ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

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Le Patriarcat oecuménique et l'orthodoxie dans le monde
Théodoros Pangalos
La politique du courage et le courage en politique
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Yannis Philippoussis, Marios Evriviades
Recensions/ Book Reviews

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ÉTUDES HELLÉNIQUES / HELLENIC STUDIES

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Entretien avec sa sainteté le
Patriarche oecuménique Bartholoméos

Cet entretien a été réalisé par Jean Catsiapis*

Sa sainteté le Patriarche oecuménique, Bartholoméos 1er, a succédé le 22 octobre 1991 à Dimitrios 1er, après avoir été élu à Constantinople par le saint synode. Conformément au règlement établi par les autorités turques en 1862 et modifié en 1924 puis en 1970, le Patriarche oécuménique remplit les conditions d'être né en Turquie et de posséder la citoyenneté turque. Son élection a été subordonnée à l'agrément préalable par le gouvernement turc d'une liste de trois candidats.

Primat d'honneur de la chrétienté orthodoxe, le deux cent-soixante-dixième Patriarche de l'Église d'Orient maintient la foi orthodoxe à Constantinople, alias Istanbul, en Turquie musulmane soumise depuis plusieurs années aux pressions d'un intégrisme intransigeant. Fin lettré, polyglotte, Bartholoméos 1er n'exerce directement sa juridiction que sur trois à quatre millions de fidèles alors que l'orthodoxie en compte deux cent millions. Constantinople ne possède en effet une autorité hiérarchique que sur la toute petite communauté orthodoxe de Turquie, les Églises d'Amérique du nord et du sud, de Crète, du Dodécanèse, d'Australie, de Nouvelle Zélande, l'Archevéché russe d'Europe occidentale et centrale. Les monastères du mont Athos et de l'île de Patmos sont aussi directement rattachés au patriarcat oecuménique.

A l'égard des autres chefs des Églises orthodoxes, le Patriarche oecuménique n'est que "Primus inter Pares". Le siège de Constantinople, fondé selon la tradition par l'apôtre Saint André, reçut du deuxième et du quatrième concile oecuménique, qui eurent lieu respectivement en 381 et 451, la primauté d'honneur après l'évêque de Rome. Il prit au VIème siècle le titre de patriarcat oecuménique, parce qu'il était situé dans la capitale de l'Empire, théoriquement oecuménique, qui ne subsistait alors qu'en Orient.

Reprenant le bâton de pélerin d'Athénagoras 1er, le successeur de Dimitrios 1er, outre ses nombreuses visites aux Églises orthodoxes, poursuit, en tant que membre du Conseil oecuménique des Églises, le dialogue avec Rome, où le 29 juin 1995, il lance avec le Pape Jean-Paul II un appel à la réunification des Églises chrétiennes.

Bartholoméos 1er, qui a rencontré le 5 avril 1996 le Premier ministre turc Mesut Yilmaz, souhaite obtenir des autorité politiques de Turquie la réouverture de la Faculté théologique de Halki fermée depuis 1971.

*Université de Paris X

Fervent défenseur de l'écologie, le Patriarche oecuménique, porte un vif intérêt à la protection de l'environnement qui, selon lui, constitue un des problèmes les plus urgents auquels est confrontée aujourd'hui l'humanité.

Question: La guerre en Bosnie a donné de l'Orthodoxie une image négative dans les médias des pays occidentaux. Quelle est votre position sur cettte guerre?

Réponse: L'image que présentent les médias, en Occident, de l'Orthodoxie à la faveur des conflits de la Bosnie nous a profondément chagriné. Nous avons souligné maintes fois que la guerre de Bosnie n'est pas une guerre de religion, mais resulte du réveil de vieilles querelles ethniques dans cette région. Nous considérons comme injuste l'attaque unilatérale contre les Serbes de la part de ces médias car la responsabilité des événements dans cette région appartient aussi à d'autres. S'agissant de la position de l'Orthodoxie à l'égard des nationalismes, nous vous renvoyons à la récente Déclaration de Patmos[1], sur ce sujet, des Chefs des Églises orthodoxes. L'Orthodoxie condamne sans réserve tout fanatisme ethnique de nature à conduire à la haine et au conflit et soutient le droit de chaque peuple à conserver et à développer ses spécificités culturelles et religieuses. Telle est la position officielle et unanime de l'Orthodoxie sur ce sujet.

Question: Où en est aujourd'hui la question de l'unité des Chrétiens?

Réponse: La question de l'unité des Chrétiens figure au premier rang des préoccupations de l'Église orthodoxe. Nous rappelons les initiatives du Patriarcat Oecuménique par lesquelles l'Orthodoxie est devenue membre fondateur de l'actuel Mouvement oecuménique et du Conseil oecuménique des Églises, ainsi que sa participation active aux dialogues théologiques qui assurent la promotion de cette unité. Dans certaines Églises orthodoxes on remarque une inquiétude accrue sur l'état de ce sujet de l'unité, en particulier avec les récentes évolutions concernant les Uniates[2], l'ordination des femmes chez les Anglicans etc... Nous sommes d'avis que ces évolutions portent un grand préjudice aux progrès de l'unité. Nous avons l'espoir que le Vatican et les autres Églises et confessions vont comprendre cela et, de concert avec les Orthodoxes, feront les efforts pour surmonter les obstacles apparus dernièrement. Sur cette base, les relations du Patriarcat oecuménique avec le Vatican évoluent de façon constructive dans un esprit d'amitié et de sincérité.

Question: Il semble que la convocation d'un Concile oecuménique des Églises orthodoxes tarde beaucoup. Pour quelle raison?

Réponse: De fait, la convocation du Saint et Grand Concile de l'Église orthodoxe tarde, mais non pas par manque de volonté de sa tenue. Les commissions préparatoires inter-orthodoxes, qui ont été créées, travaillent avec soin mais

l'état de leurs travaux a montré que des problèmes nécessitent davantage d'étude comme la question de la diaspora orthodoxe, la procédure de déclaration des Églises autocéphales et d'autres questions d'ordre canonique. Nous espérons que bientôt l'étude de ces questions sera achevée.

Question: Avec la chute du communisme en URSS et dans les pays de l'Europe de l'Est, y a t-il eu un renouveau de l'Orthodoxie? Quelles relations avez-vous avec le Patriarcat orthodoxe de Moscou?

Réponse: La chute des régimes communistes dans les pays de l'Europe de l'Est a donné la liberté aux Églises orthodoxes y vivant mais a aussi augmenté leurs obligations pour la pastorale des fidèles et pour l'évangélisation de leurs peuples. Nous pensons que tous les chrétiens doivent aider et fortifier les Églises orthodoxes dans l'accomplissement de ces obligations au lieu de se substituer à elles dans leur oeuvre pastorale par un prosélytisme et des actions de "missionnaires". Le Patriarcat oecuménique a toujours soutenu cette position. En particulier, en ce qui concerne l'Église de Russie, le Patriarcat oecuménique a fait et fait tout son possible pour que cette position soit comprise tant par le Vatican que par les autres Églises chrétiennes. Les problèmes entre nos deux Patriarcats, comme celui de l'acquisition de l'autonomie ecclésiastique de l'Estonie, supprimée en 1945 unilatéralement par le Patriarcat de Moscou lors de l'annexion de ce pays par la force par l'URSS, sont en cours de discussion dans un esprit d'affection et de respect.[3]

Question: En avril 1994 vous avez dénoncé à Strasbourg devant le Parlement européen, dont vous étiez l'invité, les attaques que venait de subir le Patriarcat oecuménique en insistant sur la responsabilité qu'a le gouvernement turc d'assurer sa securité.[4] Aujourd'hui la situation du Patriarcat oecuménique est-elle meilleure?

Réponse: Oui, il y a une attention et un intérêt plus grands à la securité du Patriarcat. Et nous espérons qu'à l'avenir il n'y aura plus d'incidents à ses dépens.

Question: La Turquie a signé un accord d'Union douanière avec l'Union européenne[5]. Etes-vous favorable à un rapprochement de ce pays avec l'Europe?

Réponse: Nous sommes sans réserve en faveur de ce rapprochement mais aussi pour la pleine adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union européenne. Nous avons évoqué cette question avec le Président Chirac[6] comme nous l'évoquons et soutenons cette position dans toute occasion qui nous est donnée.

Question: Depuis votre accession au trône patriarcal vous avez effectué de très nombreux voyages de par le monde. Quels enseignements tirez-vous de ces voyages, et particulièrement de votre récent voyage en France?

Réponse: Le principal enseignement que nous retirons de nos nombreux voyages à l'étranger est que les peuples ont soif d'unité, de paix et de coopération et attendent beaucoup, à cet égard, de leurs Églises et, en général, de leurs chefs spirituels. Ils attendent le bon exemple. Plus particulièrement notre voyage en France a été, à tous égards, un voyage béni. Les contacts avec les dirigeants politiques et les chefs ecclésiastiques ont été sincères et fructueux. Nous avons, une fois de plus, admiré l'esprit français, la civilisation française et les sentiments d'hospitalité du peuple français envers qui nous sommes reconnaissants.

Question: Vous vous intéressez beaucoup aux questions écologiques. Selon vous, quelle place doit-on faire aujourd'hui à l'écologie?

Réponse: En effet le Patriarcat, déjà à l'époque de feu notre prédécesseur le Patriarche Dimitrios, et encore plus aujourd'hui sous notre autorité, témoigne un vif intérêt à la protection de l'environnement. Nous agissons ainsi car nous pensons fermement que cette question de l'environment constitue un des problèmes les plus sérieux et les plus urgents auxquels est confrontée aujourd'hui l'hunamité et que le devoir de l'Église et de toute communauté réligieuse à ce sujet est colossal. Tant les racines de cette question que la manière de l'affronter comportent des dimensions spirituelles et théologiques car à la racine du problème il y a, d'un côté, la cupidité humaine et l'égocentrisme et, de l'autre côté, la conception erronée selon laquelle l'homme a seul de l'importance dans la création de Dieu. Nous invitons tous les chrétiens et les fidèles de toute religion à prendre conscience ensemble de la responsabilité de l'homme envers la création de la matière.

Question: Quel est aujourd'hui le message au monde de l'Orthodoxie?

Réponse: Le monde souffre aujourd'hui de l'eudémonisme, de l'égocentrisme et de la rhétorique. Le développement exclusif des sciences et de la technologie sans point d'appui spirituel et moral conduit à des routes dangereuses. L'Orthodoxie soutient l'importance et la priorité de la personne sur l'individu, et, à travers le culte eucharistique et la tradition ascétique, invite l'homme à développer une attitude de communion tant envers Dieu qu'avec les autres hommes et la nature. Telle est la quintessence du message de l'Orthodoxie aujourd'hui.

Question: Selon vous, quels seront les problèmes auxquels seront confrontés les chrétiens au siècle prochain?

Réponse: Le siècle qui vient apportera de sérieux problèmes aux Chrétiens. Ce qu'on appelle "la civilisation chrétienne", qui a dominé pendant des siècles, va subir des craquements en raison du progrès des sciences et de la technologie, ce qui exigera un dialogue fécond de la théologie chrétienne avec la science et la philosophie de sorte que soit donnée une nouvelle "présence" culturelle du

christianisme. La coexistance, attendue par ailleurs des religions dans une communauté humaine rapidement unifiée, peut conduire à des conflits de civilisations et de religions. C'est pourquoi il est nécessaire de développer un dialogue fécond entre les principaux courants réligieux et spirituels. Le 21ème siècle doit être le siècle du dialogue pour ne pas devenir celui des conflits.

NOTES

1. Du 20 au 26 septembre 1995 s'est tenue à Patmos, à l'invitation du Patriarche oecuménique, une rencontre des chefs des Églises orthodoxes.

2. Les Uniates, catholiques de rite grec mais sous juridiction romaine, ont été rattachés aux Églises orthodoxes (en particulier en Ukraine et en Roumanie) à l'époque du communisme. Ils demandent aujourd'hui la restitution de leurs biens et de leurs lieux de culte.

3. Le 22 février 1996, Constantinople a décidé de placer sous sa juridiction, et à la demande de celle-ci, l'Église d'Estonie détachée de l'Église russe et provisoirement dirigée par l'Archevêque de Finlande. Cette Église avait été rattachée de force en 1945 au Patriarcat de Moscou.

4. Le 22 avril 1994, Bartholoméos 1er a dénoncé devant les députés européens les attaques des islamistes de Constantinople contre le Patriarcat oecuménique.

5. Un accord d'Union douanière entre l'Union européenne et la Turquie a été conclu en 1995 et est entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 1996.

6. Le Patriarche oecuménique a rencontré le président Chirac à Paris au cours de sa visite en France en novembre 1995.

DOCUMENT

General principles of Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans*

Greece's policy in the Balkans is guided by the principles of maintenance of stability, peace and security as well as of the full respect of human rights, including those relating to minorities. The inviolability of the internationally recognized borders, in accordance with the relevant U.N. and OSCE principles, remains one of the cornerstones of Greece's foreign policy.

To serve these goals, Greece supports the establishment of good neighborly relations and the development of close economic ties among all Balkan countries. This is particularly important to Greece which, during the communist era, had relatively limited relations with its northern neighbors, with whom it had maintained for centuries close cultural and economic ties. It will also further promote economic development and stability in the region.

The resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, for which Greece made and is continuing to make intensive efforts, will further increase the prospects for a fruitful multilateral Balkan cooperation. This cooperation has been a leading goal of Greek foreign policy since 1976, when the first meeting of the parties concerned was convened in Athens upon Greece's initiative.

The systematic cooperation of Greece with the Balkan countries contributes also to the long-term goals of their economic and political rapprochement with Europe and other international institutions. The realization of important infrastructure projects of Balkan-wide importance, such as in the transport, energy and telecommunication fields, remains among Greece's high priorities.

Greek investment and trade exchanges with its Balkan neighbors have recently increased. Today, Greece is the second largest investor in Albania and the third one in Bulgaria. Greek foreign investment and trade in Romania is also significant.

Relations with Romania

Greece's relations with Romania have reached a very high level during the last years. Visits at all levels take place at frequent intervals, and a close and substantive cooperation in the economic and cultural fields has been noted.

A large number of Greek business firms is active in making Greece one of the countries with the highest economic cooperation with Romania. The significant improvement of Romania's investment environment is expected to lead to an even closer cooperation between businessmen of the two countries.

* Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Réflexions politiques

La politique du courage et le courage en politique

Théodoros Pangalos*

La notion de courage dans la vie en général et en politique en particulier peut s'interpréter de bien des manières, tout dépendant des circonstances; elle peut aussi bien être mal interprétée en fonction de l'objectif visé. Le courage signifie tantôt hardiesse ou intrépidité, tantôt confiance en soi, ou encore désinvolture excessive. Un homme politique se fait dire parfois «un peu de courage et tu vas y arriver», parfois «tu y vas un peu fort, on va te rabattre le caquet».

Les réponses qui résultent de l'examen de la relation qu'il y a entre l'homme politique et le courage dans une société démocratique sont en fait troublantes, susceptibles même de signaler de fâcheuses évolutions de notre système socio-politique. Les réponses viennent tout naturellement à la suite d'une série de constatations.

Un homme politique dépourvu de courage sait bien qu'il va toujours tirer son épingle du jeu, s'il s'emploie tacitement à servir les objectifs ou de son insipide et mesquine ambition personnelle, ou bien de décisions prises en haut-lieu, ou simplement en se mettant au service de sa clientèle.

L'homme politique qui se distingue par le courage de ses opinions et de ses actes court de gros risques, mais ne court certes pas à sa perte. Il peut arriver qu'il perde son fauteuil ministériel ou son siège de député, mais jamais son poids et sa stature politiques. Bien souvent cependant la balance de l'attitude politique incline davantage en faveur de la logique du courage.

Il y a aussi des occasions où d'autres facteurs, étrangers à la notion de courage, mènent à des actes qui de propos délibéré ou non sont interprétés comme des manifestations d'audace. Les raisons en sont multiples. Ils peuvent être motivés par un désir insatiable de publicité, un manque de sang-froid, un accès de présomption, une mauvaise information, ou par la nécessité de faire des manœuvres de diversion. Les politiciens de ce calibre provoquent une aversion plus grande que les politiciens "timorés".

Par ailleurs nous avons aussi des hommes politiques dont le courage ne dure qu'un temps délimité ou qu'en fonction d'objectifs bien définis. Un exemple caractéristique d'un tel courage pourrait être la défection de députés, un phénomène bien connu dans l'histoire contemporaine de la Grèce.

A l'examen des cas typiques ci-haut mentionnés, il appert qu'il y a une nette différence entre la politique du courage et le courage en politique.

Le courage politique n'est pas dicté par les circonstances; il ne s'enseigne pas,

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ne s'imite pas, et surtout il ne connaît pas de convenances hiérarchiques. Le courage politique ne consiste pas dans le fait d'exprimer son opinion quand les circonstances sont favorables et de la faire - ou pire encore de la révoquer ou de se rétracter - dès que les circonstances favorables viennent à manquer. Quelqu'un a du courage politique, quand il ne cesse de soutenir son opinion, qu'il ne cesse de l'étayer de nouveaux arguments jusqu'à ce qu'elle finisse par obtenir gain de cause et se trouver justifiée. Aucun coût politique ou personnel ne peut museler la pensée d'un tel homme.

Chaque société, y compris la société grecque, abonde en exemples spécifiques de personnes qui exercent quelquefois une politique du courage moyennant de beaux discours et d'actes même susceptibles de faire illusion, et d'autres douées de courage politique qui n'hésitent jamais à en donner une preuve tangible en posant des actes sans considérer le prix à payer par la suite.

Serait-ce désormais un luxe pour le peuple d'exiger une caution des promesses qu'on lui fait? La moindre des cautions consiste en des personnes dignes de foi, aux aptitudes reconnues par le peuple lui-même, douées d'une stabilité de positions et d'opinions, d'une stature et d'un poids politiques correspondants, capables d'affronter toute espèce d'intérêts, toute espèce d'autorités ou de mandats politiques. Caution veut dire des personnes qui ont le courage de leur opinion et de leurs actes tout au long de leur carrière dans l'arène politique, qui ne craignent ni obstacles ni heurts et ne sacrifient pour rien au monde de courageuses décisions politiques sur l'autel de quelque volonté minoritaire que ce soit.

Par contre, la politique du courage est synonyme du manque de crédibilité, de la duperie, de la bravade, et malheureusement de la trahison.

Pour ma part, motivé par l'envie de juger le degré de stabilité des opinions que j'avais autrefois exprimées, de vérifier mes prévisions, mais aussi de remuer mes souvenirs, j'ai édité en 1993 le livre *Intervention dans l'actualité*, comprenant mes interviews publiées dans la presse de 1989 à 1993, de même que les interviews de personnes connues et inconnues. Une entreprise peut-être audacieuse puisque beaucoup de points de vue n'avaient pas encore trouvé leur justification.

Peut-être que certains en jugeant le contenu s'empresseront d'arguer "oui, bien sûr, il avait du courage politique, sur bien des points il a eu raison, mais n'oublions pas qu'il s'agit d'un individu dénué de sang froid et qu'il se trouvait alors dans l'opposition". Cette assertion recèle pourtant des constatations beaucoup plus désagréables que celles que j'ai mentionnées, mais en plus contradictoires.

D'abord elle implique de convenir que le courage politique est uniquement le fait de l'opposition, qui n'a rien à perdre. Mais la lucidité et la constance sont cordialement désapprouvées, qu'on soit dans l'opposition, ou que l'on appartienne au parti au pouvoir, surtout quand le résultat dérange ou se trouve justifié

par l'évolution des événements. Deuxièmement, elle insinue que la supériorité de l'audace face au coût politique est le résultat d'explosions du moment, alors que la souplesse et le défaitisme résultent d'une pensée et d'une prudence profondes.

Enfin, autant il est difficile de clamer la vérité le moment venu, autant il est difficile d'imaginer notre société sans relations de clientèle, sans pistonnage, mais avec une reconnaissance des mérites à tous les échelons, une transparence de procédures, une application des lois sans exception, une répartition égale des fardeaux, une réelle modernisation ou bien sans soumission aux intérêts reconnus ou non qui viennent de l'étranger ou de la Grèce.

L'homme politique a le choix entre deux positions, qui vont marquer son cheminement tout entier: soit d'exercer de temps en temps la politique du courage, soit de manifester à chaque instant son courage politique. Le premier choix comporte incontestablement pour le moins le sacrifice de sa liberté d'opinion. Le second parcourt une longue et dure période d'examens devant le seul censeur qui soit: le peuple. C'est le seul qui puisse admettre ou refuser quelqu'un. Il possède jugement et voix. Il lui arrive de se montrer indulgent pour les indolents et les ignorants, mais en tout cas il n'accepte pas ceux qui tentent de passer les examens en trichant. En plus d'être juge, le peuple est aussi justicier.

Traduction Jacques Bouchard

DOCUMENT

Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans*

Relations with Albania

With Albania, Greece pursues the development of relations of good neighborliness and cooperation in all fields, based on the respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national independence, as well as the full respect of human rights, including those relating to national minorities, in accordance with the U.N. and OSCE principles.

The two countries reaffirmed their close ties and desire for even greater cooperation during the visit of the President of Greece to Albania (March 21-22, 1996). During that visit the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Albania and Greece signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, Good Neighborliness and Security, reiterating their respect for human rights and established borders, and affirming their desire for even closer cooperation in the economic, cultural, political and military fields.

Greece has supported Albania's efforts for reconstruction and development and has backed its association with international organizations. Especially during the first years of political transition in Albania, Greece stood by Albania, granting considerable humanitarian and economic aid. Through close cooperation with the Albanian government, it has also financed many infrastructure projects of social importance, namely in the fields of road transport, electrification, water supply, education and construction of schools, as well as in the field of health. During 1994 and 1995 alone, bilateral economic aid surpassed 11 million USD, while financial support coming from private sources was also significant. Greek investment in Albania exceeds 120 million USD. More than 150 joint ventures have been established. Greece strongly believes that the furthering of economic ties will be to the benefit of both countries and their peoples.

Furthermore, during recent years Greece has treated, free of charge, a large number of Albanian patients in Greek hospitals (more than 40,000 during the years 1990-1995 at Ioannina Hospital alone).

At the same time, approximately 300,000 Albanian workers have moved to Greece in the past few years. Even though most of these workers immigrated illegally, their remittances, amounting to more than 400 million USD per year, contribute considerably to the Albanian economy.

In the field of military cooperation, Greece contributes to the training of medical doctors in Greek military hospitals. It has also contributed to the modernization, through the contribution of 1.2 million USD, of part of the Tirana military hospital.

A sizable indigenous Greek minority lives in Albania. This minority, which had been persecuted during the communist regime era, greatly contributes to the development of the country and constitutes a bridge of friendship between the two countries, thus enabling their further rapprochement.

In order to allow the full participation of the Greek minority in all aspects of Albanian life and society, all its rights should be fully respected. This is necessary in order to allow it to prosper in a climate of justice and security, without any kind of harassment or discrimination. To this end, particular effort should be made to give the Greek minority proper representation in public administration, as well as the full enjoyment of its religious and educational rights.

* Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs

La France et la question chypriote

De la guerre d'indépendance à la crise de 1964*

Jean Catsiapis**

ABSTRACT

The importance of the issue and recent release of the verbatim records prompted us to include an English summary after the French article rather than an abstract.

RÉSUMÉ

Puissance coloniale qui doit affronter la rébellion des Algériens, la France, lorsqu'éclate la guerre d'indépendance de Chypre, nie, à l'instar de la Grande-Bretagne, le droit au peuple chypriote à l'autodétermination. Le Général de Gaulle, lors de la crise de 1964, dont il rend responsable Mgr Makarios, se montre très proche de la position de la Turquie qui préconise le partage de Chypre.

La France, membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, s'est toujours intéressée à la Méditerranée orientale. La question chypriote figure ainsi en permanence parmi les centres d'intérêt de la diplomatie française. Le Président Mitterrand au cours de ses deux septennats a été très attentif à l'évolution de ce problème qui concerne la paix dans une région très sensible du monde. Recevant à Paris le 28 novembre 1988 le Premier ministre turc Turgut Ozal il lui déclara :

"Chypre est un problème délicat. On ne peut pas inventer de solution comme cela, parce qu'on a envie de régler un problème. Il y a une réalité turque et une réalité grecque sur un même territoire. C'est un des conflits les plus difficiles à résoudre. Je souhaite que l'Ile retrouve sa dignité au travers d'un système politique souple que les diplomates sauront inventer. Je sais que vous avez adopté une attitude ouverte, plus ouverte que celle de votre compatriote Demirel. Ce ne sera pas facile pour vous, mais il le faudra bien. Car ce serait une gêne pour vos relations avec la Communauté et les Etats Unis. Il faut admettre que les Grecs chypriotes et les Turcs chypriotes sont chez eux, et exclure l'idée de la domination d'une partie de la population sur l'autre, trouver les moyens de vivre ensemble sans empiéter l'un sur l'autre. Il faut mettre le train sur les rails. La solution n'est pas de s'entretuer." [1]

* Cet article a été rédigé, pour l'essentiel, à partir des archives du Quai d'Orsay dont les documents, pour l'année 1964, ne sont accessibles aux chercheurs que depuis peu de temps. En particulier, on trouvera à l'annexe 4, le texte intégral de l'entretien de De Gaulle- Inonu du 1er juillet 1964, classé «très secret».

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Ces propos de F. Mitterand indiquent que la politique chypriote de la France exclut à l'évidence le partage de Chypre. Sous de Gaulle celle-ci, bien au contraire, tendait à nier l'existence même de Chypre en tant qu'Etat. La France dès le début de la guerre d'indépendance de Chypre s'était montrée réservée pour ne pas dire hostile à la décolonisation de cet Etat.

I La France et la guerre d'indépendance de Chypre

La guerre d'indépendance de Chypre éclate le 1er avril 1955, quelques mois après le début de l'insurrection des Algériens contre la colonisation française. A la coïncidence dans le temps des guerres de Chypre et d'Algérie va s'ajouter la similitude du traitement de ces conflits par la Grande Bretagne et la France. Ces deux pays vont considérer que ces rebellions sont des affaires intérieures et que par conséquent l'ONU n'est pas compétente pour traiter l'affaire algérienne et la question chypriote. Paris va nier le droit du peuple algérien à l'autodétermination tout comme Londres va refuser d'admettre que le peuple chypriote puisse prétendre à l'exercice de ce même droit. C'est pourquoi, dès que se pose la question chypriote le gouvernement français va logiquement épouser les thèses de Londres sur ce sujet.

La Grèce, bien qu'alliée de la France dans le cadre du pacte de l'Atlantique nord, n'a pas cru devoir, au début des années cinquante, s'aligner sur les positions françaises lorsque les affaires marocaine et tunisienne ont été évoquées à l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU. Sachant qu'elle aurait un jour prochain à soutenir devant cette organisation les revendications de Chypre, elle décide de s'abstenir le 13 décembre 1951 dans le vote tendant à repousser, à la demande de Paris, l'inscription de l'affaire marocaine à l'ordre du jour de la 6ème session de l'Assemblée générale ; elle fera de même, le 10 avril 1952, lors d'un vote de même nature concernant l'affaire tunisienne. Cette attitude de la Grèce, opposée aux intérêts de la France est peu appréciée, par le Quai d'Orsay. Ce qui explique que la France, le 24 septembre 1954, décide de voter contre l'inscription de la question chypriote à l'ordre du jour de l'Assemblée générale. Au cours de cette année, et de la période qui suit, le gouvernement grec qui recherche l'appui des Etats arabes à la fois pour obtenir un soutien diplomatique à l'ONU et aussi pour éviter une solidarité musulmane envers la Turquie, prend ouvertement parti en faveur des indépendantistes algériens.

Pour expliquer la position française sur la question de Chypre au début de la guerre d'indépendance de ce pays il faut aussi savoir que Paris minimise l'importance du combat du peuple chypriote. S'appuyant sur les rapports de ses services de renseignement à Nicosie [2] le gouvernement français ne peut prendre au sérieux le danger que représenteraient les communistes de l'AKEL dans les manifestations nationalistes chypriotes. Selon ces documents, les dirigeants de ce parti travailleraient pour les services anglais, ce qui permet cette conclusion

sur l'AKEL : "avec un tel secrétaire général, et des cadres dont la plupart sont connus pour leurs attaches avec les services du gouvernement il est normal de voir les autorités sourire quand on leur parle du danger communiste. Il semble évident que la seule chose dont les Anglais n'ont rien à redouter est l'AKEL, et plus spécialement les dirigeants communistes".

La crise de Suez, en 1956, va renforcer la solidarité franco-britannique, et aura pour conséquence de nourrir des sentiments anti-français à Nicosie et à Athènes. L'expédition armée des Anglais et des Français à Suez s'est faite à partir des bases britanniques de Chypre. La Grèce va officiellement déclarer qu'elle demeure "neutre" dans le conflit qui oppose l'Egypte à la France et la Grande-Bretagne. Et c'est au nom de cette neutralité qu'elle refuse le droit d'atterissage sur le sol héllénique des avions de ces deux pays se rendant à Chypre. L'Ambassadeur de France en Grèce, M. Pierre Charpentier déplore les fausses nouvelles "propagées par les missions arabes en Grèce avec des moyens financiers importants" et l'attitude de "la presse grecque emportée par son indignation contre les ennemis communs de Nasser et de la Grèce" [3].

En décembre 1958, peu avant la conclusion des accords de Zurich et de Londres , qui établissent l'indépendance de Chypre, la Grèce essuie un échec aux Nations Unies sur la question chypriote alors que la diplomatie grecque avait sollicité le soutien de la France. L'Ambassadeur de France en Grèce, M. Guy Girard de Charbonnières explique ainsi les raisons de cet échec:

"Me trouvant à Athènes en contact régulier avec les chefs de la diplomatie grecque et étant animé du plus grand désir d'aider mes interlocuteurs, j'étais dans l'incapacité de renseigner exactement le Département sur les projets ou intentions du gouvernement héllénique, les propos qui m'étaient tenus par les principaux membres de ce gouvernement se démentant les uns les autres et les communications qui m'étaient faites de la manière la plus officielle n'étant fréquemment suivies d'aucun effet.

Ce qui s'est passé à l'occasion du débat de l'ONU illustre singulièrement cette manière de procéder. Je rappelle que, convoqué spécialement par le premier ministre à la veille de ce débat, je fus chargé par lui de transmettre au général de Gaulle un message lui demandant de soutenir la thèse qui serait présentée à Manhattan par la délégation grecque, la suite que comporterait le vote d'une telle résolution étant également exposée. Or le texte déposé 48 heures plus tard par M. Averoff n'avait aucun rapport avec ce qui m'avait été ainsi solennellement déclaré. Hésitante, vélléitaire et même parfois contradictoire, telle a été la politique chypriote du gouvernement grec au cours des derniers mois. Il n'est donc pas étonnant qu'elle ait abouti à un échec" [4].

A en croire cet Ambassadeur, qui considère M. Averoff comme "un fort mauvais ministre des affaires étrangères" et souligne le fait que "M. Caramanlis n'a aucune expérience internationale", ce sont les erreurs de la diplomatie grecque

qui expliquent les revers des intérêts helléniques concernant l'île de Chypre. A vrai dire les représentants de la France, pays signataire du traité de Lausanne de 1923, qui établit le statut juridique de Chypre, déplorent de ne pas avoir été associés ou consultés lors des traités consacrant l'indépendance de ce pays. Ils seront ainsi très sceptiques sur la viabilité de la République de Chypre. M. Girard de Charbonnières, écrit au Département le 24 février 1959:

"Créer un Etat là où il n'y a pas de nation est à première vue une gageure. Lorsqu'on lit les accords de Londres, on ne peut être qu'épouvanté par toutes les clauses qui ont été imaginées pour entraver le jeu de la loi de la majorité. Le droit de veto reconnu à une minorité ne peut que fausser le mécanisme de toute institution humaine et paralyser son fonctionnement". [5]

Ainsi il est clair pour la France, au lendemain de l'indépendance de Chypre, que le maintien de la paix dans cet Etat commande une entente permanente de la Grèce et de la Turquie. Les autorités françaises pensent aussi que la Grèce avec la solution de la question de Chypre marquera désormais une certaine distance par rapport aux thèses des pays arabes à l'égard du problème algérien.

Dans la pratique la Grèce ne va pas abandonner ses amitiés arabes. Elle ne parviendra pas non plus, comme M. Averoff le suggère à la France, de s'inspirer du modèle chypriote pour résoudre le problème algérien [6]. Le fait est que le nouveau statut de Chypre, qui accorde des privilèges considérables à la minorité turque n'a pas été pris pour modèle lorsqu'en 1962 l'Algérie accède à l'indépendance, puisque la minorité française de ce pays, ne disposant pas de prérogatives propres, décide de s'établir en France.

II La France et la crise de 1964

Dès l'indépendance de Chypre, la France décide de reconnaître ce pays et d'ouvrir une ambassade à Nicosie. Le premier ambassadeur français est M. Louis Keller. Ce n'est qu'en avril 1969, quelques jours avant la démission du général de Gaulle, que la République de Chypre ouvre une ambassade à Paris en y nommant M. Modinos. Faute d'être directement informées par les représentants de Chypre, les autorités gouvernementales françaises prennent connaissance de la situation à Chypre, en dehors des communications de leur propre ambassadeur sur place, essentiellement à travers les informations qu'elles reçoivent des diplomates grecs et turcs en poste à Paris. On peut dire que les malentendus franco-chypriotes pendant la crise de 1964 s'expliquent notamment par les informations partielles ou partiales dont disposent les autorités françaises sur le problème de Chypre.

Le général de Gaulle, lorsqu'il revient au pouvoir en 1958, bénéficie en Grèce et à Chypre d'une image très favorable, celle du grand homme, chef de la France libre. Celui-ci noue des liens étroits avec le Premier ministre grec, M.

Caramanlis, qui conduisent celui-ci à détacher la diplomatie héllénique de l'emprise américaine pour l'orienter vers l'Europe communautaire. Lorsqu'éclate la crise de 1964, qui oppose la République de Chypre et la Grèce à la Turquie, l'opinion publique grecque et chypriote grecque croit fermement dans le soutien de la France. En effet, suite aux incidents armés qui opposent les deux communautés de Chypre fin décembre 1963 juste après l'annonce par Mgr Makarios de son intention de réviser la Constitution de l'Ile et face à la menace de l'intervention de l'armée turque, Londres et Washington proposent sans succès à Paris de participer à l'envoi à Chypre d'une force internationale des pays de l'OTAN. Dans sa réponse du 1er février 1964 le gouvernement français, pour justifier sa position indique que le gouvernement chypriote ne lui a pas demandé d'intervenir, que l'OTAN n'a pas de raisons valables d'intervenir à Chypre et rappelle que la France n'est pas partie aux accords de Zurich et de Londres. Le quotidien chypriote grec *Eleftheria*, dans son édition du 6 février, souligne que la France a non seulement repoussé la proposition anglo-américaine mais a aussi critiqué le régime de Zurich "imposé au peuple chypriote" et conclut que "cette décision est conforme aux grands principes de la Nation française et à ses traditions libérales qui, depuis le 18ème siècle constituent le fondement de la civilisation contemporaine".

Quelques semaines plus tard, le 4 mars, une résolution du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU décide notamment l'envoi à Chypre d'une force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix. Si cette résolution est adoptée à l'unanimité, le vote sur le paragraphe relatif à l'envoi de la force internationale est partagé puisque trois pays (France, URSS et Tchécoslovaquie) s'abstiennent. La réserve de la France sur ce texte s'explique par l'habituelle méfiance gaulliste à l'égard de l'action de l'ONU. Celle-ci est bien accueillie à Nicosie puisque Moscou, allié fidèle de Mgr Makarios prend une position analogue à celle de Paris. Les autorités chypriotes ont le sentiment que la France partage leur position sur l'impossibilité d'appliquer les accords de Zurich et de Londres puisque le 11 mars le porte parole du gouvernement français, M. Peyrefitte déclare à propos de Chypre: "Il n'y a qu'une solution, c'est de changer le statut". Les critiques de la presse turque à l'égard de la France pour sa position dans la crise chypriote renforcent l'impression à Athènes et à Nicosie que le gouvernement français soutient les vues de la Grèce et du gouvernement chypriote. Avec l'aggravation des événements à Chypre au cours du printemps et de l'été 1964 se précise la politique chypriote de la France qui, en réalité, est assez proche de celle de Washington [7] et est très éloignée des intérêts grecs et chypriotes grecs.

En apparence la France de de Gaulle, qui veut jouer un rôle dans le règlement de la question chypriote, apparaît comme impartiale et ne penche vers aucune des parties à ce problème. Le 20 juin 1964, le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU adopte une résolution qui prolonge le stationnement à Chypre de la Force des Nations Unies. Or, le représentant de la France, M. Seydoux, dans son interven-

tion du 19 juin, s'il félicite le Secrétaire général de l'ONU, n'hésite pas à dénoncer "les procédés inadmissibles qui consistent à prendre des otages et à les exécuter". Ainsi le délégué français, se faisant l'écho de certains organes de la presse internationale, accuse, sans les nommer, les Chypriotes grecs d'exactions à l'égard des Chypriotes turcs, en passant sous silence les provocations et les actions armées du contingent turc stationné à Chypre. A vrai dire, le gouvernement français considère Mgr Makarios comme le responsable de la crise de 1964.

Recevant à Paris, le 29 juin, le Premier ministre grec M. George Papandréou [8], le général de Gaulle, après lui avoir déclaré que le statut de Chypre est artificiel, s'exprime ainsi sur le déclenchement de la crise: "Dans cette affaire nous avons franchement l'impression, mais l'impression seulement, que le déclenchement de la crise est venu du gouvernement Makarios qui a voulu forcer les choses et créer ainsi un fait accompli pour en terminer avec la situation actuelle dans l'espoir d'en tirer parti. C'est ainsi, nous semble-t-il, que les choses ont commencé".

Deux jours plus tard le chef de l'Etat français reçoit à l'Elysée le Président du Conseil turc, M. Ismet Inonu [9]. Au cours de cet entretien, qualifié de très secret par les Archives du Quai d'Orsay, le général de Gaulle dévoile dans le détail les positions françaises sur la question chypriote, qui à l'évidence servent les intérêts d'Ankara. D'abord il constate que "Chypre n'existe pas en tant qu'Etat. Nous ne connaissons que la Turquie et la Grèce". Puis il observe qu'avec le statut de Chypre défini par les accords de Zurich et de Londres "Makarios a saisi l'occasion de devenir chef d'Etat" et pense, en réponse à une question du président Inonu, que "si le sentiment se répand que la Grèce et la Turquie sont résolus à rechercher ensemble une solution nouvelle tenant compte des droits des Grecs et des Turcs et mettant un terme au régime de Makarios, peut-être alors aura-t-on moins envie de se battre".

A vrai dire cette hostilité de de Gaulle à l'égard de Mgr Makarios s'explique par l'idée alors largement répandue que celui-ci va faire de Chypre un "Cuba de la Méditerranée". Tout en acceptant que l'URSS soit associée au règlement de la question chypriote, le Président français souligne devant le chef du gouvernement turc "le danger commun auquel nos pays sont exposés, je veux dire le danger que font peser sur eux les Soviets". La solution du problème de Chypre, selon la France, telle qu'elle résulte de l'entretien de de Gaulle - Inonu du 1er juillet 1964 est soit la séparation, résultant d'un partage de l'Ile, soit l'Enosis, c'est à dire l'annexion de Chypre par la Grèce, assorti d'un statut des Chypriotes turcs garanti par les grandes Puissances. De Gaulle ne cache pas sa préférence pour la première solution qui est la plus simple et "qui consisterait à séparer les Grecs et les Turcs, c'est à dire à instituer entre eux une frontière". Mais il reconnaît que cette solution que refuse la Grèce présente une difficulté

car M. Papandréou lui a fait observer "que la population turque est trop disséminée et que son regroupement n'irait pas sans de douloureuses épreuves pour les habitants eux-mêmes". M. Inonu, au contraire indique au Président français que la solution de la séparation est la seule acceptable par la Turquie. Il est possible de dire que le Président du Conseil turc retire de son entretien avec de Gaulle l'impression que la France n'est pas hostile pour ne pas dire favorable à la division de Chypre. De retour en Turquie, très habilement, il ne dément pas les articles de la presse turque [10] qui estiment que le point de vue français sur la question chypriote est éloigné de celui de la Turquie".

Au mois d'août 1964, sous prétexte d'incidents entre Chypriotes grecs et Chypriotes turcs, l'aviation turque va bombarder l'Ile de Chypre provoquant de nombreuses victimes et déclenchant une riposte de Mgr Makarios à l'égard des villages chypriotes turcs, qui sont alors soumis à un blocus économique. La désapprobation des bombardements commis par l'aviation turque ne sera que très faible de la part des pays occidentaux puisque l'aviation américaine agit pareillement au même moment dans le golfe du Tonkin contre des objectifs nord-vietnamiens. C'est, au contraire, l'attitude du gouvernement chypriote envers la communauté chypriote turque que condamne la presse internationale. Les multiples contacts de Nicosie avec Moscou et le Caire, tout au long du mois d'août renforcent aux yeux des diplomaties occidentales l'image négative de Mgr Makarios. Le Quai d'Orsay se rend compte aussi qu'Athènes soutient moins fermement Nicosie et prête une oreille attentive aux rumeurs que fait courir l'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne en France selon lesquelles "le gouvernement grec était en train d'acheter un certain nombre de députés chypriotes" [11].

La France, au cours de cette crise de l'été 1964, fait savoir le 18 août par une déclaration de M. Peyrefitte "qu'elle serait disposée à faciliter un accord entre la Grèce et la Turquie". Ainsi est confirmé le souhait de la France, exprimé par de Gaulle à MM. Papandréou et Inonu quelques semaines plus tôt, de pouvoir contribuer à rapprocher les Grecs et les Turcs au sujet de Chypre. Mais cette déclaration française n'aura aucune suite. La presse chypriote grecque dénonce l'attitude de Paris; le quotidien gouvernemental Phileleftheros titre ainsi un article de son édition du 17 septembre: "Eclaircissement total: la position française est défavorable à Chypre".

La Turquie, à la faveur des affrontements armés du mois d'août 1964, aura réussi un large regroupement de la communauté chypriote turque. Ainsi, la solution du partage de l'Ile, rendue jusque là difficile par la dispersion des Turcs sur le territoire chypriote constitue désormais une perspective réaliste aussi bien pour Ankara que pour les puissances occidentales. Pendant dix ans les relations franco-chypriotes vont connaître un certain refroidissement. Il faudra attendre l'été 1974, lors de l'invasion de Chypre par l'armée turque, qui entreprend de

compléter ses initiatives du mois d'août 1964, pour que les rapports de Paris avec Nicosie deviennent plus chaleureux. Le Président Giscard d'Estaing saura alors retisser les liens traditionnels de la France avec l'hellénisme chypriote.

NOTES

1. J. ATTALI, **Verbatim III, 1988-1991**, Paris, Fayard, 1995, p.137.

2. Annexe 1, S.D.E.C.E.(Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre Espionnage), **Bulletin de renseignements politiques** du 9 septembre 1955.

3. Dépêche du 10 novembre 1956, n° 1127/EU de M. Pierre Charpentier, ambassadeur de France en Grèce, Archives du Quai d'Orsay.

4. Dépêche du 11 décembre 1958, n° 691/EU de M. Guy Girard de Charbonnières, Ambassadeur de France en Grèce, Archives du Quai d'Orsay.

5. Dépêche du 24 février 1959, n° 143/EU de M. Guy Girard de Charbonnières, Ambassadeur de France en Grèce, Archives du Quai d'Orsay.

6. En visite à Rome, M. Averoff déclare à l'Ambassadeur de France en Italie, M. Gaston Palewski à propos du statut futur de l'Algérie: "Nous avons admis le principe d'une représentation de la minorité turque proportionnellement supérieure à son importance numérique ainsi que d'une intervention du gouvernement turc, soit concertée, soit unilatérale dans les affaires concernant cette minorité, et ceci peut constituer un précédent intéressant". Dépêche du 28 mai 1959, Archives du Quai d'Orsay.

7. Voir Annexe 2, Extrait de l'audience accordée par le général de Gaulle au Sous secrétaire d'Etat américain M. George Ball, le 9 juin 1994, Archives du Quai d'Orsay.

8. Voir Annexe 3

9. Voir Annexe 4

10. Le journal turc Hurriyet du 8 juillet 1964 rapporte ainsi ce qu'a dit M. Inonu pendant le débat à huis clos du Parlement au cours duquel il a exposé les résultats de sa tournée à Washington, Londres et Paris: "'Une phrase prononcée par le Président du Conseil au cours de son exposé a circulé hier dans les couloirs de l'Assemblée, la voici: "Au cours de ce voyage j'ai constaté que c'est le général de Gaulle qui est le plus éloigné de notre point de vue".

11. Lettre de M. Charles Lucet, Directeur des affaires politiques à M. Jacques Baeyens, Ambassadeur de France en Grèce, 25 août 1964, Archives du Quai d'Orsay.

La France et la question chypriote

Annexe 1

Extraits du Bulletin de renseignements politiques du 9 septembre 1955.
S.D.E.C.E.(Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre Espionnage)
Archives du Quai d'Orsay

Les syndicats

(...) En prenant position contre l'action de l'EOKA les syndicats communistes répondent au sentiment intime des travailleurs chypriotes, qui "ne veulent pas d'histoires" avec les représentants de la Couronne.

Il en est tout autrement avec les syndicats de PISSAS. Ce dernier, intelligent, courageux, bon orateur populaire, au style direct est un agitateur né. Avec une subvention de 500 livres sterling par mois il parvient à entretenir toute une organisation qui, si elle manque de bases vraiment populaires, se révèle très active.

Foncièrement anti-communiste, PISSAS est vraisemblablement un agent américain. Il est en contact étroit avec des dirigeants, de l'A.F.L. et a été élu membre du comité directeur du mouvement syndical libre, lors du dernier congrés de Vienne.

Nationaliste, il n'est pourtant pas attaché à l'Ethnarchie et se trouve souvent en conflit avec Makarios. Par contre, il est en étroit contact avec MAKRIS de la CGT grecque, qui est son ami personnel.

De toute façon, PISSAS doit être considéré comme l'un des plus actifs agents américains à Chypre, et comme un agitateur remarquable.

Les communistes chypriotes

Il est assez difficile de préciser la fraction purement communiste des masses qui suivent l'AKEL. Du fait de l'absence de vie politique, cette organisation groupe pratiquement tous ceux qui, libéraux, démocrates et anticléricaux, ne sont pas d'accord avec la politique suivie par l'Ethnarchie. Normalement les forces de l'AKEL devraient se partager en forces centristes, progressistes et purement communistes. Ces dernières ne semblent pas dépasser 10 % des effectifs de l'AKEL. Il n'en demeure pas moins que ce sont les communistes qui contrôlent entièrement cette organisation, qui se présente, tout comme l'EDA en Grèce, comme un Front démocratique.

L'objectif n°1 de l'AKEL est de former un vaste front national avec l'Ethnarchie. Mais le veto formel opposé par les Américains a jusqu'ici empêché tout rassemblement dans ce sens. Les dirigeants de l'AKEL ne manquent donc pas de présenter Mgr Makarios comme un agent de "l'impérialisme américain", et le leader syndicaliste Pissas, comme un agent du FBI. Ce qui pourrait d'ailleurs être assez exact. Les nationalistes à leur tour ont beau jeu de dire que l'AKEL obéit aux directives des Britanniques, ce qui n'est peut-être pas plus faux.

Cependant, ce qui porte surtout à réflexion en ce qui concerne l'AKEL, ce sont ses dirigeants. En effet, l'ancien secrétaire général de l'AKEL, Phiphis Joannou, instituteur à Paphos et marxiste doctrinaire s'est vu éloigner de son poste par les autorités britanniques. Dynamique, intelligent, il s'était révélé peu souple et peu disposé à écouter les directives. Il perdit son poste d'instituteur, et se heurta à un boycottage bien organisé, qui le laissa sans travail et sans ressources. Entre temps, il avait été chassé du parti communiste chypriote, car il avait pris publiquement position en faveur de la Constitution, ce qui est contraire à la ligne officielle de l'AKEL. Sans ressources il fut peu à peu travaillé par les services britanniques, qui le récupérèrent et lui confièrent la direction politique du journal "Phos", organe pro-constitutionnaliste. Devenu agent des Britanniques, Joannou est en contact quotidien avec leurs services.

A sa place fut installé Esaie Papaioannou. Le nouveau secrétaire général de l'AKEL est un communiste anglais, venu de Londres où il était bien connu pour ses attaches avec la police. Chauffeur de taxi, il avait une activité assez suspecte, et appartenait plutôt au milieu londonien. Peu instruit, sans caractère, il est complètement tenu par les services britanniques. (La Sûreté grecque posséderait un dossier complet sur les activités de Papaioannou à Londres).

Avec un tel secrétaire général, et des cadres dont la plupart sont connus pour leurs attaches avec les services du gouvernement il est normal de voir les autorités sourire quand on leur parle du danger communiste. Il semble évident que la seule chose dont les Anglais n'ont rien à redouter est l'AKEL, et plus spécialement les dirigeants communistes.

Annexe 2

Extrait de l'audience accordée par le général de Gaulle à monsieur George Ball

Le 9 juin 1964

Archives Quai d'Orsay

M. George BALL tient à informer, à titre strictement confidentiel, le général de Gaulle de renseignements que le gouvernement américain a reçus la nuit dernière au sujet de la situation à Chypre.

Selon les informations des services de renseignements américains, le gouvernement turc se préparerait à opérer une intervention militaire à Chypre. Les Cypriotes turcs auraient reçu instructions d'attaquer les Cypriotes grecs et simultanément la marine turque interviendrait. L'intention du Gouvernement turc étant de créer une situation de facto devant laquelle seraient placés les alliés de la Grèce et de la Turquie. M. BALL indique que l'Ambassadeur américain à Ankara a reçu instructions hier d'intervenir immédiatement auprès du gouvernement turc en lui indiquant qu'une action de ce genre serait contraire aux engagements pris par le gouvernement turc au sujet de la situation à Chypre. L'Ambassadeur américain a vu le Premier Ministre turc qui lui a indiqué que la décision était prise et qu'il entrait en Conseil des Ministres pour faire approuver cette décision. A la demande de l'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, le Premier ministre turc a accepté de retarder de quelques heures cette action. A la suite de cette démarche, le Président JOHNSON a envoyé à M. INONU un premier message suivi d'une longue lettre rédigée sur un ton très ferme dans laquelle le Président des Etats-Unis rappelait au Président turc qu'une intervention militaire violerait les accords pris par la Turquie en ce qui concerne Chypre, violerait les principes des Nations Unies et les obligations de la Turquie en tant que membre de l'OTAN. Une telle intervention entraînerait inévitablement une réponse militaire du gouvernement grec pouvant amener une guerre avec toutes les possibilités d'escalation "dont ne manquerait pas de profiter le gouvernement soviétique". Le gouvernement américain a rappelé au gouvernement turc que si une réaction soviétique résultait de cette intervention militaire turque à Chypre, cela poserait des problèmes sérieux aux alliés de la Turquie, qui ne sauraient se laisser entraîner. M. George BALL pense qu'à l'heure actuelle, la situation a été reprise en main. Il pense qu'il y a dans la position du gouvernement turc un certain bluff qui avait pour but de forcer la main aux Etats-Unis et d'amener le gouvernement américain à prendre une position plus favorable au gouvernement turc dans l'affaire cypriote. M. George BALL estime que l'incident est clos pour le moment. Il demande toutefois que le secret le plus absolu soit gardé sur cette affaire, si des indiscrétions se produisaient elles mettraient le gouvernement turc dans une situation très difficile.

Le général de GAULLE remercie M. BALL de ces indications. Il pense que si les Turcs voulaient vraiment faire une intervention militaire à Chypre, il leur aurait été difficile de le dissimuler. En ce qui concerne l'avenir de Chypre, le général de Gaulle ne pense pas que le système actuel, qui a été créé par Mgr MAKARIOS et par les Britanniques soit viable. Il n'est pas possible de faire un gouvernement et un peuple avec des Grecs et des Turcs. Il y a une Grèce, il y a un peuple grec. Il y a une Turquie, il y a un peuple turc. On peut certes les maintenir en paix chacun derrière une frontière. Mais il n'est pas possible de les fusionner et d'en faire un peuple dirigé par un gouvernement.

M. George BALL partage les vues du général de Gaulle sur l'avenir de

Chypre. Il a passé récemment trois jours dans cette île. Il a vu Mgr MAKARIOS. Il pense que la solution actuelle ne peut pas marcher. Il n'est pas possible d'arriver à un Etat unitaire.

Annexe 3

Entretien du général de Gaulle et de M. Papandreou

Le 29 Juin 1964, de 16 h à 16 h 50

Archives du Quai d'Orsay

Le Président du Conseil grec fait un long exposé au général de Gaulle de l'affaire chypriote qu'il considère pour sa part comme inquiétante et dangereuse. M. Papandreou se déclare heureux de l'occasion qui lui est offerte d'exposer au général de Gaulle ses préoccupations et de faire appel à sa haute autorité dans la recherche de la solution à apporter à ce problème particulièrement délicat.

Le Premier ministre grec passe ensuite en revue et expose au général de Gaulle les trois solutions proposées jusqu'à présent pour résoudre la crise chypriote:

1°/ Le maintien du statu quo

M. Papandreou indique au général de Gaulle que le statut actuel tel qu'il résulte des accords de Zurich et de Londres n'est pas viable. Il estime qu'à notre époque de démocratie on ne peut maintenir une situation contraire aux principes de la démocratie et de notre civilisation qui reposent sur l'exercice du gouvernement par la majorité, quoique dans le respect des droits des minorités. Or, il est anormal, que sur une Ile où vivent deux communautés (82 % de Grecs et 18 % de Turcs), la communauté minoritaire puisse bloquer le système. Le Premier ministre grec se réfère notamment au droit de veto reconnu au Vice-Président chypriote turc dans certains domaines.

2°/ La partition

M. Papandreou indique au général de Gaulle que Chypre est une Ile grecque, avec une population en majorité grecque. Le gouvernement grec ne peut accepter le partage de l'Ile qui conduirait fatalement à une guerre civile chronique.

3°/ L'autodétermination

Le Président du Conseil grec pense que l'autodétermination est la seule solution possible. Il croit, quant à lui, qu'elle débouchera très probablement sur l'ENOSIS (Union avec la Grèce) car tel est, dans l'ensemble, le voeu des Chypriotes grecs.

M. Papandreou estime qu'il est de l'intérêt non seulement de la Grèce et de la Turquie, mais du monde libre de favoriser un tel dénouement sur le rattachement de Chypre à la Grèce car il stopperait la communisation de la population grecque de l'Ile qui compte actuellement 33 % de communistes. D'autre part, la présence de la Grèce à Chypre constituerait pour la Turquie un gage de sécurité que ne lui offre pas l'état actuel des choses puisque aussi bien le gouvernement chypriote pourrait être amené à demander de l'aide là où il espère en trouver, c'est à dire chez les Soviétiques, et que M. Khroutchev paraît disposé à répondre favorablement à une telle demande.

Le Premier ministre grec examine ensuite, dans le cadre de l'autodétermination, les garanties à accorder à la minorité turque. Il se déclare prêt à étudier ce problème. Il précise que dans quelques jours le médiateur de l'ONU s'installera à Genève où le gouvernement grec s'emploiera à garder le contact avec toutes les parties intéressées.

M. Papandreou exclut l'éventualité d'une cession aux Turcs d'une Île grecque à titre de compensation. Il indique au général de Gaulle qu'en tout état de cause aucun gouvernement grec ne pourrait envisager une telle éventualité, car ainsi qu'il l'a souligné au médiateur des Nations Unies, M. Tuomioja, si l'on peut convaincre les habitants d'une Ile, on ne peut en revanche, convaincre "la terre" de cette Ile. M. Papandréou ne comprend d'ailleurs pas pourquoi les Turcs réclameraient des compensations. La Grèce n'a rien à donner parce qu'elle n'a rien demandé. Ce sont les Chypriotes qui souhaitent l'application du principe d'autodétermination.

Le Premier ministre grec informe le général de Gaulle qu'il s'est entretenu de la situation avec le Président Johnson. Celui-ci a témoigné de l'intérêt et de la compréhension pour les idées développées par M. Papandreou. En concluant son exposé le Premier ministre grec en appelle à nouveau à la haute autorité du Général de Gaulle qu'il prie, de vouloir bien faire, dans la forme qu'il estimera opportune, toutes propositions susceptibles de contribuer à la solution recherchée. Il en exprime par avance au Chef de l'Etat sa reconnaissance et sa gratitude.

Le général de Gaulle remercie M. Papandreou pour l'exposé clair et précis qu'il lui a fait. "Vous savez, Monsieur le Premier ministre, que nous aimons la Grèce et que nous sommes attachés à votre pays. Vous savez également que nous avons de confiantes relations avec nos amis les Turcs. Aussi, il nous paraît nécessaire de distinguer les deux aspects du problème, je veux dire celui de la paix et celui des solutions. Il nous semble que, pour le moment, ce qui importe avant tout c'est de maintenir la paix et pour cela d'éviter tout ce qui pourrait envenimer les choses et alourdir le climat. Je pense, comme vous, que pour remplir cette période, il est bon de maintenir les contacts entre parties intéressées et que la présence du médiateur de l'ONU à Genève peut en offrir

l'occasion. Je crois, en revanche, que le moment et les circonstances ne se prêtent pas encore à une rencontre de vous-même avec M. Inonu."

Le général de Gaulle en vient alors au second aspect: les solutions possibles. "Vous m'avez demandé, Monsieur le Premier ministre, de faire des propositions sur Chypre. Je crois que cette question ne sera jamais résolue à la satisfaction de tout le monde. Le statut actuel de Chypre, nous ne l'avons jamais approuvé, il est artificiel. Les Anglais ont essayé de faire quelque chose avec la Turquie, la Grèce et Mgr Makarios. Mais cet état de choses ne peut durer et il apparaît impossible de le réinstaller. Il n'est pas moins vrai qu'à Chypre il y a le peuple grec de toujours et un peuple turc de toujours. Chypre pour nous n'existe pas, c'est un édifice artificiel. Or je ne crois pas qu'on puisse, en mélangeant Grecs et Turcs, parvenir à un accord durable entre ces deux éléments, car il est à présumer que les Turcs n'accepteront pas la souveraineté de la Grèce. La séparation serait semble-t-il, la solution la plus logique. Croyez-vous qu'elle soit impossible?"

M. Papandreou répond: "Cette solution ne sera jamais possible, c'est mon opinion".

Le général de Gaulle en vient aux garanties internationales à obtenir en faveur de la minorité turque: "Vous avez évoqué, Monsieur le Premier ministre, les garanties internationales. C'est important, car cela permet de vivre et c'est l'essentiel surtout en Orient où les solutions ne sont jamais définitives (Macédoine, Constantinople). Aussi, l'avenir est-il peut être dans une formule comportant la souveraineté de la Grèce sur l'Ile de Chypre, où les Turcs resteraient Turcs avec leurs lois et leurs droits".

M. Papandreou se déclare favorable à des garanties.

Le général de Gaulle doute, quant à lui, que les Turcs puissent accepter que le référendum soit appliqué à Chypre à la fraction turque de la population. "Il vaudrait mieux, Monsieur le Premier ministre, étant donné cet état de choses, chercher une solution dans une direction différente. Celle-ci conduirait peut être à la souveraineté de la Grèce, avec, pour la minorité, des garanties internationales".

M. Papandreou déclare, à nouveau, accepter l'idée des garanties.

Le général de Gaulle explique ensuite au Premier Ministre grec que "nous n'aimons pas le contrôle effectif de l'ONU. L'ONU est une Assemblé utile car on peut y débattre de certains problèmes importants, s'y rencontrer et cela est bon. Mais dès lors que cette Organisation prétend devenir un élément d'action et d'intervention directes, elle nous parait inadéquate. Dans le cas qui nous préoccupe et compte tenu de l'expérience, le contrôle organique de l'ONU ne serait dans l'intérêt de personne. Pourquoi un système classique de garanties assurées par certaines puissances ne serait-il pas envisagé? On pourrait y

associer l'URSS. Ce serait un moyen de neutraliser son action. C'est ainsi que ces garanties pourraient être placées sous le contrôle des Etats-Unis, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'URSS. Elles n'impliqueraient pas la présence des troupes sur l'Ile, il s'agirait d'un contrôle diplomatique. Bien entendu on n'en est pas encore là. Pour l'heure c'est surtout le maintien de la paix qu'il importe de réaliser.

M. Papandreou assure le général de Gaulle que telle est bien son intention et qu'il a conscience des devoirs qui lui incombent à ce sujet. Il ajoute que pas plus tard qu'hier il a envoyé un télégramme à Mgr Makarios lui demandant de collaborer avec la force internationale de l'ONU pour le maintien de l'ordre.

Le général de Gaulle indique au le Premier ministre grec qu'il verra le Président Inonu et qu'il s'adressera à lui dans les mêmes termes pour ce qui est de la paix. Puis répondant à la demande de M. Papandreou concernant d'éventuelles propositions françaises, le Chef de l'Etat indique: "La France serait disposée à aider à la recherche d'une solution. Je veux bien , le moment venu, lancer quelques idées dans le sens que je vous ai dit, à savoir, souveraineté de la Grèce avec établissement et maintien par les puissances de garanties accordées par les Turcs, lesquels auraient leurs lois et leurs droits". Puis le Chef de l'Etat montre au Premier ministre une carte de Chypre avec la répartition des populations. "On m'a donné une carte de Chypre sur laquelle je le constate, les Turcs sont très dispersés. Cette dispersion rend les garanties et leur contrôle peu aisés. N'y aurait-il pas moyen de prévoir un regroupement de ces Turcs? Ce regroupement offrirait une certaine sécurité et une certaine tranquillité".

Le général de Gaulle fait part ensuite à M. Papandreou de son sentiment sur le déclenchement de la crise. "Dans cette affaire, nous avons franchement l'impression, mais l'impression seulement, que le déclenchement de la crise est venu du gouvernement Makarios, qui a voulu forcer les choses et créer ainsi un fait accompli pour en terminer avec la situation actuelle dans l'espoir d'en tirer parti. C'est ainsi, nous semble-t-il que les choses ont commencé. Vous savez aussi bien que moi que la situation en Turquie est très difficile. Vous n'avez pas intérêt à ce qu'une crise grave éclate au dedans ou au dehors de la Turquie. Il faut, vous le comprenez, je le sais, les traiter avec ménagement.

Le général de Gaulle demande alors à M.Papandreou ce qu'il pense des bases britanniques.

M. Papandreou considère que ces bases doivent devenir des bases de l'OTAN. Il ne voit pas pourquoi il y aurait des bases individuelles. "C'est, précise-t-il, le passé".

Annexe 4

Entretien entre le général de Gaulle et le président Inonu. 1er Juillet 1964.

Archives du Quai d'Orsay. Très secret.

Le général de Gaulle: Je suis très heureux et très honoré de vous recevoir. Je sais quels sont vos soucis en ce qui concerne la situation à Chypre. Je me félicite d'avoir cette occasion de vous entendre à ce sujet.

Le Président Inonu: Les difficultés remontent aux derniers jours de l'année passée, plus précisément au 25 décembre 1963. Le traité de garantie qui porte la signature de la Grande-Bretagne, de la Turquie et de la Grèce prévoit qu'en cas de violation de statut de Chypre les pays garants se consultent en vue d'une action commune. Le traité stipule d'autre part qu'à défaut d'accord entre les puissances garantes, l'intervention de chaque puissance est autorisée.

Au lendemain du 25 décembre, les communautés grecque et turque de l'Ile s'étant violemment affrontées, l'immeuble de l'ambassade turque et la résidence du vice-président turc ayant été mitraillée, mes compatriotes ont eu le sentiment que leur sécurité n'était plus assurée. Ils ont fait appel à notre protection. Nous avons tenté, conformément au traité, de provoquer une action commune. Après s'être d'abord dérobés, nos partenaires se sont résignés lorsqu'ils ont vu que nous étions décidés à agir seuls en dernier ressort.

C'est ainsi qu'un commandement unique a été établi et qui a été confié à un Général Britannique. Celui-ci avait sous ses ordres des contingents turcs, grecs et anglais. Dès le premier jour nous avons donc mis la recherche de la paix et de la sécurité au premier plan de nos préoccupations. Pour ce qui est des Chypriotes, ils n'ont jamais cessé de prétendre que la Constitution était inapplicable et qu'il fallait la considérer comme le legs provisoire de l'ère coloniale. En revanche nous avons toujours affirmé que le statut ne pouvait être modifié que par accord entre les parties signataires.

Les gouvernements d'Athènes et de Nicosie voudraient à présent que les Nations Unies se prononcent sur l'incompatibilité qui, selon eux, existerait entre les accords de 1959 et de 1960 et les dispositions de la Charte. Pour nous cette controverse est sans objet puisque ces accords ont été enregistrés par les Nations Unies.

Depuis le mois de décembre les combats n'ont jamais cessé à Chypre. Après l'échec de la Conférence de Londres, les Américains agissant d'accord avec les Britanniques ont mis en avant un projet qui aurait consisté à faire tenir la police dans l'île par un contingent international formé de troupes de l'OTAN. Cette initiative s'est heurtée au refus de Mgr Makarios qui souhaitait porter l'affaire devant l'ONU.

Nous avons cru alors que le moment était venu pour nous d'intervenir directement. Les Américains nous ont prié instamment de n'en rien faire. C'est ainsi que l'on s'est acheminé vers la réunion, le 4 mars, du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Au sein de ce Conseil, des discussions se sont instituées entre la Turquie d'une part et la Grèce d'autre part au sujet de la validité du traité et de l'incompatibilité. La question n'a pas été tranchée explicitement, mais la délégation turque a saisi cette occasion de prendre une position de principe très ferme quant au fait que le Conseil de Sécurité n'avait pas qualité pour modifier les traités existants. C'est là un point de principe auquel nous attachons une grande importance.

La mise sur pied de contingent des Nations Unies s'est avérée laborieuse. Entre temps, les atrocités se poursuivaient à Chypre, les paysans turcs étaient massacrés par les Grecs et leurs villages rasés. Une fois de plus nous avons cru le moment venu d'assurer nous-mêmes la protection de nos compatriotes, mais une fois encore nous avons renoncé à intervenir à la suite de démarches très pressantes de nos Alliés.

Depuis le 27 mars le commandement des Nations Unies est établi à Chypre. Il considère que son rôle consiste à rétablir l'ordre et la sécurité en collaboration avec Mgr Makarios, mais nous avons la conviction que ce dernier, comme le gouvernement grec, a l'arrière pensée d'exterminer la communauté turque de Chypre. Il veut de notre part une reddition sans conditions.

Cependant les Etats-Unis nous conjurent de rester l'arme au pied. Je reviens de Washington où j'ai trouvé un accueil cordial. Le gouvernement des Etats - Unis a reconnu qu'il était normalement obligé de s'intéresser à l'affaire de Chypre.

Nous sommes d'accord pour participer à la recherche d'une solution. Le gouvernement américain ne nous a saisis d'aucun projet de règlement. Il dit n'avoir rien à proposer mais souhaite voir s'établir un dialogue entre la Grèce et la Turquie en présence d'un homme d'Etat américain.

En quittant Washington je me suis rendu à Londres. Des journalistes anglais ont émis l'idée qu'une compensation pourrait nous être offerte hors de Chypre. J'ai écarté cette suggestion. Au bout du compte nous pensons que le statut établi doit être respecté. On peut sans doute l'aménager, mais à la condition que l'on commence par reconnaître la validité des traités. On a établi par traité un certain ordre de choses. A présent on déclare que cet ordre de choses n'est pas viable. En fait, dès le début, on a tout fait pour essayer de se soustraire à l'application des traités. Il faut cependant partir de cette constatation que la République de Chypre est composée de communautés entremêlées. Cette situation nous avait d'abord incités à proposer comme solution un système fédératif. Les Grecs s'y sont opposés en arguant qu'un tel système conduisait au partage. Pour ce qui nous concerne nous sommes disposés à accepter l'une ou l'autre de ces formules, soit la partition, soit l'Etat fédératif.

A présent nous faisons appel à la France. Nous vous demandons Monsieur le Président d'user de votre autorité pour orienter toutes les parties en cause dans la voie d'un rapprochement. La situation est tragique car la communauté turque de Chypre est aujourd'hui exposée à l'extermination sous les yeux des alliés de la Turquie.

Le général de Gaulle: Je vous ai écouté et je vous ai bien compris. Je connaissais d'ailleurs votre point de vue. Si j'étais à votre place je n'aurais pas dit autre chose que ce que vous avez dit, mais je ne parle ni au nom de la Turquie, ni au nom de la Grèce, je parle au nom de la France.

Quand nous considérons votre problème nous faisons, bien entendu la part des sentiments: je veux dire de la considération et de l'amitié qu'aujourd'hui comme hier nous portons à votre pays. Ceci dit, notre conviction profonde est qu'en présence du danger commun auquel nos pays sont exposés, je veux dire le danger que font peser sur eux les Soviets, la solidarité entre alliés est un devoir impérieux. Nous sommes vos amis mais nous sommes aussi depuis toujours amis des Grecs. Notre souhait aujourd'hui, et peut être demain notre politique est que vous ne vous battiez pas entre vous. Une lutte entre la Turquie et la Grèce serait un désastre.

Quant à la question de Chypre elle-même, nous procédons dans notre façon de voir, de l'idée que Chypre n'existe pas en tant qu'Etat. Nous ne connaissons que la Turquie et la Grèce. Sans doute avez-vous conclu des accords au sujet de Chypre, mais à cette époque, vous ne nous avez pas consultés; les Grecs non plus d'ailleurs, et les Anglais moins encore. Nous ne croyons pas que ces accords puissent servir de base à une solution. Le système qu'ils ont institué avait en fait été imaginé par les Anglais pour mettre un terme à l'insurrection et demeurer à Chypre. Vous avez cru trouver dans ce système une garantie; Makarios a saisi l'occasion de devenir Chef d'Etat. Mais en fait cette solution était aritificielle.

Ce qu'il faut d'abord, c'est que les Turcs et les Grecs ne se battent pas. A cet égard je suis d'accord avec le Président Johnson. Je l'ai d'ailleurs dit à M. Papandreou. Je lui ai dit que sa responsabilité propre comme votre responsabilité propre est de faire en sorte qu'il n'y ait pas de guerre. Il faut que du côté turc et du côté grec on décide de renoncer à la force et il faut aussi qu'on le proclame publiquement. Je dis bien du côté turc et du côté grec. Je ne parle pas de Makarios.

Bien entendu, il faudra trouver une solution; mais si l'on ne se bat pas, il ne sera pas nécessaire de se presser outre mesure. Pour ce qui nous concerne, nous ne pensons pas que l'ONU puisse concourir utilement à la recherche d'un règlement. Nous pensons, en revanche, que la meilleure méthode pour élaborer une solution et, plus tard, pour en contrôler l'application, consiste à recourir, selon le système classique aux bons offices des Puissances: l'Angleterre, la France,

l'Amérique, la Russie et, bien entendu, la Grèce et la Turquie. Il serait vain et fâcheux de vouloir mêler d'autres pays à l'affaire. L'Inde, par exemple, ou l'Irlande ou la Yougoslavie de Tito. Les Américains sont toujours séduits par cette façon de faire mais elle n'a jamais donné de bons résultats. On le voit bien au Congo.

Quant à la solution elle-même, rien n'a été arrêté dans mon esprit et rien d'ailleurs ne pouvait l'être avant que nous ayons eu cette conversation. Je vais y réfléchir. En tout cas je vous répète que nous ne sommes pas en faveur du statut actuel: on ne peut pas faire un seul Etat ou un seul peuple avec les Grecs et les Turcs. Le problème consiste en réalité à faire vivre à Chypre, ensemble et sans qu'ils se battent, des Grecs et des Turcs. A cet égard, en théorie, deux possibilités sont concevables:

- Une solution simple, je dirai presque simpliste, consisterait à séparer les Grecs et les Turcs, c'est à dire à instituer entre eux une frontière. Toutefois, je me demande, compte tenu de la dispersion actuelle de la population turque et des difficultés qu'il y aurait à regrouper et à cantonner ces éléments épars, si ce projet s'avérerait praticable.

- Une deuxième hypothèse est, à première vue, théoriquement concevable. Dans cette hypothèse les Turcs demeureraient à Chypre. Ils conserveraient le droit d'être Turcs et tous les droits qui découleraient de cette qualité dans l'ordre législatif, administratif et religieux. Leurs droits seraient formellement garantis et cette garantie serait placée sous la sauvegarde des Puissances. Celles-ci exerceraient leur contrôle sur place sans toutefois tenir garnison dans l'Ile. Le cas échéant, les Puissances interviendraient auprès de la Grèce et de la Turquie pour faire respecter le traité de garantie.

Si cette formule devait être écartée il n'y aurait guère d'alternative que la séparation ou la guerre. Mais faire la guerre serait bien excessif. Je ne crois guère non plus à la possibilité pratique de transférer les Turcs hors de l'Ile.

Je vous ai dit ce que, pour le moment et sous réserve d'une réflexion plus approfondie, nous avons dans l'esprit. Mais encore une fois, l'essentiel est le maintien de la paix. Voilà ce qui engage d'abord la responsabilité de la Grèce et de la Turquie. Ensuite il faudra considérer la question à loisir et associer à cette étude les Puissances intéressées, c'est à dire celles qui ont des responsabilités et des moyens. Je crois que vous avez bien fait et M. Papandreou aussi d'avoir éludé une conversation à deux sur ce sujet. Vous n'auriez sans doute pu que constater votre désaccord.

M. Inonu: Dans la deuxième formule que vous avez évoquée, celle aux termes de laquelle les populations turques demeureraient éparses dans l'Ile et verraient leurs droits garantis par les grandes Puissances, y compris la Russie, quel serait le statut de l'ensemble de l'Ile? Serait-elle annexée par la Grèce?

Le général de Gaulle: Le choix est entre l'annexion ou la séparation.

M. Inonu: J'ai le sentiment que vous ne croyez guère à la séparation, c'est à dire au partage. Vous admettez cependant que cette éventualité serait mise à l'étude.

Le général de Gaulle: Oui.

M. Inonu: Dans l'autre formule, l'Ile deviendrait grecque?

Le général de Gaulle: Oui mais moyennant les conditions que je vous ai exposées.

M. Inonu: Il y aurait donc une minorité turque dans une Ile annexée par la Grèce, cette minorité étant placée sous la garantie des grandes Puissances. En fait c'est là le plan de Makarios à ceci près que les grandes Puissances se substitueraient à l'ONU.

Le général de Gaulle: La différence est considérable. Une garantie de l'ONU ne vaut rien. Il n'en serait pas de même d'une garantie des Puissances.

M. Inonu: Aujourd'hui l'ONU est représentée à Chypre. Or les Grecs continuent d'exterminer les Turcs. Il en ira de même avec les Puissances. Je pense en revanche que la séparation physique des deux communautés n'est pas une formule inapplicable, il faut l'étudier.

Le général de Gaulle: M. Papandreou ne croit pas à cette solution. Il fait valoir que l'établissement d'une frontière exacerberait les sentiments des deux communautés. Selon lui ce serait faire le jeu des extrémistes de part et d'autre et ouvrir la voie à l'intervention des Soviets. D'autre part il observe que la population turque est trop disséminée et que son regroupement n'irait pas sans de douloureuses épreuves pour les habitants eux-mêmes. Toutefois je tiens à souligner que je ne prends pas ces objections à mon compte et que rien n'est arrêté dans mon esprit.

M. Inonu: Nous ne pouvons nous rallier à cette formule. Après nos épreuves, nos souffrances et nos deuils nous ne pouvons pas admettre d'autre solution que la séparation. Au début cette séparation sera dure. Mais le temps fera son oeuvre et l'on s'habituera à la nouvelle situtation territoriale. Il y aura un jour une frontière de plus entre la Grèce et la Turquie dont le respect engagera la responsabilité des deux Etats.

Le général de Gaulle: Je n'ai pas exclu la formule de la séparation.

M. Inonu: Cette solution ouvrirait de larges possibilités.

Le général de Gaulle: Ce qui est clair dans mon esprit c'est qu'il n'est pas possible de faire revivre le statut, cette solution artificielle imaginée par les Anglais n'a pas d'avenir. Quant aux Nations Unies, on ne les maintiendra pas indéfiniment à Chypre. Les ressources de l'Organisation n'y suffiraient pas. D'ailleurs si aujourd'hui les Américains ont la haute main sur l'ONU qui sait

s'il en sera toujours de même? La solution du problème ne repose donc pas sur l'intervention de l'ONU. Une fois encore l'essentiel est de sauver la paix. Si la paix est assurée, le temps nous appartient. Voilà votre responsabilité et celle de Papandreou.

M. Inonu: Comment notre responsabilité est-elle engagée à cet égard?

Le général de Gaulle: Sans doute la responsabilité initiale dans cette affaire ne vous appartient-elle pas. Mais si aujourd'hui vous proclamez à la face du monde que vos troupes vont débarquer à Chypre, comment pourrait-on dire que vous agissez en faveur de la paix?

M. Inonu: Mais comment arrêter les massacres en cours?

Le général de Gaulle: Si le sentiment se répand que la Grèce et la Turquie sont résolues à rechercher ensemble une solution nouvelle tenant compte des droits des Grecs et des Turcs et mettant un terme au régime de Makarios, peut-être alors aura-t-on moins envie de se battre. Je reconnais cependant qu'il ne vous est peut-être pas facile de dire ces choses. Peut-être en est-il de même pour les Anglais ou les Américains. Mais peut-être nous autres Français nous pouvons dire ces choses. Je veux dire proclamer qu'il faut en premier lieu consolider la paix et en second lieu rechercher une solution telle que les Grecs de Chypre demeurent des Grecs et que les Turcs demeurent des Turcs.

M. Inonu: Cela veut dire en fait la séparation.

Le général de Gaulle: Je n'en suis pas sûr. En tout cas cela est à voir.

M. Inonu: La solution de la séparation est la plus sûre et la plus simple.

Le général de Gaulle: M. Papandreou est d'un autre avis; mais à première vue, je n'exclus pas cette possibilité.

M. Inonu: Aucune solution pratique n'est possible si ce n'est celle-là.

Le général de Gaulle: Il y a aussi l'éventualité de la guerre.

M. Inonu: Il n'y aura pas de guerre si les Grecs renoncent à la violence. Quelle sera demain l'attitude de la France?

Le général de Gaulle: Nous pouvons suggérer une réunion des Puissances. Nous ne pouvons pas prendre à notre seul compte la responsabilité de la situation à Chypre. Personne d'ailleurs ne le pourrait.

M. Inonu: Si personne ne peut intervenir et si les atrocités continuent, alors on aura la guerre.

Le général de Gaulle: Oui et seuls les Soviets y trouveront avantage.

M. Inonu: Envisagez-vous de faire une proposition?

Le général de Gaulle: Oui, j'attendais de vous avoir vu. J'ai vu M. Papandreou, le Président Johnson m'a écrit ; il me demande de lui dire ce qui, à

mon avis peut être fait. Le moment viendra donc où nous aurons à dire ce qu'il nous en semble M. Inonu: Mais en attendant, le règne de la violence continue. La Grèce ne cesse d'intervenir et de se renforcer à Chypre.

Le général de Gaulle: La Grèce pense qu'en définitive Chypre doit lui revenir. Quant à vous vous pensez que les Turcs doivent rester des Turcs. Je ne m'attendais pas à vous entendre tenir un autre langage. J'ai noté ce que vous m'avez dit. Je vous ai dit ce que nous avons aujourd'hui dans l'esprit: d'abord la paix puis la recherche d'une solution par l'entremise des Puissances sans recours à l'ONU et moyennant l'abolition du système actuel.

M. Inonu: Vous comptez proposer la réunion d'une conférence?

Le général de Gaulle: Oui

M. Inonu: Vous savez que la Russie a pris parti pour l'indépendance.

Le général de Gaulle: Oui, mais peut-être peut-on tirer parti de cette prise de position. En tout cas on ne peut trouver une solution internationale sans la Russie.

M. Inonu: Ce qui me réconforte c'est que vous admettez que la solution de la séparation mérite d'être étudiée.

Le général de Gaulle: Oui, c'est la solution la plus simple; elle ne me choque pas personnellement. Mais est-elle possible?

M. Inonu: L'annexion de Chypre à la Grèce assortie d'un système de garantie pour les Turcs n'est pas une formule qui conduise à la paix.

Le général de Gaulle: Pourtant il y a des Turcs en Grèce et des Grecs en Turquie?

M. Inonu: Oui, mais à Chypre la violence et les atrocités ont désormais interdit la cohabitation.

Le général de Gaulle: C'est pourquoi si une minorité turque doit être établie dans un territoire faisant partie de l'Etat il faudra assurer son sort par une garantie internationale.

M. Inonu: Si les Turcs demeurent éparpillés, de quelles garanties pourront-ils en fait se prévaloir à défaut de la nôtre? Dès à présent chaque Turc qui a participé à la résistance est recherché par les Grecs. Il en sera de même demain. Pas un seul Turc ne pourra plus vivre en tranquillité sous la souveraineté grecque. Cette formule conduirait en fait à l'exode des Turcs.

Le général de Gaulle: Les Grandes Puissances ont les moyens d'agir sur le Gouvernement d'Athènes et de faire respecter les garanties. Les Nations Unies sont sans force. Il n'en est pas de même des grandes Puissances.

M. Inonu: Les grandes Puisssances ne seront pas présentes dans chaque village pour préserver les ressortissants turcs des exactions de l'administration

grecque. Je comprends bien qu'il vaut mieux ne pas se faire la guerre mais il faut trouver une solution. Vous reconnaissez que la séparation serait la solution la meilleure.

Le général de Gaulle: La plus simple...

M. Inonu: Vous êtes disposé à substituer à cette solution celle de l'annexion assortie de garanties. Or, cette dernière solution, le gouvernement et le peuple turcs la tiennent pour impossible.

Le général de Gaulle: Pour les Grecs c'est la séparation qui est impossible.

M. Inonu: La séparation soulève des difficultés et donne lieu à des dépenses. Cela ne vaut-il mieux que l'extermination des Turcs. Je vous ai expliqué la situation ingrate dans laquelle nous nous trouvons et qui n'est pas de notre fait. Nous nous sommes tournés vers la France comme vers notre plus vieil ami pour rechercher avec elle une solution qui soit équitable. Si vous prenez une initiative nous ferons ce qui dépend de nous pour en faciliter l'aboutissement. Je vous ai parlé en toute franchise.

Le général de Gaulle: Je ne dirai rien publiquement au sujet de notre conversation. Si les journalistes vous interrogent peut-être pourriez-vous dire que nous avons longuement échangé nos points de vue en toute amitié et dans un esprit de paix. Pour le reste, c'est à dire pour ce qui est de ma pensée sur le fond des choses, les journalistes l'apprendront en temps voulu. Je vous répète que la France n'a d'autre chose en vue que de concourir aujourd'hui au maintien de la paix et demain à la recherche d'une solution d'avenir.

DOCUMENT

UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTION OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

Adopted on the 2nd of September 1987
1987/19 Violations of Human Rights in Cyprus

The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,

Gravely **concerned** about the continuation of gross and systematic violations of human rights in Cyprus,

Recalling its resolutions 1 (XXVIII) and 8(XXXI) relating to the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes in safety and the full restoration of human rights in Cyprus, respectively, and regretting the delay in the implementation of these resolutions,

Recognizing that the Secretary-General is seized with the question of resolving the Cyprus problem,

Disturbed by the lack of any success of the Ad Hoc Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, after so many years of deliberations, to discover the fate of the missing persons in Cyprus,

Expressing its concern about the anguish and sorrow of the families of the missing persons of Cyprus, who have the right to know the fate of their relatives.

Further disturbed by the statement made during the consideration of this item at the present session concerning the implantation of thousands of settlers from Turkey in the occupied territories in Cyprus,

Considering that the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus will contribute to the restoration of human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots,

1. **Demands** the full restoration of all human rights to the whole population of Cyprus, including the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property;
2. **Expresses** its great concern and anguish about the fate of the missing persons;
3. **Expresses** its concern also at the policy and practice of the implantation of settlers in the occupied territories of Cyprus which constitute a form of colonialism and attempt to change illegally the demographic structure of Cyprus;
4. **Decides** that the question of human rights in Cyprus should be considered in the context of item 4 of the agenda for its fortieth session.

France and the Cyprus Issue*

From the War of Independence to the Crisis of 1964

English Summary** of *La France et la question chypriote*

Introduction

This article reviews the content and context of the crucial dialogue on the Cyprus issue which took place in Paris on separate occasions in early July 1964. De Gaulle met separately with Turkish prime minister Ismet Inonu and the Greek prime minister George Papandreou, respectively. The article draws upon the official verbatim transcript from the Quai d'Orsay only recently released to researchers by the French Foreign Office.

Overview

France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has always been interested in the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. Late president Mitterand was keenly aware of the need for peace in this sensitive area of the world. In 1988, he described Cyprus as a delicate problem which must necessarily be solved without bloodshed. Mitterand's words in a message to visiting Turkish prime minister Ozal could indicate that French policy excluded the sharing of Cyprus. Quite a departure from de Gaulle who tended to deny that Cyprus existed as a state. In fact, early in the island's war of independence and decolonization, France adopted a guarded, not to say hostile, attitude towards Cyprus.

France and the Cypriot War of Independence

The Cypriot war of independence broke out on April 1, 1955, a few months after the Algerian insurrection against French colonial authorities. This coincidence and the similarity of the British and French reaction to the conflicts are worth examining. Both Great Britain and France considered these uprisings as domestic problems, thus excluded from UN intervention. Both powers refused to grant their respective colonies the right to self-determination.

Although a NATO ally of France's, Greece did not think it necessary to be aligned with the French on the Moroccan and Tunisian issues. Knowing the Cyprus issue would come up at the UN, Greece had abstained from voting to postpone the inclusion of the Moroccan and Tunisian issues on the agenda. In retaliation, France voted against including the Cypriot issue on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1954. In the subsequent year (1954-55), Greece sought support among Arab states in order to obtain diplomatic influence at the UN and

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**Adaptation-summary of article done by Kathy Radford

to avoid Islamic solidarity with Turkey. For the same reason, Greece openly declared its support for Algerian independence.

The French position at the UN showed that Paris minimized the importance of Cypriot fighting. France based its diplomatic policy on information obtained in Nicosia and did not consider demonstrations by AKEL, the Cypriot communist party, a serious threat. According to French intelligence, AKEL party leaders were working for the English.

The Suez Canal crisis in 1956 reinforced Anglo-French solidarity and fed the anti-French feeling in Nicosia and Athens because the armed British and French expedition in Suez was directed from Cyprus. Greece was officially neutral in this conflict, which saw Egypt pitted against France and Britain. In the name of neutrality, no French or British planes en route to Cyprus were allowed to land on Greek soil. Pierre Charpentier, French ambassador to Greece at the time, criticized the tone of the Hellenic press and the expensive propaganda spread by Arab missions within the country.

In December 1958, just before the conclusion of the Zurich and London agreements which declared Cyprus an independent state, Greece failed in its attempt to have the UN deal with the Cyprus issue. Guy Girard de Charbonnières, French ambassador to Greece at the time, described the botched effort as the result of a lack of coordination within the Greek government. Despite his desire and efforts, de Charbonnières could not figure out Greece's real diplomatic position on the issue. Even at the UN debate on the issue, the French ambassador, who delivered to de Gaulle the Greek prime minister's message on Cyprus, noted that the most recent Greek proposals delivered in Manhattan by Averoff were completely different from those proposed 48 hours before. Given the "hesitant, out-dated, even contradictory" Greek attitude towards Cyprus, the French ambassador was not surprised when the proposal failed.

The same ambassador considered Averoff a "very poor minister of foreign affairs" and stressed Caramanlis' lack of experience in international politics. As a result of these Greek diplomatic errors, the Hellenic interests lost ground. In fact France, one of the countries signing Lausanne Treaty of 1923, was insulted because it claimed not to have been adequately consulted on the treaties establishing Cypriot Independence.

France had always doubted the viability of the Republic of Cyprus. The same French ambassador to Greece wrote in February 1959 that "giving the right to veto to a minority [the Turkish Cypriots] will only hamper the operations of any human enterprise and paralyze it." Nonetheless France realized that peace in Cyprus meant a permanent agreement between Greece and Turkey. French authorities believed that the peace would encourage Greece to distance itself from the Arab countries and the Algerian issue.

This was not to be. Neither was the Cypriot model taken up by the French to solve the Algerian problem. Algeria gained independence in 1962; the French minority left the former colony to return to France.

France and the 1964 Crisis

As soon as Cyprus became independent, France recognized the country and opened an embassy headed by Louis Keller in Nicosia. Yet it was only days before de Gaulle's resignation in 1969 that Cyprus finally opened an embassy in Paris. As a result, Quai d'Orsay learned of Cypriot events primarily from Greek and Turkish diplomats posted to Paris rather than from French sources in Nicosia. French-Cypriot misunderstandings during the 1964 crisis would seem to stem from the partial information provided to French authorities.

Back when de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he enjoyed a positive image in Greece and Cyprus as the great man and leader of free France. He developed close ties with the Greek prime minister, Constantine Caramanlis. This relationship led the Greeks to break away from the American diplomatic fold and lean toward the European Community. Subsequent to armed clashes between Cypriot Turks and Greeks after Archbishop Makarios announced his intention of revising the island's constitution in December 1963 and the threat of a Turkish invasion, London and Washington proposed a NATO intervention in Cyprus. Paris disagreed, saying that NATO did not have valid reasons to intervene and that France had not signed the Zurich and London agreements.

A few weeks later, the UN Security Council decided to send a peacekeeping mission to Cyprus. France abstained because of de Gaulle's mistrust of the international institution. The Cypriot government however felt that France shared its position that the London and Zurich agreements were impossible to apply. Turkish criticism of France reinforced this mistaken Greek and Cypriot impression. But during the turbulent spring of 1964, the French position, similar to the American one, become clear. It did not promote Greek or Cypriot interests.

De Gaulle's government wanted to play a role in settling the Cypriot issue, so France appeared impartial. On June 20, 1964, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution extending the stay of UN forces on the island. However, the French representative, Seydoux, criticized Cypriot Greeks for their violent behaviour towards Cypriot Turks without mentioning any of the armed Turkish provocations on the island. The French government actually considered Archbishop Makarios responsible for the crisis.

Nine days later, de Gaulle received the Greek prime minister, George Papandreou. The French leader said that his government was under the impression that the crisis was sparked by Makarios to take advantage of the situation. When de Gaulle received Turkish prime minister Ismet Inonu two days later, he revealed in detail French positions that appeared to support Ankara.

According to the records, de Gaulle implied that Cyprus did not exist as a state. France knew "only Turkey and Greece." He also said that Makarios had seized this opportunity to become a head of state. The French general responded to a question from Inonu by saying that "if Greece and Turkey resolved to seek a new solution that considered the rights of Greeks and Turks and put an end to Makarios' regime, perhaps there would be less reason to fight."

De Gaulle's apparent hostility toward Makarios stemmed from the widespread idea that the Cypriot archbishop would make his island the "Cuba of the Mediterranean". The soviet threat was uppermost in the mind of de Gaulle, who preferred the simpler solution of partition (sharing the island) over *Enosis* which would mean the annexation of Cyprus by Greece with a special status for Cypriot Turks guaranteed by world powers. Yet he understood the practical difficulties of a border and a scattered Turkish population. Inonu informed de Gaulle that only partition would be acceptable to the Turks. The Turkish leader thus cleverly never denied comments in his country's press which described the French position as quite distant from the Turkish.

In August 1964, Turkish planes bombarded Cyprus with the pretext of some incidents on the island. Makarios responded with an economic blockade of the Turkish villages. The Western world disapproved only mildly of the Turkish action because the Americans were bombing the North Vietnamese in the Tonkin Gulf at the same time. In fact, the international press actually criticized the Cypriot government's attitude toward Cypriot Turks. Quai d'Orsay realized that Athens' support of Nicosia was weakening and heeded rumours that the Greek government was buying the votes of Cypriot deputies.

In the summer of 1964, France declared that it was willing to facilitate an agreement between Greece and Turkey. This declaration by Peyrefitte confirmed de Gaulle's wish as expressed to Papandreou and Inonu that France wanted to bring Greece and Turkey together on the Cyprus issue. However the French declaration led nowhere and the Cypriot press denounced Paris' attitude.

Meanwhile Turkey managed to regroup the Cypriot Turks on the island so that the partition or sharing solution, previously considered difficult because of population dispersion, became a realistic option for Ankara and the western powers. Over the following ten years, relations between France and Cyprus cooled somewhat. Only in 1974 when the Turks invaded Cyprus, a military initiative begun in 1964, did President Giscard d'Estaing restore the traditional ties between France and Cypriot Hellenism.

Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis*

Stephanos Constantinides**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article pose la question de l'évolution de la discipline des relations internationales en Grèce et de son influence sur la politique extérieure du pays. L'auteur s'efforce de montrer les rapports dialectiques entre la théorie et la praxis, entre les hommes politiques et la communauté académique dans le débat sur l'orientation de la politique extérieure hellénique.

Deux influences majeures se manifestent dans ce débat: l'une provient des diverses théories des relations internationales, tardivement introduites en Grèce - et mal assimilées dans certains cas -, et l'autre résulte des péripéties historiques et des particularités socio-culturelles du pays.

Bien que les relations internationales constituent une discipline nouvelle, introduite dans les universités grecques seulement après 1974, on est en mesure de déceler une série de problématiques soulevées dans le débat en cours, ainsi que leur lien étroit avec la pratique et l'étude empirique de la politique étrangère de la Grèce.

ABSTRACT

This paper presents the evolution of the field of international relations in Greece and its subsequent influence on the country's foreign policy. The author tries to demonstrate the existence of a dialectical relationship between theory and praxis, between the politicians and the academia on the formulation of Greek foreign policy.

Two major influences-currents emerge: one originates from the various schools of international relations introduced late in Greece -and not well assimilated in a some instances- and the other is the result of the historical episodes and socio-cultural characteristics of the country.

Even though international relations constitute a new field, introduced in Hellenic universities only after 1974, we can detect a series of problematics raised in the current debate and their close link with the practice and empirical study of Greece's foreign policy.

I. Introduction

The current state in the theory of international relations in Greece is undoubtedly in an embryonic situation. Greek scholars in this field are usually limited to empirical studies based on history or international law. Systematic research, theoretically founded, is just at its beginning as studies in the field have generally been confined to a descriptive account of events.

* I am indebted to Kathy Radford and Paris Arnopoulos for their help. This article owes much to their generosity.

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This situation in the country that gave us Thucydides, the father and first theorist of international relations, constitutes somewhat of a paradox. There is, however, an explanation.

Indeed the field of international relations in Greece was introduced as a subject for teaching in the universities only after 1974; i.e., more than half a century behind the USA and a generation behind the Western European countries[1].

A few efforts in teaching international relations were made before 1974 in diplomatic history and international law. Yet it was only after 1974 that any real development in the field of social sciences took place[2]. Sociology and political science were introduced in universities and international relations also, became a regularly taught subject.

It was inevitable under these circumstances that this new field of study has been developed under conditions of theoretical confusion. The scholars of the new discipline came from different backgrounds, having studied or taught abroad in different countries. They brought the experience of those countries with them. Furthermore, they had different academic backgrounds; i.e., some of them had completed their first university degree in law, history or economics. Since there was no Greek tradition of international relations as a discipline, they tried to build one, each scholar contributing according to his background and foreign tradition.

As a result, there were two basic orientations seeking to influence the establishment of a Greek tradition in the field of international relations. The first orientation, the Anglo-Saxon, originated essentially in the USA. The second, the European was imported essentially from France and Germany. To these two main influences, we must add a third, the influence of the Greek diaspora. Scholars of Greek origin abroad had fruitful exchanges with their colleagues in the 'homeland' and exercised an important influence on the foundation of the discipline in Greece.

The theoretical trends in each of the above orientations are numerous but generally not clear. However they may be divided into two streams: the first stream is linked with international theoretical approaches; the second, with the 'ideologico-political' realities of the country.

It is therefore possible, even though the theoretical work in the field is in an embryonic state, to try to tease out some trends in the discipline of international relations in Greece and particularly to link its theoretical orientation with practical applications. Especially in recent years, as we witness a confrontation between opposing theoretical approaches, there are sometimes more efforts to justify the choices of Greek foreign policy *a posteriori*.

II. The Influence of the International Theories

If we follow the American model, we can say that the two schools of thought in Greece regarding the orientation of the study of international relations are now realism and idealism.

From a European perspective, we can perceive three schools of thought and analysis: the classic-realist paradigm, the idealist-transnationalist-interdependence paradigm and the Marxist-dependency paradigm with its various trends[3]. Let us discuss each one.

1. The Realist School of Thought

It is well known that the realist school of thought in International Relations can be traced back to the Greek historian Thucydides and through the classical political philosophers to Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz. Among the contemporary theorists of realism, one must mention Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron; and among neo-realists: Kenneth Waltz and Barry Buzan[4]. The main assumptions of this school are the importance granted to the state as the central actor in world politics, the importance of the concept of nation-state and balance of power. Realist theorists are also interested in the concept of national interest as the focus of international affairs. Furthermore, the international system is one of structural anarchy and conflict and the action of states is motivated by a search for power, survival and security.

Many scholars of international relations in Greece have been strongly influenced by the realist school. Nevertheless, this influence is not always clear and is not often acknowledged.

What brings Greek scholars close to the realist problematic is undoubtedly nationalism. In a country with major problems from what is seen as the threat of Turkish expansionism, and an unstable Balkan region, nationalism is a kind of ideological defense.

Beyond that, we can not trace a real theoretical development of realism in Greece nor speak of a genuine theorist in the field but only of an effort to apply realist theory in different case studies.

2. The Transnational School of Interdependence

This school of thought appeared in reaction to realism. Against the concept of the State, the transnationalists have put the community of citizens and a world without boundaries. We find its origin in Stoicism and later in Christianity. Liberalism has completed this vision of the world as a metaphor of the free market.

Scientific and technical progress, the birth of the global village, transnational human contacts, globalization of the market economy, all have given rise to complex interdependence and have reinforced this school which is looking for answers on international affairs beyond the nation-state, in political, social and economic linkages. These transnational linkages led to the emergence of new non-state actors in international affairs, e.g. international organizations and multinational corporations, as well as to values that transcend those of the nation-state.

This idealistic approach to international problems is also present in the emphasis on international law and morality rather than power politics. The influence of Kant and Grotius, the great optimists, is also very present in the transnationalist theory, notably in their idealistic conception of international law as a substitute for war.

More recently, American scholars, Robert O'Keohane, Joseph Nye, James Rosenau and Richard Cooper, as well as the French scholar Marcel Merle and the German scholar Karl Kaiser[5] have come to the forefront as the main figures of this school.

Their ideas were introduced to Greece by jurists and 'modernists' who favoured the integration of Greece into Europe. The former insisted on the importance of international law as a guide for the Greek foreign policy, the latter consider European linkage as the way to face threats from Turkey and resolve difficulties with Balkan neighbours.

Nevertheless scholars of this orientation have not really developed a consistent way of thinking other than their attachment to Europe and their opposition to nationalism.

3. The Marxist-Dependency School

Classic Marxism doesn't really treat international problems, but as a theory it offers patterns of analysis in this area, since class values and interests transcend those of nations. Lenin with his book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, introduced a theoretical approach based on economic factors.

Rosa Luxembourg and the neo-Marxists continued in the same direction, so the concept of imperialism and dependency became central to their analysis of international relations. Furthermore the ideas of the Centre and Periphery have also been introduced by neo-Marxists, as well as the concept of unequal exchange (Samir Amin, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Arghiri Emmanuel, Andre Gunder Frank, etc.)

In Greece, this school was introduced by PASOK (the Panhellenic Socialist Movement). Andreas Papandreou, the leader of the party, a scholar who taught economics in Berkeley, popularised the theory of dependency and imperialism

and the other concepts of this model in his writings, which served as a platform for the foreign policy of his party[6]. We must also mention the limited influence exercised by the orthodox Soviet visions of international relations as well as the Eurocommunist visions. The communist movement in Greece, had links with these two orientations of communism in the seventies, thus it was only natural to see efforts of "theorisation" of their position (KKE was and still is the "orthodox" Communist party, the extinct KKE interior was the Eurocommunist party). Finally, there have also been some analysts, especially historians, influenced by Marxism-Maoism.

Generally speaking, the Marxist influence (including its several variants) was important in Greece in the seventies. After the fall of dictatorship in 1974, we could say that it was a dominant vision which would go on for several years. But after 1990 -and even before- the Marxist-dependency influence diminished rapidly in favour of realism.

III. The Influence of the Greek 'Ideologico-Political' Patterns

There have been in Greece, even before independence (1830), two basic 'ideologico-political' currents which have an important influence in the vision Greeks have of the place of their country in the world. The first current after the Enlightment maintains that Greece belongs to Western Europe. Adamantios Koraes (1748-1833), a notable figure of the Greek Enlightment who lived much of his life in Western Europe (Amsterdam, Montpellier and Paris), is an eminent representative of this current. He worked to convey to Greeks the Western ideas of statehood, nationality and rationality. He regarded the modern Greeks as the legitimate descendants of the ancient Hellenes and the heirs to the classical Greek culture, rejecting Byzantium as a medieval period. The second current considers that Greece belongs to the East, where the roots of neohellenism are found in Byzantium. Consequently Greece has to resist Western influence.

These East-West patterns are ideological and political references, "largely imaginary constructs"[7]. Scholars and intellectuals of this orientation are convinced that their nation could not imitate any other culture and that Hellenism had to be based on its own sources, rejecting Western ideas. Sometime in the beginning of the twentieth century, when Eleftherios Venizelos, the eminent representative of Greek bourgeoisie, succeeded with a kind of Europeanization of the state, others were seeking "a sense of mission in the East", in "framing" even "the ideology of a multinational Eastern State" comprising Greeks and Turks.[8] As Thanos Veremis put it out, "strangely enough, it took a civil servant (Ion Dragoumis) and an officer of the Greek army (Athanasios Souliotis) to formulate the most systematic criticism against the state and propose a viable alternative to it." At the time when Venizelos reformed the Greek State and set it on course toward Europeanization, Dragoumis and Souliotis proposed the alternative of the "multinational Eastern", Greco-Turkish state.[9]

This idea is not really a new one. It goes back to the Ottoman Empire when the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Greek elites were in a sense part of the Ottoman administration. Even before in Byzantium, the Church and part of the elites resisted to the efforts of the pope and the Latin West to instore their spiritual and dogmatic domination on the Greek Orthodoxs. On the contrary under the Ottoman Empire, Greek Orthodox Church of Constantinople became a real political power over all Orthodoxs inside the Empire.

The East-West patterns present a new dimension in the eighteenth century when the Greek diaspora composed of bourgeois and intellectual elements, mainly in Western and Central Europe, received the influence of the Enlightment and the French Revolution and began to work on Greek nation-building, preparing the war of independence. The ideals of liberalism -economic and 'ideologico-political'- and enlightenment were to form the weapon opposed to internal conservative elements like landed notables and the ecclesiastic administration. The Church defended traditional values and generally "the status quo as it existed in the framework of the Ottoman Empire"[10]. As was mentioned above, we can go even further to find the roots of these patterns at the time of the Schism (1054) between the Eastern Orthodox Church of Constantinople and the Catholic Church of Rome. The anti-European attitude of Orthodox Greeks was also influenced by «the sack of Constantinople by the "crusaders" in 1204» and "left a legacy of extreme suspicion if, not to say hostility towards the presence of Western Europeans in the eastern Mediterranean and the adjacent lands."[11]

It would be, however, a mistake to consider that the patterns involved in this conflict are clear. As one scholar noted "reality is always more complex and less clear-cut than such constructs propose."[12]

It was supposed that this conflict was over when Greece became a member of the European Union in 1981. Nevertheless, there is always a strong group of intellectuals and others known as the neo-Orthodox who continue to express this anti-Western position favouring a non-Western Greece with a romantic vision: "organic communities", "anti-rationalism", a return to the roots, to the lost paradise of traditional values, etc. As Thanos Veremis noted, this romantic view of communal life under the Ottomans survives even today and is presented as a model against the nation-state considered to be a "western" product that has nothing to do with the values and culture of Hellenism. Veremis points out that "the myth surrounding communal life was challenged by historical works presenting the communities as a functional component of the Ottoman tax system rather than a product of national volition."[13]

Even the Nobelist poet, Odysseus Elytis, insisted on the importance of tradition, worried about Greek identity and considered that the West was always hostile to the Greek nation. Elytis also referred to the Schism and the crusades

and declared: «The West always tried to make us dance to their tune. And these days it has succeeded in doing so. From now on we have to walk with the one foot in the European Community and with the other in NATO.»[14]

To this traditional vision, the 'Europeanists' oppose the modernizing trends; i.e., economic development and integration to Europe.

There are also those who accept some aspects of the neo-Orthodox patterns, but try to insert it in a European schema, as an element reinforcing Greek ethno-cultural identity.

From another point of view, nationalism is a very strong current influencing the formulation of Greek external policy. Nationalism may coincide in some points with the neo-Orthodox vision but it doesn't reject (at least its most important components) the European orientation.

It should be remembered that Greek nationalism was initially the product of Western influence. Nationalism shaped the Greek identity by favouring the building of the Greek nation-state *vis-à-vis* the cultural identity put forward by the Church and her allies (who preferred the framework of the Ottoman Empire).[15]

The question to ask at this point is how these 'ideologico-political' orientations can be combined with the different schools of thought on international relations coming from abroad in order to trace the theoretical trends that scholars use.

There is no doubt that we can link the 'Europeanist-modernists' (at least most of them) to the school of transnationalism-interdependence. They try to escape from the scheme of 'real politik' and the logic of balance of power or the nation-state power as it is proclaimed by the school of realism. The importance they give to the economic development and integration of Greece within Europe, the development of better economic and political relations within the Balkan countries, the under-evaluation of national issues[16], opposition to nationalism, insistence on international law, importance of transnational relations, are but a few examples demonstrating that Europeanist-Modernists belong to the transnational school of thought.

More specifically, this trend is expressed by a group of scholars associated with ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy).[17] It is also expressed by some retired diplomats[18], social scientists (economists, sociologists, etc.)[19], journalists [20] and Greek scholars of the diaspora.

The school of realism, on the other hand, is influenced by nationalism and partly by neo-Orthodox thought. It could be argued that an important part of this school is also pro-European. But contrary to the 'modernists'-'Europeanists', the pro-European realists want a Europe based on strong nation-states and reject

the idea of a supranational federation. This group of realists believe that neo-Orthodox thought could be incorporated into this kind of European orientation reinforcing the Hellenic ethnocultural identity.

A small minority of intellectuals who do not necessarily belong to the realist school would like to see Greece severe relations with Europe. They are not necessarily specialists in international relations but they do participate in the debate concerning the place of Greece within the contemporary world.

These intellectuals are inspired from the so-called Byzantine Orthodox tradition and have made this tradition an ideological arm opposing it in a mythical way to Western modernism[21]. They equate a form of cultural identity which is defensive and introverted with the national political identity, which is dynamic and extroverted. The first one, the cultural identity, which functioned during the time of the Ottoman Empire, is also represented today by a group of neo-Orthodox intellectuals. They opposed it to the ethno-political identity which coincides with the nation-state, a concept imported from the West, according to them, and thus foreign to Greek traditions[22].

More precisely, we can say that realists are presented as moderate Europeanists or even rationalists and, by their opponents, as ethnopopulists. This current is represented by a group of scholars in Panteion University and its Institute of International Relations. It is also represented by some journalists and academics in the diaspora.[23]

The Marxist school, especially its variation of dependency and imperialism, has been influenced by Third World theorists -Samir Amin, André Gunder Frank, Paul Sweezy, etc. Nationalism and populism also influenced this particular school of thought, partly because of the official political line of PASOK, the Greek socialist party, during the years the party was the opposition. After PASOK became the government of the country (1981), the dependency school of thought was also influenced by realism, underscoring the weight of nation-state power, regional equilibrium and security. This mixture of thought is partly the result of a dialectical relation between academic visions and practical realities.

Andreas Papandreou, the former premier, was in one sense a theorist, popularizing the dependency theory through his various speeches and articles, while fulfilling his statesman duties and being responsible for the drafting of Greek foreign policy.

Papandreou wrote in *Metropolis, Periphery, Independent Development and Socialist Change* (one of his more important theoretical articles yet popularizing *in extremis*) that "with the polarization between the metropolis and the periphery of capitalism, the "class struggle" at the international level takes more and more the form of a clash between the metropolis and the periphery"[24]; and concerning Greece:

> National independence constitutes the corner-stone of the policy of PASOK and at the same time the decisive "lodestone" for the Greek people's movement. Ever since the revolution of '21, our country has not succeeded in disentangling itself from the bonds of dependence. The great options of strategic importance come from foreign, not from Greek centers of decisions. This concerns, too, the whole spectrum of options—the economic, the social, the political and cultural dimensions of our existence as a nation.
>
> During the last decades after the German-Italian occupation and the civil war, and the USA's "protector" power role, the dependence of our country took the characteristic form which is in keeping with the new image of modern monopoly capitalism, which started approximately at the end of the Second World War (...) Greece has a very bitter experience because it is perhaps the first country of the post-war period which has been corroded systematically by the services of the USA in the context of the Truman Doctrine[25]. [But] (...) it would be a mistake to consider that the "participant" Greeks are "agents" in the normal connotation of that word. The "participant" Greeks have been "convinced" that our national interest is identified with the policy of the metropolitan center, that is to say of the USA or its substitutes West Germany and generally of Western Europe. Any other position for Greece either isn't reasonable to them as a realistic alternative solution, or it constitutes a nationally suspicious position. The creation of such a climate, of such a dominant ideology, is an indispensable condition for the corrosion of the political bearers of the marginal country, as well as their state functionaries[26].

At that time (1977), Papandreou was against Greek participation in NATO, pointing out that "for every country, with exception of the USA, but particularly for a small country like Greece, participation in NATO means a loss of our national independence."[27] And he goes on to mention that "the consequences of our joining the Common Market are not different. Because the Common Market is the other side of NATO."[28]

Of course, these positions later changed and Papandreou played the game inside NATO and the European Union from the same theoretical and ideological point of view, based on dependency theory, up to 1989.

IV. The Discussion on the Greek Foreign Policy

Greek foreign policy these days may be viewed as a confrontation between the two major theoretical orientations, realism and transnationalism. It is important to repeat that these orientations are not well structured and differences between them are not always clear.

1. The Realist Approach

Realists were influenced by dependency and Marxist theory, as well as by the Hellenic tradition of nationalism and Orthodox thought. These influences explain why it is difficult to be well integrated. Nevertheless, in recent years, this current is moving to more realist positions, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union and the weakening of Marxism.

More and more scholars of dependency and the Marxist tradition moved toward realist positions, especially from the political spectrum of PASOK. With Papandreou in power after the collapse of Eastern Europe, realism became the dominant paradigm, influencing the approach of Greek foreign policy.

It may be argued that there is now in Greece a well-established realist school of thought, composed of scholars, journalists and other intellectuals. They do confront transnationalists in animated debates. We will expose some of their arguments later.

2. The Transnationalist-Interdependence Approach

In the last few years the transnationalist interdependence paradigm appears to be very dynamic. This paradigm comes from the outside world and is applied to the Greek reality. This current challenges some of the most important ideological patterns which have long constituted the central axis of Greek foreign policy: nationalism, Orthodoxy, populism, etc. What is more, this theoretical orientation presents a kind of "revisionism", compared with some basic ideas which dominated Greek diplomacy for many years; i.e., concessions on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Cyprus question and on the differences with Turkey.

The axis of this 'revisionist' policy is the European orientation of Greek foreign policy. In this sense, the theorists of this vision are opposed to the neo-Orthodox scholars and intellectuals who propose a pan-Orthodox axis in the Balkans, based on the idea that the Greek Balkan policy must follow the European line. Therefore economic and cultural cooperation in the Balkans is more important than any Orthodox axis.

And it is under this European orientation that it will be possible to treat national issues of Greece with openness to the world, leaving behind this umbilical isolation of the past.

3. The Marxist-Dependency School

As mentioned, this school of thought was introduced in Greece essentially by PASOK and its leader Andreas Papandreou. One can say that for some years (1974-1985) the Marxist-dependency school was a powerful current and the dominant orientation inside the academic community and among the

intelligentsia. Once again we must differentiate the dependency theory from the Orthodox pro-Soviet Marxist paradigm expressed by theorists of the Greek Communist Party and from the Euro-communist version expressed by a circle of intellectuals and academics.

Today all these orientations have declined and academics and intellectuals of the dependency school have joined and reinforced the realist school of thought, at the same time as PASOK foreign policy evolved in the same direction; i.e., from dependency theory to realist vision.

Nevertheless some Eurocommunists reinforced the transnationalist-interdependence school. Later a number of the dependency school followed suit. With the retirement of Papandreou as prime minister, changes may be expected in the whole orientation of Greek foreign policy.

Contrary to Papandreou's "third world" oriented foreign policy, the new Greek Premier Costas Simitis (1996) and his group are convinced 'Europeanists', 'reformers', pragmatists, rather than ideologists. As there is always a dialectic relation between theory and praxis, especially in the case of Greece, we can observe the support that the new team has received from transnationalists and in the meantime the criticism exercised from realists concerning some of their choices in foreign policy.

Under the circumstances, the question is if there is a school of dependency in Greece any more. The answer is yes, but it is too weak. The same thing can be said for all other Marxist approaches.

4. Present Debate

With a marginal dependency school, the main debate is between realists and transnationalists. It is not really a theoretical one, but merely a discussion on Greek foreign policy with theoretical references. For instance, the transnationalists argue in favour of a European orientation for Greek foreign policy. As Veremis and Couloumbis point out "the greater danger for our country is to tumble into atavism and to yield up to the sirens' temptation of chauvinism, irredentism, ethnoreligious fanaticism and of the theory of world clash - leaving its European and Atlantic supports in the name of an ambiguous cultural relationship of the so-called axis of slave-Orthodoxy"[29]. And they go on arguing in favour of a policy which will take in consideration the new realities with the end of the cold war: the importance of international law and international institutions, respect of human rights and generally an open and active diplomacy in all directions. They suggest moving from an ethnocentric isolationist viewpoint to a global and European perspective through Balkan and Mediterranean cooperation.

Dimitri Constas, a leading figure of realist thought, is very critical of the

transnationalists' positions and considers their analysis wrong. He refers to the concessions that they have made on national issues and their abandonment of the concept of national interest as anachronistic.[30] Panayiotis Ifestos, another realist scholar, goes even further and attacks particularly the models of Couloumbis-Veremis, which from his point of view, are unfounded and «idyllic», especially their model of international relations at the end of the Cold War; i.e., common strategy of the great powers, financing of environmental programs, control of nuclear weapons, respect of international boundaries, pacific resolution of conflicts and protection of human rights.[31]

On another occasion Constas wrote against the domination of the international relations debate in Greece by transnationalists. He cited their «idealistic-liberal conceptions reminding us of the ideas between the two world wars, and of harmony between the interests of the powerful and the weak of this planet». He stresses that in the international academic community, «the dominant school of thought is political realism and neorealism with the axis of analysis in national power, and its advance in comparison with transnationalist and interstate ideological products.» Constas considers that this school of thought enriches academic life, strengthens the scientific independence of international relations and contributes to the effective planning of our foreign policy."[32]

Finally Constas worries about the positions of some jurists who consider sufficient the Greek legal approach of international issues and face with disdain for any other kind of analysis, especially if it is not idealistic.

Paradoxically, an articulate response to transnationalist arguments came from journalist Chryzanthos Lazaridis, one of the most representative spokesmen of realist thought. Lazaridis says that "without theoretical rigour and practical clarity, the public discussion on foreign policy, very often leads to oppose different subjectivisms and to yield up to populistic temptations... So we became divided between "nationalists" and "internationalists" or if you prefer "patriots" and "traitors", "Europeanists" and "anti-Europeanists", "pacifists" and "warriors", etc. And he adds: "Before discussing foreign policy we have to define the theoretical field of reference. We put out globally three proposals:

> First of all, international relations is a field of antagonism of interest and imposition of balance of power.
>
> Second, the international cooperation that is institutionalized does not end national antagonisms, but simply consolidates the existing balance of power.
>
> Third, even where international cooperation is a reality, one observes the development of hegemonic relations [33].

Especially concerning the concept of "deterrence" he points out "that in Greece some people had never heard about it."[34]

With the latest Aegean crisis concerning the Imia islet, the debate on Greek foreign policy continues. The realists ask for the "Israelisation" of Greek foreign policy; i.e., that Israel provides a model to follow. Greece should, therefore, adopt a policy of military preparedness. Realist scholar Athanasios Platias, for example, argues in favour of such a strategy, while he attacks transationalists, who are against this model considering it as a dangerous militarization of the country.[35] A number of Greek politicians, journalists and intellectuals also share this idea.[36]

Responding to these arguments and the following dilemma of "Israelisation" or "Finlandisation", Theodore Couloumbis, one of the most prominent transnationalist scholars, considers "Europeanisation" as the only worthy choice for Greece. Couloumbis also asserts that "the Israeli model is misunderstood and distorted" by Greek scholars «who dub themselves 'neorealists'» because they fail "to understand that Israel, involved in the process of nation-building and surrounded in the period 1947-73 by genuinely hostile entities (as Greece was in the 19th century), has nonetheless sought and managed to cultivate relations with most of its neighbours, including the Palestinians."[37]

V. The Influence of Theoretical Orientations in the Application of Greek Foreign Policy

It is clear from what has been said so far that there is a dialectical relation between the theory and the praxis of Greek foreign policy. In some cases, it is not sure if the theoretical visions proceed to the praxis, or if this praxis produces theoretical orientations.

As we enter a new era of transition for the international system, Greek scholars try, with great difficulty, to link theory with praxis in international relations. Decision-making in this field is a little old-fashioned but, undoubtedly, it proceeds in a dialectical manner. Of course decision-making is influenced by many factors, such as cultural values and customs, economic reality, political power and information.

If we analyse the impact of theories in the post-dictatorial period of Greek foreign policy, (1974-1996), based on developments that preceded, it is clear that they exercised considerable influence in decision-making. But it is also clear that during this period theoretical patterns were confused without clear lines and without real development.

The right wing government of Constantine Caramanlis (1974-1980) was of course more pragmatic in the crafting of its foreign policy. From a theoretical point of view, the Caramanlis government experienced different influences, but the main insistence on international law, pacific conflict resolution and cooperation, indicates that the transnational-idealistic patterns had the most important

input and influence in practice. The European orientation is another indication of this influence. It should be remembered that Greece was at that time in a weak military and diplomatic position after seven years of dictatorship and after the Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus. The question, of course, is to know whether Caramanlis' foreign policy is more the result of necessity than of a clear choice.

Of course nationalism and the dependency theory did exercise some pressure on Caramanlis' government and forced it to go ahead with certain policies which under other circumstances would have been refused, e.g. the withdrawal of the country from NATO. In some cases the pressure from PASOK advancing dependency and 'Marxist' theoretical patterns accelerated government decisions to develop friendly relations with the Communist bloc -read Greece's Balkan neighbours- and the Third World.

The socialist government of Andreas Papandreou (1981-1989) did not constitute a radical change in Greek foreign policy. PASOK had set up the theoretical framework within dependency and imperialism during its opposition era and used the same language in government, but abandoned its main position to leave NATO and European community in practice. From the beginning it was clear that the realist theoretical orientation had also gained ground, at least in formal declarations and positions. We could advance the idea that at the end of PASOK's first period (1985), realism was more present as a theoretical tool of its foreign policy than the dependency theory. Nevertheless one has to proceed with caution because nothing is so clear. In some cases during this period, however, there is ideological and theoretical confusion. For example, the Davos summit[38] can not be explained in terms of realist or dependency theory but rather in terms of transnationalism.

The return of the Right to power with Premier Constantine Mitsotakis (1990-1993) changed radically the theoretical framework of Greek foreign policy. This time it was clear that the transnationalist-interdependence patterns had gained ground. Neoliberalism reinforced this vision, along with European and pro-allied positions.

Nevertheless nationalism is an obstacle to such an orientation, especially the exasperation on the Macedonian issue. Prime Minister Mitsotakis was unable to impose his vision on even his foreign minister Antonis Samaras, a convinced nationalist.

PASOK's return to power in 1993 marks a kind of revisionism in Greek foreign policy, compared with the party's first two mandates.

The Greek foreign policy of this period began to obey the logic of the interdependence paradigm more and more, although the strong current of nationalism forced the government to have a discourse which did not always correspond to

its actions. At times we also observed some contradiction in the way the government acted. For example, some government actions obeyed the realist logic; others, interdependence logic.

It seems that with Constantine Simitis as prime minister (1996), the interdependence-transnational paradigm has gained ground. We can simply observe how the realist scholars and intellectuals criticize the government's new orientation in foreign policy and how interdependentists praise it.

At the turn of the millennium, the theoretical and conceptual framework of Greek foreign policy has become clear and discussions among followers of different schools of thought could permit politicians to understand better the realities of international politics. After all, the discipline of international relations in Greece will be celebrating a quarter century, so it will be time to rethink what has been achieved and what will be the future of the discipline.

Provisional Conclusions

It is clear from what had been said that there is currently in Greece a theoretical confrontation between the 'ethno-realists' and the 'transnationalists-idealists' with practical repercussions throughout Greek foreign policy.

The result of this confrontation is a certain confusion because discussion deteriorates rapidly from the academic-theoretical point to a political one if not to partisan politics and personal disputes. Besides, these discussions lead to a simplification of the reality and finally to a Manichean bipolarism.

Furthermore, within the context of these discussions, the dependency school and other marginal 'theoritico-political' currents (e.g. the feminist or environmental paradigms) are put aside. And of course in this simplification, important variations of each of the main schools have been also omitted.

Under these circumstances, the theoretical discussion may also be subordinated to the political or even partisan logic at a time when the discipline of international relations is underdeveloped.

It is necessary at this point to broaden and enrich the theoretical debate with elements from Greek reality. The practical prolongation will follow. In any case, we can not separate theory from practice. Their relation is dialectical. Because in one way or another politicians also produce theory and examples from Greek or international political life are not lacking it.

It is important, however, to emphasize that the theoretical contribution of Greek scholars to international relations is very limited and poor. There are, of course, references to theory inside the empirical and historical studies on Greek foreign policy. But the main opposition between ethno-realists and transnationalists is increasingly situated at the political and ideological level rather than at

the theoretical field. It is no accident that these discussions take place in newspapers and magazines rather than in academic journals.

Obviously this article simplifies to a degree the general image of the discipline of international relations in Greece. But we must remember the lack of studies and research in this field. As a result, this article is only an attempt to present what is going on in the field of Greek international relations theory with the hope that a debate at an academic level will help the development of international relations in Greece.

NOTES

1. George Tenekides, a pioneer in the field of international relations in Greece, wrote that the discipline was taught for the first time in Greece in 1964 at the Panteion School of Political Science.

George TENEKIDES, **Themata koinoniologias ton Diethnon Scheseon (Subjects of Sociology of International Relations)**, Athens, Papazisis publishers, 1976, p.9. (in Greek)

2. As it is pointed out in the academic journal **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 3, No1, Autumn 1994 (Editor's note, p. 7-8) "Research and dialogue in the social sciences as such have never been in the forefront of the mainstream Greek society. A variety of reasons have been offered for this seeming lack of interest in the social research field, the primary being some kind of 'socio-political conspiracy' on the part of the conservative élites that have governed Greece almost exclusively since Independence. As a matter of fact, it is not accidental that neither sociology, psychology nor education faculties exist in Greek universities, where systematic research on political and historical issues has been minimal." This point of view was presented for the first time in 1983 in the first issue of the journal. In the edition of 1994, it is pointed out: "We can repeat what we published in 1983 with slight modifications. As a matter of fact, in Greece progress has been made in numerous fields of studies and research in the social sciences, especially in the fields of sociology, psychology, education and political science. There is now an openness in the Greek universities. Research institutions have also appeared since 1983. Nevertheless , the situation is precarious and in comparison with other western countries , Greece remains behind in all these fields."

See also **Koinonikes kai Politikes Dynamis stin Ellada (Social and Political Forces in Greece)**, Hellenic Society of Political Science, Athens, Exantas Publishers, 1977 (in Greek)

3. Jacques HUNTZINGER, **Introduction aux relations internationales**, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1987

See also Paris ARNOPOULOS, **Sociopolitics**, Toronto, Guernica, 1995

4. Bibliography on this subject is enormous. One can find publications of scholars cited as an example above and an important number of others.

5. As in the case of the school of realism bibliography on transnational school thought is enormous. One can find the publications of scholars cited above and a significant number of others.

6. See for example a collection of articles of A. Papandreou in **PASOK, Socialist Transformation 2**, Athens, International Relations Committee, Series B, Publication no 2, 1977 (in English), **PASOK kai Exousia (PASOK and Power)**, Athens, Ed. Paratiritis, 1980 (in Greek)

7. Argyris FATOUROS, "Greece's Integration in the European Community" in Harry PSOMIADES and Stavros THOMADAKIS, **Greece, The New Europe and the Changing International Order**, New York, Pella Publishing Company, 1993, p.24

8. Thanos VEREMIS, From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910 in Martin BLINKHORN and Thanos VEREMIS, **Modern Greece: Nationalism & Nationality**, Athens, ELIAMEP, 1990, p.17

9. Thanos VEREMIS, **op.cit.**, p.17. See also Dimitri KITSIKIS, **Istoria tis Othomanikis Aftokratorias (History of the Ottoman Empire)**, Athens, Estia, 1985, p.85 (in Greek).

10. Argyris FATOUROS, **op. cit.**, p.25

Constantinos DIMARAS, **A History of Modern Greek Literature**, Albany, NY, S.U.N.Y. Press, 1972, p. 143-152 and the Greek editions of the same work, i.e. Athens, 1975, p.152-156

11. John CAMPBELL & Philip SHERRARD, **Modern Greece**, New York, Washington, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968, p.33

12. Argyris FATOUROS, **op. cit.**, p. 24

13. Thanos VEREMIS, **op. cit.**, p. 21

14. Interview of Odysseus Elytis to the Greek weekly **To Vima**, December 1978, cited in the monthly **Diavazo** (Athens), April 1996, p.74

15. D.G. TSAOUSHIS, **Ellinismos kai Ellinikotita (Hellenism and Greekness)**, Athens, Estia, 1983 (in Greek)

16. See Viron THEODOROPOULOS, Efstathios LAGAKOS, Georgios PAPOULIAS, Ioannis TZOUNIS, **Skepsis kai Provlimatismoi yia tin Exoteriki mas Politiki (Thoughts and Problems about our Foreign Policy)**,Athens, ELIAMEP, I. Sideris, 1995

This group of retired Greek diplomats propose, for example, to recognize a Turkish-Cypriot state in Cyprus, **ibid**, p. 81

17. See for example, Thanos VEREMIS and Theodoros COULOUMBIS,

Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki, Prooptikes ke Provlimatismoi, (Greek Foreign Policy, Perspectives and Problems) Athens, ELIAMEP, I. Sideris, 1994 (in Greek)

18. THEODOROPOULOS and others, **ibid.**

19. These positions are generally developed in articles published in Greek dailies and some influential weekly magazines. A good source of the arguments of transnationalists scholars and intellectuals - sociologists, economists, etc. - are the weekly **To Vima** and **Oikonomikos Tachydromos**, the bimonthly **To Anti** and the English language daily **Athens News.**

20. **To Vima, Oikonomikos Tachydromos**, ibid.

21. See the arguments of Christos Giannaras, a theologian teaching political philosophy at the Panteion University of Athens. Giannaras is one of the most articulated representatives of this 'neo-Orthodox' orientation but, at the same time, one of the most conservative scholars and intellectuals. Some opponents consider his positions even reactionary. See Christos GIANNARAS, **I Neoelliniki Taftotita (The Neohellenic Identity)**, Athens, Ekdosis Grigori, 1978 (in Greek) and **Aoristi Ellada, Konserto yia dyo Apodimies (Indefinite Greece, Concert for two Passages Abroad)**, Athens, Ekdosis Domos, 1994 (in Greek)

22. **Ibid.**

23. See arguments in favour of realism expressed by Dimitris Constas, Athanasios Platias and Panayiotis Ifestos of Panteion University. Dimitri CONSTAS, "Exoteriki Politiki kai Diethnes Dikaio" ("Foreign Policy and International Law"), **To Vima**, August 27, 1995, Panayiotis IFESTOS, **Themeliodis Ptyches mias Ellinikis Ethnikis Stratigikis (Basic Aspects of a Greek National Strategy), unpublished communication to the International Congress of the Hellenic Research Institutes**, Nicosia, November, 1995. Also **I Meleti Ton Diethnon Scheseon stin Ellada (The Study of International Relations in Greece), unpublished communication**, conference of the Institute of Internationals Relations, Panteion University, June 14-15 1995, Athanasios PLATIAS, "O schediasmos tis Ellinikis Exoterikis Politikis" ("The planning of Greek Foreign Policy") in **Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Esoterikes kai Diethnis Parametri (Greek Foreign Policy: Internal and External Dimensions)**, Athens, Institute of International Relations, Panteion University - Odysseas, 1994

A number of articles by PLATIAS and IFESTOS were also published in the dailies **Eleftherotypia** and **Ta Nea**. One can also follow the debate between the two schools of thought - transnationalism *vis-à-vis* realism- in **Eleftherotypia** during 1995 and in **Oikonomikos Tachydromos** and other Greek dailies or weeklies with the participation of P. IFESTOS, Ath. PLATIAS, Th. VEREMIS,

Krateros IOANNOU, Th. COULOUMBIS, Th. LIPOVITS, Nikos MOUZELIS and others.

24. **PASOK, Socialist Transformation 2**, Athens, International Relations Committee, series B, Publication no 2, 1977, p. 26

25. **Ibid**, p.26

26. **Ibid**, p.27

27. **Ibid**, p. 28

28. **Ibid**, p. 29, 30

29. Th. VEREMIS and Th. COULOUMBIS, **Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki**, op. cit., p. 99

30. **Eleftherotypia**, March 8, 1995

31. **Eleftherotypia**, March 16, 1995

32. D. CONSTAS, "Exoteriki Politiki ke Diethnes Dikaio" ("Foreign Policy and International Law") **To Vima**, August 28, 1995

33. **Oikonomikos Tachydromos**, July 27, 1995

34. **Oikonomikos Tachydromos**, op. cit.

35. **Ta Nea**, 9 February 1996, "To Protypo tou Israel" ("The Israeli Model")

36. See, in this sense, the article of Stelios Papathemelis, "PASOK MP and former minister of security", **To VIMA**, March 17, 1996

37. Th. COULOUMBIS, "A Country Worth Copying: Israel or Finland?" **Athens News**, April 4th, 1996

38. The Davos summit took place in February 1988 between the Greek prime minister Andreas Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart Turgut Ozal.

DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION 1000 (1995) (On the Cyprus Question)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3547th meeting, on 23 June 1995

The Security Council,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 15 June 1995 (S/1995/488 and Add.1),
Taking note of his recommendation that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months,
Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the force in Cyprus beyond 30 June 1995,
Reaffirming its earlier relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and 969 (1994) of 21 December 1994,
Expressing its concern that there has been no progress towards a final political solution,
Noting that no progress has been made on extending the 1989 unmanning agreement,
Noting also that a review of the situation on the Secretary-General's mission of good offices in Cyprus remains in progress and looking forward to receiving a definitive report at an appropriate time,

1. **Decides** to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 31 December 1995;
2. **Calls upon** the military authorities on both sides to ensure that no incidents occur along the buffer zone and to extend their full cooperation to UNFICYP;
3. **Requests** the Secretary-General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring, bearing in mind the possible implications of an agreement on the extension of the1989 unmanning agreement;
4. **Expresses** concern about the modernization and upgrading of military forces in the Republic of Cyprus and the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, urges once again all concerned to commit themselves to such a reduction and to a reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, annex), and calls upon the SecretaryGeneral to promote efforts in this direction;
5. **Expresses** concern also about the failure by the military authorities on both sides to take reciprocal measures to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone, and calls upon those authorities to enter into discussions with UNFICYP on this matter in line with paragraph 3 of resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993;
6. **Regrets** the failure to reach agreement on the extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other, and calls upon the military authorities on both sides to cooperate urgently with UNFICYP to this end;
7. **Urges** the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance and reconciliation between the two communities as recommended in the relevant reports of the Secretary-General;
8. **Welcomes** the Secretary-General's decision to continue contacts with the two leaders, to make every effort to find common ground for the basis for a resumption of direct talks;
9. **Reaffirms** the importance it attaches to early progress being made on the substance of the Cyprus question and on the implementation of the confidence-building measures as called for in resolution 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994;
10. **Requests** the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 December 1995 on the implementation of the present resolution and on any obstacles he may have encountered;
11. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

Greek-Australian Literature: Between 'Majors'

Helen Nickas*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine la place qu'occupe la littérature gréco-australienne, une 'mineure' coincée entre deux 'majeures', l'australienne et la grecque (en Grèce). Cependant, l'article n'attaque pas seulement les littératures 'majeures' en raison de leur traitement arbitraire ou injuste qui marginalise les écrivains Gréco-australiens, mais tente d'expliquer pourquoi cela se passe ainsi. Dans cet ordre d'idées, l'article discute de façon critique des écrits de la première génération de Gréco-australiens ainsi que de leur développement, de la poésie orale populaire à des oeuvres ayant une approche plus littéraire et enfin à quelques oeuvres hautement littéraires. Ces dernières occupent maintenant une place au sein de la littérature australienne 'majeure' mais non pas -pour le moment- dans celle de la Grèce. Cet article affirme que l'isolement linguistique et culturel de la plupart des Gréco-australiens soit des 'centres' australiens, soit des 'centres' grecs, a sérieusement freiné la création d'oeuvres littéraires substantielles.

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the position of Greek-Australian literature as a 'minor' between two 'majors', the Australian and the Greek (in Greece). It does not however simply attack the 'major' literatures for arbitrarily, or unjustly marginalising Greek-Australian writers, but it attempts to explain why this may be so. In order to do that, the paper critically discusses the writing by first generation Greek-Australians and its development from community oral poetry, to works with a more literary approach, to a few highly 'textual' works which have now attained a place in the Australian major literature, albeit not in the Greek as yet. The paper contends that the linguistic and cultural isolation of most Greek-Australians from either the Australian or the Greek 'centres', has seriously limited the creation of substantial literary works.

To begin in the subjective mode, the notion of 'major' and 'minor' literatures first became an issue for me in the early eighties when I had to decide on a topic for my research. As I was doing combined studies in Greek and English literatures, I thought at first that one of the 'major' Greek poets (from Greece) would be a suitably respectable topic. This however soon changed after I enrolled in a subject of 'Australian' literature and for the first time I heard talk of a 'cultural cringe' and terms which had not concerned me until then, such as 'centre' and 'margins', 'major' and 'minor', 'mainstream' and 'periphery'. For those not familiar with Australian literature, English departments did not teach much else except the English canon, excluding therefore any Australian writers. In the seventies and more so in the eighties, however, Australian literature became a subject of study, followed in 1984 in the Greek Department of Melbourne University by a half unit of literature of the Greek diaspora. Needless to say that

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the topic of my research was swiftly changed from a 'major' Greek poet (from Greece) to an 'emerging' poet of Greek descent living and writing in the Greek language in Anglophone Melbourne. In other words, I was embarking on a path away from the 'canon' and into the area of 'minors', with social history and cultural politics being at the core of any discussion about literature.[1]

It has been so often said that this is the era of the minorities. The era of 'de-centering', of 'storming the citadels', of challenging the 'centres'. This 'revolution' has also been fortified by changes in literature departments of universities where even up to the seventies, nothing but canonical works were taught. With theories such as marxism, feminism and, of course, post-structuralism and post-modernism, canons have been challenged, be that on grounds of ethnicity, race, class or gender.

The great irony is of course, the illusion that by challenging the 'canon', the result will be a more inclusive body which reflects more justly and democratically the historical conditions which produced it. What happens instead is that the formerly 'minor' literature goes on to become 'major' in relation to another body which is smaller in size or status. Australian literature, which had successfully challenged the notion of an 'English' canon went on, in turn, to create its own Anglo-dominated canon or major 'Australian' literature, consisting mainly of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant (and of course, middle-class) writers, (WASP), which, in turn has been challenged by the various 'minor' ethno-specific literatures which are claiming their place in the Australian canon.[2]

One of these 'minor' literatures is the Greek-Australian one, an ethno-specific minority group in Australia (a country with English as its official language and Anglo-Celtic [English-speaking] as its dominant culture, despite its official policy of multiculturalism.)[3] The Greek-Australian literature which is written by Greek migrants and their offspring in Australia has been given several labels by academic researchers and bureaucrats. Depending on the viewpoint and aim of the research, writers of Greek descent living and writing in Australia have been called 'Greek-Australian', 'Australian Greek', 'diaspora' or less ethno-specifically, 'migrant', 'ethnic', 'multicultural', or 'NESB' (Non-English speaking background) writers.

While ethno-specific terms such as 'Greek-Australian' are often used by both Greeks and Australians in order to differentiate the origin of a particular group or person, terms such as 'ethnic' and 'NESB' are used only by the 'centre' and connote a literature which is not of the centre, and by implication not as worthy.[4] Ethno-specific minor literatures emerged in the seventies with the adoption of a multicultural policy which gave new migrants in Australia (especially those from the Southern European countries) the freedom to be themselves, to retain their own ethnic culture and to create literary works in their own language.[5]

The dichotomy between 'centre' and 'margins' adds to the difficulties which a Greek migrant writer faces in becoming recognised in Australia. On the other hand, writing in the margins of a dominant Anglo-dominated culture and away from the mother tongue in Greece, Greek writers in Australia are inevitably marginalised by both centres. Dichotomies then are on the one hand artificial constructs which are ephemeral depending on circumstances and tastes, but on the other hand, they reflect real difficulties which prevent writers from gaining wider acceptance.[6]

If we were to look for the distinguishing characteristics of 'centre', and 'margins', 'majors' and 'minors', even though the notion of a 'canon' has been challenged, one can easily see that the literature of the 'centre' is a literature of 'winners'. That is, writers who have been lauded by critics and public (though not always by both) and whose approach is a 'professional' one (without necessarily writing full time). Writers of the 'centre' seem to know about the art of writing, and see it as artifice, not as a personal or social document. For them literature is art. Writers of the 'margins' are, generally, amateurs and lack linguistic and artistic skills to write in the sophisticated manner of those in the 'centre'. In other words, to quote Deleuze and Guattari, minor literatures tend to lack major talent.[7] On the other hand, as Deleuze and Guattari also note, 'minor' literatures tend to be more political and they have more collective values. Is this the case with Greek-Australian writing?

Community Writing: the Greek Oral Tradition Continues

> *We are amateurs and so we earn our bread not by our writings but by the sweat of our brow.*
>
> - Savas Zoumis, *O Logos* 5 (1995)[8]

Living in the margins of a major language and culture tends to create the phenomenon of "community" writing or more specifically amateur writing which is not usual in the 'major'. Ever since Greek migrants arrived in Australia, they have written and published works in their Greek-language papers and magazines. It was therapeutic for them trying to survive amidst a foreign language and culture. After mass migration began in the 1950s, literary activity flourished not only in newspapers and periodicals, but also books. According to George Kanarakis, the first Hellenist who undertook systematic research into this area, over seventy books of literary works had been published by 1985.[9]

The main characteristic of Greek cultural life in Australia has been its orality. The great majority of Greek migrants who came to Australia up to the middle of

the 1960s were poor, under-educated and came from the rural areas of Greece. Such people, of course, did not have much connection with a written form of literature, except the folk-songs which were 'sung' in their place of origin.[10]

These Greek migrants having been nourished in an oral culture with a strong community spirit, continued along similar lines in Australia. Community spirit included the arts, especially poetry (albeit of the folk, oral kind). It was mainly through art that they felt that they were acting as a community. So poetry was the genre which flourished in Australia. The long poetic tradition which they had absorbed was now being perpetuated in Australia. As Jacques Bouchard discovered in his study of Greek-Canadian writers, it is also true of Greek migrants in Australia that they mostly came from a rural culture into an urban one.[11] Cut-off from the host Anglo-Australian culture, they set off to revive and perpetuate the rural culture they left behind. A culture rich in folk traditions.

The most known and respected Greek oral poet in Australia is Stathis Raftopoulos, who like his predecessor Odysseus came from Ithaka. In the following poem, the speaker is sending regards to his mother through a friend who is returning home.

Κι αν σε ρωτήσει η μάνα μου,
που χρόνια με προσμένει,
πες της πως δεν την ξέχασα
κι ας ζω μακριά στην ξένη.

Φεύγοντας είχα υποσχεθεί
γοργά πως θα γυρίσω.
Μα όλα μούρθανε στραβά.
Πες της πως δεν θ'αργήσω.

(«Πάρε μου χαιρετίσματα», *Η μπαλάντα του ξενιτεμένου*, σ. 98)

(And should you be asked by my mother/Who has long been waiting for my return/Tell her that I have not forgotten her/Even though I live in a foreign land. /I had promised her/Upon leaving that I would soon return/But things turned out bad/Tell her I will not be long.)

(*This is a rough translation of the above rhymed poem*).

Raftopoulos has been entertaining the Greek community with his poems which he recites by heart at various functions for more than forty years. He mostly improvises for each occasion and is a good example of an oral poet who reflects through his poems the reality of Greek life in Australia. The above poem encapsulates the dilemma facing the early migrants who metaphorically

lived with a foot in each country, discovering that their plan of spending only a few years, making money and returning to the mother country was not to be realised.

Raftopoulos' verse has the quality of real oral composition. It is in the traditional rhyming meter, alive, funny or sad and satirical depending on the occasion. What also makes his poems ring true is that Raftopoulos deals not with the myth of xenitia but with social reality. With his ability to produce hundreds of poems to describe every possible occasion Raftopoulos is the last of a special breed of oral composers. (These poems have subsequently been published by the poet in book form).

Most of the Greeks of his generation onwards, publish their poems either in Greek community magazines (such as *Antipodes* or *O Logos*) or publish them as books at their own expense.

The magazine *Antipodes* is the literary instrument of the Greek-Australian Cultural League which has been a major contributor to the perpetuation of Greek culture in Australia. Since its inception in 1971 it has published its magazine twice yearly giving many people in the Greek community in Melbourne (and in Australia) the opportunity to publish their works. The second magazine *O Logos*, is the instrument of the recently founded Hellenic Writers' Association, giving the opportunity to new writers to publish their poems or short prose pieces.[12]

With Greek being an oral culture and the majority of Greeks in Australia having been nourished in the oral tradition, most Greek migrants in Australia who have some natural artistic ability, 'compose' and publish poems rather than prose works. Their poems are simple, spontaneous compositions about all aspects of their life in Australia, or their past in Greece. However, among the plethora of such community 'poets', very few of them have the freshness and the authenticity of the true oral poet Raftopoulos.

In most of these poems, especially those written by many males, the myth of xenitia predominates such as, excessive nostalgia and idealisation of the mother country; idealisation of Greece as a country which never lost a war; as a country of legendary heroes; idealisation of the 'glorious' past of classical Greece implying unselfconsciously that modern Greeks are the direct descendants of the ancient Greeks. The present does not feature very highly among most of these 'poets'.

Idealising the past is common among many of the poems of these community writers who find an escape into the past good therapy for their present survival. While many writers escape social reality by resting on the laurels of the ancient past with their sentimental and highly patriotic poems, others, especially women choose to confront the present, thus giving us truthful pictures of migrant life in

the fifties and the sixties. Notice, for example the following extracts from poems by Greek migrant women:

> Κρατούσα μέσ' στα χέρια μου
> μία φωτογραφία,
> τον άνθρωπο που θα' περνα
> εδώ στην Αυστραλία.
>
> (A black and white photograph/I was clutching in my hand/of the man I was to marry/when in Australia I did land.)
>
> ("Sorrows of Migration" by Keti Pavlou in *Re-telling the Tale*, p. 15)

> Κάθε πρωί και κάθε βράδυ
> η ίδια πάντα επωδός
> σπίτι, εργοστάσιο, πάλι σπίτι
> ίδιος ο πόνος, ίδια οδός.
>
> (Every morning, every evening/always the same refrain/the same pain, the same path/home, factory, then home again)
>
> ("Foreign Land", by Dimitra Koutouli, in *Re-telling the Tale*, p. 106)

The phenomenon of self-publication of books is widely spread for two reasons: Firstly, the Greek community in Australia is too small to be able to make publishing of literature a viable proposition. It would be excessively optimistic to expect that more than five hundred Greeks in Melbourne (much less in Adelaide or Brisbane for example) would be the readers of any writing produced by Greek-Australians. Secondly, many of the works are not 'professional' and therefore do not meet the criteria of publishers in the 'centre', either in Greece or in Australia (if translated into English). It is in the difference of criteria that the conflict is revealed between orality and textuality, with the latter being the preferred mode of writing in our times. But as Dimitris Tziovas states in his article "Residual Orality and Belated Textuality in Greek Literature and Culture", the Greek literary tradition is based on orality and not on textuality.[13]

This is true of Australian Greeks and it accounts for the lack of prose writing in Greek-Australian writing, as most of the 'writers' have lacked a literary education. If however they write their compositions and publish them in newspapers, periodicals and most importantly in book form, then, they are going to be assessed with the same criteria as any other literary writing. This may account for the lack of interest from the Greek 'centre', as some of this amateurish

writing (if and when it comes to their attention) tends to reinforce the stereotype of migrants as workers, not literary writers.

Towards a Literary Approach

Largely due to the fact that Greek literature has been mostly oral, rather than textual (based on western textual patterns), very few Greek writers in Australia (of the first generation) have systematically written prose, especially short stories, and very few novels. Notable exceptions are John Vasilakakos from Melbourne[14] and Dimitris Tzoumacas from Sydney.[15]

However, two prominent short story writers (who are also prolific poets), Dina Amanatides from Melbourne and Vasso Kalamaras from Perth are considered by many as the quintessential 'Greek-Australian' writers documenting in literature the Greek-Australian migrant experience. Both arrived in Australia in the fifties having completed at least high school education in Greece. They have been living in Australia ever since and they are two writers dedicated to writing, whereas with most of the community writing is of an amateurish nature.

While many of the community poets perpetuate a myth of xenitia with its concomitant idealisation of the homeland, Amanatides and Kalamaras depict in their short stories the harsh realities faced by the first generation of Greek migrants. In other words, the emphasis in their writing is on the present, not the past.

Deleuze and Guattari have said that minor literatures tend to have a collective value.[16] This is true of Greek-Australian writing. Everything that is said, assumes a larger significance which the writer either intends or which the reader draws from it. In the case of Dina Amanatides, as I have argued previously (Migrant Daughters, p. 40), she has a definite aim: to plead the cause of the migrant (all migrants), and to make her characters the mouthpieces of the migrant's grievances. This seems to be a fairly common characteristic of any minor or peripheral group which tries to raise the consciousness of those outside it. Virginia Woolf argued this very point about nineteenth century women writers in England who wrote in the periphery of a male-dominated society.[17]

A didactic aspect has a long tradition in Greek literature, and in Amanatides' case, it accounts for the characters in her prose writing who tend to be flat and one-dimensional, always speaking with the same voice, a plot being almost non-existent and the message coming out unequivocally: migration is an unenviable situation. A quick look at her prose works Petrina Somata, [Stone Bodies], O Sporos ths Eirinis [The Seed of Peace] and Homatenioi Anthropoi [Earthen People] will confirm this.[18]

While it is true that Amanatides' characters do not have the kind of

complexity often expected from prose works, and they hardly ever surprise us as to the outcome, the repetition of the migrant motif is engraved in the readers' memory. Despite her technique not being of the self-conscious, 'textual' kind, the intensity of feeling is remarkable. While occasionally idealising Greece or often presenting migrants as martyrs, Amanatides also depicts with accuracy the conflict in each migrant's heart of where their loyalties lie: in the country left behind, or in the present. Her eloquent gnomic thought, "They say that the bread of exile is bitter, and yet it nourishes us", encapsulates fully the central dilemma of any migrant. (Skorpies Skepseis [Scattered Thoughts] 1988).

Vasso Kalamaras wrote her first collection of short stories in the fifties, isolated in a small farm town outside Perth. She wrote in an environment which had not the remotest interest in literary pusuits. In observing the people around her, Kalamaras could only see harshness, isolation, dislocation. So she wrote about this experience. Her narratives depict migrant women who try to survive in a hostile and claustrophobic environment which cuts women off from anything that is familiar or friendly.

Kalamaras' depiction of the isolation of the migrant woman is vivid and is as close to reality as it is possible to ascertain from socio-historical accounts or from personal histories. Kalamaras's central narrator gets into the skin of the characters and creates vivid portrayals of lonely women:

> Mrs Sophia washed up the evening dishes, calling out two or three times to the children, telling them to go to sleep without any more talk. She swept the kitchen floor and got out the ironing board to iron the shirts and aprons for the shop...
>
> It was the same every evening. Those last hours seemed never ending... She watched the flames which had come to life in the stove, and listened to the monotonous sad bubbling of the water boiling in the kettle. A great weight of loneliness began to oppress her... (*Other Earth*, p. 5)

The women in Kalamaras' short stories are not only oppressed by hard work but in addition, they are also oppressed by a patriarchal system which treats its women as second-class human beings. In the short story "Mademoiselle", Katerina comes to Australia thinking that she was coming to the land of plenty, only to find that her future husband wanted a worker for his shop:

> "Hey! where are you, you stupid bitch, blast you!" the heavy angry voice of her husband bellowed from the shop. His tongue dripped

> venom and betrayed his irritation...
>
> "I expected to get a woman who would standby in the shop, but instead of that up comes a half-dead cat..." (*Other Earth*, p. 40)

Kalamaras is far from interested in depicting a 'nice' picture of migration and perpetuating the myth that migrants always become successful in their new country. While a great number of migrants have settled relatively successfully in Australia, the first two decades, which Kalamaras depicts in her three seminal works (Other Earth, Bitterness and A Breadtrap) are not characterised by success but by great hardship.[19]

In her short story "The Pensioners", the old woman represents the great number of women who in the fifties and sixties were isolated linguistically and socially: "Here I have been driven mad for so many years, despised by people, drowning in a dumb world". (p. 29). The word dumb, or mutism (μουγγαμάρα in the original Greek), is a key word in Kalamaras' work, as it clearly represents the state of most Greek migrants in the first two decades of their life in Australia.

As with Amanatides, Kalamaras also depicts a reality which existed for the majority of the migrants who arrived in Australia up till the late sixties. While Amanatides uses 'types' to convey her message, Kalamaras uses more true to life, rounded characters, many of whom have become quite memorable.

Literary works by these two writers are indicative of the collective value of migrant writing and of the contribution which a minor literature can make, as they powerfully depict socio-historical realities resulting from the mass-migration of southern-Europeans to Australia.

Literature as High Art

Because most of the Greek community writing in Australia is based on an oral tradition and not having much knowledge of textuality, the reception of this kind of writing from either 'centre' (Australian or Greek), has been low-key to dismissive silence. Especially, since the phenomenon of 'oral' or community writing has never really existed in Australia (theirs has been mainly a written tradition based on western textual patterns), most mainstream critics in Australia tend to dismiss the majority of such 'marginal' writing as not 'good' writing.

Robert Dessaix, a critic from the Australian 'centre' in his article "Nice Work If You Can Get It" in the Australian Book Review (a large-circulation Australian mainstream literary magazine), dismisses constructs such as 'centre' and 'margins' as an invention of academia and claims that 'centres' consist only

of 'good' writing, not of ethno-specific writing. Therefore, he implicitly states, any writing which is 'good' will join the list of 'winners' in the 'centre'.[20]

Dessaix raised quite a controversy when his article appeared and rightly so. However, his argument does at least raise a significant point: Can literary writing be judged by non-literary criteria?

Despite the politicisation of everything including literature, academic courses in the nineties are still teaching literature (with a capital 'L') in core courses while 'other' works (such as 'ethnic' writers) are offered for study in elective, non-major courses. Proof of this is that those writers of Greek-Australian descent who have been admitted into the mainstream Australian literature are highly 'textual' writers such as the poet Dimitris Tsaloumas (who writes in both Greek and English), the poet and prose writer Antigone Kefala (who writes in English) and many of the Greek migrants' offspring who naturally write only in English.

Tsaloumas and Kefala both arrived in Australia in the early fifties and have been writing at least for the last three decades. In their works, they display all the characteristics of post-modernist writing, a style which is favoured by contemporary tastes and certainly by the 'centres'. It is a style which is aware of its own artifice and which uses words in such a way, as Dessaix has claimed, that raise the story they tell (either in poetry or prose) to literature. Tsaloumas and Kefala, have used extensively the theme of xenitia in their work, but in a highly textual, non-mimetic manner.

While those of the first-generation who write poems or prose came to Australia with high school education at the most and were brought up on a diet of folk songs and high school literary texts which did not include any writings beyond the ethographic or nationalistic mode, Dimitris Tsaloumas and Antigone Kefala received tertiary education (in the Humanities) in Australia resulting in their gaining a deep knowledge of Western styles of writing and of world literature, as well as literary theory.

In studying the works of Tsaloumas and Kefala, one becomes immediately aware of a high 'textuality' in their work. Despite the fact that I have argued earlier on in this essay that Greeks in Australia have written more poetry because Greece has a long oral tradition (and by implication it is easier to compose a poem than it is to write a novel), both Tsaloumas and Kefala treat poetry as a form of high art and as a means of combining intellectual rigour with deeply-felt emotion.

Their primary concern is the text which they treat as a literary construct. While their contemporaries (Greek migrants in the fifties) worked and developed a community spirit, presumably in order to survive in an alien environment, Tsaloumas and Kefala were becoming educated in the western tradition,

the former graduating from Melbourne University and going on to become a high school teacher of English literature, the latter graduating from Wellington University in New Zealand with an MA in literature. It is significant to note that both writers moved within an Anglo-Australian context, until they were 'discovered' by the Greek-Australians in the eighties when both were becoming accepted by the Australian establishment for their work. And this is a significant difference between these two writers and those moving within a Greek context and thus being in the periphery of both 'centres'.

As both these writers are fully aware of the artifice of literary writing, irony is an indispensable tool in their work. By using irony, they display their awareness of the multiplicity of approaches and responses to any given situation. The condition of being an exile is not something for them to express subjectively but to hold up, to analyse and even to mock.

The title of Tsaloumas' award-winning collection *The Observatory* (in Greek-English edition)[21] is revealing of his stance as a writer. He stands back and observes. He observes himself, the country he lives in, the country of his origin, Greek history, and much more. Perhaps Tsaloumas shows that one of the positive aspects of migration is to observe that which is taken for granted by the complacent majority comfortably sitting in the 'centres'. In his poem "Alexander the Great", the speaker of the poem is not of the West which exalts the importance of the historical past, nor of the East which is concerned with everyday survival, but the speaker is the sceptic who is not looking for answers to all the big questions, or suspects that there are none:

> I saw the mermaid this year again
> bathing by the desert islands
> of midday
> but I didn't speak to her as on other
> occasions. One tires of
> the same question.
>
> And where would I have seen Alexander the Great?
> (*The Observatory*, p. 17)

Tsaloumas' exile forces him to examine the situation. What is xenitia? How does it change us? What are the benefits, or the losses? Such questions are perhaps encapsulated in his epigrammatic lines: "to have held something in your hand/is worth the pain of losing it." ("Consolation", The Book of Epigrams, p.103)

The speaker of many of Tsaloumas' poems goes back home and questions what the locals call progress. He, the exile who returns home for a visit in the sixties and seventies (a time of material advancement in Greece), has seen more and has had time to reflect, so that what is progress for the locals is the opposite for him. In the following lines, we have an ironic juxtaposition of the two opposing views:

> Why the hell do you grumble and blame tourism
> for everything? What's wrong with it in any case?...
> If I had a property in the spot that yours is in,
> I'd raise a fifty-room hotel, I'd...
> That's how my fellow-countrymen go on, and truly
> they've never yet had whiter bread to eat,
> nor portlier corporations,
> nor a glossier sheen on their bald heads.
> (*The Book of Epigrams*, p. 93)

As for history and the ancient Greek past, Tsaloumas does not idealise it. It is simply there, as part of his consciousness and it is employed often when the speaker needs to discuss the present, as in the following lines where echoes from Herodotus are heard as the speaker sends a message to his mother: "Tell her that her son/came down to the spray-misted headlands/of the South and saw the onslaught of waves /huge as island hills and cried out /The sea! The sea!." (The Observatory, p. 125). In this poem a variety of elements, linguistic and historical come together to create a memorable poem.

Tsaloumas' many voices, lyric, epigrammatic, ironic, philosophical, combine to give us a multi-faceted, polyphonic view of migration: loss and pain, gain and enrichment.

Antigone Kefala, by being a writer writing in English in Australia should by all accounts be considered an Australian writer, as there are many Australian writers whose origins are other than English-speaking.[22] The interesting phenomenon is that when Hellenists began to research writing by writers of Greek descent, they discovered that there were also a considerable number of writers of Greek origin who were writing in English. Kefala is a member of the Hellenic diaspora having lived in Romania and then migrating to New Zealand

after World War II and finally settling in Australia in 1960. Like Tsaloumas, Kefala is also a detached, intellectual writer, interested in deconstructing myths, not in maintaining them. Kefala has written both poetry and prose and it is in her prose especially that she uses young narrators like herself who, being young and slightly detached from the generation of their parents, are able to sit and observe the older generation as being deeply rooted to the past:

> They both stayed in the kitchen and cried over her sorrows, over their sorrows, over the sorrows of the world...
>
> I was cleaning the house. The sharp voice of the vacuum cleaner drowned their voices, from time to time I could see Loula wiping her eyes. What could I do to save them? They were going one by one and I could do nothing to stop it. Like the telegram last month, so deceptively simple. 'Buried last Sunday.'
>
> (*The Island*, p. 29) [23]

The above picture convincingly encapsulates the life of migrants being tied to the past from where the news of the death of some loved one arrives with monotonous regularity. However, the narrator, being the child of migrants remains detached so that we get enough of the intensity of the moment but without the sentimentality of a more personally involved narrator.

From biographical information we learn that migration for Kefala was extremely hard.[24] Her family, having come from a middle-class, cultured environment in Europe, was relegated to hard manual labour in an antipodean country which must have seemed like a descent to Hades.[25] However, Kefala, by being aware of textual techniques, did not simply pour out her bitterness in some personal migrant testimony, no matter how strong the need for it was, but instead wrote an ironic story in the fairy-tale mode. In this, far from simply idealising the mother country or criticising the new one for its backwardness or its perceived vulgarity, the writer gives us an ironic view on the problems of migration with language and cultural differences being at the heart of it. For example, the central character Alexia is puzzled by the superfluous use of the word 'happy' in her new country:

> For she felt Happy to be an Enormous Word, a word full of flamboyant colours, which only people who had reached an ecstatic state had a right to use... But she could not explain this, for everyone on the Island kept asking, as if this Fantastic Word was the basic measure of their days

> 'Are you Happy?' Does this make you Happy? 'Isn't this Happiness?' and so on. And Alexia imagined them all dancing in the streets, flying above houses, their hair blowing in the wind, surrounded by flowers and angels.
>
> (*Alexia*, p. 98)

In her novella The Island, Kefala implies through Melina, the young narrator who enrols at the university, that migrants who are forced to live a divided life, often acquire (and by implication give back) a deeper understanding of the world: "... in order to understand history one needs a type of vision that only people placed at the crossroads could provide. That is, people who lived between two cultures, who were forced to live double lives, belonging to no group..." (*The Island*, p. 10).

Where Kefala goes further than the other Greek writers whose characters move only within a Greek migrant context, is that she is able to compare and juxtapose the two worlds, often to analyse them, even by mocking them as she often does in Alexia, but not by mythologising and mostly being fully aware that what she deals with is a literary construct, not social history.

What Kefala seems to achieve by being able to compare and contrast both worlds, is continued and developed by the so-called second-generation Greeks, that is, those either born in Australia of Greek parents or those who arrived in Australia at a very young age and therefore gained a western-style education.

These children write from the perspective of being firmly rooted in the new land, albeit not without the concomitant dilemmas and questions about identity. David Malouf, a prominent fourth-generation Australian writer of Lebanese descent has said that it is the children and the grandchildren who will write best about the migrant condition, as they possess the required detachment from their parents' culture to write more objectively, that is to turn their social history into literature.

The Significance of 'Minors' [26]

It seems already quite obvious that the distinctions between majors and minors have more often to do with literary value, that is, what is termed 'good' writing by current criteria. Can Greek-Australian literature make a difference? Salman Rushdie in his recent visit to Australia (December 1995) repeatedly said that he believes that hybrid cultures can produce the best writing. Rushdie's point is significant because a writer with access to and knowledge of two worlds can project a more interesting and clearer vision. Tsaloumas and Kefala are two examples.

The children of Greek migrants in Australia have already shown that their dual culture is an advantage in that it enables them to become astute observers of both worlds. Ideally, the best writers will be those who will take the best from both worlds. Those writers who move only within the one language and culture (most first-generation writers) are by necessity limited. Limited in their scope and limited in finding an audience.

I believe that Greek-Australian writing is blessed with a 'good' topic: migration and a divided life. In the case of writers like Tsaloumas, Kefala and some of the second-generation writers, the happy union of a good topic and a 'textual' style has achieved an excellent result, while in the case of the so-called community writing, the necessary tools are missing. In other words, amateurism in writing can only produce works of limited literary value and there is actually a sharp division between writing which is unaware of its own artifice and that which is. Tziovas has demonstrated the chasm between oral and textual writing in Greek literature. The same chasm exists in Australia where, of the first-generation of writers, only a very small number writes in current styles.

The difference between the Greek-Australian 'minor' literature and the Australian 'major' is that the former consists of a mixture of amateur and professional writing, while the centre consists only of professional. A small number of writers of the 'minor' literature however can join the body of 'winners' in the 'major'. So far, of the first generation there is already such a number.

George Kanarakis in his recent article "Migrant Writing in Multicultural Australia: the case of the Greeks" argued vehemently against sub-categories such as 'minors' against 'majors'.[27] While in principle this is what we all wish, the reality so far has shown that in regard to the field of 'literature', literary merit is the only passport to it. Even though departments of literature do teach cultural studies alongside the literary canon, the reality is that prizes for best literary works are not given on cultural/ethnic grounds, but on literary merit, irrespective of whether any decision by any panel is ever totally objective.

Admittedly, a canon does seem a rather elitist construct, a realm which contains literary texts deemed 'winners' by certain people's criteria. One can argue ad nauseam about the subjectivity of such criteria (i.e. who decides what is 'good' literature, or 'good' for whom? etc.) but the answer to this is simple. Artistic tastes are decided by those in power (i.e. cultural power) and unless there is some dramatic development, which is not likely, the criteria for assessing literary works will remain unchanged.

Significantly, Greek-Australian writing of the 'literary', 'textual' kind, has played an important role in widening the Australian 'canon' to include writers from Australia's post-war arrivals such as Tsaloumas and Kefala. Considering its limitations as a literature created somewhere in mid-space, away from its linguistic and cultural centres, to produce even one writer like Tsaloumas, who in

1994 won the Patrick White Award for major literary achievement in Australia, is a measure of the significance of 'minor' literatures.

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NOTES

1. The Melbourne poet was Dimitris Tsaloumas whose first Greek-English collection, **The Observatory** was awarded first prize for Australian poetry in 1983.

2. Sneja Gunew has been a major contributor to challenging the notion of Australian literature as a 'mainstream' and all non-Anglo-Australian writers as 'marginal'. Her book **Striking Chords: Multicultural Literary Interpretations** (co-edited with Katerina Longley) gives a mosaic of views by the editors as well as by academics and writers on the subject (Allen & Unwin, 1992).

3. The pioneer of research into the Greek-Australian area is George KANARAKIS. See his publications, **The Literary Presence of Greeks in Australia**. Foundation for Modern Greek Studies, Athens 1985 (in Greek) and Greek Voices in Australia, (in English translation), ANU 1988. See also Con CASTAN, **Conflicts of Love**, Phoenix Publications, Brisbane 1986 and his long introduction to **Reflections: Selected Works from Greek Australian Literature** (Th. Spilias & S. Messinis, eds). Elikia Books, Melbourne 1988.

4. See George Papaellinas, "Exoticism is just a boutique form of xenophobia: writing in a multicultural society" in Gunew & Longley (eds), **Striking Chords** (op. cit), p. 165 and Nikos Papastergiadis, "The journeys within: Migration and identity in Greek-Australian literature", p. 149.

5. The Australia Council, a government body for the support of the arts has been helping financially those who wish to write in their own language.

6. See Helen Nickas, **Migrant Daughters: the Female Voice in Greek-Australian Prose Fiction**, Owl Publishing, Melbourne 1992 and Helen Nickas & Konstandina Dounis (eds), **Re-telling the Tale: Poetry and Prose by Greek-Australian Women Writers**, Owl Publishing, Melbourne 1994.

7. See Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, **Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature**, UMP 1986, p. 16.

8. Savas Zoumis said this in an interview published in **O Logos** 5(1995). Zoumis was articulating the problems which characterise Greek-community writing and is one of the few people who are self-critically discussing our locally-produced writing.

9. See Kanarakis' introduction in **Greek Voices in Australia**, ANU 1988, op. cit.

10. In addition to Kanarakis' **Greek Voices in Australia**, see also A. Kapardis & Anastasios Tamis (eds), **Afstraliotes Hellenes**, Melbourne: River Seine Press 1988 and Anastasios Tamis, **The immigration and Settlement of Macedonian Greeks in Australia**, Melbourne La Trobe Uni. Press, 1993.

11.See Jacques Bouchard's article «Ο Ομιλος Ελλήνων Λογοτεχνών του Μοντρεάλ»in the Greek periodical *Η λέξη* 110(1992), p. 575.

12. **O Logos** is a magazine published by the Association of Hellenic Writers of Australia. However, it is interesting, and telling, to discover that many of the established writers do not belong to it, nor do they publish their works in it.

13. See Dimitris Tziovas, "Residual Orality and Belated Textuality in Greek Literature and Culture" in **Journal of Modern Greek Studies** 7(1989), pp.321-335.

14. John Vasilakakos, a writer and academic, has published several novels and other prose works in Greek, and has been acknowledged both in Australian and in Greece. His books have been published mainly by Gutenberg in Athens and include the psychographic novel **To Kolpo (The Trick)** published by Elikia Books in Melbourne.

15. Dimitris Tzoumacas' two prose works are: **The Earth is Hollow-Merry Sydney** (Greek-English edition, Leros Press, Australia and rep. 1994 by Agrostis, Athens) and Η γυναίκα με τ' αγκάθια στο λαιμό, in Greek by Agrostis, Athens 1993.

16. See Deleuze & Guattari, **op. cit.** p. 16.

17. See Virginia Woolf, **Women and Writing** (intro. by Michele Barrett). London 1979, p. 49.

18. Dina Amanatides has shown her commitment to writing by publishing all her works (poetry and prose) at her own expense.

19. Vasso Kalamaras' earlier works were published by herself, while her prose works have been published as follows: **Other Earth** (bilingual short stories) by Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1977, **Bitterness** (bilingual short stories) by Artlook Books 1983, **The Breadtrap** (bilingual play) by Elikia Books 1986 and **The Same Light** (short stories in English translation only) by Fremantle Press 1989.

20. See Robert Dessaix's essay "Nice Work If You Can Get It" in **Australian Book Review** 128(1991), p. 22-28.

21. Tsaloumas' published collections by the University of Queensland Press include the bilingual **The Observatory**, 1983 and **The Book of Epigrams**, 1985; the all-English collections **Falcon Drinking**, 1988, **Portrait of a Dog**, 1992 and **The Barge**, 1993.

22. See George Kanarakis, "Migrant Writing in Multicultural Australia: the Case of the Greeks" in **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol.3. No.2 (1995), p. 17-24)

23. All (but one) of Kefala's works were published in English by various Australian publishers: **The First Journey**, Wild & Woolley, 1975, **Alexia**, John Ferguson 1984, **The Island**, Hale & Iremonger, 1984, and re-print of **Alexia** in an English-Greek edition by Owl Publishing, 1994. Her last collection of poetry is **Absence**, Hale & Iremonger 1992.

24. See interview with Kefala in **Migrant Daughters**, op. cit. p. 225 and A. Kefala, "Statement" in **Striking Chords**, op. cit., p. 49

25. See introduction by Helen Nickas in **Alexia: A Tale of Advanced Children**. Owl Publishing, 1994

26. I owe some of the inspiration for what I say in this paper to a number of articles which appeared in **JMGS** 8(1990) and especially to Gregory Jusdanis' paper titled "The importance of being Minor", even though we are both discussing different matters.

27. In **Hellenic Studies/Études helléniques**, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1995, p. 17

The Greek-Bahamian Community: "Past, Present, and Future"

Andreas, Nicholas, Sophia and George A. Kourvetaris *

RÉSUMÉ

La communauté grecque des Bahamas a été fondée en 1887 par des pionniers venus des îles de la mer Égée, oeuvrant au sein de l'industrie des éponges. A partir des années 40, les membres des deuxième et troisième générations se dirigent davantage vers d'autres domaines comme l'hôtellerie et la restauration.

L'actuelle communauté grecque des Bahamas est prospère et on retrouve ses membres au sein de différentes professions libérales et entreprises. Les caractéristiques observées dans cette communauté sont similaires à celles des autres communautés de la diaspora grecque.

ABSTRACT

The Greek-Bahamian community originated in 1887. It emerged out of the sponge industry of the protoporoi (pionneers) who came from the Aegean Islands. By the 1940's, the coming of age of the second generation and the start of the third generation, Greek-Bahamians turned to other areas of business.

The present Greek-Bahamian community is a prosperous one branching in various entreprises and professions. The patterns observed in this community are similar to the other communities of the greek diaspora.

Sixty miles off the South coast of Florida and stretching as far as Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic lies the Commonwealth of the Islands of the Bahamas. A coral archipelago of 700 islands, only 29 of which are inhabited, along with 2,000 or more rocks and cays. The Bahamas has a population of about 269,000 people, most of whom live on ten islands (New Providence, Grand Bahamas, Eleuthera[1], Abaco, Exuma, Long Island, Inagna, Cat Island, Bimini, and Andros[2]). With the exception of 10-15 per cent which is of European background, the rest of the inhabitants are of African descent and some of mixed parenthood. While Andros is the largest of the islands and the least explored and populated, New Providence is one of the smallest and most populated. The city of Nassau, located on New Providence Island, is the capital of the Bahamas, and has a population of approximately 165,000 people, which is more than half of the total population of all the Bahamian Islands.

The Bahamas is an English-speaking country that gained its independence from England on July 10, 1973. However, the Bahamas continues to be a mem-

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ber of the British Commonwealth. It has a British-type parliamentary system along with a prime minister and a governor general who is recommended by the prime minister and who must be approved by the Queen of England. The parliamentary democracy has operated without interruption for 275 years.

The economy of the Bahamas depends predominantly on tourism, international banking, and other financial services. In addition, retail and wholesale distributive trade, light manufacturing, agriculture, and fisheries comprise the other sectors of the Bahamian economy. The gross domestic product (GDP) of the Bahamas exceeds $3 billion, 60% of which comes from tourist related activities. The per capita income of the country was $11, 000 in 1994. The Bahamian dollar is on par with the U.S. dollar. Except for property taxes, there are neither income nor corporate taxes in the Bahamas.

The Discovery of the Greeks of the Bahamas

On December 27, 1994, George Kourvetaris, Professor of Sociology of Northern Illinois University, landed at Nassau, the capital of the commonwealth of the Bahamas. Two days later his daughter Sophia and his two sons Andreas and Nicholas joined him to spend the next couple weeks in the Bahamas. Before leaving the United States, they had very little knowledge of the islands of the Bahamas other than the usual information of a tourist haven for those who wanted to escape the zero temperatures of the Midwest and to enjoy the sun and the sea of the Caribbean beaches and Islands. What made their vacation more intriguing was the discovery in Nassau of a highly prosperous and successful Greek community.

Initially, we were introduced to some members of the Greek community including the Greek Orthodox priest through our host and hostess Mr. Stephanos and Maria Antonas, who operate a Guest House on Market Street[3] in Nassau. Using a variety of approaches including participant observation, informal interviews with members of the Greek community and extensive field work, we were able to collect some useful data about the Greek community of Nassau in Providence, Bahamas. In the next few pages we would like to present our joint report about our experiences and perceptions of the Greeks of Nassau[4].

Three major questions guided our research of the Greek community of the Bahamas. When and why did the Greeks come to the Bahamas? What is their present socio-economic status? And how does the future look for the Greek-Bahamian community? In other words, questions dealt with the past, present, and future.

The Beginning of the Greek-Bahamian Community

In 1887, the arrival of 24 Greek sponge divers from the island of Kalymnos,

one of the Greek Dodecanese islands in the Aegean Sea, marked the beginnings of the Greek presence in the Bahamas. The most likely sponsor of these men was the Vouvalis Sponge Packers and Exporters Company. The Vouvalis head office was in London and was established in 1882. (Public Records Office, Archives section, 1974:14). Indeed, the Vouvalis Company had been one of the first major firms to establish a sponge business and warehouses in the Bahamas. This Company was a Greek company, which in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, expanded its operation to major sponging centers in Africa, Cuba, Bahamas, and Tarpon Springs, Florida (Public Records Office, 1974:14). Three years later in 1890, the George Damianos Sponge Company was also established as packers and exporters of sponges in Nassau, Bahamas (Public Records Office, Archives Section, 1974:16). It must be noted that the arrival of the 24 pioneer Greek Sponge divers was perceived by the native Bahamian sponge merchants as a threat to the local control of sponge fisheries. In a letter to the *Nassau Guardian* paper in December 1887, sent by Joseph Brown, a leading sponge merchant at that time he wrote: "Twenty-four aliens have arrived, experts in the gathering, clipping and packaging of sponge, and if I am rightly informed, determined to handle it themselves in all stages from the gathering to the packing, thus excluding native labor. If the experiment should be successful, it is quite probable that we should soon have hundreds of men in our midst, whose ways are not our ways, who would form a distinct section of the population, and who would only continue to remain here until such time as the sponge beds become exhausted or the business ceases to be profitable". (*Nassau Guardian*, Dec. 28, 1887).

This letter by Joseph Brown had some discriminatory and alarming remarks against these early Greek men due primarily to economic competition. The letter further suggested that a law should be enacted to protect native sponge fisheries, against 'encroachment of aliens'.

Brown's letter triggered a similar wave of letters of protest by Bahamians sent to local papers to dramatize the threat which the entry of the two dozen Greeks in the sponging industry posed to native spongers. An additional demand for protective legislation against this alleged Greek "invasion" into the sponge business was made in a petition, signed by 14 of 29 members of the House of Assembly and 141 other citizens, presented to the Governor of the colony in March 1888. (*Nassau Guardian*, 3 March, 1888). The argument in the petition was basically an urgent plea to protect local resources from foreign intrusion and from the dangers of attracting foreigners who would not easily be integrated into Bahamian society. Indeed, the thrust of the petition was outright anti-Greek arguing that the "Greeks by culture and race were not amenable to be integrated into the Bahamian society. The petition went on to state that the only objective of the Greeks was to gather that product of nature, the sponges, and thereby crush the backbone of our prosperity, and upon which the very existence of a large portion of this commmunity exist" (*Nassau Guardian*, 3 March, 1888).

Later, however this anticipated "invasion" of Greeks into the sponge business never materialized. Some attempts by Greeks to bring sponge divers from the Greek Islands to compete with the natives proved to be an utter failure. The Greek sponge divers "could not compete with the natives and those who had embarked in the undertaking suffered to considerable loss in both time and money" (*Nassau Guardian*, 5 Oct. 1889). In general, Greek immigrants to the Bahamas concentrated on the buying, packing, and exporting of sponges. Indeed, initially many Greeks came to the Bahamas as buying agents for the Vouvalis Company. Some of them established their own sponge business after accumulating some savings. As we mentioned one of the earliest independent buyers of sponges was George Damianos and his son who started his business in 1890. Other early Greek buyers of sponges were such individuals as Christofilis, Esfakis, Psilinakis, Mungos, Tiliacos, and Mailis (Transcript of interview with Mr. Psilinakis, 15 Oct. 1973, Dept. of Archives; also "The Greek Connection", *The Tribune*, 26 March 1981).

By 1924, the Greek community had established their control of the sponge/trade as buyers and exporters. Specifically in an editorial in the *Nassau Tribune*, August 1924, it was noted that the "Greeks practically control the sponge business of the island". It was estimated that they paid 20,000 annually in wages. However, despite the growing economic importance of the Greeks, they were not readily accepted socially by members of the white "Bahamian elite" (The "Greek Connection", *The Tribune*, 26 March, 1981).

It must be emphasized that the Greeks prospered in the sponge business as sponge merchants and not as sponge divers. They were the buyers and traders. Native Bahamians actually went out on the boats and picked up the sponges on the sea floor of various Bahamian Islands, such as Acklins Island, Abaco, Mayaguana, Turks Islands and so on. The competition was most intense among the Greek sponge merchants and buyers themselves. Even brothers competed for the price of sponges. Over all we believe it was the Greek merchants who benefited more from the sponge industry than the natives, who "always found themselves in debt". Dr. Gail Saunders, in the video on "The History of the Sponge Industry" also attended to this. The Greeks were essentially the middle men and the entrepreneurs who bought the sponges and sold them throughout the world. This entrepreneurial ethos of the Greeks is similar in most Greek communities of the diaspora, and is one of the primary sources of economic prosperity of the Greeks.

About the same time in 1896, the first Greek man arrived in Tarpon Springs, Florida who later became the first pioneer of the sponge Greek community. His name was John Cocoris who came from Leonidion, Kynouria, the eastern province of Arcadia, Peloponnesos, in south central Greece. John Cocoris became the driving force of the sponge diving industry and the builder of the

Greek community of Tarpon Springs. (Frantzis, 1962:40). The history of sponge fishing in Florida began in 1849. Hook-spongers were natives of Key West, Cuba, and the Bahamas. (Frantzis, 1962:38). In 1889, John K. Cheyney, a wealthy banker from Philadelphia, and a rich landowner in Tarpon Springs, entered the sponge business and built warehouses in 1890.

Gradually, an influx of sponge merchants arrived from Greece, particularly from the Dodecanese Islands of Kalymnos, Halki, and Simi, and they established warehouses in Tarpon Springs (Frantzis, 1962:54-55). In Tarpon Springs the sponge industry was a multi-million dollar industry which flourished until the 1950s when the industry declined due to the use of synthetic and plastic products. It must be stressed that the sponge industry became the focal point of Greek community building in both Tarpon Springs, Florida and Nassau, Bahamas.

Although most early Greeks of the Bahamas engaged in the sponge trade, by the 1920s they began to venture into other businesses. For example, Theophilus Mungos established a bakery in 1924. By 1927, there were 4 branches of this bakery. Also the Mungos family opened the "Parisian Store" which sold women's wear imported from Paris, including perfumes, and which catered to the lucrative tourist trade (*Nassau Tribune*, 17 Dec. 1927). Other Greeks owned fresh fruit stores and imported vegetables imported from the United States. One of these was the Californian Fruit Store owned by the Bantouvanis family. By 1930 two other fruit stores owned by Bahamian Greeks were established - the Olympia Fruit Store and The Acropolis Fruit Store ("Greek Connection" 26 March 1981; *Nassau Tribune*, 17 Dec. 1927; 10 Dec. 1930).

Another area of Greek enterprises was the restaurant business, which primarily depended on winter tourism. For example, D.N. Photiades, who had previously owned a central lunch stand, operated a fruit, vegetable, delicatessen and light lunch business called The Grand Central in 1926. (*Nassau Tribune*, 21 Aug. 1926). Other restaurants owned by Greeks included Bahamas Restaurant (operated by Steve Plakaris & Co.) and Prince George Restaurant (operated by Jim Glico) (*Nassau Guardian*, Sept.1928; *Nassau Tribune*, 8 Jan. 1930). Although sponge trade was the first attraction that led Greek immigrants to the Bahamas, the sharp increase in the size of the Greek community after World War I was largely due to individuals joining friends and family members who had immigrated earlier (the "Greek Connection", *The Tribune*, 26 March 1981).

A Profile of Present Greek Community of the Bahamas

For years, the words "Greek" and "sponge merchant" were practically synonymous in Nassau, Bahamas. In 1939, a mysterious marine disease attacked the sponge beds and virtually wiped out one of the most lucrative businesses in the Bahamas (*Bahamas Handbook*, 1970-71:55). Though some

species recovered the blight, synthetics quickly took the profitability out of fishing for natural sponge. Today the sponge industry is no longer an important source of income. You can still find sponges in souvenir shops. In addition, a few merchants still maintain small sponge businesses but only as a sideline.

During the early 1930s, the Greek Orthodox Church was built largely through the efforts of master carpenter-builder James Mosko who came from Kalymnos a little later when Italy controlled the Greek Dodecanese Islands. At present, Mosko (second generation) is considered one of the wealthiest Greek-Bahamian s. The Greek church in Nassau was the first Orthodox church in the entire West Indies. Since its founding, three priests, including Father Kolyvas, the present one, have served the church. Father Kolyvas, who by profession is also a printer, came to Nassau in 1953. He became the parish priest, the Greek school teacher, and the printer who operated his printing shop from his home to supplement his income. In his words, "there was no other way to support myself and my family but to continue my printing business which I knew before I migrated to Nassau from Kalymnos, Greece." The community could not adequately support a full-time priest and his family. However, the Greek community has provided him with a home that is adjacent to the church. A number of Greeks, concede that even if the priest retired, he and his wife would continue to live in the present church home. At age 79, although retired from the priesthood, Father Kolyvas continues to serve as priest of the Bahamian Greeks. For his services to the Greek community, the Greek Archdiocese of North and South America has given him an appreciation award. In addition, the Greek Government has awarded him an award for his contribution to the resistance movement against the German occupation of the Dodecanese and Greece during WWII (1941-45).

As mentioned before, the present Greek-Bahamian community emerged out of the sponge industry of the protoporoi (pioneers), that is, all those who came primarily from the Greek Island of Kalymnos, some however came from the Greek islands of Skopelos and Crete in the Aegean also. The nature and social structure of the present Greek-Bahamian community reflects the beginnings of the protoporoi, but is not a pale replica of the early sponge industry which at one time was dominated by the Greek merchants.

By the 1940s and the coming of age of the second generation, the Greeks of the Bahamas, like their counterparts in Tarpon Springs, Florida, branched out in other types of businesses. From a sponge business community, the second and third generation of Greek-Bahamian s entered other areas of business and professions. As one would expect, the first generation Greek immigrants provided the economic base for their progenies who in turn branched out in other business ventures and professions. Similar to the Greek communities in the United States, the early restauranteurs and other service establishments provided the economic base for the second generation (see Moskos, 1990, Kourvetaris, 1987,

1994). Many second generation Greek-Bahamian s pursued careers in other occupations and professions such as medicine, law, architecture, construction, real estate, retail stores, restaurants, jewelry and perfume shops, hotels, accounting, carpentry, and teaching. In our view, we believe Greek-Bahamian s have achieved a middle and upper middle class status economically in the Bahamian society. In addition, at least a dozen or so millionaire Greeks from the U.S. and Greece live in exclusive areas of Nassau, along with other local and foreign elites. Most Greek shop owners have resort homes in the Bahamas and belong to exclusive clubs. For reasons that are unclear, these wealthy Greeks are not visible in the Greek-Bahamian community. They usually appear once or twice a year in the Greek church. In this wealthy group of foreign Greeks there are at least half a dozen wealthy Greek-Bahamian s.

According to the Greek priest Father Kolyvas, the Bahamas in general and the Greek community in particular began to bloom in the 1950s. The closing of Cuba in 1959 contributed to a shift of tourism from Cuba to the Bahamas. The last 30 years or so, the Bahamas and the Greeks have prospered due primarily to American tourism. There is a fear, however, that the re-opening of Cuba with the anticipated end of Castro's regime, might hurt the economy of the Bahamas.

At present, there are approximately 320 Greeks in Nassau, Bahamas of which according to the Greek priest 80-85% are members of the local Greek Orthodox Church. This includes first, second, and third generations including mixed marriages. There are at least another 100 Greeks on other islands of the Bahamas. This includes first generation (recent immigrants from Greece), their children (second generation), and grandchildren (3rd generation). Only a few families and individuals came since the 1960s. Most second generation Greeks speak Greek but not the third generation. Similar to other ethnic groups, the Greeks of the Bahamas have married non-Greek spouses. Those who marry non-Greeks, usually bring their spouses to the Greek church. By third generation however, most marriages tend to be mixed and very few of the 3rd generation children speak Greek. Second generation parents no longer speak Greek to their children. Furthermore, the Greek language is not taught by the Greek priest to the Greek-Bahamian children. However, the liturgy at the church continues to be mostly in Greek. Only the sermon is in both Greek and English.

The first generation Greeks came primarily as workers and eventually became entrepreneurs. They opened restaurants (about 8-10), including one cafeteria and two carry-outs and Dominos Pizzas[5].

The second generation is mostly in the professional realm 5-6 doctors, a dozen or so lawyers, about half a dozen teachers, and informants told us that many of the second and third generation Greek-Bahamian children go to the United States, Canada, and England to pursue their higher education. After they finish their education many of them return to the Bahamas.

Granting independence to the Bahamas benefited all Bahamians including the Greeks. One of our interviewees put it this way: "Prior to independence, the British ruled the Bahamas with a local ruling elite. At present if you have an idea and want to work, you are free to make money." Indeed, the Greeks and other white ethnic groups in the Bahamas are doing well especially after the Bahamas gained their independence from the British.

When Archbishop Iakovos, the primate of North and South America visited then Governor Sir Charles Dundas in the 1970s prior to the Bahamas independence, it has been reported that "the governor told the archbishop that the best element in Nassau was the Greeks" (Bahams Handbook, 1970-71:61).

Future Prospects of the Greek-Bahamian Community

As the first generation gradually dies out, more and more second, third, and subsequent generations are replacing the Greek-Bahamian community. In our interviews and participant observation, we have come to certain conclusions about the future of the Greek-Bahamian community. Some of our observations are presented in terms of tentative propositions for further research.

1. The Greek Orthodox Church is the focal point of the Greek-Bahamian community. However, the present structure and facilities of the church do not adequately serve the needs of a growing third and younger generation of Greek-Bahamian s and mixed parenthood children. The old timers are attached to Greek traditions and to the Greek language who are represented by the protoporoi (a few still alive) and by those Greeks who came during the 1950s, including Father Kolyvas. The young congregation and children of mixed marriages do not understand the liturgy which is almost entirely in Greek (with the exception of the gospel, the apostle, and the sermon which are in both).

2. We found no sense of strong ethnic Greek identity among the Greek-Bahamian s. The most salient characteristics of the Greek-Bahamian s seemed to be a pervasive entrepreneurial ethos bordered on individualism, competition, and enterprising. In the words of some Greeks who arrived in the 1960s to the Bahamas: "Greek-Bahamian s are for money... They don't talk to you if you are not well off... Even relatives and members from the same family are competing."

3. Most Greek-Bahamian s, both old and new, came overwhelmingly from the island of Kalymnos in the Dodecanese. Many of them are related. The new Greeks (who came here in the 1960s and later) are a minority and as a rule do not associate with old timers and their progenies, especially if the new Greeks were from different regions of Greece. We learned that many of the new Greeks who came during the 1960s to Bahamas returned to Greece. Only a small number of the new Greeks remained especially those who had relatives already

there. Some of the new arrivals came as sailors working in Greek ships in the Carribean and decided to settle to make their living in Nassau, Bahamas.

To our question what three things stand out about the Greeks of the Bahamas, one second generation respondent put it this way: "Greeks are prosperous, law abiding, and Christian." Another second generation informant phrased it this way, "Greeks are now well accepted and integrated into the Bahamian society. The Greeks feel at home, and no serious problems exist between the Greeks and the rest of the Bahamians." we found no evidence of poor Greeks in the Bahamas.

In conclusion, we can say that Greek-Bahamian s have evolved from a limited number of original Greek sponge entrepreneurs to a full-fledged Greek-Bahamian community branching out in various other small enterprises and professions. As a rule, the early Greek immigrants started as workers and with small business. By second generation, some Greek-Bahamian s continued in the same line of business as their fathers while others branched out in other enterprises and professions. Similar patterns can be observed in other Greek communities among the Greeks of the diaspora.

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ENDNOTES

1. Eleuthera is a fairly large island in the Bahamas. In 1649, English dissidents in search of religious freedom, shipwrecked on the shores of this island, named it Eleuthera, from the Greek word "free" or "freedom".

2. There is a similar Greek Isle in the Cyclades Islands in the Aegean Sea called Andros. The Greek Andros is famous for its shipowners. The Bahamian Andros was once famous for sponges. Some of the Greeks of the Bahamas believe the first Greeks who reached the island were from Andros. However, the most likely derivation of the name was from the British colonial Governor of Massachusetts and New England,who is said to have received a grant of land in the Bahamas from the Lord Proprietor. (**Handbook**, 1965-1966 fifth edition p. 98). The name of the governor was Sir Edmund Andros.

3. A guest house is a private house approved by the city to be in part used as a place of accommodation for tourists. Guest houses provide shared bathrooms and showers, have a refrigerator, room services including clean bed sheets and towels everyday. There is no radio or T.V. in the room. There is also a local telephone. As a rule guest houses are cheaper than hotels or other accommodations.

4. Interviews and participant observations were supplemented by a visit of the father and his son Andreas to the Department of the Archives where they met Dr. Gail Saunders, the Director and a native Bahamian historian educated both in Canada and England. Dr. Saunders and her staff in the department were very helpful in providing us available historical information in the Archives concerning the Greek community of the Bahamas. A video which was used at the Pompey Museum on Bay street in Nassau for visitors was also helpful in giving us a historical background and the social structure of the Bahamian society. Dr. Gail Saunders was the major speaker in that video.

5. Five of the Greek-owned restaurants are named Lums, Grand Central, Skans Cafeteria, Coco, and Imperial. They also own and operate hotels such as the Olympia, El Greco, Parthenon (recently sold). There are 5 jewelry shops owned mostly by second generation Greeks.

Suicidal Adolescents and the Greek Community of Montreal

Danae Savides*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine le phénomène des adolescents suicidaires d'origine grecque à Montréal et les réactions familiales à cette problématique.

En comparaison avec l'ensemble de la population, le tabou entourant le phénomène du suicide est très prononcé au sein de la communauté grecque. Cette realité sociale s'explique en partie par l'influence de l'idéologie religieuse, par les attitudes sociales ainsi que par l'emphase particulière que met la société grecque sur l'importance du rôle parental. En effet, les familles grecques sont davantage réticentes à l'intervention sociale que le reste de la population.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the phenomenon of Greek adolescent suicide and familial reactions to this amongst members of the Greek Community of Montreal. Interpretation of the data revealed the following: the social stigma attached to suicide is more pronounced in the Greek community than in the larger population. This is because of the influence of religious ideology, societal attitudes and the particular importance Greek society places on family and parental roles. Greek families are more resistant to treatment.

Introduction

Suicide is a phenomenon that has been a cause for concern to many therapists and researchers (Dunne, McIntosh & Dunne, 1987; Stillion, McDowell & May, 1989). In Quebec, suicide is one of the primary causes of premature mortality (Bellerose, Lavallee & Camirand, 1994). Quebec together with France, Belgium, Hungary and the Scandinavian countries has one of the highest suicide rates in all of the industrialized countries (St. Laurent, 1995). There has been a spectacular rise in the number of completed suicides in Quebec from 1971–1983. In 1971 there were 10.6 reported suicides per 100,000 inhabitants. This rose to 18.1 for the same number of inhabitants in 1983. In subsequent years the rate decreased slightly (17.6) only to increase to 18.1 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1993 (St. Laurent, 1995).

Suicide among the young can be a painful reality for many mental health practitioners (Berman, 1991). It appears that suicide in adolescents and young adults has risen dramatically in recent years. In the United States the overall suicide rate for young people ages 15 – 24 has more than tripled from 1957 to 1987 (Berman, 1991). The same is true of Canada, where the statistics of suicide for adolescents and young adults (ages 15 – 19) have risen sharply in the past 40

*This article is based on the Master of Social Work Thesis deposited at McGill University, August 1995

years (3.3 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1950 to 13.8 for the same number of inhabitants in 1991) (Suicide in Canada, 1994).

In Quebec, the adolescent and young adult group (15 – 24) had the highest rate of reported suicidal ideation and para–suicidal behaviour. (Bellerose, C., Lavallee C., & Camirand, J., 1994).

Not only do health practitioners in Quebec have to deal with all the different facets of suicide, they also have to work with a population that includes citizens of various ethnic origins, as many immigrants from the four corners of the world have chosen to establish themselves in Quebec. Immigrants invariably settle in the large metropolitan areas. In Quebec the vast majority settled in Montreal and its surrounding suburbs.

In recent years an increasing number of authors have been exploring the significance of ethnic and cultural traits affecting human behaviour (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; McGoldrick, Pearce & Giordano, 1982). Mental health professionals are also beginning to stress the importance of ethnic variability and the impact that cultural traits have on psychological functioning (D'Abate and Di Stefano, 1986). This is evidenced in the increasing literature on cross-cultural counselling and recent developments in working with families of diverse ethnic backgrounds (Devore and Schlesinger, 1991; Di Nicola, 1985).

In addition authors are reporting that ethnic values have a substantial impact on families and how they react to treatment.

Furthermore they add that the ethnic family will tend to sustain ethnic values and transmit them to subsequent generations. This process sets them apart from the dominant culture, lifestyles and behaviours of the host society.

Ethnic values and cultural traits are a surprisingly resilient phenomenon which cut across socioeconomic and inter–generational lines. An ethnic group according to Ishwaran (1980) is collectively sharing unique sociocultural traditions which are transmitted from one generation to another. Cultural traits and ethnic values can also have a profound impact on the manner in which individuals respond to crisis.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the phenomenon of suicide within one cultural community, the Greek Community of Montreal, and to examine the cultural factors that influence the behaviour of families of Greek origin, when they are faced with a suicidal adolescent. In our definition of suicidal adolescents, the author includes the spectrum of suicidal behaviours which include suicidal ideation (thinking about suicide), parasuicide (attempted non–lethal suicide and deliberate self harm), and completed suicide (death by suicide).

The term Greek Community in Montreal as well as Greek families and Greek immigrants are used interchangeably in this paper.

Sometimes the collective term clients or citizens of Greek origin is used to include Greek immigrants and their children – usually born in Montreal.

I. Review of the Literature

Unfortunately the literature review did not reveal any articles on this topic. The cultural component is almost non-existent in the field of suicidal adolescents. What the research revealed were several articles on Native Indians, fewer on Black Americans and even less on Americans of Hispanic origin (Berlin, 1985; Gibbs, 1988; May & Dismag, 1974; Shore, 1972; Zayes, 1987). None of the above groups are significantly similar to the Montreal citizens of Greek origin. Consequently the articles and books on suicide selected to be reviewed for this paper are those that correspond with the topics discussed by the key respondents. They include the following: the influence of religion and societal attitudes towards suicide, suicidal adolescents and their families, and the therapy of choice that emerged from practice. This is followed by a review of the literature on the Greek Community of Montreal, with special emphasis on the culture and religion of this group and the attitudes of Greek families towards therapeutic interventions.

Religion, Societal Attitudes Towards Suicide

No discussion on suicide is complete without an analysis of the influence of religion and societal attitudes towards suicidal behaviour.

Some authors argue that religious beliefs and the ensuing practices can influence the incidence of suicide (Maris, 1981). It is proposed that as most Catholics view suicide as sinful and abnormal, one will find a lower number of suicides in Catholic countries than in those countries that harbour a more tolerant view of suicide (Maris, 1981). Others dwell on the stigma society attaches to suicide and suicidal gestures which in turn influences the reactions of the families involved (Curran, 1987).

Attitudes towards suicide have differed from age to age and civilization to civilization (Grollman, 1971). The predominant religious ideology in traditional societies determined to a large extent those societies' attitudes towards suicide. Consequently in eastern societies where Brahmanism and Buddhism prevailed, suicide was tolerated and under certain conditions even encouraged. In societies where Islam prevailed, suicide was considered a sin and suicidal acts condemned (Farberow, 1975; Stengel, 1970). The philosophical and religious currents of the Greco-Roman tradition did not condemn suicide (Stengel, 1970). This in turn helped to shape the attitudes of the early Christian Church.

It was in the year 400 A.D. that St Augustine proclaimed self-killing a sin, because it was viewed as a homicide and thus it violated the sixth commandment, "thou shalt not kill" (Stillion, 1989). In later years, suicide was perceived as a mortal sin because those who had killed themselves could not confess and atone for it. It was also seen as an act that demonstrates lack of faith in God. For the above reasons, in 1284 A.D. at the Synod of Nimes, those who had

committed suicide were denied interment in the Christian burial grounds (Grollman, 1971).

In 1054 A.D. the Christian Church was divided into the Western or Catholic Church and the Eastern or Greek Orthodox Church. The Eastern Orthodox religion was practised in the region that now constitutes modern Greece. To this day it is the religion of choice of the vast majority of citizens of Greek origin (Costantinides, 1983).

The Greek Orthodox Church maintained the position adopted by the Christian Church at the Synod of Nimes. Suicide was, and still is viewed as a murderous act and a sin against God (Yearbook of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1995).

In practical terms, the consequences are severe for the survivors of the suicide. Those who have committed suicide are not allowed a funeral within the church, nor is the person interred in the burial grounds of the Greek Orthodox church. The family is therefore deprived of the comfort and support they would otherwise receive during the funeral and the consequent burial.

Recently the Greek Orthodox Church has modified its strong position. If the family can prove that when the person committed the act of suicide he or she was insane, they are pardoned and allowed a funeral and a burial within the burial grounds of the Greek Orthodox Church (Yearbook of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1995).

Although writers believe that religion plays an important role in determining the incidence of suicidal behaviours, and the reaction of the families to the above, the attitudes of society towards suicide can also be a determining factor. This occurred because many Western societies have internalized the values of the church and suicide has became taboo (Grollman, 1971; Schneidman, 1970). Even when societies move towards secularism and suicide is viewed less harshly, the authors believe that the stigmatization of suicide persists (Stillman, 1989; Garden, 1985; Curran, 1987).

Society is especially harsh on parents of suicidal adolescents, who are perceived as having failed to protect their children (Curran, 1987). It will be important to examine the phenomenon of suicidal adolescents and how their families react to suicidal behaviour.

The Greek Community of Montreal

None of the literature examined revealed information on families of Greek origin and their reaction to suicide, nor did the literature delve into the reactions of the Greek Community of Montreal to suicidal adolescents. It did however provide an understanding of this community that will be presented in the following section.

a. The Family Structure, Values, and Dynamics

The importance of the family within the Greek culture is considerable. There is a long-standing tradition, religious values, structures and a dominant ideology which have made the Greek family the most fundamental institution of Greece (Constantinides, 1983).

The importance of Greek families is maintained even after Greeks emigrate to various countries. In a study that compared Greek- and Anglo-Australian families, Smolicz (1985), found that the most important element differentiating the two groups was the special bond that unites Greek families.

Although in Greece there has been an evolutionary trend in family values as the country becomes more industrialized, this happens at a much slower rate in Greek immigrant families of Montreal, as they remain culturally and linguistically isolated. This is described by Constantinides (1983) as the "ghettoization" of the Greek family. Within the family structure, the father maintains the authority in the home. This authority is to be feared and respected by all members of the family. The mother, on the other hand, is expected to show tenderness, spontaneous self-denial and self-sacrifice (Gavakis, 1983; Primpas–Welts, 1982; Rosenthal, Dimitriou & Efklides, 1989; Xenacostas, 1991). Within that structure, generational boundaries are rigidly maintained and power and authority is held by the eldest members of the family. (Primpas–Welts, 1982). As divorce is considered an insult for the Greek family, the number of divorces remains relatively low. According to the Constantinides study (1983), the divorce rate within the Greek Community of Montreal was 4.23%. This corresponds with the divorce rate for Greek families reported in a study done by the CLSC of Park Extension in 1979 (C.L.S.C. 1979). The divorce rate in Quebec for 1983 was 39% (Quebec – Statistique, 1985).

b. Parental Relationships with the Children

According to the Constantinides study (1983) almost 90% of the parents stated they had good or very good relationships with their children. Further, the respondents stated that they spent more than 3 hours with their children every day. The authors however, were sceptical about these findings, because interviews conducted for the study with several Greek teachers revealed that Greek families are experiencing very serious emotional problems but these are not acknowledged because it would jeopardize the honour of the Greek family (Constantinides, 1983). In fact according to Primpas–Welts (1982), although the Greek family is very child oriented and contacts between the parents and the children remain loving and loyal, most contacts are superficial and centred around meals, holidays, and family gatherings. Greek children have little opportunity to sort out their feelings by talking about their problems. They do not hear their parents articulate their feelings and they are not allowed to talk back

if they disagree because that would be interpreted as a challenge to parental authority (Primpas–Welts 1982).

Education of the children is highly valued by the Greek immigrant group (Xenacostas, 1991). However, the interest in their children's education is not followed by an involvement of the parents in the schools of their children. Rather they leave all the responsibility of educating their children to the teaching staff of the schools (Constantinides, 1983). Constantinides believes that this is due to the paucity of Greek-speaking teachers within the education system. He also suggests that because Greek parents are uneducated they may feel limited and incapable of becoming involved within the structures of the schools of their children.

An essential value within Greek families is that parents provide the basic material needs such as clothing, food and shelter to their children. Greek parents feel very proud when they are able to provide for their children the things they were deprived of during their youth in Greece (Xenocostas, 1991).

Regarding the socialization of the children, according to the Constantinides study, the children stated that 60.58% of their friends are also of Greek origin. Two reasons are given for the "ghettoization" of the children. First, the authors believe it is an extension of similar behaviour by the parents and second, it is a function of the parents' disapproval of their children's relationships with non-Greeks. As they expect their children to marry within the Greek Community, they believe that at a young age their children should socialize with other children of Greek origin (Constantinides, 1983). The children of Greek immigrants share their parents' preference for endogamy (Xenocostas, 1991).

c. Culture, Language, and Religion

The pinnacle of Greek society is the family, where all roles are well defined and boundaries are rigid. The family is not limited to the nuclear family but includes members of the extended family such as the "Koumbaroi" - the godparents of the children - uncles, aunts, and sometimes even neighbours. How Greek parents are perceived by others is very important, because their prestige and social reputation depends on the opinion of those who form their social network (Xenocostas, 1991).

The Greek immigrants are well known for their attachment to their language. According to O'Bryan (1976) in a study made of different linguistic groups in the Montreal area, 80.1% of Greek people interviewed stated that they spoke Greek within the home.

This was the highest percentage noted by the groups selected for this study.

The church has also played a significant role in the cultural evolution of the Greek Community. Traditionally the Church has had a significant political role

in Greece under the rule of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. After the creation of the Greek state in 1830, the political role of the church diminished. However, the church remained omnipresent in the life of the Greek citizen. The vast majority of the Greeks in the Greek community of Montreal are of the Greek Orthodox faith, and 44.8% go to church at least twice a month. It is believed however that belonging to the church is becoming less a matter of faith and more a cultural manifestation (Constantinides, 1983).

In a study that examined inter-generational conflict between Greek immigrant parents and their children, born in Canada, Vlahou (1991) found that parents and children held parallel beliefs and practices on religion, and no apparent conflict on this issue existed.

d. Services to the Greek Community

It is only recently that the social services in Quebec have incorporated the cultural component in their practice. According to the Constantinides study in 1983, citizens of Greek origin were under-represented in the public and para-public sector. Since 1983, some efforts have been made to hire members of the Greek community within the public and para-public sectors, but the process has been slow and has experienced moderate success. This is not to say, however, that members of the Greek community have been clamouring for social services in their language or have asked for services that take into account their cultural specificity. Greek families are not open to therapeutic intervention. "It is unusual for Greek people to seek psychotherapy of any kind. Greek family members, particularly fathers, are confident that they alone know the causes of their problems and how best to solve them" (Primpas-Welts, p. 283, 1982). In the Constantinides study 64.9% stated that if they had a problem, they would try to solve it by themselves and only 2.5% said that they would go to a social worker for help (Constantinides 1983).

According to Primpas-Welts, (1982) Greek families view emotional and marital problems as nerves. That is, they think of them as physical problems that reflect their inability to deal with stress. Consequently they ask for medication. Depression is not considered a psychiatric issue but is seen as a physical condition, a sadness that follows a loss or a trauma. Sometimes it is even attributed to the evil eye. Therapists are perceived as stigmatizing to the reputation of a Greek family (Primpas-Welts, 1982). Within Greek families rationalization and denial are customary defenses. Further parents will often try to triangulate the therapist by asking him to support their version. Although Greek families will, initially at least, come for sessions, they will often withhold personal thoughts and feelings from the therapist and other family members (Primpas-Welts, 1982).

II. Methodology and Analysis of Findings

An extensive literature search did not reveal material pertinent to the topic. Regrettably the publications on suicidal adolescents of Greek origin and on reactions of Greek families to treatment were not very numerous.

Consequently, certain key respondents were selected and interviewed by means of a prepared questionnaire. (See Appendix I). The respondents included: social workers who have worked in the CLSCs and schools and three psychiatrists. The above provide services in areas where there is a high concentration of Greek immigrants. In addition, the director of social services of the Hellenic community was interviewed, as well as a member of the clergy of the Greek Orthodox faith, and one of the directors of Suicide–Action Montreal. The questionnaire consisted of nine questions. Informants were not limited to the questions on the questionnaire but were asked to expand on topics with which they were familiar. They were asked to comment on the causes and number of suicides on adolescents of Greek origin, how the families react to therapy, and to offer their opinion on the influence of religion, the social stigma and the comminity's attitude towards suicide, as well as the social services offered to the members of the Greek community. All of the above were illustrated by case studies.

Causes of Adolescent Suicide in the Greek Community

It appears at least from the cases presented by the respondents that the causes leading to suicide in adolescents of Greek origin are very similar to those cited in the literature. The most vulnerable adolescents of Greek origin are those who belong to families who are experiencing problems, those who are enmeshed with their parents and adolescents from divorced or single parent families. Equally vulnerable are those Greek adolescents who are involved in the consumption of drugs and those who are depressed or who have suffered a serious loss.

Number of Adolescent Suicides in the Greek Community and the Issue of Under-reporting

All the respondents felt that there was a smaller proportion of adolescent suicide cases in the Greek Community in comparison with the number of similar kinds of cases in the host society. They were divided, however, in their analysis of this occurrence. Some felt it was because Greek families as all traditional families, are more supportive and consequently help to prevent self-destructive behaviour. Others attributed this to religious beliefs, while others felt that there was a smaller number of cases reported because of the social stigma attached to the suicide. This writer believes that the smaller number of suicide cases in the Greek Community is a result of a combination of these factors. As reported in

the literature, Greek families are close–knit and enjoy a special bond that unites their members. It is feasible then that depression or serious losses and/or suicidal gestures would be handled within a supportive structure that would help to ease the suffering. Consequently such families would be more effective in preventing suicide.

Writers discussed at length the influence of religion on suicide. It is believed that suicide rates are lower in countries where the predominant religious currants condemn self-destructive behaviour. As the Greek Orthodox Church passes harsh judgment on those who commit suicide and as it was reported in the literature that adolescents of Greek origin hold the same beliefs and practices as their parents, then it is highly probable that the teachings of the Greek Orthodox Church are partly responsible for the lower suicide rate in the Greek Community.

The above would not exclude under-reporting. Greek families are very conscious of the opinions of their friends and relatives. If under-reporting is a consequence of the social stigma attached to suicide, it is very likely as stated by some of our informants that Greek families would tend to under-report.

Family Reactions, Social Stigma, the Influence of Religion and the Community on Suicide and Suicidal Gestures

Families of Greek origin, as depicted by the respondents, reacted in anger, tried to deny the suicide, avoided treatment and did not discuss the suicidal behaviour of their children. Many of the reactions were related to how others would judge them. It appears that Greek families are very sensitive to "what will the neighbours think." The respondents attributed the above to the social stigma attached to suicide which they believe is stronger in the Greek community. This writer believes this is true because of external factors as well as those that are intrinsically associated with the role of the Greek family and its members.

The external factors that would affect attitudes towards suicide in the Greek community would include the ideology of the Greek Orthodox church and the internalization of those values by the Greek Community.

It is true that most of the respondents did not believe that religion influenced the behaviour of families of Greek origin. However, when one considers that at least 44.8% of members of the Greek Community attend church at least twice a month, it is difficult to believe that the religious ideology of the Greek orthodox church does not influence the reactions of Greek families. One can safely assume that at least some members of the Greek Community believe in the teachings of the church. For those families suicide is a sin and an act against God. They would feel shame if their children exhibited suicidal behaviour and would attempt to deny or at least not to discuss it with friends, neighbours and professionals.

Undoubtedly there are a number of Greek non-believers who do not consider suicide a sin. However, a substantial part of their social network adheres to the teachings of the Greek Orthodox Church and will judge them accordingly. For this reason even the non believers would try to hide the suicidal behaviour of their children.

Moreover even secular societies stigmatize the parents of suicidal adolescents. The secular part of the Greek Community is no exception. Consequently parents of suicidal adolescents in families of Greek origin will be subject to stigmatization. For all of the above reasons, Greek families would deny the existence of suicidal behaviours of their children and would avoid treatment.

In addition to the above, families of Greek origin would be especially sensitive to the social stigma of the suicide because of the importance of the family in Greek society, and the expectations and obligations associated with the parental role.

As stated in the literature, the Greek family is the pinnacle of Greek society and Greek parents are expected to provide for their children. Problems should be solved within the family structure. Further suicidal behaviours tarnish the reputation of the family and cast doubts on the capacity of the parents to care for their children. Understandably, Greek parents would react negatively to the suicidal behaviour of their children, and would deny or avoid discussing them with others.

Therapy

It is not surprising that all the respondents believed that Greek families are more resistant to treatment than are other families. This corresponds with the findings in the literature. As stated earlier, Greek families, like all traditional families, do not seek help from professionals and they try to solve their problems within the family structure. When faced with the inevitable, however, such as a suicide attempt, then the whole family will attend treatment sessions. One wonders however if they are truly motivated to change their behaviour or whether they attend therapy sessions in order to control the amount and type of information given to the professional. Considering what was discussed in the literature about the social stigma attached to suicide and how the respondents described the Greek families, one could readily believe that this could happen.

Services to the Greek Community

According to the literature, there are few services in the health and social service field which target the Greek community. All the respondents suggested that in an area as sensitive and as complicated as suicide, the specificity of clients of Greek origin should be taken into account.

One of the questions to be asked, however, is how permanent are those cultural differences. Are the changes to be implemented for a population that is itself changing and will soon be very similar to the host society? This writer believes that the process of acculturation is slow and ethnic values persist for many generations. Acculturation is also a function of the openness of ethnic groups to the culture of the host society. If one considers the cultural and linguistic isolation of the Greek community in Montreal as reported in the literature, and the fact that this "ghettoisation" is transmitted to the children who also, to a large degree, only socialize with other children of Greek origin, one can deduce that this is not a group that will change values easily, or readily. One can believe, therefore, that recommendations that target the Greek community which take into account their cultural specificity will still be valid for the future generations of families of Greek origin.

Divergent opinions exist about the hiring of more practitioners of Greek origin. Some prefer to educate the existing health practitioners, while others believe that the various institutions should reflect the cultural profile of their clientele within all levels of their structures. This writer believes that both points of view are valid and important for service delivery. It is true that an institution cannot always reflect the profile of its clientele, and that some health practitioners do not wish to work only with clients of one particular ethnic group. Educating all practitioners therefore about the cultural characteristics of one group could be very beneficial.

However, many clients feel comfortable only if they are interacting with someone who they perceive as culturally like them. Greek families of suicidal adolescents, as was already mentioned, are resistant, suffer a social stigma and are particularly sensitive about their social image. If they feel more comfortable with a professional that they believe is at least culturally like them, then they should be entitled to such services. If, on the other hand, because of issues of confidentiality, they do not wish to be treated by a practitioner of their own ethnic group, those wishes should also be respected.

III. Conclusion

It appears, then, that culture does influence the behaviour of clients of Greek origin, even when they are faced with something as serious as suicide. Greek clients have different values from those of the host society. As suicide in adolescents is a major problem within the Quebec society, it is important to understand the cultural dynamics of Greek families so as to deliver improved services.

Health practitioners have always been open to new and more complete methods of treatment. This paper adds perhaps one more dimension to a complicated problem that is faced by Quebec society. The clients of Greek origin also

face a challenge. They have adapted well to the host country but need to learn more about psychological problems and therapeutic interventions, if their families are to receive the help they need in dealing with crisis situations such as mental illness and suicide.

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Appendix 1: Questionnaire

1.What is your profession and where do you work?
2.What percentage of your cases are Greek or of Greek origin?
3.Have you dealt with suicidal adolescents?
4.Were some of your suicidal clients of Greek origin?
5.Do you think there are more or less suicidal adolescents of Greek origin and why do you think this is so?
6.How did your clients define the problem?
7.What was the reaction of the parents and other members of the family?
8.Do the family members continue therapy after the acute crisis phase?
9.Do you think there are enough services to incorporate the needs of suicidal clients of Greek origin and their families.

The Imia Files - Dossier d'une crise

January 1996 - Janvier 1996

Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Talking Points Concerning Unilateral Turkish Claims to the Imia Rocks

Introduction

International treaties and agreements, dating back to 1923, establish unequivocally that the Imia rocky islets constitute an integral part of Greek sovereign territory.

The fact that the tension caused by the recent Turkish claims to the Imia rocks did not erupt into immediate conflict does not in the least mean that the danger has receded. On the contrary, Turkey, through its former Prime Minister's explicit threat to use military force against Greece, continues to press claims that are unfounded both in international law and in the established practice of civilized relations among nations.

This recent crisis was particularly serious because Turkey's principal argument establishing its claim to these islets is that the International Treaties that set down the territorial status of the southeastern Aegean are not necessarily binding on Turkey. By questioning the sovereignty of the Imia rocks Turkey thus seeks to overthrow the territorial status of the entire region.

At the same time, Turkey has consistently refused to support the assertions it has suddenly put forward through peaceful and legal avenues, by bringing them to the International Court of Justice, as both Greece, a number of European Union countries, and the United States have repeatedly suggested.

As will be seen in greater detail in the following paragraphs, the Imia rocks have been under Greek sovereignty since the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty with Italy in 1947. For half a century Turkey did not raise any questions concerning the status of the islets and rocks. Unfortunately, the reason she does so now falls within the well-documented pattern of illegal Turkish intentions and actions over the past twenty years.

More specifically, in 1974, Turkey invaded and occupied Cyprus in defiance of international law and in the face of the indignation of the international community, as expressed in numerous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

At the same time, she turned her sights to the rest of the Aegean, by setting up the so-called «Army of the Aegean,» a overtly offensive military force equipped with the largest fleet of landing craft in the Mediterranean. Turkey also raised

claims against Greek sovereign rights concerning the continental shelf, control of the air space of the area, as well as Greece's right, as established in international law, to extend her territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. (n.m.)

In June of last year, the Turkish Parliament passed an unprecedented resolution authorizing the Turkish government to use all means, including military ones, should Greece exercise her legitimate rights concerning the extension of its territorial waters.

Turkey also challenges Greece's national air space, backing up its claims by frequent and at times massive violations of the air space by its military aircraft.

Unfortunately, the threat of the use of military force seems to be an integral part of Turkish foreign policy. Just as in the case of the territorial waters, during the Imia incident Turkey brandished the threat of war in order to impose her objectives, declaring that any attempt to question self-proclaimed «Turkish sovereignty» would constitute a casus belli.

These actions, encouraged - at least initially - by the lack of any firm reaction on the part of the international community, have now been proven to be part of Turkey's design to question Greece's internationally established rights in the Aegean, and to usurp sovereignty of at least half of the Aegean, by officially rejecting the established legal status quo.

If Turkey's attempts to question the binding force of international agreements were valid, then the majority of the treaties regulating international frontiers after the First and Second World Wars would collapse.

The Crisis

On the 25th of December 1995, the Turkish Cargo boat «Figen Akat» ran aground on one of the Imia rocks, situated 2,5 miles from the Greek island of Kalolimnos. Although the accident occurred in Greek territorial waters, the captain of the «Figen Akat» refused assistance from the competent Greek authorities, claiming that he was within Turkish territorial waters. Despite assurances to the contrary, the captain sought assistance from the Turkish authorities.

Finally, in agreement with the Turkish company that owned the ship, the «Figen Akat» was set free with the aid of a Greek tug boat, owned by the company Matsas Star, and towed to the Turkish port of Gulluk.

On the 29th of December, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed a Verbal Note to the Embassy of Greece in Ankara, asserting for the first time that Imia constitutes a part of Turkish territory, as it was registered in the land registry of the Turkish province of Mugla. It should be noted that this was the first time that Turkey openly laid claims over actual Greek territory.

In response to Turkey's claims, on the 10th of January 1996, the Greek

Embassy addressed a Verbal Note to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In that Note the Turkish claim to the islets was rejected. The Note underlined the fact that Turkey had reaffirmed Imia as belonging to Italy by virtue of a bilateral agreement signed between the two countries in 1932, and that the islets were subsequently ceded to Greece with the rest of the Dodecanese island chain by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.

Turkey then addressed a second Verbal Note to Greece on the 29th of January 1996, wherein the initial claim was repeated and extended with the request for negotiations concerning the status of all the islands, islets and rocks whose status, according to Turkey, is not well determined.

In response Greece addressed a Verbal Note to Turkey on February 16, 1996. In that Note Greece presented international legal documents and other facts establishing unequivocally the territorial status of all islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean. Greece emphasized that no country, including Turkey, had ever challenged that status in the past. The Note concluded that, as is only natural, Greece would not negotiate with Turkey matters pertaining to its territorial sovereignty as established by international law and treaties.

The tension over Imia began to escalate on the 27th of January, when Turkish journalists from the newspaper Hurriyet took down the Greek flag from the larger of the two Imia islets and raised the Turkish one. On the 28th of January, a Greek navy detachment replaced the Greek flag.

Initially, there were no naval units in the area except one Greek unit and a Turkish torpedo boat. On January 30, however, Turkey sent several ships to the area, prompting Greece to send an equal number. A Turkish frigate violated Greek territorial waters targeting a Greek gunboat that was patrolling the area. A Turkish helicopter taking off from one of the Turkish frigates flew over the Imia rocks. At the same time, Turkish warplanes repeatedly violated Greek air space.

The tension reached its peak in the early morning hours of January 31, when the Turkish army landed some men on the smaller of the Imia rocks. An American mediation effort had already been initiated by means of repeated telephone contacts between President Clinton and Prime Minister Simitis, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Under Secretary Holbrooke with Foreign Minister Pangalos, and the Ministers of Defense Arsenis and Perry.

After a special session of the Government's National Security Council in the early hours of January 31, the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs announced that an understanding had been reached by means of American mediation. Both sides would withdraw their forces from the area of Imia and the situation would return to its previous condition (the «status quo ante»).

The Legal Status of Imia

The Imia islets lie at a distance of 1.9 nautical miles from the Greek island of Kalolimnos, 5.3 n.m. from the Greek island of Kalymnos, 3.65 n.m. from the Turkish coast and 2.3 n.m. from the Turkish island of Cavus (formerly Kato). Like the rest of the Dodecanese island chain, they were ceded to Italy by virtue of article 15 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923.

At least three international agreements establish unambiguously Greece's ownership of Imia.

The first is the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, which limits Turkish sovereignty - with the exception of Imbros, Tenedos and the Rabbit islands - explicitly only over islands lying within a three-mile limit off the Turkish coast (Article 12). As noted above, however, the Imia islets are 3.65 n.m. off the Turkish coast.

Under Article 16 of the same Peace Treaty, Turkey «renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.»

The second is the January 4, 1932 Agreement between Italy and Turkey and its supplementary agreement of December 28, 1932. More specifically, the January 4 Agreement set down with precision the maritime frontier between the island of Castellorizo and the Turkish coast. The day this Agreement was signed, the two parties exchanged official letters by which they mutually asserted that there was no difference between them as to their respective territorial sovereignty, and called for a joint Italo-Turkish technical committee to be set up for the purpose of precisely delimiting the rest of the maritime boundary between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast.

In accordance with this Agreement, the representatives of Italy and Turkey signed in Ankara, on December 28, 1932, a supplementary agreement by which the rest of the maritime frontier between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast was precisely delimited. The agreement fixes 37 pairs of reference points between which the maritime boundary dividing Turkish and Italian territory (which, at the time, included the Aegean Dodecanese islands) was drawn.

Point 30 of this agreement states that the maritime frontier north of Kalymnos will pass at a median distance between the Imia rocks (on the Italian side) and Kato island (on the Turkish side). Thus, Italian sovereignty over Imia is confirmed by the explicit reference made to them in the text itself.

The third international agreement was the Paris Treaty of 1947, signed between Italy and the Allied Powers after the conclusion of World War II. In that treaty Italy ceded the Dodecanese islands and all adjacent islets to Greece. As it is well known, under international law, the successor state automatically

assumes all the rights and obligations that have been established by international treaty between the initial possessor state and every third party (in this case, between Italy and Turkey).

The Reaction of the European Parliament

The European Parliament, on February 15, 1996, adopted a resolution entitled «On the Provocative Actions and Contestation of Sovereign Rights by Turkey Against a Member State of the Union» by an overwhelming 342 to 21 majority. In that resolution the Parliament found that «the islet of Imia belongs to the Dodecanese group of islands» pursuant to the 1923, 1932 and 1947 treaties. The Parliament also condemned «the dangerous violation by Turkey of the sovereign rights of Greece,» and called on Turkey to comply «with international treaties» and to abstain from non-peaceful actions or threats of such actions.

It should be noted that the Parliament, a few months earlier, had ratified the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU. It should further be noted that the Common Position of the Council, set out at the EU-Turkey Association Council meeting of March 6, 1995, stated that it was «of paramount importance to encourage good neighborly relations between Turkey and its neighboring Member States of the EU.» The Parliament, in its February 16, 1996 resolution, emphasized that «these privileged relations between the Union and Turkey should automatically preclude any military aggression.»

The International Court of Justice

After the crisis, the U.S. administration suggested that Turkey's Imia claims be taken for peaceful resolution to the International Court of Justice.

Similarly, on February 26, 1996, the Italian Presidency of the European Union issued the summary of discussions that took place that day among the EU's fifteen Foreign Ministers on the issue of Imia. In that announcement the Presidency, among other things, emphasized that «territorial disputes must be resolved only through recourse to Law, that is to say, by the International Court of Justice.»

Turkey immediately turned down both appeals. In contrast, from the beginning of the crisis Greece has stated that it would consider such an adjudication should Turkey, which is the party raising the territorial claims in the present instance, where to apply to the Court.

It should be noted that, unlike Greece, Turkey has not yet accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ.

Turkey's Legal Assertions

The principal argument on which Turkey bases its claim is the assertion that the

legal procedures of the agreement of December 1932 were not completed and that it was not registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

However, the December Agreement was supplementary to that of January, which set the maritime frontier between Castellorizo and the Turkish coast and settled an issue concerning the sovereignty of some islets around Castellorizo, over which there was a difference of opinion between the two sides. The December agreement did not aim at settling any territorial difference between the two countries, as was stated both in the text of the agreement itself and in the letters exchanged on the 4th of January 1932, between the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the then Italian Ambassador in Ankara, by which the two parties declared that there existed no difference as to the territorial sovereignty of each side. The December agreement merely sets with precision the remaining maritime frontier between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast. For this reason it did not need separate registration with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. It is thus not surprising that the delimitation of the frontier set by this agreement was never in the past contested by Turkey or Italy, even after the Dodecanese was ceded to Greece.

Turkey has further asserted that Greece allegedly had doubts, at the time of the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, concerning the validity of the 1932 agreements. This Turkish argument is unfounded both in law and in fact. As noted above, according to international law, the successor state succeeds to all rights and obligations established by international treaties between the original possessor state and any third party. Greece had no doubt as to the validity of the aforementioned agreements nor had Turkey or Italy, since they both immediately implemented the provisions of the Agreement and abided by them thereafter. There is clearly no need for any confirmation of the validity of any treaty regulating the status of the ceded territories.

This is further evidenced by other international agreements and maps of the immediate post World-War period, according to which this delimitation is officially recognized by Turkey as its frontier line with Greece. To mention just two, there is the map attached to the 1950 ICAO Regional Agreement adopted by the Council of the Organization, and also the official Turkish map included in the 1953 edition of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Navigation through the Straits.

Furthermore, not only Greece and Turkish maps, but also official maps of other countries such as the United States and Italy include the Imia rocks within Greek national territory.

Finally, the fact that both Greece and Turkey considered the agreements of 1932 as valid, is shown by the fact that Greece was the country that exercised sovereign rights over the Imia islets all this time without Turkey ever raising any protest. The Greek Geographic Service repeatedly visited the Imia islets

and used a trigonometric marker on the larger rock which it had installed for its purposes, Greek fishermen fished regularly in the waters surrounding these islets, and Greek shepherds are the owners of the goats that graze on the islets. Finally environmental activities both by Greece and the European Union were carried out on the Imia rocks since 1984.

Most recently, through a written statement in mid-March 1996, Turkey asserted that, in the case of the Aegean, it abides only by those international agreements that it itself considers valid, and then only by those that both it and Greece have signed.

In other words, Turkey indirectly denied the binding power of the Italian-Turkish agreement of 1932 (which reaffirmed Italy's sovereignty over Imia, among other islands and islets) and of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 (in which Italy, in turn, ceded the Dodecanese islands and all adjacent islets to Greece). Thus, for the first time, Turkey questioned Greek sovereignty not just over Imia, but over all the Dodecanese islands.

Political Aspects of the Dispute

From the outset of the Imia crisis Greece has asked the Turkish government to affirm officially and unequivocally its adherence to three fundamental principles that guide relations among all civilized nations: that it respects international law and treaties; that it condemns the use of force or the threat of such use in relations between nations; and that the country raising novel territorial claims - in this case, Turkey - must seek their resolution by peaceful means, under international law, at the International Court of Justice.

Among world nations today, these principles are self-evident. Any country that finds it difficult to state its unequivocal acceptance of them is a country that questions the very basis upon which peaceful relations among nations are built.

Unfortunately, in the past two months Turkey has consistently refused to make even these minimal and self-evident commitments. Its refusal persisted in the face of constant efforts by a number of Greece's European Union partners, as well as the United States, urging Turkey to do just that. On March 25, 1996, the Turkish government refused to commit itself to similar principles, which had previously been incorporated in the draft Common Position of the EU Foreign Ministers. As a consequence, the Council of Ministers had to postpone for the near future the scheduled EU-Turkey Association Council.

Recognizing the paucity of its legal arguments, Turkey has recently claimed that the matter (as well as other legal claims that Turkey unilaterally raises against Greek sovereignty) should be settled through negotiations. It goes without saying that all legitimate differences should be settled through dialogue. Greece has repeatedly invited Turkey to a sincere dialogue over the

strengthening of the economic and cultural ties between the two countries. It has also invited Turkey to negotiations over the drafting of a compromise for the submittal of the two counties' differences over the Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice.

Turkey has refused both of these proposals. Instead, in the case of Imia, it wishes to coerce Greece into bilateral negotiations over Greek sovereign rights, under the specter of the use of force. No civilized nation would willingly submit to such a process, let alone to the open disregard of international law, and neither will Greece. As seen above, the territorial status of the islets and rocks is absolutely clear, and Turkey herself - understandably - never challenged it in the past.

Unfortunately, Turkey's proposal appears to be nothing more than a thinly-veiled attempt to legitimize in the eyes of the international community an otherwise insupportable claim of sovereignty over territory that belongs to another sovereign nation. Indeed, when one compares Turkey's proposal for dialogue with the belligerent declarations made by former Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller in the aftermath of the Imia crisis - i.e., that 1,000 islands in the Aegean are Turkish (she later raised that figure to 3,000, which is roughly the total number of islands in the area) - Turkey's real intentions become even more obvious. The former Turkish Prime Minister added that any attempt on the part of Greece to challenge her assessment would be a casus belli. This second threat of war comes at the heels of the Turkish Parliament's aforementioned resolution concerning the extension of Greece's territorial waters.

By challenging Greece's internationally recognized frontiers, and by using the threat of force to do so, Turkey violates the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for international frontiers, which, as a signatory to the Charter of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, it has pledged to respect. In so doing, Turkey establishes itself as a real and direct threat to the peace and stability of the area and, in consequence, of Europe. If allowed to continue unchallenged, this will create an extremely dangerous precedent for all those countries that, for one reason or another, consider that the present borders of Europe are unjust.

Greece, perhaps more than any other nation, wishes to have as its neighbor a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Turkey. The absence of these factors can divert the imagination of some leaders to dangerous foreign policy adventures, as the Imia case illustrates. Greece wishes to develop friendly and peaceful relations with Turkey, and it will keep striving to achieve them in spite of any problems that may at times appear to block the way to friendship.

At the same time, neither Greece nor the international community can afford the destabilization of the Aegean region through the continuation or the encouragement of Turkey's illegal claims.

Greece, on its part, will continue to defend the principles of international law, respect for established borders, and the peaceful coexistence among nations both with respect to Turkey and with respect to all other countries in the region.

La position de la Turquie

*Le différend relatif aux rochers de Kardak en mer Égée entre la Turquie et la Grèce**

Les activités de sauvetage déployées en vue de sauver le bateau "Figen Akat" échoué sur les rochers de Kardak le 25 décembre 1995, au large de Rodrum en mer Égée, ont abouti à des revendications inacceptables de la Grèce sur l'appartenance de ces rochers, et constitué un différend sérieux entre la Turquie et la Grèce.

Cet accident maritime, survenu il y a plus d'un mois, d'une façon tout à fait hasardeuse, a fait l'objet de démarches diplomatiques successives entre les autorités compétentes des deux pays jusqu'à ce que ce problème soit dévoilé à la presse grecque le 20 janvier 1996.

Le gouvernement turc regrette cette divulgation qui a de nouveau fait surgir le problème de la délimitation des frontières maritimes entre les deux pays et a malheureusement débouché à ce brusque regain de tension entre les deux pays.

Le gouvernement turc est convaincu que les rochers de Kardak se trouvent sous la souveraineté turque. Mis à part toute référence aux arguments et documents légaux y afférents de nature à confirmer cette souveraineté, il est à souligner que les pêcheurs turcs ainsi que les bateaux commerciaux et touristiques turcs ont toujours pu mener librement leurs activités autour de ces rochers sans aucun empêchement jusqu'à l'éclatement de ce problème.

Le gouvernement turc croit fermement, face aux revendications grecques inacceptables et sans fondement légal d'appartenance sur ces rochers, qu'une issue à ce différend ne pourrait être trouvée que par la voie de négociations diplomatiques.

La Grèce essaie de faire dépendre ses revendications de souveraineté sur Kardak sur les accords turco-italiens de 1932 et prétend avoir hérité le droit italien découlant desdits traités.

Le Traité italo-turc du 4 janvier 1931 et le traité du 28 décembre 1932 concernant la possession des petites îles du Sud-Ouest de la mer Égée et la délimitation des eaux territoriales dans la région ont été négociées dans le contexte de la situation politique particulière précédant l'ère de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

Le premier accord ne concerne pas les Rochers de Kardak (Imia). Une référence a été faite aux Rochers de Kardak dans le Protocole de Décembre 1932. Cependant, les procédures légales à l'égard du Protocole de 1932 n'ont jamais été complétées. Elles n'ont pas non plus été enregistrées par la Société

*Source: Ambassade de Turquie en France, Paris le 30 janvier 1996

des Nations. En d'autre termes, un document légal valable n'existe pas dans ce domaine.

De plus, la proposition grecque se référant aux deux documents sus-mentionnés qui avait été soumise aux négociations du Traité de paix de Paris en 1947 n'avait pas été acceptée, et de plus aucune référence s'y rapportant n'avait été incluse dans le texte dudit Traité.

Le fait que la Grèce ait entrepris une démarche auprès du gouvernement turc en 1950 et encore une autre en 1953 consistant à proposer la tenue des pourparlers en vue d'aboutir à l'échange de lettres entre les deux gouvernements qui attesteraient la validité de ces deux documents aussi bien pour la Turquie et la Grèce démontre clairement que la Grèce elle-même portait des doutes concernant la validité des deux documents de 1932 sus-cités.

Le seul document légal auquel on peut se référer concernant les îles du Dodécanèse est le Traité de Paris de 1947. Ce traité stipule dans son article 14.1 que l'Italie a cédé à la Grèce les îles du Dodécanèse et les énumère une par une en citant leur nom. Le même article inclut ausi "le ilôts adjacents" à ceux qui sont nommément cités.

Les rochers de Kardak situé à 5,5 milles nautiques de l'île grecque la plus proche ne peuvent être définis ni comme adjacents ni considérés en terme d'îlots. Les centaines d'îles qui parsèment la mer Égée se divisent par ordre de taille décroissant en îles, îlots et rochers. Dans ce contexte, les rochers de Kardak qui sont situés à 3,8 milles nautiques de la côte turque appartiennent à la Turquie et le défi grec envers la souveraineté nationale de la Turquie ne peut être soutenu par le droit international.

De surcroît, en cherchant à évoquer un article d'un traité quelconque pour assumer les droits, l'on devrait également remplir en bonne foi les obligations qui en découlent. Dans cet ordre d'idées, il faut signaler que l'article 14.2 du Traité de paix de Paris de 1947 stipule clairement et sans équivoque que les îles du Dodécanèse devraient être et rester démilitarisées. Or, la Grèce continue de violer cette disposition.

(...)

En considération de ce qui précède, la Turquie ne peut en aucun cas accepter les revendications de la Grèce relatives au problème concernant les rochers de Kardak. Il est évident que la Grèce tente d'étendre sa souveraineté nationale sur des îles au-delà de celles qui lui ont été cédées par le Traité de paix de Lausanne de 1923 et le Traité de paix de Paris de 1947. La remise en cause grecque de la souveraineté turque sur les rochers Kardak ne peut être justifiée devant la loi internationale.

A la lumière de ce qui précède, il est évident que la possession d'autres petites îles, des îlots ou des rochers de l'Égée dont le statut n'a pas encore été clairement défini par des documents internationaux doit être déterminée par un accord. En conséquence, la tentative par la Grèce d'habiter les petites îles, îlots

ou rochers en question d'une manière artificielle et démonstrative ne peut en aucun cas créer des conséquences légales concernant leur statut.

Le gouvernement turc est prêt à entamer des négociations avec la Grèce dans le but de déterminer la possession des petites îles, îlots ou rochers de la mer Égée. A l'issue de telles négociations, le problème de la délimitation des eaux territoriales peut également faire l'objet de discussions. De ce fait, la Turquie suggère que les parties s'abstiennent de poser des actes unilatéraux qui pourraient aggraver la situation dans la région.

European Parliament

Adopted by a vote of 342 for, 21 against, 11 abstentions on February 15, 1996 on the provocative actions and contestation of sovereign rights by Turkey against a Member State of the Union

The European Parliament

A. having regard to Turkey's provocative military operations in relation to the isle of Imia in the Eastern Aegean,

B. concerned about the dangers of over-reaction if this dispute continues,

C. having regard to Turkey's official statements making territorial claims and contesting the sovereign rights of an EU Member State,

D. whereas the islet of Imia belongs to the Dodecanese group of islands, on the basis of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the Protocol between Italy and Turkey of 1932 and the Paris Treaty of 1947, and whereas even on Turkish maps from the 1960s, these islets are shown as Greek territory,

E. whereas this action by Turkey forms part of a broader policy of questioning the status quo in the Aegean,

F. having regard to the common position of the Council set out at the association Council meeting of 6 March 1995 which considered it of paramount importance to encourage good-neighbourly relations between Turkey and its neighboring Member States of the EU, and whereas these privileged relations between the Union and Turkey should automatically preclude any military aggression,

1. Gravely concerned by the dangerous violation by Turkey of sovereign rights of Greece, a Member State of the European Union and by the build-up of military tension in the Aegean;

2. Deplores the fact that Greece and Turkey appeared to be on the brink of hostilities and calls for an immediate stop to all actions which endanger peace and stability in this area;

3. Stresses that Greece's borders are also part of the external borders of the European Union;

4. Calls for compliance by Turkey with international treaties, and in particular the OSCE, which insists that all disputes be settled by peaceful means in accordance with international law;

5. Deplores the failure of the European Union and its Member States in this crisis, to take effective action within the framework of the common foreign and security policy;

6. Calls on the Council to take appropriate initiatives for the amelioration of the relations between Greece and Turkey;

7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Government of Turkey, the Parliament of Greece and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Réflexions philosophiques

Autarcie et logos chez Zénon de Cittium

Anna Kélessidou*

Ce qui a déterminé la vocation philosophique de Zénon de Cittium, et a marqué la fin de sa vie au pays d'Aphrodite Cypris, nous est attesté par une triple tradition: selon la première, c'étaient les ouvrages des philosophes socratiques[1] que le marchand Manséas, le père de Zénon, a rapporté à son fils, après un de ses voyages à Athènes; selon la seconde[2], c'était la réponse de l'oracle, d'après laquelle ce "à quoi il était préférable" que Zénon "occupât sa vie" était celui qui le ferait converser avec les morts, réponse que le Chypriote aurait compris comme incitation à s'appliquer à l'étude des auteurs anciens, à s'enraciner "dans le roc ferme du passé"[3]; pour la troisième, c'était un naufrage du jeune commerçant en face du Pirée et la rencontre avec Cratès. Tout un sens est contenu dans chacune de ces traditions; mais on doit y ajouter un quatrième facteur: cet esprit "chercheur et aimant en toutes choses les explications rigoureuses"[4] aurait, sans doute, éprouvé une certaine insatisfaction pour la vie facile et les moeurs "point sévères" sur l'île de Chypre, dont les ressources naturelles, la fertilité du sol et les richesses des mines "avaient attiré les colons grecs et les Phéniciens[5]. En témoigne la grande aptitude à recevoir les enseignements de Cratès, dont Zénon a fait preuve après son installation à Athènes. Originaire d'un pays ensoleillé, le pays du blé, des figues, du vin et de l'or, Zénon une fois installé à la cité d'Athéna, se nourrit avec une extrême frugalité - peu de pain, des figues vertes et peu de vin -[6] et lorsqu'il fait froid, il se chauffe au soleil.

Cette indépendance de Zénon, par rapport aux besoins et aux difficultés extérieures, traduit son autarcie intérieure; Zénodote en fait l'éloge dans son épigramme cité par Diogène Laërce[7], en l'asssociant à la conduite conforme "au logos" viril. L'exemple de ce retour délibéré sur soi Zénon l'aurait trouvé chez un des morts avec qui il aurait conversé: Socrate, pour qui le principal bienfait de la philosophie a été "d'apprendre à vivre dans la société de soi-même"[8], et qui a identifié le logos avec la vertu et la vertu avec le bonheur[9]; il l'aurait également trouvé chez certains vivants, son maître Cratès, qui a choisi d'abandonner ses propriétés aux troupeaux et de vivre de pain et d'eau en se donnant à la philosophie, et Xénocrate, le dirigeant de l'Académie, qui faisait de la vertu la condition du bonheur.

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Mais il y a plus: une conduite d'indépendance ne se produit pas sans rapport avec la nécessité historique. Encore une fois en témoigne Socrate qui préfère se suffir à lui-même, construire dans son âme des retranchements inexpugnables, ainsi que l'affirme Platon dans la *République* (496d-e), et se soustraire ainsi à la politique active dans une cité où "il n'y a rien de sain "(488a)[10]. Et l'on sait[11] que pendant un bon siècle avant la fondation du stoïcisme le monde grec a vécu le désastre des cités, le déclin matériel, des réformes vaines, bref, la démoralisation profonde partout où la conscience humaine, accrochée aux intérêts particuliers, en faisait dépendre son bonheur.

Les vicissitudes de la réalité historique imposent le changement de point de vue sur l'homme et le monde: la recherche d'un bonheur accessible à tous - et non plus aux privilégiés d'un certain ordre social ou de l'instruction - et qui ne sont pas soumis à des conditions instables[12]. G. Rodier, traitant du matérialisme stoïcien, a expliqué avec raison leur physique et leur recherche de la vérité au niveau de la connaissance sensible par leur conviction que le monde, dans lequel nous vivons, est le meilleur possible; "le monde est un vivant animé raisonnable"[13]; la solidarité de l'homme avec le monde est une vérité valable pour tous. Cependant, Rodier a surtout insisté sur l'écart qui sépare ici le stoïcisme de la pensée de Platon et d'Aristote. L'explication - pour les trois scolarques du Portique, du moins - doit être complétée parce qu'on a appelé "la conscience malheureuse"[14] de ce temps: la mise "en quête de biens moins précaires que ceux procurés par les circonstances matérielles et politiques, des biens qui ne dépendent que de l'âme humaine".

La "satisfaction des besoins, auxquels la société ne peut plus répondre"[15], impose l'exercice d'un art de vie concernant toutes les actions et où la fin (*telos*) des activités leur soit immanente, désirable pour elle-même, et non point extrinsèque, comme c'est le cas du succès ayant rapport à un *skopos*[16]. "La première inclination", selon Zénon, est "celle qu'a l'animal à se conserver, la nature l'attachant à lui-même dès le principe"[17]. La satisfaction de cette tendance est conforme à la nature: "suivre la nature c'est se gouverner suivant l'inclination"[18]. Or la nature propre de l'homme étant d'être doué de raison, le souverain bien consiste dans la vie selon la raison, ou comme le dit Zénon[19], dans la vie menée "conséquemment avec soi-même". Stobée[20] explique ainsi la formule zénonienne ομολογουμένως ζην: "vivre selon un principe unique et en accord avec soi-même, car les hommes qui vivent en désaccord sont malheureux".

Confiance de l'homme à lui-même, vie selon la nature - la "force qui contient le monde", "celle qui fait pousser les êtres vivants sur la terre"[21], vie selon la raison, selon la justice et selon la vertu, sont, pour Zénon, des idées qui se pénètrent; le bien qui en résulte est la perfection conforme à la nature de l'être

raisonnable comme tel, sa vertu, ou le bonheur solide et assuré: "la vertu suffit au bonheur"[22]. "Zénon", témoigne Stobée, "définissait ainsi le bonheur: le bonheur, c'est le cours bien réglé de la vie"[23].

L'impératif de se déterminer par sa raison et de suivre le cours bien réglé de la vie sauve l'individualité et, du même coup, garantit l'ordre de la vie en commun. "C'est une seule et même raison qui, dans la dialectique, enchaîne les propositions conséquentes aux antécédentes, dans la nature lie ensemble toutes les causes, et dans la conduite établit entre les actes le parfait accord"[24].

Vivre conformément au principe naturel raisonnable et à sa volonté n'est pas se retirer du monde en cultivant son jardin[25], mais rechercher la société de ses semblables. L'homme stoïcien est "par nature sociable et agissant"[26]. Le Logos - Héraclite, que Zénon a étudié[27] et dont les Stoïciens "ont, en grande partie, repris la physique"[28], l'a déjà enseigné - est le principe unificateur, dans lequel tous se sentent solidaires et égaux, par lequel tous se retrouvent et communient. "Le postulat que tous doivent suivre le logos... est ce qui dispose les hommes à vivre en société. L'homme agit selon la raison, lorsque son action est conforme à la loi naturelle générale, qui est la même pour tous les êtres rationnels... [la] tendance [de l'homme] à la vie commune lui est donnée par le logos, par lequel il se sent partie du tout, et qui lui indique de soumettre ses propres intérêts à l'intérêt commun. Comme le semblable attire le semblable, l'âme rationnelle, dont tous sont doués, est la même. La conscience de l'unité est à la base de la tendance de vivre en société..."[29]

C'est ainsi que cette morale zénonienne, qui est devenue le point central de la morale stoïcienne, par son recours au logos - raison droite et langage qui lie les hommes de l'intérieur -, "a pu faire apparaître... des liens destinés à transformer la communauté humaine"[30].

Dans les philosophies grecques du logos on trouve trois sortes de conciliations: la conformité de l'homme avec lui-même, avec autrui, avec la loi de la nature entendue comme ensemble des existences; même quand elles admettent un ordre hiérarchique, ces philosophies défendent l'égalité de tous à l'égard du logos. Héraclite enseigne qu' "il faut suivre ce qui est commun" à tous (VS B 2) et s'attache avec force à l'idée que "ceux qui parlent avec intelligence, il faut qu'ils s'appuient sur ce qui est commun à tous de même que sur la loi d'une cité et beaucoup plus fortement encore. Car toutes les lois humaines se nourrissent d'une seule loi, la loi divine..."(B 114). Platon recommande par la bouche de Socrate: "j'ai un principe, qui n'est pas d'aujourd'hui, mais qui fut le mien de tout temps: c'est de ne me laisser persuader par rien que par une raison unique, celle qui est reconnue la meilleure à l'examen" (*Criton*, 46b). Mais Platon "unifie la nature et l'homme, le mécanisme et le dynamisme par la croyance à la réalité des Idées, qui se révèlent en l'homme"[31]. Aristote (*Éthique à Nicomaque*

E 10 1134a 35) affirme la primauté du *Logos* ou (*Physique* q 1 252a 12-13) réunit ensemble les notions de nature, de raison et d'ordre. Cependant, on sait que pour le Stagirite tout dans la nature n'est pas rationnel; la contingence et le hasard y ont leur place; comme il est dit dans la *Politique* (H 13 1331b 40 sqq), la raison peut aller quelquefois contre la nature; dans la *Métaphysique* (q 5 1048a 8) Aristote dit que l'homme, par la possession de la raison, fait régner dans sa conduite l'ordre que celle-ci n'aurait pas naturellement.

Le point de vue des anciens Stoïciens - leur optimisme - est l'idée du *Logos* qui est Dieu, "raison unique, principe démiurgique individuel, qui fait du monde un vivant plein de sagesse"[32], du *Logos* gouvernant les pensées humaines; d'où la conviction de l'unité de la vie individuelle et sociale, de l'existence d'une âme et d'une vertu, et du bien conforme avec la raison et la nature.

L'expérience actuelle du renversement des principes de rationalité et d'objectivité par les volontés désaxées et perverties remet en vigueur l'idée que le "stoïcisme reprend des forces par temps d'épreuves"[33]. L'actualité du stoïcisme consiste en trois thèses zénoniennes: a) la définition de la passion comme mouvement de l'âme déraisonnable, contraire à la nature, ou inclination exagérée [34]; b) la définition du "convenable", comme "l'action qui, une fois accomplie, peut se défendre raisonnablement, par exemple l'action conséquente dans la vie". (Le terme de "convenable" Zénon, selon Diogène Laërce, le prenait "dans son sens étymologique": "advenir à quelqu'un", c'est-à-dire comme désignant "l'activité qui est en affinité avec la constitution naturelle d'un être"[35]); c) l'idée que toutes les vertus se ramènent à la première, la *phronèsis* [36] et que celle-ci, suivant les choses où elle s'applique, est courage, tempérance, justice [37].

Depuis 1974 les compatriotes de Zénon, les Chypriotes Grecs,[38] subissent les conséquences d'une invasion qui ne peut se défendre par la raison et la justice. Zénon, cet "homme de bien" qui offrait à tous l'exemple de "sa propre vie... conforme aux théories qu'il exposait"[39] et incarnait ainsi l'incitation stoïcienne à l'imitation des vies exemplaires, se contenterait-il aujourd'hui de contribuer "à la réparation des bains publics" dans sa patrie? Lui, qui "ne reniait pas son pays" et demandait qu'on ajoute à son nom Ζήνωνος του φιλοσόφου και το Κιτιεύς[40]? Pourrait-il être le sage indifférent qui n'est d'aucun pays? On sait qu'en pareilles circonstances la philosophie stoïcienne a pu soutenir un Guillaume Var, l'auteur de *Constance et consolation et calamités publiques*, écrit en 1950, pendant le siège de Paris; qu'elle l'a consolé par l'idée que les patries, comme les individus, sont mortelles. Cependant, l'indifférentisme n'était pas le dogme du stoïcisme. Dans l'indifférence Zénon, le philosophe de Cittium, ne voyait pas la vertu, mais plutôt le chemin qui conduisait à la vertu, puisque vivre selon la vertu est "ce qui convient toujours", que le "kathikon" est ce que la raison αιρεί ποιείν[41].

Le sage stoïcien "fera de la politique, s'il n'en est pas empêché"; cela signifie "qu'il arrêtera le vice, encouragera à la vertu " et "ne donnera" jamais son asentiment à une chose fausse" [42].

NOTES

1. V.D.L., **Vies et doctrines des philosophes**, VII, 32

2. D.L., **Vies**, VII, 2

3. L.GOUBERT, Préface au livre d'Alain, **La théorie de la connaissance des Stoïciens**, Paris, PUF 1964, p. VIII

4. D.L., **Vies**, VII, 15

5. G. RODIER, **Études de Philosophie Grecque**, Paris, Vrin 1957, p. 222

6. Cf. D.L., **Vies**, VII, 26-27

7. VII, 30

8. André BRIDOUX, **Le stoïcisme et son influence**, Paris, Vrin 1966, p. 16

9. Cf. p. ex. PLATON, **Phédon** 99e

10. Cf. Anna KÉLESSIDOU, **Le Concept de salut dans la pensée politique de Platon** (en grec), éd. de l'Académie d'Athènes 1982, pp. 40-41

11. A. BRIDOUX, o.c., 23 sqq.Cf. Anna KÉLESSIDOU, "Sur quelques idées de la philosophie zénonienne, leur portée, et leur actualité" in *Le Stoïcisme et la culture*, Διοτίμα 20 (1992), pp. 26 sqq.

12. G. RODIER, o.c., p.254

13.D.L., Vies, VII, 139; cf. 148: "Zénon dit que la substance de Dieu est le monde..."

14. A.BRIDOUX, o.c., p. 25

15. (P.-M. SCHUHL), **Les Stoïciens**, Bibliothèque de la Pléïade, Gallimard 1962, pp. XXII.

16. Cf. G. RODIER, o.c., p.276

17. D.L., **Vies**, VII, 85

18. D.L., **Vies**, 86

19. STOBÉE, **Ecl.** II, 132

20. **Ecl.**, II, 7; Cf. D.L., VII, 87

21. D.L.,**Vies**, VII, 148

22. D.L., **Vies**, VII, 127

23. **Ecl.**, II, 138

24. Émile BRÉHIER, **Histoire de la Philosophie**, t.2, 1961 (7), p. 303

25. Cf. (Émile BRÉHIER, Introduction au Stoïcisme), **Les Stoïciens**, p. LIX

26. D. L. VII, 122

27. NUMÉNIUS, Eus. Pr. Ev. 14, 5, 11; cf. R.D. HICK, **Stoic and Epicurean**, London, 1910, p.10. E. V. ARNOLD, **Roman Stoïcism**, London, 1911, p.70

28. A. BRIDOUX, **o.c.**, pp. 34 et 48

29. J. N. THÉODORACOPOULOS, **La morale stoïcienne** (en grec) Nea Estia 1305, 1981, pp. 1554-55

30. A. BRIDOUX, **o.c.**, p.124; cf. pp. 126-127 (influence stoïcienne sur la "Déclaration des Droits de l'homme"). cf aussi A. JAGU, **Zénon de Cittium**, Paris, Vrin, 1946, pp. 44-45

31. Henri BERR, Avant propos au livre de L. ROBIN, **L'Évoluion de l'humanité**, Paris, Albin MICHEL 1948, p. XII

32. L. ROBIN, **o.c.**, p.416

33. A. BRIDOUX, **o.c.**, p.197

34. V.D.L., **Vies**, VII, 110. Cf. Cicéron, Tusc. disp. IV, II

35. D.L., VII, 107

36. ARNIM, S.V.F., 20

37. V. PLUT. I, I, 7, 1034C

38. V.D.L., **Vies**, VII, 1. Pour l'origine grecque de Zénon v. Kyriakos HATZIIOANNOU, **L'ancienne Chypre dans les sources grecques** (en grec), Nicosie, 1975, v. III, part. A/, pp. 44-48 et v. V, pp. 219-222

39. D.L., VII, 10

40. D.L., VII, 12

41. CICÉRON de FINIBUS, II, 75

42. Cf. D.L., VII, 121; cf. aussi 108, 20

RECENSIONS/BOOK REVIEWS

Skepsis:
A Journal for Philosophy and Inter-Disciplinary Research

L.C.BARGELIOTES & N.CHRONIS (Eds), Athens-Olympia, Academia Verlag-Sankt Augustin, Vol.VI, 1995, pp.210.

***Skepsis**, is the periodical publication of the **International Center of Philosophy and Inter-Disciplinary Research**, edited by Professors L.C. Bargeliotes and N. Chronis at the University of Athens, published in Athens and Olympia and distributed by Academia Verlag-Sankt Augustin.*

*A Journal for Philosophy and Inter-Disciplinary Research, **Skepsis**, although closely related to Scepticism as the title indicates, is open to all philosophical currents and to all the disciplines of scientific research as the subtitle denotes. It is grounded on the constructive side of Scepticism. As was indicated in the "Introductory Note" of Volume I, (i) the aim of the Journal is "to initiate and encourage dialogue among those researchers, who consider criticism an obligation rather than a privilege" and "thus, Skepsis is predominantly addressed to those who, opposed to rigid and unprogressive conceptual patterns, submit their research activities to critique, as this proceeds in the continuous conflict of ideas and beliefs"; (ii) its principles are "the critique and the inquiry"; (iii) its aspiration is "to become an international forum" for essays and debates and, thus, "it does not intend to exclude from its pages the expression of opposing views and counterarguments". In conclusion, "Skepsis respects the intellectual tradition; however, it grounds the truth on searching criticism and questions the principles of scientific discovery".*

The International Center of Philosophy and Inter-Disciplinary Research organizes, since 1988, biannual or annual Symposia, Conferences or Congresses in Olympia-Amaliada-Zacharo. In the Summer of 1996, August 13-18, in conjunction with the 100th anniversary of the Olympic Games, the Center organizes the VIIth International Conference on "Polis and Culture" and the VIIth International Symposium of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research on "Individual and Polis, Ancient and Modern Sociopolitical Theories".

***Skepsis** was first published in 1990 and, in 1995, Volume VI appeared. The Journal publishes Essays, Discussions and Book Reviews in English, French, German and, of course, in Greek. Following are the Contents of the last volume.*

The present VIth Volume, besides the Discussions and the Book Reviews, contains 10 Essays on "Scepticism and Contemporary Thought", the topic of the Vth International Symposium of the International Center of Philosophy and Inter-Disciplinary Research, Symposium which took place in Olympia-Amaliada-Zacharo in the Summer of 1994.

The ADDRESS to the Symposium, published in this volume (pp.5-8), was delivered by the Dean of the School of Theology at the University of Athens, Prof. Basil TSAKONAS, who died suddenly and unexpectedly on March 4, 1995, and whose "IN MEMORIAM" appears in pp.191-192, along with that of Prof. Th. VEIKOS, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Athens, who passed away ten days later, March 14, 1995. Prof. Tsakonas, in his address, sees that "Skepticism, like the other philosophical systems of the hellenistic times, paved the way for Christianity, by giving a positive answer to the problems of God and truth, thus, liberating man from the impasse of doubt". (In this review, the authors' spelling of the word 'Scepticism' has been respected, according to the British and the American traditions).

In this issue of SKEPSIS there are ten excellent ESSAYS on Scepticism. The first three deal with the history of Scepticism, from pre-Pyrrhonian to post-modern. The next two arcticles deal with its relation to two other philosophical currents, Platonic and Stoic. The following two articles relate Scepticism to Religion followed, in turn, by three which discuss scepticism in Hume's Ethics and in Newton's Natural Philosophy.

In the first article, "Pyrrhonian Postmodernism: Ancient Roots of an Historiographical Crisis", Prof. B.C. Southgate argues that, applied to historiography and historical texts and studies, the "sceptical contemporary [late twentieth-century] attitudes towards historical truth have their own historical roots in ancient scepticism" and, by tracing it through the centuries, "Scepticism is not a problem newly-discovered by post-modernist theorists: it is a perennial problem, the discussion of which periodically returns to fashion".

Prof. Ch. Evangeliou, in "Sextus on Skepsis and Skepticism", agreeing that "Skepticism, in one form or the other, has been present in every period of philosophy, ancient, modern, and post-modern", and realizing "a need for a clear understanding of the nature and character of Skepticism", feels that "this need may be partially satisfied by going back to the ancient roots of Skepsis". However, going back to Sextus Empiricus, Prof. Evangeliou finds that, although "at the theoretical level, Sextus tried to differentiate genuine Pyrrhonian Skepticism from any other philosophical schools", yet "in practice, Sextus seems to follow neither the consequence of his theoretical commitments to epoche and ataraxia nor the noble example of Pyrrho's detachment".

In the third Essay, "Roots, Rising and Versions of Skepticism", Prof. L.C.Bargeliotes proposes that, in tracing out the roots, the rising and different

versions of Skepticism, we have "to go back to the pre-classical antiquity and follow its course of development and transformations through the classical, hellenistic, byzantine and western european periods down to our days". Thus, the author, starting with Xenophanes and Socrates, comes to Phaedo and Pyrrho, both of Elis, close to Olympia, where "the rising of the Pyrrhonian Skepticism out of Phaedo's School of Elis follows as a 'natural' consequence". After a development of the Academic and the Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Prof. Bargeliotes traces the meta-Pyrrhonian Skepticism in the Christian Fideism, in Montaigne, Pascal and Descartes and in Hume's Phenomenalism.

L.P. Gerson, in "Scepticism and the Platonic Tradition", tries "to show how a Platonist would respond to the sceptical argument against rational belief" and "how Plotinus tries to remedy such defects" in Plato's position. Next is the essay "Sceptical Criticisms of the Stoic Doctrine of Signs" by R.L. Purtill in which the author discusses Sextus's attack of the absolute and relational predication in the relation between the indicator and the indicated in the Stoic Theory of the "Sign"(indicator) and Sextus's logical criticisms of the Stoic system. Yet, Purtill notices, the Stoic theory did survive Sextus's criticisms: "some lasting value?"

In the next essay on the "Theological uses of Skepticism: The 'Pros' and 'Cons'", Prof. J. Reedy proposes to answer the question "How did the Catholic Church [since 1870] come to view skepticism as an absolute evil" and become "a great champion of reason" while, in the XVIIth c. "Catholics, especially Jesuits", used skepticism to combat Protestantism. D.N.Blakeley, in his Skepticism and the Religions of the World", discusses John Hick's thesis on "the third phase of the relationship between skepticism and religion" (i.e., across religious traditions in a multi-systems perspective), a thesis which is found not to meet the challenge of the contemporary skepticism, nor that of the ancient skeptics.

A.E. Hatzimousis, in his "Hume's Ethics and the Limits of Hellenistic Scepticism", finds that Hume "seems to maintain diverse, if not conflicting, philosophical claims: although he appears to be an epistemological Sceptic, Hume is, however, a Stoic in his ethical writings. In his "Human [Humean?] Skepticism and Moral Sentiment", M.Hester concludes also that Hume's thesis "will surprise those who take Hume to be mainly a skeptic", since, by accepting that "the principles of taste are universal in the human species", "Hume has a certain kind of systematic and comphehensive study of the 'science of human nature' lacked by many Greek skeptics". In " 'Phenomenon' and 'Occult Qualities' (*occultae qualitates*): sceptical views in Newton's Philosophy" (in Greek, with an English 'Summary'), Prof. J.G.Dellis traces, first, the indirect and direct sceptical influences on Newton's thought and, second, Newton's sceptical philosophy in accepting the notion of "phenomenon' in the sceptic

sense and "rejecting the concepts of '*occultae qualitates*' because they belong to the area of Metaphysics". Newton's Scepticism is found, in the end, to be a "mitigated" (cf. D.Hume) or "enlightened Scepticism" (cf. S.Brown).

In the DISCUSSIONS, we find "Les principes epistémologiques généraux chez le néoplatonicien Proclus (412-485) et chez le chrétien pseudo-Denys (5 ou 6 s.), where Dr. Chr.Terezis tries to show the gnoseological differences of the two thinkers and, consequently, their difference in Henology and Ontology.

A Journal for Philosophy and Inter-disciplinary Research, SKEPSIS, although closely related to Scepticism as the title indicates, is open to all philosophical currents and to all the disciplines of scientific research as the subtitle denotes. If all the articles of this issue are on Scepticism, it is only because, incidentally, Scepticism was the theme of the Center's International Symposium in the Summer of 1994. The 1995 Symposium was on "Scepticism and the Platonic Tradition". For the Summer of 1996 (August 13-18), the topic will be "Individual and Polis: Ancient and Modern Sociopolitical Theories".

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CONSTAS DIMITRI AND STAVROU THEOFANIS G., Editors,

Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century

Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995 (Published in cooperation with the Institute of International Relations, Panteion University). XI+319p.

Modern Greece remains a country of paradoxes and of contradictions, a country pushed by its history and its traditions and pushed by the forces of modernity. Unique amongst its Balkan neighbours, it is an integral part of what may perhaps be the most potent institutions of the modern world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Both institutions, in their own way, have had a profound effect on their members. For Greece in particular membership was actively pursued for security and political reasons. In regards to NATO it was pursued in order to counter the threat from the north posed by the combination of Tito's national communism as this was expressed with Yugoslavia's support to the Greek communists and to the concept for an "independent" Slavic Macedonia streching from Skopje to Thessaloniki, Greece's primary northern port.

Membership in the EU was primarily sought in order to consolidate what by general consensus is considered the greatest political achievement of Modern

Greece, the transition from arbitrary and authoritarian rule to democratic governance. In the long-term EU membership was also seen as supplementing the security provided by NATO.

Today Greek membership in the EU, its NATO security alliance and, by extension, Greece's security relationship with the US, are considered the foundations upon which Greece must built in order to ensure a secure and prosperous future for its people, as the country and the world enter the 21st century.

The prospects of doing so successfully was the central theme of an international symposium held in mid-1992 at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.. The symposium was jointly sponsored by the Panteion University with the scholarly cooperation of the Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism. The volume under review contains updated versions of papers discussed in Washington. It is edited by Professor D.Constas, at the time Rector of Panteion University and currently Director of the Institute of International Relations, and the person who conceived the idea of the symposium, and by Professor Th. Stavrou of the University of Minnesota. The thirteen page introduction, jointly prepared by the two scholars, provides a thoughtful synthesis of the positions articulated by the contributors, of the themes that emerged during the conference and Greece's future prospects.

The critical and introspective nature of all essays, which are based on serious scholarship by aknowledged scholars, is noted in the introduction. And despite the pessimistic outlook of many of its contributors, the editors consider their criticism as a source of optimism and a "harbinger of things to come". And this because criticism, introspection and reexamination are prerequisites for positive action. The overall consensus of the symposium is that Greece can best cope with the challenges of the 21st century through effective and functional integration with the EU. And that with the appropriate and in certain cases radical reforms and adjustments there are no insurmountable obstacles or inherent reasons why Greece cannot meet the challenges successfully. After all the Greeks, as people and as a nation, have demonstrated resilience that enabled them to weather much tougher times with more limited resources and capabilities.

The volume is divided in five parts. Part I deals with institutions and political culture and contains essays by N.Mouzelis and Th. Stavrou. Foreign policy is dealt in Part II with contributions from M.Stearns and D.Constas. The Greek economy and the EU challenge are addressed by S.Thomadakis and K.Vergopoulos in Part III. T.Gallant and C. Tsoukalas in Part IV examine the strengths and strains of Greek society, while the challenge of tradition and modernity are treated by G.Babiniotis, M.Paraschos and M.Kyriazis in Part V.

The staff of the Woodrow Wilson Press Center has done an excellent job in preparing this paperbound volume which contains notes of all contributors, figures and tables on various aspects of Greek society and the economy, as well as a comprehensive index.

The editors, the contributors and all others who made its publication possible should be proud of the final product. But the ultimate beneficiaries are the readers, the laymen and the scholars interested in the affairs and world of Hellenism. In its pages they will encounter with many of the problems, dilemmas and challenges confronting modern Greece as well as insightful and provocative views on how these can be overcome.

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Assistant Professor of International Relations

Athens University of Economics and Business

CHRONOLOGIE - CHYPRE

Deuxième semestre 1995

14 juillet: La Grèce cède à Chypre 56 chars AMX 30, qui seront modernisés sur place sous le contrôle de techniciens français pour un coût supérieur à 15 millions de dollars.

28 août - 1 septembre: XIV ème Congrès annuel, à Nicosie, des Chypriotes de l'étranger.

15 septembre - 15 octobre: Mois culturel européen à Nicosie sous les auspices de la Commission européenne et du gouvernement de Chypre.

20 septembre: réunion conjointe, à Bruxelles, des ministres de l'Intérieur de Chypre et de l'Union européenne.

1er octobre: Trente-cinquième annniversaire de l'indépendance de la République de Chypre.

23 octobre: Le Premier ministre espagnol, M. Felipe Gonzales, en sa qualité de Président en exercice de l'Union européenne déclare à propos de l'adhésion de Chypre que "l'Union européenne s'est engagée à ouvrir les négociations six mois après la fin de la Conférence intergouvernementale et nous respecterons cette décision".

10 décembre: Dans son Rapport de renouvellement du mandat de la Force de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies à Chypre, M. Boutros Ghali, le Secrétaire général de l'ONU, note que "la zone nord de Chypre (zone occupée) est une des régions les plus militarisées du monde avec 30 000 soldats turcs et 4 500 soldats chypriotes turcs".

13 décembre: Le Conseil National de la République de Chypre a unanimement rejeté les propositions de M. Denktash, leader chypriote turc, concernant un éventuel accord de la partie chypriote turque à l'adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne en contrepartie de la reconnaissance, de la part des Chypriotes grecs, d'une souveraineté séparée et d'une égalité politique pour les Chypriotes turcs.

CHRONOLOGIE - GRECE

Deuxième semestre 1995

21 juillet: Gigantesques incendies dans la région de l'Attique détruisant 5000 hectares de forêts et une centaine de maisons totalement ou partiellement.

8 août: Décès d'Antonis Ambatielos, grande figure du mouvement syndical et communiste de Grèce.

26 août: Réunion à Ioannina des ministres bulgare, grec et roumain des Affaires étrangères.

31 août: Le gouvernement grec déplore les raids alliés contre les Serbes de Bosnie.

11 septembre: Démission de Costas Simitis, Ministre de l'Industrie, de l'Energie et du Commerce.

13 septembre: La Grèce conclut un accord avec les autorités de Skopje et lève l'embargo

économique qu'elle appliquait depuis février 1994 contre l'ancienne république yougoslave de Macédoine.

14 septembre: Remaniement ministériel. Akis Tsohatzopoulos, Secrétaire général de PASOK, devient ministre de l'Intérieur.

11 octobre: Costas Skandalidis remplace A. Tsohatzopoulos au poste de Secrétaire général du PASOK.

20 novembre: A. Papandreou, victime d'une pneumonie, est hospitalisé au Centre Onasseio. A. Tsohatzopoulos, assure l'intérim du Premier ministre.

20 décembre: Dimitri Tsovolas, ancien ministre de PASOK, crée un nouveau parti le DI. K. K. I. (Mouvement démocratique et social).

28 décembre: Un avion "Phantom" turc s'abîme en mer près de Lesbos après avoir été intercepté par deux avions "F 16" grecs.

LIVRES REÇUS/BOOKS RECEIVED

1. *Valkanika Symmikta*, 5-6 (Balkan Studies), Thessaloniki, The Institute of Balkan Studies, 1993-1994 (in Greek)

2. *Valkanika Symmikta*, 7 (Balkan Studies), Thessaloniki, The Institute of Balkan Studies, 1995 (in Greek)

3. Paris Arnopoulos, *Sociopolitics*, Toronto, Guernica, 1995

4. Stephanos Constantinides, *To Kypriako Provlima (The Cyprus Question)*, Nicosia-Montreal, Éd. O Metoikos-Le Métèque, 1995 (in Greek)

5. Leonidas Bombas, *Gia tin Ekpedefsi ton Allodapon Paidion stin Ellada*, Athens, 1994 (in Greek)

6. *Politistiki Taftotita kai stratigiki tou Ellinismou*, INERPOST, Athens, Gnosi Publishers, 1995 (in Greek)

7. *Ellinismos tis Voriou Epirou ke Ellinoalvanikes Schesis*, (Epimelia Vasiliou Konti), Vol. 1 & Vol. 2, Athens, Estia Publishers, 1995 (in Greek)

8. Agnes Smith, *Through Cyprus*, London: Hurst and Blackett Publishers, 1887 (Reprinted, Nicosia, 1995)

9. Cyprus Researh Centre (KY.KE.M), *Cyprus Yearbook 1994*, Nicosia-Cyprus 1995

10. Andreas Kl. Sofokleous, *Typos kai Exartisi, I Kypriaki Krisi tou 1974 kai i Efimerida The New York Times*, Nicosia-Cyprus, Intercollege Press, 1995 (in Greek)

11. Antigone Kefala, *Alexia, A Tale for Advenced Children*, Melbourne, Owl Publishing, 1995

ACTIVITÉS ACADÉMIQUES /ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES

Lancement du numéro 2, vol. 3 de la revue académique Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies à Montréal

Le numéro 2, vol. 3 de la revue académique Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies a été lancé à Montréal le 2 octobre 1995 à l'Université Concordia. Par la même occasion, une conférence a été donnée par le professeur Paris Arnopoulos, président du Conseil d'administration du Centre de recherches helléniques (Canada) sous le titre "Polis-Ethnos-Cosmos: la contribution grecque aux affaires internationales".

Le consul général de la Grèce M. Nikos Vamvounakis a aussi brièvement pris la parole pour souligner l'importance que revêtait la publication de ce nouveau numéro de la revue pour la mise en valeur de l'hellénisme au sein de la communauté académique, du milieu diplomatique et politique et plus généralement de l'opinion publique.

Le professeur Yannis Philippoussis a présenté la revue et ses buts alors que le directeur du Centre de recherches helléniques (Canada), Stephanos Constantinides, insistait sur la nécessité de continuer à travailler pour la recherche et les études helléniques en collaboration avec le autres institutions dans le secteur, tant de la métropole que de la diaspora hellénique.

L'hellénisme au sein du village global Conférence à Nicosie

Le Centre de recherches helléniques (Canada) a participé à la Conférence internationale des Instituts de recherche de l'hellénisme à Nicosie, qui s'est déroulée du 3 au 8 novembre 1995. La conférence, qui avait pour thème "L'hellénisme au sein du village global", était organisée par le Comité de coordination des instituts de recherches de l'hellénisme dont le Centre de recherches helléniques (Canada) fait partie comme représentant du Canada. Le directeur du Centre, Dr. Stephanos Constantinides, a fait une communication sur le thème "Politique étrangère grecque: orientations théoriques et praxis". Le Centre chypriote d'études (KY.KEM) était l'hôte de la conférence.

Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE)


At the invitation of the Hellenic Republic, Hellenes from around the world as far away as Europe, Australia, South Africa, North and South America, Russia and Ukraine attended a Conference in Thessaloniki creating the Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE). The council is composed of more than 250 representatives of the seven million Hellenes estimated to be living beyond Greece's shores.

The Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research (Canada) was represented by its director Dr. Stephanos Constantinides. Dr. Constantinides addressed the conference presenting Hellenism in Canada.

Andrew Athens was elected President of the World Council and Christos Tomaras, president of SAE of America.

The president of the Hellenic Republic, Costis Stephanopoulos, his counterpart Glafkos Clerides of the Republic of Cyprus, political, ecclesiastic and academic dignitaries addressed the council. Also several forums were organized on subjects like Greek studies abroad, media, women's issues, etc.

Our Next Issue - Notre prochain numéro



The next issue of Hellenic Studies will be on the theme of the Aegean dispute. Among the many topics covered:

- Continental Shelf
- Territorial Waters
- Air Space
- Imia Case

Notre prochain numéro sera consacré au différend Gréco-turc en mer Égée. Plus d'une dizaine des meilleurs spécialistes de la question - juristes, historiens, experts en études stratégiques, et autres - contribueront à cette édition. Entre autres, les questions suivantes seront traitées:

- Les eaux territoriales
- L'espace aérien
- Le plateau continental
- La crise d'Imia

Advice to Contributors

Three copies of all manuscripts, typewritten on computer, double-spaced should be submitted. Manuscripts should follow the APA Manual, or the MLA Style Sheet or be consistent with practice in the discipline of each particular author.

The *Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research*, the Editor and Editorial Board of *Hellenic Studies* take no responsibility for the opinions or data presented by contributors to the journal.

Manuscripts, published or unpublished, are not returned.

Avis aux collaborateurs

Les textes doivent être soumis en trois exemplaires dactylographiés à l'ordinateur à double interligne et conformément à la présentation en usage.

Le Centre de recherches helléniques, l'Éditeur et le Comité de rédaction de la revue *Études Helléniques* déclinent toute responsabilité quant aux opinions exprimées par les auteurs des articles.

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