Home Office within 30 days of starting their employment in the UK. The remaining EU15 Member States maintained their work permit systems, albeit with some modifications, sometimes combined with a quota system.

Denmark, for instance, issued work permits to EU8 workers on the condition that their work was full-time and was either governed by a collective labour agreement or complied with normal standards for the sector or profession. Work permits were issued without a prior examination of the labour market situation, but the applicants needed to be in possession of a residence permit before commencing their employment. The Netherlands adopted a two-fold procedure. A traditional full work permit system, including a labour market test, applied for most sectors (though a number of sectors and occupations were temporarily exempted from this labour market test). When the exemption applied, a work permit could be granted within two weeks, importantly, without the need for a labour market test. The list of exemptions was reviewed by the government on a tri-monthly basis.

France decided to maintain a traditional work permit system with some exceptions, for example, for work in the research sector. Belgium, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg and Spain also maintained a work permit requirement. A work permit system with several modifications applied in Germany and Austria as well. These two countries also applied restrictions on the posting of workers in certain sensitive sectors. Italy combined a work permit system with a special entry quota for workers from the EU8 Member States. Legislation in Portugal also provided for a quota system.

Three EU8 Member States (Poland, Slovenia and Hungary) applied the principle of reciprocity to EU15 Member States, applying restrictions, while none of the EU8 Member States applied for permission to restrict access to workers from other EU8 Member States. Finally, the Treaty of Accession of Cyprus contained no restrictions on the free movement of workers, while Malta made use of the provisions in the Accession Act, allowing the issuing of work permits automatically for monitoring purposes.

In the months following the 2004 enlargement of the EU into 25 Member States, the flow of workers between the EU10 and the EU15 proved to be very limited and was not substantial enough to affect the European Union labour market in general. Though few studies have been carried out regarding actual immigration flows since the enlargement of the EU, the European Commission published the results of a comprehensive study on the eve of the second phase of the transitional arrangements. Presented on February 8th 2006, the report identified that, with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Austria, the percentage of EU10 nationals in the resident population of each EU15 Member State remained stable; before and after enlargement (*Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty*, 2006).

The report went on to highlight the advantages of free movement. Workers' mobility from the EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe to the EU15 resulted in mostly positive effects. Workers from the EU10 helped to relieve labour market shortages by taking on jobs which locals had previously shunned, thereby contributing to enhanced economic performance within those host countries. Moreover, despite the original fears of EU15 nationals, workers from the EU10 member States did not crowd out local workers. Country nationals proved to be more concentrated in the service sector, particularly in public administration, education and health. EU10 nationals typically took on a wide variety of jobs in catering, leisure, construction and agriculture.

In regards to the transitional arrangements, the report identified that the countries which had not applied restrictions in May 2004 (namely, the UK, Ireland and Sweden), were generally positive about the effects of this decision; their labour markets had experienced elevated economic growth and reduced levels of unemployment. Ironically, flows into Member States without restrictions were comparable, if not lower, to those of Member States which had enforced restrictions. In fact, the European Commission acknowledged that the restrictions sought to be enforced may have

encouraged EU8 nationals to explore other ways in which to perform economic activity in the EU15 Member States; such as where workers claim to be self-employed. Given these findings, the report concluded that there was no evidence to show a direct link between the magnitude of mobility flows from EU10 Member States and the transitional arrangements in place.

The European Commission report stressed that immigration flows from non-EU countries was a much more widespread phenomenon than intra-EU mobility, given that the percentage of non-EU workers in the 25 Member States was, at 4.3%, double that of European workers in the EU (2%). Furthermore, the European Commission expressed that the restrictions placed on workers were not merely unfair but, moreover, simply did not work. Consequently, EU15 Member States were called upon to reconsider the restrictions imposed on May 1st 2004. Furthermore, by this time, the EU8 Member States had already made their position clear. The 8 countries stressed their citizens' fundamental right to freedom of movement as workers in the 25 Member States and called for the lifting of all restrictions.

Following the publication of the above report, the EU15 Member States had until April 30th 2006 to notify the Commission of their intentions for the second phase of the transitional agreements (which began on May 1st 2006 and will end on April 30th 2009). These notifications were decidedly promising. During the second phase, an additional four EU15 Member States – Spain, Finland, Greece and Portugal – opened their labour markets completely, bringing the total to seven (in addition to the UK, Ireland and Sweden). Even though the UK continues its mandatory registration scheme and Finland is, at the moment, working on a registration/monitoring scheme, Italy decided to lift all restrictions in July 2006. This was a development Vladimir Spidla, European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, said would “bring benefits to Italy's economy and the country as a whole”. Italy's recent decision means that eight of the EU15 and, therefore, the majority of European Member States, have lifted restrictions. As a result, workers can now move freely between 18 of the EU's 25 Member States.

Furthermore, several EU15 Member States announced simplifications of their existing national access restrictions to varying degrees. Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were among them. Denmark notified the Commission that it would maintain restrictions while simplifying its procedures at the same time. In the case of the Netherlands, for the period of May 1st 2006 to December 31st 2007, the access to certain

sectors and professions will be facilitated on a permanent basis. Moreover, the Dutch Parliament is in the process of reviewing their transitional arrangements.

Germany and Austria notified the Commission that they would maintain national measures for the second phase. Finally, Hungary and Poland indicated that they will apply reciprocal measures, while Slovenia, on the other hand, decided to no longer apply the principle of reciprocity. None of the EU8 Member States have resorted to the safeguard procedure, which means that the European Commission law on the free movement of workers continues to apply among the EU8 Member States.

Once the second phase of transitional arrangements ends on April 30, 2009, EU15 Member States will be authorized and able to continue applying national measures for an additional two years. However, the transitional arrangements cannot extend beyond an absolute maximum of seven years. They will, therefore, irrevocably end in April 2011. The outcome of the second phase of transitional arrangements is considered an important step forward in the context of the 2006 European Year of Workers' Mobility.

The syndrome of the global “free market”: Obstacles to European Workers' Mobility

The latest developments, regarding the Member States' transitional arrangements, served to propel the European Union closer to achieving their goal of a “knowledge-based economy”. Although the majority of Member States have done away with the restrictions which previously hindered the mobility of European workers, numerous barriers still exist. Europeans willing to migrate to other European countries for work purposes face significant obstacles that may inhibit mobility. The list of obstacles is long, ranging from cultural barriers to problems in recognizing individuals' qualifications. Moreover, the following obstacles apply not only to potential employees but to their partners and families as well.

Lack of Information

Perhaps one of the most frustrating obstacles to mobility faced by European workers is the lack of clear and up-to-date information regarding the rights and opportunities available to them in other Member States.

Nationals of one Member State, contemplating moving to another Member State for work, need to have access to a wide range of essential information. This information may relate to areas such as pension and social security entitlements, income and career opportunities, residence and work permits, housing and schooling, to name a few.

Recognition of Qualifications

One of the common problems often encountered by workers moving to another EU country is that of having to explain their qualifications in terms of the other country's standard equivalency. In this instance, their qualifications are often called into question and deemed inadequate, used as possible grounds of discrimination against them.

Foreign Language Barrier

Language is one of the major barriers to geographical mobility. According to a 2005 Eurobarometer survey, undertaken across the EU, every second person speaks at least one other language other than their mother tongue. However, significant differences exist between Member States. To illustrate, approximately 70% of UK citizens speak only one language, while in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, the Baltic States, Malta and Luxembourg, more than 87% of the populations speak at least one other language. The most widely spoken foreign language by far is English, as it is spoken by 34% of Europeans (*Europeans and Languages*, 2005).

Socio-Cultural Barrier – Attitudes & Perceptions of Local Natives

An additional obstacle faced by people who move to another country, especially when they are executives in a new country, is the attitude of the local or host population. Whereas, previously, expatriates were most frequently greeted with enthusiasm by overseas subsidiaries, they are increasingly viewed with resentment and seen as appropriating valuable jobs and resources commonly available to the locals. There are cases where the national culture, prevalent in one country, does not coincide with the norms and repertoires of another country. Indeed, elements of a national culture may even differ greatly. This makes it very difficult to accept a total foreigner as part of a team and understand their different way of thinking and acting.

Natives of host countries often worry about the problems which may

result from allowing too many foreigners into the country for work. For example, natives may be concerned with the consequences of ethnic dilution, the adverse influence of foreigners on their culture and traditions, as well as the alteration of the overall social, economic and religious complexion of the country.

Companies' Attitudes towards Mobility

Despite the various benefits attributed to labour mobility, workers seeking job opportunities abroad can and do face difficulties related to discrimination. Certain companies, for instance, may give priority to their own nationals when hiring new employees. A study by the Austrian Public Employment Service surveyed 510 Human Resource managers and discovered that 69% of companies had not recruited any individuals from the European Economic Area (EEA) for a period of 24 months. Although some managers explained that there had been no need to hire any additional staff during that period, other reasons for this finding included negative experience with foreign workers in the past and, moreover, the deliberate favouring of Austrian employees over foreigners (*Recruitment of Staff by Austrian Enterprises*).

It would appear that companies are wary of recruiting staff from other EU Member States. The same study identified that 71% of enterprises suspected obstacles when recruiting highly qualified staff from other EEA countries. Nevertheless, 32% of the companies surveyed had already had experience with staff from other EEA countries.

Job Opportunities for Employees' Partners

One of the important obstacles, often overlooked by both employees and employers, pertains to the job opportunities available to partners of employees sent abroad for work. According to Van der Boon (2006), 85% of women living abroad are there on account of accompanying their partners on overseas assignments. Unfortunately, a vast majority of these women are not able to find work during their time abroad. Significantly, only 12% of women living in another country are expatriate executives. Companies are generally unaware of the difficulties their employees' partners face in regards to finding paid employment abroad. This obstacle, however, should not be ignored, as an estimated 50% of all foreign assignments are refused due to the importance placed on the dual-career factor.

Recently, companies and other bodies have been focusing on this issue. According to a survey of 120 *Fortune* Journal 500 companies, conducted by the Foreign Trade Council, 88% of respondents indicated that dual-career issues would become more acute in the near future. Price Waterhouse Coopers conducted additional research into this, surveying 270 international organizations employing 65,000 expatriates. Eighty percent of the companies reported experiencing major difficulties in recruiting executives to go abroad. According to PWC International, “Getting people to accept international assignments remains a challenge”. Various family issues and the lack of available support to manage dual-careers were given as among the most pressing reasons for refusing posts abroad (Van der Boon, 2006).

Findings by the GMAC/Windham International Global Relocation Trends 2000 Survey highlighted that partner satisfaction and family concerns were the top two factors which resulted in assignment failure. In spite of this knowledge, few companies provide assistance in finding employment for accompanying partners (Van der Boon, 2006). In order to promote increased mobility within the European Union, employers need to devote more attention and resources to issues relating to partners’ adaptability and dual-career management. Responsive corporate policies on spousal and family issues are essential. Ignoring these issues may result in poor job performance and the failure of foreign work tenures. It will also, no doubt, have serious financial consequences.

On a more positive note, the European Commission recently decided to integrate dual-career issues into its action plan; something which is expected to facilitate increased and smoother mobility within the European Union.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Workers’ Mobility

At first glance, it appears that EU initiatives have not succeeded in instilling a genuine “mobility culture” in European workers, nor an actual policy of mobility at the European Labour Market level. As previously outlined, many obstacles of a legal or administrative nature, as well as linguistic and socio-cultural ones, continue to hamper workers’ freedom of movement; subsequently, discouraging interested workers from taking advantage of the opportunities for mobility that may arise. Their apprehension is often linked to a lack of essential information about existing opportunities, as well as, to a related absence of support mechanisms available to them through the EU.

People who have undertaken a move to another European country in order to work often share their knowledge and experience with other people who are thinking of doing the same. These people often advise others to prepare appropriately for the move; stressing that, otherwise, one may be taken aback by the language, culture or job search difficulties that they may encounter in the new country. It is highly recommended that individuals attend language courses and take full advantage of whatever services and facilities are available, either through business corporations or other existing support services.

The Case of Cyprus

Pashiardes et al (2001) were concerned with describing and commenting upon the internal labour market in Cyprus. Writing in 2001, they also made reference to the then imminent accession of Cyprus to the European Union and the continuing harmonization efforts this entails. A fundamental part of this process is the lifting of all restrictions on the movement of labour between Cyprus and the other EU Member States, as well as those countries which will comprise the expanded EU. The ultimate goal is a single and robust European Labour Market with full and free worker mobility for EU nationals.

The above commentators predicted, however, that this potential for free movement, even if secured in theory, would remain unutilized on the ground. They reasoned that experience shows us workers' relocation from one country to another does not take place, particularly when language and cultural characteristics hugely differ. They base this on the similar standard of living the EU Member States (and, at the time, soon-to-be Member States) exhibit, emphasizing that worker migration would only ensue if this standard were significantly different. Regarding Cyprus, Pashiardes et al (2001) described the standard of living as similar to the other countries which are, or soon will be, members of the EU and, therefore, mass worker migration between them was considered unlikely.

Nevertheless, as we pass through 2006, designated as European Workers' Mobility Year, the above general prediction seems to not have panned out in the case of Cyprus. Before examining the European dimension, it is both significant and relevant to provide a brief note on the labour market and immigration in Cyprus in general. Firstly, it should be noted that Cyprus was traditionally a country of emigration, exporting labour to other more affluent countries.

Whilst the end of colonization and the creation of an independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960 did not automatically end this situation, it did produce slightly more favourable conditions for immigration into Cyprus (though the general pattern did not change dramatically until the relaxation in the immigration policy in 1990). Nevertheless, one may speak of waves of immigration coming into the island since independence. The first such sustained wave was the result of the continued conflicts in the Middle East, forcing thousands of workers (Lebanese, Palestinians etcetera) to relocate in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A related but less significant inflow into Cyprus followed at the time of the Gulf War, though many returned to their countries.

The events of 1974 (Turkish invasion) devastated the island, leading to the permanent occupation of 38% of its territory and stunting economic growth (GNP fell by 18%). It also caused a dramatic, albeit temporary, 30% rise in unemployment (*The Cyprus Question*, 2003). The subsequent rapid 'economic miracle' of the 1980s and 1990s created major labour shortages, primarily in the vital tourism industry, which had been vastly responsible for this economic revitalization. This led to a move away from the restrictive immigration policy pursued up to that time in the republic. The relaxation in the immigration policy in the 1990s, coupled with international developments, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, translated into a large influx of immigrants from the former Soviet bloc, as well as Pontians from the Caucasus region. By far the largest groups that have answered the call for work over the years, however, are workers from several Asian countries – especially the Philippines and Sri Lanka (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005).

Workers are the various low-level tourism-based services (in hotels, restaurants etcetera) and in wholesale and/or retail commerce. Michael et al (2005) similarly point to a huge and continued influx of foreign workers to Cyprus, resulting in major increases in the total employment figure and in the Net National Product. Specifically, foreign workers are viewed as responsible for an annual growth rate of 3.4%. Otherwise, all things being equal, the rate would have been 1.6%. This rate has been sustained therefore, argue Michael et al (2005), by foreigners as opposed to locals. Such an analysis is consistent with the findings of Borjas (1995), as well as the more recent findings of Coppel, Jean and Ignazio (2001). These commentators highlight the benefits of immigration, describing a total net advantage to the economy of the host country given the synergies produced by the combination of foreign labour and domestic production catalysts.

The influx itself is partly the result of the local population's desire to pursue further studies, resulting in a shortage of unskilled labour in the predominant tourism industry. In parallel, recent years have witnessed an increased demand for domestic help; similarly, partly due to the higher proportion of local women pursuing tertiary education. This demand has been met almost wholly by a foreign labour force, culminating in a 100% employment rate in domestic help positions by foreigners in the year 2000, as opposed to approximately 60% in 1991. The annual percentage of foreign workers in Cyprus since 1991 reflects a growth tendency in most sectors of the Cyprus economy. However, it is non-European foreign workers that are commonly employed in most unskilled or semiskilled jobs, such as in private households as domestic help. Moreover, according to official figures of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance for 2005, cited in *STOCKwatch* (9 Aug. 2006), one of every three foreign workers is employed as a domestic helper. Other common employment outlets for non-European foreign.

More specifically, the number of total foreign workers in 1995 was 15, 000. This had shot up to 47, 000 by 2004, revealing a 13. 7% average annual growth rate in foreign worker employment within that period. Today, the percentage of foreign workers is estimated to be slightly higher than 20% of the total work force in Cyprus. It is important to note that this percentage also factors in the 20-30, 000 illegal foreign workers (a substantial portion of which are made up of foreign students enrolled in colleges but also working), believed to be employed in the Republic of Cyprus by the Immigration Department (Michael et al, 2005).

In a Country Report prepared for the European research project *POLITIS*, Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2005) identified certain 'restrictive conditions' within Cyprus, as regards immigrant participation in political life. Although their principal focus was on the impediments to immigrant civic participation within the republic, the underlying message is clearly applicable to, and important for, foreigners residing in Cyprus on a wider scale (those coming from the European Union, European Economic Area and elsewhere). In analyzing the contextual conditions of life and work for immigrants, the Country Report describes an 'unsympathetic immigration regime', which exhibits sizeable racial discrimination. In fact, Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2005), go so far as to use the term 'hostile environment' to describe their findings of these conditions. Likewise, earlier findings by Trimikliniotis and Pantelides (2003) designate the labour market as one of the 'discriminatory landscapes of Cyprus'.

There are obvious negative implications for EU workers already employed, or wanting to be employed, in Cyprus, who also naturally fall under the wider banner of immigrants. This is supported by the preliminary results of a study conducted by Cyprus College on behalf of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance. The main strands of this study, up until this time, have been cited in a recent article in the Greek-Cypriot newspaper *Phileleftheros* (12 Oct. 2006). The crux of the findings points to the widespread exploitation of EU employees by local employers. Testimonials of various EU nationals included in the article paint a bleak picture of working in Cyprus, while the article itself is suggestively entitled “Cyprus Inhospitable for European Workers”. All this is further indicative of a ‘hostile environment’, as identified above by Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2005), which thus appears to be a general state of affairs holding true for both European and non-European workers.

As non-European immigrants have been in Cyprus longer and comprise by far the larger group of foreign workers in the country, studies have either focused on them or else contained more relevance to them. This is a situation which has been gradually, but steadily, changing since Cyprus acceded to the European Union however. Whilst non-Europeans continue to overshadow European nationals in absolute figures, as regards employment in Cyprus, there has been a recent and considerable increase in the employment percentage of the latter group as against the former. According to a study conducted by the Ministry of Finance, cited in *STOCKwatch* (13 Sept. 2006), the first quarter of 2006 saw an increase from 11, 731 European workers to 16, 157. This represents a 37. 7% rise in that quarter. Conversely, the non-European employment percentage dropped by 3. 5% in that quarter.

The Republic of Cyprus entered the European Union on the 1st of May 2004, conceivably opening up employment opportunities within Cyprus for all other EU Member State nationals. More importantly, it appears that many EU nationals have indeed begun taking advantage of this potential of mobility. According to official figures of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, cited in *STOCKwatch* (16 Aug. 2006), a significant number of Polish, British, Slovak and Hungarian nationals are currently employed in Cyprus; mainly in tourism, construction and commerce. While this represents a promising start to a more vibrant and freer worker mobility culture between Cyprus and other EU Member States, it does warrant some pause that 45% of EU workers flocking to Cyprus originate from Greece.

The above fact reinforces Pashiardes et al's (2001) position, which implies a positive correlation between the degree of similarity in language and cultural characteristics of countries and the level of worker mobility likely to ensue between them. In other words, given the close linguistic and cultural ties between the two countries, it is no surprise that Greeks migrate to Cyprus in such large numbers. As aforesaid, they comprised 5, 572 (or 45%) of the 12, 395 EU nationals working in Cyprus in 2005 (*STOCKwatch*, 16 Aug. 2006). The challenge, from this point onwards, therefore, is to facilitate an environment in which more EU nationals, in greater numbers and from all Member States, will be able to follow suit.

Conclusions

The outcome of the second phase of the transitional arrangements in April 2006 has gone a long way towards encouraging and enhancing European workers' mobility. Today, Europeans are free to work in 18 of the 25 Member States without facing any serious restrictions. Nonetheless, European nationals who contemplate relocating to another European country for work often come up against various hurdles. These include, but are not limited to: the shortage of clear up-to-date information about available job opportunities, the difficulty of getting academic credentials recognized and the socio-linguistic differences.

According to Vandamme (2000, p. 453), mobility "depends on being properly informed about living and working conditions". By having access to such vital information, individuals will be in a better position to make the necessary decisions required to move forward. In fact, they may be more willing and more eager to move to another country.

Although mobility remains limited – less than 2% of European nationals working in a Member State come from another EU country –, interest in mobility is growing among Europeans. According to EuropeDirect, a telephone service which answers any queries regarding the EU (in all EU languages), approximately 25% of callers' questions are concerned with mobility (*European Year of Workers' Mobility Kicks Off*, 2006). However, in order for European countries to truly achieve a 'mobility culture', a great deal more needs to be done; both in terms of enlightening people by providing them with the necessary and relevant information and in terms of attempting to reduce as many of the obstacles that already exist and which may arise.

In an article in the *Financial Times* (29 Jan. 2001), European Commissioners Frits Bolkestein and Anna Diamantopoulou stressed that governments and economic players at European, national, regional and local levels, need to work towards breaking down the barriers and overcoming the hurdles which stand in the way of European workers' mobility.

General Recommendations

From past and present studies, reports and monographs on mobility of workers, it is evident that there is a need for more surveys to be conducted at a European level on this issue, as shown by recommendations of both individuals and employers. The result that comes out of many surveys on European workers' mobility is that although individuals and employers recognize the benefits of mobility, they are reluctant to engage in such actions in many cases or they are not very optimistic that these advantages will be applied in their own case. Thus, the need to provide more information at an individual, firm and government level on the advantages of mobility is imperative. Particularly, there is a need to better understand the factors that influence the various types of mobility and how each of these types can be promoted further among different target groups. In addition, further research needs to be conducted on the influence of new technologies on the types and level of mobility, as this is an aspect that has been neglected until today.

Moreover, since mobility levels differ among European countries, especially between old and new member states, there is a call from different stakeholders of mobility to tailor solutions and recommendations to match each country's culture, economic and social environment. Since many studies have been conducted so far on the obstacles to mobility, the relevant agencies and policy-making organizations need to acknowledge these barriers, understand the national differences that exist between Europeans and get the necessary training and support from national governments in addressing these issues. At this point, it is also necessary to stress the importance of modifying national policies on workers' mobility, whenever this is deemed necessary by the European Union. Different actions and modifications will be needed for countries that have high levels of workers' mobility compared to other which have lower levels.

An aspect which is evident that requires more information needs to be provided to both individuals and businesses within Europe, is the

implications for reward packages offered in relation to the different tax and legislative systems that currently exist in different countries. People often present this factor as one of the main obstacles to mobility. Moreover, from the worker's point of view, businesses which recognize the advantages of employing workers from different countries and are willing to employ these people, need to offer more family-friendly policies (already applied in many international and local organizations across Europe) in order to support the employee to maintain his/her family and friendly relationships intact. In addition, providing better information to employers through employment agencies and job centers about the rights and obligations of EU nationals can help overcome some of the problems in collaboration often mentioned between foreign workers and local businesses. The increased flexibility of transferring entitlements to foreign pensions is also a very important issue that needs to be addressed within EU legislation. Thus the Commission should be supported by national governments in its efforts to make cross-border pension funds possible. In the meantime, a thought expressed by experts in the mobility field is the setting up of a cross-border group pension fund within a small number of countries, in order to test this in practice before implementing it on a European level. Finally, the government of each European country can offer additional motives and flexible schemes for organizations that are active in recruitment of European workers, in order to induce other firms that are more reluctant to employ these new policies. Furthermore, employers could have a larger pool of candidate employees if they are informed about the unique combination of tax, pension, social security and health care issues that apply in each country, in order to help mobile workers to adjust better to the new situation.

One of the main obstacles to mobility presented in this study and many other studies conducted at a European level was the issue of language. People feel uncertain in moving in another country of which they do not speak the language well. That is why we see that the majority of people in European countries that are mobile choose to move in another country which has the same first language. In order to go beyond this obstacle, countries need to invest in programs which equip local workers with language and other important skills, like cross-cultural management, team working, respecting other people's culture, religion and history.

Overcoming some of the more persistent and serious barriers to mobility will require more than local surveys in each European country and changes in policies on a local level. Greater efforts to explain and promote the

benefits of mobility to the right individuals and addressing their concerns with family-friendly policies may help to diminish some of the major reservations that currently decrease the number of employees who are willing to move from one country to another. In addition, there is a call for emphasizing on greater communication of the obstacles to mobility and how to address them, rather than on trying to change the underlying policies, which are only likely to change slowly over time.

Further research also needs to be conducted on the impact of new technological advancements on the types and levels of mobility. It would be interesting to study over time the extent to which trends towards virtual working, where the employee does not have to leave his or her home country, will affect the level of labour mobility.

A significant aspect to the improvement of mobility levels within EU is the intense and relevant training of public officers that work in relevant offices, by equipping them with the necessary information of legislations and by providing them clear guidelines on how to treat different cases from a variety of European countries. There are often complaints among European workers who visit Cyprus that there is lack of quality service from relevant national agencies because these offices are underemployed. Thus national governments, including Cyprus, need to invest time and money on the mobility aspect.

Finally, an important aspect is the education of young people, as described also in the European Action Plan of 2002 on occupational mobility. The need to educate young people as much as possible, equip them with the necessary skills (like knowledge of at least two European languages besides their mother tongue) and competencies is imperative, since it is evident over time that low-skilled workers have a lower propensity for job mobility compared to educated people. Expanding opportunities for occupational mobility, therefore, requires the greatest efforts to raise education levels and improve skills and competences in all Member States and regions. An important aspect of higher education is the opportunity offered within EU for students to follow part of their studies in another Member State. For example, programs like Erasmus give the chance to students to move for at least three months to another European country and participate in the lectures of a local university. This kind of experience helps young people entering the labour market after they complete their studies to be more open to, and appreciate the advantages offered by, occupational and geographical mobility.

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A Commentary on the Relationship between Globalization and Democracy*

Michalis Spourdalakis**

RÉSUMÉ

La globalisation est devenue un mot à la mode. La démocratie, d'autre part, est simplement présumée. Ce que j'ai voulu faire dans cet article est d'amener les deux notions ensemble et de voir comment la première influence la seconde. Bien sûr, il n'est pas besoin d'être un expert pour comprendre qu'il s'agit d'un sujet extrêmement complexe, qui ne peut être abordé de façon exhaustive dans un bref article. Cependant, il est raisonnable de prétendre qu'une ébauche de quelques dimensions de la relation entre globalisation et démocratie est possible. Néanmoins, j'essaie d'aborder cette question du point de vue d'un citoyen cosmopolite, préoccupé par l'avenir de la démocratie.

ABSTRACT

Globalization has become a buzzword. Democracy on the other hand is simply assumed. What I would like to do in this paper is to bring the two together and see how the former influences the latter. Of course, one does not have to be an expert to see that this is an enormously complex issue which cannot be dealt with exhaustively within the constraints of a brief article. However, it is only reasonable to claim that an outline of some dimensions of the relationship between globalization and democracy is possible. Nevertheless, I will try to do from the perspective of cosmopolitan citizen who is concerned about the future of democracy.

Introduction

Since the 1990s Globalization is probably the most fashionable academic and political term. No other term can match this distinction. This is not of course, because it has provided the always eager academia with new themes for (often tedious and scholastic) discussions but mainly because of the political

* This is the written and updated version of a talk the author has addressed at Lakehead University in Canada.

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use (and abuse) of the term. Indeed globalization, notwithstanding the substance and the realities it denotes, seems to have become a cornerstone for constructing the hegemony of contemporary capitalism. However, and this is rather ironic, despite its obvious political implications, the debates that globalization has generated have neglected to focus on its political consequences. Of course, in addition to the lengthy and often technical debates on the definition of globalization, on its economic traits and on the new conditions it creates for labour, there are some very insightful contributions on major and thus fairly abstract political themes (such as the new role of the state, the role of international institutions). Rarely however do these considerations focus on the transformation of the political institutions that shape the actual politics of individual social formations and therefore determine democratic structures. This neglect betrays an economic reductionism on the part of the critics of globalization which falls into the trap of promoters of the beast, who present it as a natural phenomenon, and thus immune to the possibilities of collective and certainly popular intervention.

In the light of these opening remarks, the relationship between globalization and democracy, the topic is clearly not mundane. Globalization has become a buzz word. Democracy on the other hand is simply assumed. What I would like to do in this few pages is to bring the two together and see how the former influences the latter. Of course, one does not have to be an expert to see that this is an enormously complex issue which cannot be dealt with exhaustively within the constraints of a brief article. However, it is only reasonable to claim that an outline of some dimensions of the relationship between globalization and democracy is possible. Simply put this is what I will try to do from the perspective of cosmopolitan citizen who is concerned about the future of democracy.

Globalization – an Empty Term ?

Globalization, has become a master key capable of unlocking, explaining and/or justifying a number of puzzling political and social developments (e. g. the unprecedented convergence of governmental policies, a whole range of worldwide social perils, expansion and the consolidation of extensive poverty pockets, the permanency of economic refugees etc.). However, the inflationary use of the term has created great confusion and a mythologizing mystique which, if not politically devious, is often misleading. In this context, *Globalization* is increasingly understood as a natural phenomenon.

In fact, virtually everybody is free to define its content at will. Subsequently one is free to identify with some of its aspects and to be selective about its political consequences and implications. Thus, globalization, although it is an ever-present factor and a consideration in almost every social analysis, it tends to become an “empty signifier”, to use Laclau’s term. In other words *Globalization* becomes a meaningless state of affairs, which ironically is, or is perceived to be, at the root of every development in public life and yet no one can do anything about it !!!

Of course, there is a minority that reacts to the admittedly political manipulation of the term, and contends that there is nothing new about “globalization” (P. Q Hirst, G. Thomson: 1999). The phenomena which are commonly identified as elements of its processes are simply the outgrowths the power relations that have characterized our societies for the last two centuries. Although there is no doubt that there is some truth in this argument, it obviously leads to the passive acceptance of the political, social and cultural consequences. Furthermore, and this is probably more important, these approaches tend to overlook the positive dynamics of these very developments, developments which bring people and cultures closer to each other and create the preconditions of the much discussed vision of the “global village”. This is a vision with obviously positive utopian connotations for the future of humanity.

There is no doubt that globalization, as any other development, could only have been part of a particular historical era. This era is none other than the one which is characterized by the subjugation of labor to capital and by the constant commodification of every aspect of human life. However, it would be a mistake, if we do not recognize that what we even intuitively call “globalization” radically transforms the totality of our civilization (economics, politics, society, culture) and that the dynamics of these changes, apart from their positive dimensions, run against the grain of the long standing ideals of the humanist tradition. It is a humanist tradition based on a long standing Greek, Judeo-Christian, liberal and socialist intellectual tradition(s), which has been articulated in the establishment of universal principles of human, civil and social rights.

Thus, given the significance of globalization in combination with the widespread misunderstanding and confusion surrounding its meaning and connotations, the term calls for some clarifications.

To be sure, globalization is an old story. “The accumulation of Capital has always been a profoundly geographical expansion and spatial affair.

...Globalization has been integral to capitalist development since its very inception". Marx and Engels, in their 160 year old *Communist Manifesto*, noted that modern industry not only creates the world market but also that this need for a constantly expanding market "chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe" so that it "must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere". Despite the primarily political nature of the text, which has been underestimated and criticized even by Marxists, the authors offer us with a very penetrating description of globalization. They continue:

"The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country... All old established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature". (K. Marx, F. Engels: 1967, Ch. 1)

"If this is not a compelling description of globalization, then it is hard to imagine what would be. And it was, of course, precisely by way of this analysis that Marx and Engels derived the global imperative "working men of all countries unite" as a necessary condition for an anti-capitalist and prosocialist revolution." (D. Harvey: 2002) However, although one cannot but stay on the very same historical track, there is something new about globalization as we experience it today.

Three Levels of Globalization

The processes of Globalization are in effect the outgrowth of the revolutionary technological advances vividly displayed on the following levels. The British professor Susan Strange, one of the key commentators on

globalization has provided us with a very good description of what it is all about (S. Strange: 1996). It is a description which sees the articulation of these processes on three levels.

- A. On *the level of production*. Production, the process which determines which material goods and services are produced by human societies for their survival and comfort, has been transformed. Instead of goods and services being predominantly produced by and for the people living in the territory of a state, they are now increasingly produced by people in several states, for a world market instead of for a local market.
- B. Globalization also involves changes in the *financial structure* – the system by which credit is created to finance production and trade in goods and services. Where once the creation and use of credit mostly took place within the societies of territorial states, it now takes place across territorial frontiers, in global markets electronically linked into a single system. Of course, within that system there are local banks and markets creating credit for local use. But these are no longer autonomous; they are part of the larger system, more vulnerable to its ups and downs.
- C. Finally, at *the cultural level*, i. e. at the level of perceptions, beliefs, ideas and tastes, globalization has also been making an impact. Here, while cultural differences persist, the sensitivities and susceptibilities of individual human beings are increasingly being modified by the processes of global homogenization. Although this level of globalization is hardest to qualify and/or monitor, it may in the long run be the most important of all changes brought to the fore by globalization. That is because the convenience and the ease, in combination with low cost of communication, the so-called information revolution essentially provides the channels, the means upon the whole globalization structure is built.

As we know and in fact as we are reminded every day, often brutally, these developments are neither smooth nor without striking contradictions. We do not have to think too much to list (and link together) issues of poverty, deprivation, ecological and human needs which have proliferated and spread to unprecedented historical levels. Here is some impressionistic examples: Repeated reports from international organizations such as World Disaster Reports, Red Cross or various UN agencies verify that in the “age of Globalization”, the age of the global coming together of more than fifty local wars spread death to millions while the number of refugees from various reasons is approaching half a billion people. In the “age of Globalization”

more than seventy countries have an average income less than that of the 1980s. While in 1960 the richest 20 per cent of the world's population was 30 times better off than the bottom 20 per cent in the beginning of the new century, this gap has more than doubled. In the age of Globalization, eighty percent of the world's production was directed to the twenty percent of the world's population in the richest societies. At the same time in a number of African countries the figures for life expectancy is dropping dramatically (often far more than ten years and this is not a result of local wars). In the age of Globalization, despite the tremendous economic growth rates in various regions this has not managed to squeeze unemployment out of the picture or to eliminate the extensive pockets of poverty and social exclusion even in the advanced capitalist societies.

The Political Dimension

But where globalization has made more impact than anywhere else is at the political level – in the field of politics, in the field in which we conduct our affairs in the public sphere. Globalization has been transforming politics and with it democracy and democratic processes as we know them. More concretely, it is rather obvious that at the political level the gap between international activities and governmental efficiency has widened. National governments are daily facing the challenges of what has been called the “uneven denationalization” of politics. The state, regardless of its composition and its democratic tradition is systematically being put aside. It is being undermined by the processes of globalization. This development not only drastically reduces its political effectiveness but also reduces the political choices of the governments, which in turn leads to a striking convergence of governmental policies even among governments of opposing political and ideological orientations.

Consider for example the case of the New Labour Party in the UK or its counterpart in Greece, the modernizing PASOK, which dominated Greek politics for more than ten years, whose policies only marginally different from their conservative predecessors. Their policies converge to the degree of being identical. In fact, without great risk, I would argue that these convergences, as they tend to overturn established structures and political ethics, go well beyond the similarities of daily politics and are decisively altering their entire political culture. In addition, it is a common conviction that governments are no longer in a position to secure fiscal stability. They

no longer have the effective tools to counterbalance the pressures of the international markets and fix the exchange and interest rates, or even to determine the (acceptable) rate of inflation.

Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that even governments with socialist and/or social democratic backgrounds cannot convincingly support even a welfare state rhetoric. "International competition" in combination with unprecedented capital mobility leads to a labor cost reduction of suffocating levels. Thus, it is not surprising that these pressures, along with the reduction of state revenues, have led to a unanimous abandonment of social policies. At best, what it has been sustained is a kind of rhetoric or even some timid steps towards policies of "social sensitivity", which however are no longer based upon the principles of the universality of the welfare state. Thus, I would argue that these policies essentially solidify and institutionalize market inequalities and that they in effect function merely as mechanisms for securing social peace.

This striking universality in governmental policies, even in countries with very different historical development, has been accompanied by unprecedentedly increasing levels of bureaucratic and technocratic power not only at the national but primarily at the international level. In fact as globalization gradually but steadily builds its political (international) institutions (NAFTA, the EU, the WTO et al.) politics become more and more removed from society and more and more determined by the bureaucrats and technocrats, who are not subject to public control and accountability. More and more (constitutional) lawyers and financial experts as political appointees, deal with clearly political issues that should have been subject to control and scrutiny by the institution of popular sovereignty such as parliaments, senates or other representative bodies, which are the cornerstone of the liberal democratic edifice.

Thus, economic reductionism, the commodification of society, the overall subjugation of politics to the market and the religious exclusion of any principles, ethics and ideas that may even remotely constitute a counter-hegemonic discourse, guarantee the development of a new political culture. It is a political culture which in effect overturns the givens of democratic, popular conquests. These conquests, which in the last two centuries have contributed to the democratization of public life and secure at least the formal democratic settlement of social difference and inequalities, are becoming nullified day by day. In other word as Globalization is shifting power from the states to the firms and to the market, it has allowed

international bureaucracies to undermine democratic accountability, which as we know is the outcome of long struggles for liberty and democracy. Very few of the new state authorities are accountable or even transparent. Thus, our societies are increasingly faced with a staggering democratic deficit with obvious consequences for democracy as we knew it.

It is to these side-effects of globalization that one can attribute the numerous phenomena of political crisis: The withering away of representative institutions, the growing indifference and cynicism about politics, the anti-party and anti-politician populist trends, political passivity, the widespread contempt for political collective involvement and action, the destabilization and even the collapse of established party systems are some of the phenomena which daily contribute to the devaluation of democracy.

Politics Transformed

In short Globalization changes the definition of politics and subsequently the “venture” of democracy as it was shaped by the popular struggles of the past. The story now-a-days could read as follows:

Once upon a time, production was determined largely by choices of management in negotiation (structured explicit or implicit) or even scrutinized by organized labor.

Once upon a time, Trade Unions struggled to free themselves from international constraints and institutions. Today recent developments indicate that they can have a future only through new international institutions of labour representation.

Once upon a time there was sturdy and (almost) full employment, and although working conditions were never as idyllic as we often think, working people could make ends meet, today this arrangement is not even an issue on political or even on the broadly defined public agenda.

Once upon a time, National Health Systems were seen as given and they were understood as the trade mark of “civilized and democratic” societies, today even in their severely trimmed down version they are subject to international complete pressures to reduce production cost and attract investment.

Once upon a time, old age pensions and welfare programs were part of collective plans at the national level. Now social security is increasingly individualized and subject to the moods of international financial markets.

Once upon a time, a university’s curricula appeared to be the exclusive

outcome of academic and scientific considerations and problematiques. Today, with a few exceptions, they increasingly have to be justified on a cost-benefit basis.

Once upon a time, there were party systems whose alignments corresponded to societal (often recognized) divisions. Today party systems tend to represent the society less and less and focus exclusively on the process of governing.

Once upon a time, political parties represented ideological and political differences, even in a mediated way. Today direct ideological and political references and commitments have become obsolete.

Once upon a time, citizens felt that by voting they could make a difference in the policy orientation of governments. Today that sense has been lost along with the feeling that no collective popular action can make a difference on key issues of governmental activity.

Once upon a time, democratic procedures were, in one form or another, about expressing competing social interests and deciding upon political choices and initiatives.

Once we believed that democracy could make the difference. Today can we afford to maintain that conviction without attaching a long explanatory and skeptical footnote about the conditions of such a possibility?

Conclusion

Globalization as most broadly defined, i. e. as the structural tendency to break down national boundaries of economic, cultural and largely political life, is at the center of much that shakes the world today. That is so despite the devastatingly negative effects for today's societies. More than ever before in history a global perspective is necessary for humanity to grapple with many of the major problems it is facing and in that sense one cannot and should not oppose globalization per se. Having said that, however, one should not be led to the conclusion that we are on the brink of a new stage of civilization. Globalization has been positive in the sense that it has broken down provincialism and antiquated ways of thinking and acting but now we have a common, global awareness and a chance, or in fact we are in a position to do away, or at least reduce, the perils threatening our planet.

However, we should not lose sight of the fact that the social and political forces that currently determine the direction of globalization, adversely for

most of humanity, severely limit our ability not only to create a better world, but even to observe some of the formal rules of liberal democracy. As long as greed, profit maximization and the further accumulation of capital in the hands of the few and especially the domination of market values remain the sole and exclusive basis for judging every aspect of human need, initiative and activity, the negative effects of globalization will proliferate.

As Eric Hobsbawm put it in his monumental *Age of Extremes*: “If humanity is to have a recognizable future, it cannot be by prolonging the past or the present. If we try to build the third millennium on that basis, we shall fail. And the price of failure, that is to say, the alternative to a changed society, is darkness” (E. Hobsbawm: 1996, p. 585).

Or if you prefer, as an insightful American commentator of a different ideological orientation, Jeremy Rifkin put it “On the eve of the third millennium, civilization finds itself precariously straddling two very different worlds, one utopian and full of promise, the other dystopian and rife with peril” (J. Rifkin: 1996, p. 216), not just for democracy as I tried to demonstrate but for the very existence of human race and their societies as these have evolved throughout their long historical march towards freedom.

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Globalization and Greek Foreign Policy

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RÉSUMÉ

La politique extérieure de la Grèce fait face aux mêmes défis que la politique extérieure de toute nation, dans le contexte d'une globalisation plus moins en crise. Cet article est centré sur quelques domaines de pointe de la globalisation, qui influencent plus particulièrement la politique extérieure hellénique: l'intégration européenne, la diaspora grecque, la marine marchande grecque, le phénomène de l'immigration et la lutte pour les oleoducs et les gazoducs pour le transport du pétrole et du gaz naturel.

ABSTRACT

In the context of a Globalization, more or less in crisis, Greek foreign policy faces the same challenges as the foreign policy of any other nation. This article focuses on some leading areas of Globalization, which influence particularly Greek foreign policy: the European integration, the Greek Diaspora, the Greek merchant navy, the immigration phenomenon and the battle of oil and natural gas pipelines.

Even if Globalization is considered as the product of the development of capitalism, nevertheless this tendency is not really a new one. Human societies across the globe have established progressively closer contacts over many centuries. Throughout history, people-philosophers, preachers, adventurers, generals, soldiers, merchants, crusaders, "barbarians", pilgrims, migrants, nomads and financiers-have constructed an ever-more-global society and global economy. In antiquity, trade and cultural exchanges between peoples were also a reality, as it is reported, for example, by Homer in *Odyssey* and *Iliad*¹ or by the Greek historian Herodotus.² In modern times, Globalization is associated with the colonial empires, like the Spanish

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one, the Portuguese, the French and especially the British one. But if in the modern times we associate Globalization with the Empire phenomenon, why can't we do the same for antiquity or for the Middle Ages? Why, for instance, Alexander's Empire, the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire or the Arab Empires can't be associated with the Globalization phenomenon? One, of course, can object that trade and exchanges at that time were limited and it's true. Nevertheless, Globalization is not only the economic exchanges. Globalization is also a cultural phenomenon or a religious one. Christianity, for instance, or Islam constitute global movements of integration as it was, before stoicism, the philosophical movement. But trade also was vivid in one way or another in antiquity or in the Middle Ages. One can mention, for example, Greeks or Phoenicians in antiquity who, with their colonies, dominated trade around the global world of that time. Another example is the «Silk Road», a trade route of some five thousand miles long through central Asia linking China with Constantinople, Damascus, Rome and Alexandria. There were not only goods traded but cultural and religious exchanges were also taking place between peoples of Asia, Africa and Europe. It was a route connecting East and West and linking traders, merchants, pilgrims, monks, soldiers, nomads and urban dwellers from China to the Mediterranean Sea; its role was a unique one in developing trade and political and cultural relations.³

In modern times, Globalization is the result of an increasingly global economy with free trade, free flow of capital and cheaper foreign labour. Changes in communications and transportation and, generally, progress in technology gave the process new impetus. But other elements like cultural common values, travel and every day communication are also some of the characteristics of Globalization. Coming up with a definition of Globalization is difficult, as it is a complex trend. A single definition of the phenomenon does not exist, either among academics or in everyday conversation. Nevertheless, one may consider Globalization, following Immanuel Wallerstein, as the process, completed in the twentieth century, by which the capitalist world-system spreads across the actual globe.⁴ From a liberal point of view, Globalization is the acceleration and intensification of economic interaction among the peoples, companies and governments of different nations or even the economic integration, or the flow of information, technology, and commerce and the increasing world-wide integration of markets for goods, services and capital. Some thinkers, economists and intellectuals consider that the current wave of Globalization

has its origins in the economic crisis of the 1970s. According to them, Globalization came as an alternative to the Keynesian economic model imposed after the economic crisis of 1929. Considering Globalization in this way, they associate it with Friedrich von Hayek and, later, Milton Friedman, the guru of neoliberalism. More than an economic paradigm, Globalization became gradually, in the hands of neoliberals, a political ideology especially after the 1990s collapse of the Soviet Union.⁵

It is interesting also to note that nowadays there are references more and more of collapse of Globalization and the rebirth of the nation-state. The technocratic and technological determinism and market idolatry are not any more the theology of the economy,⁶ especially these days with a new crisis in the markets.

This new global environment definitely influences international relations as a whole and the foreign policy of every nation. In this sense, Greek foreign policy faces the same challenges as the foreign policy of every other nation, in the context of a Globalization more or less in crisis.

After the Second World War, Greece is part of major global organisations like the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or the NATO Alliance. The Greek economy also has been integrated in the international economic system. In this way from a political and economic point of view, the Greek foreign policy follows the integration of the contemporary world and is forced to respect this new environment. There are, however, some particular elements, some leading areas of Globalization, which influence particularly Greek foreign policy. In this article we will insist on five of these leading areas, the European integration, the Greek diaspora, the Greek merchant navy, the immigration phenomenon and the battle of oil and natural gas pipelines.

The European Integration

Some analysts and academics insist that the European integration is the main characteristic of the Greek foreign policy in recent years. They call it the phenomenon of Europeanization of Greece's foreign policy.⁷ But this Europeanization began in the 60's with the Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC)⁸ of that time, even if Greece became a full member of the European Union on January 1, 1981. Even if we consider the pause during the military dictatorship, there had been a new beginning after its collapse. Greece became the 10th member of the

European Community (now the European Union) and participated for the first time in the European parliamentary elections held on October 18, 1981. Why these analysts and academics place Europeanisation of Greece's foreign policy only in the mid-90's? Certainly the post-Cold war environment is an important factor to consider the Greek foreign policy in a new perspective. However, these analysts used to associate Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy mainly with the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of that time and the so-called "modernization" which was the ideological slogan of the Costas Simitis government. According to this analysis, there had been a major change in Greece's foreign policy in the mid-1990s accompanied by the modernization of the Greek political system. The implementation of this policy resulted from the will of the government to move Greece to the epicentre of the European developments following a reformist agenda. But other secondary actors and processes, such as the Civil Society, the media, the immigration, the trans-national Greek lobby, contributed to this change.⁹ Academics, supporting this point of view, describe the change in Greek foreign policy at that time in terms of an ideological contrast between "Europeanism" and "nationalist populism".¹⁰ There is no doubt that the membership in the European Monetary Union was an important step for Greece's integration not only in the European structures but also in the global international society. But this revisionism, introduced in Greek foreign policy in the mid-1990s under the paradigm of "Europeanisation" or "modernisation", is not really a profound major change especially in terms of modernization. The simplistic consensus, among a number of revisionists - and somehow postmodernists - political scientists, foreign policy analysts and social scientists in general, is more an ideological one than the result of sociological research findings. The so-called change reflects more the communication patterns of this period than the social reality. The goals fixed by this revisionist policy, in areas like the Cyprus question, the Aegean contention or the Balkan equation, didn't give tangible results. Today, Costas Simitis, who as prime minister presided to this revisionism, recognizes its failure by abandoning the support of Turkey's full membership in the EU. From the champion of Turkey's full membership, he considers now that the best solution for the E. U. is a framework of a special relationship with this country, and through this special relationship Greece may solve some of its problems in South-eastern Europe.

To say that the Greek foreign policy "was first under the sway of national populism, roughly until 1996, and Europeanism thereafter" is a kind of

Manichean thinking, because, neither before 1996 the so called nationalist populism was the single ideology that guided the Greek foreign policy, nor the so called Europeanism displaced, after 1996, the national populism.¹¹

More serious was the failure to reform the Greek political institutions and especially the administration. The weakness of Greek political institutions, coupled with a tendency towards populist politics during the Simitis era, contrasts with the rhetoric of reformism and modernization. The wider process of modernisation of the Greek economy, society and politics was rather a relative failure not only in the Simitis era but also in the era of his successor, the actual Prime Minister Costas Caramanlis. Greece is always marching with the political institutions inherited from the post-dictatorial era of the 70s.

Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy, if we consider such a direction, didn't result *ex nihilo* in the mid-1990s. It resulted rather from a long march, which began in the 60s and accelerated in the era after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974. The modernization of the country's political structures in the post dictatorship era opened the door of the Europeanisation of the Greek foreign policy and its integration in the multidimensional mechanisms and institutions of the global international system. There is no doubt that the post-Cold war period of the 90s exercises a considerable influence in the orientations of the Greek foreign policy. There is no doubt that the new post-Cold War global system pushed Greek foreign policy to be adapted to this new environment. After all, it was the only way for the country to serve its national interests. Therefore, Greece has opted for a multilateralist foreign policy. In reality, this multilateralist option has been adopted after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974 and it was adapted to the post-Cold War environment. There is a large consensus around the multilateralist contours of Greek foreign policy. The adoption of the multilateralist paradigm liberates in a way, partly, the Greek foreign policy from the American dominance or pressure in vital for Greek questions like the Balkan situation, the Aegean dispute or the Cyprus question. Contrary to some "revisionist" suggestions, the priorities of Greek foreign policy remain unchanged. The whole range of Greco-Turkish problems, including Cyprus and the Aegean, remains the first priority of Greek foreign policy, despite economic, social and political interdependences which have been created between the two countries in recent years. The Balkan situation follows as its second priority, especially the Macedonian question and, even more, the risk of the Albanian expansionism after the Kosovo declaration of independence.

The Greek merchant Navy

Shipping is the second largest contributor to the Greek economy after tourism and constitutes the heavy industry of the country. It forms the backbone of world shipping and is the first truly globalized sector of the Greek economy. The shipping industry is uniquely free of the territorially based constraints under which most industries still operate. Shipping capital's freedom from the constraints of time and space functions to disenfranchise labour and to create what is perhaps the first truly global labour pool. Its key centers of operation are Piraeus, London and New York. The port of Piraeus is the third largest in the world in terms of passenger transportation. Greek shipping is accounting for roughly half of all European shipping and almost 20 percent of the world shipping fleet.¹² It flies a variety of flags, including flags of convenience. However, some Greek shipping is gradually returning to Greece following the changes to the legislative framework governing its operations and the improved infrastructure. Approximately 23.5 percent of the world's oil tankers of 73.8 million DWT belong to Greek ship owners. This is as large as the US and Japanese fleets combined. The Greek-owned merchant fleet totalled 3,700 ships in February 2007, 8.5% of the world merchant fleet and 16.5% of world tonnage. During 2006, Greek ship-owners spent approximately \$23.7 billion for the purchase and building of new ships, \$8.7 billion for acquisitions and \$15 billion for shipbuilding. Spending \$8.7 billion, Greeks come first in investment in ship acquisitions, followed by the Norwegians (\$3.5 billion) and the Germans (\$3.2 billion).¹³ In a way, Greek merchant fleet is a commercial giant.¹⁴

The impact of the Greek merchant navy on Greek foreign policy is evident. This impact is manifest on the decision making and as an instrument of power in realizing the objectives of this policy. This is not a new phenomenon, as the Greek merchant fleet was a powerful tool of the Greek economy from the beginning of the independence in the nineteenth century. During the war of independence, it has been transformed in a very effective war navy. During the nineteenth century, it constituted a bridge between the small Greek state, the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Diaspora. The Greek ship-owners were able to exercise considerable influence in decision-making in Athens but at the same time they were the economic arm extension of this small Greek state in the global world. They continued to have the same role along the twentieth century giving Greece the possibility to have a presence in the international political

arena. For example, in 1956 Greece was invited to participate in the conference held in London concerning the Suez crisis. Responding to those analysts questioning Greece's invitation, the influential French journal *Le Monde* wrote: "Greece was invited because Greek ship-owners control, either under national flag or flag of convenience, the more important merchant fleet in the world".¹⁵ In the Israeli-Arab war of 1973 Greek ship-owners exercised pressure on the dictator George Papadopoulos not to allow the use of the American military bases in Greece against Arabs because of their relations with them as the transporters of the Arab oil. Papadopoulos tried apparently to limit American operations and this policy was eventually one of the reasons that caused later his overthrow by a group of officers under the brigadier-general Demetrios Ioannides, more docile to Americans.¹⁶

As it was noted, "indeed, so grateful were Greece's ship-owners for the concessions they were granted, in an effort to persuade them to register their ships under the Greek flag rather than under flags of convenience, that in March 1972 they elected Papadopoulos president for life of the Association of Greek Ship-owners".¹⁷

The repatriation of shipping activities back to Greece is more intense in recent years and the relations between ship-owners and governments in Athens more complex. Nowadays Greek ship-owners continue to influence Greek politics. But, contrary to their predecessors, they expanded their business to other sectors of the economy by transferring ship-owning capital into other domestic sectors. They control for example media and insurances, they entered the banking sector, the telecommunications and the real estate market. Ship-owners are these days among the new media barons. In this way, they are able to intervene with more efficiency in the decision-making, either in interior politics or in foreign policy. Greek foreign minister Dora Bakoyianni refers to the other dimension of influence of the Greek ship-owners, the one that reinforces the foreign policy of the country, giving it a positive perspective in the international scene. This is particularly true in a global economy in which the Greek ship-owners are among the main champions.¹⁸

The Greek Diaspora

The Greek Diaspora existed even before the Nation-State building. The modern Greek Diaspora started when Greece was still a part of the Ottoman Empire and played a crucial role in Greece's independence. In the late 18th century, Greeks abroad developed a mercantile empire which included areas

of Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. It was this Diaspora that first developed the concept of a Greek nation influenced by the European liberal movement and the ideas of the French Revolution. Historically the Greeks from the antiquity created colonies around the Mediterranean and Black Sea basins, especially in Sicily, Southern Italy, Spain, Southern France and the Black Sea coasts. But the modern Greek Diaspora goes back to the 15th century when many Greeks fled Constantinople after its fall in 1453. They found refuge in Western Europe, especially in Italy. Later, Greeks from the Ottoman Empire created communities in the countries of the Western and Central Europe, in Russia and around the Mediterranean. As it has been noted “a Diaspora nation before the creation of the Greek State in 1829, Greeks played an important role in an area stretching from Vienna to Cappadocia and from Saint Petersburg to Alexandria”.¹⁹ The Greek Diaspora contributed to the making of the modern Greek nation-state, since the period of the Enlightenment, acting as a channel of Western ideas and modernization into Greece and the Balkans. It was in these communities of the Diaspora that a Greek bourgeoisie has been developed and which took the leadership of the war of independence. It was toward the end of the 18th century that this rising Greek bourgeoisie, with the beginnings of a national consciousness, began to develop. In the nineteenth century, the Greek mercantile Diaspora reached the peak of its international presence. The base of this Diaspora was of course outside the new created Greek state. “A cosmopolitan bourgeoisie, it spread from the Black Sea and the Danube, throughout the Mediterranean and reached up to Northern Europe and Britain. Within the context of the Greek mercantile Diaspora, networks based on informal partnerships and, often, verbal contracts were developing over the centuries”.²⁰ It was an important trans-state network with trans-state activities in different areas, with the trade as the main economic activity. Diaspora financiers played an important role in the financing of the Greek public debt. They were also major shareholders in the Greek railway companies. They acted as mediators to raise substantial bond capital for the railways during the Greek railway boom (1882-1910) or acted inside the consortia formed with foreign financiers. As it was noted, “Greek Diaspora financiers, particularly those with experience in the financing of the Ottoman and Egyptian public debts, provided a gateway to Greece, acting as trusted guarantors for Western European bankers. They were familiar with Western business practices, while they also had an intimate knowledge of local conditions, and thus lowered the risk and transactions costs for

foreigners. These services were indeed of crucial significance, as Greece was not easily penetrable".²¹ Inside this bourgeoisie, ship-owners, bankers and merchants established alliances with the political elites of the new Greek state and contributed to the development of its policies. Many of the so called national benefactors were from this people. They identified their own interests with those of the Greek State. The example of Emmanuel Benakis, who enriched himself in Egypt, is characteristic from this point of view. Benakis was a friend of Eleftherios Venizelos, financed his party and became minister of Finance in his cabinet.²² Another example is Andreas Sygros. A banker, founded the *Crédit Général* in 1872 with a capital invested by a group of Greek Diaspora financiers. The discussions around this investment took national proportions with the participation of the newspapers, the intelligentsia and the political and economic elites of the country. These discussions put into evidence the ramifications of Sygros and his friends from the Diaspora with the power elites of Athens.²³ Facing especially the antagonism of British and other European financial interests, the Greek financiers and merchants of the Diaspora were obliged to look for the protection of their own national state notwithstanding its weakness. During this period, "in the context of the Globalization of the nineteenth century, the Greek economy integrated into the European capital market through informal network arrangements, in which foreign and ethnic Greek financial institutions intermingled, with the Greek Diaspora playing the cohesive role". Nevertheless, "in the more difficult and problematic financial environment of the inter-war years, informal financial networks which had operated reliably before 1914 became fraught with uncertainty" and Greek Diaspora lost its role as mediator. The historical Diaspora, heritage of the Ottoman period, evaporated, for different reasons, during the twentieth century and has been succeeded by the migrant Diaspora in the USA, Canada, Australia and Western Europe. This new wave of migrants proved that, indeed, the Greeks are a diasporic nation. Even if in the beginning the new migrants were poor peasants, their children occupied a new socio-economic space as merchants, financiers, academics and professionals. But they never attained the influence of the historical Diaspora. This is partly, because the Greek State is not anymore as weak as it was in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless this is not the case of the Greek ship-owners, if we consider them as part of the Diaspora who continued to have an enormous influence in the decision making in Athens after the Second World War. But, at the same time, they were not really associated to the migrant Diaspora

but, rather, they were the continuation of the historical Diaspora. We may consider this group as the connecting element between the historical and the migrant Diaspora. In the meantime, some of them have gradually chosen to transfer their offices in Greece.

As it has been noted, “three types of Greeks made up the Diaspora: the very poor, the very rich and the political exile, often an intellectual”.²⁴ The great majority of the transatlantic emigration was composed by the first category. The third category, the political exile doesn't exist any more.

Certainly, at the end of the Cold War, things have changed. Greece became a host country of immigrants, the Greek Diaspora is not any more reinforced with fresh immigrants and, inside the second and third generation, a new solid bourgeoisie appeared. Especially solid is the new Greek-American bourgeoisie. It is characteristic that in *Forbes* magazine's annual list of the four hundred richest American billionaires (2007) there were three Greek-Americans. In Great Britain, an annual Greek Rich List detailing the top 100 millionaires and billionaires covering the Greek and Greek-Cypriot community in the UK is also published. For 2008, the top 100 are worth a staggering £ 10,708 billion in total. Of the top 100, only 15 people actually inherited their wealth. The other 85 are self-made. In Australia and Canada we have also some millionaires, generally self-made.

What is the relation of these billionaires and millionaires with Greece? Did they influence decision making in Athens? Did they have to defend any interests in Greece? Some of them make business in Greece, others invest in Greek companies and others make, or intend to make, business in the Balkans and the East Mediterranean. Certainly, they don't have the same close economic relations with Greece as the Greek Diaspora bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century. But many of them have developed relations with the Greek political elite in Athens. In the USA, for example, they contributed to the creation of chairs in some universities to honour Greek politicians. There is also information that some of them contribute to their electoral expenses. Therefore, in one way or another they exercise some kind of influence in the Greek capital.

But we have to consider the Diaspora as a whole and see it as a bridge between Greece and the global world. We have to consider it as a lobby for the Greek interests in the host countries, particularly in the United-States. This lobby which, in the beginning acted in favour of Greek interests, acts now more and more in favour of the host country. Van Coufoudakis noted already in the nineties the “reverse influence phenomenon”, i.e. the influence of the

Greek-American Diaspora in the decision-making in Athens in favour of American interests,²⁵ a phenomenon that took more importance nowadays. A new triadic relation is more and more the new pattern of Greek Diaspora.

The Impact of the Immigration

Greece, throughout its modern history, was a country of emigration. Some millions of Greeks emigrated in the 19th and the 20th centuries to different destinations like Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and Africa. Around 12% of the Greek population emigrated from 1881 to 1951. The reverse phenomenon of immigration began in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern and South-Eastern Communist regimes. Therefore, the beginning of mass illegal immigration into Greece, in the early 1990s, was largely the result of disintegration of the former Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, a small immigration group grew before at the beginning of the 1980s when a small number of Asians, Africans, and Poles arrived in Greece and began to work in construction, agriculture, and domestic services. In 1986, legal and unauthorized immigrants totalled approximately 90,000. One third of them were from European Union countries. The 1991 Census registered 167,000 "foreigners" in a total population of 10,259,900.

In the 1990s the war in Yugoslavia and the instability in the whole area of Balkans has created a flow of legal and illegal immigrants from these neighbouring countries who entered Greece. The main flow came from Albania. In recent years however immigrants entering the country come from as far away as Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Philippines. In fact, Greece became a labour importing country as the other South-Eastern European countries. These migrants work in the agricultural domain, in small business, in domestic services and in construction. The total estimated number of immigrants today in Greece is more than one million, including legal migrants about 600,000, illegal migrants and refugees. In proportion to its population, Greece has therefore more immigrants than many other European countries. Policing the entry of migrants in Greece is difficult because of the large coastline of the country and the multiple islands²⁶.

The immigration phenomenon has an important impact on Greek foreign policy. The country faces a new geopolitical environment, a new geopolitical scene with new challenges and new opportunities

For a long time, immigration has been considered of low interest in international relations. Not anymore, in the reality of Globalization as

population movements are seen today as a matter of security. Theorists of international relations have been forced to face the phenomenon of immigration in terms of national, regional and international stability.²⁷ There is a perception, nowadays, of a global migration crisis. These considerations provoke more tensions and heated discussions in Greece in terms of national security. First of all, there is a perception of a threat to Greek national identity. Secondly, illegal immigration may result in bilateral tensions between Greece and the countries of origin or the transit countries. And, thirdly, because of the numbers the integration of the immigrants in Greek society is not assured. In one way or another immigration nowadays became a tool of foreign policy for host countries as well as for countries of origin. Greece experienced for a long time immigration as a tool of its foreign policy from the point of view of a country of origin. It was the era of a trans-national Greek lobby, especially the Greek-American lobby. A lobby that always exists but which acts more and more, as it was already pointed out, in favour also of the American interests.²⁸ Today it experiences immigration as a tool of its foreign policy from the point of view of the host country. From the status of emigration to the one of immigration, the Greek foreign policy has faced difficult challenges. The political instability in the Balkans, the problems that Greece faces with some neighbouring countries like FYROM and Turkey and even sometimes Albania, exacerbated the discussions on the phenomenon, deeply emotional sometimes. But it is true also that the immigration pressures had a real impact on the internal policies of the country.

Greece and the Battle of Oil and Gas Pipelines

Greece has been trying in recent years to promote herself as emerging energy hub. On the one hand Athens tried to establish solid relations with Russia in order to avoid total dependence from Washington and to obtain the support of Moscow in some crucial areas of its foreign policy like the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus question. On the other hand, from an economic point of view, cooperation with Russia opens to Greek economy interesting new horizons for activity. The American reaction to this openness to Russia is permanent. To some point, it is the same reaction manifested against Europe's cooperation with Russia in the area of energy. Russia, on the other hand, is fighting to establish a dominant role in Europe's energy supply. Washington considers that this cooperation leads to Europe's dependence from Moscow with dangerous consequences. In reality, it's an over reaction in order to protect the American strategic interests.

Washington fears the creation of an autonomous political and economic European pole, detaching Europe from the American hegemony. In the case of Greece, there is one more reason why Washington reacts to Athens-Moscow rapprochement. It's the fact that, by this rapprochement, Russia is facilitated to expand its influence in the Balkans.

In November 19, 2007, *The New York Times* wrote: "Greece and Turkey opened a \$300 million pipeline on Sunday, creating an energy corridor that connects the rich natural gas fields in the Caspian Sea region to Europe, bypassing Russia and the volatile Middle-East. The 178-mile pipeline also solidifies improved ties between Greece and Turkey, linking the long-time Aegean rivals through a project that will give Caspian gas its first direct Western outlet and help ease Russia's energy dominance as oil and gas prices soar". Two things are clear in this article of *The New York Times*: the first one is that the pipeline creates an energy corridor connecting the rich natural gas fields of the Caspian Sea to Europe, bypassing Russia. It's an important point because one major objective of the American policy is to isolate Russia by creating oil and gas pipelines bypassing it, in order to cut any dependence of the former Soviet Republics of Caucasus and the Caspian Sea from Moscow. The second thing that underlines the *New York Times* article is that the pipeline improves ties between Greece and Turkey and links the two countries in a project under American hospices. In other words, the project is more political than economic, because it diversifies supplies of energy to Europe without going through Russia and, in the meantime, encourages Greek-Turkish rapprochement. It's not without reason that the inauguration of the pipeline by the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey Costas Karamanlis and Tayyip Erdogan was attended by the American Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman.

When later, in December 2007, Greek premier Costas Karamanlis paid an official visit to Moscow, Russian president Vladimir Poutin offered to supply Greece double as much gas up to 2040. The Americans expressed again fears that a possible long-term Russia-Greece agreement on gas supply may damage the project to buy gas from Azerbaijan supported by Washington. One has to remember also that Greece cooperates with Russia in the oil sphere in the Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline project. It's another project that Washington looks with suspicion, whether Greece considers it as corresponding to its national strategic interest. Nevertheless, Greece agreed in May 2007 to cooperate to the building of a Turkish-Greek-Italian natural gas pipeline to transport gas from Azerbaijan. In fact, it will be the second phase of the

strategically significant section connecting the natural gas systems of Turkey and Greece. The connection will be extended via Greece to Italy.²⁹

In a visit to Washington in March 24, 2008, Greek Development Minister Christos Folias “was able to outline Greece's energy policy in meetings with U. S. officials during which he emphasised Greece's potential role as an important energy hub for South-Eastern Europe”. In those meetings, “he presented Greece's policy of ensuring the greatest possible diversity of fixed energy supply, explaining that Greece actively supported multiple sources and routes for transporting energy and was already obtaining natural gas from both Algeria and Russia”. No doubt he wanted to reassure Washington that Greece's energy policy was one of diversity. He also pointed “to the country's participation in the construction of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) pipeline, which will transport natural gas from the Caspian Sea to the West, as well as ongoing discussions with Azerbaijan regarding the South-stream pipeline that will transport natural gas from Russia”.³⁰

In April 7, 2008, the governmental committee convened and focused on development and energy issues under the Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis. Development Minister Christos Folias after the meeting said that he briefed the Committee on the issues of energy policies and the latest developments. Folias went on saying: “*We repeat our dedication we have to re-advance our country to an energy node of South Eastern Europe, in a key-position. Our will, intention and dedication are to secure for our country efficient energy supplies and to avoid pollution in the best price. In addition, we want to be the trade-transit center for energy transmission to our partners in the European Union*”.³¹

In the meantime, visiting Athens on April 9, 2008, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew J. Bryza, expressed again the American reservations concerning Greek and European dependence from Russian gas. Americans oppose the South Stream pipeline, a Russian-Italian backed project, with possibility of Greek participation, which will transport Russian gas to Europe. On the contrary Washington supports the Greek-Turkish-Italian pipeline which will transport the Azeri gas. Bryza met Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis and other Greek officials with whom he discussed Balkan and energy issues. Speaking at a conference, Bryza said the United States aimed at sharpening competition in the natural gas sector by bolstering the negotiating position of Greece, Turkey, Italy, Georgia and Azerbaijan vis-a-vis Russia and its Gazprom monopoly. He noted that Greece receives 80 percent of its gas from only one company, but

stressed, 'our goal is not to have a standoff with Russia on energy.'³² Speaking in the conference of the *Economist* in Athens on April 10, 2008, Bryza said that it is a tragic mistake the fact that Greece receives 80 percent of its gas from only one source, the Gazprom.³³

On April 29, 2008 the Greek and Russian leaders signed a deal in Moscow on Greece's participation in the South Stream pipeline. The deal was signed at a Kremlin ceremony attended by Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The proposed Russian-Italian South Stream pipeline will pump Russian gas under the Black Sea to Bulgaria before splitting into two branches. One branch will take gas northwest to Austria, while the other will head southwest to Italy, going through Greek territory. According to experts, the amount of natural gas being consumed in Greece over the next eight years is expected to double.

Meanwhile, Putin said both the South Stream project and a proposed Russian-backed oil pipeline through Greece could only benefit Europe. "The aim is to significantly increase the energy security, not only of the Balkans but of the entire European continent," Putin said, before warning critics in Europe that they should not snub Russian gas.

The two leaders also discussed the 280-kilometer (175-mile) Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline that will connect the Black Sea to the Aegean as a vital alternative route, bypassing the tanker-congested Bosphorus Strait. Yesterday's visit by Karamanlis to Moscow is his third trip to Russia, while Putin has also visited Greece three times.³⁴

One has to recognise the political and economic implications of all these planned energy networks in the Balkans and the Southeast Europe for the European Union as a whole, but also the implications in the trilateral relations between Brussels, Washington and Moscow. It is clear that in this context Athens tries to balance its foreign policy between American dependence and Russian cooperation, especially in the area of energy in order to better serve its national interests. It is not however certain that this policy, promoted by prime minister Costas Karamanlis, is entirely shared by the whole political spectrum, especially inside his own party.

Conclusion

Greek foreign policy entered a new era in the context of Globalization facing new challenges as they were explored above in this article. Nevertheless the old problems like Greek-Turkish relations and the Balkan equation, are

always in the agenda. There is no doubt that, in this new era, Greece is forced to adopt balanced policy, inside and outside European Union, of multilateral orientation and with open options for the future.

NOTES

1. "Tell me, O muse, of that ingenious hero who travelled far and wide after he had sacked the famous town of Troy. Many cities did he visit, and many were the nations with whose manners and customs he was acquainted". The beginning of *Odyssey*.
2. Herodotus (fifth century BCE). The great Greek historian describes the Persian Empire under Cyrus, Cambises, Darius, Xerxes, and the expedition in 480 B. C. He describes also many peoples from an ethnographic point of view and he is indeed an anthropologist with great interest. In other words Herodotus presents the global world of his time.
3. The Silk Road was initiated around 114 BC by the Han Dynasty (114 BC), although earlier trade across the continents had already existed. The first person who used the term "Silk Road(s)" or "Silk Route(s)", was the German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877.
4. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Utopistics: Historical Choices Of The 21st Century*, New York: The New Press. 1998, p. 32.
5. See for example John Ralston Saul, *The Collapse of Globalism*, New York, Overlook, 2005.
6. *Ibid*
See also, Niall Ferguson, "Sinking Globalization", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2005 issue.
John Gray, "A diverse world would be a safer world", *Resurgence*, issue 212.
7. See the special issue of *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, Greek Foreign Policy, Emerging Actors and Processes, vol. 15, no 1, 2007 edited by Panayotis Tsakonas.
8. On 9 July 1961, Greece becomes the first European State to sign an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC).
9. See the special issue of *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, Greek Foreign Policy, Emerging Actors and Processes, vol. 15, no 1, *op. cit.*
See also – among others - Ian Lesser, Stephen F. Larrabee, Michele Zanini and Katia Vlachos-Dengler, *Greece's New Geopolitics* (RAND, National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, 2001), Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal",

Journal of European Integration (Vol. 27, No. 2, June 2005), pp. 217-239; Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment" in Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery* (London Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 73-94; and Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems" in Achilleas Mitsos and E. Mossialos (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), pp. 359-372.

10. *Ibid*

11. George Kalpadakis and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, "Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy", in *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, Greek Foreign Policy, Emerging Actors and Processes, vol. 15, no 1, p. 61.

12. John Tagliabue, "Rough Going for Greek Merchant Fleet", *The New York Times*, May 27, 1997.

13. Sources of Statistics concerning Greek merchant fleet are the Ministry of Mercantile Marine, The Aegean and Island Policy, the Hellenic Center for Investment, Bank of Greece and US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) data.

14. John Tagliabue, *Ibid*

15. *Le Monde*, 8-08-1956.

16. Jacob Abadi, "Constraints and Adjustments in Greece's Policy toward Israel" *Mediterranean Quarterly* 11. 4 (2000) 40-70. The author refers to *Jerusalem Post*, 29 November 1973. In his article noted that "...the junta had to be extremely cautious. Consequently, it refused to provide bases and facilities to the American airlift of weapons to Israel during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973".

Spyros Markezinis, at that time prime minister of Papadopoulos, also referred to the American role on the overthrow of the dictator because he refused some facilities to Americans during this period. See Spyros Markezinis Memories, 1972-1974, Athens 1979, pp. 93-111 (Σπύρος Μαρκεζίνης, Αναμνήσεις 1972-1974, Αθήνα 1979, σσ. 93-111).

See also Andre Slengesol "Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 2000; 11: 96-129.

17. Richard Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, (Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 185-199.

18. Dora Bakoyianni, The importance of the Greek merchant navy for the Greek foreign policy, Speech to the Greek shipowners the 8 march 2008, Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

19. George Prevelakis, Talk given in the seminar series "Globalization and the 'Old' Diasporas" organised by the Transnational Communities Programme at the School of Geography, University of Oxford, 12 November 1998.

20. Ioanna Minoglou-Pepelasis, "Between informal networks and formal contracts: international investment in Greece during the 1920s", *Business History*, 44:2, 40-64, Frank Cass & Company Ltd, April 2002.
21. *Ibid*
22. Yiorgos Dertilis, *Istoria tou Ellinikou Kratous, 1830-1920*, B' tomos, Athina, Estia 2006, pp. 853-855.
23. Yiorgos Dertilis, *op. cit.*, tomos A', pp. 411-416.
24. James Pettifer, *The Greeks*, London, Penguin Books, 2000, p. 218.
25. Van Coufoudakis, "The Reverse Influence Phenomenon: The Impact of the Greek-American Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Greece", in Dimitri Conostas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics*, London, The Macmillan Press, 1993.
26. Sources of Statistics concerning immigration in Greece are the Ministry of Interior and The Hellenic Migration Policy Institute (IMEPO).
27. Charalambos Tsardanidis, "Immigration and its Impact on Greek Foreign Policy", in Greek Foreign Policy, Emerging Actors and Processes, *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, vol. 15, no 1.
28. Stephanos Constantinides, «Le lobby grec et son influence sur l'élaboration de la politique étrangère grecque», in Greek Foreign Policy, Emerging Actors and Processes, *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, vol. 15, no 1.
29. Source of information about these developments in the area of gas and oil pipelines concerning Greece is the Greek press and especially the dailys *I Kathimerini* and *To Vima*.
30. Athens News Agency: "Folias Discusses Energy Policy in U. S.", 27-03-2008.
31. *I Kathimerini*, April 8, 2008.
32. *I Kathimerini*, English edition, April 11, 2008.
33. *To Vima*, April 11, 2008.
34. *Kathimerini*, April 30, 2008.

Globalizing Greek Society: An Overview of Immigration to Greece

Christos Kassimeris*

RÉSUMÉ

Le but de cet article est d'évaluer un des effets immédiats de la globalisation sur la politique et la société grecques. Bien que la Grèce a été, le plus souvent, considérée comme un pays, qui a pendant longtemps souffert des tendances massives de l'émigration jusqu'à tout récemment, la période de l'après la guerre froide a été pour ce pays une phase de lutte contre l'immigration et les conséquences qui en résultent. Des flux migratoires vers l'Europe sont à peine nouveaux, plus particulièrement, si l'on tient compte que l'Union européenne soutient le concept du « mouvement de population », il est vrai pas à une grande échelle. Dans le cas de la Grèce, cependant, les autorités locales de même que la société ont eu du mal à s'adapter aux nouvelles réalités dictées par la globalisation. L'objet de cet article est d'illustrer le phénomène de l'immigration en Grèce immédiatement après la chute du communisme en Europe.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to assess one of globalization's immediate effects on Greek politics and society. Although Greece was, more often than not, considered as a country that had long suffered from massive trends of emigration until very recently, the post-Cold War era found her battling against immigration and the ensuing consequences of this phenomenon. Flows of immigration to Europe are hardly new, particularly, when considering that the European Union supports the concept of 'movement of population,' though not to any perverse extents. In the case of Greece, nevertheless, local authorities and the society alike have found it difficult to come to terms with the new realities dictated by globalization. It is the intention of this paper to illustrate the phenomenon of immigration in Greece immediately after the collapse of communism in Europe.

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Greece in a Globalised Environment

It has been argued that “Alarmist predictions about large-scale migration from south to north across the Mediterranean, common in analyses of the strategic environment in the 1980s and 1990s, have proven unfounded. In the western Mediterranean, southern Europe does face a stressful social problem from migration from Africa and elsewhere, but the scale has been limited.”¹ There is certainly much truth in this statement; however, the overall effects of immigration should not be under-estimated either. While to exaggerate the impact of immigration would surely generate high levels of xenophobia and racial discrimination, the exact opposite is often seen as a threat to national identity and, perhaps, social integration. Even at the level of the European Union, the omnipresent amalgamation of globalization and regionalism, only a very selective trend of immigration is actually encouraged that answers to the name of ‘internal mobility.’ To this end, Greece resisting immigration is no exception to European Union ‘norms’. On the contrary, ever since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the abrupt termination of the superpower rivalry, instrumental in preserving a peculiar sense of order and stability, the occasional Greek government is often confronted with the heated debate that surrounds the phenomenon of immigration, always in line with the fundamental principles of respect for human rights and ethics.

In the case of Greece, nonetheless, a country with a small population of about 10-11 millions, controlling immigration has proved a daunting task that is rarely crowned with success. The added weight on Greece’s already strained welfare system and not that prosperous an economy should not be neglected. As it happens, “societies around the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean are experiencing rapid, sometimes violent, change, with the potential for sudden and disastrous refugee movements. The last 10 to 15 years have seen dramatic examples of this phenomenon, including the massive exodus of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria (many have since returned), sporadic large-scale movements from Albania to Italy, the flow of Kurds from South-eastern Turkey and northern Iraq, and the exodus from Bosnia and, more recently, Kosovo. Turmoil in Egypt might also generate large refugee flows affecting Greece and the region, although the failure of such migration to materialize from the Algerian crisis suggests that neighboring countries in North Africa, rather than southern Europe, would face a larger refugee burden than Europe.”²

Greece herself is no stranger to civil strife, political tension and economic

crises, but to embrace those originating from countries suffering from the exact same levels of turmoil is a wholly different matter. Although Greece is, indeed, an integral part of the global village, there seems to be a rather strong urge to resist anything characteristically distant to whatever ingredients constitute the Greek identity altogether. Beyond any shadow of doubt, “Globalization also threatens the security of identity in many societies, as a consequence of migration or through wider access to information. As elsewhere in Europe, Greek society has experienced some aspects of this problem, but for other societies around the region, especially those across the Mediterranean, globalization poses a much more serious challenge to identity. At a minimum, globalization is likely to be part of the environment that Greece confronts in dealing with its eastern Mediterranean neighbors in the future.”³

From Emigration to Immigration

The unique history of Greece in the twentieth century makes it a particularly interesting case in terms of its recent migration history. Amongst these particularities are the civil war (1946-1949) and the military dictatorship (1967-1974), with both of these events having their repercussions on the migratory movements to and from the country. Noteworthy is the substantial outflow of nationals, either as political refugees (1949 -1951) or as economic migrants (1950 -1973), generating a net emigration of almost one million out of a population of 7. 2 million. Castles and Miller (1998)⁴ discussed extensively the new global trends of immigration, its acceleration and the fact that today many more countries are affected by it and its political aspects. Greece changed from a country of emigration until the 1970s to one of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s. As a matter of fact, “according to recent research findings and estimates announced by the Greek Migration Policy Institute, up to ten per cent of the population are immigrants. This translates to 1. 15 million documented and undocumented ‘foreigners’ that reside (and most of them work) in the country. The number of immigrants has quadrupled in the last fifteen years, making Greece the country with the highest proportional increase in immigration in the European Union (EU) over this time.”⁵

Greece was traditionally perceived as a ‘country of emigration’ throughout the better part of the twentieth century, but the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the more recent trend of globalization

have altered her status to a 'country of destination' for immigrants reaching the Greek shores from Asian and African states. Before the Second World War, between 1900 and 1924 to be more precise, Greek migrants accounted for some 420, 000. ⁶ Sadly, the economic and social issues that tormented the Greek society in the aftermath of World War Two forced an even larger number of Greeks to leave their country in search of better living standards and employment opportunities with the most likely destinations being the United States and West Germany. Disturbingly, Fakiolas (2000)⁷ argues that almost one million Greeks left their country from 1945 to 1973. Not surprisingly, the Greek governments of the time encouraged the flow of Greek emigrants simply because of the obvious economic benefits that derived from this awkward movement of population.⁸ As a matter of fact, it seems that emigrant remittances contributed much to the improvement of the Greek economy, since in 1960 alone such remittances covered 35 percent of the balance of payments' deficit and made up for 30 percent of the total 'invisible' imports.⁹ The causes that accounted for the mass exodus of Greeks in the post-war period ranged from political reasons, such as the civil war that marked contemporary Greek history from 1946 to 1949, to the ever-increasing unemployment that resulted from the Second World War. Nevertheless, the deteriorating economies of some destination countries in the early 1970s as a result of the oil crises, coupled with Greece's return to parliamentary democracy in 1974 signalled the beginning of a new era whereby the emigrants decided to return to their homeland.¹⁰ Between 1987 and 1993 nearly 50, 000 ethnic Greeks returned to their homeland.¹¹

As in the case of Italy, Portugal and Spain, Greece, too, witnessed mass emigration prior to the 1990s and mass immigration in the post-Cold War era. The changing patterns of migration appeared during the 1980s when the return of Greek emigrants coincided with the entry to Greece of foreign immigrants. In fact, one can identify three categories of immigrants in Greece, the first consisting of Greek migrants returning from the former Soviet republics, Albania and Eastern European countries. The second category concerned foreign workers that were legally employed in Greece, with some 34, 000 immigrants recorded in 1992, though the majority consisted of European Union nationals. Finally, the majority of immigrants arriving in Greece originated from Easter Europe, Africa and Asia. The vast majority of them, however, were illegally resident in Greece; therefore, exact figures for that period of time are largely unavailable.¹² During the 1990s, a

period marked by a significant increase in immigration to Greece, most problems related to immigration, one way or another, resulted from the lack of analysis, research and statistical data. If truth be told, a government supervised Migration Policy Institute (IMEPO) was only established as recently as 2002.¹³ All in all, “countries of Central and Eastern Europe began to emerge as source countries. The first noteworthy flows from these areas were observed from the mid-1980’s when some of the socialist countries there embarked on a course of liberalization. Migrants began to arrive from Poland and later from Bulgaria and Romania. The flows increased sharply, however, at the end of the decade with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and its allies in the region and then with the collapse of Albania at the beginning of the 1990’s.”¹⁴

It appears that the geographic location of Greece rendered the country vulnerable to immigration flows. Moreover, the fact that until very recently Greece shared no common borders with European Union member-states, while the country happens to be located in the politically unstable region that is the Balkan Peninsula, speaks volumes for the numbers of people that treated her as a bridge to Western Europe.¹⁵ To better comprehend migration in Greece, the push/pull factor theory must be stressed at this point. According to Theodoros Iosifides and Russell King (Autumn 1996) five key elements have acted as pull factors for Greece. Ease of entry was considered as the first element that encouraged immigrants to regard Greece as a likely destination. Much unlike northern and western European countries, Greek policies regarding migration seem ridiculously lax, if not inviting. What is more, Greece’s coastlines and numerous islands in the Aegean Sea provide a unique environment of multiple entry points impossible to guard with effect. Political tension and instability in the wider area of the Eastern Mediterranean is yet another factor that almost justifies immigration to Greece, while her economic recovery ever since the country’s admission to the European Communities has also attracted the attention of immigrants from nearby countries. From a demographic perspective, Greece as any other European state suffers from an aging population and low birth rates, which may prove a daunting task for any government aiming at restraining uncontrolled migration flows.¹⁶ By contrast, push factors have constituted different causes depending on different countries. The various difficulties that have been faced by sending countries have included ethnic conflicts, political problems, religious tension and numerous economic challenges. Therefore, migrants seem to have decided to leave their homes in search of

higher wages, a safer and peaceful environment and have even viewed Greece as a transit country since entry to her would have meant entry to the EU or to other Western States with stricter immigration policies.¹⁷ On the whole, in the 1990s Greece received its first significant numbers of migrants and refugees. The country's proximity to zones of international and civil conflict saw the influx of large numbers of people who were fleeing war and economic instability. According to the 2001 national census, the number of officially recorded non-nationals now represents 7.3% of the population. In the Athens Metropolitan area, non-nationals make up 10% of the population. On top of this, it is estimated that undocumented migrants represent a large group in Greece. In addition, Greece has a number of minorities, such as the Roma and the Muslim minority in Thrace, who have an established presence in the country. Against this background, Greece has developed a strong sense of national identity over different periods in response to what it sees as an external threat to national identity and security from 'outsiders'.¹⁸

Immigrants' Professional Occupation

Most certainly, an examination of the type of profession that migrants occupy in Greece is central to our subject matter. Most foreign workers in Greece are more often than not qualified as non-skilled and have, therefore, gained employment in distinct sectors of the market. The majority of them belong to the category of 'production workers,' which is in its own turn divided into several sub-categories. Agriculture is a significantly large sector in which migrants seek employment, particularly, when taking into account the need of Greek farmers to employ numerous seasonal workers. Actually, farmers have welcomed migrants merely because this kind of work requires unskilled, seasonal, workers that usually receive low pay and seek no social security. In the case of illegal migrants, they are definitely considered 'good for business.' The same scenario, more or less, describes working conditions in the industry, fisheries and elsewhere. As one might expect, this clear preference over migrant labour has caused tension in the job sector between employers and the indigenous labour force.¹⁹ Self-employment presents additional opportunities for immigrants to make a living in Greece, including street vendors, prostitutes (often involving females forced into the sex industry by gangs and members of the organised crime) and traders.²⁰ Another common activity for migrants concerns jobs in the construction business, usually occupied by eastern Europeans and Albanians. Finally, the

service sector has recently incorporated a number of migrants employed in hotels, catering services and care workers in institutions like hospitals.²¹

Consequences from Immigration

There is no doubt that immigration in Greece has had a serious impact on the country's economy. The employment of migrants in the parallel economy has brought about its expansion and increase of its influence in the general economic situation of Greece. Many migrants make their living depending on the underground economy, thus maintaining the need for manpower in other sectors of the economy.²² The black market, in particular, offers employment opportunities with companies that operate underground, as well as regular companies that employ individuals on a black market basis. It is noteworthy that a large part of illegal immigrants in Greece are often employed within these parameters.²³ The extensive employment of illegal migrants in the secondary sector of the economy of Greece has caused the creation of specific trends. The fact of illegality itself has defined the status of migrant workers. Employers have preferred migrants as they can extensively benefit from their exploitation. In fact, illegal migrants have no legal rights while manipulation has become a general feature of the underground economy.²⁴ According to Gabriella Lazaridis and Eugenia Wickens (1999) "Most [immigrants] are in an illegal situation as regards work in the informal sector. This places them in a weak bargaining position, forcing them to accept terms stated by the employers without attempting to negotiate."²⁵

Research conducted to examine the consequences of migration to the host country, in terms of employment, has revealed that giving employment to migrants caused in general the increase of employment levels. Moreover, "immigration has had a notably positive impact on economic development, and it will be a permanent, and positive feature of Greek society well into the future."²⁶ This has been concluded by identifying that migrants have usually occupied positions that the native population has not been willing or adequate (in terms of numbers) to occupy. The result has been jobs that migrants occupy to be developed and maintained, while the native population has been able to engage in better-paid and more prestigious positions of work. Hence, the immigrants that have gathered in Greece have been used as a scapegoat when economic weaknesses such as unemployment occur. The native population often blames migrants for the increase of

unemployment, while continuation of the above situation has inflicted another problem of a social dimension, which is nothing short of discrimination and xenophobia. In Greece, discrimination and social exclusion is also discussed with reference to notably ethnic Greeks (*palinnostountes omogeneis*) repatriated from the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (entitled to Greek citizenship and correspondingly privileged in access to social services, education and employment), the Muslim minority in Thrace, the Roma minority (who are all Greek citizens) and migrant ethnic Greeks from Albania.²⁷

Immigration has caused several significant problems within the social structures of Greece. During the last few years the sex and entertainment industries have shown signs of rapid growth. However, Morokvasic (1983)²⁸, Lazaridis (2000)²⁹ and Phizacklea (1983)³⁰ make clear that women rarely attracted the attention of either the authorities or researchers, given that they somehow seem to evade the traditional definition of what constitutes migrant labour force. In this respect, Psimmenos (1995),³¹ Iosifides (1997),³² Lazaridis (1999)³³ and Romaniszyn (1999)³⁴ have carried out some of the exceptionally few studies in this field of research. On the whole, prostitution and other forms of sex-related 'entertainment' have transformed into a big business, given that the trafficking of females from various parts of South-east Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has largely increased. Although the majority of women are usually employed as entertainers, when they reach their destination they realise that they are expected to provide paid sex. Others that have been indebted within their own country may have been trafficked as part of bonded labour, which actually implies that breaking free of the bond from the trafficker or patron will cause deportation from the destination country.³⁵ Migrant women have been divided into two groups according to their status at the point of entry into Greece. Those who enter the country legally under family reunion are expected to become dependent on males and, therefore, have not suffered prostitution. Women who have entered illegally have been confined to self-employment, which has included such types of work as domestic service and the sex industry. This has made the second group part of a highly racist sexual division of labour.³⁶

Research conducted in Greece revealed very interesting results concerning the extent that prostitution has taken. Women who were engaged in this type of work were between the ages of 10 to 15, while young boys between the ages of 8 to 10 are often mistreated as well. All individuals that have been

part of the sex industry have suffered numerous inhuman conditions. Usually, traffickers and the mafia have 'convinced' individuals to work for them by locking them indoors for weeks without food or treating them in other inhuman ways. Young women have been made dependent not only during entry into the country, but also afterwards since their documents are conspicuously lost.³⁷ An even uglier face of trafficking concerns diseases, severe debilitation and even deaths caused by the inhuman transportation of migrants.³⁸ Unfortunately, no real protection exists on the part of the Greek State for this large number of people that have been forced into prostitution. In particular, there exist no legal or health provisions that could cater for these ill-treated individuals. The authorities, as it happens, rarely offer welfare services to any such victims, while the Greek police often deport illegal immigrants with limited success as the latter are quite likely to return to the country soon after.³⁹

As a result, xenophobia, in particular Albanophobia, constituted a significant social force within the Greek society. Fittingly, perhaps, the 'Equality in Diversity: Migration and Integration' report stresses the very origins of the word 'xenophobia' stating that "hostility to strangers' specifically focuses on the rejection of and even hostile attitude or behaviour towards people or groups of people that are presumed or actual foreigners, the term 'xenophobia', derived from Greek, means 'fear of or timidity towards foreigners'."⁴⁰ Increased crime, drug trafficking and the mistaken perceptions related to unemployment have caused phobias within the native population.⁴¹ The 2003 European Social Survey indicated that the majority of the Greek population "did not approve of increased immigration from other cultural spheres or poorer countries," as most agreed that "migrants take away jobs", "immigration is bad for the economy" and "migrants contribute to a rise in crime."⁴² The media, too, have played a vital role in the increase of xenophobia. When the media are concerned with the hardship and inhuman conditions in which Albanians live, the sympathy of Greeks is usually anticipated.⁴³ On the contrary, increased reporting of crimes conducted by Albanians, for example, has made Greek employers suspicious of their employees and, as a result, they are confronted with a huge dilemma when considering employing workers of Albanian origin. Interestingly, Albanian workers usually receive lower pay when compared to other migrant groups for carrying out the exact same duties.

The word 'Albanian' generally denotes to a widely held stereotype and is believed to be the main reason behind the stigmatisation and ultra-

exploitation of the Albanian migrants.⁴⁴ Finally, the Greek State has always been willing to exploit the issue of illegal Albanian immigrants in negotiations with the government in Tirana, intending to secure the rights of the Greek minority in Albania. The treatment that Albanians receive is explained as an effort to comply with the Schengen Treaty in order to strengthen border control and prevent the seemingly uncontrolled flow of migrants.⁴⁵ This is a very interesting issue that necessitates further research, since the Greek attitude towards the Greek minority in Albania has been two-fold. In particular, the Greek State has tried to support this minority in any possible way so to facilitate its existence on Albanian soil. In cases where these individuals move to Greece, however, they are then treated suspiciously and are given the same status as any other foreigner. Consequently, their identity has not been questioned on Albanian but on Greek territory.⁴⁶

Evidently, “Repatriated’ ethnic Greeks from the NIS and migrant ethnic Greeks from Albania as a co-ethnic minority acquire Greek citizenship through a special process. Migrant Greeks from Albania were discouraged from acquiring Greek citizenship, while distinguishing them from other foreign nationals through a special residence and work permit of unlimited duration. In this way Greece can still claim the existence of a substantial ethnic Greek minority in Albania.”⁴⁷ On the whole, Greece maintains a rather intriguing relationship with her neighbours over the issue of immigration. As a matter of fact, “Negotiations between Greece and immigrants’ countries of origin are usually confined to bilateral agreements that involve foreign policy objectives. For example, discussions between Greece and Albania (Greece’s main source of immigrants) have focused on the principle of reciprocity – so that Greeks in Albania enjoy the same rights and conditions as Albanians in Greece. Greece is trying to strike similar deals with Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia. Greece and Bulgaria have established a circle of contacts to work together to combat trafficking and irregular migration (Macedonian Press Agency, 28/9/2004).”⁴⁸ Most certainly, what is a complex subject matter may encourage neighbouring countries to improve their diplomatic relations, for immigration policy is not a topic that should be treated lightly, particularly nowadays, given the ever increasing waves of migration. In this respect, all pertinent policies should not be limited within the context of domestic affairs, merely because it has the capacity to severely affect the external affairs of a given state with its immediate environment.

Greek Response to Immigration

The unexpected change for the status of Greece from an emigration country to one of immigration has meant a confusion of policy. The real extent of immigration has not been realised by successive Greek governments until very late.⁴⁹ Initially, Greece received strong external pressure from other European Union member-states so that her policy on immigration would be hardened. All member states have been concerned by the influx of migrants in Greece as this meant that a large proportion of them could then move within the European Union freely. Consequently, European Union membership, the signing of the Dublin Convention of 1990 and the application for membership with the Schengen group of countries meant that Greece would have to both harden her migration policy and adhere to communal European Union policies as well. In particular, freedom of movement within the European Union clearly illustrated that Greece had to become more careful with regard to migration policy and improve border controls. Only the constitution of Greece seemed to provide adequate protection. More precisely, Article 4. 1 of the constitution of Greece states, *'All Greeks are equal before the law'*, while Article 5. 1 states, *'Every person shall have the right to develop his or her personality freely and to participate in the social, economic and political life of the country, insofar as it does not infringe upon the rights of others or violate the constitution and moral values.'* Finally, Article 5. 2 states, *'All persons living within Greek territory shall enjoy full protection of their life, honour and freedom, irrespective of nationality, race or language and religious or political beliefs. Exceptions shall be permitted only in cases provided for by international law.'* A constitutional reform of March 2001 extended the protection of human rights in respect to discrimination in the legal relations between private legal persons. Therefore the anti-discrimination provisions of the constitution concern also discrimination by for example individual employers or companies towards their employees.⁵⁰

The immediate outcome of both external and internal pressures was changed to occur in the Greek law in 1991 replacing that of 1929. These changes made reference to *'Alien Immigrants and Refugees,'* while its main goal was the strengthening of both the State's external borders and the related control procedures of entry. In addition, provisions were made for work permits to be provided before arrival since otherwise illegal entry would implicate imprisonment from three months to five years. What is important to mention is that employers of illegal migrants would have to pay

a fine of 294 euros. Complementary measures to this new law have been taken so that administrative control of immigration could be improved. These measures involved the increase of border guards, the tightening of criteria for granting residence and work permits and the use of deportation of illegal immigrants. In addition, acquisition of citizenship would be given only in the case of application by a Greek spouse after five years of residence. Finally, individuals that have been born on Greek soil, but without having inherited nationality, would obtain the Greek nationality immediately. It should be stated that the Greek State has been in need of these individuals since, as has been mentioned previously, the country has long suffered from low birth rates.⁵¹

In 1997 a legal framework was created according to which immigrants that have already moved to Greece gained the right to obtain permission of work and residence to the country. The term for getting these privileges is based on providing proof of working for Greek employers. Another important piece of legislation, law 2910/2001, concerned “entry and residence of aliens into Greek territory and naturalization of aliens”.⁵² Although refugees have been excluded from its scope, this law has had some impact on them, since any alien entering Greece would be covered by this particular law before lodging application for asylum. The law has also provided the necessary limitations regarding the maximum period of detention, in cases of pending deportation that has been ordered by the police, to a three-month period. Law 2910 has differentiated the time needed for applying for naturalization of refugees. Accordingly, refugees that have resided in the country may be able to acquire Greek nationality after a five-year period of application while the period for immigrants has been defined to ten years. Finally, there have been no modifications regarding the treatment of the Greek State towards Afghan Asylum seekers.

However, these laws have largely been unsuccessful considering their lax application, while the Greek population has been quite indifferent too. As a result, the effect of the Greek legal framework regarding migration has been reduced by internal factors to a large degree. In particular, the Greek State aims at tackling migration, but the Greek population has welcomed it as it can be beneficial to Greek employers. This situation made entrance of migrants easier, while it obligated them to suffer lower wages, absence of social and individual rights as the Greek government was unwilling to provide this kind of welfare. Consequently, migrants got involved in the informal economy, which in itself has increased suspicion of migrants among

the native population. This has made clear that the Greek State and society are not ready yet to provide the appropriate resources including human resources and relevant knowledge that would make things smoother.

The legal status of refugees has been another interesting issue to consider. Treaties that make guaranties for the rights of legal migrants have not protected illegal ones. Consequently, as Gabriella Lazaridis and Krystyna Romaniszyn (1998) argue "Illegal migrants have no rights. They are, almost by definition, excluded, modern pariahs."⁵³ This status of deprivation of basic social rights of social security, health and education of their children has been in direct opposition with both the Greek constitution that has made provisions for equality and freedom and Community law as well since the concept of universality of human rights has been a general principle of it.⁵⁴ Except for the creation of new legislation, Greece, as well as other Southern European countries like Italy and Spain, has used unilateral emergency measures such as deportation with the intention to combat the number of illegal migrants on their territory. Administrative deportations have been included in all Southern European States' laws. Usually, data concerning expulsions of migrants have been confidential and not often published in official publications. In comparison to Italy, Greece has illustrated a surprisingly severe regime since the Greek figure for the year 1994 is only 158, 000 of whom 152, 000 have been of Albanian background. It may seem surprising since Greece has had a relatively high concentration of illegal immigrants, even though Greece was in favour of the June 1995 French initiative within the third pillar of the Treaty on the European Union, the Justice and Home Affairs, advocating joint action against illegal immigration and relevant employment. Yet, it is important to note that although this effort resulted in a limited resolution with no binding results, all Southern European States, including Greece, supported the proposition regarding detection and expulsion of illegal migrants.

More effective actions and policies were required on a European level in order for migration to be combated. Co-operation among European Union member states was imperative and could be achieved through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership framework. Strengthening the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would have been in the interests of all member states, given its potential for promoting further co-operation so that migration from certain countries be reduced.⁵⁵ In general, co-operation with European Union States on migration matters has been regarded vital for Greece. This has been clearly illustrated by the declaration of the Greek

presidency of the European Council this year that harmonisation of Greece with EU policy has constituted a significant goal. However, forming an effective policy is a rather controversial matter. EU States would have to take a rather difficult and complex step toward achieving the formation of a policy that would be both promoting human rights and allowing room for manoeuvre.

Greek immigration policy certainly evolved during the 1990s, since the country underwent a major transformation from that of emigration to immigration, and was much influenced by external and internal factors. Although several laws were created and various initiatives taken, Greek migration policy remained inadequate, as problems caused by migration were not been surpassed. Furthermore, the prospects of co-operation between Balkan and European Union member States could have greatly contributed to the reduction of crime, trafficking and illegal migration in the region as a whole. Finally, Greek policy-makers would have to consider other options with the intention to combat illegal migration as well as the negative consequences that Greek society witnessed because of the influx of migrants. For example, such matters would have to be taken into consideration as the prospect of legalisation and regularisation of foreigners without preconditions, granting of permits to work without the condition of a link to a specific employer, strict enforcement of labour laws for the protection of all migrants' rights, provision for access to health services, rights for education and equal civil rights to all migrants regardless of their origin.

Conclusion

Theories central to the phenomenon of immigration sometimes fail to produce a more comprehensive explanation of it, other than elucidating its economic impact. Marxism could have provided such a solid point of departure, in our attempt to understand immigration and the relationship between the newly formed classes; however, the so-called 'push'/'pull' factors only refer to the economic reasons that may encourage the mobility of migrants from one country to another. The need to explain immigration adequately is imperative, simply because this extraordinary phenomenon has been transformed from a low politics issue to a high politics one.

From an economic perspective, Greece, like other Southern European States, has experienced the extension of the parallel economy, while employment of illegal migrants has become widespread as well. A number of

negative consequences have become prevalent, since the exploitation of migrants through employment has become common practice. Preference of migrants over indigenous workers has caused significant tensions within the Greek society and has even allowed the native population to use migrants as scapegoats at times of high unemployment. Moreover, from a social point of view, prostitution and exploitation of juvenile females and males has increased to such a degree where the sex industry has caused the concern of the Greek population. As a consequence, the Greeks often hold negative stereotypes as regards migrants, thus producing the necessary grounds for xenophobia and racial discrimination to grow. Interestingly, the case of the Greek minority in Albania and the treatment of these people once they decide to repatriate provides ample evidence about how Greeks feel with regard foreigners. If anything, the seemingly compassionate Greeks reserve much sympathy for people who suffer, as long as they themselves are not affected.

Greek migration policy is still pretty much in its infancy, ever since it was asked to serve a particular objective during the 1990s, though vague in its nature and scope. Just as with various pieces of European Union legislation, the governments of Greece have witnessed limited success. The effectiveness of Greek migration policy notwithstanding, her role in the Balkans remains essential. Closer co-operation between Balkan states would be a great step toward eradicating, or at least reducing, crime, human trafficking and illegal migration. Given that information on the emigration background of Greece and the immigration patterns that confront her have contributed much to the better understanding of the issue, a more comprehensive and effective immigration policy to deal with the almost unexpected influx of migrants is certainly anticipated. Exactly this is what renders Greece, among most of her European Union counterparts, the ideal case study to examine relevant issues and the role of all pertinent actors.

On the whole, the issue of immigration has been controversial not so much for its negative impact, but because of the ineptitude of policy makers and government officials alike to condone the occasional loopholes in legislation and strive for its drastic revision. Immigration policies should not be reduced to mere measures of restricting the access of immigrants to a country, they should allow room to foresee relevant problems upon their arrival and settle them accordingly in a civilized fashion, as dictated by the democratic norms of the receiving countries that are genuinely concerned with this phenomenon. Greece may have had the opportunity to excuse herself due to her limited experience as regards immigration; however, it has

become obvious that she now needs to keep up the pace with the ever expanding globalised environment and make sure that the necessary policies are in place. Migration should no longer be considered as a menace, even though some extremists view it as the necessary evil of Globalization.

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In Pursuit of Utopia: “A Pakistani, an Arab and a Scotsman ‘Return’ to Cyprus...”

Christopher Kyriakides*

RÉSUMÉ

Le but de cet article est d'évaluer un des effets immédiats de la globalisation sur la politique et la société grecques. Bien que la Grèce a été, le plus souvent considérée comme un pays qui a pendant longtemps souffert des tendances massives de l'émigration jusqu'à tout récemment, l'ère après la Guerre Froide l'a trouvée à se battre contre l'immigration et les conséquences qui en résultent. Des flux migratoires vers l'Europe sont à peine nouveaux, plus particulièrement, si l'on tient compte que l'Union européenne soutient le concept du 'mouvement de population', bien que pas à une grande échelle. Dans le cas de la Grèce, cependant, les autorités locales de même que la société l'ont trouvé difficile de s'adapter aux nouvelles réalités dictées par la globalisation. L'intention de cet article est d'illustrer le phénomène de l'immigration en Grèce immédiatement après la chute du communisme en Europe.

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the role of aspiration in the formation of migrant experience, and argues that sparks of utopia are inherent to the human migratory process. A relationship between racism and anti-utopianism is drawn out in the tentative formation of a theory of migrant reception. Drawing on personal experience of transnational migration, the author narrates an ethnographic journey from second-generation migrant born and raised in Scotland of Greek Cypriot parents, to his recent 'return', illustrating that rejection of identity proliferation – the antithesis of conservative multiculturalism – can be experienced as liberatory. Personal narrative is situated within a wider socio-political analysis of modernity's shifting public-private divide, the contours of which are played out in the post-cold war demise of Left-Right ideological contest. The author contends that a politics of identity proliferation (multiculturalism) compliments the current capitalist dystopia, and concludes by arguing for a new utopian vision.

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Voices of Charlie¹

“Cyprus is changing!” is a hard statement to ignore, especially as I have heard it uttered, in one form or another, so many times since arriving in 2006. The first time was part commentary, part complaint. A cousin explained, “our neighborhood is no longer recognizable, many foreigners have settled”. Apparently, her “once mainly-Greek” inner-city locale, and the “closeness” of her “memorable”, tightly bound community had been eroded by immigrants. An alternative complaint often-heard, particularly from work-colleagues, is that, “Cypriots have a problem with foreigners and that needs to change!” There are two sides to the coin of small-change it seems, or are there more, and at what cost? There I was sitting in the cafeteria of the newly opened IKEA furniture showroom in Nicosia. An elderly gentleman and his middle-aged son joined my table. In moments we were companions as we journeyed through the old man’s stories of youth, followed his route from trainee engineer for the British in the 1950s; detoured via the industrial accident that prematurely ended his army career - a fortuitous calamity without which he would not have “made” his “name” as a successful taverna owner; and then, we arrived at *my* present destination. “Where are you from?”, he enquired of me. “Father from Kolossi, Mother from Nicosia,” I replied, “but they left in '55, and we were born and brought up in Scotland”. “Even better!” his son interjected, “I work in the ports, with a lot of Scots, not like the English... I've been to Glasgow, my cousin married a Scot, Scots are more like us than the English”. His father informed me that my “Greek was very good considering” I “had not lived in Cyprus”. Acknowledging his ‘compliment’, I ventured an experience of my own: “when I speak Greek, people seem amused. It is as if my '55 Greek inherited from parents is not widely spoken anymore”. Father, now somber, offered solace, “your Greek is Cypriot, it is not strictly Greek. You speak my language, and I understand you perfectly”. After a pause, he added, “Cyprus has changed”. His departing tale was of kindness and generosity once witnessed and demonstrated towards “strangers”. His moral - Cypriots had lost their groundedness, their compassionate hospitality. Cypriots were now “selfish, untrustworthy and greedy”. As the three of us finished our respective portions of fifteen meatballs, fries and cranberry in our newfound haven of multiple consumer choice, the irony of our insatiable sameness did not escape me. The old man’s perception of change and our mutual desire for ‘contemporary styles at affordable prices’ were not mere illusions. So, is Cyprus really changing?

An answer to this question depends very much on first agreeing what

Cyprus once was, and hence, has changed from; second, on what Cyprus has become or is in the process of becoming. The dialectical relationship between both points is obvious. Also obvious is that no such agreement currently exists. Would Christofias and Papadopoulos agree? Did Makarios and Grivas?²² As a sociologist I am immediately struck by more difficulties. When we say "Cyprus", do we mean the institutions located in Cyprus - political, economic and social-, or are we referring to "the people" of Cyprus? Are we talking about cultural habits, customs, language, symbols? Do we mean "the environment" – rural, urban, nautical? Or is it health that concerns us? Perhaps history? One could be forgiven for suggesting that "all of the above" is the correct answer. But if that is the case, then answering our question becomes a formidable task.

Empirical or substantive focus is usually influenced by the theoretical stance adopted. As a Universalist, I begin from the assumption that Human Beings make 'all of the above'. Humans are the subjects of history and hence of historical change, I argue. How then have human beings changed Cyprus? Are human beings changing aspects included within 'all of the above'? And if human beings have changed, what would such changes mean for Cyprus? Many of you reading this will immediately protest, "what is this 'human being' you demand of us?" And you would be in prodigious company. When the 18th century French conservative counter-revolutionary, Joseph de Maistre (1965) mocked, "there is no such thing as *man* in the world..." only "Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, and so on" (p. 80), his particularist essentialist claim was in its day a moribund critique of universalism that would reappear in many guises over the coming two centuries, especially when quests for social progress threatened the established order of things. To explain...

Recently I had the pleasure of being interviewed by a PhD student from the University of Sussex. Her thesis topic was *British born Greek Cypriots who return to Cyprus*. During the interview I felt compelled to state that although I had been born in Britain and my parents were Greek Cypriots, it did not necessarily mean that I was either British or Greek Cypriot. Moreover, as I had never lived in Cyprus prior to my arrival in 2006, I could not be said to be 'returning', could I? My aim was that of drawing out the complexity involved in the conflict between these external ascriptions and the possibility, if not the development, of something new, which may not be captured within existing policy or academic remits (for a discussion of this 'newness' in relation to British national identities and Muslims, see Kyriakides et al,

2009). “My parents migrated to Scotland in 1955,” I explained. “I was born in Glasgow in '71. For the first 15 years of my life, I was identified as Pakistani, for the next 15 years I was identified as Arab, then, when I moved to Cyprus, I was identified for the first time as a Scotsman!” So, one could say that I am ‘all of the above’. Alternatively, one might say, ‘I am none of the above’. I have an ‘identity of nothingness’. In 1970s Scotland, as in Britain, the word ‘Paki’ (short for Pakistani) was common currency among racists, a means of designating anyone who was not white or black. The expletive was an expression of the desire to keep ‘us’ out of history. We were not subjects who had the right to act effectively and decisively, to compete legitimately for resources - economic or cultural – deemed British.

The British labour movement at that time was powerful, and enjoyed a privileged place in the post-war welfare compromise with capital (Kavanagh & Morris, 1994, Mercer, 1996). The movement was however primarily stalinist, ‘socialist in one country’, and hence, worked within the confines of Britain. In its support for racist immigration controls (Miles and Phizacklea, 1977; Sivanandan, 1976), the British labour movement proved its patriotism. Bereft of an internationalist agenda, the rights and circumstances of racialised ‘non-white’ migrants were practically ignored (Thompson, 1988, Solomos, 1993). I recalled to my interviewer how as a child growing up in Scotland I would be asked: “where are you from?” When I replied, “Scotland”, the response was often “yes, but where are you really from?” In addition, childhood holidays to Cyprus all-to-often reminded me that I was “not really” Greek Cypriot: “Έν Σκωτσέζουίν” (he’s a small Scot) was how I was introduced and dismissed. My ‘existential’ crisis was eventually partially resolved as a nineteen-year-old attending student parties. Drunken enquiries as to my “real origin” were met with my now-standard rejoinder: “I originate from carbon”. Baffled looks were treated to the addition: “well doesn’t everything on the planet?” I was smug, especially when they remained baffled. But in my smug amusement I felt some liberation.

My Greek-Cypriot migrant parents, like many of those Pakistani parents who settled in Glasgow after World War Two, arrived with hopes, fears and above all the aspiration to build a life denied them, for their children. Being immigrants, and branded ‘non-white’, placed them in the precarious position of having to work twice as hard as the then indigenous population and in worse conditions (Smith, 1977). At least, that is how my parents experienced their situation. And work they did, ‘24/7’, until eventually like some migrants they entered the British middle class (CMEB 2000). They

faced discrimination and cruelty, but still made friends and became part of what they and other migrants had made – a new community, which would no longer accept Britishness as homogenously 'white' (see Gilroy, 1993). Some fought to become part of History by challenging the racially exclusive boundaries, which unsettled us. Others *settled* for a share in Britannia's dwindling surplus as diminishing futures were rebranded into 'new horizons'. In 'the end' the ahistorical construction of Britishness as 'white' was undermined even if the current cultural relativist 'Cool Britannia' does not represent History's realization (see Kyriakides, 2008). That was the Britain I left in 2006, but what is key is that I took with me a sense of aspiration, a yearning for a better future, which had been instilled by the migrant experience of nothingness. It was that aspiration which enabled the rejection of imposed ethnic origin, freedom from the determining categories of exclusion and inclusion, thus clearing a way for the making of humanness. Nothingness did not entail the absence of everything, for it was the *hope of freedom* that compelled the rejection of 'identities' imposed. Only a refusal to bow to the power of external determinacy kept that hope alive. And in that rejection a space was created for the emergence of something new. The space drew upon migrant aspiration, which in turn allowed for creation. The pre-requisite for the existence of aspiration, creation and renewal, as Castoriadis (1991) might say, for the breaking of *eidōs*, is Utopia.

Practices of Mastery

It was Thomas More, the 15/16th century English statesman who coined the term utopia, a play on the Greek *ou-topos*, meaning "no place", and *eutopos*, meaning "good place" (Sargent, 1982). The two senses are intimately connected – the image of a perfect topos (place) does not correspond to a really existing location, but is the means of acquiring improvement in the present. Utopia relates to a journey - not to a final destination - from the present to an improved future. Nothingness, *ou-topos*, is a premise for freedom the end-point, *eutopos*. The bridge between experience and vision is provided by hope. But if freedom is the supreme destination of hope (Bloch 1959), what is the basis of hope?

Paleoanthropology offers a partial answer (Klien 2000). The relatively genetically homogenous *Homo Sapiens* (Cann et al 1987, Ingman et al 2000) - Latin for "wise man" or "knowing man" - from which the present 6.6 billion world population is descended, evolved in East Africa 100-200, 000 years BP

(before present)³, migrating outward 55-60, 000 years BP via the Middle East, Asia, Europe, Australia and the Americas (Hudjashov et al, 2007). Capable of abstract reasoning, introspection and language, Homo Sapiens took advantage of glacial cooling; we beachcombed, harvested marine foods, hunted, and hence followed rivers, lower ocean levels, warmer climates and migrating animals. Out of Africa (Stringer & McKie, 1996) came our culturally universal *predisposition* for creative action which enabled the overcoming of monumental natural catastrophes that occasionally threatened human existence (Ambrose, 1998). Whilst such actions were reactive, it is in this reactivity that we find the spark, all-be-it undeveloped, of utopia. Implicit to utopia is the reciprocal relationship between creative action and possibility of improvement. The making of Human History requires *experience* of that possibility. The most basic and fundamental (although not always conscious) experience of improvement lies in the orientation human beings adopt towards nature. Through the creative manipulation of nature, humans have learnt that they can wilfully change their circumstances. The ability to build shelter from natural elements, the discovery of fire, fishing and hunting are all *practices of mastery* which underpin the experience of positive change – the movement, made by application of will - from a cold and hungry present, to an *improved* 'place' where hunger and exposure are no longer as problematic. Within this migratory movement we find the embryonic development of the belief in a better future amid the failure of practices as represented by the determining power of natural calamity.

Experience of successful and failed practices of mastery situates human beings at the centre of the human story. The book of Genesis, for example, presents a moral compass situating good and evil around the Garden of Eden. The Hebrew word “adam” is a generic word meaning “humanity”; the name “Adam” a masculine form from the word “adamah” which means “ground” as in “formed from the ground”. The narrative of the emergence of the 'first man' represents the belief that all nature was infused with life. Man emerges from and reverts to earth imbued with vital substance. Whilst both generic and individualised uses of “adam” are interweaved throughout Genesis, the generic sense dominates and applies whenever “adam” connotes a passive subject of divine creation (McCurdy et al, n. d). The fear and ‘worship’ of nature (the new God) steals the fire of divine ordinance, this new knowledge sparking celestial jealousy. Experience of the power of nature and the questioning of God, casts “Man” from the Garden of Eden - from ignorant bliss. Instilled with self-doubt, anxiety and guilt, human beings face

the reality of their own mortality. With this knowledge emerges the possibility of the active subject. Humans become conscious, not only of their own actions, but of the power which their actions contain. Fromm (1966) used *Adam and Eve* allegorically. *Eating from the Tree of Knowledge* symbolised awakening; awareness of being both part of and separate from nature. Their “naked shame” reflects consciousness of themselves as mortal and powerless in the face of natural and social forces. Dis-united from the universe and hence from their pre-human 'instinctive' existence brings guilt and shame, the solution of which lies in the development of exclusively human powers. Raised consciousness is implicit in the emergence of the belief that humans make the human world and are ultimately the masters of our own destiny; that Human will, not nature, is destiny's author. Hence, only with human mastery through practices do we have the possibility of dreams or visions of *paradise on earth*. Human mastery of nature has provided the basis, in part, for a non-nihilistic wilfully determined and future-orientated terrestrial existence. “To measure the life ‘as it is’ by a life ‘as it might or should be’ is a defining, constitutive feature of humanity” (Bauman, 2003, p. 11).

There is another equally fundamental shaper of experience, which affects our understanding and belief in the possibility of improvement. Human beings live, not only in relation to nature, but also in relation to each other. Human existence is crucially social. It is the social nature of human beings, which shapes the experience of practices of mastery. Individuals internalise social experience, which permeates the expression of will. The shape is provided by historical context. In the modern world, social life, through technological advancement, transcends the determining power of natural scarcity, such that the human life-world is related but distinct from the natural-world. Nature is socialised – utopia informed by the self-mastering practices of social progress.

As Bauman (1976) notes, the modern shaping of the life-world includes two qualitative and complimentary conditions – “impersonalism” and “plebiscitism”. Impersonalism refers to the interaction of standardised anonymous beings, the individual universalised as a socially non-distinct public persona. Non-modern personal, idiosyncratic particularisms are “off-limits”, but continue nonetheless to be expressed, shaped by social impersonalism. Plebiscitism refers to political process through which human beings are transformed from the subjects of monarchs into citizens of state, their collective will positing and striving for an idealised autonomy.

Citizens are equal for as long as they are indistinguishable – difference is the private mirror of the impersonal public universal body-politic. However, the idealisation of autonomy is not simply a reference to 'the individual'. In the sense advocated by Plato, it is the pursuit of a transcendent, idealised and perfectible human condition that impels subjects out of their private worlds into the polity of collective expression. As Castoriadis (1991) argued, it is the positing of autonomy, the radical utopia, that brings possibility of real freedom. Hence, Prometheus stole the fire of the Gods. Nevertheless, in the modern polity, the ideology of autonomous subjectivity has been cohered by political conflict. Historically the Right wished to attain the individual in opposition to the collective subject of the Left. Their different orientations compelled the pursuit of qualitatively divergent futures. Where the Right stressed the past as a source of authority, taking a conservative stance against radical change in order to avoid a worse future, the Left traditionally took a progressive anti-conservative stance in pursuit of radical future-orientated change.

Sennet (1993) provides insightful flesh on the bones of the modern public-private divide. The late 18th and early 19th century public was delimited by relationships between strangers who must utilise roles and codes of behaviour approximating interaction appropriate to *cosmopolitan* anonymity – the 'bond of a crowd' (1993, p. 3). The public is the realm of anonymous exchange between cosmopolitans. Social and ethnic origins were of less concern in a diverse urban public sphere as they had been in the era of Kings and serfs, of feudal privilege. The claims of the modern civil cosmopolitan public were balanced against those of the 'natural' private – the family. Neither was preferred, each deemed important and mutually reinforcing. Only with the revolutions of the 19th century were Enlightenment public-private divides re-interpreted. Enter the anti-modern ideology of race (Lukacs, 1980).

When the 18th century German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder coined the highly influential idea of the national *Volk*, he opposed racial differentiation. However, culture separated the nations in as dire a way as racial determinacy eventually would. National *Volksgeist*, from intuition to sentiment, to language, to thought, was organically unique to a people, making cultures incommensurable. People were determined inter-generationally by inner voice, not outward physique. The nation was the teleological end-point of an organically founded and continuous spirit. But as Malik (1996) notes, Herder's *Volksgeist* could very easily, and did, translate into a theory of the incommensurability of 'races'. Balibar (1991) puts it

slightly differently: 'theoretical racism' incorporates a philosophy of history which 'makes history the consequence of a hidden secret revealed to men about their own nature and their own birth' (p. 55). It 'makes visible the invisible cause of the fate of societies and peoples'. An 'ideal synthesis of transformation and fixity, of repetition and destiny' (p. 57) substitutes the signifier of culture for that of race, attaching the secret of heritage, ancestry, rootedness' (p. 57). The formation of this tendency lay in a collapse of the belief in social progress – the basis of the bourgeois epoch. The Enlightenment promise of equality contradicted by the inability of the capitalist system to deliver on that promise provoked ruling elite crisis (Malik, 1996). The agitating masses of Europe in 1848 and India in 1857, led to a post-hoc rationalisation of bourgeois rule (Lukacs, 1980). The ideology of racial (i. e. non-human) determinacy, and its nationalist homologue came to permeate a now secularised and collapsing public-private order. Those feudal particularisms, once privately acquiescent, were publicly recast under the guise of scientific racism – the antithesis of utopia. In turn, the collapse of bourgeois social progress precipitated the irrationalist elevation of natural limitation. The earlier 19th century works of anti-revolutionary Thomas Malthus, who believed that population growth, specifically of the urban poor and working classes, outstripped natural resources and should be curtailed, gained currency of explanation (Case & Fair, 1995). Malthus' anti-utopian critique was levelled at the utopian works of William Godwin and The Marquis de Condorcet (see Avery, 1996). Through later notables such as Darwin and Spencer (see Young, 1985), neo-Malthusian anti-humanism laid the groundwork for future policies of eugenics. Only with the eventual mass annihilation of Holocaust and the rise of anti-colonial movements for self-determination, do we witness the full crystallisation of the battle of utopia against the dystopic destruction of reason. It is to the post-colonial context that I shall now turn.

Cypriot *res publica*

Ironically Cyprus became a Democratic Republic at a time when the public sphere was being significantly eroded in established sovereign democratic states (Sennet, 1993). The one enmity, now international, which kept the battle over the public sphere alive, was the rivalry between Left and Right (Furedi, 1993). The transition to a Cypriot public between the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960 and the Turkish invasion of 1974, from that public introduced in part by the British, was arrested in its infancy by rival Greek-

Turkish ethno-nationalisms (Bryant, 2004a; Faustmann & Peristianis 2006), but maintained a cold-war momentum (Hitchens, 1997). The plebiscitarian and impersonalisation pre-requisites of modernity could not fully take hold in a newly emerging global post-colonial context. In Cyprus, the public, what Sennet describes as a cosmopolitan space in which strangers meet, lying beyond private informal family and friend relations, remained stunted by fixed ethnicities - the existence of compulsory voting reveals starkly the desire to create a public by compulsion. Such compulsion is the antithesis of the impersonalised public entered 'voluntarily' by cosmopolitan moderns and this is mirrored in the continuing reliance placed on family and friendship networks when it comes to crucial questions of buying/selling a house or finding a job. A level of informality traverses the Greek Cypriot social space, and, lest things fall apart, the state oversees that which informality cannot hold. Put another way, the state has a set of legitimacy problems, which go hand in hand with an occupied governing zone over which the Republic has diminished authority. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee inset the upward assurance of security to Greece, Turkey and Britain. Despite compulsory military service, the state of the Republic relies *militarily* on the presence of third-powers – the UN – diminishing its powers of legitimacy in that it does not control the legitimate expression of force in a sovereign territory; and *socially* – the EU – since its 2004 accession, extending public contract to a notoriously bureaucratic and unaccountable supra-national regime.

In a sense Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos acknowledged the Republic's vulnerability when he asked Greek Cypriots, in a tearful TV broadcast of April 7, 2004, to reject the *Annan Plan*, centrepiece of the 2004 referendum. The 75% of the electorate who subsequently voted against the establishment of a United Cyprus Republic, reciprocated – in effect voting for the continuation of the UN presence and crucially for the acknowledgment that the Cypriot state could not guarantee their rights and security on its own. One observer remarked that Greek-Cypriots voted “against the future” (Kadritzke, 2004) whilst another explained the no-vote as “certainty of the future” (Bryant, 2004b). However, it could be argued that the Greek-Cypriot no-vote reflected the perceived *absence* of a future. This would not make Greek-Cypriots any different from post-cold war peoples across the globe. The collapse of the future, predicated on the end of utopian experiments in social planning and policy is the hallmark legacy of the failure of 'communism'. The political orientation endorsed by Left-Right rivalry, which previously compelled utopian public action, has little purchase on

contemporary politics. For sure, there are some who still hold their positions, but contemporary culture is powerfully a-political, and hence anti-utopian. The collapse of the public sphere has in turn precipitated a governing style which seeks to connect with anxiety - a private emotional concern (see Nolan, 1998, Furedi, 2004). Papadopoulos' emotional appeal was symptomatic of a governing style orientated around the collapse of utopia – a diminished public sphere. In a socio-historical context where nothing lies beyond the self, the latter becomes beginning and end of 'political' action. The conversion of political discourse into emotionalism follows.

What does all of this tell us about migrant experience?

When they enter Cyprus, migrants are in-effect entering an arrested public sphere, one in which private informal relations hold more sway. It is not therefore simply the case that impersonal institutionalised mechanisms block access. Rather, exclusions are inherently personal. Migrant aspiration is circumscribed within a personalised social milieu that denies the possibility of transcendence in the human world – 'who you know' makes a difference. For example⁴: a Greek-Cypriot male drives his Middle Eastern wife to the Ledra street crossing in Nicosia, she has a meeting at the Fulbright Centre situated between Greek and Turkish Cypriot zones. The patrolling police officer stops her and asks for her passport – an inconsistent practice. On seeing this, husband gets out of his car and approaches to assist but is immediately reprimanded by the officer: “you do your job and let me do mine!” The husband replies: “this woman is my wife, so this is MY job, and it certainly is not YOURS!” On hearing this, the police officer is defensive and backs down: “oh, you are Greek Cypriot, well if that is the case then it is OK my friend”, he ingratiates. Wife later informs husband that she was worried the police officer thought he could take advantage of her, as a foreign women he saw her as vulnerable. When he discovered she was married to a Greek, he realised he had broken a code of belonging and backed off. She received her social status from her personal relationship to a Greek. If the police guard had been public-minded, marital status and being married to a Greek i. e. a private relationship, would not have altered his initial approach. Indeed, it is doubtful if there would have been an initial approach to alter. This is not an isolated case. Migrants often complain that their reception by immigration department personnel reflects the personal disposition of whichever immigration officer happens to be on duty at the time. At times reception is helpful, at others deliberately obstructive. Also, immigration and nationality law is interpreted subjectively, barriers or their

removal are often a consequence of what immigration officers *feel* should be the case. *Public* servants engaging with strangers would orientate their interaction along impersonalised cosmopolitan codes of behaviour, leaving little room for subjective feeling.

If one should care to take a Sunday afternoon stroll along the pedestrianised downtown waterfront walkway of Limassol known as Molos, one would be struck by the hustle and bustle of the market bazaar, which meets there. A remarkable soiree brightens an otherwise sedate esplanade. Sri-Lankan, Philipino, Indian, and Arab consumers gather on their Sunday afternoon-off to engage in a bit of relaxed leisure time. Pedestrian strolling space is indeed an invention of modern city planning reflecting the spatial and temporal needs of capital exchange relations and the urbanite cosmopolitan clientele engaged in those relations. However, what is equally notable about Molos' urbanized gathering of strangers is the absence of Greek Cypriots - retailers or consumers. Where are they? Experience offers an answer. A new acquaintance and his wife from Nicosia called in on me during their recent visit to Limassol. I invited them to join my usual Sunday afternoon saunter. On arrival at Molos, my guests engaged in a private quarrel, the details of which I was not privy to. As their quarrel escalated, the husband pointed to a Sri Lankan female standing no more than ten yards from us and shouted at his wife in Greek, "if you don't stop moaning, I am going to run off with that black prostitute!" What struck me was the ease of discursive movement from private quarrel to public outburst, and that the target of that outburst was discarded through racialised and sexist enmity. Belief translates into behavior; the target's *absence* represents the *presence* of racist ideology. Such disregard for cosmopolitan exchange between strangers revealed itself once more that afternoon. We were sitting on a bench eating ice cream when a young man and four young women, all Sri Lankan, strolled passed. Whilst they were still in earshot and for no apparent reason my acquaintance raised his voice: "look at that goat with his four bitches". The targets did not react, but that they were aware and weary of such approaches I was certain. I recognized a sense of resignation on their part that comes through continuous exposure to second-class treatment without remedy. My acquaintance would not have made such comments to a group of Greek Cypriot strollers, of that I am equally certain.

Jacoby (1999) has argued that the irony of multiculturalism, our celebration of cultural difference, is that in actual fact we tend towards its antithesis – "sameness". Market forces carry us towards convergence whilst

aggrandizing our incessant self-gratifying contemporary need to present ourselves as different. In the absence of Politics, we are presented with a myriad of choices giving us the impression that we all have unique cultural dispositions. We are sold difference as “cultural authenticity” which in actuality distracts us from our *real* similarity in the present socio-historical context - our banal ability to choose identities like new hats. The irony of 'successful' assimilation is that we are assimilated to believe in our inherent difference. We make our difference 'meaningful'. The politics of multiculturalism fits well with capitalisms' ceaseless demand for short-term profits, but I remain uncertain if multiculturalism as an anti-assimilationist code enjoys any widespread adherence in the Cyprus of present. Perhaps migrants are thought of as inassimilable? “True racism”, states Castoriadis, “does not permit others to recant ... racism does not want the conversion of the others – it wants their death” (1997, p. 27). Since capitalism's inception, its globalizing tendencies have suggested an opposite trajectory – the tendency towards uniformity and the political corollary - equality. The equality of difference marks no straightforward reversal of this trend. It is the political failure of the promise of human equality which renders us in constant negotiation with an absent centre - an unequal present, once challenged by utopia, is rebranded in utopia's absence, as 'equality'. Thus, we celebrate difference in the absence of freedom. My first trip to IKEA Nicosia could have been replicated at IKEA Glasgow – same commodities, same meatballs, *same* desire for difference. We are sold the promise of 'uniqueness' this time wrapped in Greek signage which points us in a circular route through an array of commodities to satisfy any home-maker fetish. Each time we take the journey, we arrive at a new destination which may titillate but ultimately leaves us feeling lost - *short-changed?* Maybe we are all IKEA migrants now? Should the reader be so inclined, politics could also orientate itself around the freedom to choose “within the coordinates of existing power relations” leaving “an intervention which undermines those very coordinates” absent (Zizek, 2001, p. 7).

It is true we live in deeply anti-utopian times; indeed, at present one might more fruitfully search for the Holy Grail than for a better world. As Metzarus (1995) notes, the idea that “There Is No Alternative” is a blindly deterministic and pessimistic slogan of our time. Utopia is almost always paired in the contemporary imagination with totalitarianism and fascism. Current orthodoxy holds that a line be drawn from the Enlightenment to the Bolsheviks to the Nazis to Al Qaeda, each of which are deemed to have

begun from a utopian premise that ultimately leads to the imposition of a totalizing world-view. This dehistorical distortion is the legacy of Hayek, Popper and Berlin, but it is challengeable. Jacoby (2005) writes against the grain of history when he defends what he calls “iconoclast” in opposition to “blueprint” utopians. Where the latter picture a future, give a name to it and plan it down to its finest detail, argues Jacoby, the former refuse to give a name to their god. The blueprint utopians suffocate aspiration in the name of a defined end because all ideas and actions that do not conform to that end are banished – invalidated. For iconoclasts the aspiration towards a glorious future on Earth overrides the need to define it. Theirs is a qualitatively different aspiration to those who look for quantitative guarantees prior to committal. The absence of the future is a blueprint legacy and it is the banality of cultural relativism that fills the void left by the nihilism of pre-determinacy at 'History's End'. The lack of belief in a positive future, in social progress, leads to the celebration of a mythical past. Iconoclastic utopianism stands against such pessimistic determinacy. It is in this vein that I write this paper.

The anti-imperialist Franz Fanon (1963) spoke for many when he castigated the Western Left for failing in its humanist mission. However, Fanon did not dismiss a humanist project. Rather, the task of creating a new humanist agenda, a “new man”, argued Fanon, now fell to anti-colonial peoples who would lead in their struggle towards History. Evidently, as is the case with Cyprus, there is no automatic relation between colonial and human liberation. Nevertheless, if it is true that utopias, “help to lay bare and make conspicuous the major divisions of interest within a society” (Bauman. 1976, p. 15), then the question with which this paper opened should be re-posed. Not only need we enquire as to the nature of our (un)changing society. Rather, we must ask: are *you* (un)changing it?

The Republic of Cyprus was a cold-war casualty, but within that catastrophe meaning and hope continued to challenge an arrested Cypriot public sphere. Current Cypriot enmity towards migrants reflects the perception that a Greek-Cypriot social space is diminishing, because the cold-war rivalry of Left and Right, and hence the utopias which gave meaning to that space have all but gone, with little else to take their place. In the absence of utopia, dystopic tendencies can arise. It is the personalized dystopic contours of Greek-Cypriot self-identity which greet the migrant newcomer. The solution should be the positing of a world beyond self-identity. However, it seems that the trajectory is in the opposite direction. A

series of lifestyle choices is what remains, sold to us in an ethnically culturalised package of “authentic self-identities”. Next time you meet a migrant at IKEA or Molos keep in mind that it was the human pursuit of an improved life that brought them to Cyprus, and it is that pursuit which provides the spark of aspiration so necessary for the creation, based on vision, of a better place.

NOTES

1. 'Charlie' is a nickname, derived from 'Prince Charles', given by Greek Cypriots to Anglo-born Greek Cypriots. Although sometimes used affectionately, it usually carries derogatory connotations.
2. Dimitris Christofias has been General Secretary of the Cypriot Communist Party – AKEL since 1989. Tassos Papadopoulos of the centrist Democratic Party (DIKO) has been President of the Republic of Cyprus since 2003. Archbishop Makarios III was the first President of the Republic of Cyprus (1960-1977). George Grivas, leader of the anti-colonialist EOKA (1955-1959) and founder of EOKA B (1971), which formed a coup against the Makarios Presidency in 1974 with the aim of establishing Cypriot unification with Greece.
3. I am referring here to the Mitochondrial DNA and the Y chromosome - the only two parts of the human genome that are not affected by evolutionary mechanisms designed to generate inter-generational diversity. Both remain unchanged from generation to generation. All 6.6 billion of the current human population have inherited the same Mitochondria from one woman who lived in Africa approximately 150,000 years ago, 'Mitochondrial Eve'. All men have inherited their Y chromosomes from a man who lived approximately 60,000 years ago, 'Y-chromosomal Adam'.
4. All examples cited are taken from personal field notes collected in 2006 and 2007.

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Global Thoughtlessness, the Social Contract and the Double Bodied Female Other in the Cypriot Imaginary

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article explore la persistance d'une image-celle de l'autre au corps double- dans les esprits des Chypriotes. Les effets nuisibles d'une telle construction imaginaire sur les vies des travailleuses étrangères, aussi bien que ses racines politiques et ontologiques constituent les deux principaux aspects de la question abordés dans le présent article. En réduisant les personnes à un assortiment comprimé de parties corporelles a comme effet de les deshumaniser et par extension de justifier moralement leur exploitation. Les fondements de telles constructions imaginaires peuvent être trouvés politiquement dans les théories classiques du contrat social qui fournissent le fondement moral et politique pour le traitement de certains groupes de personnes comme des non-humaines. De plus, une approche ontologique à ces mêmes questions, indique une façon globale de penser, qui a comme but de maîtriser le monde dans lequel nous vivons en le transformant en une image; une manque générale d'égards, qui fournit les conditions ontologiques pour des imaginaires aussi monstrueux, qui, cependant porte en elle-même les germes de sa propre destruction.

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the persistence of an image - that of the double bodied other - in the minds of Cypriots. The deleterious effects of such an imaginative construction on the lives of foreign female workers, as well as its political and ontological roots constitute the two main areas of focus of this paper. Reducing persons to a compressed assortment of body parts has the effect of dehumanizing them and by extension morally justifying their exploitation. What grounds such imaginings politically can be found in the thinking of classic social contract theories that provide the moral and political foundation for the treatment of certain groups of people as non-human sub-persons. In addition, an ontological approach to these same questions, points to a global way of thinking, that aims to master the world in which we live by turning it into a picture; a global thoughtlessness, that provides the ontological conditions for such monstrous imaginings, yet one that bears within itself the seeds for its own collapse.

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The foreign female other in the Imaginary of post-colonial, post Anan-referendum, still politically suspended Cyprus of today appears as an amalgamation of random foreign elements, reminding one of a Dali painting, that take the shape of a Double-Bodied Female figure with three heads, different shapes of eyes, shades of skin, color and texture of hair, muscle tones and bone structures. Although this monstrous figure of the female other is a mental creation, it acquires corporeal substance ready to satisfy real and imagined needs. The first body in this figure, coming from the old Soviet block and Eastern Europe, “the body of the prostitute”, is imagined as lean with long legs, its facial features are fair, with eyes in the shades of blue and blond hair. This is a totally sexualized body, holding the power to seduce, please, destroy families, empty bank-accounts and satisfy men’s wildest sexual fantasies. The other, that of the house maid, comes in two versions: the first that of the woman from the Philippines is thought of as muscular, quick in its movements, hard working and is semi-sexualized. The second, that of women from Sri Lanka, is constructed as darker and bigger, with long black hair, dark sad eyes, slower in its movements, lazier, more comforting, and is seen as almost totally non-sexual. Both the body of the prostitute and the two headed body of the house servant have one thing in common, they are for sale at a reasonable price. Three for the price of one, a bargain of sorts one may argue.

This compressed assortment of foreignness, put together to serve the needs of consumers with a taste for the exotic “stand(s)” to appropriate Ellison, “noisy in its silence, harsh as a cry of terror in its quietness”.¹ These jarred-women-for-sale are the missing women from history, women of transition, the ignored other whose expressionless faces speak louder than any words would if anyone were ready to listen. Of what world do they speak? And what makes possible such monstrous imaginings are the two questions this paper attempts to explore.

Editors’ Note: The situation presented in this article is not unique to Cyprus. Sexual exploitation and trafficking of women is a common problem in other European countries like Germany, Belgium or Great Britain for example. According to Amnesty International even UN and NATO troops (Americans, British, French etc) in the region of Balkans, especially in Kosovo, are using the trafficked women for sex and some have been involved in trafficking itself. (BBC, 6 May 2004, Amnesty International, Press Release, 6 May 2004, Euro/Topics 18-02-2008).

The Monstrous World of Female Foreign Workers in Cyprus

The 2007 Cyprus Report on Human Rights Practices released by the US State Department² indicates that Cyprus is a destination point for women trafficked for sexual exploitation. Despite legal sanctions prohibiting trafficking in persons that have a specific focus on countering trafficking for sexual exploitation, trafficking women for sexual exploitation to the country still constitutes a major problem. In addition, allegations of police corruption related to trafficking continue to be reported. Although a plan of action to stop the trafficking of persons and the exploitation of children was adopted in 2005, the authorities seem to generally tolerate this practice.

Trafficking for prostitution to Cyprus involves almost exclusively Eastern European Women (from Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine).³ Every six months more than 1000 foreign female workers come to Cyprus to work in cabarets (PP, 32). They arrive in Cyprus on entertainment visas since the law strictly prohibits prostitution related activities that are effected through the use of force (PP, 4). The legal requirement that employers apply for a visa on behalf of the employee prevents any of the details about her employer or the nature of her employment from reaching the employee before she arrives on the island (PP, 2).

Because of this, most women think they will be working as barmaids in nightclubs and bars on the island and only after arrival they discover what their work entails (PP, 2-3). Not only are they, in most cases, deceived about the nature of their employment, but even when they are not, and compensation is given to them for sexual transactions, they only receive a small fraction of the profits for their services (PP, 3). While not all women are forced into prostitution, most suffer sexual and physical violence in the hands of their employers (PP, 3). During their “free time”, their freedom of movement is for the most part limited as in a number of cases their passports are taken from them or they are being watched closely to prevent them from escaping or reporting abuse (PP, 3). More importantly, the nature of their work carries with it a stigma creating a negative image of these women in the minds of Cypriots making the quality of their lives on the island extremely hard to bear. For the sake of simplicity, Eastern European Women are all referred to as “Russian” while all South East Asian Women, whether from Sri Lanka or the Philippines, are abbreviated with “black.” It seems that both “the Russian prostitutes” and the “black housemaids” are seen by the Cypriot society as just that: “prostitutes” and “housemaids,” not people. Aided by such “naturally” taken for granted assumptions, Cypriots are enabled to first completely

dehumanize these women and then exploit them - taking advantage of a global liberal capitalist economic system that exploits the many to benefit the few in its demarcation of the world into “first” and “third” - by using them as cheap labor. Ironically it is the financial exploitation of these nameless others that constitutes one of the factors contributing to the strengthening of the Greek-Cypriot economy. That it is taken for granted that these women are something less than human shows itself more strongly through simple observations of their treatment in public. It would be a rare phenomenon to see a group of South East Asian, or eastern European women, sitting in any of the popular Cypriot cafés enjoying their tea or coffee after a hard day’s work, or having a meal at a restaurant by the sea on their day off. It would be just as odd to see any of the foreign workers chatting amicably with Cypriots enjoying each other’s company. If a South East Asian woman is seen with a Cypriot family, she is mostly there to mind the children or an old person, and even when she is just there “to enjoy” her meal, she sits by herself, with hardly anyone noticing or addressing her - unless they need something - *feeling and being treated like a servant*. The assumptions change, however, when an eastern European woman is observed at a restaurant or a café. She, contrary to the South East Asian woman, *feels, and is being treated like a prostitute*. To suggest that either “the prostitute” or “the housemaid” chooses to live this way would be, to put it mildly, a thoughtless, yet by no means accidental, “oversight”.

The worsening economic situation plaguing former Eastern block countries forces many women to look for work abroad. Cyprus’ booming economy, its strategic location and recent induction to the European Union make it an attractive employer for these women and the organized networks that promote them (PP, 1-2). Until the early 90’s most women working in Cabarets were from South East Asia mainly from the Philippines. The Government of the Philippines, however, following numerous complaints from women who found themselves forced into prostitution even though they were promised work as cabaret dancers, banned the issuing of entertainment visas for its women (PP, 3). South East Asian Women are now employed as house servants in Cyprus. Foreign female workers, employed as housemaids, come on four year contracts and face labor exploitation as they receive extremely low wages (82 cents per hour compared to four or five pounds per hour for Cypriot maids)⁴ and no legal provisions for overtime pay, or health and safety regulations in their work environment (CCR, 11). They are for the most part overworked as they not only mind the houses of their employers but also those of their employers’ relatives. Their duties

involve cleaning, caring for children, taking care of old people, cooking and gardening. Most do not dare complain as they fear deportation.

What this brief - and by no means exhaustive - factual portrait reveals is that the not so human treatment the foreign female working force in Cyprus receives is due to its perceived sub-person status that takes shape in the very real thought-image of the double bodied female other. A perception based on the racist/sexist/heterosexist/classist logic that can only exploit when it dehumanizes and it dehumanizes because of the taken for granted perception that these women are something less than human. Imagining women as a collection of body parts devoid of any resemblance to human beings dehumanizes these women and justifies their exploitation. The reductive logic that thinks of these women as “standing reserve”⁵ to use Heidegger, or “docile and useful bodies”⁶ to use Foucault, or to put it differently that justifies morally such monstrous imaginings, is what the next section traces. The intention here is neither to make an “objective”, empirically supported claim - although some data have been used - nor to suggest that the interpretive framework used here only applies to the Cypriot context. Rather the aim is to examine philosophically the taken-for-granted presuppositions of an enduring structure of thinking that justifies the inhuman treatment foreign female workers receive in Cyprus. What may be uniquely Cypriot is the specific shape the image in question takes as it arises out of a certain local context. Its particularity, however, is but a symptom of a durable logic that is global in its origin and manifests itself variably in different contexts. A logic that has its roots *politically* in the enlightenment principles that ground social contract theory and *ontologically* on a specific interpretation of being and truth characterizing the modern epoch that aims to master the world by turning it into picture.

Political Grounds: The Social Contract and its Ideal Visions of Equality, Personhood and Morality

In Political Philosophy various accounts have been offered that describe how people originally got together and through mutual consent agreed to certain common rules that would enable the establishment of a civil society of equals. The importance of these accounts for our purposes lies in the way they articulate the question of what it means to be human and what makes one a person. In Plato's *Republic*⁷ we see the first articulation of this common agreement between people that provides the foundation for later contract

accounts such as those of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant. With Plato morality is established as central to the creation of a civil society demanding that the Social Contract as well as its signatories are moral. Glaucon in order to force Socrates to argue in favor of morality as an end in itself plays the devil's advocate and says that people act morally out of necessity and not because they want to. Morality is thus seen as a compromise between what is considered the best of all which is "doing injustice without paying the penalty" and the worst of all which is "to suffer it without being able to take revenge" (R, 359b). Glaucon presents human nature as fundamentally bad and the aim of the common agreement between people is, therefore, to curb their unruly nature but more importantly that of others. The story of Gyges and his magic ring that as he discovers can make him invisible further supports this claim. The argument is that if we could get away with evil acts we would commit them. It is the fear of being found out as well as the possibility of others doing wrong to us without us being able to retaliate that makes us willing to agree to a compromise with others. Glaucon's major assumptions about human nature come close to those of Hobbes in the *Leviathan*⁸. For Hobbes the natural equality among men makes their belief in their ability to attain their highest hopes very strong. Such a strong belief in themselves makes men enemies to one another as they assert themselves on each other in their self-righteous efforts to pursue and achieve their aims. In the absence of a sovereign with the "power to over-awe them all," (L, 99) men find themselves in a state of war where competition, diffidence and glory are the main causes of quarrel. In this time of war every man is enemy to every other man and life is characterized by a lack of arts and letters, the absence of a society and the continuous fear and danger of violent death. In such a state, Hobbes famously claims, the conditions of life are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (L, 100). An agreement thereby becomes necessary that would enable people leave this state of nature and elevate themselves under the guidance of a strong sovereign—a king or an assembly, ruling arbitrarily and demanding obedience in return for protection—to the civil society. Hobbes' absolutism and violent take on human nature is tamed down by John Locke⁹ who speaks of a more peaceful human nature that permits people to act with more civility within the state of nature. For him, within the state of nature men are rational, equal to one another and they enjoy perfect freedom. The threat of war provides the reason for men to enter into civil society, established by consent in the commonwealth, where they are free under government. For Locke, authority can never be absolute.

Contrary to Hobbes, he envisions an assembly regularly reviewed through elections acting as an adjudicator of disputes. His version of the social contract is severely critical of a monarch's arbitrary rule and hierarchically structured societies. Locke's liberal ideals, however, do not seem to apply to all equally, he admits to some justified exclusions when he very clearly points out that some "men" are more equal than others in his section on property. As he says "God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it to them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. *He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational* (and labour was to be his title to it), not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious." (STG, V, 34). As Mills¹⁰ points out, Locke uses the case of America and specifically that of Indian idleness - which for him resulted in the destruction of land its turning into wild woods and uncultivated waste - to support his claim. What Locke thoughtlessly takes for granted when he imposes his European liberal criteria on to the American natives is that American Indians were neither as industrious nor as rational as the white Europeans that settled on their land, hence they could not leave the state of nature and elevate themselves to civil society. In addition, the land that they lived on all their lives was not really theirs as they had not earned the right to own it through reason and labor. Compared to the European settlers that proved themselves through their industriousness and superior rationality, they were something less than human, something below persons. The Indians, for Locke, were sub-persons.

As we have seen so far, inherent in these accounts is the requirement that *one is a person*. The fulfillment of such a requirement, permits one to enjoy the moral agreement that will not allow the strong to exert their power on the weak arbitrarily as in the case of Glaucon; or benefit from the protection of a powerful sovereign who would preserve the quality of life in society by not allowing it to revert back to a state of war in the case of Hobbes. With Locke, however, it becomes clear that not everyone meets the criteria of personhood. Some are left out from the original agreement. The Enlightenment principles and the benefits these promise "for all" are in essence restricted only to some, those who are persons, and *the decision as to who is or is not a person is decided the moment the original contract is signed by those who sign it*. In the signing phase, while the signatories with satisfaction imagine an ideal world of equals, they at the same time construct a world of unequals, an underworld, inhabited by disfigured sub-persons who are but

negative reflections of all the things the equal selves are not. Although the two worlds appear to be distinct, they are ironically linked by a negative dependency.

For Mills, the philosopher more responsible for the distinction between persons and sub-persons is Immanuel Kant¹¹. In Kant's moral theory one gets a clearer understanding of what is meant by "person," a category of vital importance to classic Social Contract accounts. Kant explains the meaning of the third formulation of the categorical imperative by saying that ¹².

For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case at the same time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic union of rational beings by common objective laws, i. e. a kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means. It is certainly only an ideal. A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when, although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws, he is subject to the will of any other. (K, 181, 182).

On the one hand *a person* is understood here as an abstract individual, who is autonomous, rational, an end in himself capable of abiding to as well as creating objectively valid and universally applicable moral laws. In addition, such a person earns the right of passage to the community of rational beings like him, the kingdom of ends, in which he co-exists with all others as their equal. Personhood and Equality informed by a universal moral code are, thus, the main presuppositions of the Social Contract (or to use Kant the kingdom of ends) which, he is quick to point out, is only an ideal. Kant's views, however noble they might sound, are not as egalitarian as they appear to be. Mills points out, that Kant is not only "the most important moral theorist of the modern period," but also "the father of the modern concept of race" (RC, 70). His views on moral character are racialized making skin color something more than a physical characteristic, something providing "evidence of an unchanging and unchangeable moral quality...full personhood for Kant is actually dependent on race" (RC, 71). Mills concludes his account of Kant's racialized thinking by saying that "...the embarrassing fact for the white West (which doubtless explains its concealment) is that their most important moral theorist of the past three hundred years is also the foundational theorist in the modern period of the division between *Herrenvolk* and *Untermenschen*, persons and sub-persons, upon which Nazi theory would later draw. Modern moral theory and modern racial theory have the same father" (RC, 72). Mills

strongly asserts that in light of these, the hotly debated discussions in academia concerning Martin Heidegger's and Paul De Man's complicity with the Nazis must be put into perspective. Heidegger and De Man for him were "minor leaguers", "bit players" (RC, 72). Without claiming that Kant would endorse genocide, he argues that the distinction in Kant's moral theory between persons and sub-persons has more serious implications as it provides the ontological and moral ground for distinctions that grant one the right to become a member of the society of equals *as it determines the criteria for gaining entry to personhood*. Is Kant simply a product of his time unintentionally reflecting certain mindless biases that were mere "exceptions" to his otherwise "ideal" schema? Or is his thinking symptomatic of a process that Heidegger calls "the complete Europeanization of the earth and of man"¹³ or global thoughtlessness?

The Contract's Shadows

To assume that despite the "occasional flaw" in the thinking of classic contract accounts, the early theorists "meant well," as opposed to seeing how their thinking constitutes the grounds for the inequities of the world in which we live would mean to accept the fiction of an ideal Social Contract. As Critics have pointed out, implied in the original agreement is that the category of *non-human sub-persons* will legitimately, and justifiably be left out of the contract. The contract is thus seen as both subjective and biased by definition. The "biases" are part of its thinking, and not exceptions to it. Behind its abstract façade, and despite its claims to objectivity and presuppositionlessness, the contract is shown to be very concrete, presupposing without giving it any thought, a world divided into superior and inferior races, genders, sexual orientations and classes. At its very core the contract is racial/sexual/heterosexual and defined by specific economic parameters. These invisible dimensions guiding its thinking are as central to it as its more visible ones-- equality, personhood and morality. If there is an agreement between signatories, it is that these unquestioned presuppositions should remain unquestioned. It is this implicit agreement that explains Mills' puzzlement at people's ability to consistently do the wrong thing while thinking that they are doing the right thing (RC, 94). As he argues,

The requirements of objective cognition, factual and moral, in a racial polity are in a sense more demanding in that officially sanctioned reality is divergent from actual reality. So here, it could be said, one has an agreement to misinterpret the world. One has to

learn to see the world wrongly, but with the assurance that this set of mistaken perceptions will be validated by white epistemic authority, whether religious or secular. Thus in effect, on matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and sociologically functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made. Part of what it means to be constructed as "white"...is a cognitive model that precludes self-transparency and genuine understanding of social realities. To a significant extent then, white signatories will live in an inverted delusional world, a racial fantasyland...There will be white mythologies, invented orient, invented Africas, invented Americas, with a correspondingly fabricated population, countries that never were, inhabited by people who never were...but who attain virtual reality through their existence in traveler's tales, folk myth, popular and highbrow fiction, colonial reports, scholarly theory, Hollywood cinema, living in the white imagination and determinedly imposed on their alarmed real-life counterparts. (RC, 18-19).

Mills' critique becomes even more important when thought in conjunction with that of feminist critics of the social contract. What these critical perspectives reveal is that the ossification in thought of the main presuppositions of classic contract theories as natural - those of personhood, equality among its signatories, and an objective moral code that is universally applicable (except in the case of Hobbes) - has the effect of rendering us blind to the fact that the Social Contract describes exclusively *ideal* conditions that do not reflect the non-ideal reality under which most people in the world live. It is on the negation of such a reality that the contract in its ideal form is founded. More specifically, feminist critics of classic contractarianism have pointed out that the social contract in its ideal form is in fact underwritten by classist, sexist, heterosexist, and racist assumptions working together to constitute various intersecting Shadow Contracts that in turn inform the conditions of the "ideal" contract.

Monique Wittig¹⁴ speaks of the straight mind as a totalizing discourse that conceives and interprets reality in universalist - in this case heterosexual - terms. Heterosexist assumptions underlying the social contract privilege one group of people - those with a straight mind, the legitimate contractors of

the ideal contract-over and above another - those excluded because of their inability to think straight. Carole Pateman in *The Sexual Contract*¹⁵ speaks of the patriarchal bias of classic contract positions. Her analysis shows that although women were equal to men in the state of nature, they were later not part of the group that signed the original contract with the intention to form the political state. This absence resulted in their exclusion from the contract and its benefits--freedom and equality for all persons.

Marxist feminists¹⁶, in challenging the classic liberal assumption that our capacity for rationality is what makes us human, challenge at the same time the very foundations of contract theory positing instead that what makes us human is that we produce our means of subsistence. The liberal feminist demand for equality with men, on the grounds that women are also capable of rationality, is thus found by Marxist Feminists to be an inadequate solution to oppression in that it fails to satisfactorily grasp the structural power imbalances in capitalist societies. In addition, the liberal belief that capitalism is a system of voluntary exchange relations is seen as dangerously naive by Marxist Feminists who speak of capitalism as a system of power and economic relations which results in the division of the world between those who own the means of production and those who are exploited while producing them. What Marxist analyses effectively disclose is that the Social Contract having its basis on liberal principles is an economically restricted agreement. If liberal feminism gave the abstract subject of modernity a gender, Marxist feminism located her/him within a system of economic power relations. While fighting gender oppression from the liberal feminist perspective simply means demanding the right of entry to the masculine world - through the right to vote, access to the public sphere, and education, (an individual effort) - from a Marxist point of view, fighting oppression becomes a collective effort consisted in acquiring class consciousness and refusing to accept the lies imposed by the ruling class. The Marxist challenge thus runs deeper, questioning the very notion of an abstract, autonomous, rational, classless individual demanding a collective effort for a solution. Simply adopting liberal ideals for the feminist cause is not an adequate challenge to oppression as it allows the standards set by the privileged groups as well as the imbalance of power inherent in them to remain intact.

The final feminist critique levelled against liberal ideology comes from Black feminists,¹⁷ who speak from the perspective of “multiple oppressions.” For them it is not enough to understand oppression from any one perspective alone but only in the way these (gender, sexual orientation, class and race)

intersect with one another. Any one of these locations can not, on its own, fully explain how the image of the double bodied female other is capable of existing in the minds of Cypriots in such a real way. It is the complexity of multiplication and not of simple addition that makes this figure monstrous. Its haunting monstrousness is the result of *gender (x) class (x) race (x) sexual orientation* and not of *gender (+) class (+) race (+) sexual orientation*. The Double Bodied Other, as the outcome of multiplying various dimensions of sub-existence, pointing to the intersectionality of difference, speaks of the multiply located sub-persons that did not make it to the world of equals. This is the figure of the ultimate other and the more she is compressed as pure negation the more the Self comes to the fore in all its glory.

It must be noted, at this point, that the Contract in its current configuration has become capable of silencing its critics by rewriting itself, thus adapting to the demands of the times. Its movement is insidious. It will magically transform *non-human sub-persons into human persons* when this becomes necessary - there is a hierarchy within the ranks of sub-persons which “moves” regularly, reshuffling the positionality of groups, promoting some to higher ranks, demoting others to lower positions, making some think that the movement is a real one and that there is hope for change and even success only if one were to try harder, so as to prove that he/she is as good as the *human persons*. The appearance of mobility makes some perceive these “changes” as steps to progress. These adjustments, however, do not change the inner exclusionary logic of the contract. The structure of oppression inherent in the liberal model remains untouched. Some will always continue to be excluded.

All these critical perspectives taken together show how these shadow contracts, all these “isms”, interlock and in effect disclose the real, concrete, non-ideal situations of those who are not perceived as legitimate members of the civil society of equals - those not allowed to become signatories to the Contract. The exclusion of sub-persons and the inhuman treatment they receive “makes sense” when thought from the perspective of the critiques levelled against classic contract theory. The taken-for-granted ideal notions of “personhood”, “equality” and “morality” as they depend on their shadows, are but projections of assumptions buried deep in the hearts and minds of the signatories of the ideal social contract. From this perspective, the logic of exclusion inherent in the agreement among “persons” takes shape; at its core it is, *at the same time*, an economically, sexually, heterosexually and racially restricted pact that can only appear in its ideal form by standing on and

pushing its negative aspect deeper into the shadows. The shadows are as important to it as its positive side. Only in the warped fantasyland of a masculine/capitalist/white/straight mind can there be room for imagining that it is morally permissible for “black housemaids” and “Russian prostitutes” to be placed on shelves for sale next to other commodities.

The Ontological Grounds of Global Thoughtlessness and the Haunting Silence of the Shadows

Although the specificity of the shadow image of the double bodied other may be local in its origin (as it arises out of the Cypriot context), the thinking that makes it possible is global. The ability to mentally manipulate and suppress body parts for use as one sees fit is symptomatic of a global thoughtlessness that Heidegger refers to as calculative, instrumentalist or technological thinking. Its aim is to mentally master, so as to concretely utilize, the world as picture. This is the thinking that characterizes our times and as Heidegger warns, it is spreading with such a rapid pace throughout the world that it becomes impossible to even consider the possibility of any other kind of thinking.¹⁸

In *The Age of The World Picture*¹⁹, Heidegger distinguishes between the different ways in which being reveals itself in the age of the Greeks, the Middle Ages, and the modern age. Each interpretation of being and truth reveals ones relationship to being at each epoch. He points out, that since the time of Descartes (in his *Meditations of First Philosophy*) the question of being has come to be understood as “the objectiveness of representing, and truth as the certainty of representing (AWP, 127). What characterizes the modern age is that subjectivism and individualism are introduced as the theocracy of the Middle Ages is replaced by the anthropocentrism of the modern age. What ultimately changes then is the very essence of man in that he becomes subject (AWP, 128). “Man” in this way, “becomes the relational center of that which is as such” due to “a change in the comprehension of everything that is” (AWP, 128). While in the middle ages, being was interpreted as *ens creatum*, and to be in being meant to belong within a specific rank of the order of what had been created, a rank there from the beginning, with the god creator being the highest cause (AWP, 130), in the age of the Greeks, Man is apprehended by being “the apprehending of whatever is belongs to being because it is demanded and determined by being....man is the one who is looked upon by that which is, by that which

opens itself. To be beheld by what is, to be included and maintained within its openness and in that way to be borne along by it, is to be driven about by its oppositions and marked by its discord, that is the essence of man in the great age of the Greeks” (AWP, 131)²⁰. *The long forgotten Greek apprehending of being*, changes into the modern *representing of being* when in the age of reason, Man, conceives and grasps the world as picture, “what is stands before us as a system...what is in its entirety is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth” (AWP, 129). What for Heidegger is decisive about this event is not its newness but rather the fact that “man makes depend upon himself the way in which he must take his stand in relation to whatever is as the objective. There begins that way of being human which mans the realm of human capability as a domain given over to measuring and executing, for the purpose of gaining mastery over that which is as a whole” (AWP, 132). One can see, then, that “that the world becomes picture is one and the same event with the event of man’s becoming *subjectum* in the midst of that which is” (AWP, 132). With the emergence of humanism, Man, becomes the measure out of which everything is evaluated and understood. Specific to the modern interpretation of being is the confrontation of worldviews, whereby man “brings into play his unlimited power for the calculating, planning and molding of all things” (AWP, 135). A sign of this event is that the *gigantic* is making its appearance, which is not simply the “blind mania for exaggerating and excelling” (AWP, 135). For Heidegger

The gigantic is that through which the quantitative becomes a special quality and thus a remarkable kind of greatness...but as soon as the gigantic (in planning and calculating and adjusting and making secure shifts over out of the quantitative) becomes a special quality, then what is gigantic and what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes precisely through this incalculable. This becoming incalculable remains the invisible shadow that is cast around all things everywhere when man has been transformed into subjectum and the world into picture...This shadow, in turn points to something which is denied to us of today to know (AWP, 135).²¹

But suppose, Heidegger asks,

that denial itself has to become the highest and most austere revealing of being? What then?...If denial is to be understood as the concealed

essence of being, it unveils itself first of all as nothing, but nothing ... is the keenest opponent of mere negating. Nothing is never nothing, it is just as little a something (an object), it is being itself, whose truth will be given over to man when he has overcome himself as subject, and that means when he no longer represents that which is as object (AWP, appendix 14).

The gigantic, then, is to be understood as a symptom of an age that understands “man” as the center of everything that is, as a “man” who represents to “himself” the world as picture, an object that can be measured and controlled. In a more important way this can be seen as an act of hubris, as a forgetting of the fact that as humans we are essentially finite and thereby limited, and inevitably as an attempt to overcome that very finitude. The appearance of the gigantic constitutes, however, the moment when modern man’s arrogance is exposed in that by calling this calculative plan of taking over the world “greatness,” a value that is incalculable, “he” at the same time creates the conditions for its destruction²². Thus, in the transformation of the gigantic (something quantifiable) into the incalculable value of greatness (the ultimate expression of hubris) the modern subject is forced to face “his” own limitations in that “he” discovers that “he” can not measure and control “greatness” in the same way one can measure and control inert objects. To avoid the anxiety evoked by such a realization, the modern subject attempts to suppress it by either ignoring it through relegating it into the realm of “accidents,” or by trying to make it into something through naming it. But it refuses to be named; it rather seems that the more it is pursued or ignored the more forcefully it flees from “him” in that it is turned into that silent ghost that haunts his otherwise “whole” picture of the world. The echoes of this silence are what can potentially undermine the global imperialist project of modern “man” and disclose to “him” a world - the underworld of shadows - that is totally other than the one “he” takes for granted, one however that is “his” own. The haunting silence emanating from the disturbing image of the double bodied other, points to such a world - a world that remains an alarming mystery without a solution for the modern subject as it can not be packaged neatly within a frame.

NOTES

1. Ellison Ralph, *Invisible Man*, New York: Vintage International, p. 440.
2. US Department of State, *Cyprus, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices released by the bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor*, March 6, 2007 8-9, henceforth *CCR*.
3. The Protection Project, "The Cabaret Artistes of Cyprus," Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 2005, henceforth *PP*.
4. Markides Constantine, "82 cents an hour: the cost of a foreign maid", *Cyprus Mail*, 2007.
5. Heidegger Martin, "The Question Concerning Technology" in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977, 3-35. With "standing reserve" Heidegger identifies the specific way in which being reveals itself in its truth in the age of modern technology as orderable and substitutable. As he says "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [*Bestand*]" (17).
6. For Foucault, "docile and useful bodies" are the effects of a power that no longer functions through repression but through production so as to adapt to the demands of liberal capitalist democracies that exert their power through the disciplining of bodies rather than punishment. What Foucault's analysis ultimately reveals is that power or rather its technologies are adaptable to new and ever changing conditions. What has essentially changed since the time of the Enlightenment is not that power no longer exists but rather that its center is now rendered invisible as a result of its adaptable nature. The formidable power of death of the old regime with the monarch being its visible center becomes now the seemingly center-less but still regulatory power over life of the Enlightenment era. The Dinosaur has mutated into the Lernaia Hydra - the many headed monster. With this shift in focus, we are forced to move away from an understanding of power that is thought of in purely negative terms, as Foucault says: "We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'marks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production." (149). In Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1977. Also see Spanos, V. William in *America's Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire*, 51. Of special interest has been Spanos' insistence that the center of power did not simply disappear in the 17th century but rather that it has been rendered invisible adapting in this way to the new demands of power in the age of reason.

7. Grube G. M. A, (trans), *Plato Republic*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1992, book II, henceforth *R*.
8. Hobbes Thomas, *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*, New York, Touchstone, 1997, henceforth *L*.
9. Locke John, in *The Second Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration*, Mineola, New York, Dover-Thrift-Editions, 2002, henceforth *STG*.
10. Mills Charles W., *The Racial Contract*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, henceforth *RC*.
11. See Mills Charles W., "Kant's Untermenschen" in Andrew Valls (ed.) *Race and racism in Modern Philosophy*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2005, 169-193. In this essay Mills builds on his earlier work *The Racial Contract*, and discusses specifically Kant's racial views and their implications.
12. Kant Immanuel, from "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals", in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, 6th edn, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London: Longmans 1909, 9-22 and 29-59. Excerpted in Sterba James P., (ed.) *Ethics: The Big Questions*, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 1998, 171-185, henceforth *K*.
13. Heidegger Martin, "A Dialogue on Language" in *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter B. Hertz, San Francisco, 1982, 1-54. henceforth, *DL*.
14. Wittig Monique, *The Straight Mind and Other Essays*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1992, 21-45.
15. Pateman Carole, *The Sexual Contract*, Polity Press, 1988.
16. For a more detailed discussion of Marxist Feminist critiques of the major assumptions of Liberal Feminist Theory see Josephine Donovan, *Feminist Theory: The Intellectual Traditions of American Feminism*, New York: Continuum, 1994; Alison M. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988; Rosemarie Tong, *Feminist Thought, A Comprehensive Introduction*, Boulder and San Francisco, Westview Press, 1989.
17. Bell Hooks, *Feminist Theory from margin to center*, Boston: South End Press, 1984; Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought, Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment*, New York, Routledge, 2000.
18. As Heidegger points out when he discusses the oblivion of being--in Heidegger, Martin. "Memorial Address". In *Discourse on Thinking, A Translation of Gelassenheit*, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966, 43-57 "...the approaching tide of the technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking...Then there might go hand in hand with the greatest ingenuity in calculative planning and inventing indifference toward meditative

thinking, total thoughtlessness. And then? Then man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature-that he is a meditative being. Therefore, the issue is the saving of man's essential nature. Therefore the issue is keeping meditative thinking alive (55-56).

19. Heidegger, Martin, "The Age of the World Picture", in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans., William Lovitt, 115-154. New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1977, henceforth, *AWp*.
20. For Heidegger, the fact that Greek man *is* as the one who apprehends being, constitutes the reason why the world in the age of the Greeks cannot become a picture (*AWP*, 131). He does point out, however, that with Plato and his definition of *eidōs* as the beingness of whatever is, the path is opened up for "the world's having to become a picture" (*AWP*, 131). In other words, beginning with Plato, we see the pre-conditions for the later modern interpretation of being and truth that manifests itself as the world having become a picture. Heidegger also speaks of this in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" in *PathMarks*, ed., William McNeil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 155-182. As he says locating with Plato the origin of the change in the understanding of being and its truth, "Truth is no longer, as it was *qua* unhiddenness, the fundamental trait of being itself. Instead, as a consequence of getting yoked under the idea, truth has become correctness, and henceforth it will be a characteristic of the knowing of beings. Ever since, there has been a striving for 'truth' in the sense of the correctness of the gaze and the correctness of its direction. Ever since, what matters in all our fundamental orientations toward beings is the achieving of a correct view of ideas" (179).
21. Heidegger points out that the incalculable as shadow is experienced as that which, withdrawn from representation, is nevertheless manifest in whatever is, pointing to being, which remains concealed (Appendix 13).
22. Think, for example, of the way in which empires call themselves "great". The great Roman Empire, or America the "greatest nation on the planet", and how in these proclamations, a quantitative term is magically transformed into a quality. What is ironic, however, is that in that very transformation, something monstrous is created that exceeds its original calculated and controllable determination.

Globalization for Whom? The US and Europe: A Light House Project; Challenging the Ethics of Neoliberalism

Constandinos Tsiourtos*

RÉSUMÉ

Dans les sociétés démocratiques modernes les priorités ont été modifiées à travers l'évolution de la dynamique du capital et sous l'influence déterminante du capitalisme et sa version vicieuse la plus récente-le néolibéralisme-dans une grande partie du monde. Plus particulièrement l'aspect économique a corrompu ses fondations, et a établi son propre système de valeurs. Les relations économiques sont maintenant au centre d'attention tandis que les valeurs sociétales et la sauvegarde des libertés fondamentales sont devenues un outil utilisé comme prétexte par les pouvoirs qui les transgressent au même moment qu'ils proclament qu'ils les protègent. Le 'mouvement' de globalisation a été utilisé pour la prolifération du capital et pas des valeurs démocratiques. Des alliances telles NATO et le partenariat transatlantique entre l'Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis imposent leur propre agenda du jour au reste du monde et offrent leur propre version de «paix virtuelle».

Le concept de la Gauche pour un système mondial devrait être le premier pas vers une purification de la globalisation au lieu de la démoniser. Ce que la Gauche doit réaliser est un nouveau mouvement d'internationalism qui devrait être initié au sein du système des Nations Unies.

ABSTRACT

In modern democratic societies, priorities have been altered through the evolution of capital dynamics and under the catalytic impact of capitalism and its latter vicious version - the neoliberalism - to a big part of the world. In particular, the economic has corrupted those foundations, and established its own system of values. Economic relations are now in the centre of attention whilst societal values and safeguarding of fundamental freedoms have become a tool to be used as a pretext, for those powers that violate them the same time they proclaim to protect them. The globalization 'movement' was used mainly for the spread of the capital and not democratic values. Alliances such as NATO and the EU-US transatlantic partnership impose their own agenda to the rest of the world and offer their own version of "virtual peace".

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The concept of the Left about a world system should be the first step towards purifying globalization than to demonize it. What the Left has to achieve is a new movement of Left internationalism and it should be initiated within the United Nations system.

Introduction

It was not long after the inception of the human race that humans developed the wish for living together¹. Human tendency to form groups, called societies, have always been a matter of collective responsibility to each other. To provide a sense of security to the many who respected the social contract of obeying the rules – now-a-days, we say, the rules of law – whilst enjoying the benefits. It was also the issue of the primitive economic relations that occurred within the social group. Hence, having the opportunity to share goods and services. The last issue, but not the least, was the need to share values. It's not an exaggeration to claim that societal ethics have been the core foundations of societies, upon which nation-states have been built. Fundamental freedoms were the biggest accomplishment of this process. The notion that societies and states exist to serve the citizen came to be a universal value. The greater notion was that the state exists to safeguard and preserve the freedoms of its citizens.

The vast majority of modern democratic societies keep the elements of the original societies, to a certain extent. Nevertheless, priorities have been altered through the evolution of capital dynamics and under the catalytic impact of capitalism and its latter vicious version, the neoliberalism, to a big part of the world. The economic globalization² that evolved since the early beginning of the 20th century and became a full scale operation the last two decades has corrupted those foundations, and established its own system of values³. Economic relations are now in the centre of attention whilst societal values and safeguarding of fundamental freedoms have become a tool to be used as a pretext, for those powers that violate them the same time they proclaim to protect.

The Dominance of the Market

Globalization of economy used many imaginative ways and pre-existing concepts to invade into people's lands and minds. In some cases new concepts were invented. One of the main arguments of the pro-globalization economists is that, *in these days, the whole world is sharing a view, that the*

world economy and the global institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank – centric levers of globalization – can be better guarantors of the civil rights and prosperity than governments – or nations, which can be corrupted and seek rewards or be militaristic. By using sensitive issues such as people's rights and prosperity as a Trojan horse, the propaganda machine of globalization realized that it can be more effective at imposing economic guidelines. Still, it is no better than a brutal blackmail.

This is the part when people mistake globalization with internationalism, a movement that has been high-jacked. A notion of the left, which did not last to the attacks of nationalism but romantically is still a vision in ideologist's minds. Internationalism Vs Nationalism has been the clash then, back in the early years of the 20th century. Globalization machine is still facing the same opponent, but this time the problem can be resolved, as it is an issue within the same family, as it has been established by several scholars that nationalism is typically the hat of many right liberal political movements,⁴ that bring it up whenever is opportune. After the 1930s and the economic crisis, movements as such have survived the political stage, by pretending to be something else. Still, nationalist movements with no hidden liberal agenda exist and distinguish themselves from the neoliberal agenda.

The frustrating fact however is that such as for the right movements, many socialist political movements have been transformed essentially, alas, into something else. European socialism was to gain power in the 90s, with the support of the centre, in a big part of Europe. The most effective and constant liberal reformations were initiated during that era. From Spain, to France and England, the European socialists invented and applied the so-called "third way", the economy of the social market in veiled. That was the era of pregnancy for the extreme neoliberal policies that gave birth and full-fledged in this decade, within the European Union and Europe at large.

Yet, the current situation in Europe is not just affecting the European citizens but naturally has a greater impact to the rest of the world, except, as you would expect, the United States; those transformations took place in the United States in earlier years. This is conceivably the main reason of the social and economic situation in Europe today.

European Integration and the Vision for Globalization

As the capital in the United States kept growing, it started searching for new markets, new grounds to expand. Developing countries were an easy

victim and they served the capital by offering cheap labor in production. But what they needed now was consumers. Consumers in billions exist in countries like China and India but still - at the time - not as wealthy as the Europeans. European Union was the primary target but not an easy one, as they had to face the tradition of Social Europe that stood solid for decades.

The Marshall Plan was a first attempt to reach Europe, but that was in the early years after the Second World War and admittedly even the Americans had not yet fully realized or planned this with a clear agenda. One can even say that the Marshall Plan was to a certain extent a genuine act of solidarity within the spirit of the epoch and was indeed successful. It was long after, that they realized how useful it could be in order to understand the social and economic structures of Europe.

Europe had already progressed internally towards the goal of the so-called European Integration. The main pillar of that project, as planned by the Europeans, was the single market. This was a smaller scale of an open world market, which is globalization, thus the global integration of markets. It all started in Rome, with the EEC, when they did not yet have the final idea where this would lead or if they were ever going to achieve anything. But the concept was clear and was not free market in neoliberal terms. It was merely an interlinking of economies thus creating a common market and this is what many thought that would remain.

In 1993 the European leaders signed the Maastricht Treaty that established an accurate calendar to carry out European Monetary Union, split into three phases, defined the institutions that would manage monetary policy and established economic discipline requirements that the countries would have to fulfill if they wished to be included in the monetary union. Before that, the Schengen Treaty⁵ had abolished internal borders to a large part of the Union. Barriers for free movement of capitals, goods, services and people kept falling towards creating a Single Market.

At the start, the Americans feared that Single Market, but on the way they learned how convenient it could be. The creation of a strong European economy appeared as a threat, a challenge to the American world domination in economic and other terms. Soon, they realized that the real threats were coming from a different direction. China, India and the reviving Russia have been growing into economic giants that already contest the American Hegemony.

Americans approached the European Union and Europe at large as a friend and political ally and not as a competitor.⁶ On 3 December 1995 at

the EU-US Summit in Madrid, European Commission President Santer, Spanish Prime Minister González, as President of the European Council, and then US President Clinton signed the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA).⁷ This provided a new framework for a partnership of global significance, designed to lend a new quality to the Transatlantic relationship, moving it from one of consultation to one of joint action in four major fields: Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world; responding to global challenges; contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; building bridges across the Atlantic. The NTA is accompanied by a Joint EU-US Action Plan setting out no less than 150 specific actions to which the EU and US have committed themselves. These range from promoting political and economic reform in Ukraine to combating AIDS. From reducing barriers to Transatlantic trade and investment to promoting links between colleges and universities. It was an agenda which was ambitious, outward-looking and which affected all sectors of society from big business to the individual citizen.

That was the beginning of the “invasion” of the economic, social and legal standards of the United States into the European Union *acquis* and policies. The Americans felt that American capital investments in Europe were a risky business, as the social tradition of Europe was jeopardizing their success and restraining their profit margins to levels they were not used to. The Americans wanted a flexible working force, a non-temporary personnel, minimal social benefits to workers, personal contracts and not having to deal with workers’ unions, less State and more private institutions to deal with, less beauraucratic barriers and less State interventionism etc. The European Union, alas, consented to a great extend.⁸

After the 1995 agreement, we had the 1998 Summit in London that launched the Transatlantic Economic Partnership, complemented by a wide range of bilateral co-operative actions and a regular dialogue on multilateral trade policy issues, agreements to remove technical barriers to trade by mutual recognition of conformity assessment, and working together on customs procedures. In the Bonn Declaration, adopted at the 21 June 1999 EU-US Summit in Bonn, both sides committed themselves to a "full and equal partnership" in economic, political and security affairs. Since then, the annual Summits between the two powers examine their progress and set new goals but also new spheres of co-operation, not only in the economic field, but also the political one. They discuss their common approach to the conflicts that arise

all over the world, their co-operation against terrorism and their common action together under the umbrella of NATO, to launch humanitarian interventions to places of crisis. As of the April 30, 2007, EU/US Summit, there is now the Transatlantic Economic Integration Framework, which gave birth to the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), in other words the World's Economic Directorate. The TEC's open agenda is to observe and coordinate the economic integration of the two sides of the Atlantic.

Conclusively, the US plans to spread the known as “Washington Consensus” entered the right path. The so called “Washington Consensus” can be summarized in the following ten principles: Fiscal discipline, redirection of public expenditure priorities towards fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education and infrastructure, tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base), interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, secure property rights.

The adjustment of the European Union to globalization is a project that started long ago, even long before the 1st EU – US Summit back in 1990, and was launched in many stages. The last one was initiated with the original Lisbon process in 2000 and was revised in 2005. Lisbon provided the guidelines for many policies to come on the way, for which I will refer to later.

Let us now have a better look at how the leaders of the European Union institutions understand the globalization process today and what their vision is.

*“As I have said time and time again, globalization is not a zero sum game. The emerging economies' gain is not our pain. Globalization has created a win-win dynamic, allowing millions of previously impoverished people to get richer while the developed nations also benefit...the Lisbon strategy is Europe's response to globalization. And it is working...it is a strategy for good times and bad. It was right when the economic conditions were favorable. And it is also right now that they are less favourable”.*¹⁰

Jose Manuel Barroso was indeed sincere when he admitted the above. Barroso to a great extent has spoken the truth. Emerging economies had considerable gain, for the ruling capital. Globalization has created a win-win dynamic, for the capital elite of all the world's leading economies. Millions of people got richer, but dozens of millions got poorer; let's not forget that the world is almost 6 billions. Lisbon strategy is indeed a policy for good and

bad times, and was obviously very bad and unsuccessful in both times, according to the EU commission¹¹ and its advisors. Again he is right that Lisbon worked and provided results when economic conditions were favorable and less favorable. The European people would know better about that, as they paid for it and they continue paying; both the cost of implementation and the cost of its failure.

The Alliance of the Market-New institutions, New Values, Old Geopolitics

The US and the European Union appear determined to advance their economic integration to a new level with the progressive reduction or abolishment of regulative and other obstacles in direct reciprocal investment and the completion of financial markets but also the intensification of their political relations, according to the 2007 summit results. The estimate of the political leaders of two sides is that, the progress in the economic and financial fields can help in the improvement of general political relations between Europe and America, and can constitute a powerful foundation, useful at times of political turbulences around the globe.

The final objective of agreements in the US - EU summits, is clearly proclaimed, in the official documents of the Summit Declaration of 2006 *"the creation of a Common Market without obstacles aiming at the hegemony of world economy"*. *This is why they created the Transatlantic Economic Council in 2007, which will operate as the economic directorate, coordinating the economic integration.*¹²

In 2008 the two forces aspire to make a step forward, completing the liberalization of Trade worldwide and erasing all the regulating obstacles. The EU, complying with the guiding lines of the Summit, advanced already in the completion of further single market and the lifting of internal obstacles. The directive of services in the internal market, known as "Bolkestein" was only the beginning. In the framework of the preparation of the terrain for the conquest from the enterprising world on both two sides of the Atlantic, the European Commission advances with devoteness towards the Americanization of the regulations governing the European economy and the enfeeblement of labor law.

The revised agenda of Lisbon, the concepts of adaptability and flexicurity as they appear in Commission documents, relocation of enterprises, the working hours directive, increase of limits of retirement,

long life learning policy, increase of budgetary resources for the programs of competitiveness at 35% (budgetary frame 2007-2013), the liberalisation of air transportations, the liberalisation of public procurement, the Green Bible of the Commission on the removal of obstacles for investments, the Green Bible on the opening of services of public benefit to the private sector, the Naiades program for the liberalisation of shipping, the strengthening of relations and close collaboration of the EU with NATO in the regions of crises and conflicts, the agreed convergence of professional qualifications in the 2 sides of Atlantic, the legal convergence of accounting standards, the establishment of a European Aid organization according to the USAID regime and philosophy, the measures taken to combat terrorism whilst offending civil rights and violating personal data. All of the above are a direct result of the decisions taken on the transatlantic level.

If one fumbles all the texts of agreements of the last three years summits, will easily discover that the decisions in the texts of declarations and the road map agreed upon, match with the economic guidelines of the Council of the Union and the legislative proposals of the Commission (many are included in the annual legislative program of the Commission). Many of the provisions of the agreements have already been materialized and constitute today a Community *acquis*.

It is evident that the EU is preparing the field for a full integration of the two economies. But their action does not stop there. As they declare provocatively in the declaration of 2007, *the unstable countries and regions cause crises that threaten the world safety. Thus the EU and the USA supported by NATO but also the UN (it is reported last) will correspond to these crises, protecting the world from threats.*

Just to summarize what we have read above: the EU – US agreements, are aiming for the hegemony of the world economy; will protect the world from threats they conceive as such for which they will use humanitarian-intervention - type invasions with the support of NATO; they will achieve economic – and overall – and regulative integration between themselves which will serve as a “success story” for the rest of the world and the final achievement of a global single market. To this effect they manufactured the Transatlantic Economic Council as their directorate.

But let us look up closer at the “philosophy” behind this strategy: Globalization is in the centre of it. The new world we aim to achieve has a global economy and global rules and needs a global economic directorate, a

global gendarmerie and a global government.

What do we need the United Nations and the Security Council for? What do we need the WTO for? What do we need democracy for? And, what do we need international law for? It is cynical but true: to use, abolish or exploit. One of three verbs can match any question raised above.

As the transatlantic alliance progressed, it provided new fruits and values to the world. The partnership declarations refer to common values and common interests that constitute the base of the transatlantic relation. The package of the agreements constitutes a threat to the system of social, political and civil values of Europe, as well as its cultural diversity.¹³ The establishment of a transatlantic area of liberalization of transactions would lead to an alignment of European legal system with the American. It is consequently a US plan with the consent of the European Capital to transfer their own standards and “values” into the European Union and Europe at large, in economic and political level. The transformation of a new legal culture that will conceive the world with their own eyes. Their own perceptions for labor, the economy, the social protection, the way politics work, the relation of state and citizens and the protection of human and civil rights.

The economic environment that will be created with this partnership will be undeniably ideal for the business world. Keeping in mind the serious social problems that the American people faces with the enfeeblement of social vested from the most brutal capitalistic system in history and the complete predominance of right and capital in the US, somebody could easily express legitimate concerns for this collaboration and the degree to which it can extend itself. Perhaps eventually we witness the beginning of a new period in the EU - US relations that will not be limited in solely economic integration but the economic assimilation of one side to the other. If one judges from the level of internal homogenization of the two economies, can effortlessly come to conclusion for which side will be absorbed. Or still, whether the assimilation of economy opens the appetite of the American capital, that will wish to transfer the given social environment in which it got used to function, into Europe, touching upon sensitive strings for the Europeans as the social state and the labor relations.

The scenario for the rest of the world gets even scarier. Americans do not solely wish to dominate Europe but to use the legitimization that Europe has to offer – given its reputation compared to the Americans - to dominate the rest of the world. The Globalization of economy, is not just about dominating economies of states, but has a broader sense. The geopolitical

games played in the race of the major league players for energy is a big stake for the Americans as well as for the Europeans.

USA is today the undeniable and unique superpower. The extension of USA's hegemony depends mainly on the control of energy sources and the USA have already conceived since the first invasion in Irak, inasmuch as the control of energy can mean only one thing: the control of world economy, that is the final objective.

The modern interventional so-called "humanitarian" wars might not have all directly economic motives, but indirectly they lead to this effect. They were also the confirmation of the hegemony of the USA, mainly against the emerging forces, with the suppression of their energy autonomy. It was also the application of the classic recipe for the overshooting of the recession in the worldwide capitalistic economy, by destroying the surplus of productive forces and the intensification of weapons' production. It was the charge of the powerful American multinational companies-energy colossuses, producers of military material, companies of reconstruction - for the general reshaping of energy map with the enfeeblement of OPEC and the complete energy control at a world scale. At the same time, however, it is an operation of abolishment of possible obstacles worldwide, such as the national governments' controls in the markets.

Aside the USA, the European Union realizing that in the game of energy cannot be alone, since it does not have the interventional capabilities-at least not as solid-that the US have, or even because it suits them fine to have others doing its dirty work, has decided and chose its strategic partner. Observing a hypocritical attitude, presenting itself as an advocate of human rights while several leading member-States assist the Americans to violate them - illegal kidnappings and overflies of CIA, agreement of extradition of suspects (June 2005), mission of troops of European States to Iraq and Afghanistan - the European Union keeps the hands clean in Community level, while it occasionally exercises strict criticism to the Americans for the Guantanamo and the environment. The Transatlantic partnership is a strategic choice of the EU, allowing, on the one hand, the Americans to use Europe, knowing, on the other hand, it will also profit from this relation.¹⁴

The Civil Division-The Regional Division

The driving force behind the expansion of the contemporary world system, based on the rules of the market economy, is industrial and corporate

capitalism, and the system is related in some way to the division of the world into rich nations and poor nations, or into wealthy core, developed areas, and dependent peripheral, undeveloped, or non-industrialized areas. The system is not a creation for many but for few. It is profoundly established on the consuming habits of the wealthy that enjoy the fruits produced from the exploitation of many.

At the same time, the system exploits even the few. The wealthy population the system has manufactured is being exploited and blackmailed on a different level. If for the wealthy population the issue is to sustain their “way of life”, for the poor population, outside the sphere of the critical mass of the big consumers, the stake is to escape poverty or just continue their biological life, with what they have left. Thus, creating an informal contrast of interests between the privileged and the non-privileged, in which the privileged are self bounded – in a sense of gratefulness - in their precious wealthy world and are afraid to shake the still waters. This way the system is restricting the solidarity movement towards the non-privileged that used to be strong in the western world in previous decades, but can't motivate people as it used to anymore. The propaganda machine of neoliberalism has managed to establish an ill-generated conception about “We” and “They” as in “We against They”. The propaganda machine has grown so strong that the “We” do not seem to realize that their condition is not far from being “They”.

The above helps us to understand how many divisions have been provoked. It helps also to understand the profound reasons of terrorism, which is mainly due to the years of oppression of the non-privileged and their economic stagnation - without any intention to justify its brutality by no means. It helps us to understand how the system sustains injustice in the world so it can rule.

The “divide and rule” concept¹⁵ has been given a new meaning by the modern neoliberals. It is a divide amazingly strong as it targets people's strongest instinct: the one of survival.

On the other hand, we have the regional division. The conquest of new markets and the monopolization of natural resources make capitalism stronger. So too does the swelling of Third World proletariat populations, provoked by competition of the advanced agricultural businesses of the imperialist world, thus destroying the basis of farmers' agriculture. Thereby driving dispossessed farmers into poor urban suburbs. Deprived of the means of being able to make a living from the land, they turn into an almost inexhaustible supply of labor, available to Western Businesses for hire at

inhumanely degrading wages, to supply corporate giants with fat profits, which can then be loaned out, at interest, to the Third World countries for “growth and development” a pretty word used to dress up the building of infrastructure by Western engineering firms, to transport goods and raw material out of the country; in other words, to develop the Third World as a subsidiary economy based on the supply of raw material, as markets for capital investment and armies of the dispossessed with no option but to work at humiliation-level wages, or starve.

An example to demonstrate that non-privileged where they can not be found can be created and then subjugated.

Making the Best of Globalization-The Left Perspective

The production of wealth the last 50 years has been more than the world has ever known. The allocation of this wealth has been more uneven than the first half of the century and surely gets more uneven as the hyper accumulation of capital continues. The world resources, the national resources, ownership of the people, are being exploited by the multinational corporations. The people's economy is being granted to the private economy, just to be sold back to people piece by piece, thus creating a vicious circle of dependence.

Meaning that people today and in the future will be working to make excess profit to the capital and get the least possible share.

Let us give a new price to work. To redefine the price of work, asking for a fairer distribution of work and profit. The reduction of time of work and the fairer distribution of profit is a win-win system even for the capitalists. And the only possible way to achieve this is by globalization. Globalization by different terms.

Using globalization with a new-old meaning. An old meaning for the Left, a new meaning for the world. Globalization after all is not a bad word but the established concept is. The concept of the Left about a world system should be the first step towards purifying globalization than to demonize it.

No, I am not going back to the époque of Socialist Internationalism. But this is not to say that a new brand of Left Internationalism, based on the same core values, adjusted to the new world, cannot be emerged. This would be the first step towards a just world, but the final step.

What the Left has to achieve is a new movement of Left internationalism even if the social base to support that position does not readily exist. This

process can be sparked by the same causes nation-states did. The American and French Revolutions, which effectively invented our idea of the nation-states, were products of societies, seeking to defeat the causes of their oppression. Oppression can have different faces, but the historic causality proves that they all have the same unavoidable fate.

This new internationalism should take effect within the given socio-economic system if it is to succeed. It must also take effect by using existing institutions, as controversial this might sound. An effort to change the system of economy and society simultaneously will inevitably result to failure, as priorities will get mixed.

It must be initiated within the United Nations system as the only internationally acceptable global institution, comparatively less controlled by the Capital than others. The initiative could promote a new notion of solidarity among nation-states - as the central message of internationalism - it will be a fresh effort to universalize democratic values and promote human rights protection. This can lead to a formation of a group of Nations, an alliance, that will share the concept and promote it, hence creating a dynamic to spread to the rest of the world. It is never too early nor too late for this initiative to take place. The momentum has to be created and not expected.

Many questions can be raised for this notion. I can find a hundred reasons that would lead such an effort to failure, as the brain-washing machine of capitalism has established the belief it is uncontestable. Even themselves, capitalists ended up believing it. This is exactly their biggest disadvantage, the Achilles' heel of capitalism. The certainty that nothing can disturb the new world order. The graveyard of history is filled with empires that shared the same arrogant stance towards the power of the people.

The views and opinions expressed in this paper reflect the Author's point of view and not necessarily those of the institution he is employed from.

NOTES

1. Nevertheless people's social awareness was limited to the tribe.
2. For the purpose of this paper the term "Globalization" means the economic

liberalization as described by Bhagwati, Jagdish (2007). *In Defense of Globalization*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Either wise, it will be defined as other.

3. Each day that passes we witness the fiasco of the impetuous neoliberalism, the cutting edge of globalization. A system of values, founded upon the simulacrum of self-regulating of the so called economy of the market. Each day becomes more brutal and cynical in its methods, provoking the oppressed citizens which seem helpless to react. Simulacrum or simulacra, such as virtual reality: There are four stages that Jean Baudrillard distinguishes: the era of the original > to the counterfeit > to the produced, mechanical copy, and through > to the simulated "third order of simulacra", whereby the copy has replaced the original.
4. The term "liberal" has been given several definitions in US and Europe, and can be interpreted also with political or economic terms. For the purpose of this paper the definition is the one referring to the currently established liberal economics, meaning the concept of the free market.
5. The name "Schengen" originates from a small town in Luxembourg.
6. Nevertheless, the differences still exist between the two allies, as the economic conflict is vivid.
7. The EU-US summits initiated in 1990, but the 1995 agreement was the first one with significant value as it was accompanied by an action plan.
8. I refer to the formulated situation as it appears today.
9. A term that John Williamson used to refer to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions, directed to Latin American countries as of 1989.
10. Speech by President of the European Commission Barroso, at the Brussels launch of "The Lisbon scorecard VIII: Is Europe ready for an economic storm"?, Brussels, 10 March 2008.
11. Commission's Lisbon evaluation report (2004), *Wim Kok report* (2004).
12. According to the declaration of 2007, its terms are:
 - a. Oversee the efforts outlined in this Framework, with the goal of accelerating progress;
 - b. Guide work between EU-U.S. Summits with a focus on achieving results, including setting goals for achieving the purposes of this Framework, developing metrics, setting deadlines and targets, and monitoring progress;
 - c. Adopt a work program, drawn initially from the existing work program under the 2005 U.S.-EC Economic Initiative, with the goal of achieving the objectives of this Framework, and shall adapt this work program and otherwise organize its activities in the manner best suited to achieving those objectives;

- d. Review at least semi-annually its progress in achieving the objectives of this Framework;
 - e. Facilitate joint action under this Framework to advance its purposes;
 - f. Review ongoing EU-U.S. economic engagement in order to maximize progress in existing transatlantic dialogues with a view to consider phasing out technical dialogues that have completed their work or are otherwise no longer necessary;
 - g. Meet at least once a year at such time as the co-chairs decide;
 - h. Oversee preparation of annual reports to the EU-U.S. Summit leaders on goals, metrics for meeting those goals, deadlines, achievements, and areas where more progress is needed;
 - i. Facilitate closer cooperation between the European Union and the United States and our legislators and stakeholders;
 - j. Convene a group comprised of individuals experienced in transatlantic issues drawing in particular from the heads of existing transatlantic dialogues to provide input and guidance to the EU-U. S. Summit on priorities for pursuing transatlantic economic integration; and
 - k. Include representatives of other governmental entities as the Council determines to be appropriate.
13. The development and spread of capitalism has, in general, not been conducive to the maintenance of diverse cultures.
14. The European integration process, is no more than a regional effort of harmonization of the European system to the American-led globalized single market. The European Treaties however did not have this direction from the beginning, back in 1950s.
15. The use of this strategy was a know practice of the Roman and British empires that were charged with playing one tribe against another to maintain control of their territories.

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La Question des Chypriotes disparus en voie de solution

Jean Catsiapis*

L'intervention militaire turque de l'été 1974 à Chypre a causé la disparition de 1619 Chypriotes grecs, hommes, femmes et enfants¹, dont on sait avec certitude qu'ils étaient en vie au moment où on a perdu leur trace. A ce chiffre il faut ajouter celui des 502 Chypriotes turcs disparus au cours des troubles intercommunautaires de 1963-1964.²

Le sort des disparus

Si on peut penser que tous les Chypriotes turcs disparus ont dû trouver la mort durant les affrontements de 1963-1964, en revanche il semble que certains Chypriotes grecs ont pu survivre après la perte de leur trace au cours de l'intervention militaire turque de 1974. Parmi ces disparus figurent de très nombreux soldats, sous-officiers et officiers capturés par l'armée turque et dont les photos ont été publiées par la presse de Turquie. Certains d'entre eux ont même reçu la visite pendant les premiers jours de leur détention³ de représentants du Comité International de la Croix Rouge (CICR).

Il est probable qu'une dizaine d'années après les événements de 1974 certains Chypriotes grecs disparus étaient détenus en Turquie. C'est ce qui résulte notamment de témoignages reçus par l'*Association des Amis de la République de Chypre*, basée en France, à la suite de demandes d'information sur le sort des Chypriotes grecs disparus, que cette organisation a publiées sous forme d'encarts publicitaires dans le quotidien français *Le Monde* et le quotidien libanais *l'Orient-le Jour*. Parmi les réponses reçues – soumises à vérification - d'étrangers ayant séjourné dans des prisons turques ou y ayant rendu visite, il ressort que des Chypriotes grecs se trouvaient en 1985 dans des centres de détention de plusieurs villes d'Anatolie dans des conditions de vie très difficiles⁴.

La négation par la Turquie de la détention de tout Chypriote grec disparu dans ses prisons a d'autant plus intrigué les observateurs, que ce pays s'est

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refusé à accepter toute enquête internationale dans celles-ci. On a donc pu supposer pendant longtemps que le gouvernement turc se réservait la possibilité de retrouver miraculeusement des Chypriotes grecs disparus lors du règlement global de la question chypriote afin de pouvoir bénéficier durant les négociations sur ce règlement de concessions de la part du gouvernement de la République de Chypre en échange de cette bonne volonté - même tardive - d'ordre humanitaire.

Le fait est que 34 ans après l'intervention militaire turque de 1974 il est désormais logique de penser que la quasi-totalité des 1619 Chypriotes grecs disparus ne sont plus en vie à l'exception peut-être de certains enfants, qui ont été capturés, semble-t-il, en vue de leur adoption par des familles de Turquie.

La découverte et l'identification de plusieurs centaines de restes de Chypriotes grecs et turcs à compter de 2006 - comme on le dira ci-après - permettent d'envisager progressivement dans un proche avenir l'élucidation du sort des disparus, un des éléments parmi d'autres de la question chypriote.

La Question des Chypriotes disparus devant les organisations internationales

Dans les premiers mois, qui ont suivi l'intervention militaire turque de 1974 plusieurs Organisations internationales se sont préoccupées du sort des Chypriotes disparus. On doit d'abord citer la résolution du 13 février 1975 de la Commission des droits de l'homme de l'ONU, qui demande que des efforts soient entrepris pour découvrir le sort des disparus puis la résolution du 9 décembre 1975 de l'Assemblée générale de cette Organisation priant son Secrétaire général «d'agir en étroite coopération avec le CICR pour aider à retrouver la trace et connaître le sort des personnes portées manquantes à la suite du conflit armé à Chypre». Ce sont aussi le Parlement européen et l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe, qui se sont préoccupés du sort des Chypriotes disparus. Force est de reconnaître l'inefficacité de ces instances internationales, qui se sont heurtées à l'intransigeance de la Turquie refusant son concours à la mise en œuvre de leurs résolutions.

C'est la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (CEDH) - après l'acceptation par Ankara en 1987 du principe du droit à un recours individuel - qui a pu, au bout de près de 3 décennies, contribuer à élucider le sort des Chypriotes portés disparus en 1974. Il faut d'abord citer l'arrêt du 10 mai 2001 *Chypre c. Turquie* de la CEDH qui reconnaît la responsabilité de la Turquie au regard de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme:

- violation continue de l'article 2 (droit à la vie) en ce que la Turquie n'a pas mené d'enquête effective sur le sort des Chypriotes grecs qui ont disparu dans des circonstances mettant leur vie en danger et sur le lieu où ils se trouvaient.
- violation continue de l'article 5 (droit à la liberté et à la sûreté) en ce que la Turquie n'a pas mené d'enquête effective sur le sort des Chypriotes disparus dont on allègue de manière défendable qu'ils étaient détenus sous l'autorité de la Turquie au moment de leur disparition et sur le lieu où ils se trouvaient.
- violation continue de l'article 3 (interdiction des traitements inhumains ou dégradants) en ce que le silence des autorités turques devant les inquiétudes réelles des familles des disparus constitue à l'égard de celles-ci un traitement d'une gravité telle qu'il y a lieu de le qualifier d'inhumain.

Cette décision a eu pour effet d'accroître la pression sur la Turquie pour élucider le sort des Chypriotes grecs disparus alors que ce pays déployait des efforts intenses pour faire accepter l'ouverture des négociations par Bruxelles sur sa candidature à l'Union européenne.

Très récemment, le 10 janvier 2008, la CEDH a constaté la violation par la Turquie des articles 2, 3 et 5 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme et a condamné ce pays à payer 4,000 euros, au titre des frais de justice, à chacun des 9 parents de disparus, qui avaient mis en cause sa responsabilité devant cette juridiction⁵.

La création du Comité des disparus

La question des Chypriotes disparus, qui constitue un dossier purement humanitaire, dont la solution aurait dû, en principe, intervenir rapidement et sans difficulté est devenu en fait, au fil des ans, un problème politique, aussi insoluble que les autres sujets de dispute opposant la République de Chypre à la Turquie. Dans les premières années, qui ont suivi l'invasion du nord de Chypre de l'été 1974, se sont engagées des négociations intercommunautaires pour créer un *Comité sur la question des personnes disparues*. La politisation de cette question a empêché la formation d'une telle institution, chaque communauté de l'île disposant d'un Comité des parents de disparus agissant avec ses propres moyens. Du côté chypriote grec les parents de disparus bénéficiaient d'une aide matérielle du gouvernement pour leur Comité, qui périodiquement effectuait une tournée d'information auprès des capitales de grands pays.

Du côté chypriote turc il a été rapidement décidé que les disparus devaient être considérés comme décédés. Ce qui a permis de régler les problèmes juridiques liés à toute question de personnes disparues, notamment de succession, qui, du côté chypriote grec sont restés en suspens pendant des décennies.

C'est seulement en 1981 que le *Comité sur la question des personnes disparues* a pu être créé sous les auspices de l'ONU. Il comprend 3 membres: un représentant Chypriote grec nommé par le président de la République de Chypre, un représentant Chypriote turc nommé par le chef de la communauté chypriote turque et un représentant de l'ONU, sélectionné par le CICR et nommé par le Secrétaire général. Ce Comité pendant un quart de siècle n'a pas réellement fonctionné, notamment en raison du refus de la Turquie de coopérer à la recherche des disparus. C'est seulement le 3 juillet 2006 avec l'installation, en présence du président Papadopoulos et de Mehmet Ali Talat, le chef de la communauté chypriote turque, de Christophe Girod nouveau président du Comité que cette institution va pleinement accomplir sa mission. C. Girod, de 1986 à 2004 a travaillé pour le CICR dans différents pays, en particulier dans l'ex-Yougoslavie et à Guantanamo. Après avoir intégré l'ONU en 2005 il devient le représentant de cette Organisation au sein du *Comité sur la question des personnes disparues* à Chypre. Fort de son expérience internationale, il va, à partir du second semestre 2006, réussir à retrouver les restes de Chypriotes disparus et commencer le processus de leur identification.

L'identification des disparus

En 1997 un accord entre les dirigeants des deux communautés de l'île est intervenu pour l'exhumation et le retour des personnes disparues de chaque côté. Puis en 2000 c'est le Comité, qui s'est approprié cette mission de recherche et d'identification des restes des Chypriotes disparus en mettant en œuvre un processus en cinq étapes, qui n'a pu commencer effectivement qu'en 2006.

D'abord le représentant Chypriote grec et le représentant Chypriote turc effectuent chacun de son côté des enquêtes pour situer les tombes. Ensuite le Comité se réunit pour un échange d'informations et pour mettre au point un projet d'exhumations. Puis le laboratoire anthropologique construit dans la zone tampon⁶ analyse les restes exhumés en comparant les informations ante-mortem recueillies auprès des familles et les informations post-mortem

récoltées sur les restes humains. C'est alors qu'intervient le laboratoire ADN, situé en zone libre de Chypre, qui reçoit des échantillons d'ossements et s'efforce d'en extraire l'ADN pour le comparer avec celui des membres des familles de disparus. En dernier lieu lorsque l'identification d'un disparu est positive le Comité en informe sa famille.

Sur 379 corps exhumés, 84 ont pu, fin mars 2008, être identifiés (58 Chypriotes grecs et 26 Chypriotes turcs). Les premiers enterrements de Chypriotes disparus ont pu avoir lieu en 2007.

Le Comité dispose d'un budget de l'ordre de 3 millions d'euros, alimenté par l'ONU mais aussi par des contributions volontaires, dont les plus importantes sont celles de la Commission européenne et des deux communautés de la République de Chypre. La modestie de ce budget, qui sert notamment au financement d'une partie des frais d'enterrement des personnes identifiées, explique la lenteur du processus d'identification des restes des Chypriotes disparus

La Question des disparus et le règlement de la question chypriote

Il est certain que la solution de la question des Chypriotes disparus, ne peut que faciliter le règlement de la question chypriote. De fait les représentants des deux communautés de l'île, qui coopèrent pleinement depuis deux ans pour élucider le sort de leurs disparus, pourront sans doute plus aisément négocier les autres aspects du problème de Chypre, une fois résolue la question de ces Chypriotes dont on est sans nouvelles depuis plusieurs décennies.

Il convient de noter que le gouvernement de la République de Chypre et les autorités chypriotes turques ont fait le choix ni de tirer vengeance ni même de faire justice des assassinats de leurs ressortissants, que constate le *Comité sur la question des personnes disparues*, chaque fois qu'il procède à une identification d'ossements. Il a en effet été décidé de ne pas poursuivre sur le plan pénal les meurtriers des Chypriotes disparus identifiés, dont les restes sont le plus souvent retrouvés grâce aux indications de ceux, qui les ont exterminés.

Les proches des Chypriotes disparus, qui ont pu être identifiés, sont désormais en mesure de faire leur deuil et de trouver un certain apaisement à leur grande peine. A plus long terme il ne faut pas exclure la création d'une Commission Vérité, chargée de revisiter le passé de Chypre et d'éclairer le peuple chypriote sur les événements qui ont ensanglanté son histoire récente.

NOTES

1. Parmi les 1619 Chypriotes grecs disparus on dénombre 1507 hommes, dont 1008 militaires et 112 femmes. Certains de ces disparus étaient des enfants de moins de 16 ans (20 garçons et 6 filles).
2. De graves incidents ont opposé de décembre 1963 à l'été 1964 la communauté chypriote grecque à la chypriote turque. Le bombardement en août 1964 de Chypre par l'aviation militaire turque a entraîné le regroupement en cantons de milliers de Chypriotes turcs souhaitant échapper à la colère de certains extrémistes Chypriotes grecs. C'est en 1964 que l'ONU a envoyé à Chypre une force de maintien de la paix, toujours sur place, et qui est restée passive lors de l'intervention militaire turque de l'été 1974.
3. On peut citer en particulier le cas d'Andréas Georgiou qu'ont pu rencontrer des représentants du CICR le 23. 8. 1974 au Poste de police de Saray dans le quartier turc de Nicosie.
4. Des preuves de vie de Chypriotes grecs disparus, en particulier celles fournies par l'*Association des Amis de la République de Chypre*, ont été publiées dans le périodique grec *Tachydromos* de juin 1986.
5. Arrêt de Chambre de la CEDH *Varnava et autres c. Turquie* (10 janvier 2008).
6. Il y a une zone tampon appelée aussi zone morte, représentant 3% du territoire de Chypre séparant la zone libre de la zone occupée.

Discontent, but Also Blind? Understanding the Discipline of International Relations in Greece

Spiros Makris* & Kyriakos Mikelis**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article entreprend une description des conditions, sous lesquelles l'œuvre scientifique des Relations internationales se produit localement et plus particulièrement en Grèce. La présentation est faite sur la base de quatre catégories: a) la structure institutionnelle, b) le rôle de la société, c) le sens de la science et la relation entre la société et la science et d) le contenu théorique. La reconstitution critique de l'image de soi révèle les tendances de la référence de soi, avec lesquelles le passé intellectuel est approché surtout avec l'optique contemporaine. Des tendances similaires constituent la perception de l'évolution de la discipline comme une lutte entre l'étude du droit international et la politique internationale ou entre le réalisme politique et les conceptions rivales, comme le libéralisme et les approches critiques. Mais cela cache ou sous-estime les mécanismes réels, ou la discipline a vraiment évoluée.

ABSTRACT

This article pursues the brief and systematic description of the conditions under which the scientific work in the name of International Relations has been produced locally, namely in Greece. The narration unfolds on the basis of four sets of factors: a) the institutional structure of I.R., mainly in terms of university structure, b) the role of society, i.e. the so called external elements of science like ideology and foreign policy, c) the science-society relationship and the meaning of science and d) the theoretical content. The critical reconstruction of the self-image demonstrates that presentist tendencies in self-reference (whereby the intellectual past is seen through the perspective of the present) may characterize non Anglo-Saxon communities as well. Such tendency is viewing the development of I.R. mainly as a confrontation between the study of international law and that of international politics or between political realism and its critiques like liberalism or critical approaches. But this hides or downplays the actual mechanisms through which the discipline had indeed been under-developed.

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Introduction

The engagement of scholars of International Relations (I.R.) with the investigation of the characteristics and the exact mechanisms of their discipline's development has met a substantial growth. The respective literature may be said to be a qualitative upgrade with regard to the discipline's self-reflection, since it has recently drawn more systematically and extensively upon epistemology, the history of ideas as well as the history and sociology of science. There have been several themes and methodological concerns within this literature. Special tribute has been granted to the development of the intellectual field and the discipline of I.R. as well as to the degree of correspondence of the scientific work produced locally (nationally or regionally) with the field's universal image and to how such an image has occurred.¹

To this end, several explanatory models or modes of narrative have been forwarded, generalizing the relevant factors and figures.² Those models and consequently the organized I.R. self-reflection have attempted the systematic integration of several parameters, including and/or transgressing space, time, the ideological context and the scientific content. That is, they have included references to the present or to the past, to a specific country/region or to the globe, to science or to international politics and to the social-political reality in general.

So it makes sense to speak of the discipline's development in many respects, one of which is the multi-dimensional reference to specific countries and, in this case, Greece. Although this article pursues the brief but systematic description of the conditions, under which the I.R. scientific work has been produced locally, it focuses critically on how this production has been viewed, since quite a few scholars have expressed their position. In particular, the article is not only a contribution to how the discipline has developed in one more non English-speaking country. It supplements the demonstration of the periphery scholars' dilemmas over the theory-praxis *problématique* through interviews or publication patterns.³ In particular, it aims to such demonstration through the critical reconstruction of the self-image, proving that presentist tendencies in self-reference, whereby the intellectual past is seen through the perspective of the present, may characterize non Anglo-Saxon communities as well.⁴

Indeed several attempts of the analysis of the discipline's development in Greece, written in either Greek or English by scholars either residing in the country or not, have admittedly concentrated on the description of the

institutional framework, of the community's special characteristics and of the relationship between science and politics, usually focusing on the analysis of Greek foreign policy.⁵ Besides the acknowledgment of the substantial institutional growth during the last years, their common ground has been more or less a feeling of displeasure with regard to the field's theoretical status, in the sense that scientific work, which has been produced and communicated locally, has rarely undergone the theory's scrutiny as a means of systematizing the local debates of foreign policy and international politics.

The re-construction lies on both theoretical and empirical reasons and constitutes our central research objective, since the self-image includes inevitably a variety of elements such as ontological and anthropological premises, intellectual and epistemological orientation as well as assumptions over the causes of war. Theoretically, the majority of the local self-reflection has not drawn upon the general self-reflection systematically and has rarely mentioned it with regard to the respective work produced recently. Despite the aforementioned complain that the scientific work produced locally has not been scrutinized thoroughly through theory, the reflection over this work has not undergone comprehensively the second order theory's scrutiny.⁶ At the same time, reasonable and multi-dimensional references seem to occasionally suffer at the empirical level as well, in the sense that certain empirical facts about the country's educational or social reality have been underestimated. For example, there is a common acknowledgment that global (or indeed Anglo-Saxon) disciplinary developments, since the Interwar, were ignored to a certain degree and not kept up with. However, this was not followed consequently by the acknowledgment that the Anglo-Saxon intellectual 'non-connection' should be viewed as something more than the criterion for an *a priori* theoretical evaluation and should be contrasted to Greece's Anglo-Saxon political connection that did exist somehow ambivalently during the Interwar (with regard to Great Britain) and rather more clearly during the early Cold War, when Greece had re-enforced its American diplomatic ties.

Our narration unfolds on the basis of the relevant sets of factors set out by O. Wæver, upon four following sections: a) 'institutional framework', b) 'sociology', c) 'epistemology' and d) 'historiography'. These sections correspond accordingly to: a) the institutional structure of I.R., mainly in terms of university structure, b) the role of society, i.e. the so called external elements of science like ideology and foreign policy, c) the science-society relationship and the meaning of science and d) the theoretical content.⁷

1. Institutional framework

At present time, the I.R. subject matter is researched and taught in quite a few university departments mainly in the name of international studies or international economic studies as well as regional studies, let aside courses offered in departments of economics, political science and law (see Table 2). The quite sized and somewhat diversified institutional framework can be compared to the early Cold War's monopoly of I.R. subjects by international law chairs in departments of Law and in Panteios School.⁸ The chairs were assigned to international law (public and private) and sometimes included the addition of diplomatic history, although the latter was more or less disregarded especially by historians. Its non-autonomous position was affirmed by the lack of a separate chair of diplomatic history, especially in the Faculties of Arts, where history was taught. Diplomatic history was included sometimes in the scientific work of other chairs like the history of foreign nations and political history, but this was not done systematically. So the present self-reflection's reference to the dominance of the I.R. subject matter by the study of international law and diplomatic history may be right but also misleading, if it is taken to mean that historians were actually engaged heavily in diplomatic history, which was not the case.

The present situation is the result of two factors. The first factor is the change of the basic academic unit (from the Faculty to the Department) and the abolition of the chair institution with a law passed in 1982. Implementing the newly introduced organizational structure, the departments of law and politics verified and indeed claimed the investigation of subjects related to international politics, through the establishment of departmental sections dedicated to what was termed international studies. The second factor is the 1990s' university enlargement (increase in number of departments), with an emphasis to regional studies and international economic relations.

This variety embeds various epistemological choices which are affirmed by the diversification of sections or specialties.⁹ In that sense, regional studies, especially with regard to the countries of the East, provide an interesting example. While a historical-linguistic emphasis could be expected, regional studies have only been partially subject to the framework of political science or international studies, probably in a lesser degree or later than in Anglo-Saxon states and mainly the U.S. Moreover, the study of law had indeed tended to absorb and exhaust political science and I.R. After all, when sections of international studies were introduced in the three law departments, only one out of the latter (that of the Aristotelian University of

Thessaloniki) included explicitly international relations and diplomatic history as subjects researched by the respective sector. The continuation of the study of international law in law departments and even in departments of political science is still part of the picture and in any case no innovation of the Greek case. Most importantly, the study of international organization and international institutions was - and for some it may continue to be - a supplement to the study of international law, while has not been pursued exclusively in the framework of political science or (international) political economy. To be sure, the recent growth of departments or sections of international and European studies in economic universities or departments has tended to qualify this situation.

Although quite recently there has been an expressed concern in the existing self-reflection over the margin and the potential for a broad social/political perspective of the I.R. subject matter, the establishment of research institutes, emphasizing international politics/foreign policy, took place in the late 1980s. It did not precede but followed research centers which had been founded just or quite before, emphasizing regional studies or international law although an older center, which focused on the latter, included the term I.R. in its title (see Table 3). The name of the professional association of international studies in the 1980s as the Hellenic Association of International Law and International Relations is equally indicative, since this term and the addition of two separate strands have been preferred in rather few countries.¹⁰ The Greek choice may be said to originate from the need for the attribution of respect to the oldest and quite sized strand.

Understanding this as the dominance of a certain (the legal) perspective of reality is part of what has happened but would mistakenly be thought that it exhausts it. If it did, in the sense that the proponents of the legal approach wanted and pursued successfully the inexistence of others, then how could a small number of respective books and the existence of various journals dealing somehow diversely with international politics, before the 1990s and the 2000s, be explained?¹¹ However, such journals have usually been proven rather short-lived, demonstrating that the scientific communication was existent and, yet, rather incomplete.

2. Sociology

The current self-reflection's sociological common ground is the connection of the development of political science and international studies with the

degree of Greek political life's rational organization. Acknowledging the short and general character of the description which follows and hoping that it does justice to this image, as it has evolved inside I.R. locally, we perceive that I.R. was the victim of authoritarianism and the variance of the degree of democracy at several levels; that is, inside Greek society and state (which was enhanced by legal formalism) as well as inside science (which was enhanced by the rigid university structure system) and most importantly with regard to international political reality itself in light of the perceived and actual dependence and vulnerability of the Greek state. The discipline's salvation from the restricted development or the virtual inexistence (with the exception of the study of international law) was aggravated moreover by the dominance of ideologies, like nationalism or cosmopolitanism/ internationalism, over science. In contrast to the rather embryonic development of social and political sciences locally, the political restoration after the fall of the Junta in 1974 signals some kind of cure. In the case of I.R., this was enhanced by the perceived need and potential for renowned scientific contributions to deal with both science's, and Greek foreign policy's, stalemate (the latter especially with regard to the Cyprus issue) as well as opportunities and challenges like Greece's entrance to the E.E.C. In other words, special challenges for foreign policy have led to the increase of the respective demand for I.R. and some kind of alternate discourse with supposedly greater theoretical and epistemological width, more so since scholars were able to claim that foreign policy and international politics had not been taken seriously or systematically enough.

While such a description may be similar to other states' descriptions, an element should be noted, which is compatible with this image but has been either omitted or mentioned rather marginally in the I.R. self-reflection.¹² The Greek state became independent in the first half of the 19th century with different state frontiers than the present ones due to subsequent enlargements. Political life in Greece had been characterized since then, and for quite a long time, by rather intense scientific and political/ideological debates over political dilemmas such as the geographic expansion of the Greek state, the existence of significant parts of the Greek nation living outside the Greek state, the relationship of antiquity with modern Hellenism, the relations of Greeks living inside the state with those living outside and finally the debate on West-East. Given the general dispute over the adoption of western standards *per se*, the result was an ideas-centered social research until the mid-Cold War as well as a rather incohesive, non-systematic and

incomprehensive discussion of those standards. The latter was enhanced by the fact that Greece became an independent state which seceded from the Ottoman Empire, so it could draw from various administrative or educational systems and not from a specific one, as would have probably been the case if it belonged to another Empire like the British one.

If the need for the state's geographic expansion and (since the 1920s) the preservation of its bigger borders could be seen as a starting point for the tradition of *Realpolitik*,¹³ the former was nevertheless counterbalanced by a rather peculiar role of the state. The tribute of the legal science to the state did not lead to the reasonable expansion of the respective discourse. Nor did so the nation-centric view of historical studies, since the basic unit of historiography was not the 'state' but the 'nation', the history of which was approached more in idealistic terms rather than materialistic or a combination. Indeed, political realism as a distinct intellectual tradition was quite under-developed. This anti-materialism is demonstrated in the critique against Marxist approaches like dependence theory. Nowadays this may be attributed too readily, albeit latently, to Greece's American diplomatic connection, missing the fact that such tradition existed in I.R. of another country - Japan in the Cold War - despite such a connection.¹⁴ Ironically, the acceptance of Marxism as well as of Critical Theory in the social sciences and in the field of history, after the political restoration, coincided more or less with the political scientists' engagement with international politics in terms of power, interest and international system. It may well be that the former focused on the research and even so critique of nationalism as a phenomenon, however it was missed that the development of political realism was not self-evident. Indeed, there were instances when analysis tended to be characterized by a rather strong confusion and mix-up of nationalism and cosmopolitanism as ideologies to be searched even so criticized and of I.R. political realism and liberalism as distinct scientific approaches or intellectual traditions.

Generally it can be claimed that the field's challenges and opportunities for the last decades, with regard to the degree of local political development, have been acknowledged by I.R. scholars themselves. On the other hand, the endeavor to determine them exactly has had the danger of overestimating or underestimating the historical weight of various factors, including the oversight of the social and intellectual context of ideas about interests and power. More so, it is endangered by the reproduction of a mentality of the type 'let's now do business as usual', as demonstrated in the section to follow.

3. Epistemology

The common ground of the references to epistemology in Greek I.R. textbooks and texts, about the discipline's development in the country, is the acknowledgment of both a rather difficult paradigmatic embodiment and the status of ordeal for the local community, due to the usual a-theoretical character of the analysis especially in scientific work produced in the native language. This common ground includes the influence of the last decades' political developments to the development of renowned discourse, which would be less normative or ideas-centered than before. Its scientific standards would be upgraded along with both the enhancement of empirical research and with theoretical embodiment, i.e. the explicit and broader location of research and teaching in various and yet clear enough standards. At the same time, the correspondence with the field's universal image remains an important criterion for the local evaluation. However, the allocation of subjects in selective departments in the first two years of study, where obligatory courses are the majority and make comparisons easier, demonstrates a certain divergence in the scientific training even at the beginning of the courses (see Table 4). There seems to be agreed that courses of economy, Europe, history, I.R. theory, methodology and politics should be offered. While a range of subjects is recognized, the focus to a subject may vary among departments, which decide themselves about the curriculum through their general assembly.

The call for the upgraded scientific standards as well as the acquaintance with game theory, quantitative methods or the systemic approaches of I.R. could be considered indicative of a broad positivism which nevertheless did not evolve into a systematic and comprehensive epistemological position. For example, it was not an I.R. expert but a political scientist who noticed the lack of systematic use of statistics in the political sciences.¹⁵ However, and in contrast to other scientific fields in the country, like sociology or political science, the acquaintance with Marxism and post-positivism specifically in I.R. has turned to be rather delayed.¹⁶ It should be noted that up to roughly the 1980s the doctoral training of social sciences' scholars had taken place more in Continental Europe rather than the Anglo-Saxon countries, least of all Great Britain. This has changed. Scholars who have been trained especially in Great Britain, at a time when I.R. (post)positivism was discussed intensely and explicitly, have pursued or might pursue an academic career in the country. This could mean that a respective discussion (whether dialogue or monologue) might strengthen up.

Overall, the construction of scientific identity includes the call for being scientific, more so in the sense that empirical reality should be searched through an epistemological variety, which is relevant to the institutional diversification. Apart from this call, the scientific identity is also based upon the faith to the field's function as a national/state science, in the sense of the contribution to the current policy debates. This contribution has been regarded as the confrontation between scientific discourse and the occasionally 'dangerous' public discourse, supposing a certain relationship between the appropriateness of the scientific framework and the effectiveness of foreign policy. It is important to note that the actual content of this image has varied, while theoretical inquiries have been highly thoughtful of the possible connection of hegemonism with particular theoretical approaches such as either political realism or liberalism.¹⁷

For example, one strand relates to the critique of the approach of security issues as national issues, which includes the critique against political realism and the *problématique* of power and the balance of power. Such a critique has been pursued by both historians and I.R. scholars.¹⁸ Another strand, which may be seen as a response to rather intense attacks against political realism since the 1990s, relates to the necessity of keeping up to the traditional paradigm of I.R. as a means for insuring the acceptance and application of rules that should guide the function of the local scientific community. Here, the application of the traditional paradigm is used for an epistemological evaluation of ontologically cosmopolitan approaches, which seem to conflate scientific critique with ideological one. Although this kind of analysis does not refer explicitly to the scientific ethos *ala* Merton, it actually uses it for the local evaluation, while at the same time it treats ontology extensively in communitarian terms.¹⁹

This epistemological variety need not necessarily be seen as a weakness. However, at the end of the day the importance of the sharp marking and probably exclusion of a piece of analysis (as well as scholars for that matter) as nationalist or hard-liner and utopian or no expert lies not in the fact that such marking exists but in its function to the communication of sub-fields in a meta-level.²⁰ Moreover, having identified the rather troubled relationship between science and politics, i.e. the fact that a somewhat problematic political situation has compromised the position of science, I.R. scholars seem to agree that being a realist, in the sense of evoking the empirical element, is an important future of students' training. Then again, what about the danger of falling to the epistemic fallacy and about the

differences of what exactly means to be a realist in philosophical terms?²¹ It is fair to argue that they have not been commonly acknowledged and that the theory/empirical research relationship seems to be rather downplayed in both textbooks and research articles. Put in other words and with all due respect to emerging exceptions, the field has been original in a negative sense, with regard to Anglophone literature, since the latter has reflected extensively, comprehensively and much earlier on the theory/empirical research relationship in terms of scientific progress and not just in terms of contribution to foreign policy-making. The corollary of this is the scholars' inability (or delay at best) to tackle seriously with the fact that the field's scholarly character had been undermined by its dependence from daily politics, since its social and disciplinary legitimacy and funding were thought to rely heavily on the field's policy-making relevance.

4. Historiography

The near monopoly of the I.R. subject matter by the chairs of international law does not necessarily mean that a history of ideas about diplomacy and international politics would be exhausted in the study of international law. This monopoly, which is commonly recognized in the local self-reflection, means the discipline's restricted development as such but not that of the scientific work *per se*. The Interwar provides many examples. One relevant example is a geopolitical *problématique*, including imperialism, expressed by sociologists or economists in particular. The current self-reflection ignores it completely when it makes reference to the infamous legal dominance of international studies before the mid-1970s. A second example is the work of scientists or intellectuals, who usually had turned quickly to politics, focusing on international organization.²² However it was usually of elitist nature or written in a foreign language and in any case it was often left out of university audiences.²³

Nevertheless this discourse was characterized by the lack of a specific and wide core of ideas. Moreover it would be neglected during the Cold War. The work of the early Cold-War was less broad and it emphasized more in terms of society of states than balance of power or related themes. In that sense, the public and even so scientific tendency of viewing politics in terms of power and interest as a pathology has had its impact to the analysis of diplomacy as well. It is highly indicative that, despite the generally strong connection of Greek international law scholars with French scholarship or at least French-

speaking one (since Greek international law experts tended to contribute in French), *polémologie* was virtually ignored by both law experts and historians. However it was addressed by a sociologist as a subject in a rather comprehensive manner.²⁴ At the same time, heavy criticism against the legalistic line of thought came in the name not of political science or I.R. but of economics, in view Greece's entrance prospects to the EEC. These mean not that I.R. scholars have been wrong, with regard to their complaint that international politics had not been dealt seriously and systematically enough, but that at least during both the Interwar and the early Cold War the sovereignty/anarchy *problématique* had actually been addressed and discussed.

On the other hand, the political restoration in the mid-1970s has been followed shortly after by the presentation of theoretical perspectives at textbooks in a rather neutral manner. The field's thematic enlargement during the next two decades was based more to the establishment of I.R. sub-fields and the evocation of subject-matters *per se* rather than to the growth of empirical research as a response and feedback to theory. With regard to research and analysis that may be of policy relevance, there was a change at least in the sense that the reality of international politics consists definitely - although not exclusively - of terms of dependence and political pressure.²⁵ This was not irrelevant to the fact that Marxist political and scientific discourse was more or less legitimized. So terms like power and interests could be used more easily, although what to make of them might have not been the same for every analyst. Moreover, the development of a Marxist analysis of international affairs may be attributed more to social scientists in general than I.R. scholars.

At the end of the day, state-centricity on the whole may have been questioned more than actually undermined. But it was only since the 1990s when explicit and extensive reference was made to the antagonistic character of the international system²⁶ and attention was given to the combination of systemic theory for the explanation of the restrictions of state behavior with the theory of internal structure for the analysis of state choice.²⁷ During the last years, this approach has been regarded as a value-neutral description of political reality in the name of the intellectual tradition of Thucydides' work, following the growing tendency of investigating the ancient Greek tradition over interstate relations.²⁸ These did not precede but actually followed both the quite sized and still increasing literature over Europeanization, due to Greece's membership to the E.E.C./E.U., and a liberal-like line of reasoning. Since the mid-1970s, there has always been a research concern linked to the

pluralist systemic approach, the theory of interdependence and nowadays the investigation of the possible consequences for sovereignty in view of globalization.²⁹ The Annan plan is an example where the anarchy/sovereignty *problématique* was recently discussed, with regard to a serious foreign policy issue. On the one hand, there was the argument that its acceptance was necessary due to severe negative consequences that its rejection implied. On the other hand, a serious argument was made against it because its acceptance by Greece and Cyprus would mean the actual demise of the latter's sovereignty.³⁰

This thematic variety has been seen by the recent self-reflection as a dispute that may focus on both (Greek) foreign policy and the conceptualization of world politics but relates to current and global theoretical debates. One could argue that the objects of critique have been both a kind of not a realist enough realism (or not realism at all) and a not realistic enough realism. However the linkage to the global debates has been rather deductive. That is, it seems that references to them have actually been made in order to rather legitimize preference to one approach or the other, with usually little interest in viewing them comprehensively for the purpose of furthering answers or reformulations of the meta-theoretical questions that have arisen globally. Here lies the irony that the field has been related to the real world, with regard to its dependence to policy relevance, but at the same time it had remained unrelated to it in certain respects, since its apparent polyphony is an achievement of the last years and an extensive analysis of international anarchy explicitly in the name of political realism delayed, making its appearance essentially after the end of the Cold War.

Conclusions

The critical reconstruction of the local self-reflection in Greece demonstrates that there is something more at stake in the local self-reflection of periphery scholars than perceived. Observing how the locals have observed themselves includes also how they have not observed themselves. That is, what they don't say and see in their pursuit and expression of scientific identity is equally important with what they say and see. But the point is not to blame wrong to the concentration on the description of the institutional framework, of the community's special characteristics and of the relationship between science and politics as well as to the acknowledgment of the substantial institutional growth and the feeling of displeasure about the field's

theoretical status. It is that the construction of the self-image should be viewed not as the *a priori* solution to the problem of enhanced paradigmatic embodiment but as part of the problem, due to the a-historical nature of the feeling of discontentment with regard to the field's theoretical status and local development, i.e. the fact that references to the social and intellectual past have not been made systematically and comprehensively.

For example, the perceived dominance of the legal perspective of reality is indeed part of what has happened, however without exhausting it. It is equally important what historians did also and -to be exact- what they didn't do. That is, they were not engaged heavily in diplomatic history. Although they are forgotten today by the current I.R., the ones who indeed studied international politics are some Interwar writers, whose socio-economic thought included it. Although they did not built up a discipline, they formed a forgotten discourse with distinct references to geopolitics or international organization. In that line of thought, the state was the point of reference instead of the nation. But this was the exception and not the rule, while at the same time the continental political thought was not negotiated in its entirety. The distinction between the nation and the state may seem trivial but it bears serious ontological assumptions. The nation-centric idealist discourse of the past does not fit ready-made criticisms against either typical political realism or typical liberalism, exactly because it has been an animal of its own. This animal has been criticized, in the efforts to legitimize some kind of a renowned discourse, but even as a subject of critique it was not taken seriously enough. It may be accepted that there was something wrong with scientific endeavors in the past, but they have been taken more as a given and less as a complex construction.

Consequently, the present days reference -even so emphasis- to the global theoretical trends misses the ontological bases of the past discourse. The tendency of viewing the development of I.R. mainly as a confrontation between the study of international law and that of international politics or between political realism and its critiques, like liberalism or critical approaches, is a presentist move that hides the actual mechanisms through which the discipline had indeed been under-developed, enabling the reproduction of an -indeed diverse- mentality of the type 'let's now do business as usual'. In that way, the projection of the field's status to state failure or weakness is restricted to state's power with regard to foreign policy and not expanded also to the internal dimension, i.e. the impact to the social sciences as well the scientific communication. So, while I.R. theory is evoked rightly as a means and

criterion for the systematization and comprehensiveness of analysis and research, there still remains the difficulty of understanding 'theory' as more than the criterion for an *a priori* scientific evaluation, like as a product with specific spatial-temporal context.

Contrary to what has been happening in the past, the establishment of I.R. in peripheral countries is less an issue. However, systematic progress as well as inter-disciplinary communication are still an issue, for good reason too, since the commission of vast resources in international studies doesn't ensure automatically scientific progress. Dealing seriously with the local self-reflection is part of negotiating this issue. To be sure, at the end of the day the analysis of the peripheral scholar will have to teach the rest something about foreign policy and international/global politics. But, at the same time, it may teach also about his/her country as well as science produced there. The lessons are out there, as long as one is looking for them.

TABLE 1

Explanatory Models of the Development of I.R. in a Specific Spatial-Temporal Context

Models	Levels
Wæver, 1998: 694-696	A) state and society: A.1) ideology and tradition of political thought A.2) cultural-intellectual style and educational culture A.3) state characteristics and the state-society relationship A.4) foreign policy (the role and behavior of the state in the international arena) B) social science: B.1) social interests B.2) the development of basic principles guiding the field's discursive organization C) intellectual activity within I.R. C.1) social and intellectual structure in terms of paradigmatic stability, hierarchy e.t.c. C.2) intellectual content and theoretical traditions
Drulák, Druláková, 2000: 256-257	A) institutional framework B) produced work C) biography of scientists/researchers
Lucarelli, Menotti, 2002: 114-116	A) characteristics of national literature: A.1) themes and substantial issues A.2) degree of abstraction A.3) dominant approaches/schools of thought A.4) communication patterns between local scholars and the international I.R. community B) academic and cultural context of intellectual production

<p>Breitenbauch, Wivel, 2004: 416-420</p>	<p>A) national traditions and conditions of social science (internal to both the state and science)</p> <p>B) foreign policy and geopolitics (external to both the state and science)</p> <p>C) political culture (internal to the state and external to science)</p> <p>D) global theoretical trends (internal to science and external to state)</p>
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TABLE 2
Departments with a Focus on the International Dimension

University	Department	case A	case B	case C	case D	remarks
University of Athens	Political Science and Public Administration	+	*			
University of Athens	Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies				+(2)	Foundation 2004
University of Athens	Slavic Studies					Foundation 2007
Athens University of Economics and Business	International European Economic Studies			*(2)		Foundation 1989
Panteion University	International European Studies	+(3)	*(2)	*(1)	*(1)	Foundation 1997 from split of the Department of Political Science and International Studies
University of Piraeus	International European Studies		+(2)	+		Foundation 2000
University of Macedonia	International European Economic and Political Studies		+	+		Foundation 1990, as Dep. of International European Economic Studies. Renamed in 1993
University of Macedonia	Balkan, Slavic and Eastern Studies				+(3)	Foundation 1996
Democritus University of Thrace	International Economic Relations and Development	+(2)		*(3)		Foundation 1999. Two more sections exist

Democritus University of Thrace	Language, Literature and Culture of Black Sea Countries				+(4)	Foundation 2000
University of the Aegean	Mediterranean Studies		+		+	Foundation 1997. There is another division with regard to archaeology
University of Western Macedonia	Balkan Studies					Foundation 1999 in the Aristotle's University of Thessalonica. Transferred in 2004
University of Peloponnesus	Political Science and International Relations					Foundation 2003. Accepted students for the first time in the academic year 2007-2008

The table includes the departments specialized in 'International Studies' (including Regional and International Economic Studies. It excludes the departments of Language and Literature with regard to western countries, the program of European Culture at the Hellenic Open University and the Departments of Law which have a section of international studies (Universities of Athens, Thessalonica and Thrace)

-case A: section of international and/or European Studies or International Relations

-case B: speciality in International Studies/Relations

-case C: speciality in International Economic Studies/Relations

-case D: speciality in regional studies

In columns B, C and D the mark '+' denotes the officially recognized and institutionalized speciality, while the mark '*' denotes a speciality which is not institutionalized officially.

TABLE 3

Research Institutes-Professional Associations of International Studies

Before the 1980s	-Hellenic Institute of International and Foreign Law -Institute of International Public Law and International Relations -Institute of Balkan Studies (IMXA) -Hellenic Mediterranean Center of Arabic Islamic Studies
Early 1980s	-Hellenic Society of International Law and International Relations -Hellenic Center of European Studies and Research -Foundation of Mediterranean Studies -Center of international European Economic Law
Late 1980s	-Hellenic Institute of Defense and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP. Later the term 'defense' was replaced by the term 'European') -Hellenic Institute of International Strategic Studies -Hellenic Center of European Studies -Institute of International Relations -Hellenic University Union of European Studies
The 1990s and onwards	-Defence Analyses Institute -Institute of international Economic Relations *Institute of Democracy Constantin Karamanlis *Institute of Strategic and Development Studies

The table is indicative but not exhaustive. The duration and viability of the above is not uniform. The mark '*' indicates institutes connected to a political party and a broader interest in politics, including a special interest in international relations.

TABLE 4

Distribution of Subjects in Curricula in Selected Departments,
in the First two Years

Department of International Relations →	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Subject ↓							
Foreign languages		4		8	4	4	
Computers		2			2		2
Mathematics-Statistics-Econometrics		5			3		4
Methodology	2	1	1	1	2		
Greek politics/history	1			1	1	3	
Sociology	2						
Politics	5	1/2	2	2	3		
Economy	1	6	2	2	4	1	11
Law	2	1	1	2			1
International + European Law		1	2	3	1	1	1
International Relations, Strategic Studies	1	1/2	5	5	3	1	
History International European + Diplomatic	1	1	4	2	2		1
International + European Organization	1	1	1	4	1	1	
International Economic Relations- International Political Economy		1	2	2	1		
Archaeology						3	
Linguistics						4	
History (regional historical studies)						4	
Selective	4		4		1	8	4
	20	24	24	32	28	30	24

List of Departments:

1. Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Athens
2. Department of International European Economic Studies of the Athens University of Economics and Business
3. Department of International European Studies of the Panteion University
4. Department of International European Studies of the University of Piraeus
5. Department of International European Economic and Political Studies of the University of Macedonia
6. Department of Mediterranean Studies of the Aegean University
7. Department of International Economic Studies of the Democritus University of Thrace

Source: The Departments' websites (electronic visit: Spring 2007). The subjects include those with credits and they are recorded as described in the websites. These departments are the ones which were considered equivalent by a ministerial decision (no 2, 3, 4, 5, 7) plus one with a division of International Relations and Organizations (no 6) plus one with a section of International and European Studies (no 1).

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* The authors wish to express their thanks to the article's reviewer for rigid and thoughtful remarks and suggestions which have helped the former with the elaboration of the essay's argument.

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3. See respectively Mathews, J. "Composing Identities: Literacy Dilemmas of Periphery Scholars Negotiating the Theory/Policy Gap in International Relations" Paper delivered at the 45th I.S.A. Convention, Montreal Quebec, Canada, 17-20/03/2004. PDF File / I.S.A. Archive: <http://www.isanet.org/archive.html> & Aydınli, E. & Mathews, J. "Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations" *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 1 (2000), No. 3, pp. 289-903.
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6. The term 'second order theory' refers to theory about theory or in other words meta-theory, which is inherent in every scientific and theoretical framework/approach.
7. It can reasonably be argued that a more appropriate framework to Greece's particularities could have been elaborated. But this raises the issue; Is Greece really a peculiar/particular case? If so, why this particularity couldn't and

shouldn't be shown by general explanatory modes, especially if the latter reflect the consensus among I.R. scholars, needless to say epistemologists, that particularities may be at place but their analysis should be systematic, i.e. multi-dimensional? No matter the differences of what constitutes the respective dimensions, why shouldn't a model guide the respective research? Doesn't it ensure that particularities are not taken a given or described in a rather *ad hoc* manner but examined thoroughly? Theoretically speaking, why would the Greek case need an analytical model only for itself? Why should the case study precede and not follow the explanatory model? To be sure, the research outcome could provide valuable feedback. Indeed, in this case, particularities are demonstrated through the model, since certain blind spots are detected. At the same time, a critical reconstruction is achieved, by juxtaposing various narratives of both international politics and the discipline.

8. The latter has been based in Athens and now bears the name 'Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences'.
9. The section is the organizational unit within the department and the specialty is the official division of the curriculum. The degree includes reference to the student's specialty.
10. For example, the affiliate associations of the World International Studies Committee, as shown in its website (http://www.wiscnetwork.org/about_wisc.php), have used usually but not exclusively the term 'international relations' or 'international studies'. A search in the internet, with search term 'Association of International Law and International Relations', has shown that such associations have existed in Greece, Spain and Romania. It is noted that our neutral description of institutional growth and variety (which is an indisputable fact), embedding epistemological choices, need not necessarily mean the lack of personal or subjective preferences and the insignificance of inter-personal relations. On the contrary, the fact that the title of the professional I.R. organization has not followed the usual universal path demonstrates exactly that such choices have been at least partially subject to preferences of a rather personal nature.
11. Here, the reader should take under consideration the science studies' regard of scientific journals not as an epiphenomenon but as a criterion for science's maturity.
12. This is less the case with the self-reflection of the political sciences and history.
13. Although national claims did not stop and Greek populations still continued to live outside Greece, it was indeed then that the majority of Greeks lived in Greece, whose borders were almost like its present borders.
14. Inoguchi, T. & Bacon, P. "The Study of International Relations in Japan: Towards a More International Discipline" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 1 (2001), No. 1, pp. 1-20: p. 12.

15. Sotiropoulos, D. (2003) "New Challenges for the Study of Greek Politics" Keynote Speech, delivered at the Hellenic Observatory's Conference on Current Social Science Research on Greece. Draft submitted for Inclusion in the Website of the Hellenic Observatory, LSE, July, 2003: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/KeynoteSpeech.pdf>: p. 18. To be sure, the achievement of a comprehensive epistemological position is a broader problem of I.R. or any scientific field for that matter. However, the point here is that the departure (or at least serious discussion about it) from traditional methods of law and diplomatic history as its supplement, with regard to the disciplinary study of international politics since the 1980s, led to a rather empiricist scientific stance rather than a strictly behaviourist one.
16. This point applies less to historians and political scientists engaged with the study of international politics, who have used post-positivist or Marxist tools and meta-theoretical bases since quite a few years, and more to I.R. scholars, although certainly some of them would be content with such use by other scholars especially as a critique against political realism.
17. Concern about this connection with regard to realism has been expressed in the work of A. Heraclides [e.g. Heraclides, A. *International Society and Theories of International Relations. A Critical Investigation*, Athens: Sideris, 2000 (in Greek): p. 110], while concern about this connection with regard to liberalism has been expressed in the work of P. Ifestos [e.g. Ifestos, P. "Cosmo-theoretic Difference and the Claims for Political Sovereignty" Athens: Piotita, 2001 (in Greek): p. 223].
18. E.g. Heraclides, A. *Greece and the 'Danger from the East' Stalemate and Breakthrough* Athens: Polis, 2001 (in Greek). In terms of (meta)theoretical content this played a role in the split of the Department of Political Science and International Studies of Panteion University to two departments: a) Political Science and History and b) International & European Studies.
19. Ifestos, P. *International Relations as an Object of Scientific Study in Greece and Abroad. Course, Object, Content and Knowledge Base*, Athens: Piotita, 2003 (in Greek).
20. For this and the importance of the handling of high task uncertainty, see Waever, *op. cit.*, pp. 717-719.
21. For a critique of the epistemic fallacy, i.e. the transposing of epistemological arguments into ontological ones, see Wight, C. *Agents, Structures and International Relations. Politics as Ontology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006: p.

In the field of science studies, epistemic fallacy constitutes a major issue and has also been defined as the attempt to derive an ontology from an epistemology, to seek empirical solutions to ontological questions or finally to analyse, define and reduce statements about being to statements about knowledge.

22. Indeed some of them, like A. Papanastasiou and P. Kanellopoulos, became prime minister.
23. For example, the Ph.D. thesis of the famous politician P. Papaligouras under the title 'Théorie de la Société Internationale' (Papaligouras, P. "Théorie de la Société Internationale" Zurich: Les Editions Polygraphiques, 1941, vol. 1, was indeed neglected by international law scholars, needless to say historians. It was only a couple of years ago that a book was written about it by E. Cheila: Cheila, E. *International Society. Past and Current Approaches. The Contribution of P. Papaligouras*, Athens: Herodotus, 2001 (in Greek).
24. It was P. Stamatiades. He taught in Panteios School in the 1960s but not for long.
25. Such books were written by both D. Conostas and Th. Couloumbis.
26. Ifestos, P. *War and its Causes. The Many Faces of Hegemonism and Terrorism* Athens: Piotita, 2002 (in Greek).
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28. Platias, A. *International Relations and Strategy in Thucydides*, Athens: Estia, 1999 (in Greek).
29. For example, the latter have been discussed by several contributors to the volumes Canellopoulos, A. & Fragonicolopoulos, Ch. (eds.) *The Present and the Future of Greek Foreign Politics*, Athens: Sideris, 1995 (in Greek) and Tsinisizelis, M. & Ifantis, K. (eds.) *Current Problems of International Relations. State Sovereignty: Threats and Challenges*, Athens: Sideris, 2000 (in Greek). J. Kinnas was an older contributor to the systems approach.
30. This point has been raised especially by Ifestos. See Ifestos, P. "Power and Law in International Politics: Greek Foreign Policy 1974-2004" in Arvanitopoulos, K. & Koppa, M. (eds.) *30 Years of Greek Foreign Policy 1974-2004*, Athens: Livanis, 2005 (in Greek), pp. 163-216 and esp. pp. 186 & 198-201 as well as special files in his website: <http://www.ifestos.edu.gr>. Moreover, positive attitude towards the plan usually construed the plan's rejection only in terms of sentimentalism, ignoring that this rejection was also based on the logic of consequences concerning sovereignty.

Human Rights in Cyprus and the Myth of Isolation of Turkish Cypriots

Stephanos Constantinides

The “Cyprus problem” is far from being a local issue. It is, primarily, a European issue. In its essence, it is the result of the invasion and continuing occupation by Turkey of 37% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus, a member of the European Union, is, sadly, the last divided and occupied country of Europe.

In the meantime Turkey is negotiating its accession to the EU. In this context the EU is in a position to act as a catalyst for the reunification of the divided country and to put an end to the presence of 43.000 Turkish soldiers in the occupied part of the island. Faced with this very-hard-to-justify situation, Turkey has conjured up the myth of the so-called isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. In fact it is no other than Turkey, and its military presence on the island, which for more than thirty years forcibly imposed prohibition of movement across the UN ceasefire line. Prior to that, Turkey has systematically been implementing a geographic separation of the population along ethnic lines, by forcing the Greek Cypriots out of their homes in the occupied areas and moving the Turkish Cypriots into the occupied territory.

Since 2004, when Turkey authorised “regulated” movement across the UN ceasefire line, over 90% of Turkish Cypriots obtained the passport and the identity card of the Republic of Cyprus which permits them to circulate freely in the EU. As rightful citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, they can work in any part of the Republic and also travel abroad, unhindered, through the ports and the airports of the internationally-recognised Cypriot state. They can, further, use the port and airport facilities to export and import from them goods and services.

Turkey, however, whose military presence on the island is overbearing, discourage and prevents the export of Turkish Cypriot goods and services through the legal seaports and airports on the Republic. It does so despite the fact that the Government of Cyprus has offered special arrangements to Turkish Cypriots for their exports at the Larnaka port.

In the meantime the legal and internationally recognised Government of Cyprus has the obligation to defend its sovereign rights and the rule of law

concerning the use of ports or airports in its occupied territory. Cyprus cannot accept Ankara's aim to secure the secessionist regime under its control the attributes of an independent entity. Any movement in this direction only serves to promote the de facto recognition of an illegal and secessionist regime, in direct violation of international law and UN Security Council resolutions particularly resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1994).

Even independent analysts feel strongly that the so-called economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots has, in fact, been inflicted by the masters of the occupied areas of the island, back in 1983, with the unilateral declaration of independence. Since then, all efforts by the Republic to get Turkish-cypriot participation in non-political events, have been in vain. The Republic of Cyprus offered to Turkish Cypriots the opportunity of participation in any sporting or cultural event under the Cypriot flag. There was even an offer to participate in the delegation that negotiated Cyprus accession to EU. Only to be turned down by the Turkish side, time after time. What is also not that well-known outside the island, is that the Government of the Republic has always extended to Turkish Cypriots a number of essential services, including pensions and social security benefits. Turkish Cypriot patients are also given priority at public hospitals in the areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus, and their treatment is, free of charge. All this, despite the fact that the T/C do not contribute to the government coffers nor do they pay social security contributions.

Also often overlooked is the fact that the Government of the Republic has supported the provision of EU financial assistance for the benefit of Turkish Cypriots with the only reservation that political stipulations not be attached to such financial aid. It is important to note that from the moment that Turkey partially lifted its ban on free movement across the divided parts of the island, back in 2003, living standards for the Turkish Cypriots have shot sky high. As borne by statistics, following Turkey's decision to allow T/C to come to the areas controlled by the Republic for work, the per capita income of the Turkish Cypriot community has trebled, from 4.000 USD in 2003 to 12.000 USD in 2007. In other words, far from widening, income disparities between the two communities have over the last four years narrowed sharply. And, no doubt, they would have narrowed even more, if Turkey did not prevent the Turkish Cypriots from enjoying the full benefits of a reunified economy and a re-united Cypriot market for goods, services, capital and technology. If there is anything true about the assertion of T/c sustaining the consequences of economic isolation, to the extent that Turkish troops have

separated a small economy into two halves, against the face of all economic evidence as to how best to promote improvement of living standards and progress towards per capita income parity, between the two communities

Another objective that Turkey is seeking to serve under the misleading slogan about “the need to end T/C economic isolation” is to cloud the violation of human rights in Cyprus for which it is fully responsible. This violation has been recognized by the European Commission of Human Rights as well as by the European Court of Human Rights. Ankara, with outmost disrespect for these decisions, continues in the meantime to transfer into the occupied areas thousands of settlers from Anatolia. Its aim is all too obvious: to change the ethnic composition of its population. So far more than 160.000 settlers have been transferred to the occupied area of Cyprus in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, article 49.6. This is a war crime governed also by article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. These settlers, incidentally, illegally participated in the referendum of April 2004, contrary to what the UN imposed in similar cases in Western Sahara and in the East Timor.

The British professor of Public Law, Claire Palley, former UK member of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and former Constitutional Consultant to the President of Cyprus noted: “All who wish to turn a blind eye to Turkish settlers, to the illegality of their presence, to the unlawfulness of their voting in violation of the principle of self-determination, and to the interferences with Greek Cypriot rights of property by way of expropriation (and/or requisition) in order to provide housing and other amenities for them or other persons, now need to consider the Advisory Opinion pronounced on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice. Although not binding, it is of high persuasive authority for all UN Member States”.

Turkey exploits the rejection by the Greek Cypriots of the deeply flawed and unbalanced Annan plan in April 2004 in order to legalize its military presence in Cyprus. But the Annan plan was not the result of an accord between the two parties. It was, rather, an act of arbitration which favoured the Turkish side. It was based on ethnic separation, stipulating for major derogations from the European Convention of Human Rights which deprived all Cypriots of their fundamental rights, while other EU nationals residing in Cyprus would have enjoyed all their rights under the Convention. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots are always in favour of a negotiated solution defined within the context of the *acquis communautaire*

and the principles of the EU on human rights. That is to say that all the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek or Turkish, should enjoy the same fundamental rights as all other EU nationals. There cannot be room for discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion.

The restoration of all human rights to the whole population of the island, including the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property, will lead to a viable, workable and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. A solution that will put an end to Turkish occupation, reunify the country and its people, reintegrate its economy and satisfy the fundamental concerns of all its citizens on the basis of international law and the principles of the EU. In this respect, EU involvement in this effort is possible and desirable in the context of the «good offices» of the UN Secretary General and it will facilitate its efforts in this direction.

It is precisely through such an economic and political reunification, without artificial barriers and controls, that per capita income levels between the two communities will be driven towards parity. As the experience of South Africa under the apartheid regime so aptly manifests, so-called separate economic development only masks a wish to keep a section of the population permanently in a handicapped state of being. The government of the Republic of Cyprus and the vast majority of Greek Cypriots, do not advocate such a nasty and non-egalitarian two-state solution in the context of a tiny island with the second smallest economy inside the EU. What does Turkey and its proxies in the occupied areas of the island really want?

Chronologies

Chypre: 1^{er} octobre 2007 - 31 mars 2008

23 octobre: Accord de coopération stratégique entre la Grande Bretagne et la Turquie par lequel ces deux pays s'engagent à revaloriser la statut de la zone occupée de Chypre désignée par les termes de «République turque de Chypre nord».

2 novembre: Décès dans une prison chypriote turque de Stéphanos Stéphanou, ancien consul d'Irlande à Chypre, détenu depuis le 18 octobre sur l'accusation d'un trafic d'antiquités.

6 novembre: La Commission européenne déclare que la Turquie ne doit pas empêcher la libre circulation des marchandises à l'égard de la République de Chypre et déplore que le manque de coopération entre les centres de contrôle de Turquie et de Chypre compromettent la sécurité de l'espace aérien.

8 novembre: Visite à Beyrouth de la ministre des affaires Étrangères Erato-Kozakou-Markoulli. Son homologue libanais déclare que «Chypre sera la voix du Liban au sein de l'UE».

10 décembre: Sergueï Lavroff, ministre russe des affaires étrangères en visite à Chypre conteste le rapport du Secrétaire général de l'ONU Ban Ki-moon relatif au soi-disant isolement des Chypriotes turcs. Chypre, comme la Russie se prononce contre la prochaine indépendance du Kosovo.

22 décembre: Décès à l'âge de 80 ans de Mgr Chrysostomos ancien Archevêque de Chypre.

1^{er} janvier: Entrée de Chypre dans la zone euro (1 euro= 0, 585274 livre chypriote).

17 février: 1^{er} tour de l'élection présidentielle: Ioannis Kassoulidès, ancien ministre des affaires étrangères du président Cléridés, soutenu par le parti de la droite DISY arrive en tête avec 33, 51% devant Dimitri Christofias, Secrétaire général du parti communiste AKEL et président de la Chambre des Représentants,(33, 29%). Elimination de Tassos Papadopoulos, président de la République sortant(31, 79%) soutenu par les partis DIKO, EDEK, EUROKO, et les Verts. Il y a eu près de 90% de votants sur les 516 000 électeurs inscrits.

24 février: 2^{ème} tour de l'élection présidentielle. Election de D. Christofias, sixième président de la République de Chypre avec 53, 36 % des voix devant I. Kassoulidès 46, 64%.

28 février: Formation du nouveau gouvernement:

Ministre des Affaires étrangères: Marcos Kyprianou

Ministre des Finances: Charilaos Stavrakis

Ministre de l'Intérieur: Neoklis Sylikiotis

Ministre de la Défense: Costas Papacostas

Ministre de l'Agriculture, des Ressources naturelles et de l'Environnement: Polynikis Charalambides

Ministre de la Justice et de l'Ordre public: Kypros Chrysostomides

Ministre du Commerce, de l'Industrie et du Tourisme: Antonis Paschalides

Ministre du Travail et des Assurances sociales: Sotiroula Charalambous

Ministre de l'Education et de la Culture: Andreas Demetriou

Ministre des Communications et des Travaux publics: Nicos Nicolaïdes

Ministre de la Santé: Christos Patsalides

Porte-parole du Gouvernement: Stephanos Stephanou

Mme Androulla Vassiliou, du Parti des Démocrates unis et épouse de l'ancien président Georges Vassiliou remplace Marcos Kyprianou à la Commission européenne pour la période à courir jusqu'à la fin de son mandat.

6 mars: Marios Karoyan, président du parti DIKO est élu président de la Chambre des Représentants par 36 voix (AKEL, DIKO, EDEK, EVROKO, Ecologistes) et 15 abstentions (DISI).

21 mars: 1^{ère} rencontre entre le président Dimitri Christofias et le chef de la communauté chypriote turque Mehmet Ali Talat, qui décident de reprendre le processus de négociations intercommunautaires pour régler la question chypriote et d'ouvrir rapidement la rue Ledra à Nicosie séparant les deux secteurs de cette ville.

27 mars: Saisie record par la police chypriote de 150 kgs de cannabis après une enquête de plusieurs années.

31 mars: En visite à Nicosie le ministre français de l'Immigration Brice Hortefeux déclare que l'Union européenne doit fournir une aide à Chypre pour lutter contre l'immigration illégale à travers les 180 km de la ligne verte.

Grèce: 1^{er} octobre 2007 - 31 mars 2008

1^{er} octobre: Le Parlement approuve par 152 voix contre 148 les déclarations de programme du gouvernement Caramanlis.

14 octobre: Premier transfert des vestiges de l'Acropole d'Athènes à son nouveau musée de 25000 m2 situé à 300 m en contrebas de ce site.

11 novembre: Les 900 000 militants et amis du Pasok ont réélu Georges Papandréou à la tête de ce parti avec plus de 60% des voix devant Evangelos Venizelos (34 %) et Costas Skandalidis (6%).

18 novembre: inauguration par les Premiers ministres grec et turc d'un gazoduc à Ipsala et Péplos. A ce gazoduc gréco-turc va s'ajouter un gazoduc gréco-italien dont la construction commencera en juin 2008. Ainsi sera acheminé du gaz naturel depuis la région de la mer caspienne jusqu'en occident.

17 décembre: Mme Fanni Palli-Pétralia est nommée ministre de l'emploi à la suite de la démission de Vassilis Magginas.

18 décembre: En visite officielle en Russie le Premier ministre Costas Caramanlis rencontre le président Poutine et le Patriarche Alexis II, qui souligne que Grecs et Russes sont «des frères disposant d'un héritage commun qui est la Sainte Orthodoxie».

20 décembre: Vote du budget par le Parlement à une courte majorité (152 voix contre 148).

23-25 janvier: Visite officielle en Turquie de Costas Caramanlis, la première d'un Premier ministre grec depuis 49 ans.

28 janvier: Décès à l'âge de 70 ans de Mgr Christodoulos, Archevêque d'Athènes et Primat de Grèce. Election, le 7 février, de son successeur, Mgr Ieronymos, Métropolitain de Thèbes et de Léviaia.

4 février: Journée nationale à la mémoire de l'Holocauste des Juifs grecs au Palais de la musique en présence du Président de la République Carolos Papoulias.

10 février: Election d'Alexis Tsipras, Président de la Coalition de la gauche au 5^{ème} Congrès de ce parti.

13 février: Grève générale pour protester contre le projet de loi sur la réforme de la sécurité sociale.

5 mars: Le directeur du quotidien d'extrême droite *Eleftheros Kosmos* et deux autres journalistes ont été condamnés par le tribunal correctionnel d'Athènes à 7 mois de prison avec sursis pour «incitation à la haine raciale» après avoir publié des propos antisémites et négationnistes dans ce journal.

19 mars: Grève générale, la troisième en 3 mois, pour protester contre le projet de loi relatif aux régimes des retraites.

24 mars: Trois militants de *Reporters Sans Frontières* ayant perturbé la cérémonie d'allumage à Olympie de la flamme olympique pour les Jeux de Pékin pour protester contre la répression chinoise au Tibet ont été arrêtés puis relâchés après avoir été inculpés pour «action offensante». Après 7 jours d'un périple à partir d'Olympie la flamme olympique a été remise, le 30 mars, par le président de la République Carolos Papoulias aux organisateurs des Jeux de Pékin.

28 mars: Rejet de la motion de censure déposée par le Pasok pour protester contre la réforme de la sécurité sociale entreprise par le gouvernement Caramanlis par 152 voix (Nouvelle Démocratie + le député indépendant Koukodimos) contre 138 (Pasok, KKE, Coalition) et 10 abstentions (Laos).

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