ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

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ÉTUDES HELLÉNIQUES / HELLENIC STUDIES

ÉTUDES HELLÉNIQUES / HELLENIC STUDIES

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Études Helléniques est une revue interdisciplinaire bilingue (français-anglais) consacrée à la recherche: elle a pour objet l'étude de l'hellénisme tant de la Grèce que de la diaspora.

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NOTE DE LA RÉDACTION

Dans notre première édition (printemps 1983) nous écrivions :

La recherche dans le domaine des sciences sociales n'a jamais connu de développement sérieux en Grèce : même aujourd'hui, c'est un domaine sous-développé auquel on accorde peu d'importance. Il y a plusieurs raisons qui expliquent ce phénomène, mais l'explication principale réside dans le fait que les élites conservatrices qui sont depuis l'indépendance aux commandes de la société grecque ont toujours banni les sciences sociales, les considérant comme subversives. Ce n'est pas un hasard s'il n'existe pas au sein des universités grecques de département ou de faculté de sociologie, de psychologie ou d'éducation, alors que même en histoire et en science politique les recherches ont été et restent toujours très limitées. D'aucuns soutiennent que les recherches et analyses approfondies sur les problèmes de la société héllénique furent exclues de propos délibéré. Les institutions spécialisées dans de telles recherches se font encore attendre. Par ailleurs, la Grèce est celui parmi les pays européens et les pays développés en général qui consacre le plus bas pourcentage de son produit national brut à l'investissement dans le domaine de la recherche : c'est encore un indice que la recherche dans le domaine des sciences sociales ne constitue pas une priorité.

*De l'autre côté, il faut signaler l'existence d'une "autre Grèce" en dehors des frontières nationales, constituée par les Grecs de la diaspora - **Apodimoi Hellenes** -. Les Grecs de la diaspora sont dispersés à travers le monde. On les trouve plus particulièrement dans les pays industrialisés, aux Etats-Unis, au Canada, en Australie, en Allemagne de l'Ouest, en Suède, pour ne nommer que quelques pays. La Grèce métropolitaine a jusqu'à maintenant manifesté peu d'intérêt pour la recherche en sciences sociales concernant les millions d'immigrants grecs; il n'existe qu'un petit nombre de rapports descriptifs et non systématiques rédigés pour des raisons administratives. Les études existantes sur les immigrants grecs à travers le monde sont le travail exclusif de chercheurs grecs de la diaspora, d'organismes relevant des immigrants eux-mêmes, ou même, dans quelques cas des chercheurs non-grecs travaillant dans le domaine des relations ethniques en général. Cette tendance de l'étude des différents paramètres ethniques s'est intensifiée durant les vingt dernières années au sein des sociétés d'accueil.*

De cette façon, en faisant connaître les contributions positives des spécialistes grecs et non-grecs qui se sont penchés sur de telles questions, la revue ETUDES HELLENIQUES se propose de relever un défi de taille dans le domaine des sciences sociales. Les ETUDES HELLENIQUES inaugurent leur publication en se fixant comme but de devenir un forum académique international de dialogue et d'échange d'idées parmi les universitaires et chercheurs qui s'occupent des HELLENES à travers le monde. En plus, en publiant en

français et en anglais les ETUDES HELLENIQUES vont favoriser la coopération internationale des experts des problèmes grecs. Dans nos prochaines livraisons il est possible que nous incluions un nombre limité d'articles en langue grecque.

Nous croyons que les ETUDES HELLENIQUES peuvent combler une lacune au niveau académique, et nous espérons qu'elles sauront répondre aux attentes des chercheurs. Nous sommes persuadés que cette revue sera une contribution positive à l'étude scientifique aussi bien des affaires grecques que des problèmes de notre société en général.

Pour différentes raisons nous avons interrompu notre édition en 1985. Qu'est qui a changé depuis ? Je crois que nous pouvons repéter ce que nous avons écrit en 1983 avec quelques légères modifications. Il est en effet vrai que depuis on remarque un certain progrès dans un nombre de secteurs de recherche et d'études tels la sociologie, la psychologie, l'éducation et la science politique. Il y a actuellement une ouverture pour ces secteurs dans les universités grecques. Quelques institutions de recherche ont aussi fait leur apparition depuis 1983. Néanmoins, la situation reste précaire et la Grèce tire de l' arrière dans tous ces domaines en comparaison avec les autres pays de l'Europe occidentale.

De façon générale, les objectifs fixés par les ETUDES HELLENIQUES à notre première édition en 1983 restent toujours les mêmes.

L'EDITEUR

EDITOR'S NOTE

In our first issue (spring 1983) we wrote :

Research and dialogue in the social sciences as such have never been in the forefront of the mainstream Greek society. A variety of reasons have been offered for this seeming lack of interest in the social research field, the primary being some kind of "socio-political conspiracy" on the part of the conservative elites that have governed Greece almost exclusively since Independence. As a matter of fact, it is not accidental that neither sociology, psychology nor education faculties exist in Greek universities, where systematic research on political and historical issues has been minimal. Numerous scholars have pointed out that in-depth research and analyses of the different socio-political issues prevailing in Greek society have been repeatedly avoided or even stifled altogether. Only very few instances exist where individual efforts have challenged this traditional indifference towards unraveling the mechanisms and processes underlying the very structures and functioning of the entire Greek social apparatus. In addition, the mere fact that Greece spends the least money in terms of pencentage of GNP of all European and developing nations for research is one more indication of the low priority placed on social sciences investigation.

On the other hand, as has been documented throughout the existing literature , almost "another Greece" exists outside Greece proper. The so-called ***Apodimoi Hellenes*** *or the Greek diaspora may be found all over the globe, and more so in the large industrialized countries of the Western world, such as the USA, Canada, Australia, West Germany, and Sweden, to name a few. Research and social interest about the millions of Greek immigrants on the part of "metropolitan Greece" has been virtually non-existent, with the exception of a few unsystematic descriptive accounts for mainly administrative purposes. Whatever studies do exist about Greek immigrants around the world are the exclusive work of scholars of the Greek diaspora and organizations of Greek immigrants themselves, or even, in some instances, of non Greek scholars working within the overall field of ethnic relations. This trend, towards investigating different ethnic parameters, has intensified over the last twenty years or so among the immigrant- receiving societies.*

By acknowledging and sharing the positive contribution of all efforts of Greek and non-Greek scholars who have somehow been, involved in the studying of Greek issues around the globe, HELLENIC STUDIES aims to offer one more concrete challenge within the social sciences field. HELLENIC STUDIES begins its publication with the sincere and ambitious goal of becoming the international academic forum of dialogue and exchange of ideas among all scholars dealing with the multifaceted issues prevailing among the ***Hellenes*** *of the entire world. Furthermore, this latest journal including articles and analy-*

ses in English and French, at both the theoretical and empirical level, will pursue the cooperation and contributions of the best experts on Greek issues inside and outside Greece proper - future issues of the HELLENIC STUDIES journal will most probably include a limited number of articles in Greek as well.

It is our aim and belief that such an effort will fill an existing gap in the academic community and that HELLENIC STUDIES will be welcomed by Greeks and non-Greeks alike. We are convinced that this periodical will make a positive contribution towards a better understanding of general Greek issues and the larger societal issues as well.

For several reasons we interrupted the publication of this journal in 1985. What has since been changed? I believe that we can repeat what we published in 1983 with slight modifications. As a matter of fact, in Greece progress has been made in numerous fields of studies and research in the social sciences, especially in the fields of sociology, psychology, education and political science. There is now an openness in the Greek universities. Research institutions have also appeared since 1983. Nevertheless, the situation is precarious and in comparison with other Western countries, Greece remains behind in all these fields.

Lastly, the overall objectives of HELLENIC STUDIES remain the same as stated in our first edition in 1983.

THE EDITOR

INTERVIEW WITH GLAFKOS CLERIDES *

THE CYPRUS PROBLEM
TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE TURKISH INVASION

This interview was conducted by Stephanos Constantinides **

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean with an area of 9,251 square kilometers. It has a maximum length of 240 km from east to west and a maximum width of 100 km from north to south. It lies in the north-eastern corner of the East Mediterranean basin, at the meeting point of three continents-Europe, Asia and Africa - a fact which has considerably enhanced the island's strategic importance and development.

The island has a population of approximately 750,000 of which 80% are Greeks, 18% are Turks and 2% are other minorities (Maronites, Armenians and others).

Cyprus appeared for the first time in the history of civilization in the 6th millenium B.C. during the Neolithic Period. Greek language and culture were introduced to the island in the 13th century B.C. by the Achaean Greeks who arrived and settled in Cyprus. Both Greek language and culture have been preserved to this day.

After being part of the kingdom of Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire, a French dynasty was establised in Cyprus during the Crusades (the Lusignans 1192-1489). Then the island was ruled by the Republic of Venice and, in 1571, it was conquered by the Turks. The Turkish period lasted until 1878 when the island was given to Great Britain.

Cyprus participated in the Greek War of Independance, during which a large number of Cypriots fought and fell on the Greek mainland. The question of the incorporation of the island in the Greek State (created in 1830) was raised soon after 1830. Since then the Cyprus people have continued to demand the union of Cyprus to Greece.

In 1955, after the long but unsuccessful demands of Cypriots to unite with Greece by peaceful means, the Cypriots took up arms against the British colonial power. In 1960 the island won its independence and was proclaimed a Republic.

The 1960 Constitution of the Cyprus Republic proved unworkable in many of its provisions (e.g. separate votes based on ethnic affiliation of members of

* President of the Republic of Cyprus

** Director of the Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research (Canada) he teaches Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal

Parliament and right of veto of each ethnic group) and this made impossible its smooth implementation.[1] In 1963 the president of the Cyprus Republic, Archbishop Makarios, proposed some amendments (e.g. a unified state vote) to facilitate the functioning of the State. The Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership opposed these propositions. In December 1963 the Turkish reaction led to an open rebellion against the State. The Greek side accused Turkey of using the proposals for amending the Constitution as an excuse for putting into effect their long prepared plan for the partition of Cyprus. The Cyprus Government brought the matter before the UN Security Council and in March 1964 a UN Peace- Keeping Force (UNICEF) was sent to the island.

In July-August 1974 a coup was staged in Cyprus by the Greek military Junta for the overthrow of President Makarios. Turkey used this pretext to launch an invasion with a full-fledged army against Cyprus. Turkish troops occupied 37% of the island's northern territory.

The Turkish invasion and occupation have been condemned by international bodies, such as the UN General Assembly, the European Parliament, the Non-aligned Movement and the Council of Europe.

Several rounds of intercommunal talks between the island's two main communities (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) have not led to any solution. The Greek side considers that this situation is due to the Turkish side's intransigeance and continuing effort to partition and occupation of the whole island by means of maintaining an occupation army of 36,000 soldiers and by colonizing the occupied part of Cyprus with more than 90,000 settlers from Anatolia.

Furthermore on the 15th of November 1983 the Turkish side declared a separate "state" under the name of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". This move was condemned by the International Community and the UN Security Council adopted a resolution which deplores the declaration of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus, considers the declaration as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal. The same resolution calls upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus. No country, with the exception of Turkey, has recognized the so called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus".

A round of talks this year, held under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali has not led to any progress. President Glafkos Clerides hopes that the start of negociations - maybe in 1995 - on Cyprus entry into the European Union will force Turkey to be more reasonable in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem [2].

In a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali dated September 7th 1994, President Clerides reaffirms his conviction that the failure to make progress was due to the lack of political will both by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leader-

ship.He also makes clear that both sides must accept that the basis of any negotiations is the one stipulated by paragraph 2 of UN Security Council resolution 939 (29 july 1994),i.e. a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship.

Stephanos Constantinides - Mr President, twenty years after the invasion of Cyprus and in spite of the continuing negociations and painful concessions made by the Greek side since then, why has there been no solution to the Cyprus problem ?

Glafkos Clerides - The reason why there has not been any progress towards the solution of the Cyprus problem is stated very clearly in the last report of the UN Secretary General to the Security Council. He states in his report that the Security Council and the Secretary General have tried repeatedly to produce progress but they all have failed because there is a lack of political will on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. He then goes on to analyse and states that whether we discuss the substance of the problem or measures for building confidence it's unlikely that we would produce results because of the lack of political will on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot side to negotiate a solution to the Cyprus problem. These are the words of the UN Secretary General and I think his diagnosis is perfectly correct. That is why the Security Council, in its last resolution, has included two very important paragraphs. Paragraph 2 of the Resolution, resolution number 939, states that the solution of the Cyprus problem must be based on one sovereignty, one international legal personality, one citizenship and the equal political status of the two communities within the context of a bizonal federation. We accept that.

The Turkish side not only doesn't accept it but Mr. Denktash [3] got his parliament to get the provision that unless the sovereignty of his so called state is recognized, he is not willing to negociate [4]. In other words, he wants recognition that the occupied land is a separate sovereign state. And this is where we can make no progress towards the solution of the Cyprus problem.

The same resolution, requests that the UN Secretary General make a far-reaching and intense examination of the Cyprus problem and consult and recommend that the Security Council act with the guarantor powers, with the two leaders [5], to find new and effective ways of promoting a solution, clearly indicating that present negotiations are not effective because of the lack of Turkish political will. And you cannot have negotiations with one side negotiating and the other lacking political will. In this respect, one must also examine the terrible negative influence of the large presence of Turkish forces in Cyprus. It is that influence which creates the lack of political will and to counter that fact, I had offered, in writing, to the UN Secretary General and to the other side to dis-

mantle the National Guard, to hand over all its weapons to the UN peacekeeping force, not to purchase anymore arms and accept military inspection by the UN. The money I would save by not maintaining a National Guard and not purchasing arms would be put in a UN account to be used for projects beneficial to both communities, with the understanding that the Turkish forces would be withdrawn, to pay the total cost of a larger peacekeeping force, provided that the Turkish-Cypriots hand over their weapons as well. In other words, we undertake to pay the total cost for an increase in the UN peacekeeping force, and to disarm ourselves, provided the Turkish forces evacuate the Island. Turkey refuses.

S.C.- How do you define now the position of the Republic of Cyprus in the light of this lack of political will on the part of the Turkish side, particularly on the part of Ankara to find a just solution of the Cyprus problem ?

G.C.- We will, of course, write to the UN Secretary General and we will inform him that we are ready to go into direct negotiations with the Turkish-Cypriot side in the presence of representatives of the Secretary General, provided the Turkish-Cypriot side accepts Paragraph 2 of the last resolution which provides one sovereignty, one international personality, one citizenship etc..etc...[6] We then will wait for the Turkish-Cypriot reaction. If they do not respond, then we shall have to consider a number of ways of promoting a solution. These different ways will be discussed with the Greek Government and the National Council [7].

S.C.- Mr. Papoulias, the Greek Foreign Minister said that the Cyprus problem should be considered on a different basis from the one being followed in the last twenty years. As this phrase "to consider the problem on a new basis " has recently been used frequently, would you like, Mr. President, to explain how you understand it ?

G.C.- When we say to consider the problem on a new or different basis, one has to consider two aspects : the first one refers to the high-level, Makarios-Denktash and Kyprianou-Denktash, [8] agreements and the second one to the invasion and occupation by Turkey. If to consider the Cyprus problem on a new basis means to abandon the high-level agreements I believe that it will be a serious mistake of a great political dimension. That's what the Turkish side is doing and we don't have to do the same but on the contrary, oppose this intrasigence because if we mimic them, the UN General Secretary will deny the mandate of good offices he received in order to achieve a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus.

Concerning the second aspect, that is to say we don't negotiate as far as the occupation continues, it will be contrary to the UN resolutions because these resolutions call, of course, for the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Cyprus, but also for negotiations between the representatives of the two com-

munities. You can't accept only a part of the resolutin and ignore the rest.

But if to consider the Cyprus problem on a new basis means that because of the lack of political will from the Turkish side we have to find new ways to achieve a settlement, then I agree. That's what the last Security Council resolution asks the UN General Secretary to do: to find more effective ways for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

S.C.-Don't you think that the negotiations on constitutional arrangements all these years distract from the essence of the Cyprus question? International public opinion is left with the idea that the problem is just a conflict between two communities, not an invasion and occupation of 37% of an independant state, the Republic of Cyprus, from Turkey.

G.C.- I don't think that this will happen in the new approach that we propose. According to this approach we will begin first of all with the question, does the other side accept the principle that it will be one sovereign state, one international legal personality for this state, one critizenship, etc.

If the answer is yes, then we will discuss the rest. Then there is the question of the Turkish occupation forces in Cyprus. When will they leave the island ? What will be the future guarantees ? What will the structure of the state be and how will human rights be preserved ? And only then will we discuss the constitutional aspect of the problem.

S.C.- Mr. President, I can conclude from what you said that you are suggesting a new policy.

G.C.- Yes, we comply with the last resolution of the Security Council that gives the mandate to the UN General Secretary to look for effective ways leading to a settlement. Up to now things were not clear. We were asking for a solution based on a federation and Turks were asking for something else - two sovereign states- and we were discussing to find out what it is - between the two.

We propose to begin from where the UN Security Council put down in its last resolution. If the other side accepts it, then we will not discuss the constitutional aspect of the problem, but the question of the presence of the Turkish troops in Cyprus and the guarantees for the future of the Republic will be adressed. We don't accept Turkish, British or Greek guarantees for the independence of Cyprus (9).We have to find other kinds of guarantees, for exemple guarantees from the permament members of the UN Security Council or from the European Union.

S.C.- What you want Mr. President, is to find security mechanisms to safeguard the independence of the Cyprus State.

G.C.- Of course. We have to find also mechanisms to safeguard human rights. And only after we find solutions to all these aspects of the problem, only then

will it be appropriate to discuss the constitutional framework. This is the only effective way to discuss the Cyprus question positively.

S.C.- I would like to ask you, Mr. President, if you are not promoting Mr Denktash - when you, the President of the Republic of Cyprus,discuss the Cyprus problem with him ?

G.C.- Well, it is clear from the UN Security Council resolutions that I discuss with Mr. Denktash not in my capacity of President of the Republic of Cyprus, but as the leader of the Greek community. And so Mr. Denktash represents the Turkish community and not its pseudo-state as he sometimes claims. The only state that the international community recognizes is the Republic of Cyprus.

S.C.- There is another problem, Mr. President. For twenty years now the Greek Cypriot side has negotiated with Mr. Denktash, but it is well known that behind him is Turkey. How can one clarify and show that Ankara is responsible for blocking the negotiations ?

G.C.- We don't have any other choice than to follow the guidelines of the UN Security Council resolutions that provide for negotiations between the two communities. We prefer of course, to discuss the Cyprus problem in an international conference with the participation of the UN Security Council permanent members. In such a conference Greece, Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus and representatives of the two communities will also be present. But unfortunately, Turkey refuses to accept such a conference.

I think that Ankara was always behind Denktash. But now, as Turkey supports the position adopted by the pseudo-state against a federal solution, it becomes clear to the international community that Turkey can't continue to play the role of the "good guy" leaving its puppet, Denktash, to play the role of the "bad boy".

S.C.- Mr. President, what about the relations of the Republic of Cyprus with Greece, and especially the joint defense doctrine ?

G.C.- I think that there has never been such close cooperation in the past between the two countries. The joint defense doctrine is absolutely necessary since Turkey has 37 thousand soldiers on occupied Cyprus. We will continue military cooperation with Greece as long as the Turkish troops are in Cyprus. Greece has the responsibility to defend Cyprus according to the treaty of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the treaty of guarantee of it's independence (Greece is one of the guarantor powers of Cyprus).

S.C.- Mr. President I would like to have your thoughts about the European orientation of Cyprus. Do you think that Cyprus will soon be a member of the European Union ?

G.C.- I believe that Cyprus will ensure its security inside the European Community, that is why we try to accelerate the process of entry into the

European Union. We are a small country, too far from Greece and too near to Turkey. If we enter the Community, this will facilitate the solution of the Cyprus problem. Why? Because if Turkey has any expansionist visions on Cyprus, and it has, it will be forced to abandon them from the moment we will be part of Europe.

And after abandoning these expansionist plans, Turkey will seek a solution to the Cyprus problem. It will not be in its interest to occupy 37% of the territory of Cyprus and to miss the benefits of the European Union.

S.C.- Which are the potential perspectives on becoming a member of the European Union ?

G.C.-I believe that from an economic point of view we have no problem. They told us that we fullfil the conditions for entrance to the European Union. Of course the European Union prefers to find a solution to the Cyprus question before the island's entry. Nevertheless, there are serious indications that if there is no progress to such a solution as a result of Turkish intransigence, we will still have the chance to enter the Union. And I hope the negotiations on Cyprus' entry into the European Union will begin early 1995. But I don't believe we will be accepted before the Union resolves its own institutional problems. Because of its enlargement the problem of how they will function is put into question. For exemple, will Europe continue to function by consensus? Will every country continue to have a right of veto?

S.C.- Mr. President, do you believe that the key to a solution of the Cyprus problem is founded in Europe and not in the USA ?

G.C.- No, the key to an immediate solution is still founded in the USA. If the USA exercises the necessary pressure on Turkey this will open the road for a solution. But as the USA has other interests, the support of Europe will be useful because from the moment we will begin the negotiations for entrance into the Union, Turkey will understand that it will be difficult to continue its expansionist plans on Cyprus.

We are pleased that the European Union appointed, for the first time, an observer to the negotiations on the Cyprus problem. The observer's mandate is not only to inform the European Union on the progress of these negotiations, but also to inform them if the discussed solution will be in accordance with the Union's fundamental principles. And this is very important for us.

S.C.- So, you consider that the role of Europe is important in the effort to find a solution to the Cyprus question.

G.C.- Yes it's important and it may oblige Turkey to be reasonable.

S.C.- What about the role of the Cypriot and Greek diaspora and their contribution to the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus question?

G.C.- Well, we appreciate this contribution and we consider the role of our compatriots abroad as very important. Hellenism all over the world always gave us support and it continues to defend the just cause of Cyprus.

Notes

1. The 1960 Constitution was imposed by an international treaty. It provides for a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Vice-President of the Republic not elected by the whole people but by their own separate communities. The President is the head of the Greek community and the Vice-President is the head of the Turkish community. The Vice-President is excluded from representing or being deputised for the President. These functions are held by the President of the House of Representatives who is a Greek Cypriot. The Council of Ministers is consisting of ten members, seven Greeks and three Turks. The Greek and Turkish Ministers are to be nominated and dismissed by the President and the Vice-President respectively. The right of veto granted to the Vice-President on fundamental laws and on decisions of the Council of Ministers leads to a situation of co-presidency. The separation between the two communities was also applied to the House of the Republic. 70 per cent of members were to be elected by the Greek community (80% of the population) and 30 per cent by the Turkish community (18% of the population). Separate majorities of the Greek and Turkish members were required for a number of laws, especially laws imposing taxes or modifing the electoral law.

2. Cyprus signed on December 1972 an association agreement with the European Community and initialled on may 22 1987 a Customs Union agreement. In July 1990, Cyprus applied to the European Union for full membership. The European Commission issued a favorable opinion on June 30, 1993. The leaders of the European Union, who met in Corfu from June 24 to June 25 1994, also expressed a favorable opinion to include Cyprus in the EU enlargement procedure.

3. On August 29, 1994, the Turkish side officially rejected federation as the basis for a Cyprus settlement.

4. The Turkish position is that of two sovereign states in Cyprus forming a kind of confederation.

5. According to the Zurich and London agreements (February 1959) establishing the Republic of Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey are the three guarantor powers of the Independence of Cyprus (Treaty of Guarantee).

"The two leaders" is a reference to the leaders of the two communities of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish.

6. Resolution 939 adopted by the UN Security Council on 29 of July 1994.

7. The National Council is a consulting body presided by the President of the Republic and comprising the main political parties of Cyprus.

8. These agreements provide the guide-lines for a solution of the Cyprus problem and have been signed by the president Makarios and Kyprianou and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash.

9. As it has been noted, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey are, according to the Treaty of Guarantee (Zurich and London agreements of 1959), the three guarantor powers. It is interesting to note, however, that this treaty was imposed upon Cyprus and is contrary to international law and the UN Charter.

DOCUMENT

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (186) OF 4 MARCH 1964

The first session of the United Nations Security Council on the substance of the Cyprus question commenced on 18 February 1964, and went on until 4 March, when the following resolution was adopted unanimously:

The Security Council,

Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 196O,

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its article 2 para 4, which reads: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independance of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,"

1. **Calls upon** all member-states, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;

2. **Asks** the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3. **Calls** upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

4. **Recommends** the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The Commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governements providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. **Recommends** that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and return to normal conditions;

6. **Recommends** that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;

7. **Recommends** further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

8. **Requests** the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

INTERVIEW WITH GERASIMOS ARSENIS *

GREECE: DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY

(Cyprus, Balkans, Europe)

This interview was conducted by Stephanos Constantinides**

Stephanos Constantinides: - Minister Arsenis, first I would like to talk about Cyprus. We have just completed 20 years since the invasion and the occupation continues. I would like to ask, what is your political position regarding Cyprus.

Gerasimos Arsenis: At the present time there is very close political cooperation between the Government of Cyprus and the Government of Greece concerning this issue. We can say that the two centers of Hellenism, the one in the metropolis and the other in Cyprus, shape the strategy for Hellenism, in general, and of the Cyprus problem, in particular.

A characteristic point of this cooperation is that we moved beyond the sphere of diplomacy to the issues of defense. It is widely known that last December (1993) the Prime Minister of Greece (Mr. A. Papandreou) and the President of the Republic of Cyprus (Mr. G. Clerides) in a joint declaration, announced the coordination of the defense plans of the two countries. As part of the implementation of this plan, I visited Cyprus last March and I want to inform you that, this was the first visit of a Greek Minister of Defense to Cyprus since 1963-64. I had various discussions and contacts with members of the Government of Cyprus and with members of various political parties and, from this position, I can assure you that there was an agreement regarding the issue of the joint defense space and proceeding to specific programs. The visit of the Minister of Defense of Cyprus to Athens was the next step towards the implementation and coordination of the defense plans. To avoid any misunderstanding I want to clarify that the joint defense space is for security and deterent purposes. The two centers of Hellenism recognize the common threat: Turkish expansionism. It is obvious why the two countries are obliged to coordinate their defense plans to form the military power which will discourage the enemy from any military intervention against our countries. Needless to say that Greece is one of the guarantor powers in accordance with the treaty of Zurich.

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S.C.- Do you mean that the joint defense plans are a result of Greece's role of guarantor power in accordance with the treaty of Zurich?

G.A.- This is only an additional reason besides the legal view on the issue. The reality is that you have two independent members of the UN facing a common threat, who have combined their defense plans.

S.C.- Is this defense policy legally justified by international law and practice?

G.A.- Exactly, exactly.

S.C.- At this point I want to ask your opinion concerning the allegations of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot press that the joint Greek-Cyprus defense plan is not a serious effort and that the Greek side stepped back leaving the plan only on paper. There are also allegations that there are strong pressures from the CSCE and NATO to cancel it. What are your comments to these rumors?

G.A.- No, there was no such reaction. On the contrary, there was the impression that this move should have been made a long time ago. There is a bitter experience of diplomatic failures which prove that no one is able to bargain if he has no bargaining power. If your country is "laisser passer", you cannot find justice even if you are right. A good and organized defense discourages the enemy. It creates the proper conditions to force the opponent into discussion and negotiations leading to a peaceful solution by the mere fact that you are well equipped and armed. A fact that cannot be ignored.

Our intention to proceed with a defense plan , which will arm Cyprus and will increase the government's bargaining power to pursue a peaceful diplomatic solution, annoys those who oppose such an outcome. Yes, there are many rumors because everyone knows that the possible solutions offered this time for the Cyprus problem are not feasible or fair for the Greeks and therefore, in my opinion, not viable.

S.C.- At this exact time, I would like to have more details. It is known that all the recent efforts of the UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali, to build a mutual understanding between the two sides have failed. What comes next?.What will be the future Greek political line?

G.A.- Greece will support the policy of Cyprus. I do not know the future diplomatic solutions, but at this point I would risk predicting that the UN dialogue concerning Cyprus will continue under the auspices of the UN and that this is what the Greek side wishes.

Now is the exact time to initiate a dialogue including the issues of the illegal occupation of an independent country by an army of another country and the violation of the UN resolutions. We must insist that a viable solution should not ignore essential problems. The dialogue should not remain academic and should include all the above issues. In addition, we must convince all those who promote this dialogue to adopt these issues.

S.C.- Do you mean that you support the view that the subject of the discus-

sions should be considered on a different basis than the one being followed for the last twenty years and that this basis led us nowhere forcing Greece to successive withdrawals?

G.A.- Personally, I believe that Cyprus did not have a strong bargaining power during the years since 1974 and that was the reason for the continuous drifting away from the issue. This drifting should stop and reverse its direction. The dialogue should include essential issues or else it is not only meaningless but dangerous too.

S.C.- As far as I understand the essential issue for you is the presence of the Turkish occupation army in Cyprus.

G.A.- Exactly, it is the occupation. It is also necessary to institutionalize the essential issues, which should not remain just mere declarations but should be implemented on a day- to-day basis. The civil rights of the citizens of Cyprus should be respected. I would also like to emphasize another issue. This is the issue of the demographic changes in Cyprus with the establishment of colonizing Turkish settlers. This issue goes against the international UN spirit and is considered a barbaric action.

In other words, besides the constitutional arrangements, we should secure the unity of Cyprus, the democratic structure of the state and its independence without the Turkish occupation army and the Turkish settlers.

S.C.- Because of the bad memories and experiences of the past, there are people wondering how long the joint policy and defense plan will last?

G.A.- You see, there is a common threat, the danger is unique. It would be a tragic mistake for one to think that the crisis in the Aegean Sea or in the area of Evros should not trigger a crisis in Cyprus. Whatever happens in Greece has an impact on Cyprus and vice-versa. It would be naive for one to believe that a crisis in Cyprus will not have an impact in the Aegean Sea or Evros. I want to point out that the problem is unique and cannot be solved by applying different political methods or separate defense plans.

S.C.- Is the joint defense plan in the process of implementation ?

G.A.- Yes, it proceeds.... You mentioned certain political pressures, newspaper articles concerning this matter and certain rumors. There have been questions and articles, but Greece and Cyprus have explained to the international community that the wish of both nations is the implementation of this program which is within the framework of international law, the resolutions of the UN and the Treaty of Zurich.

S.C.- Regarding the Greek policy in the Balkans, there is criticism concerning the attitude of Greece towards the Serbs. Can you explain the Greek policy in the Balkans ?

G.A.- I think that the Greek policy in the Balkans has not been understood by the international community. It is lacking the proper information concerning

this region. The Greek policy in the Balkans can be summarized as follows:

First, the borders which resulted from the international treaties should be respected. It would be a tragic mistake to doubt the existence of these borders. Secondly, the Balkans should proceed to form a joint economic community because only the large economic communities can survive in these difficult days.

In North America, the United States, Canada and Mexico were forced by the circumstances to form a large economic unit (NAFTA). Based on that, it would be a fatal error for the Balkan states to split into small independent nations without any intention to have mutual cooperation. The result would be an unstable region. The Greek policy considers the economic alliance between the Balkan states.

Today, we are the second investor in Bulgaria and we proceed to Romania. We intend to use the same policy with Albania and the Republic of Skopje as soon as the normal diplomatic relations with these nations are reinstated. Thirdly, the Balkan states should respect the history of the neighboring nations. The deformation of the history of a nation is unacceptable and leads to instability in the region. The Greek political strategy promotes the peaceful cooperation among the Balkan neighbors with the main characteristic being economic and social cooperation.

A further step will be the cooperation on security issues. The security of the Balkans will be an affair for the peoples of the Balkans.

S.C.- What is your answer to some international political circles when they blame Greece for her attitude towards Skopje. Do you respond that the policy of Skopje opposes the realization of what you just mentioned ?

G.A.- On the contrary, we are the only nation in the Balkans whose interest is the viability of the Republic of Skopje for obvious reasons. What we propose in order to have economic cooperation with this country is that, it should respect our own history and abstain from all these actions which insult our history, such as the use of our national symbols or names and a false irredentism. We should make our position clear to them. If they comply we shall be the first to help that country by any means.

S.C.- Do you mean that the issue of the symbols and names is the beginning that leads to further territorial disputes with Greece ?

G.A.- This is not a matter of interpretation. It is a fact. If you thoroughly study the constitution of the republic of Skopje, you can see that it deals with territorial claims and is referred to the issue of a greater Macedonia.

S.C.- Minister, how can you explain the bad relations with Albania if you take into consideration that these relations were milder in the past ?

G.A.- To tell you the truth, the only reason I can see is bad diplomacy from the Albanian side. Let's face today's reality. Albania survives these days on the

smuggled income of the illegal Albanians trespassing in Greece. At this time there are 300,000 illegally working Albanians in Greece who support their economy and consequently their country on money earned in Greece. We did not take any strict measures against them as other countries did. Italy, for instance, threatened to throw the Albanians who illegally cross their borders into the sea. We are sensitive to their problems, taking into consideration the social aspect. The fact is that the economy of Albania is based on the income of the Albanians who work illegally in Greece and Mr. Berissa should not forget that. Another fact is the power of the Greek currency in Albania, especially in the south part of the country. We are prepared to invest capital in Albania and I think that the Albanians should not be afraid to start economic relations with Greece, but to accept these relations with a positive attitude. This is the only way to help Albania become a member of Western society. The reaction of the Government of Albania is a projection of the way Albanians have been brought up as a nation. It is a remnant of the Stalinist way of living and thinking in the past. Albania should open its borders and cooperate with us. This is in their interest.

S.C.- What is your answer to those who criticize Greece for her one-sided policy in the Balkans, which is the sole support of Serbia and the New Yugoslavia?

G.A.- This is not a matter of support because there is no military involvement. I believe that our initial position towards Yugoslavia is the position which has been vindicated afterwards. We, as a nation, have declared publicly that the partitioning of the Republic of Yugoslavia would have been a tragic error. Instead of encouraging the separation of Slovenia and Croatia and the recognition of the newly formed states, we should have considered a reformation of Yugoslavia to a certain kind of loose federation. Our position was not adopted at all at that time. Various European nations hastily supported the separation, following Germany, which played a leading role to that. Now we see the results of this policy.

We also believe that the solution of the Bosnia problem is not of a military nature. The solution should be political-diplomatic based on international laws. We have historical relations with the Serbs, but this fact does not prevent us from being strict with them whenever we are not in agreement with their actions and we consider the side of the Muslims. I would like to assure you that it is not the Greek position which is one-sided, because our policy is a result of many centuries of knowledge and experience of the problems in the Balkans. It is the position followed by the Western mass media which is one-sided and dangerous because of the lack of knowledge of the area and its problems. Military intervention does not provide a solution.

S.C.- You just mentioned that Western mass media is one-sided. Is this attitude a result of an organized hidden interest or it is the weakness of the other

side to present its positions ?

G.A.- I am not aware of the motivations leading to these extreme positions. I would like to point out that the mass media should give the opportunity to some other views to be heard. This has not been done so far.

S.C.- Let us talk now about the Greek European policy. There are rumors that Greece does not behave according to the European criteria. What is your explanation ?

A. Greece is a member of the European Union and participates in the development of the European reality. Greece has her views and I have reasons to believe that those views are constructive. There is lack of objectivity from the Western mass media whenever Greece's views are different from those of the other European nations. The Anglo-Saxon press strongly criticizes Greece for the lack of European spirit.

The European spirit is not a passive adaptation to what the Europeans believe but rather is an active participant and in dialogue with other European partners to create new views for the improvement of the European policy.

On the contrary, when the eleven partners reached the election of the president of the executive committee of EU in Corfu, Great Britain destroyed the agreement. I did not see any reaction from the European partners for that anti-EU action of Great Britain. This is a lack of objectivity on the part of the mass media. There is the general acceptance that the role of Greece within the EU is positive and that the Greek presidency that ended last summer was one of the best in the history of the EU.

S.C.- What are the Greek plans for a better Europe ?

G.A.- Greece is now culturally, economically and socially an integral part of the EU. Europe is for us the Europe of cooperation of sovereign nations. We wish to see the spirit of democracy dominate Europe.

Greece in cooperation with other progressive European nations tries to change the rigid framework of the Mastricht treaty. This treaty does not give any priority to quality of life and employment issues.

S.C.- Do you worry that the influence of Europe will be a threat to the cultural identity of Greece. How can Greek culture survive European integration ?

G.A.- On the contrary, we believe that the Greek presence within the European Union is a challenge for Greek culture. Greek culture fades out when it is isolated. The Greek spirit flourishes when is at the crossroads of great changes and this is what a united Europe offers to us.

S.C.- Before we finish, I would like to ask you about the attitude of Greece towards the Greeks of abroad, the Greeks of the diaspora.

G.A.- The importance of Greeks of the diaspora has been correctly conceived. I believe that there is a mutual concern and understanding. We do not lack ideas

or lack national strategy of how to tackle this issue. We seem to have some difficulties in the process of implementation. I strongly believe that we shall have results of our strategy to this national issue with the "Panhellenic Parliament of the Greeks abroad". In this way we shall have more systematic contacts between the metropolis and all the Greeks of abroad. These contacts will not only be limited to the state-government level but will encompass opportunities of cooperation among Research Centers and Cultural Institutions of Greece with their equivalent Institutions abroad.

There are for instance so many such Institutions in Canada and elsewhere.

(Translated from greek by Kostas Pappas)

DOCUMENT

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (353) OF 20 July 1974

Following is the text of resolution 353 adopted by the UN Securyty Council at its 1779th meeting on 20 July 1974:

The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General at its 1779th meeting about the recent developments in Cyprus,
Having heard the statements made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the statements by the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and other member-countries,
Having considered at its present meeting further developments in the island,
Deeply deploring the outbreak of conflict and continuing bloodshed,
Gravely concerned about the situation which led to a serious threat to international peace and security and which created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area,
Equaly concerned about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus established and guaranteed by international agreements,
Recalling Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, and subsequent resolutions of the security Council on this matter,
Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with article 24 of the Charter of the United Nation,
1. Calls upon states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus;
2. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and requests all states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;
3. Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of operative paragraph 1;
4. Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Arcbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July !974.
5. Calls upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negociations without delay for the restauration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;
6. Calls upon all parties to cooperate fully with UNFICYP to enable it to carry out its mandate;
7. Decides to keep the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-General to report as appropriate with a view to adopting further measures in order to ensure that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible.

ENTRETIEN AVEC ALECOS MICHAELIDES*

CHYPRE: VINGT ANS APRES L'INVASION TURQUE

Cet entretien a été conduit par Stephanos Constantinides **

Chypre d'une superficie de 9,251 kilomètres carrés est la troisième plus grande île de la Méditerranée après la Sicile et la Sardaigne. L'île est située à l'extrémité nord-est de la Méditerranée orientale, à 380 km au nord de l'Egypte, à 105 km à l'ouest de la Syrie et à 75 km au sud de la Turquie. La Grèce continentale se trouve à une distance de 800 km à l'ouest de Chypre alors que les îles grecques les plus proches sont situées à une distance de 380 km à l'ouest. Elle occupe ainsi une situation géopolitique privilégiée; d'où son importance stratégique.

La population de l'île s'élève à 750 000 dont 80% sont des Grecs, 18% des Turcs et 2% d'autres (maronites, Arméniens, etc).

Chypre apparaît pour la première fois dans l'histoire de la civilisation au 6e millénaire av. J.-C. Au 2e millénaire av. J.C., les Grecs Achéens s'établirent dans l'île et introduirent la langue et la culture grecques. Tant la langue et la culture grecques sont preservées jusqu'à nos jours.

Les principales Cités chypriotes ont collaboré au cours du 5e siècle av. J.C. avec Athènes alors que plus tard l'île a fait partie de l'empire d'Alexandre le Grand. Chypre a par la suite fait partie de l'Empire romain et de l'Empire byzantin. Conquise au moment des croisades par Richard Coeur-de-Lion d'Angleterre elle a été cédée plus tard aux Lusignans de France qui établirent à Chypre un royaume sur le modèle féodal de l'Occident (1192 à 1489). Des Lusignans l'île passa à Venise, puis aux Turcs (1571-1878) et finalement aux Anglais.

Chypre prit part à la guerre d'indépendance de la Grèce (1821) et après la création de l'Etat grec (1830) elle exigea d'y faire partie. C'est de cette époque que date le mouvement de l'Enosis, c'est à dire l'Union avec la Grèce.

La colonisation anglaise dura jusqu'en 1960. Après une lutte armée de quatre ans (1955-1960) les chypriotes compte tenu du contexte international de l'époque abandonnèrent la revendication de l'union avec la Grèce en faveur

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d'une République indépendante[1].

La constitution imposée à la République de Chypre par l'insistance britannique et turque s'est avérée inapplicable. En 1963 quand le président de la République, l'archevêque Makarios, proposa quelques amendements afin de faciliter le fonctionnement de l'appareil de l'Etat, les dirigeants de la communauté chypriote-turque (18% de la population) avec le soutien de la Turquie sont entrés en rébellion (décembre 1963). Devant les menaces d'une intervention turque le gouvernement de Chypre fit appel au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU qui envoya dans l'île une force de maintien de la paix.

Le 15 juillet 1974, la junte militaire d'Athènes organisa un coup d'Etat à Chypre pour renverser le président Makarios. La Turquie, utilisant comme pretexte ce coup d'Etat envahit Chypre le 20 juillet et occupa 37% de son territoire.[2]

L'invasion et l'occupation turque furent condamnées par l'ONU (Conseil de sécurité et l'Assemblée générale), le Parlement européen, le Conseil de l'Europe et le Mouvement des Pays non-alignés.

Plusieurs séances de négociations entre les deux communautés de l'île n'ont pas donné de résultat. Du côté grec on considère que l'échec des négociations pour trouver une solution à la question chypriote est dû à l'intrasigeance turque et aux efforts continus de la Turquie de promouvoir le partage de l'île sinon de l'occuper dans son ensemble. C'est dans ce but, soutient-on qu'Ankara maintient dans l'île une armée d'occupation de plus de 37 000 soldats et procède par ailleurs à la colonisation de la zone occupée avec déjà plus de 90 000 colons d'Anatolie.

Même si les résolutions de l'ONU prévoient le retrait des troupes turques de Chypre, la Turquie ne les a pas respectées. Elle a même encouragé la proclamation unilatérale de la "République turque de Chypre du nord" dans la partie occupée de l'île. La communauté internationale l'a considérée comme "nulle et non avenue" [3].

Le Secrétaire général de l'ONU Boutros-Ghali a tenté de débloquer la situation en proposant un "ensemble d'idées" qui furent adoptées par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Elles prévoyaient une solution fédérale avec un Etat bi-zonal (résolution 750 du Conseil de sécurité du 10 avril 1992[4]. Les négociations n'ont pas abouti à un réglement et Boutros-Ghali proposa le 1er juillet 1993 une série de "mesures de confiance" destinées à faciliter les négociations. Elles prévoyaient entre autres la réouverture de l'aéroport international de Nicosie fermé depuis 1974, la remise de Varosia (le quartier de Famagouste habité avant l'invasion turque par les Grecs) à l'ONU pour permettre à quelques milliers de Grecs d'y retourner et des échanges économiques entre les deux communautés.

Les "mesures de confiance" n'ont rien donné et le Secrétaire général de l'ONU dans son rapport du 30 mai 1994 reconnaissait que l'échec de ses efforts

était dû au manque de volonté politique du côté turc pour aboutir à une solution.

Dans une lettre envoyée au Sécrétaire général de l'ONU Boutros-Ghali le 7 septembre 1994, le président de la République de Chypre M. Glafkos Clerides réaffirme que c'est le manque de volonté politique de la part de la Turquie qui empêche de trouver une solution à la question chypriote. Il insiste aussi sur le fait que toute négociation doit se faire en tenant compte du paragraphe 2 de la résolution 939 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU (29 juillet 1994) qui stipule "un Etat de Chypre doit être doté d'une souveraineté, d'une personnalité internationale et d'une citoyenneté uniques".

Stephanos Constantinides- Monsieur le ministre, vingt ans après l'invasion de Chypre par la Turquie, après des années de négociations sans resultat, pourriez-vous préciser la politique de la République de Chypre sur la question chypriote en ce moment ?

Alecos Michaelides- Nous avons fait l'évaluation que les efforts consentis pendant ces vingt années ont été voués à l'échec pour deux raisons. La première raison fut la mauvaise évaluation de notre part des positions des Turcs qui nous a conduit à adopter une approche constitutionnelle pour la solution du problème. La seconde raison qui n'a pas permis à ces efforts d'aboutir fut l'intervention des tierces parties qui influençaient l'évolution des questions internationales et qui se rapprochaient des positions turques pour éviter un affrontement, chaque fois que les négociations arrivaient à une phase cruciale où l'on saurait si on allait vers une solution ou non. Ces deux raisons expliquent l'échec des efforts pendant ces vingt ans pour trouver une solution. Il est caractéristique de ce point de vue que le Secrétaire général de l'ONU dans son dernier rapport ait parlé du manque de volonté politique comme l'élément qui explique selon lui l'échec de tous ces efforts. Il fait évidemment référence au manque de volonté politique du côté turc[5]. La question est de savoir ce que nous faisons aujourd'hui, quelle est notre approche, après cette constatation. Nous considérons qu'il n'est pas possible de discuter de constitution avant de trouver une solution au problème de fond. C'est une perte de temps d'aborder l'aspect constitutionnel du problème. Il faut discuter des aspects qui constituent effectivement l'essence même du problème et qui vont montrer si la volonté politique pour une solution est là. Et ces aspects sont la présence de l'armée turque à Chypre et la sécurité du pays. Nous parlons de la présence de 37.000 soldats Turcs, présence de plus de trois cents chars et l'existence d'un aéroport militaire. Un de mes collègues européens à qui justement je faisais part de cette présence militaire massive turque dans l'île, m'a fait remarquer que l'ensemble de l'armée de son pays n'était pas aussi importante que l'armée turque à Chypre! C'est ici que se pose le problème, car nous sommes continuellement sous la menace de l'armée d'occupation turque.

Pour faire face à cette situation le président Clérides a proposé un plan de

démilitarisation. Y-a-t-il d'autres propositions ? Nous n'acceptons pas certaines suggestions qui parlent de diminution des forces en place, parce que cela fait l'affaire de la Turquie. Même si le nombre des soldats de l'armée d'occupation turque baisse de 37 000 à 25 000 cela ne change rien puisque c'est toujours l'occupation, une menace permamente pour nous. Nous, nous proposons la démilitarisation totale. Sinon nous allons renforcer notre défense. C'est de notre devoir moral de nous défendre. C'est pourquoi nous voulons discuter de cette question qui constitue l'essence même du problème chypriote avant de discuter son aspect constitutionnel.

S.C.- Monsieur le ministre est-ce que vous considérez que pendant vingt ans la partie grecque a donné plus d'importance à la constitution et qu'elle a négligé l'aspect international du problème ?

A.M.- Nous avons mis totalement l'accent sur la constitution. C' était sans doute justifié aux premières années de l'invasion turque. Mais il est devenu clair par la suite que ces discussions constitutionnelles étaient une perte de temps. Quand le leader Chypriote-turc Rauf Denktash parle de la partie occupée de Chypre comme d'un Etat séparé, quand il parle d'annexion de cette partie à la Turquie, à quoi cela sert-il de continuer de discuter de constitution ? C'est pourquoi nous ne discutons pas cette question, nous voulons discuter de sécurité, nous voulons discuter de la présence de colons "importés" de la Turquie pour changer la structure démographique de l'île. Selon des sources turques, les colons - plus de 90 000- constituent maintenant la majorité de la population dans la partie occupée de Chypre. A quoi bon discuter de constitution dans ce contexte ?

S. C.- De quelle façon cette nouvelle politique sera mise en application ?

A.M.- Nous demandons l'implication des membres permaments du Conseil de securité.Même si c'est le Sécrétaire général de l'ONU qui a le mandat de surveiller les négociations, nous croyons que leur implication donnera une dimension politique différente à ses efforts. Nous voudrions des discussions au sein d'une conférence internationale avec la participation des pays membres permaments du Conseil de sécurité, d'un représentant de la Communauté européenne, de la Grèce, de la Turquie, des deux communautés et bien sûr de la République de Chypre. Nous parlons donc d'un changement tant au niveau des procédures qu'au niveau du contenu des négociations.

S.C.- Pensez-vous que cette nouvelle politique coïncide avec l'option de ceux qui parlent de retirer les concessions déjà faites du côté grec et de négocier d'une base zéro ?

A.M.- Je ne vois pas la nécessité de faire une telle déclaration. D'abord pour ce qui est des accords de sommet entre les présidents Makarios-Kyprianou et Rauf Denktash nous pensons qu'il ne faut pas les rejeter[6]. Notre position ne sera pas meilleure en les rejetant.

Pour le reste, tout document déposé à un moment des négociations l'a été dans une perspective qui n'a pas abouti. Donc automatiquement il a perdu sa valeur par la suite. Par conséquent le départ de toute négociation ne peut être autre que les accords de sommet. Ces accords prévoient un certain nombre des choses qui peuvent constituer une base de solution du problème chypriote. Par exemple il est précisé dans ces accords que la solution du problème doit être basée sur la création d'une fédération. Ceux qui s'opposent à la création d'une fédération que proposent-ils comme alternative ? Je reconnais que pour un petit pays comme Chypre la fédération bizonale n'est pas la solution idéale. Mais il faut tenir compte des circonstances dans lesquelles nous nous trouvons à l'heure actuelle et des rapports de force. De l'autre côté les accords de sommet Makarios-Denktash prévoient que dans une fédération les libertés essentielles seront garanties.

S.C.- Il y a aussi le problème de l'égalité politique entre les deux communautés. Comment peut-on parler d'égalité ente la communauté turque qui constitue le 18% de la population et la communauté grecque qui constitue le 8O% de la population ? Est-ce qu'il n'y a pas là une perversion des principes démocratiques ?

A.M.- Le problème existe malheureusement parce que l'armée turque occupe le 37% du territoire de Chypre. La minorité turque a derrière elle la Turquie et l'armée d'occupation. Effectivement les Turcs parlent d'une fédération ou les deux communautés seront égales à savoir qu'elles partageront le pouvoir à égalité au sein de l'Etat, pire encore ils parlent de souveraineté partagée entre deux Etats. Dans ce cas il ne s'agit pas d'une fédération, mais d'une confédération, avec en réalité deux Etats souverains. Bien sûr nous, nous n'acceptons pas une telle solution. Cela signifie égalité entre la majorité et la minorité ce qui est antidémocratique et va à l'encontre des droits de la personne. Dans les résolutions du Conseil de securité l'égalité politique entre les deux communautés est définie simplement comme la participation effective de deux communautés aux organes de l'Etat. Mais participation effective ne signifie pas égalité. Nous sommes d'accord pour une telle participation puisque nous avons accepté le principe d'un Etat fédéral. Mais nulle part, ni dans un Etat fédéral, ni dans un Etat unitaire les droits de la majorité ne sont brimés par ceux de la minorité.

S.C.- Est-ce que le dialogue de ces vingt dernières années en insistant sur l'aspect constitutionnel du problème n'a pas fait oublier l'occupation turque ?

A. M.- C'est sûr que nous avons transformé le dialogue en une discussion sur les aspects constitutionnels du problème, alors que l'essence du problème est l'occupation turque. Il ne faut pas oublier cependant que nos efforts pour trouver une solution pendant cette période étaient influencés par l'action des tierces parties. Prenez aujourd'hui l'exemple des mesures de confiance proposées en juillet 1993 par le Secrétaire général de l'ONU. Les Américains et les Anglais et le Conseil de sécurité en général, mais surtout les deux premiers, voulaient

mêler la Turquie dans ce processus en disant, non pas publiquement, que la décision sur l'acceptation de ces mesures serait prise à Ankara. Pourtant quand ce processus a échoué la première chose qu'ils ont voulu faire c'était de sauver la face à la Turquie en jetant la responsabilité de cet échec sur Rauf Denktash. Si je cite cet exemple c'est pour montrer que les gouvernements précédents avaient les mêmes difficultés que nous. Ils ne maîtrisaient pas le processus des négociations à cause de l'intervention des tierces parties.

S.C.- Je voudrais justement vous demander quelle est votre analyse de la situation internationale à l'heure actuelle et de quelle façon elle influence la question chypriote : positivement ou négativement ? Et bien sûr par rapport à la place que la Turquie occupe sur l'échiquier international.

A.M.- Dans le nouvel ordre mondial, la Turquie a perdu beaucoup de son importance stratégique. Mais en même temps la Turquie joue une nouvelle carte, celle du danger intégriste. Il y a ensuite l'importance économique de la Turquie.

Concernant le fondamentalisme islamique il y a une inquiétude certaine tant aux Etats Unis qu'en Europe. La Turquie exploite cette inquiétude et elle se présente comme le pays musulman modèle : institutions laiques et démocratiques et rempart au fanatisme. Bien sûr ce point de vue ne tient pas vraiment parce qu'il y a en Turquie un courant intégriste très fort et parce que la Turquie n'est pas un pays démocratique. Les droits de la personne sont violés de façon brutale et systématique dans ce pays.

Quant à l'importance économique de la Turquie, il s'agit,ne l'oublions pas, d'un marché de soixante millions d'habitants. Même si l'économie de la Turquie est en mauvais état, les investisseurs étrangers font des profits énormes. Cela est possible à cause du manque de lois sociales et d'une main d'oeuvre à bon marché.

Vous m'avez demandé mon analyse de la situation internationale. Je crois que le grand changement survenu après la fin de la guerre froide est que l'économie a pris le devant sur les problèmes de défense et de confrontation idéologique. Ainsi les positions politiques sont déterminées par les intérêts économiques. Dans ce contexte la Turquie a évidemment une avance considérable sur nous.

Mais il ne faut pas croire que tout va bien pour la Turquie. Son économie est en mauvais état, l'inflation est très élevée, sa dette augmente et son déficit aussi.

Autre élément à signaler, l'échec de la politique turque envers les anciennes républiques musulmanes soviétiques. La Turquie n'a tout simplement pas les moyens d'une politique de défense pour ces pays ni les moyens financiers pour leur apporter une aide. En outre elle ne peut pas faire face à une confrontation avec la Russie qui considère toujours ces républiques comme faisant partie de son champ d'influence.

Enfin, la Turquie fait face au problème kurde. Dans une conversation que j'ai

eu dernièrement avec un ministre des affaires étrangères d'un pays européen, il me disait que la Turquie essaie de les rassurer en leur demandant de ne pas réagir aux moyens brutals qu'elle utilise contre les Kurdes, avec la promesse que dans deux ans elle en finira avec le problème kurde. Mais le problème kurde est là pour longtemps. Je ne peux pas prévoir comment il va évoluer, mais une chose est sûre : on ne peut pas écraser tout un peuple. Enfin l'opinion publique internationale commence à reagir aux violations des droits de la personne et aux brutalités commises contre les Kurdes.

En définitive, les données internationales ne sont ni absolument négatives ni absolument positives pour la Turquie.

S.C.- Comment évolue la question de l'adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne ? Quelles sont les perspectives ? Etes-vous optimiste ?

A.M.- Il y avait auparavant un point de vue selon lequel l'entrée de Chypre à l'Union européenne n'était pas possible sans que la question chypriote soit auparavant résolue. Notre position au contraire fut de souligner qu'à partir du moment où ce n'est pas nous qui empêchons la solution du problème, il n'y a pas de raison de ne pas aller de l' avant. Dans la mesure où c'est la Turquie qui ne veut pas de solution de la question chypriote, commencer les négociations qui vont nous permettre d'adhérer à l'Union européenne c'est exercer la pression nécessaire sur ce pays pour l'amener à se conformer aux résolutions de l'ONU et faciliter une solution du problème chypriote[7]. La preuve que la Turquie s'inquiète d'une possible adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne est sa réaction à l'avis émis le 30 juin 1993 par la commission de Bruxelles, avis favorable à la demande d'adhésion de Chypre.

Pourtant, ce sont surtout les Chypiotes-turcs qui vont tirer le plus grand profit de cette adhésion. Pourquoi alors la Turquie s'oppose-t-elle à l'entrée de Chypre à l'Union européenne ? Parce qu'elle a des ambitions sur l'ensemble de l'île et l'adhésion de Chypre à l'Union européenne mettrait fin à ses projets expansionnistes. Pour nous par contre cette adhésion est une garantie pour assurer notre indépendance, qui est menacée par la Turquie qui occupe illégalement 37% de notre territoire.

L'étape décisive suivante dans cette marche vers l'Europe est de fixer la date des négociations pour l'adhésion. Malheureusement l'Europe doit résoudre ses propres problèmes institutionnels avant son nouvel élargissement. Personnellement, cependant, je suis optimiste. Je crois que tôt ou tard l'Europe va nous accepter.

S.C.- Que pensez-vous de la décision de la Cour européenne d'interdire les importations dans les pays de l'Union européenne de produits provenant de la partie occupée de Chypre ?

A.M.- C'est une décision normale, basée sur le droit international.[8] Il y a à Chypre une autorité légale, c'est le gouvernement de Chypre. Permettre les

importations de la zone occupée c'est reconnaître la légalité d'occupation, ce qui est impossible en droit international. En définitive cette décision de la Cour européenne qui est obligatoire pour tous les pays membres de l'Union européenne renforce la légalité internationale.

S.C.- Monsieur le ministre, voudriez-vous nous parler des relations de Chypre avec la Grèce, et en particulier de la doctrine commune de défense ?

A.M.- Ces relations résultent de la constatation que la question chypriote est une question nationale pour la Grèce. La question chypriote existe à cause des visées expansionnistes de la Turquie. Par conséquent la Grèce n'a d'autre choix, comme un de trois pays garants de l'indépendance de Chypre que de la défendre. La doctrine de défense commune prévoit justement les moyens pratiques de cette défense. Puisque la volonté politique était là il fallait trouver les moyens de la matérialiser. C'est ce que nous sommes en train de faire avec cette doctrine de défense commune. Avec la présence de 37.000 soldats turcs dans la partie occupée de Chypre avons-nous d'autre choix ?

Remarquez cependant, comme je l'ai déjà mentionné, que le président de la République Glafkos Clerides a écrit le 17 décembre 1993 au Sécrétaire général de l'ONU, M. Boutros-Ghali, pour proposer la démilitarisation complète de Chypre. Nous étions et nous sommes toujours prêts à dissoudre la garde nationale, dont l'armement serait conservé par les forces de l'ONU à condition bien sûr que la Turquie retire ses troupes de Chypre et que les Chypriotes turcs remettent aussi leurs armes aux forces de l'ONU. Le président Clerides proposait encore la consignation, auprès de l'ONU, des sommes économisées sur les achats d'armements pour les utiliser aux bénéfices de deux communautés. Le Gouvernement chypriote était encore prêt à prendre en charge financièrement le contingent de Nations unies à Chypre.

C'est la Turquie qui a rejeté ce plan. Dès lors nous n'avions pas d'autre choix que de demander à la Grèce, puissance garante, de nous défendre.

Dans l'ensemble nos relations avec la Grèce sont excellentes. Nous travaillons ensemble dans tous les domaines.

S.C.- Monsieur le ministre, comment évaluez-vous le rôle et le soutien de la diaspora chypriote et de façon plus générale celui de la diaspora grecque dans l'effort de trouver une solution à la question chypriote ?

A.M.- Nous estimons que ce rôle est important. L'apport de Chypriotes et des Grecs en général de la diaspora fut précieux dans la lutte pour la sauvegarde de notre indépendance. Nous les considérons comme l'avant garde de cette lutte et nous les remerçions pour leurs efforts continus.

NOTES

1. Sur l'histoire de Chypre voir entre autres: Achille Emilianides, **Histoire de Chypre**, Paris, (PUF, Collection "Que sais-je?"), 1969, Sir George Hill, **A History of Cyprus**, 4 vol., Cambridge, 1940, 1948, 1952, Jean-François Drevet, **Chypre, île extrême, chronique d'une Europe oubliée**, Paris, Syros/Alternatives, 1991 et Georges Ténékides, **Chypre, histoire récente et perspectives d'avenir**, Paris, Nagel, 1964.

2. Sur les accords de Zurich-Londres et la période trouble qui a suivi voir Tenekides, op. cit., Drevet, op. cit., et une importante documentation de l'ONU.

3. Le Conseil de sécurité, par sa résolution 353 du 20 juillet 1974, exige le retrait des troupes turques. Après la proclamation unilatérale de la "République turque de Chypre nord", le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, par sa résolution 541 du 18 novembre 1983, la considère "comme nulle et non avenue".

4. L'"ensemble d'idées" du Secrétaire général de l'ONU Boutros-Ghali ont été soumises au Conseil de sécurité dans son rapport du 3 avril 1992 et enterinées par la résolution 750 du 10 avril 1992.

5. Rapport du Secrétaire général de l'ONU M. Boutros-Ghali au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU du 30 mai 1994.

6. Ces accords ne sont que des principes de négociation vagues et interprétés de façon différente par les parties. Ils ont été préparés par l'ONU et soumis le 12 février 1977 au président Makarios et au leader Chypriote-turc Rauf Denktash à une rencontre sous les auspices du Secrétaire général de l'organisation mondiale à l'époque, Kurt Waldheim. En mai 1979 le président de la République de Chypre Spyros Kyprianou et le leader chypriote-turc Rauf Denktash se sont mis à nouveau d'accord sur les mêmes principes pour continuer le dialogue inter-communautaire.

7. Sur les suggestions conjointes du Président Clerides et de Boutros-Ghali, le Conseil des ministres des Douze a nommé - malrgé les objections de la Turquie - Serge Abou (décembre 1993) observateur de l'Union européenne pour suivre l'évolution des négociations sur la question chypriote.

8. La décision de la Cour européenne a été rendue le 5 juillet 1994.

DOCUMENT

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541 OF 18 NOVEMBER 1983

The UN Security Council adopted on 18 November 1983 resolution 541 (1983) by 13 votes in favour, one against (Pakistan) and one abstention (Jordan).

Following is the text of the resolution:

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,
Concerned at the Declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent state in northern Cyprus,
Considering that this Declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,
Considering therefore that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute worsening of the situation in Cyprus,
Reaffirming its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975),
Aware of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem, based on the mission of good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,
Affirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus,
Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement of 17 November 1983,
1. Deplores the Declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;
2. Considers the Declaration reffered to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal;
3. Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975);
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;
5. Calls upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;
6. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;
7. Calls upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus;
8. Calls upon all states and the two communities in Cypus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

CYPRUS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS SINCE 1960

Van Coufoudakis*

RESUMÉ

Cet article examine des aspects de maintien de la paix par les Nations unies et d'autres organisations régionales dans le cas de Chypre. L'article met l'accent sur le rôle des Etats Unis avant et après la guerre froide. Motivés par des intérêts stratégiques en Méditerrannée orientale, le Proche Orient et dernièrement par ce qui se passe dans les Balkans et l'Asie centrale, les Etats Unis ont fait la promotion des intérêts de la Turquie dans le cas de Chype, ont soutenu de façon selective l'implantation des décisions unanimes du Conseil de sécurité sur l'île et n'ont pas insisté à l'application du droit international. L'article examine et rejette le "paquet d'idées" de Boutros-Ghali d'août 1992 et les soi-disantes mesures de confiance. Aucune de ces approches ne conduira à une solution viable et fonctionnelle du problème chypriote, une solution qui protègerait les intérêts de tous les Chypriotes. L'article conclut avec des suggestions pour l'avenir.

ABSTRACT

The paper examines aspects of peacekeeping and peacemaking by the United Nations and other regional organizations in the Cyprus problem. The paper focuses on the role of the United States during and after the Cold War. Motivated by strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and as of recent in the Balkans and in Central Asia, the United States has promoted Turkey's interests in the Cyprus problem, has taken a selective view on the implementation of the unanimous Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, and has failed to promote the rule of law. The paper examines and rejects the Boutros-Ghali "set of ideas" of August 1992, and the so-called confidence building measures. Neither approach would lead to a viable and functional solution of the Cyprus problem, one that would protect the rights of all Cypriots. The paper concludes with suggestions for the future.

Cyprus became independent in 1960. The alternative appeared to have been the partition of the island by the British under the 1958 Macmillan plan. The 1959 London and Zurich agreements reflected the Greek, Turkish and British compromise over the future of Cyprus which was reached without any consultation with the Cypriots.

The three founding treaties signed in the spring of 1959 by Britain, Greece and Turkey, were imposed on the Greek Cypriot majority. These treaties were the Treaty of Establishment Concerning the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance, which were complemented by various memoranda of understanding, some of which remained secret until recently.[1] The constitution of the republic formalized the role of the guarantor powers in the affairs of this independent republic; guaranteed the bi-communal character of the state; and perpetuated communal cleavages. The constitutional crisis that erupted in November 1963, was not unexpected.[2] It has yet to be resolved.

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The causes of this constitutional crisis have been discussed extensively elsewhere,[3] and so have the attempts at a negotiated settlement of this dispute prior to the 1974 Turkish invasion.[4] A domestic dispute involving the political aspirations and power sharing conceptions of two ethnic communities has been complicated by the strategic interests of the superpowers and the involvement of Greece and Turkey in the problem.

The government of Cyprus, prior to 1974, had rejected all federation and/or cantonization proposals presented by Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots and the United States, because such proposals were seen as a cover for the eventual partition of Cyprus. The threat and the fear of the partition of Cyprus has been the foremost concern of the Greek Cypriot political leaders since the early 1950's. This is why, prior to 1974, the government of Cyprus rejected all plans that diminished its authority over the island republic, as in the case of the 1964 NATO plan, or plans that aimed at the partition of the island as in the case of the 1964 Acheson plan.

During the 1964-74 period, the government of Cyprus was in control of most of the territory of the republic. This period was marked by secret Greco-Turkish talks over the future of Cyprus; the destabilization of the government of Cyprus by the junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974; the formation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and threats of a Turkish military intervention.[5] The negotiating positions of the Greek Cypriots were supported by United Nations resolutions upholding the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cyprus. With the negotiating balance of power in favor of the Greek Cypriots in the U.N. sponsored talks on Cyprus from 1968 to 1974, the Turkish Cypriots had accepted virtually all of the "13 points" proposed by president Makarios in 1963 for amending the Cypriot constitution. The point of contention remaining to be fully resolved just prior to the 1974 coup and the Turkish invasion was the form of local administration to be granted to the Turkish Cypriots[6],an issue that was affected by the Greek Cypriot suspicions that the Turkish Cypriot demands were a cover for the eventual partition of Cyprus.

The Greek sponsored coup of July 15, 1974, against the government of Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish invasion and occupation of nearly 39% of the island republic radically changed the balance of power on Cyprus. The 1975 forcible population exchange and the expulsion of nearly all Greek Cypriots from the occupied areas created for the first time two largely homogeneous ethnic zones on the island. Consequently, the idea of establishing a federal Cyprus appeared as a viable constitutional option. Prior to 1974, the idea of federation had been rejected not only by the government of Cyprus, but also by constitutional authorities such as Lord Radcliffe in 1956, and the U.N. mediator Galo Plaza in 1965.

The fundamental question that has dominated all negotiations on Cyprus since

the events of 1974, is how to restructure Cyprus constitutionally into a viable and functional federal bi-communal system, and territorially into a bi-zonal system, while maintaining the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the republic and protecting the rights of all Cypriots. These questions were complicated by the presence of nearly 35 000 Turkish troops in the occupied areas, of tens of thousands of Turkish mainland settlers[7], and Turkey's insistence that a new constitutional agreement must include provisions for the stationing of large numbers of Turkish troops on Cyprus and for Turkey's right of military intervention in Cyprus. Additional complications emerged as the evolving Turkish/ Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals substantially diverged from those of the government of Cyprus. In contrast to the framework for a federation proposed by the government of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot proposals sought the creation of a loose confederation of two ethnically homogeneous sovereign states which amounted to the formal partition of Cyprus.

In seeking the resolution of the Cyprus problem the government of Cyprus faced additional difficulties. It had to negotiate under the threat of force from the occupied area. It felt abandoned by the influential members of the international community which, while extending verbal support for the plight of Cyprus, subordinated their legal and moral obligations to regional political and security considerations. It was in this setting that the government of Cyprus pursued a multifaceted policy in search of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

The Policy of Internationalization

The government of Cyprus since 1964, and particularly in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion has actively pursued the policy of internationalization of the Cyprus problem. This policy has focused on keeping the issue of Cyprus visible in various international fora until a just, viable, and functional solution was reached through negotiations under United Nations auspices, free from the threat of force. The policy of internationalization served multiple objectives. First though a clarification on this policy. The government of Cyprus was fully aware of the differences in the political potential of each of the international fora at which it presented the problem of Cyprus. Such fora included, among others, the meetings of the Non-aligned Movement, the Council of Europe, and the Commonwealth. These organizations did not have the ability or the authority to engage in the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Further, the United States opposed the involvement of these organizations in the Cyprus problem because it could not control their actions, and because of the membership and functions of these organizations the United States expected that their actions would conflict with the American objectives. For example, actions taken by the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe[8] dealt only with a specific, albeit important, facet of the Cyprus problem. Positions adopted and actions taken by each of these international bodies served an important complementary support-

ive role for policies pursued by the government of Cyprus at the United Nations, and for influencing the U.S. Congress.

The policy of internationalization was a form of public international mobilization intended to break the isolation felt by the Cypriots, and to pressure the influential members of the international community to act along rule of law principles, rather than on the basis of realpolitik considerations. This policy served additional objectives: It kept the Cyprus problem in front of the international community. It sought the adoption of resolutions condemning Turkey's actions in and around Cyprus, and called for the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. It countered schemes that undermined the unity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and disregarded majority rights. It sought the endorsement of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and of the rights of the Cypriots, through resolutions and communiques adopted by various international bodies on Cyprus. It sought to engage the United Nations and its influential members in the search for a negotiated solution, free from the threat of force by Turkey, and on the basis of principles and procedures incorporated in unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The policy of internationalization reaffirmed the international status of the government of Cyprus as the government of the republic of Cyprus and not as the administration of the Greek Cypriot community as Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots argued. Priority was given to this objective following the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the government of Cyprus in 1964. This objective attained even greater priority in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish invasion, and the creation by the occupation army of the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" on November 15, 1983, following the Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence.

Another objective of the policy of internationalization has been the quest to impose sanctions on Turkey for her violations of international law, regional treaties, and American legislation, on the basis of decisions and findings by international bodies such as the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe. Further, the government of Cyprus sought to establish that Turkey's 1974 action amounted to the invasion and occupation of an independent country, and to condemn actions such as the massive introduction of Turkish mainland settlers that altered the demographic balance on Cyprus in general, and among the Turkish Cypriots in particular.

The successful pursuit of the policy of internationalization by the government of Cyprus explains why the United States and Turkey specifically sought the de-internationalization of the Cyprus problem. The latter part of the paper will analyze why the United States modified its policy on the involvement of the United Nations on the Cyprus problem in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War. The United States and Turkey preferred a solution of the

Cyprus problem through intercommunal talks, under United Nations auspices, on the basis of political equality, away from international fora, and along principles that substantially diverged from those endorsed by international fora such as the Commonwealth.

The policy of internationalization has not directly contributed to the resolution of the Cyprus problem. However, it remains an important source of pressure and embarrassment on countries such as Turkey and the United States who have sought to close the book on Cyprus with any solution acceptable to Turkey. This policy has also exposed the contradictions and double standards in the policies of influential members of the international community, particularly in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

The peacemaking limitations of international organizations such as the United Nations can be attributed to other reasons than just the attitude and policies of the United States in this dispute. States are members of multiple international and regional organizations. Consequently, influential members such as the former Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and others, face conflicting policy priorities and cross pressures. Positions endorsed by government representatives and other experts at one level, may be disregarded or downgraded at another when these positions conflict with policies that have higher priority for that government. In contrast, states that maintain consistent positions at all international or regional organizations often do not have the ability to influence the resolution of a dispute.

The post-1974 Period and the Search for a Negotiated Settlement

Earlier sections of the paper addressed policies of the government of Cyprus intended to deal with the consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion, as well as the objectives of the policy of internationalization. At the same time the government of Cyprus sought the peaceful resolution of the problems created by the Turkish invasion through intercommunal talks with the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots under the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Under the urging of the United States, the Cyprus government made some very painful concessions to the Turkish Cypriots in order to open serious negotiations on the resolution of the Cyprus problem after the deadlock that had developed in five rounds of intercommunal talks that had been held in Vienna. The concessions were included in a communique issued on February 12, 1977, at the end of a U.N. sponsored meeting between president Makarios of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash.[9] In this meeting the government of Cyprus accepted the principle that the constitutional structure of the republic would be a bi-communal federation, based on a bi-zonal territorial allocation. These concessions were made prior to the commencement of negotiations with

the Turkish Cypriots, and without any concessions on their part. The four point Makarios-Denktash agreement introduced two additional fundamental concepts that have influenced all subsequent proposals for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. The first was the acceptance by the government of Cyprus of the vague principle that the territory under the administration of each community will be determined on the basis of its "economic viability, productivity, and land ownership."The second was that the acceptance of the three freedoms was qualified by the bi-communal nature of the federation, and "certain practical difficulties" that may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community. This fateful agreement undermined the resolutions attained by the government of Cyprus at the Security Council and the General Assembly, and provided justification for the confederal proposals that have been presented since then by the United States and the Turkish Cypriots for the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots maintained consistent positions in the various negotiating cycles with the government of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots were asked for specific concessions in order to bring the Turkish Cypriots to the negotiating table. The negotiations usually ended in stalemate because the Turkish Cypriots failed to meet any of the Greek Cypriot constitutional and political concerns. Everyone agreed that the solution of the Cyprus problem would be based on a constitutional v. land trade off. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, however, consistently refused to submit a map considerably reducing the territory under occupation which would allow for the return of large numbers of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes.

The slow and painful evolution of the Cyprus problem found two more manifestations in the decade of the 1970's. One was the high level agreement between Turkish Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash and the new president of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou. This ten point agreement[10] reaffirmed the Makarios Denktash agreement of February 12, 1977, but also the "U.N. resolutions relevant to the Cyprus Question." The Turkish Cypriots agreed that the intercommunal talks would deal with "all territorial and constitutional aspects,"and that priority would be given to the resettlement of Varosha. For these reasons this ten point agreement can be seen as a belated attempt to refine the Makarios-Denktash agreement.

The second development was the presentation in November 1978 of the so-called "Western Framework for a Cyprus Settlement" known also as the "ABC" plan or the Nimetz plan.[11] This proposal promoted a loose bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as demanded by the Turkish Cypriots; relegated the U.N. resolutions to a secondary position compared to the Makarios-Denktash agreement; and avoided addressing issues fundamental to the Greek Cypriots, such as the three freedoms, the withdrawal of the Turkish forces and settlers, etc. This plan remain the foundation of subsequent negotiating proposals presented by the United States and the United Nations to the two sides.

The United Nations Resolutions, 1974-1989

One of the objectives of the Cypriot policy of internationalization was the implementation of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Cyprus that were adopted since 1974. This objective was not shared by the United States, Great Britain and some other influential members of the Security Council. They gave precedence to their political and strategic interests in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean and to their relations with Turkey. Consequently they subordinated these resolutions to the objectives outlined in the 1977 Makarios-Denktash agreement, and to the compromises made by the Greek Cypriots in the inconclusive rounds of the intercommunal talks.

The major objectives of the United Nations on Cyprus contradicted those of Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots and the United States. Only when the Security Council adopted resolution 649(1990), which reflected American and Turkish interests on Cyprus, did the United States endorse the principle of implementing this resolution.

It is the view of the government of Cyprus that the resolutions adopted by the Security Council from 1974 to 1989, contain substantive elements that provide the basis for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, and that these resolutions mandate their implementation. These resolutions included resolution 353(1974), resolution 3212(XXIX) unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, and resolutions 364(1974), 367(1975), 440(1978) 541(1983) and 550(1984).[12]

All resolutions adopted by the Security Council upheld all earlier actions by the Council and named specifically many of the resolutions mentioned in this paper. The provisions included in these resolutions, the specific calls for their implementation and the recognition that the terms of these resolutions provided principles for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, strengthened the negotiating position of the government of Cyprus. However, the non-implementation of these resolutions, the compromises made by the government of Cyprus in the intercommunal talks, and the willingness of the Secretary-General to pursue negotiations based on a framework other than the United Nations resolutions, weakened significantly the importance of these resolutions as well as the credibility of the United Nations.

The Gulf Crisis and the Implementation of U.N.Resolutions

When the Gulf crisis erupted in August 1990, the United States led the effort to restore the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Kuwait as well as its legitimate government. This was done under the auspices of an international coalition whose actions were authorized by unanimous Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. Throughout the war and its aftermath the United States and its coalition partners called on Iraq to comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

The issue of the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus gained prominence because of the Gulf War. The post-Cold War cooperation between the United States and Russia in the Security Council; the emphasis given to the "rule of law" as the foundation of the "new world order"; and the statements by president Bush that the status quo in Cyprus is unacceptable, encouraged the government of Cyprus to seek a new commitment by the United States and the United Nations to revitalize the stalemated intercommunal talks.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War the United States sought a quick negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem. However, Washington did not find any similarities between the cases of Kuwait and Cyprus. The United States argued that, in contrast to Iraq, Turkey had intervention rights in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee. Moreover, on the subject of the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, U.S.Secretary of State James Baker argued that in contrast to those on Kuwait, the resolutions on Cyprus were only of a procedural nature because they called for talks under the auspices of the United Nations. When confronted with evidence to the contrary, on February 4, 1991, the Department of State spokeswoman acknowledged the presence of other substantive clauses in these resolutions, but argued that the solution ought to be found through intercommunal negotiations.

On April 17, 1991, in hearings at the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, experts representing the administration argued that whereas the Kuwait resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, those on Cyprus had been adopted under Chapter VI. The implication of this argument was that the Council was under no obligation to enforce its unanimous resolutions. However, this argument is misleading. Several of the resolutions on Cyprus were adopted with the specific objective of addressing a threat to international peace. Resolution 186(1964), 353(1974), and 360(1974) are such examples. Resolutions 3212(XXIX), 365(1975), and 541(1983), contained specific provisions calling for the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, and for the compliance of all members with these resolutions. Finally, resolution 550(1984) authorized the Council to take appropriate measures in the event of the non-implementation of resolution 541(1983) and of resolution 550(1984).

Article 25 of the Charter reads that "...the members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."Article 24 also confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security under Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. The contention that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to the enforcement measures under Chapter VII is not supported by international law authorities[13] who argue that it is not possible to find in the Charter any support for this view. Article 25 applies to decisions by the Security Council adopted in accordance with the Charter. Moreover, this article is placed

not in Chapter VII of the Charter, but following article 24, the part of the Charter that deals with the powers and functions of the Security Council. If this article had reference solely to decisions of the Security Council concerning enforcement actions under articles 41 and 42, then the article would be superfluous since articles 48 and 49 of the Charter give the decisions of the Council under Chapter VII a binding effect.[14]

The Bush administration also argued that certain resolutions on Kuwait called for the restoration of its legitimate government, and thus, enforcement actions were taken to meet that objective. In contrast, the issue in Cyprus was the restructuring of its government so that once more there would be effective participation by the Turkish Cypriots. That could only be achieved through intercommunal negotiations. For these reasons Washington could not support enforcement actions against Turkey. However, Cyprus never requested the use of military force to implement these resolutions. The government of Cyprus expected that more traditional diplomatic efforts by permanent members of the Security Council and members of the European Community would bring about Turkey's compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

The fact that the United States raised these arguments in the case of Cyprus reflected a strict constructionist view of the Charter, as well as the reality that the enforcement of United Nations resolutions was not so much a legal issue as a political one. This was shown clearly after the adoption of resolution 649(1990) by the Security Council.

Since the early stages of the Cyprus problem in the 1950's, American policy had been affected by politico-strategic considerations in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, and appraisals of Turkey's role in the Cold War. The demise of the Cold War in the late 1980's did not diminish Turkey's politico-strategic value for the United States. Even though the threat posed by the former Soviet Union did not exist any more, new sources of concern to the United States revitalized Turkey's role. These concerns included the regional instability in the Middle East, the Gulf War and Turkey's contribution to that war, Turkey's role in the Turkic speaking republics of the former Soviet Union, as well as Turkey's interest in the developments in the Balkans. These developments provided new opportunities for strengthening Turco-American relations. Further, the Bush administration called for the development of a bilateral relationship with Turkey similar to the one existing between Israel and the United States, and encouraged Turkey to view itself as a regional power, with regional interests that went beyond parochial problems such as those in Greco-Turkish relations and Cyprus. In view of these assessments of Turkey's significance in the post-Gulf War era, it was unlikely that the United States would reverse its previous position on the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. Washington's search for a solution to the Cyprus problem reflects the following assumptions, most of which have not changed even under the Clinton administration:

a)The irreversibility of the 1974 Turkish invasion and of the 1983 Turkish Cypriot UDI.

b) That international sanctions against Turkey would make Turkey more inflexible in any future negotiations.

c) That the Cyprus problem is a case of lost opportunities and near misses, as in the case of the 1978 Nimetz plan, and Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar framework proposals of 1985, 1986, and 1989.

d) That the ideal solution of the Cyprus problem must be based on a constitutional v. territorial trade off. In return for substantial territorial concessions by the Turkish Cypriots that would allow a significant resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees, the United States endorsed the Turkish Cypriot confederal proposals, supported expanded veto provisions for the Turkish Cypriots, and recognized Turkey's claim for a major military presence on Cyprus and as a guarantor of the new constitution.

e) That the solution ought to be found through intercommunal talks, on equal footing, between the leaders of the two communities, with the support of Greece and Turkey.

f) That the European Community should not get involved in the Cyprus problem, and that it should not approve the Cypriot application for membership in the Community. The Community could not play a constructive role because Turkey was not a member, and the Turkish Cypriots had not participated in the application decision. These views were reflected in the Security Council resolutions that were adopted after 1990.

The United States, the United Nations and Resolutions 649(1990), 716(1991), 750(1992), 774(1992) and 789(1992)

With the end of the Cold War, the United States intensified its efforts to seek a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The active involvement of the U.S. Department of State Cyprus Coordinator on behalf of the good offices of the U.N. Secretary-General signified the coincidence of the American objectives on Cyprus with those of the United Nations.

Following the deadlocked high level meetings in New York, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Council on March 2, 1990, stated that under the terms of resolution 367(1975), his mandate was to assist in the drafting of a framework for a new constitution for Cyprus that would regulate the relations between the two communities on a federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal basis. He also indicated that the two communities would participate in these talks on an equal footing and that each community would give its consent separately to any new constitutional arrangements. The Secretary-General claimed that the terms of his mandate reflected the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements. He made no reference to the U.N. resolutions on Cyprus. Thus, the Secretary-General by his own actions undermined the effectiveness of his own institution. As a result of

the Secretary-General's report to the Council, resolutions 649(1990) was adopted unanimously.

This resolution met Turkish and American objectives because it presented the Cyprus problem as an intercommunal problem; it called for negotiations on an "equal footing", which had been a constant Turkish objective; it defined the parameters of the settlement, but remained silent on the issues of the implementation of United Nations resolutions, the withdrawal of Turkish forces and the Turkish settlers, the return of the refugees, the three freedoms, etc. The Cyprus government endorsed resolution 649(1990). This was another serious concession by the Greek Cypriots. Even though Cyprus had accepted the principle of bi-zonality and bi-communalism in 1977, that acceptance was part of an integrated whole that included the withdrawal of the Turkish forces and settlers, addressed Turkey's intervention rights, reaffirmed the three freedoms, etc. Moreover, resolution 649(1990) undermined the unity and sovereignty of Cyprus and the legitimacy of its government.

The end of the Gulf War intensified United Nations and American efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. Visits to Greece and Turkey by president Bush, visits by Ambassador Nelson Ledsky U.S.Department of State Coordinator on Cyprus, and by representatives of the Secretary-General to the three capitals, were intended to revive the stalemated negotiations. Once the negotiations got under way the objective was to bring the parties within agreement range. A high level meeting would then be convened to conclude a framework agreement. The final accord would be signed at a conference attended by the Secretary-General, the leaders of Greece and Turkey, and the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. Needless to say that the proposed five party conference was another Cypriot concession. The traditional Cypriot position had called for an international conference, and that position had been reaffirmed a few weeks earlier in a joint meeting of the Greek prime minister with the president and the National Council of Cyprus.

The approach proposed by the United States and the United Nations implied that the Cyprus problem was both an intercommunal problem and a Greco-Turkish problem. Further, it actively engaged both Ambassador Ledsky and the Secretary-General in these talks. In the case of Perez de Cuellar, there was a notable shift in his role, i.e. from one of offering good offices to the parties to one of a mediator presenting a complete set of ideas for an overall framework agreement. Meanwhile, Mr. Denktash held to his earlier position that each side possessed sovereignty which it would retain after the establishment of a federation, along with the right of secession. The Secretary-General in his report to the Council of 8 October 1991, posited a solution based on the existence of one state of Cyprus, comprising of two communities, based on the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements and resolution 649(1990). Once more there was no mention of the other critical United Nations resolutions on Cyprus.

Despite the postponement of the talks because of the Turkish elections, the Secretary-General and Ambassador Ledsky continued their efforts to reopen the talks at the earliest time and from the point where the talks ended prior to the Turkish elections. The April 3, 1992, report to the Council by Boutros Ghali, the new Secretary-General, showed how far these negotiations had advanced; how closely the views of the United Nations and of Ambassador Ledsky reflected the fundamental Turkish positions and how Cyprus had compromised on most of its basic positions.

It appeared that by April 1992, the issues of territorial adjustments, the federal executive, and the displaced persons stood on the way of an overall framework agreement. Other differences included the practical application of "political equality". The Secretary-General endorsed a definition of "political equality" which did not mean equal numerical participation in all areas of the federal government as Mr. Denktash demanded. Political equality meant safeguards, participatory mechanisms, and identical powers and functions for each of the federated states. The report also affirmed that the solution must be based on the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements, and did not refer to any of the other crucial United Nations resolutions. The report made it clear that the three freedoms would be significantly restricted, and that the Turkish Cypriot community would enjoy expanded veto powers. The report also indicated the continuing validity of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, placed various economic obligations on the Greek Cypriots to revive and equalize the Turkish Cypriot economy, and expanded the Turkish Cypriot veto to include the question of membership in the European Community. Finally, the report pressured the government of Cyprus to move quickly toward a settlement by raising the possibility of the withdrawal of UNFICYP from Cyprus.

The Secretary-General's report was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council under resolution 750(1992), which affirmed resolutions 649(1990) and 716(1991), and all the principles contained in the recent reports of the Secretary-General and in these two resolutions. Because of French objections, the resolution excluded an endorsement of paragraph 26 of the report which dealt with the membership of Cyprus in the European Community. France felt that paragraph interfered with the powers of the European Community.

By the spring of 1992, the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem had developed a clear pattern. The representatives of the Secretary-General along with Ambassador Ledsky would visit the three capitals to keep the negotiating momentum alive and to bridge the gap in the positions of the two sides. The two Cypriot leaders would then be brought to New York for additional talks on a framework agreement. The Secretary-General would issue a report on his mission of good offices which would include an outline of the emerging compromise solution. Each report was endorsed by a Security Council resolution giving added legitimacy to the American led and inspired U.N. mission of good

offices. The commitment of the United States to implement these select resolutions increased tremendously the negotiating leverage of the Secretary-General, as well as the costs of a potential breakdown of these talks.

The negotiations at the three capitals resulted in a new round of proximity talks and later in face to face talks in New York between Boutros Ghali, president Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash, starting on July 15, 1992. The talks, with the active participation of Ambassador Ledsky, made significant progress on several issues but deadlocked over positions adopted by Mr. Denktash on issues such as territory and the map presented by the Secretary-General, the displaced persons, the federal executive, manifestations of legal definitions of sovereignty and equality in the federal constitution, and issues affecting the transitional arrangements. The Secretary-General's report and its annex[15] vividly describes in 25 pages a confederal constitutional scheme in which the government of Cyprus has made all the concessions in the expectation of limited territorial compromises by the Turkish Cypriots.

This report describes even in greater detail than any of its predecessors the "ideas" for an overall framework agreement on Cyprus, and how closely these "ideas" reflect the basic Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions on the Cyprus problem. On August 26, 1992, the Security Council unanimously endorsed this report and its annex as the basis for reaching an overall solution. Resolution 774(1992) also set in place a time table for the holding of separate ratification referenda on the proposed framework agreement.

Looking back at the Turkish positions on Cyprus since 1960, one is struck by their consistency. Let me summarize these positions:

1) The relationship of the two communities is not one of majority-minority, but one of equality.

2) The two communities are co-founders of the Cyprus republic.

3) The republic of Cyprus is based on the partnership and political equality of the two communities.

4) Despite its unitary appearance, the 1960 constitution established a functional federation in which two self administered communities were represented at all levels of government.

5) The Turkish Cypriots required Turkey's military guarantee and presence in order to protect their lives and property.

6) The problem of Cyprus must be resolved through intercommunal talks, on the basis of equality and away from international fora.

7) The government of Cyprus represented only the Greek Cypriots and not the republic as a whole.

8) Appropriate state mechanisms existed in areas under Turkish military protection (i.e. the TFSC from 1975 to 1983, and the TRNC after 1983).

9) The Cyprus government must be replaced by a transitional government in which the two communities are equally represented.

10) The equality and sovereignty of each of the two states.

11) The new constitution must provide broader veto powers to the Turkish Cypriots compared to those contained in the London and Zurich agreements.

12) The European Community should not be involved in the Cyprus problem, and that Cyprus should not become a European Community member without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots.

These Turkish/Turkish Cypriot positions were not political rhetoric designed only for domestic or foreign consumption. They were substantive positions that had direct constitutional implications, as shown clearly in the Secretary-General's proposals that were presented on August 21, 1992. Most of the Turkish positions have found specific application in these proposals. The Secretary-General's "framework of ideas", in contrast to the frameworks presented to the parties in 1985, 1986, and 1989, have been endorsed by the Security Council by resolutions 774 (1992) and 789 (1992).

In contrast, through a policy of concessions by the Greek Cypriots and the salami negotiating tactics of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the government of Cyprus accepted resolution 774 (1992), as the basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The set of ideas of August 21, 1992, had been prepared by Ambassador Ledsky and the British in cooperation with the Secretary-General. This set of ideas calls for the creation of a loose confederation on Cyprus; the establishment of a Turkish protectorate over all of Cyprus; and the continuation of Turkey's right of military intervention, because the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 would remain in effect, and a significant number of Turkish troops would remain in Cyprus.

Further, the Ledski-Ghali proposals include the effective denial of fundamental rights (the three freedoms) of all Cypriots; they undermine the prospects for the membership of Cyprus in the European Community; and they limit the applicability of European legislation in the internal affairs of Cyprus. Moreover, the framework does not provide for the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, or of the estimated 80,000 Turkish settlers from the occupied areas as required by the U.N. resolutions. The framework does not provide any guarantees that a significant number of Greek Cypriot refugees would be able to return to their homes. Finally, this framework establishes a cumbersome system of checks and balances that is unprecedented in modern constitutional history.

Despite the fact that the set of ideas met Turkey's objectives on Cyprus, Mr. Denktash, supported by Turkey, brought the negotiations into deadlock by refusing to discuss the Secretary-General's territorial proposals, and by raising new constitutional issues.

The decision by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to push for a solution that

legitimized the invasion, occupation and partition of Cyprus is shown clearly in the eighteen page document prepared by the Secretary-General's staff under the title "Summary of the Current Positions of the Two Sides in Relation to the Set of Ideas of August 21, 1992". The Turkish Cypriot side claims to agree with 91 of the 100 paragraphs of the set of ideas. The nine paragraphs over which they disagree include the following substantive points which contradict any constitutional notion of viability and functionality for the new constitution of Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriots insist on creating a loose confederation that would include a rotational presidency; equal representation of the two communities in the cabinet; the rotation of cabinet ministries and the principle of unanimity in cabinet decisions; the establishment of a transitional government with equal Turkish Cypriot participation and the dissolution of the internationally recognized government of Cyprus; the elimination of economic disparities between the two federated states; a Turkish Cypriot veto on all issues pertaining to membership in the European Community; the sovereignty of each federated state; the exclusion of the return of the displaced to their homes; the rejection of the Secretary-General's map with a new territorial allocation between the two units of the federation; and the issue of Turkey's military guarantee and the right of unilateral military intervention in Cyprus.

Even the Secretary-General, whose framework of August 21, 1992, met all of Turkey's substantive constitutional demands, found these new Turkish Cypriot demands and interpretations to be in variance with his framework and, for the first time, he found the Turkish Cypriots to be in variance with the terms of eleven United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and that these positions were in variance with the set of ideas on substantive issues such as the nature of the federation, the displaced persons, and the territorial adjustments. Boutros Ghali concluded that the Turkish Cypriots sought to maintain a fully sovereign state as apart of the federation; that this concept contradicted Security Council resolutions that called for a state with a single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship; a state whose independence and territorial integrity would be safeguarded; and that Mr. Denktash's position on the displaced precluded the possibility that any Greek Cypriot would be able to return to their homes. The total separation of the two ethnic communities was incompatible with the views of the United Nations. Boutros Ghali also stated that Mr. Denktash refused to accept the map endorsed by the Security Council in August 1992 for the allocation of territory between the two communities. The Secretary-General therefore called on the Turkish Cypriots to adjust their positions to those of the United Nations, and recommended confidence building measures that could be implemented immediately in order to improve the confidence level between the two sides.

The findings of the Secretary-General confirm what the government of Cyprus has said all along, that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots aim to legit-

imize the partition of Cyprus, as well as the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the aftermath of the 1974 invasion, and to establish a Turkish protectorate over all of Cyprus. Boutros Ghali did not go far enough in any of his reports to the Council. Calling for goodwill by the Turkish Cypriots did not bring their positions any closer to those of the United Nations. He also failed to recommend sanctions against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots for violating the United Nations mandate.

President Clerides views the Secretary-General's set of ideas as a framework for negotiation but not as the basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem. He correctly argues that a Cyprus settlement must conform to the European Convention on Human Rights; that it must guarantee the rights of all Cypriots; and the Cypriot membership in the European Union will guarantee the security and well being of all Cypriots.

Cyprus has applied for membership in the European Union. Despite American and British objections, the European Commission ruled that Cyprus qualifies for membership, and that only the continuing deadlock in the search for a political solution stood in the way of Cypriot membership. The Commission will reexamine the Cypriot application after January 1995, if a political solution has not been found by then. The European Union has also appointed an observer to the U.N. sponsored talks, but Turkey and Mr. Denktash refuse to cooperate with the representative of the European Union.

In the Summer of 1993 in an attempt to break the deadlock in the negotiations, the Secretary-General proposed a package of confidence building measures linking the reopening of the city of Varosha with that of the Nicosia International Airport. The government of Cyprus accepted in principle discussions on these measures despite the risks they entailed for the unity and sovereignty of Cyprus. It also indicated that these measures are not a substitute for a solution of the Cyprus problem.

The United Nations sponsored proximity talks between the U.N. Special Representative, the president of Cyprus and Mr. Denktash, with the assistance of Ambassador Lamb, the American Special Coordinator on Cyprus. The objective of the proximity talks was the implementation of the CBM's at the shortest possible time. The Secretary-General and his team of experts presented these measures "without prejudice to the respective positions of both sides on the overall settlement" and indicated that the CBM's are not "an end in themselves" but a step toward an integrated solution of the Cyprus problem.

It is amazing that Boutros Ghali could make this statement. The CBM's do prejudice the final settlement by lifting all restrictive measures that have been taken by the government of Cyprus against the pseudostate created by the occupation army, a state that has been condemned as illegal by resolutions of the Security Council, the European Union, and other international bodies. The

CBM's, as proposed, provide Mr. Denktash the opportunity to legalize his state and to attain its de facto recognition by the international community.

The measures linking the reopening of the Nicosia International Airport with portions of the city of Varosha represent another concession to Turkey. In the past, United Nations resolutions called for the return of Varosha to its legitimate inhabitants without any linkage to other issues. Further, Mr. Denktash agreed to give priority to the reopening of this city in his 1979 agreement with the then president of Cyprus Spiros Kyprianou.

The CBM's, as proposed by Boutros Ghali, undermine the unity and sovereignty of Cyprus, and the standing of its internationally recognized government because: (1) they equate the internationally recognized government of Cyprus with the illegal regime of Mr. Denktash; (2) they would allow the application of laws in effect only prior to December 1, 1963, in areas under U.N. administration, that is laws that were in effect before the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government of the republic. However, legislation adopted by the legitimate government of Cyprus since December 1963, would not have any effect in areas under U.N. administration; (3) it would create special status areas not under the control of the government of Cyprus. These areas would be administered by the United Nations which will have full administrative powers, including the power to legislate, to tax, and to police these areas. This proposal had first been made in the late 1970's by Willy Brandt, and had been rejected at the time; and (4) would not protect Cyprus from the influx of new illegal settlers from Turkey, and would not distinguish between the illegal settlers and the native Turkish Cypriots. Under the CBM's as proposed, the illegal settlers would be able to conduct business and reside in Varosha, and move freely in and out of the occupied areas.

The Secretary-General, his team of experts, and the American Special Coordinator on Cyprus Ambassador Lamb, were optimistic that they could provide practical answers to every problem associated with the measures. In a series of "non-papers" containing new ideas and answers to the concerns expressed by the government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots, they pressed both sides to accept these measures. The CBM's represent the final act in the process of closing the book on Cyprus, given that the international community is unwilling to enforce the rule of law in the case of Cyprus. In the final analysis, the acceptance and implementation of the CBM's would legitimize the partition of Cyprus, extend economic benefits to the occupied areas, undermine the economy of the republic and the legal standing of its government. This would end all efforts for an integrated solution of the Cyprus problem. Turkey and Mr. Denktash will have no incentive to negotiate if they can attain the legal and economic benefits they have demanded since the 1974 invasion without any concessions. Needless to say that the proximity talks deadlocked in June 1994 because of Mr. Denktash's intransigence. The United States, assisted by

Boutros Ghali's representatives, has continued to press for the implementation of the CBM's under some form of compromise that would combine the CBM's with some new form of discussions for a comprehensive solution of the problem. The United States initiatives have been justified under Security Council resolution 939(1994).

One little noticed aspect of the report of the United Nations technical experts on the CBM's has to do with the size of the population of the occupied areas. Analyzing the bad state of the economy in the occupied areas and the benefits the CBM's will bring to the North, the report on page eleven states that 40,000 young educated Turkish Cypriots have left Cyprus since 1974. At that time the Turkish Cypriot population amounted to less than 120,000. The experts conclude that the population in the occupied areas is currently at 170,000. Even though this may not have been the intent of this report, it provides an official confirmation that nearly 80,000 illegal Turkish settlers have come to the occupied areas since 1974. Today, the Turkish Cypriots have become a minority in their own land, this time outnumbered by the settlers and the occupation army.

In December 1993, president Clerides, in an attempt to break the deadlock in the U.N. sponsored negotiations proposed a dramatic plan for the demilitarization of Cyprus. The plan called for the use of savings from defense spending for the economic development of the North and for supporting an expanded U.N. peace keeping force in Cyprus. It also called for the removal of the occupation forces and the demilitarization of all of Cyprus. Turkey and Mr. Denktash rejected this proposal.

These developments, the consequences of the Yugoslav crisis, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, have created a clear and present danger for Cyprus. Turkey has redefined its strategic role, and neither the United States not the European Union appear willing to force Turkey to comply with the rule of law in the case of Cyprus. Instead, Turkey has been allowed to act as an honest broker in the Cyprus dispute even though its forces still occupy Cyprus, and Cyprus remains the only divided and occupied country of Europe.

Another consequence of the Balkan crisis has been the acceptance of the break up of multi-ethnic states, the acceptance of ethnic cleansing, and the promotion of confederal constitutional schemes. The European Union and the Clinton administration support the implementation of the Ghali set of ideas which would establish a loose confederation on Cyprus and would legitimize the outcome of Turkey's invasion, conquest, and ethnic cleansing. Mr. Denktash believes that time is on his side and, that in these circumstances, his pseudostate will be recognized by the West much as it happened in the case of the former Yugoslav republics.

Concluding Remarks

Peacemaking by the United Nations has been ineffective for a number of rea-

sons. First is the unwillingness of member nations to implement resolutions for which they voted in the General Assembly and/or the Security Council. It was only after the adoption of resolution 649(1990) that the United States has shown any interest in the implementation of selected resolutions on Cyprus, because these resolutions include objectives sought by the United States and Turkey on Cyprus. Second, because influential members of the United Nations, including both superpowers, often placed their strategic interests above those of a viable and functional solution of the Cyprus problem. The United States in particular undermined and opposed United Nations procedures when they did not serve American interests in the dispute. The third and foremost factor involves the policies of Turkey which, since the mid-1950's, has consistently advocated the partition of Cyprus. After 1974, Turkey has pursued this objective through the imposition of the outcome of the 1974 invasion, and through the confederal proposals that have been presented for the resolution of the dispute.

Earlier, the paper examined the objectives of the Cypriot policy of internationalization. This dynamic policy has kept the Cyprus issue in front of the international community despite the fact that the resolutions of the United Nations and of other regional organizations remain unimplemented. Cyprus may have had the ability to build a wide ranging international coalition, but neither Cyprus nor its allies had the political influence to reorder the policy priorities of the influential powers of the international community. In the final analysis, the implementation of United Nations resolutions is a political and not a legal issue. Cyprus may have won the moral victory in various international fora, but realpolitik considerations of influential actors carried the day.

The shifting balance of power at the United Nations and the Secretary-General's willingness to promote objectives other than those of the pre-1990 resolutions on Cyprus, and to downgrade the positions adopted by other regional organizations, undermined the credibility of the United Nations. It also placed the government of Cyprus in an unenviable position. Having committed itself to the good-offices of the Secretary-General, to the implementation of United Nations resolutions, and to the need for the active involvement of the United States in the resolution of the Cyprus problem, the government of Cyprus found it impossible to reject the efforts of the United States and the United Nations. Consequently, in a series of compromises, successive Cypriot governments accepted principles that negated key United nations resolutions.

This course of events could not have been predicted by the government of Cyprus. Earlier governments, unwittingly and under the pressures and consequences of the 1974 invasion and the promises of the United States to assist in bringing negotiating flexibility in Turkey's positions, entered into the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements which have been used to undermine the pre-1990 United Nations resolutions on Cyprus.

Twenty years have passed since the Turkish invasion and continued occupa-

tion of nearly 38% of Cyprus, twenty years marked by Greek Cypriot concessions and negotiating deadlock. Are there any unexplored options still available for the government of Cyprus that may help break the cycle of concessions and deadlock? There are no indications of a substantive change in American policy, nor is there any evidence that Russia's suggestions of a Security Council sponsored international conference will provide a viable negotiating alternative, unless the influential members of the Security Council and of the European Union change their policy as to what constitutes a viable settlement of the problem. Cyprus must not get involved in another round of negotiations and concessions if it is to avoid sanctioning its own partition. Cyprus must have the courage to redefine its negotiating positions from a zero base. The search for a peaceful solution must continue; it must involve Turkey, and must begin with the premise that all concessions made to date by the government of Cyprus are null and void. The concessions made since 1974 were made in anticipation of reciprocity by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Instead, their response has been unilateral actions, such as the 1983 UDI of Denktash's pseudostate, and demands for legitimizing this breakaway state.

The active involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus problem must be encouraged. All Cypriots can benefit from membership in the European Union, which can resolve issues such as the three freedoms, etc. But the temptation of membership in the European Union should not hide the seriousness of the British opposition and the risk of the indirect acceptance of the partition of Cyprus, if only the free areas are brought into the Union.

The Cyprus problem represents a classic example of the interplay of domestic and international politics. In respect to the latter, politico-strategic considerations affected the Cyprus problem from its genesis, as well as the involvement of the United Nations in this perpetuated dispute. The demise of the Cold War and the emergence of the so-called "new world order" appear not to have changed any of these conditions. On the contrary, the "new world order" may spell the end of the republic of Cyprus as we have known it.

NOTES

1. Great Britain, **Conference on Cyprus, Documents Signed and Initialled at Lancaster House on 19th February 1959**, London: HMSO, 1959, Cmnd. 679.

2. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Analysis of the Cyprus Agreements," **Intelligence Report No. 8047**, July 14, 1959.

3. Thomas Ehrlich, "Cyprus-The Warlike Isle: Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis," **Stanford Law Review**, Vol. XVIII, May 1966, pp. 1021-1098. Stanley Kyriakides, **Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government**, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968.

4. Glafkos Clerides, **My Deposition**, 3 vols., Nicosia: Alithia Publishing Co., 1989-1992. Michael Dekleris, **Kypriako, 1972-1974: He Teleftaia Efkairia**, Athens: by the author, 1981. Polyvios Polyviou, **Cyprus in Search of a Constitution-Constitutional Negotiations and Proposals 1960-1975**, Nicosia: Nicolaou and Sons, Ltd., 1976.

5. Van Coufoudakis, "U.S. Foreign policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation, "**Millenium, Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1976-77, pp. 245-268.

6. Glafkos Clerides, **op. cit.**, Vol. II (Greek edition), pp. 347-359.

7. Estimated to be at least 80 000 by 1993.

8. Van Coufoudakis, "Cyprus and the European Convention of Human Rights: The Law and Politics of Cyprus v. Turkey, Applications 6780/74 and 6950/75, **Human Rights Quarterly**, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1982, pp. 451-473, 497-507.

9. For the text see Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, **Cyprus Intercommunal Talks** (Nicosia: PIO, 1979), p. 23.

10. Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, **Cyprus Intercommunal Talks**, pp. 40-41.

11. Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, **ibid.**, pp. 62-65. "ABC" stood for American, British, Canadian, i.e. the three sponsors of the proposals. It was also known as the Nimetz plan because it was presented to the parties by Matthew Nimetz, the Counsellor of the U.S. Department of State.

12. For the text of these resolutionsn see Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, **Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations on the Cyprus Problem 1964-1990**, Nicosia: PIO, 1990.

13. Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., **International Organizations in their Legal Setting** (Minneapolis: West Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 403-405.

14. This was manifested in the Namibia case following the 1962 ICJ decision and the adoption of various resolutions terminating South Africa's Namibian mandate.

15. S/24472, 21 August 1992, and annex.

DOCUMENT

LA POLITIQUE CANADIENNE SUR LA QUESTION CHYPRIOTE

The Secretary of State for External Affairs — Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

Le 19 avril 1993

M. Stéphanos Constantinides
Comité Canadien Justice pour Chypre
C.P. 382 Succursale Outremont
Outremont (Québec)
H2V 4N3

Cher Monsieur,

Merci pour votre courrier du 29 novembre 1992 au sujet de la décision du Canada de retirer ses troupes de la Force de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies à Chypre (UNFICYP). Vous voudrez bien excuser le retard à répondre à votre lettre.

Le gouvernement du Canada a informé le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, le 11 décembre 1992, que le contingent canadien de maintien de la paix serait retiré de UNFICYP à compter du milieu de 1993. Cette décision a été prise en prévision du changement de mandat souhaité par le Secrétaire général pour la Force, qu'il y ait ou non accord politique.

Avant d'arriver à cette décision, j'ai procédé à un examen exhaustif de la situation; j'ai consulté notamment le Président George Vassiliou, le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, les ministres des Affaires étrangères de Chypre, de Grèce et de Turquie, ainsi que des représentants d'autres nations intéressées. Je regrette n'avoir pu m'entretenir avec le chef de la communauté chypriote turque, Rauf Denktash, car je crois que notre rencontre aurait été constructive. Cet examen a abouti à la conclusion que, malheureusement, la possibilité d'un règlement

Fallait-il maintenir nos forces à Chypre pendant une période indéterminée? Comme vous le savez, le Canada fait partie d'UNFICYP depuis déjà 28 ans. Étant donné la faible chance de progrès et la demande croissante pour des forces de maintien de la paix ailleurs dans le monde, il nous est apparu difficile de maintenir indéfiniment notre présence à Chypre. Il ne s'agit pas d'un geste précipité puisque nous avons consulté les intéressés et que nous avons accordé un délai de six mois aux Nations Unies pour procéder aux ajustements rendus nécessaires par notre retrait.

Entre-temps, le Canada adhère totalement aux efforts déployés par le Secrétaire général pour amener les deux communautés de l'île à conclure un accord. Je déplore sincèrement que les parties ne soient pas parvenues à régler leur différend au cours de la dernière ronde de négociation tenue en octobre 1992. Le Canada continuera, conjointement avec le Secrétaire général et d'autres responsables, à encourager le Président Clerides et M. Denktash à aborder les prochaines négociations dans un esprit positif et constructif.

Veuillez agréer, Cher Monsieur, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.

Barbara McDougall

Intra-Ethnic Conflict and its Consequences with Special Reference to Greek Canadian Communities*

Peter C. Chimbos**

RESUMÉ

Basé sur des informations provenant de rapports publics et non publics, d'interviews de leaders de la Communauté grecque et de participation-observation, cet article analyse les facteurs qui contribuent aux conflits intra-ethniques dans les différentes communautés grecques du Canada. La lutte de pouvoir entre clergé et laics visant le contrôle administratif des communautés ethnoreligieuses, la compétition demandée pour le statut et les intérêts personnels, les expériences culturelles d'immigrants grecs dans la mère patrie et une forte cohésion ethnique sont considérées comme des facteurs contribuant aux conflits intra-ethniques.

Ceux-ci ont des aspects négatifs dans la mesure où ils entravent l'adaptation des nouveaux arrivants à la structure socio-économique et politique déjà installée, et dans la mesure où ils épuisent l'énergie des participants, affectant défavorablement les réseaux de parenté et créant parfois une perception négative de la part de la population locale. Cependant, les conflits intra-ethniques ont aussi des conséquences positives comme le changement des structures communautaires autoritaires, l'amélioration de la communication entre les divers groupes de la communauté ethnique et enfin la facilitation de l'adaptation de ce groupe ethnique à la société d'accueil.

ABSTRACT

Based on information obtained from published and unpublished reports, personal interviews with Greek community leaders and participant observation, this paper examines the factors which contribute to intra-ethnic conflict in Greek Canadian communities. Power struggle between clergy and laymen for the administrative control of the ethnoreligious communities, old country politics competition for status and personal interests, cultural experiences of Greek immigrants in the homeland and strong ethnic cohesion are viewed as factors contributing to intra-ethnic conflict and friction.

Intra-ethnic conflict has negative aspects insofar as it impedes the adaptation of newcomers to the established socio-economic and political structure, drains energy from participants in the conflict, adversely affects kinship networks, and, sometimes, creates an adverse perception by outsiders. On the other hand, however, intra-ethnic conflict has positive consequences such as changing authoritarian community structures, enhancing communication between various groups within the ethnic community, and facilitating the ethnic group's adaptation to the host society.

INTRODUCTION

A look at Canadian history indicates that since the early 1900s Greek Canadians established ethnocultural communities to (a) maintain their cultural

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heritage, (b) cope with problems of discrimination in the host society and (c) contribute to the social and economic welfare of the motherland Greece[1]. An ethnocultural community (e.g. a Greek Canadian community) refers to "a group of people within a Canadian city who share the Hellenic language and culture, have some form of ethnic organization through which they carry on activities for maintaining their cultural identity and maintain cultural contact with the homeland."[2] From the beginning the Greek Canadian communities were organized around the Greek Orthodox Church, an offshoot of the Greek Orthodox Church in the United States, for at least two reasons:

1. The insecurities and anxieties the immigrants experienced because of cultural shock and discrimination in the host society. The church, for example, reminded the newcomers of their homeland and gave them a sense of belonging in a foreign land.

2. The Greek Orthodox Church's previous experience in leadership of the oppressed and powerless Greeks during the Turkish occupation 1453-1821. During this period the Greek Orthodox Church became the center of social organization, especially in rural areas of Greece. These organizational experiences of the church were later carried over to the Greek communities in North America.

The Greek Canadian communities have been perceived, at least by outsiders, as organizations characterized by solidarity, even clanishness, and internal cooperation. This perception, however, is far from the truth. A closer look at the history of Greek Canadians suggests that since the early 1900s intra-ethnic conflict has been a common feature of Greek community life. Intra-ethnic conflict refers to dissociative forms of interaction within an ethnic community characterized by hostilities, clashes and cleavages which affect the sociocultural life of the ethnic group. Directly or indirectly intra-ethnic conflict touches the lives of all ethnic group members.

The objective of this paper then is to answer two questions: (1) what factors have contributed to conflict within the Greek Canadian communities over the years and (2) what are the negative as well as the positive consequences of such conflicts. The analysis is based on information obtained from the National Archives of Canada, unpublished reports from Greek Canadian organizations, the Greek Canadian press, personal interviews with leaders of Greek communities and organizations and the author's participant observation in Greek community life for more than twenty years.

Prior to World War II conflicts within the relatively small Greek Canadian communities were limited. However, with the influx of more than 110,000 Greek immigrants to Canada after 1950 conflict within the Greek Canadian communities increased significantly. The post World War II immigrants came from more diverse educational, political and occupational backgrounds. Thus,

as the diversity of the Greek community population increased, the potential for conflict also increased. Most of the conflicts occurred in cities with relatively large numbers of Greek Canadians[3] including Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Hamilton and London, Ontario.

Factors Contributing to Intra-ethnic Conflict

A major factor which contributes to conflicts and divisions within the Greek Canadian communities is the power struggle between clergy and secular leaders over the administration of the community's cultural and economic affairs. Although conflicts between clergy and laymen had occurred since the establishment of the first parish communities in the early 1900s they became more intensified after 1964 when the priest became the head of the parish community and played a supervisory role in all parish organizations. According to Uniform Parish Regulations of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, "the priest as head of the Parish, by virtue of the ecclesiastical authority vested in him, shall guide and oversee the total parish program, and is ultimately responsible for the whole life and activities of the Parish."[4] This authoritarian parish community structure was challenged primarily by influential Greek Canadians, including intellectuals, educators and members of the new middle class. Such a response was inevitable in Greek Canadian communities where a large number of individuals had the resources to challenge the administrative power of the clergy over cultural affairs.

After many confrontations and court battles the civic leaders of the Greek communities of Toronto and Montreal were able to curb the administrative power of the clergy by making legal changes in the parish community by-laws. Under the modified by-laws the elected boards of trustees have substantial powers and do not recognize the administrative power of the clergy particularly in cultural and social affairs, including the Greek school, buying and selling property, social services, hiring of staff, etc. Apparently in retaliation and to circumvent this development, the Greek Orthodox Diocese of Canada established churches outside the administrative auspices of the Greek communities in Toronto and Montreal.[5]

Another alternative to the traditional parish community model was the establishment of secular community structures[6] in various Canadian cities, including London and Sarnia, Ontario and Edmonton, Alberta. These organizations which appeared in the early 1980s constitute an ethnocultural community without church affiliation where the power rests in the general assembly and its elected board of directors who have the authority to establish schools, cultural centers and auxiliary organizations. This secular model usually co-exists with the parish community model in the same city and consequently there is competition, conflict and duplication of Greek cultural activities and ethnic celebrations. The secular communities have been viewed by the church establishment with suspi-

cion and distrust because (a) they present a threat to the political leverage of the church leaders who claim to be the religious as well as the ethnocultural leaders of the Greek minority, (b) the clergy have a fear of secularization and secular leaders and (c) the income of the parish community decreases with the establishment of organizations outside the parish.

Politics of the home society is another important factor contributing to conflicts within the Greek Canadian communities. Since World War I political conflicts and upheavals in Greece have often been reflected in Greek Canadian communities. And the more serious the political conflict in the home society, the higher the probability for conflict and social movements within the Greek Canadian communities.

During World War I Greek Canadians were divided into two rival factions. The supporters of Prime Minister Eleftnerios Venizelos believed that the interests of Greece were with her allies (Britain and France), whereas the Royalists believed that Greece should remain neutral. The two factions did not only support two different political policies of the homeland, but fought over the administrative control of Greek Canadian communities. Many conflicts between Venizelists and Royalists took the form of heated arguments in coffee houses (Kafenia) and Greek community cultural centers[7]. The conflict between these two political factions diminished as the struggle between Royalists and Venizelists began subsiding in Greece.

The defense of Greece against Italian and German fascist forces (1940-41) and later the National Resistance Movement against Nazi occupation (1941-45) united Greek Canadians in an effort to assist the motherland. Greek Canadians put their political quarrels aside and united to help Greece resist foreign aggression. Assistance in the form of food, clothing and medical supplies were sent to Greece through the Greek Relief Fund in Canada.

During the Civil War (1946-49) between communist and nationalist forces in Greece, there was no evidence of conflicting Greek political groups in Canada. Most of the Greek Canadians had been in Canada for too many years to identify with the new communist struggle for power in Greece, and those few Greek Canadians with left wing leanings could not organize any significant political movements.

The political situation which had the most significant impact on post World War II Greek communities in Canada was the right wing military takeover of Greece on April 21, 1967. The dictatorship divided Greek Canadians into two major political camps. The liberals expressed strong opposition to the military takeover of Greece while the conservatives—many with right wing leanings—offered their moral and economic support to the military junta. Many of the Greek Orthodox parish community administrators and clergy were sympathetic to the military dictators who claimed that the coup d'état was necessary to pre-

vent a socialist takeover in Greece. Conflicts between anti-junta and pro-junta Greek Canadians took the form of intimidation, heated arguments in coffee houses and community centers and violent confrontations during demonstrations. With the collapse of the Greek dictatorship in 1974 conflicts between the two factions in Canada also subsided.

Struggle for power between and among various interest groups or cliques can also contribute to conflicts and cleavages within the Greek Canadian community. Neither the parish nor secular organizations are immune from such conflicts. The power struggles take the form of general ideological disputes, conflicting personal ambitions (e.g., desire for status), and economic interests. Ambitious Greek Canadians, whose accessibility to political and social positions of power in the host society is limited, or is perceived as being blocked, choose the ethnic community's structure as an arena to act out achievement motives and strive for upward social mobility. Possibly one of the reasons for the relatively high degree of ethnic community involvement of middle-class Greek immigrants may be their perceived inaccessibility to positions of power in the host society combined with the fact that the ethnic community is large enough to provide a viable alternative.[8]

It can also be argued that conflicts within the Greek Canadian communities are deeply rooted in the cultural experiences of Greek immigrants. In other words, Greek immigrants who had been influenced by authoritarian institutions (e.g., family, school, church, government) in the home society are unable to coordinate their resources or solve differences and conflicts in a cooperative and compromising way. In Greek community meetings, heated arguments and insulting confrontations are thus not uncommon.

Strong ethnic cohesion, as indicated by an intense involvement and participation in ethnic community institutions, with noninvolvement in non-ethnic organizations, is another factor that may contribute to intra-ethnic conflict. Coser has argued that the fewer the groups people belong to, the more likely they are to become involved in the ones they have[9]. Thus, the higher degree of ethnic group cohesion the higher the chances of intra-ethnic conflict. Preliminary research by this author in a northern Ontario Greek Canadian community has shown, for example, that only 14.7% of Greek immigrants were active members of at least one Canadian voluntary association[10]. Internal conflicts in this Greek Orthodox community were very common in the late 1960s and 1970s.

Adverse Consequences of Intra-Ethnic Conflict

The conflicts and divisions within the Greek Canadian communities and organizations have adverse consequences for the Greek Canadian ethnic culture and identity. There are at least four theoretical positions regarding the effects of intra-ethnic minority conflict:

1. Intra-ethnic conflict facilitates the assimilation process. According to this position, the higher the degree of conflict and friction within the ethnic community the more alienated the youth become from ethnic values and institutions and the greater the chances for assimilation (including loss of Greek identity). One mechanism by which this occurs is exogamy. For example, identification with one ethnic organization (e.g., parish community) and isolation from another ethnic organization (e.g., secular community) limits the number of ethnic eligibles in the mate selection process and increases the likelihood of marrying outside the ethnic group. According to Reitz, exogamy reflects a significant loss of group loyalty, leads to the dilution of the ethnic culture, and creates obstacles to intergenerational ethnic cultural transmission.[11]

2. Intra-ethnic conflict drains off the energy of minority group members, especially ethnic group leaders, and distracts them from other important issues such as (a) cooperating with other ethnic groups to cope with government policies and programs on ethnic minorities in Canada and (b) organizing a strong lobby at the municipal, provincial and federal levels of government. Greek Canadians, for example, do not constitute an effective lobby because of lack of unity.

3. Intra-ethnic conflict provides outsiders (i.e., non-Greeks) with a blurred or negative perception of the Greek minority in Canada. Some conflicts within the Greek Canadian community are reported by the Canadian mass media, and this may influence public opinion and politicians. An observable consequence is the reluctance by governments to provide Greek Canadians with grants for cultural and educational functions and a tendency of politicians to minimize contact with Greek Canadians for fear of becoming involved in conflict or perceived as siding with one side of a dispute. In other words, politicians of all parties and government officials do not want to risk getting embroiled in rivalries, which is likely to happen when one faction claims to represent the Greek community in a particular Canadian city. It is interesting to note here that reluctance to associate with rival Greek Canadian factions has also been observed among Greek members of parliament and other Greek representatives who have visited Greek Canadian communities.

4. Intra-ethnic conflict adversely affects kinship networks among Greek Canadians. It is not uncommon to find families being internally divided or estranged from each other because of Greek community politics. This situation is problematic because kinship networks have been important support systems for the immigration, social adjustment and occupational mobility of Greek Canadians. Many Greek immigrants, for example, have improved their social and economic positions in Canada by participating in kin networks that involve mutual obligations and support.[12] In business matters, for example, the Greek immigrant looked to his relatives for economic assistance (e.g., jobs, loans) and advice.

Positive Consequences of Intra-ethnic Conflict

Intra-ethnic conflict is not always dysfunctional (negative) for the ethnic group. It may also have functional (positive) consequences which are usually unanticipated[13] and unrecognized by ethnic group members. Coser argues that conflict often leads to social change[14] such as innovation. Thus, intra-ethnic conflict may alter the administrative structure of the Greek Canadian community. As indicated earlier, the challenge to the traditional conservative parish-community structure and especially to the administrative power of the clergy, by liberal and influential Greek Canadians, has resulted in the democratization of the Greek Canadian communities in Toronto and Montreal.[15] These changes have also challenged the popular myth that Greek organizations cannot function effectively without authoritarian leadership and structure.

Intra-ethnic conflict also enhances communication between and among the various sub-groups of the ethnic community by bringing problems and issues into the open. It is through conflict, then, that interest groups understand the strengths and weaknesses of each other and establish their identity within the ethnic community. Many of the issues and problems of Greek Canadian communities and the views of different interest groups are presented in community meetings, forums and the Greek media, including newspapers, radio and television. The most publicized conflicts have been those between clergy and laymen for the control of the administration of the Greek communities of Metropolitan Toronto and Montreal during the 1970s.

Finally, intra-ethnic conflict facilitates the ethnic groups' social adaptation to the host society. Through conflict Greek Canadians examine the problems they encounter and make the necessary changes. Without conflict the ethnic community could become static and maladaptive. For example, as previously noted, the conflict between clergy and laymen in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the establishment of many Greek organizations—academic, cultural and athletic—outside the Greek Orthodox parish community. The appearance of these secular organizations was very functional as the Greek Orthodox parish communities were not ideologically and structurally capable of helping the flow of new immigrants adjust to the host society.[16]

Summary and Conclusion

Intra-ethnic conflict is an important aspect of Greek community life in Canada and results from (a) power struggle for the administrative control of the ethnoreligious communities and ethnocultural organizations, (b) ideological differences often related to old country politics, (c) competition for social status and personal interests, (d) cultural experiences of Greek immigrants in the homeland, and (e) strong ethnic group cohesion. Such a conflict increased with the diversity of the Greek population in Canada after 1950 and had both positive and negative

consequences for the ethnic community. To what extent similar patterns of intra-ethnic conflict exists in Greek communities of other countries (e.g., United States and Australia) will have to be demonstrated in future sociological inquiries.

Friction and overt conflict within the Greek Canadian communities will continue to exist as long as the clergy demand to exercise their administrative authority over the sociocultural life of Greek Canadians and as long as there are groups or outspoken individuals with different interests, political ideologies and organizational philosophies. It is not unrealistic, however, for Greek Canadians to have a united voice at the provincial and federal levels, especially as a lobby group. The Hellenic Canadian Congress, which consists of several Greek provincial organizations is in a strategic position to represent Greek Canadian regardless of their administrative philosophies. It is through the cooperation of both religious and secular Greek organizations and the coordination of their resources that Greek Canadians will become stronger and more dynamic as an ethnic minority in a multicultural society.

NOTES

1. Peter D. Chimbos, "The Changing Organization of Greek Canadian Communities". **International Journal of Comparative Sociology** (Vol. 27, Numbers 3-4, 1986): p.209.

2. Peter D. Chimbos, **op. cit.** p. 209.

3. **ibid.**, p. 210.

4. For more information on the power of the clergy see Uniform Parish Regulations of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1973, pp. 13-14.

5. Peter Chimbos, **op. cit.** p. 212.

6. Greek secular communities are incorporated under the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations of their respective provinces and are empowered to form auxiliary organizations which are clearly under their jurisdiction.

7. Peter D. Chimbos, **The Canadian Odyssey**. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980)pp. 120-21

8. Peter D. Chimbos, "Historical Development, Conflict and Social change of Greek Communities in Canada" **in Greeks in English Speaking Countries.** (Melbourne, Hellenic Studies Forum Inc., 1992)p. 48.

9. Lewis Coser, **The Functions of Social conflict**. (New York: the Free Press,1956)p.267.

10. Peter D. Chimbos, "A Comparison of the Social Adaptation of Dutch, Greek and Slovak Immigrants in a canadian Community", **International Migration Review** (Vol. 6, fall 1972)p.243.

11. Jeffrey Reitz, **The Survival of Ethnic Groups.**(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980)p.114.

12. See Peter D. Chimbos and Carol Agocs, "Kin and Hometown Networks as Support Systems for the Immigration and Settlement of Greek Canadians", **Canadian Ethnic Studies** (Vol. 14, No.2, 1983)pp. 43-56.

13. For detailed discussion on positive and negative consequences of any given system see Robert K. Merton, **Social Theory and Social Structure.** (New York: the Free Press of Glencoe, 1957) pp.50-54.

14. Lewis Coser, **op. cit.** 1956.

15. Peter D. Chimbos, **op.cit.** p.212.

16. Some of these organizations included the Hellenic Federation of Parents and Guardians of Montreal, The Greek Canadian Labour Association of Montreal, The Hellenic Canadian Cultural Society in Toronto, The Pan-Macedonian Association of Ontario and The Greek Writers Association of Montreal.

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DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION 939 (1994) ADOPTEE PAR LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE A SA 3412e SEANCE, LE 29 JUILLET 1994

Le Conseil de Sécurité,

Rappelant ses résolutions sur Chypre,

Accueillant avec satisfaction le rapport du Secrétaire général en date du 3O mai 1994 (S/1994/629) et sa lettre du 28 juin 1994 (S/1994/785) concernant de bons offices,

Réaffirmant dans ce contexte que les mesures de confiance, sans être une fin en soi, et sans se substituer à un processus politique plus large, offriraient des avantages importants aux deux communautés et faciliteraient le processus politique conduisant à un réglement d'ensemble,

Rappelant que les deux parties ont accepté les mesures de confiance dans leur principe et **se félicitant** que le dirigeant de la communauté chypriote grecque ait accepté le "Projet d'idées pour la mise en oeuvre de l'ensemble des mesures de confiance" (S/1994/785, annexe) en date du 21 mars 1994, et **se félicitant également** des progrès considérables accomplis sur la voie d'un accord par le dirigeant de la communauté chypriote turque, qui sont décrits dans la lettre du Secrétaire général datée du 28 juin 1994,

Notant qu'il existe maintenant une large convergence de vues sur la teneur des mesures de confiance et sur les modalités de leur application, mais **notant** aussi avec **préoccupation** qu'aucun des deux dirigeants n'est pour le moment disposé à les appliquer selon les termes énoncés dans la lettre du Secrétaire général datée du 28 juin 1994,

Ayant étudié les options et les idées envisagées pour l'avenir aux paragraphes 57 à 62 du rapport du Secrétaire général en date du 3O mai 1994,

1) **Réaffirme** que le maintien du statu quo est inacceptable.

2) **Réaffirme** sa position selon laquelle le réglement du problème de Chypre doit être fondé sur un Etat de Chypre doté d'une souveraineté, d'une personnalité internationale et d'une citoyenneté uniques, son indépendance et son intégrité territoriale étant garanties, et composé de deux communautés politiquement égales, telles qu'elles sont décrites dans les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de Sécurité, au sein d'une fédération bicommunautaire et bizonale, et selon laquelle un tel règlement doit exclure l'union, en totalité ou en partie, avec un autre pays, ou toute autre forme de partition ou de sécession,

3) **Prie** le Sécrétaire général d'entamer des consultations avec les membres du Conseil, avec les puissances garantes et avec les deux dirigeants chypriotes, afin d'entreprendre une réflexion aprofondie et de grande portée sur les moyens d'aborder le problème chypriote d'une façon qui produise des résultats, et **demande à nouveau** aux parties de faire preuve de leur engagement en coopérant pleinement à cette fin,

4) **Demande instamment,** dans ce contexte aux parties de coopérer pleinement avec le Secrétaire général et son Représentant spécial afin de parvenir à s'entendre au plus tôt sur les modalités d'application des mesures de confiance,

5) **Prie également** le Secrétaire général de lui soumettre, à la fin d'octobre 1994 au plus tard, à l'issue des consultations visées au paragraphe 3 ci-dessus et compte tenu des progrès accomplis dans l'application des mesures de confiance, un rapport qui comprenne un programme devant permettre de trouver une solution globale à toutes les questions que soulève le problème chypriote,

6) **Décide** de rester activement saisi de la question.

LA GRECE ET LES BALKANS

Jean Catsiapis *

ABSTRACT

Inter-balkanic cooperation began before World War II. However, it did not become a practical reality until the 1976 Athens conference, which brought together representatives from Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Yougoslavia and Romania. Albania joined them in 1984.

The fall of the communist regimes of Central Europe put an end to the privileged ties which Greece developed with most of its neighbors. Hence, for a few years now, Athens has tense relations with Skopje and Tirana. But Greece, due to its European Union membership and to the dynamism of its exports in the balkan peninsula, could well play the role of a regional power and constitute a pole of stability in this agitated part of Europe.

RESUMÉ

La coopération inter-balkanique a commençé bien avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Toutefois elle ne connaîtra une véritable réalité qu'à partir de la conférence d'Athènes de 1976, qui réunit les représentants de la Grèce, de la Turquie, de la Bulgarie, de la Yougoslavie et de la Roumanie. L'Albanie, à partir de 1984, participe aussi aux rencontres entre Etats balkaniques.

L'effondrement des régimes communistes d'Europe centrale aura pour conséquence de mettre fin aux liens privilégiés que la Grèce entretient avec la plupart de ses voisins. C'est ainsi qu 'Athènes depuis quelques années se trouve en opposition avec Skopje et Tirana. Mais la Grèce, grâce à son appartenance à l'Union européenne et au dynamisme de ses exportations dans la péninsule balkanique pourrait fort bien jouer un rôle de puissance régionale et constituer un pôle de stabilité dans cette partie agitée de l'Europe.

"La Grèce a la politique de sa géographie". Cette constatation de Théodore Pangalos, le ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères de Grèce [1] permet d'éclairer la diplomatie grecque concernant les Balkans. La république héllénique dispose en effet au nord de son territoire de frontières longues de 1170 km se répartissant ainsi: frontière gréco-albanaise (247 km), frontière gréco-ex-yougoslave (246 km) frontière gréco-bulgare (474 km) frontière greco-turque (203 km).

Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et durant quatre décennies la Grèce est parvenue à promouvoir la coopération interbalknique. Mais l'effondrement communiste dans les Balkans au début des années quatre vingt dix a permis l'émergence d'un axe Ankara-Skopje-Tirana, qui isole Athènes dont les positions diplomatiques se heurtent à l'incompréhension de la plupart des capitales européennes.

I LA COOPERATION INTERBALKANIQUE

Les Balkans au XIXème siècle ainsi qu'au début du XXème siècle ont constitué un foyer de tension internationale et un théâtre de guerres fratricides. Mais au moment où les méthodes de Hitler bouleversaient la diplomatie européenne, plusieurs Etats balkaniques décident de se rapprocher et, le 9 février 1934, la

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Grèce, la Turquie, la Yougoslavie, et la Roumanie signent un pacte de garantie mutuelle de leur intégrité territoriale et forment l'Entente balkanique. Toutefois, la diplomatie de l'Allemagne hitlérienne réussit sans difficulté, à partir de 1937 à diviser les puissances de l'Entente balkanique et celle-ci ne fut jamais constituée dans les faits.

Le pacte balkanique de 1953

Après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale la coopération balkanique reprend mais sur un plan bilatéral, en particulier entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie ainsi qu'entre ce pays-ci et la Yougoslavie. Une première tentative de coopération multilatérale a lieu avec la signature à Ankara, le 28 février 1953, d'un traité d'amitié et de coopération entre la Yougoslavie, la Turquie et la Grèce. Quelques mois plus tard, le 9 août 1954, ce pacte balkanique est complété par une convention d'assistance mutuelle ainsi que par un memorandum relatif à la création d'une Assemblée consultative composée d'un nombre égal de représentants des Parlements des trois pays [2]. Le pacte balkanique se désintègre à la suite de la détérioration des rapports entre la Grèce et la Turquie que provoquent les débuts de la guerre d'indépendance de Chypre et les manifestations anti-grecques d'Istanbul de 1955.

En 1957 c'est la Roumanie qui prend l'initiative de relancer la coopération balkanique sur un plan très large: le 10 septembre elle adresse à l'Albanie, la Bulgarie, la Grèce, la Turquie et la Yougoslavie un message invitant ces pays à réaliser une collaboration multilatérale et qui faciliterait la recherche d'une solution aux différents problèmes en suspens dans cette région. Les dirigeants roumains proposent que se tienne à Bucarest une conférence des chefs de gouvernement des pays balkaniques. Cette proposition ne réunit pas l'accord de tous les pays concernés mais avance l'idée d'une coopération fondée sur des actions concrètes.

Après son retour au pouvoir en 1974, M. Caramanlis entreprend de développer les relations de la Grèce avec ses voisins balkaniques. Au cours de l'année 1975 il se rend en visite officielle en Bulgarie, en Yougoslavie et en Roumanie. Avec ce dernier Etat il signe une déclaration de douze principes devant servir de fondement non seulement aux relations entre Athènes et Bucarest mais aussi aux rapports entretenus par les deux pays avec les autres membres de la communauté internationale. La Grèce et la Roumanie par leur déclaration commune exprimaient, en particulier, leur volonté de s'unir avec leurs voisins pour le maintien et la consolidation de la paix ainsi que pour la promotion de la sécurité dans les Balkans.

La conférence d'Athènes de 1976

La conférence interbalkanique de coopération multilatérale, qui se tient à

Athènes du 26 janvier au 5 février 1976, à l'initiative de M. Caramanlis constitue la première application régionale de la Déclaration d'Helsinki. Elle a pu réunir des pays dotés de régimes politiques différents: la Bulgarie, la Grèce, la Roumanie, la Turquie et la Yougoslavie [3].

Les experts économiques des cinq Etats au niveau desquels s'est tenue la réunion d'Athènes ont examiné un total de 154 propositions dont 32 concernaient l'agriculture, 23 l'environnement, 22 le commerce, 18 les transports et 10 les problèmes énergétiques. Ce sont les litiges politiques entre la Grèce et la Turquie ainsi que la délicate question de la Macédoine, qui ont pesé sur les travaux de la conférence et en ont limité la portée. En dépit des interventions du délégué roumain, qui proposait de faire des Balkans une zone de paix dénucléarisée et débarrassée de toutes bases étrangères cette conférence devait borner ses objectifs à des domaines purement économique et commercial.

Une seconde conférence des cinq pays balkaniques s'est tenue à Ankara en novembre 1979. Les résultats de cette rencontre ont été très limités; mais M. Caramanlis, qui souhaitait, tout à la fois inciter la Turquie à se rapprocher de la Grèce par le truchement d'une coopération multilatérale et prévenir grâce à une concertation permamente tout foyer de troubles dans une région du monde à l'équilibre instable, a pu légitimement s'estimer satisfait des premiers résultats de sa politique balkanique.

La politique balkanique de Papandreou

Avec l'accession au pouvoir à Athènes du parti socialiste PASOK dirigé par Andréas Papandreou en octobre 1981 s'amorce une nouvelle politique balkanique de la Grèce. Le premier ministre grec propose le 10 décembre 1982 la dénucléarisation des Balkans: "Nous croyons que la sensibilité particulière de cette région exige la transformation des Balkans en une zone de paix à l'abri des coalitions politico-militaires et des armes nucléaires. L'idée de base est un accord commun qui pourrait inclure les pays balkaniques et serait signé par leurs gouvernements respectifs".

M. Papandreou souhaitait par ce projet de dénucléarisation des Balkans, qui sera voué à l'échec, entreprendre la première étape de la dénucléarisation de toute l'Europe. Toutefois la coopération interbalkanique sur le plan économique, commercial et scientifique se poursuit régulièrement avec les sessions de la conférence interbalkanique auxquelles participe, pour la première fois l'Albanie, au début de 1988 [4].

II. L'EFFONDREMENT COMMUNISTE DANS LES BALKANS

La Perestroika, c'est à dire, la restructuration de la société soviétique amorcée par Gorbatchev en URSS en 1985 va permettre également une libéralisation des

"démocraties populaires" d'Europe centrale. Dans les Balkans, peu à peu, les régimes communistes vont s'effondrer; ce qui aura pour effet de faire resurgir les renvendications nationales étouffées pendant près d'un demi-siècle.

Les initiatives de Mitsotakis

Parvenu au pouvoir en avril 1990, M. Mitsotakis, le président de la Nouvelle Démocratie, estime que la Grèce, seul pays de la péninsule balkanique à appartenir à l'Europe communautaire, doit pouvoir jouer un rôle moteur dans cette région.

Le premier ministre grec s'est ainsi proposé d'être l'avocat auprès des autorités de Bruxelles, de la Bulgarie et de la Yougoslavie. Et c'est sur son initiative que Tirana a pu obtenir le statut d'observateur à la Conférence de Paris sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe des 19-21 novembre 1990.

Mais la désintégration de la Yougoslavie en 1991 va mettre en échec les tentatives d'Athènes de relance de la coopération interbalkanique : le gouvernement Mitsotakis doit ainsi se résoudre à annuler la convocation à Athènes pour le 21 septembre d'une conférence qui aurait dû réunir des représentants de la Grèce, de la Bulgarie, de la Serbie et de la Roumanie, tous Etats de religion orthodoxe, pour discuter de l'évolution politique de la Yougoslavie. Si la Grèce parvient, en décembre, au sommet de Maastricht et au Conseil des ministres qui l'a suivi, à faire accepter certaines conditions préalables à la reconnaissance internationale de tout Etat issu de l'ex-Yougoslavie, il convient d'observer que ses partenaires européens vont rapidement s'affranchir des règles ainsi posées pour reconnaître l'indépendance de la Croatie, de la Slovénie puis des autres anciennes républiques Yougoslaves.

La position isolée de la Grèce

La politique balkanique de la Grèce, depuis 1992, se heurte à celle des autres pays européens. Ceux-ci, en effet estimant qu'il faut détruire les derniers vestiges du communisme en Europe centrale vont pousser à la décomposition de la Yougoslavie. Ainsi ils ont pensé que l'émergence de républiques indépendantes permettrait de mettre un terme définitif à la présence au pouvoir de dirigeants communistes, tardivement convertis à la social-démocratie ou même au libéralisme. Au lieu d'essayer de maintenir l'unité de la fédération yougoslave les grandes puissances européennes se sont au contraire efforcées de faire éclater le pays difficilement unifié par Tito. Le fait est que cette stratégie a été vouée à l'échec, les anciens dirigeants communistes yougoslaves, comme le serbe Milosevic, ont renforcé leurs positions en jouant la carte du nationalisme.

La Grèce, qui a participé, depuis le siècle dernier, à de nombreuses guerres balkaniques, a estimé pour sa part qu'il fallait sauvegarder l'équilibre des Balkans et en particulier les structures étatiques de la Yougoslavie. C'est ainsi

que le diplomatie héllénique a considéré que la Bosnie et la FYROM [5]constituent deux Etats difficilement viables. C'est pourquoi Athènes a été la dernière capitale européenne à établir des relations diplomatiques avec Sarajevo; elle s'efforce aussi de soumettre à d'indispensables conditions la reconnaissance du régime de Skopje.

Il serait vain d'expliquer uniquement par une solidarité de pays orthodoxes, ou d'Etats autrefois alliés sur le plan militaire les relations d'amitié de la Grèce avec la Serbie. En fait le gouvernement héllénique considère que Belgrade constitue un élément incontournable de toute solution de la crise de l'ex-Yougoslavie. Il fait donc tout pour éviter que le dialogue de la communauté internationale avec la Serbie ne soit interrompu. Mais marginalisée au sein de l'Union européenne, la Grèce est aussi isolée face à ses voisins du nord, avec lesquels elle entretenait, il y a encore peu, des relations suivies et souvent amicales.

III. L'AXE ANKARA - SKOPJE - TIRANA

La Grèce entretient avec la Turquie depuis 1974 un lourd contentieux : la question chypriote, les problèmes de souveraineté en mer Egée, le sort du patriarcat oecuménique de Constantinople. Mais depuis quelques années une nouvelle source de tension entre Athènes et Ankara a été créée autour du statut de la minorité musulmane en Thrace grecque. La Convention de Lausanne de 1923, qui avait prévu un échange de populations entre la Grèce et la Turquie ne s'est pas appliquée à la minorité turque de Thrace. En effet le gouvermenent grec souhaitait, moyennant cette concession, que les citoyens héllènes habitant Istanbul puissent y demeurer. Les Turcs de Thrace estimés à 106 000 en 1934 sont aujourd'hui 120 000. Ils disposent d'établissements scolaires, de journaux et de mosquées. La Turquie, au début des années quatre-vingt, a posé le problème de la minorité turque de Grèce en invoquant les difficultés que celle-ci rencontrerait. Le gouvernement d'Athènes, pour sa part, a contesté le fait que la minorité musulmane de Thrace subirait des pressions administratives, en soutenant que celle-ci n'avait jamais cherché à émigrer, ainsi que le prouve son évolution démographique. Alors qu'à l'inverse la quasi-totalité des deux cent mille Grecs vivant encore en 1923 à Istanbul avait dû se résigner par la suite à se réfugier en Grèce, compte tenu de la permanence des mouvements anti-héllèniques existant en Turquie. La désignation aux élections législatives de 1989 et de 1990 de deux députés musulmans, qui au Parlement grec s'exprimaient ouvertement au nom des intérêts de la Turquie a conduit à une modification de la loi électorale, que devait condamner le gouvernement turc [6].

La Grèce accuse aujourd'hui la Turquie non seulement d'agiter la minorité musulmane de Thrace mais encore de contribuer à la détérioration de ses relations avec ses voisins au point qu'il est possible d'affirmer que s'est constitué

au détriment d'Athènes un véritable axe Ankara-Skopje-Tirana.

Le bras de fer avec Skopje

Par referendum du 8 septembre 1991 les électeurs de la FYROM ont approuvé l'indépendance de leur Etat, que s'est empressée de reconnaître la Turquie, prête à lui fournir aide et assistance.

Après les élections du 10 octobre 1993, qui marquent le retour au pouvoir du PASOK, la question macédonienne est entrée dans une nouvelle phase. Alors que le gouvernement Mitsotakis avait accepté, après l'admission,le 8 avril précédent, de la FYROM à l'ONU, que des négociations s'engagent avec Skopje sur l'appelation définitive de la Macédoine yougoslave indépendante, le gouvernement du PASOK décide de ne pas poursuivre ces négociations.

Athènes a estimé que les pourparlers avec le gouvernement de la FYROM étaient interminables et sans issue. Fin décembre, quelques jours avant que la Grèce n'assume la présidence de l'Union européenne pour le premier semestre de 1994, la France et l'Allemagne, suivies par d'autres pays européens décident de reconnaître "de jure" la FYROM. Athènes a alors considéré que ces initiatives étaient inamicales à son égard.

Le 16 février 1994, la Grèce, invoquant les menaces que la FYROM faisait peser sur elle, décide, en s'appuyant sur l'article 224 du traité de Rome, de fermer ses frontières avec cet Etat. Le blocus économique [7], ainsi imposé à Skopje, a été dénoncé par la Commission européenne, qui estimant que cet acte est en contradiction avec l'article 113 du traité de Maastricht et décide de poursuivre le gouvernement grec devant la Cour de justice de Luxembourg [8]. La Grèce, tout en soutenant que la fermeture de ses frontières ne constitue pas un acte illégal, puisqu'elle considère que sa sécurité est en danger, compte tenu des agissements de Skopje, laisse entendre qu'elle pourrait assouplir son attitude en cas de geste de bonne volonté de sa voisine.

Il semble donc qu'un compromis sur la question macédonienne puisse être finalement trouvé sur les trois points faisant l'objet de litige : l'appelation de la FYROM, l'emblème figurant sur son drapeau représentant l'étoile à seize branches de Vergina et les articles de sa constitution relatifs aux "Macédoniens de l'étranger". Il n'en demeure pas moins que cette question macédonienne, qui est devenue depuis plusieurs années le problème numéro un de la Grèce a affaibli sa position internationale et lui a fait comprendre la fragilité de la solidarité européenne, qui semblait lui être due.

La crise gréco-albanaise

La chute du régime communiste en Albanie a entraîné en 1993 une détérioration des relations entre Athènes et Tirana. D'une part le gouvernement grec a

pris fait et cause pour la minorité héllénique vivant dans le sud de l'Albanie dont les droits ne seraient pas respectés [9]. Il a en particulier protesté contre l'expulsion le 25 juin d'un prêtre orthodoxe grec accusé par les autorités albanaises d'avoir fait circuler des publications nationalistes. D'autre part la Grèce s'inquiète de la présence sur son territoire de trois cent mille Albanais, pour la plupart réfugiés clandestins, en quête d'un emploi.

Les expulsions périodiques de milliers de ces clandestins sont dénoncées par Tirana, qui y voit une politique de réprésailles à son égard. Désavouée par certains membres de l'Union européenne, qui désapprouvent la procédure expéditive et collective des expulsions entreprises, la politique albanaise de la Grèce a reçu, en revanche, au cours de l'été 1993 le soutien du président Eltsine [10]. En avril 1994 un violent incident de frontière [11] ayant provoqué la mort de deux militaires albanais a conduit Tirana à saisir le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU afin de faire condamner la Grèce pour "acte de terrorisme" et "grave violation de la souveraineté de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Albanie". Niant toute responsabilité dans l'accrochage à la frontière albanaise, le gouvernement grec a proposé une normalisation, qui a été acceptée, de ses relations avec l'Albanie. La Grèce estime que le harcèlement de l'Albanie à son égard s'explique non seulement par la volonté du gouvermenent de Tirana de dissimuler les graves problèmes qu'il rencontre sur le plan intérieur par des initiatives injustifiées sur le plan international mais aussi par le soutien actif d'ordre financier et militaire que lui accorde la Turquie.

L'axe Ankara-Skopje-Tirana, constitué à l'encontre d'Athènes, est d'aurant plus efficace que les relations gréco-bulgares autrefois exemplaires, se sont relâchées depuis le spectaculaire rapprochement de Sofia avec la Turquie, à la suite de la chute du régime de Jivkov.

VI. LA STRATEGIE BALKANIQUE DE LA GRECE

Pour faire face aux dangers pesant sur l'intégrité de son territoire et sur ses intérêts dans les Balkans le gouvernement grec a mis au point une stratégie fondée non seulement sur le renforcement de sa politique de défense, et l'utilisation de l'arme diplomatique, mais aussi sur l'élargissement dans la région de son influence économique et financière.

Le renforcement de la politique de défense

La doctrine militaire grecque définie le 17 décembre 1984 par M. Papandréou indiquait que l'ennemi n'était plus au nord mais se trouvait à l'est désignant ainsi clairement la Turquie. Près de dix ans plus tard, présentant son programme de gouvernement devant les députés le 23 octobre 1993, celui-ci insistait sur "la défense de l'indépendance nationale et de l'héllénisme". Ainsi était indiqué que les menaces sur la Grèce provenaient non seulement de l'est mais aussi du nord,

la Turquie constituant toujours l'adversaire désigné.

Le gouvernement du PASOK, poursuivant l'action de son prédécesseur, a renforçé la politique nationale de défense en accroissant le potentiel militaire du pays au nord du territoire et en réaffirmant la politique d'alliance de la Grèce.

C'est ainsi qu'en juin 1994, le ministre de la défense, M. Arsenis, a annonçé la création d'un corps spécial de police chargé de la surveillance des frontières, placé sous la tutelle du ministère de l'Ordre public mais agissant en liaison avec l'état major des armées [12]. Il a aussi précisé que tous les appelés effectueraient au cours de leur service une période de six mois dans les zones frontalières de la Grèce ou dans les îles [13].

D'autre part le gouvernement Papandreou a fait ratifier par le parlement hellénique le traité d'adhésion de la Grèce à l'Union de l'Europe occidentale (UEO) conclu, le 2O novembre 1992 par M. Mitsotakis, et qui constitue le bras armé de l'Union européenne.

Il est vrai vrai qu'Athènes ne pourrait invoquer la solidarité des autres Etats membres du traité de Bruxelles, en cas d'agression de la Turquie, ainsi que le prévoit l'acte d'adhésion. Mais la Grèce, en revanche, pourrait bénéficier, du concours des autres membres de l'UEO en cas de conflit armé provoqué par l'Albanie, la Bulgarie ou la FYROM.

Pour affirmer la signification de son effort de défense, la Grèce, depuis octobre 1993, en collaboration avec la République de Chypre a déterminé la conception d' "un espace militaire unifié" commun aux deux pays. Selon cette politique de défense Athènes et Nicosie décident d'unir leurs efforts pour faire face à toute intervention militaire de la Turquie, qui occupe déjà depuis 1974 plus d'un tiers du territoire chypriote.

Toutefois la Grèce n'a aucune intention belliqueuse à l'égard de ses voisins de la péninsule balkanique. C'est pourquoi pour éviter toute implication militaire de sa part dans cette région, la Grèce a refusé d'envoyer des troupes en ex-Yougoslavie dans le cadre de la force de paix de l'ONU alors que la Turquie s'est empressée, bien au contraire d'y expédier un contingent.

Les armes de la diplomatie grecque

Pour faire prévaloir sa politique balkanique, la Grèce s'est attachée à user les armes que lui offrait sa diplomatie. D'une part elle décide de s'appuyer sur les Etats-Unis bien que l'action de ce pays a été très longtemps considérée par elle comme défavorable à ses intérêts et d'autre part elle s'emploie à utiliser toutes les prérogatives que lui confèrent son appartenance à l'Union européenne.

Peu après sa désignation comme premier ministre, M. Mitsotakis,se rend à Washington. Visite d'une importance particulière puisqu'il s'agissait de la première qu'effectuait dans ce pays un premier ministre grec depuis 1964.

Les retrouvailles avec les Etats Unis ont été couronnées par la conclusion de l'accord du 8 juillet 1990 sur le nouveau statut des bases américaines en Grèce. Engagées le 11 janvier 1988 les négociations entre Athènes et Washington, que le gouvernement Papandréou n'avait pu conclure, visaient à renouveler l'accord du 8 septembre 1953, initialement prévu pour une période de cinq ans et plusieurs fois reconduit depuis. Le nouvel accord ne maintient que deux bases principales et les vingt bases auxiliaires existant antérieurement.

La campagne présidentielle américaine de l'automne 1992 a été l'occasion pour la Grèce et le puissant lobby grec des Etats- Unis de faire pression sur la politique balkanique de Washington. De fait tant le président Bush que le candidat B. Clinton se sont alors engagés à aligner la position de leur pays à l'égard de la FYROM sur celle définie par les Européens. Ainsi la Grèce a t-elle obtenu une certaine neutralité américaine dans la dispute l'opposant aux autorités de Skopje.

Le nouveau gouvernement Papandréou, formé en octobre 1993, a poursuivi la politique de rapprochement avec les Etats-Unis pratiquée par son prédécesseur. A telle enseigne qu'on a pu croire que M. Papandréou, par un revirement radical de ses orientations antérieures en était arrivé à préférer les Américains aux Européens. Le fait est que la Grèce, tout en célébrant l'amitié retrouvée avec les Etats-Unis, n'entend pas pour autant renoncer à tous les droits que lui accorde son statut d'Etat membre de l'Europe communautaire.

Très favorable au traité de Maastricht, Athènes a toutefois subordonné sa signature de ce traité à l'acceptation de son adhésion à l'UEO envisagée sans enthousiasme par certains Etats européens. Ainsi l'Allemagne a cru devoir exprimer des réticences à l'intégration de la Grèce dans l'UEO, notamment pour manifester son mécontentement à l'égard de la politique héllénique à l'égard de l'ex-Yougoslavie, jugée par elle trop conciliante envers Belgrade.

Usant de son droit de veto la Grèce, périodiquement bloque l'octroi d'une aide financière de l'Europe des douze à la Turquie, incompatible selon elle avec l'occupation par ce pays d'une partie importante de la République de Chypre, Etat associé à l'Union européenne et qui a vocation à en devenir membre.

En juin 1994 alors qu'Athènes assumait la présidence européenne a été repoussée, sur son initiative, une aide de 35 millions d'ECU sollicitée par Tirana. La Grèce a, en effet estimé que la situation des libertés publiques dans ce pays était critiqué et qu'y étaient violés les droits de l'importante communauté héllénique.

Athènes mène aussi un combat, d'arrière garde, il est vrai, dans différentes enceintes internationales et a pu ainsi jusqu'à présent s'opposer à l'entrée de la FYROM dans la CSCE.

Toutefois le meilleur terrain pour la Grèce d'assurer son influence dans les Balkans n'est pas le champ militaire ou la scène internationale mais est consti-

tué par le domaine de l'économie et des finances.

La drachme et les Balkans

La monnaie grecque, la drachme, qui a perdu environ 8% de sa valeur par rapport aux monnaies européennes en 1993 et qui ne participe pas au SME, est considéré comme une devise forte dans plusieurs pays des Balkans. Au point qu'il est possible de parler de zone drachme. La transition difficile vers l'économie de marché, en particulier en Bulgarie et en Albanie a permis à la Grèce de prendre dans ces Etats des parts de marché. Thessalonique, capitale de la Macédoine grecque, constitue le fer de lance de cette offensive dans les Balkans.

C'est en Bulgarie que la présence économique de la Grèce est la plus visible. De nombreuses banques et entreprises industrielles et commerciales helléniques ont installé des succursales à Sofia et dans les principales villes bulgares. De 1991 à 1993 les exportations grecques vers la Bulgarie, ainsi que le montre le tableau ci-dessous, ont été multipliées par trois.

Exportations grecques en Europe centrale et orientale
(en millions de dollars)

	1991	1992	1993 *
Roumanie	84,8	107,4	73,9
Bulgarie	87,8	167,2	227,3
Albanie	12,2	41,3	95,4
Ex-Yougoslavie	159,9	90,5	140,4
Pologne	74,9	71,2	40,6
Ex-Tchécoslovaquie	46,1	62,4	40,9
Hongrie	36,6	35,6	29,2
Ex-URSS	88,0	124,7	164,2

* période janvier-octobre 1993
Source du tableau TO VIMA, (hebdomadaire grec) 13-2-1994

L'Albanie est le second pays visé par l'économie hellénique. D'une part les travailleurs albanais en Grèce, en situation légale ou clandestine, envoient dans leur pays d'origine des produits grecs et une bonne partie de leurs salaires en drachmes. D'autre part, il y a un commerce entre les deux pays en expansion accélérée au bénéfice de la Grèce.

La FYROM jusqu'à l'embargo établi par le gouvernement héllénique était aussi un pays dépendant étroitement, d'un point de vue économique de la Grèce, qui se trouve ainsi pénalisée par la fermeture des frontières qu'elle a cru devoir imposer à cet Etat.

A l'heure actuelle la Grèce développe une politique balkanique qui n'est comprise, faute d'une politique suffisante de communication ni de ses partenaires européens ni de ses voisins. Et beaucoup estiment à Athènes qu'il est difficile aujourd'hui d'être Grec. Mais la Grèce, Etat le plus prospère et le plus stable des Balkans, possède de nombreux atouts pour jouer à moyen terme dans cette zone si sensible le rôle d'une véritable puissance régionale.

NOTES

1. Voir **Le Figaro** des 8-9 janvier 1994

2. Le pacte balkanique prévoyait aussi son extension aux autres Etats de la région. Mais cette extension ne se réalisa pas étant donné les rapports difficiles des trois pays signataires avec certains de leurs voisins.

3. M. Caramanlis avait aussi invité l'Albanie, qui alors étant hostile à toute idée de coopération multilatérale, a décliné l'invitation du premier ministre grec.

4. Dans une déclaration du 28 août 1987 le gouverneent grec indique que "l'Albanie n'est plus tenue pour un Etat ennemi" et abroge la loi sur l'état de guerre promulguée en 1940 au moment du conflit gréco-italien. Cette initiative d'Athènes a ainsi permis à Tirana de s'associer à la coopération interbalkanique.

5. FYROM: Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine.

6. Pendant longtemps les députés musulmans de Thrace ont appartenu aux grands partis politiques grecs, PASOK et Nouvelle Démocratie. Aux élections législatives de 1989 et 1990 les députés musulmans ont été élus sur leurs propres listes. L'obligation d'obtenir au moins 3% des voix au niveau national imposée par la nouvelle loi électorale, a empêché aux élections législatives du 10 octobre 1993 la désignation de députés musulmans indépendants des grands partis.

7. Ce blocus économique se traduit par l'arrêt des échanges commerciaux depuis le port de Thessalonique, notamment des produits pétroliers. (voir le Monde du 18-2-1994).

8. Trois cents intellectuels grecs le 7 mars 1994 dénoncent l'embargo contre la FYROM. En revanche le 20 avril, le compositeur Mikis Théodorakis a approuvé cette mesure suggérant même que la Grèce quitte l'Union européenne si celle-ci devait persister à s'opposer à la politique d'Athènes à l'égard de Skopje.

9. Cette minorité comprendait 400 000 personnes sur trois millions d'habitants selon Athènes et seulement 60 000 selon Tirana.

10. En visite a Athènes, le 1er juillet 1993, peu après l'expulsion par les autorités albanaises d'un prêtre orthodoxe grec, M. Eltsine a indiqué qu'il soutenait la position du gouvernement grec envers Tirana.

11. Un commando, dont les membres portaient des uniformes grecs a attaqué de nuit un centre d'entraînement de l'armée albanaise.

12. Voir le quotidien grec **Kathimerini** du 1.6.1994.

13. Voir **Kathimerini** du 15.1.1994.

LES MEILLEURES INTENTIONS L'EX-RÉPUBLIQUE YOUGOSLAVE DE MACÉDOINE FACE À LA GUERRE DANS LES BALKANS

Gilles Bertrand *

ABSTRACT

Is there a Macedonian nation ? The fact is that by calling "Macedonia" their country, the rulers of Skopje are trying to build a Nation State on the Jacobin-Bonapartist french model (unitary state).

But, the choice of the name "Republic of Macedonia" doesn't take into account the multi-ethnic character of the Former Yougoslav Republic of Macedonia, (FYROM). One has to underline that the tension between Slavo-Macedonians and Albanians living in this country is a reality.

Paradoxically, the crisis between Athens and Skopje, far from having provoked the political instability of the FYROM, has reinforced the authority of Mr. Gligorov. However, we must question the capacity and will of the Skopje leaders to go ahead with the democratization of their country and with the integration of the Albanians and other minorities.

RESUMÉ

Y a t-il une nation macédonienne ? Le fait est qu'en appelant "macédonienne" leur nation et en nommant leur Etat "Macédoine", les dirigeants de Skopje tentent de construire un Etat - nation sur le modèle jacobin-bonapartiste français (Etat unitaire).

Mais le choix du nom "République de Macédoine" ne tient pas compte du caractère multi-ethnique de la FYROM (ancienne république yougoslave de Macédoine). Et force est de constater que la tension est réelle entre les Slavo-Macédoniens et les Albanais vivant dans ce pays.

Paradoxalement la longue crise entre Athènes et Skopje, loin d'avoir provoqué une instabilité politique de la FYROM a renforçé l'autorité de M. Gligorov. Toutefois on doit s'interroger sur la capacité et la volonté des dirigeants de Skopje de mener à bien la démocratisation de leur pays et l'intégration des Albanais et des autres minorités comme citoyens à part entière.

Devenue indépendante le 8 septembre 1991 mais reconnue - sous un nom provisoire [1]- le 7 avril 1993 par les Nations Unies, la Macédoine anciennement yougoslave est la seule des républiques de l'ex-Yougoslavie à n'avoir pas été touchée par la guerre.

Contrairement à ce qu'ont écrit nombre de journalistes occidentaux, la non-reconnaissance puis la reconnaissance sous un nom provisoire n'ont apparemment pas mis en péril cette république. En revanche, une reconnaissance sous le nom «République de Macédoine» adopté par le Parlement de Skopje pourrait s'avérer plus problématique pour ne pas dire conflictuelle. Ce nom est refusé par la Grèce ainsi que par une partie des Albanais de la république. De plus l'intégrité du territoire est contestée par les Serbes qui estiment que le nord du pays

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est historiquement serbe.

Face à cette menace serbe et à l'intransigeance du gouvernement grec, les autorités de Skopje affirment avoir les meilleures intentions à l'égard de tout le monde: respect des frontières et non-ingérence à l'égard de la Grèce, coexistence avec la Serbie et la Bulgarie, respect du droit des minorités, notamment celui des Albanais, recherche de partenariat économique en direction de l'Allemagne et des États-Unis mais aussi de la Turquie.

Les dirigeants de la Macédoine ex-Yougoslave auraient ainsi toujours suivi la voie de la sagesse: en tentant de sauver la Fédération yougoslave avec les dirigeants bosniaques contre les projets slovènes de décentralisation et contre les projets serbes de centralisation; en se retirant de la Fédération pour ne pas se retrouver en tête-à-tête avec la Serbie et le Monténégro; en se soumettant ensuite aux amendements à la Constitution demandée par la Commission Badinter afin d'obtenir la reconnaissance de la Communauté européenne.

Sagesse, pacifisme et tolérance, telle est l'image du gouvernement de la Macédoine ex-yougoslave dans les médias occidentaux. Tout irait pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possibles si le danger d'une guerre à la fois internationale et civile était véritablement écarté.

Nous allons tenter de montrer pourquoi la querelle sur le nom et plus largement sur l'identité «macédonienne», le statut des minorités et le contentieux avec la Serbie - ces deux derniers éléments découlant du premier - peuvent faire craindre l'éclatement d'un nouveau conflit, au sud de l'ex-Yougoslavie cette fois.

I. UNE NATION «MACÉDONIENNE» ?

La question de l'identité «macédonienne» est éminemment complexe. Pour les Grecs, il est évident que la Macédoine est la patrie d'Alexandre le Grand et que si ce nom doit être revendiqué de façon exclusive par un État contemporain alors «La Macédoine est une et elle est grecque» [2]. Cependant, la Macédoine n'est aujourd'hui qu'une région au sens géographique du terme mais sans population homogène. Elle a été divisée, au nom du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes et de considérations géopolitiques, entre trois États au traité de Bucarest en 1913. On doit donc parler de la Macédoine comme on parle des Alpes ou des Balkans... C'est-à-dire comme d'espaces territoriaux sans unité politique.

Tout le problème est qu'il existe une population qui revendique une identité nationale spécifique liée à cet espace territorial. Cette population est certes considérée comme serbe par les uns, comme bulgare par les autres. Nous n'entrerons pas dans le détail des querelles entre historiens bulgares, grecs, serbes ou slaves de Macédoine. Nous préférons constater, avec Marie-Claude Smouts et Bertrand Badie, que «l'analyse sociologique ne peut pas isoler objectivement

des communautés culturelles, parce qu'elle ne peut pas déterminer à quel niveau une collectivité sociale est réputée culturellement significative, c'est-à-dire suffisamment distincte et autonome des autres pour s'imposer comme souveraine et se revendiquer comme nation (...) aussi les cultures relèvent-elles de l'ordre du fluctuant, du mobile, de l'instable (...) c'est pourquoi la sociologie invite davantage à raisonner en termes de construction nationale, de stratégie nationaliste et d'idéologie de la nation qu'en termes d'identité ou même de peuple, notion d'usage courant, mais dont on doit admettre les incertitudes accompagnant son usage»[3].

L'«idéologie de la nation» «macédonienne» est née, à partir des années 1870, lorsque le Sultan autorisa les Bulgares à créer leur Église autocéphale, l'Exarchat. Les Bulgares tentèrent de rallier à l'Exarchat les Slaves de Macédoine dont ils considéraient les dialectes comme des branches de la langue bulgare. Dans cet espace très montagneux qu'est la Macédoine - et particulièrement la Macédoine septentrionale - ceux des habitants ne parlant ni serbe, ni grec, ni bulgare, ni roumain, ni albanais communiquaient non pas dans une langue mais dans plusieurs dialectes, plus ou moins proches les uns des autres, plus ou moins proches des langues citées ci-dessus et déjà codifiées à cette époque. De cette volonté de différenciation par rapport aux nations déjà constituées et aux langues nationales déjà codifiées, naquit l'Organisation révolutionnaire intérieure macédonienne (ORIM ou VRMO) en 1893. Certes, on m'objectera que la «stratégie nationaliste» de l'ORIM n'a pas toujours été très claire vis-à-vis de la possible «bulgarité» des habitants slaves de Macédoine, «bulgarité» revendiquée par Sofia: «l'ORIM était alors financée et armée par Sofia»[4] indique l'historien Georges Castellan. Mais la constitution d'un «Comité Suprême Macédonien» (1895) ouvertement pro-bulgare signifie que l'ORIM paraissait suspect au gouvernement de Sofia, c'est-à-dire trop peu bulgarophile. Le soutien de la population slave de Macédoine est difficile à évaluer, toujours est-il qu'il permit à l'ORIM de déclancher l'insurrection de la Saint Élie (Ilinden) le 20 juillet 1903 puis de renaître de ses cendres après l'échec de cette insurrection, les deux guerres balkaniques et la Première Guerre mondiale.

La création de la République fédérée yougoslave de Macédoine en 1946 enclencha un processus - officiel - de «construction nationale». Si ce processus n'est peut-être pas achevé aujourd'hui (un tel processus peut-il l'être un jour ?), l'existence d'une élite intellectuelle se disant «macédonienne», d'une langue codifiée, l'identification comme telle de la population slave (non compris les minorités telles que la minorité serbe) ont fait dire à l'historienne bulgare (et conseillère du président Jelev) Antonina Jelyazkova que «La République de Macédoine a connu des évolutions complexes, mais mettant en évidence la formation d'une nouvelle ethnie. C'est sans doute regrettable pour les Bulgares, les Grecs et les Serbes, mais c'est ainsi»[5].

Lors des premières élections libres de 1990, l'ORIM, reconvertie en parti politique, obtint 22% des voix et l'ex Ligue des communistes de Macédoine (l'Alliance social démocrate de Macédoine)20,4%. Or ces deux partis, les premiers du pays, revendiquent - ils ne sont pas les seuls - l'existence d'une «nation macédonienne». Ceci montre bien que les électeurs slaves de Macédoine (non Serbes) acceptent, et plus encore revendiquent, leur statut de nation à part entière.

II. LE PROBLEME DU NOM

Cependant, si elle se dit «macédonienne», cette nation peut légitimement revendiquer tout le territoire de la Macédoine (donc la Macédoine égéenne qui est grecque et la Macédoine du Pirin qui est bulgare). En appelant «macédonienne» la nation et en nommant leur État «Macédoine», les dirigeants de Skopje tentent de construire un État-nation sur le modèle jacobino-bonapartiste français (État unitaire). Par conséquent, ils considèrent tous les autres peuples du pays comme des minorités, ce qui est explicité dans la Constitution[6].

Le raisonnement «nous sommes Macédoniens et notre république s'appelle la Macédoine» apparaît dès lors en complète contradiction avec les déclarations du président Kiro Gligorov à la presse française: «fonder un État sur l'ethnie est une grande bêtise»[7] ou encore «l'État ethnique est une menace de guerre perpétuelle»[8]. M. Gligorov a beau jeu de refuser l'appellation de «République slave de Macédoine» «inadéquate en raison du caractère multiethnique du pays»[9]: ceci signifierait accepter de ne plus s'appeler «macédonien» mais «slavomacédonien»[10]. Le choix du nom «République de Macédoine» ne tient en effet pas davantage compte du "caractère multiethnique du pays» puisque les «Macédoniens» sont différenciés des Albanais, des Roms, des Turcs, etc.[11]

III. L'ENJEU DE LA MINORITÉ ALBANAISE

Peu importerait que les déclarations pleines de sagesse du président Gligorov à la presse occidentale [12] soient en contradiction avec la réalité constitutionnelle, me dira-t-on, si le droit des minorités est respecté. Le droit des minorités - tel qu'il est défini par les Conventions internationales - est certes respecté à en croire le Rapport de la Commission Badinter et le Rapport Mazowiecki[13]. Il reste que, dans les faits, les Albanais (20 à 40% de la population selon les estimations) sont très faiblement représentés à tous les niveaux de l'administration (1% des effectifs de la police, 7,5% de ceux de l'armée en 1992), même si le gouvernement Crvenkovski formé le 5 septembre 1992 compte 5 ministres albanais. Selon un collaborateur de Radio Free Europe, Hugh Poulton, «the two mains communities of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians have little communicationn with each other»[14].

Plusieurs éléments incitent à penser que la tension est réelle entre Slavomacédoniens et Albanais: des incidents entre les deux communautés ont fait 4 morts le 6 novembre 1992 dans le quartier albanais de Skopje. On peut aussi se demander pourquoi les autorités de Skopje ont déclaré à la mission des Nations Unies envoyée sur place du 28 novembre au 3 décembre 1992 qu'en cas de conflit au Kosovo et d'intervention albanaise, les «forces [albanaises] devraient passer par la Macédoine, puisque ses communications routières avec le Kosovo la traversent»[15]. Ceci est inexact dans la mesure où, dans ce cas précis,les troupes albanaises auraient avantage à emprunter la vallée du Drin[16] qui traverse la frontière albano-kosovare plutôt que de tenter de passer par la région nord-ouest de la Macédoine ex-yougoslave, région qui est celle du massif du Mont Sar...

Il faut souligner les contradictions rapportées par le Rapport de la mission de l'ONU entre la position des autorités et celle de la communauté albanaise: «le Président [Gligorov] a indiqué que la situation interne était stable. Les problèmes d'ordre ethnique étaient traités par la voie du dialogue et de la négociation»[17] mais «lors d'une rencontre avec le maire et l'adjoint au maire de Debar, localité située à l'ouest sur la frontière albanaise, il est apparu que des tensions ethniques existaient dans cette région où des Albanais essayant d'entrer illégalement en Macédoine avaient été tués par des soldats macédoniens»[18]. Contrairement aux autorités, «le représentant du Parti de la prospérité démocratique, le principal parti à prédominance albanaise, a indiqué qu'il ne voyait nullement le besoin d'une présence des Nations Unies sur la frontière albanaise car l'origine du conflit se situerait non pas dans cette direction mais au nord»[19]. Le rapport de la mission des Nations Unies illustre ainsi la méfiance des dirigeants (slavomacédoniens) de Skopje envers les Albanais.

Cette méfiance peut s'expliquer par la crainte de se voir entraîner dans un conflit albano-serbe qui éclaterait au Kosovo. Elle peut également s'expliquer par l'hostilité des orthodoxes des Balkans, donc des Slavomacédoniens, à l'encontre des musulmans (cette hostilité dont les médias nous parlent tant). Les Slavomacédoniens pourraient craindre de voir la population albanaise atteindre la parité numérique avec la population slavomacédonienne, voire à la dépasser: les Albanais ont en effet des taux de natalité record en Europe. Si le taux de natalité était de 1,7% en 1989 en République yougoslave de Macédoine, ce taux cache les différences existantes entre les Slavomacédoniens d'une part dont on peut penser que le taux de natalité avoisine celui de la Serbie (1,17% en 1989) ou du Monténégro (1,51%) et les Albanais d'autre part. Le taux de natalité en Albanie est de 2,47%, il est de 2,77% au Kosovo (peuplé à 90% d'Albanais), et on ne voit pas pourquoi les Albanais de la Macédoine ex-yougoslave auraient un comportement démographique différent alors qu'il s'agit souvent, par delà des frontières, des mêmes familles.

En outre, les Albanais sont acusés de participer activement aux différents trafics (armes, drogue, cigarettes, faux papiers, fausse monnaie,...) dont la Macédoine semble en passe de devenir le centre[20]. Les incidents du 6 novembre 1992 auraient d'ailleurs été provoqués par une opération de police contre la mafia albanaise[21].

Les revendications autonomistes des Albanais sont à prendre en considération. Les 11 et 12 janvier 1992, un référendum non officiel organisé par les partis politiques albanais a eu un large succès: 90% des électeurs albanais de la Macédoine ex-yougoslave ont participé au vote et 99% d'entre eux ont voté en faveur de l'autonomie. Mais autonomie ne veut pas dire indépendance. Les Albanais de Macédoine ex-yougoslave ne sont pas les Serbes de Bosnie. A l'instar des Albanais du Kosovo, ils n'ont pas manifesté, jusqu'à présent, l'intention de faire progresser leur revendication par la violence ou la menace de sécession pure et simple. A cet égard, l'organisation clandestine «Armée de tous les Albanais» découverte en novembre 1993 au sein de l'armée de la république a sans doute été constituée dans un but offensif (dans le cas d'un conflit serbo-albanais) ou dans le cadre d'un «rééquilibrage» du pouvoir des deux principales communautés (slavomacédonienne et albanaise) de la république. On pourrait expliquer de la même façon l'accroissement de la proportion d'Albanais dans l'armée (de 7,5% à 26% des effectifs de juillet 1992 à juillet 1993).

La principale revendication des Albanais reste l'accès au statut de deuxième nationalité de la République de macédoine ex-yougoslave au lieu de leur actuel statut de minorité parmi les minorités. Il est vrai qu'avec un effectif de 430 000 à 600 000 personnes (selon les estimations), les Albanais ont un tout autre poids démographique que les Turcs (97 000 recensés en 1991), les Roms (50 000) ou les Serbes (44 000 en 1991, peut-être 22 000 depuis le départ de l'armée «fédérale» yougoslave), surtout pour un pays qui compte un peu plus de 2 millions d'habitants.

Revendiquant ce statut de deuxième nationalité[22], les Albanais ne sont pas, loin s'en faut, toujours d'accord avec le nom - constitutionnel - de «République de Macédoine» donné à leur pays. Après avoir rencontré le leader du parti de la Prospérité démocratique, Nevzat Halili, Hugh Poulton rapporte que: « their position is that if there has to be a new name, then an ethnically neutral name[23] - for example, the Central Balkan Republic or the Vardar Republic - would be the most appropriate. In any case, they insist to be consulted first»[24]. Des propositions à première vue très acceptables pour le gouvernement grec !

Le rêve d'une «grande Albanie» ne hante donc apparemment pas les membres de la communauté albanaise. Nevzat Halili semble ainsi être en parfait accord avec Ibrahim Rugova (président élu de la "République du Kosovo" non reconnu par Belgrade) mais aussi avec le président albanais Sali Berisha: adoption d'un profil bas et non-violence. Ceci explique que les Albanais se soient réfugiés

dans une politique d'abstention et de repli plutôt que d'une contestation radicale (boycottage du référendum sur l'indépendance mais aussi du recensement, abstention lors du vote de la constitution par le Parlement).

IV. TOUS CONTRE L'ORIM ?

Cependant, le Parti pour la prospérité démocratique (17 députés)[25] ainsi que le Parti populaire démocrate (également albanais, 5 députés), participent au gouvernement actuel [26]. On peut s'interroger sur ce paradoxe apparent: rejet de la Constitution et participation au gouvernement moins d'un an après. La participation des Albanais au gouvernement peut avoir deux origines: soit les partis au pouvoir ont cherché à intégrer les Albanais dans le système politique en leur proposant de contribuer par eux-mêmes à la promotion sociale de leur communauté; soit il s'est agi, pour les uns et les autres de contrecarrer l'ORIM sur le plan politique. Les deux explications sont sans doute aussi vraies l'une que l'autre, l'ORIM tenant régulièrement des discours anti-albanais.

Reconstituée en parti politique le 17 juin 1990, l'ORIM-PDUNM (Organisation révolutionnaire intérieure macédonienne - Parti démocratique pour l'unité national macédonienne) revendique 150 000 membres et a envoyé 38 députés au Parlement à l'issue des premières élections libres de 1990. C'est ainsi le premier parti de Macédoine ex-yougoslave. Albanais, anciens communistes slavomacédoniens (de l'Alliance sociale démocrate macédonienne et du Parti socialiste macédonien)[27] et "libéraux" (ex-fédéralistes du parti de l'ancien Premier ministre fédéral Ante Markovic)[28] sont condamnés à s'entendre s'ils veulent empêcher l'ORIM-PDUNM d'accéder au pouvoir.

Car l'ORIM n'a pas plus changé de discours qu'elle n'a changé de nom depuis les années 1920. Elle revendique le nord de la Grèce et la région bulgare du Pirin. Le leader actuel de l'ORIM, Ljupco Georgievski, interrogé par une chaîne de télévision française[29], considère que des minorités «macédoniennes» vivent non seulement en Grèce et en Bulgarie mais en Albanie également. Il dit espérer à ce sujet une «réunification». Son parti édite des cartes englobant les trois Macédoine dans un seul et même État...ayant Skopje pour capitale bien sûr!

Des dissensions ont cependant éclaté au sein de l'ORIM: 3 de ses députés ont fondé un parti nommé Ilinden[30]_ Démocrates libres- et un autre député siège désormais sous l'étiquette ORIM-Parti démocratique. «Internally, the IMRO-DPMNU is split between pro-bulgarian and a faction that espouses an Independent Macedonia»[31] remarquait Hugh Poulton en juin 1993. L'ORIM - soeur ou concurrente ? - reconstituée en décembre 1990 en Bulgarie prône, elle, le rattachement de la Macédoine ex-yougoslave à la Bulgarie. Elle a donc accueilli très fraîchement la décision du président bulgare Jeliu Jelev de reconnaître la «République de Macédoine» sous ce nom, bien qu'il se soit abstenu de

reconnaître l'existence d'une nation "macédonienne".

L'ORIM (de Skopje comme de Blagoevgrad) a-t-elle (ou plutôt: ont-elles) renoncé au terrorisme des premiers temps ? Rien n'est moins sûr. Des dirigeants de l'ORIM de Blagoevgrad ont déclaré qu'ils devraient réagir, y compris par la force, au cas où leur gouvernement reconnaîtrait une nation "macédonienne"[32]. Quant à l'ORIM de Skopje, Xavier Raufer et Franéois Haut révèlent qu'elle aurait mis en place un "comité de sécurité" paramilitaire de 100 000 militants[33]. L'ORIM a d'ailleurs été inscrite sur la liste des organisations terroristes par le State Département des États-Unis en 1991.

Autre fait intéressant, les contacts de l'ORIM avec des organisations slavomacédoniennes aux États-Unis, au Canada, en Australie mais aussi en Allemagne. Si l'on parle volontiers de lobby grec dans ces mêmes pays, le lobby slavomacédonien n'est pas non plus à négliger. Il s'agit là d'un véritable réseau transnational dont l'action vise, bien sûr, à faire reconnaître la «République de Macédoine» sous ce nom. Si l'importance numérique de ces groupes est difficile à évaluer - la Canadian Macedonian Society affirme quant à elle que «there are more than 10 000 Canadians of Macedonian descent» - la majorité de ces personnes d'origine slavomacédonienne sont originaires de la Macédoine égéenne. Ils ont émigré de la Libération à la fin de la Guerre civile pour la plupart d'entre eux, ce qui peut expliquer d'une part le fort sentiment d'appartenance à la nation slavomacédonienne (c'est une émigration relativement récente) et d'autre part le succès des idées expansionnistes de l'ORIM auprès d'eux. Ce succès est attesté par les documents émanant de ces associations: la Canadian Macedonian Society ne craint pas d'affirmer que «the Republic of Macedonia has existed for almost 75 years. It was established as a result of the diplomatic settlement at the end of World War One», ce qui traduit soit une énorme méconnaissance de l'Histoire, soit l'intention de "vieillir" la «République de Macédoine» dans l'espoir de lui conférer une légitimité historique plus importante. La Communauté macédonienne de Paris-Association culturelle orthodoxe Saint Clément d'Ohrid n'a pas hésité à envoyer une télécopie à Antonis Samaras, alors ministre des Affaires étrangères, à Bruxelles, pour lui expliquer que Philippe II de Macédoine n'était pas grec...On imagine la réaction de M.Samaras à la lecture de cette télécopie !

Pourtant, les liens entre ces groupes et associations avec l'ORIM sont souvent difficiles à établir. La position du gouvernement - Kiro Gligorov en tête - ne diffère en effet guère de celle de l'ORIM sur la question des origines historiques des Slavomacédoniens.

La position officielle est un mélange d'arguments fournis par les historiens slavomacédoniens à l'époque du régime communiste et de discours apaisant lorsque l'interlocuteur est occidental. Sous Tito, les historiens slavomacédoniens se sont évertués à construire une identité "macédonienne" depuis

l'Antiquité. Donnant ainsi une légitimité "historique" à la création de la République fédérée de Macédoine par Tito, ils ont par là même fourni des arguments à l'ORIM d'aujourd'hui. C'est pourquoi on retrouve dans la bouche des uns et des autres, de Ljupco Georgievski à Kiro Gligorov, la même version de l'histoire des Slavomacédoniens. Il me semble inutile de revenir sur la revendication slavomacédonienne concernant Philippe II et Alexandre de Macédoine. Il faut pourtant noter que cette revendication est rejetée lorsque l'interlocuteur est occidental, ce qui en dit long sur les "certitudes" qu'auraient les Slavomacédoniens à ce sujet. Ainsi Petre Mitev, Délégué général de l'ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine en France me déclarait-il en juin 1993: «nous sommes un pays slave. Nous n'avons rien à voir avec les Macédoniens antiques. Ce sont les Grecs qui affirment que nous disons cela». Derrière lui, sur le bureau, était posé le drapeau rouge orné du Soleil de Vergina (un symbole... des «Macédoniens antiques» !)

Le choix du Soleil de Vergina pour orner le drapeau de la République nouvellement indépendante est lui-même significatif de l'état d'esprit qui règne au sein de la classe politique du pays: l'ORIM-PDUNM proposa de mettre sur le drapeau le lion qui figure déjà sur le drapeau bulgare. Voyant là une manoeuvre visant à attirer la république dans le giron de la Bulgarie, les formations politiques gouvernementales imposèrent le Soleil de Vergina au cours d'un vote au parlement. Ce choix devait être ensuite interprété par les Grecs comme une provocation. En réalité, ce choix permettait de contrecarrer une fois de plus les plans de l'ORIM tout en ne brusquant pas ses partisans, le symbole choisi étant considéré par les uns et les autres comme patrimoine de la nation "macédonienne". Il peut alors sembler paradoxal que les députés albanais aient voté en faveur d'un symbole renforçant l'équation "République de Macédoine = État-Nation des (Slavo)Macédoniens". Il faut y voir, là encore, une manifestation de la volonté des Albanais de ne pas jouer la politique du pire, donc celle de l'ORIM. Ljupco Georgievski, le leader de l'ORIM-PDUNM ne manque, lui, pas d'aplomb lorsqu'il déclare à Christophe Chiclet à propos de cette affaire: «nous avons choisi ce symbole [le Soleil de Vergina] sous la pression de notre diaspora, mais sans aucune arrière-pensée. Les Grecs ne se sont insurgés que dix-huit mois plus tard. S'ils avaient protesté dès le début, nous aurions choisi le lion»34.

V. KIRO GLIGOROV ENTRE DEUX FEUX ?

A la lecture de cet article, on pourrait être tenté de croire que le président Gligorov est "pris entre deux feux", entre des Albanais qui revendiquent le statut de nationalité à côté des Slavomacédoniens et l'ORIM-PDUNM, parti slavomacédonien le plus puissant et ultranationaliste. Le discours présidentiel aux médias occidentaux en contradiction avec la réalité constitutionnelle n'aurait-il pour seul objectif que de maintenir l'équilibre entre Slavomacédoniens et

Albanais ? Kiro Gligorov est-il ainsi le garant de l'unité de son pays ? C'est tout au moins ce que semblent penser les gouvernements et les journalistes occidentaux.

On rappelle souvent la carrière de Kiro Gligorov (né en 1917), carrière qui ferait de lui un homme politique chevronné: résistant, membre du gouvernement provisoire à la Libération, Secrétaire général du gouvernement fédéral yougoslave (1945-1947), professeur d'économie à Belgrade, membre puis Vice-président du Comité éxécutif fédéral (1962-1969) et enfin président de l'Assemblée de la République yougoslave de Macédoine (1974-1978), membre du Comité central de la Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie. D'où sa sagesse et sa modération affichée. Chose assez curieuse, les observateurs occidentaux ne se posent aucune question au sujet de cet ancien communiste titiste alors que Tito lui-même est accusé d'avoir creusé la tombe de la Yougoslavie et que les autres dirigeants ou politiciens ex - ou néo-communistes d'Europe de l'Est sont sévèrement critiqués pour leur politique économique immobiliste (Roumanie), suspectés de vouloir restaurer «la dictature du prolétariat» (Russie) ou mis à l'index pour avoir substitué une idéologie ultranationaliste à leur idéologie communiste (Serbie). Kiro Gligorov et les partis anciennement communistes qui le soutiennent (Alliance Social démocrate macédonienne et Parti socialiste macédonien[35]) se sont certes engagé sur le chemin de la privatisation, reste que la démocratisation du pays est encore à peine amorcée [36]. On doit aussi se demander si l'ORIM constitue un adversaire ou un concurrent pour les partis gouvernementaux. Ces partis ont en effet voté la Constitution (qu'il a fallu amender pour se conformer aux critères de reconnaissance par l'Union européenne) avec l'ORIM-PDUNM contre les partis albanais. De plus, comme nous l'avons vu, le président Gligorov adhère pleinement à l'idée selon laquelle la "République de Macédoine" est l'État-nation des (Slavo) Macédoniens. Kiro Gligorov joue-t-il ainsi sur la fibre nationaliste, mais de façon plus habile et moins violente que Ion Iliescu en Roumanie, Slobodan Milosevic en Serbie ou Vladimir Jirinovski en Russie, tous anciens communistes comme lui ? Comment les anciens communistes slavomacédoniens ne pourraient-ils pas être tentés par cette voie, alors que leurs anciens "camarades" d'Europe Orientale l'ont suivi avec un certain succès et que le premier parti de leur pays est lui-même ultranationaliste ?

Les dirigeants de l'ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine ont certes manifesté les meilleures intentions du monde (et surtout de l'ex-Yougoslavie), ils ont tenu depuis le début de la crise yougoslave un discours étonnamment pacifiste qui contraste avec ceux des acteurs du conflit serbo-musulmano-croate. Ce discours a contrasté avec les déclarations beaucoup moins prudentes de la classe politique grecque, accusée d'être belliciste et ultranationaliste. L'habileté diplomatique du président Gligorov lui a permis d'apparaître comme l'homme providentiel aux yeux des Occidentaux, comme celui qui devrait assurer la stabilité

de son pays et la paix dans la région.

VI. L'INSTRUMENTALISATION DE LA RECONNAISSANCE

Ainsi, la longue crise avec la Grèce concernant la reconnaissance internationale du pays «aurait dû» causer la persistance de l'instabilité interne, c'est ce qui explique en partie le soutien des Occidentaux au président Gligorov. Pourtant, il faut se demander si, au contraire, cette crise n'a pas contribué à la stabilité du pays. En effet, «jusqu'au jour de l'admission de la République de Macédoine, toutes les forces politiques du pays se sont efforcées d'obtenir que ce pays soit reconnu comme sujet de droit international. Pendant ce temps, aucun changement radical ne s'est produit sur le plan intérieur, à l'exception de la chute du gouvrnement des experts et son remplacement par un gouvernement politique»[37]explique Liliana Kotevska.

Le processus de reconnaissance internationale a ainsi permis et permet encore au gouvernement de s'assurer du soutien de toute la classe politique, ORIM comprise. La crise avec la Grèce a "mis en veilleuse" la crise potentielle interne, notamment à propos du nom (contesté par la communauté albanaise) et de la question des relations avec la Bulgarie (posée par l'ORIM). Dès lors on perçoit mieux l'attitude de Kiro Gligorov dans les négociations, affirmant qu'il fait des concessions alors qu'il les refuse toutes (ainsi de son refus de la médiation française proposé par François Mitterand en 1992). Refuser les concessions c'est satisfaire son opinion publique et faire taire son opposition.

De plus le gouvernement pouvait se payer le luxe de ne pas faire de concession, de conserver son drapeau[38], dès la fin de 1992, dans la mesure où on peut considérer que la «République de Macédoine» a été reconnue de facto par l'ONU le 25 novembre 1992. A cette date, le président du Conseil de sécurité accepta la «proposition d'envoyer en Macédoine un groupe de personnels militaires, civils et de police» [39], proposition faite par le Secrétaire général, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, à la demande du gouvernement de «Macédoine». Or l'ONU ne reconnaît et ne dialogue qu'avec des États souverains lorsqu'il s'agit d'envoyer une mission voire des «casques bleus» sur un territoire. Dépêcher une mission à Skopje, rencontrer les membres du gouvernement signifient la reconnnaissance de l'indépendance du territoire sur lequel ledit gouvernement revendique sa souveraineté.

Par le vote de la Résolution 795 (10 décembre 1992) le Conseil de sécurité a décidé d'envoyer des «casques bleus» sur le «territoire macédonien»[40], ce qui renforça cette reconnaissance de facto. La reconnaisance de jure n'était alors urgente que pour permettre à la «Macédoine» l'accès aux institutions internationales. Cette reconnaissance est intervenue, sous le nom provisoire d'ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine, à l'ONU le 7 avril 1993 (Résolution 817). La Communauté européenne, le Fonds monétaire international et la

Banque européenne pour la reconstruction et le développement ont suivi.

Restait le problème du nom et du drapeau. Le gouvernement de la Macédoine ex-yougoslave pouvait se permettre d'attendre. Le seul vocable «Macédoine» est de toute façon déjà utilisé pour désigner cette république par les observateurs occidentaux. Une Encyclopédie Larousse parue fin 1993 n'hésitait pas, outre le «nom constitutionnel», à imprimer le drapeau rouge frappé du Soleil de Vergina (non reconnu par l'ONU). L'encyclopédie de l'Europe de François Joyaux, publiée par les éditions du Seuil (1993) et le Dictionnaire de géopolitique d'Yves Lacoste (Flammarion,1993) parlent eux aussi de «République de Macédoine» comme si de rien n'était.

Pourtant, bien que la survie de la «République de Macédoine» ne soit plus un problème pour les organisations internationales, le risque de guerre est loin d'être écarté dans le sud de la péninsule balkanique. Quoi qu'il doive demeurer en suspend tant que la guerre durera en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Ensuite, on peut malheureusement penser que les milices serbes se tourneront vers le Kosovo. La fin d'un conflit peut ainsi en générer un autre et il risque de se produire dans l'ex-Yougoslavie ce qu'il s'est produit dans d'autres conflits, à savoir que les vétérans d'une guerre, miliciens, mercenaires voire soldats de l'armée régulière démobilisée, incapables de se réadapter à la vie civile, partent s'engager dans d'autres conflits.

Quant à la soi-disante "menace" grecque, nous voyons mal le gouvernement grec se lancer dans une aventure militaire qui le mettrait au ban de l'Union européenne et de l'OTAN.

Notre interrogation porte donc sur la capacité et la volonté des dirigeants de Skopje de mener à bien la démocratisation et l'intégration comme citoyens à part entière des Albanais et des autres minorités. La présence de "casques bleus" américains sur le territoire de cette république pose également la question du rôle que pourraient jouer les États-Unis dans la région et dans le règlement du conflit. En tout état de cause, ce ne seront pas 300 "casuqes bleus", même américains, qui empêcheront les Albanais de Macédoine ex-yougoslave de se porter au secours des Albanais du Kosovo au cas où les Serbes seraient tentés d'y étendre leur politique de purification ethnique.

NOTES

1. Celui d'ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM)/Former yougoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

2. "H MAKEDONIA EINAI MIA KAI ELLHNIKH" proclame le slogan grec.

3. Bertrand BADIE et Marie-Claude SMOUTS, **Le retournement du monde, sociologie de la scène internationale**, Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques & Dalloz, 1992, p.42.

4. Georges CASTELLAN, **Histoire des Balkans XIVe-XXe siècle**, Paris Fayard, 1991, p.353.

5. **Le Monde** du 14 juillet 1992. Cette historienne a sans doute raison, reste que le nom de cette "nouvelle ethnie" pose encore problème.

6. Voir à ce sujet le **Rapport de la Commission Badinter**.

7. **La Croix**, 14 février 1992.

8. **Le Monde**, 27 octobre 1993.

9. Idem

10. Terme qui paraît plus approprié: ce peuple slave n'habite qu'en Macédoine, ce qui lui donne le droit de se qualifier ainsi, mais les autres nations habitant cet espace géographique peuvent également se dire "macédoniens".

11. Lire à ce propos le **Rapport de la Commission Badinter**: "dans les écoles où l'enseignement sera donné dans la langue de l'une des autres nationalités, le macédonien devra également être enseigné".

12. Voir aussi la presse canadienne au moment de la visite de Kiro Gligorov, fin janvier 1992 et notamment The Ottawa Citizen, 28 janvier 1992.

13. Tadeusz MAZOWIECKI, "La situation des droits de l'homme dans le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie". **La Nouvelle Alternative**, no 3O, juin 1993: p.54-61.

14. Hugh POULTON, "The Republic of Macedonia after UN recognition", **Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Report**, 2 (23), 4 juin 1993, p.26.

15. ONU: **Rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine**. 9/12/1992: p.4.

16. Route M25-17 reliant Shkoder en Albanie à Prizren au Kosovo en passant par le poste-frontière de Vrbnica.

17. Idem, p.5.

18. Idem.

19. Idem, p.6.

20. Xavier RAUFER et François HAUT, **Le chaos balkanique**, Paris: La Table Ronde, 1992: "c'est notamment à Skopje, en l'absence à peu près totale de toute police ou gendarmerie, que s'organise le contournement de l'embargo décidée par les Nations Unies à l'encontre de la Serbie", p.15O.

21. Stefan TROEBST, "Macedonia: Powder Keg Defused?", **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report**,3 (4), 28 janvier 1994, p.38

22. Ce qui ne les obligerait plus, entre autres choses, à apprendre le slavomacédonien, parlé par un peu plus d'un million de personnes alors que l'albanais, à quelques différences près entre les trois communautés d'Albanie, du Kossovo et de Macédoine ex-yougoslave, est parlé par 4 à 5 millions de personnes.

23. Ce qui signifie que les Albanais eux-mêmes ne considèrent pas le nom de "République de Macédoine" comme ethniquement neutre, ce que voudrait faire croire le président Gligorov (voir note 7).

24. Hugh POULTON, "The Republic of Macedonia after UN recognition", **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report**, 2 (23), 4 juin 1993, p.25.

25. L'Assemblée nationale compte 120 députés.

26. Ces deux partis détiennent (en association) les portefeuilles des Finances, des Sciences, du Travail et des Affaires sociales. Ils comptent également un Vice-Premier ministre sans portefeuille.

27. Comptant respectivement 30 et 4 députés (un député de l'ASDM a fait défection, les Jeunesses du PSM ont un député).

28. Les Forces Réformatrices-Parti Libéral ont 16 députés après une temporaire scission de leur aile gauche.

29. Au cours de l'émission Géopolis, no 20, France 2, 13 février 1993.

30. Par référence à l'insurrection de la Saint Elie (Ilinden en slavomacédonien et en bulgare) de 1903.

31. Hugh POULTON, "The Republic of Macedonia after UN recognition", **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report**, 2 (23), 4 juin 1993, p.30.

32. Déclaration faite à Sylvie KAUFFMANN, "Macédoine, le rêve perdu des Bulgares", **Le Monde**, 12 décembre 1992.

33. Cd Xavier RAUFER et François HAUT, **Le chaos balkanique**, Paris: La Table Ronde, 1992, p.149. Ces auteurs citent l'entretien donné par le maire d'Ohrid à un journal de Skopje.

34. Christophe CHICLET, "Athènes et Skopje dans l'impasse macédonienne", **Le Monde diplomatique**, mai 1994, p.8.

35. L'ASDM dont est issu Kiro Gligorov est l'ancienne Ligue des communistes; le PSM regroupe d'anciens communistes réformateurs.

36. Lire à ce propos: Liliana KOTEVSKA, "La démocratisation macédonienne freinée par l'omniprésence des anciens communistes", **La Nouvelle Alternative**, no30, juin 1993:p.30-31.

37. Idem.

38. Drapeau qui est une invention récente.

39. ONU: **Rapport du Secrtaire général sur l'ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine**, 9 décembre 1992.

40. Idem, p.1

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EUROPEAN DIMENSION ASPECTS IN GREEK SCHOOLS THE STUDENTS' "VOICE " *

Leonidas Bombas **

RESUMÉ

Cette brève presentation se refère aux données préliminaires d'une étude pilote qui examine des "questions reliées à l'Union européenne", à partir d'un petit échantillon d'élèves Grecs du secondaire. De façon générale les élèves semblent être en faveur de l'intégration européenne tant au niveau individuel qu'au niveau collectif. Certaines reserves sont néanmoins exprimées. L'école grecque n'offre pas l'opportunité aux élèves d'en apprendre sur l'Union Européenne alors que le développement éducationnel en Grèce est affecté par ce qui se passe en Europe. La plupart d'entre eux disent avoir une connaissance très limitée sur l'Union Européene et tout ce qui lui est relié. C'est quelque chose que l'école grecque doit rectifier par le biais de l'enseignement formel et informel. En se basant sur ces données purement indicatives on a developpé quelques autres aspects de la "dimension européenne" et de son rapport avec l'école grecque d'aujourd'hui.

ABSTRACT

This cursive presentation reports on the preliminary findings from a pilot study investigating "European Union related issues" as perceived by a small sample of Greek secondary school students. On the whole, students seem to be in favour of pursuing European integration at both personal and collective (national) level, but several reservations are also recorded. The Greek school of today does not offer opportunities for students to learn about Europe, whereas educational developments in Greece are directly affected by the overall developments in the EU. The participants believe that the school should and could provide information and knowledge about the EU. The vast majority of the subjects state that they have a very limited knowledge about the European Union and all related issues/developments. Something that the Greek school should "rectify" via formal and informal teaching. On the basis of these purely indicative results, several important parameters of the rather ellusive "European dimension" issue and today 's school in the framework of the EU are further elaborated.

A. Setting the pace for a European dimension discussion

There is little doubt, nowadays, that the notion of European dimension in virtually every single aspect of our collective and personal lives has already become the "moto" of our European Union era. European dimension discussions and considerations of one or another kind are literally everywhere. One may even argue that, to a considerable extent, European dimension "talking" has become fashionable across Europe. In short, dealing with European dimension aspects may largely be considered as a highly "in" engagement and activi-

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ty, especially so among a relatively small group of experts and other individuals who make their living from such engagements.

From applied economics to politics, from socio-cultural concerns to defence/security and migration matters, and from external policy issues to education, training and employment/unemployment schemes and initiatives, the concept and the pursued objectives of European dimension are always present. Explicitly stated as such or implied and indirectly referred to, the notion of European dimension has become a de facto "ingredient" and, quite often, a prerequisite for many of our daily pursuits.

Expectedly so, at least for the time being, this apparent interest and involvement with European dimension considerations all over Europe has been registered mostly at a (rather) theoretical or the "talking" level, where the notion of European dimension is being meticulously scrutinized and explored. European dimension aspects in their plausible applied form continue to puzzle most interested parties. All pertinent literature on this matter across the Union member states and the multitude of personal experiences on the part of both experts and the so-called man in the street may serve as the best supportive documentation of the trend.

On the other hand, and this ought to be underlined from the very beginning of this presentation, the notion of European dimension has barely completed its "natural and necessary incubation" period in the context of a contemporary Europe striving to synthesize and construct its new (21st century) face. In that sense, then, the problems and the difficulties associated with European dimension aspects in every day (real-life) situations should be very well understood and appreciated.

Among others, the official "polyglot" documents of the European Commission and the detailed descriptions and references to the European dimension objective in all these publications are more than indicative. European dimension references and pursuits, explicitly stated as such or indirectly stressed and implied, seem to constitute the backbone of all European programmes and initiatives. A simple glance at EC publications - and more so at special publications concerned with education and training matters- may reveal a plethora of European dimension intentions, recommendations, goals, etc.(Commission of the European Communities, 1989; 1991a; 1991b) The perennial fight for securing European funds through the different EC programmes has definitely given European dimension an additional impetus and a rather "peculiar attractiveness". (Makrakis, 1993; Bombas, 1994)

Yet, definitional ambiguities about the actual and the precise meaning of the European dimension concept as well as about the exact - descriptive and/or normative- content of this highly publicized and cherished notion continue to prevail. Put differently, quite often and for a variety of legitimate reasons, different

people in the twelve member states (and not only) mean and understand different things when using the term or the objective "European dimension". The apparent relative recency of this Europen dimension notion at both the theoretical and the practical level (in light of all profound developments within the European Union) combined with the extremely significant consequences and the rather "subjective" nature of this notion, complicate things further. As a result, this definitional controversy is far from settled.

Notwithstanding all these definitional ambiguities, one may very well discern several commonalities among the Union members vis-à-vis the European dimension notion and its possible applications in the field of education.

Not surprisingly, as one may observe elsewhere, the overall meaning attributed to European dimension appears to depend substantially on each specific country concerned and the concrete goals pursued at each point in time. Accordingly, in very general terms, each member state portrays European dimension in such a way as to best fit and/or serve its own priorities and interests. In so doing, each member state "exploits" European dimension initiatives and opportunities according to its own relative power and influence within the European Union chessboard. If we take, for example, two of the principal aspects of the European dimension issue in education, namely of foreign language teaching and student/ teacher mobility across member states, it is crystal clear which foreign language(s) predominates and which country gets the "lion's share" in the different mobility schemes.

The most recent opening up and the enlargement/cooperation of the EU with other European countries (including the countries of Central/Eastern Europe) complicate further the European dimension ambiguity and controversy as described above. In addition, the ever-present inequality between the North and the South within the EU context at all levels, the so-called "two gears" of the less developed southern countries and those of the rich North, continues to play a higly significant role in any serious attempt to approach and understand European dimension in depth.

B. European dimension in education

Having said that, and bringing our discussion to the educational field which constitutes the central focus of this exploratory work, it seems appropriate at this point to place European dimension issues against the backdrop of Comparative Education theorizing and historical development.

Such a comparative perspective could highlight all relevant parameters of this European dimension phenomenon. Thus, the well- known Sadlerian theme of "national character" (Sadler, 1964) and its pervasive impact in moulding national systems of education may make its interpretive contribution in this

European dimension context. Each member state of the Union, through its unique national character, formulates its own version of European dimension that is to be "consumed" within and outside the education system. Virtually all Sadlerian "forces" (e.g. race, religion, language, culture, politics, economy) come into play every time a European dimension argument - of one or another kind - is being put forward.

Likewise, several other descriptive and/or explanatory constructs from the Comparative Education "repertoire" could provide additional theoretical ammunition in clarifying further and refining the European dimension "case". Among others, the monumental comparative works of Hans (1958), Newcombe (1977), Kazamias (1962), Mallinson (1966), King (1973), and Bereday (1967), although not dealing directly and as such with European dimension in education, are highly instructive "tools" when investigating European dimension aspects and concerns. In the final analysis, any approach to European dimension aspects in education entails some form of cross-cultural and comparative perspective, rendering thus Comparative Education methodologies and explanations imperative.

On the other hand, as argued throughout different relevant sources, European dimension in education has become (almost) by definition an interesting area of study for those delving into comparative education analyses and investigations across countries. A theme that has already started to make noticeable inroads throughout the pertinent literature. The present International Conference being the most tangible illustration of this highly desirable and promising trend. Among many others, Bouzakis (1993) and Vorberk (1992) have alluded to this trend through their most recent works.

Furthermore, an additional theoretical paradigm or "model" in the education field that has recently acquired some exceptional prominence among the experts, the so-called intercultural approach and learning (Damanakis, 1993; Ulvhammar & Jacobson, 1984), bears direct relevance to the European dimension notion in education. If nothing more, culture in its wider sense (Damanakis,1993) constitutes the central and decisive feature of both intercultural education and the European dimension aspects in education. Interculturalization of the entire school curriculum proposed by interculturalists within the multicultural and polyethnic Europe, for example, is indeed quite close to applying aspects of European dimension in the education systems of the EU.

With all these introductory remarks in mind and for the purposes of this present small-scale research, let us refer to the European dimension definition provided by the Commission of the European Communities in one of its latest publications dealing with Higher Education in Europe (1991: 28-43). Although this particular official document explores tertiary education issues and contemporary developments within a United Europe, the analogies, the similarities, and

the very essence of the European dimension for the education field as a whole are there.

Thus, in very short and purely descriptive terms, the framework that defines European dimension is the following :

- Student mobility within the Community ;
- Cooperation between institutions at European level ;
- Europe in the curricula ;
- The central importance of language ;
- The training of teachers ;
- Recognitions of qualifications and periods of study ;
- The international role of Higher Education ;
- Information and policy analysis ;
- Dialogue with the Higher Education sector.

Similar, more or less, definitions and pursued objectives of the European dimension in education may be found in most EU documents and publications. The most recently adopted programme in the field of education ("SOCRATES", 1994) that aspires to "cover" all levels of education (from primary school to University within the European Union - and not only) keeps stressing the same European dimension "ingredients": Student mobility, cooperation between schools, foreign languages, teacher training and the introduction of Europe in school curricula. In other words, awareness and knowledge about/for Europe constitute the cornerstones of European dimension in education. The extent and the degree to which present-day schools across Europe are in a position to successfully perform this European dimension "mission" in the meta-Maastricht era, that is another serious issue that needs serious, systematic and comparative undertakings (CEC 1993).

On the whole, these apparently obvious European dimension "ingredients" when it comes to the education field seem to characterize all talking and all writing about this important notion of our present-day era across Europe.

Educator after educator, researcher after researcher are continuously entering this European dimension discussion and dialogue. More so, educational planners and policy makers are keeping themselves alert in order to incorporate into their proposed reforms the most functional and most realistic European dimension elements. The differences among member states with respect to differential rates of emphasis, frequency, or depth vis-à-vis European dimension issues in education may very well be explored along the comparative education domain.

Thus the "Greek case", within the European dimension in education continuum, presents part of itself here as a concrete - however tentative and cursive-stimulus in this respect.

C. European dimension and Greek schools

Let us begin this particular section on European dimension and the Greek schools by a rather unusual and, perhaps, provocative reminder in the context of this exploratory empirical research.

It will not be very far from the truth if one argues that a relative "time-lag" characterizes Greece when compared to most of the other EU member states. An easily discernable time-lag that extends itself to matters of economic development, to science and research/technology, to welfare and pension plans, to environment and education - to name only a few crucial fields of socio-personal activities and developments.

For a plethora of historical, political, and several other reasons, the analysis of which lies well beyond the scope of this presentation, this relative "delay" of Greece tends to become something like a tradition. Numerous well-documented and absolutely well-meant references from virtually all fields and disciplines attesting to such a tradition, may be recorded within and outside the Greek bibliographic production. Yet, exaggerations and ill-founded hyperboles of this "Greek-tradition" have always been around by both Greeks and non-Greeks alike.

Thus, European dimension in education, aspects and parameters of which concern us here, seems to follow the same long tradition in the case of the Greek education arena in general, and the Greek schools in particular. European dimension concerns and ensuing considerations at the different levels of the Greek education apparatus have not attracted the attention of all those (officially and/or unofficially) charged with developing and moulding the Greek education system towards the 21st century (Mavrogiorgos 1993).

For better or worse, the conceptual difficulties characterizing the European dimension notion in the post-Maastricht era, the definitional ambiguities associated with the term itself as explained earlier, and the intra-European Union "power struggle" among the member states with respect to European dimension, have made the Greek "lag" even more pronounced and more accute. There is no doubt, that if one looks at the European South, Greece is not alone in this seemingly delayed route to European dimension avenue and its educational "ingredients" (Bombas 1994).

Nonetheless, in the midst of all these traditional and deep-rooted "Sissyphian" problems (Kazamias, 1993) characterizing the Greek education system since its establishment in 183O (Bouzakis,1985), things seem to have started to take a

rather positive turn over the last couple of years with respect to European dimension considerations. If nothing more, European dimension in education has already made its appearance in most agendas and discussions initiated by concerned educationalists and other experts in related fields. A growing number of specialized researchers have started to include European dimension variables into their research proposals along educational lines, whereas - quite often - active collaboration with non-Greek experts has started to enhance this latent interest. In short, nowadays in Greece, something "is moving " along the European dimension phenomenon in the education field. Pertinent literature is indicative and quite illuminating in this respect.

Expectedly, as most probably could be argued for the entire EU, this awakened interest for European dimension parameters and aspects in Greece limits itself - almost exclusively - to the interested experts in each field who, among others, strive to proclaim themselves specialists in European dimension matters.

Occasionally, this European dimension interest is also reflected in several Greek news-papers and other media agencies, a coverage which is, by definition, sporadic and fragmented. Thus, not only the average Greek continues to remain, principally, unfamiliar with the European dimension "repercussions" in the entire education field, but virtually all "school-related" people as well. The vast majority of teachers, of school principals, and the students do not seem to participate (yet?) in this European dimension dialogue. And that is, of course, a highly noticeable feature of Greek education even today. European dimension considerations continue to remain outside the school/classroom walls.

At any rate, several analyses and a number of empirical studies investigating European dimension related issues and the Greek schools have started to make thir presence felt.

Without delving into every single research and related analysis exploring European dimension issues and education in an attempt to portray the present "state of affairs" in Greece, a synoptic account of the trends may be quite illuminating and instructive. Although we do not refer directly to them at this point in time, it is more than certain that a number of additional studies on European dimension aspects and education are presently underway in Greek universities and other research institues. A growing number of international (joint) projects under the auspices and the funding of the EU - projects that involve Greek experts and Greek institutions /organizations -are also concerned with European dimension issues and the field of education in one form or another. And these are, definitely, quite positive and encouraging developments.

In short, as already mentioned above, European dimension considerations have - for good - come out of the "closet". The Greek Ministry of Education itself - this highly centralized and rigidly bureaucratic body resisting change and reform - has started talking about these issues, however reluctantly and superfi-

cially. Special Conferences and Seminars have been organized by both public and private institutions (Kakavoulis 1993) aimed at exploring in depth and with systematic scrutiny the entire range of European dimension related aspects and their plausible educational impact and relevance. All Departments of Education of the Greek Universities have already started including into their programmes special courses about different aspects of the EU, whereas European dimension references are gaining more and more ground in most teachers training departments. Greek academic reviews and magazines are now publishing papers and articles pertaining to European dimension in the educational field, and the Greek publishing houses have already produced several useful books along these lines.

Among others, the Greek Educational Society has dynamically entered this European dimension dialogue through its bi-annual international conferences and other collective activities and initiatives. Several papers presented during the 1991 international conference of the Society

("Education in the Intergrated Europe") are indicative of the trend (e.g. the papers presented by Vamvoukas & Kanakis ; by Troulis ; by Papoulia -Tzelepi).

Thus, Vamvoukas & Kanakis (1991) have investigated the knowledge and the opinions of future Greek teachers vis-à-vis the European Community, whereas Papoulia-Tzelepi (1991) looked at "The European dimension in the education of teachers : Needs and prospects". Along similar lines, Troulis (1991) has attempted to highlight the "main features in the training of the Greek teachers within a United Europe". Furthermore, in a more recent article, Papoulia-Tzelepi (1992) examined attitudes and expectations of university students towards Europe and concluded by stressing emphatically that: "The need for including European dimension aspects in university programmes/courses and especially so in the course of studies for training future teachers is obvious" (p.256).

Tsaoussis (199O) in his collection of papers on "The European Challenge in Higher Education" has elaborated on European dimension aspects in university studies in Greece, whereas Kakavoulis (1993) has devoted his most recent work on European dimension in education by combining empirical research findings (Greek teachers) and general theoretical observations. As a matter of fact his last chapter ("European dimension in Greek schools : A case study of experience") summarizes the main initiatives taken by the Greek State towards promoting European dimension in Greek schools, while several "Case Study Schools" are also presented. More so, Zafaras (1993) has concerned himself with European dimension aspects in the initial training of teachers in all twelve member states and has also analyzed teachers' in-service training in the framework of the European Union.

A number of additional publications (in Greek) which may be considered as dealing indirectly with European dimension related issues and education have become available over the last 5-6 years. Among them one could very well mention Zigos (1988 ; 199O) books on "The Educational Policy of the European Community" dealing with the official EC documents, and the "European Systems of Education and the Comprehensive (Common) School" where the author presents a comparative picture of several EC educating systems along with the historical development and the need for comprehensive schools across Europe - and certainly in Greece. Along the same lines, Markopoulos (199O) has presented a descriptive work on European systems of education and the educational policy of the European Community, making several direct and indirect references to European dimension aspects in education.

Yet the need for additional and, principally, empirical data on different aspects of European dimension related issues and the Greek schools of today is imperative.

This urgent need for primary and empirically collected data has been stressed time and again (Papoulia-Tzelepi, 1992; Vamvoukas, 1991). Not only by academics, educational researchers, and other experts of the scientific community, but by a growing number of "men in the street" as well who have started to become aware and sensitive about such issues in the post-Maastricht era.

It is consoling the fact that, even at a slow pace and somewhat reluctantly, most of the Greek teachers themselves have started entering this apparent plea for more and better knowledge about European dimension features. Their growing interest, no doubt, signals "something good" for the education system as a whole. In that sense, prospects are recently turning more and more promising to the extent that the teachers concerned do not get discouraged by the seemingly "slowness" of the official state.

The present small-scale empirical study, investigating indicative parameters and a limited number of European dimension related variables in a Greek secondary school, aspires to make a token contribution in this respect. Its principal aim is to serve as an additional (much needed) stimulus for continuing and broadening the European dimension dialogue in the education field by introducing into this current discussion the "voices" of the students themselves.

D. Recording the students' "voices"

i) the research

The present small-scale research attempted to explore several European dimension related issues by recording the responses of a small number of secondary school students. It was assumed that the individual items/questions making up the respective questionnaire that was administered to the students

(N=36) of the study bore relevance to European dimension features, as these features have been discussed in the preceeding sections of this presentation.

More specifically, on the basis of existing literature and the emerging discussions on European dimension related issues within the education field, it was assumed that a number of tentative answers to questions pertaining to "how I feel about the EU", "how much do I know about the EU", and "If and how much the school teaches /informs me about the EU" may provide an overall picture on the specific issue under consideration here, namely European dimension aspects and the Greek school through the "eyes" of the students themselves. There is no doubt that, to a considerable extent, how one feels about the EU depends substantially on how much he knows about the EU. And, how much one knows about the EU (and not only) depends, among others, on how much information and knowledge is being provided by the school - especially in the case of school - aged youngsters. In that sense, European dimension aspects and parameters are (or are not as the case may be) "cultivated" within both the formal and the informal school curricula.

Thus, the subjects of the study were asked to register their feelings and attitudes about the European Community and the European Union, their level of knowledge concerning different EU related themes and parameters, as well as their overall opinion about the contribution of today's Greek school towards promoting and strenghtening European dimension objectives and pursuits. Aspects of the relationship between the Greek education system developments and the developments within the EU in its entirety were also (partially) explored through some of the students' responses.

ii) the sample

The sample of the study consisted of 14 boys and 22 girls attending grade three of a public Lyceum (upper secondary school) located in the downtown Athens area. The educational level of the subjects' parents was as follows :

a) their fathers:

13.9% had completed primary school (6 years) only ;

8.3% had completed junior high school (9 years) only ;

22.2% had completed senior high school (12 years) only ; and

52.7% had post-secondary or university education.

b) The respective percentages of their mothers, per level of education completed, were: 19.4%, 11.1%, 19.4%, and 47.2%.

The results of the research

Section A on feeling and attitudes of the subjects about the EU and several related issues (five items) revealed an interesting picture.

It should be stressed that for only a relatively small percentage of the sample (36.2%) the highly publicized European citizenship appears to be a "good thing". Almost one out of five seemed to believe that such a citizenship in the framework of the EU will be a "bad thing", whereas 13.9% of the respondents opted for the "I do not know" answer. Interestingly enough, three out of four (75%) of the students expressed their support of the efforts that are being made towards achieving a United Europe. Yet another 19.4% were against ("almost against/very much against") such efforts (Table 1 ; and Table 2).

The "expectations" of the sample from the realization of the Single European Market were registered at the level of 41.7% ("many expectations" 27.8% ; "not many expectations" 13.9%) which appeared to be noticeably lower than the "fears" (50%) expressed either as "many fears" (33.2%) or as "not many fears" (16.7%). A total of 36.1% felt that the realization of the Single Market is going to be "something good for people like myself", whereas for 5.6% of the participants this development at European level is going to be "something bad for people like myself". The "neither good nor bad" (27.8%) option and the "I do not know" response (27.7%) in this particular question represented the larger segment of the sample. Only 22.2% of the students appeared to be optimists stating that "next year" is going to be a better year in the framework of the European Community. For 38.9% of the sample "next year" was expected to be worse (Table 3 ; Table 4 ; and Table 5). Section B of the responses codifying the "knowledge level" of the subjects revealed that a little more than four out of ten (41.7%) thought that they had satisfactory knowledge about EU related issues and matters. However the majority of the respondents (55.5%) opted for the "No" answer to this crucial question. Thus, the overall response pattern and the corresponding percentages of the above item appeared to be in line with the specific options to the following question, where 83,4% of the participants would like to "know more" about the structure, the function, and the different activities of the EU (Table 6 ; and Table 7).

Clearly, the central importance attached by the sample to the EU was reflected in the total percentage (72.2%) of the respondents who emphasized that the overall functioning/activities of the European Union influence the daily lives of all Greeks in general, and the daily life of "each of us separately" (table 8).

Questioned as to "who" should decide (the Greek government only by itself or jointly with the European Union) on several political issues/actions (questions that are usually included in the annual "European Barometer" questionnaire), the sample provided its own interesting "version" concerning these topics.

The specific items that registered over 50% through the students' responses in the "co-decision" option (jointly decided by the Greek government and the EU were: a) protection of the environmemt (80.6%) ; b) co-operation with the developing countries of the third world (69.4%) ; c) health and social protection

(50%); d) scientific and technological research (75%); e) external policy with respect to non-EU countries (55.6%). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the fact that the respective percentages or "who should decide" in the field of education were 44.4% for the Greek government and 47,2% for a "joint decision" (the Greek Government and the EU).

Finally, the exploration of education and school related issues (Section C of the questionnaire) in the framework of the EU as investigated in the present study has pointed to the following tentative results :

Fifty percent of the sample believed that all developments in the larger EU area do influence (positively or negatively) Greek educational "affairs". It is worth mentioning in this context the fact that a relatively high percentage (36.1%) of the students expressed their ignorance with respect to this particular question by opting for the "I do not know" answer (Table 11). Today's school in Greece "rarely" (38.9%) or "almost never" (55.5%) provides opportunities and the means for students to acquire some knowledge about EU activities and the different developments at a European level. Only 5.6% of the respondents felt that today's Greek school provides such opportunities either "frequently" or "sometimes". A particularly noticeable - if not alarming - finding on the eve of 2000 (table 9).

Nonetheless, 69.4% of the students felt that their classmates (and their agemates in general for that matter) "rarely" (58.3%) or "almost never" (11.1%) have adequate information and knowledge about the EU and its multitude of developments/activities (Table 10).

Almost unanimously (91.7%) the participants registered their strong belief that today's school has the obligation to provide information and relevant knowledge about the EU. But for a percentage of 72.2% of the students the Greek school (as operating today) is actually in no position to inform its population about EU issues and developments effectivelly. Only 16.7% of the sample appeared convinced that the school is able to carry out such undertakings successfully (Table 12 ; and Table 13).

One out of four of the respondents (25%) felt that there are several specific school subjects through which todays' Greek school could "initiate" its students to the EU activities and developments. For a total of 33.3% of the sample no such school courses existed. It should be noted in this context that a high percentage (38.9%) of the participants opted for the "no answer" response, an option that most likely bears its own significance in the framework of this exploratory research (Table 14).

E. Keeping alive the European dimension debate

All methodological limitations of the present small-scale research granted and in light of both conceptual and definitional ambiguities surrounding the notion of European dimension in education, the data collected here could serve as an instructive stimulus for further discussion. The "Greek case", as revealed in this context through the indicative voices of the students themselves who have delineated a series of specific European dimension aspects in today's Greek schools, deserves its own consideration in any comparative analysis of similar phenomena Europe-wide. Without claiming originality or generalizability across socio-cultural contexts, the results obtained pose some challenging questions to both theorists and - principally- policy makers concerned with European dimension and the schools in the E.U.

There is no doubt, whatsoever, that Greek students - as most likely many other youngsters all over the EU - have come to realize the "dual" status of Greece as both an independent state and as a member state of the EU. This relatively recent realization appears to gain more and more momentum anong the younger generations, even if their formal schooling continues to somehow evade and/or ignore all profound developments at a European level. Unfortunately, today's Greek school does not provide its students with this much-needed (and wanted) information about Europe. It is, perhaps, a bit too extreme to resort to such comments nowadays, but one is tempted to remind himself of the traditionally arteriosclerotic nature of the Greek school resisting change and adaptability to contemporary demands and priorities.

Attempting an overall summary of the entire data collected in the course of this highly tentative study, and reformulating the core of the central arguments for keeping the debate for European dimension and education alive, one may stress the following observations in a point form :

1. Greek students seem to be aware and cognizant of the central and decisive role of the EU vis-à-vis the Greek society in its entirety and education field in particular. The Greek Government is expected to co-decide and co-operate with the EU in several important domains/activities of public life, including education and technology.

2. However, reluctancy and, occasionally, fears and anxieties appear to "colour" the attitudes and the feelings of the Greek youngsters with regard to their prospects and their future life within a Single European Market, and within the EU where a European citizenship is proposed for all member states' citizens.

3. The students' knowledge about EU related issues is not at a level desired or wished. The Greek school shares great responsibility for this apparent lack of adequate information and knowledge.

4. Today's Greek schools should undergo several reforms and changes in their curricula so that they could be in a position to respond effectively and "narrow the information gap" with respect to European dimension related aspects and initiatives.

5. On the whole, it is clear that European dimension aspects are still "outside" the formal education system and the daily functioning of today's Greek schools. The students themselves express their interest in getting to know more about the EU and they seem prepared to support a more active involvement of their school in European dimension related developments and activities.

Undoubtedly future empirical research along similar lines, employing representative student population from all Greek schools and using more extensive and more sound methodological instruments, is in great need and urgency if we are to explore and unravel all relevant parameters of European dimension and education. This present "Greek case" delineated through the "voices" of the students themselves may be considered as a tiny - yet aspiring - contribution to this end of scrutinizing European dimension and education at both theoretical and practical terms.

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APPENDIX (Tables 1-14)

Table 1

The proposed (common) "European citizenship" for all country-members' citizens is :

	%
A good thing	36.2
A bad thing	19.4
Neither bad nor good	19.4
I do not know	13.9
Both good and bad	2.8
No answer	8.3

Table 2

Concerning the efforts towards a United Europe, I am :

	%
Very much in favor	13.9
In favor (almost)	61.1
Against (almost)	8.3
Very much against	11.1
I do not know	2.8
No answer	2.8

Table 3

The realization of the Single European Market gives me :

	%
Many hopes	27.8
Few hopes	13.9
Few fears	33.2
Many fears	16.7
I do not know	2.8
Both fears and hopes	2.8
No answer.	2.8

Table 4

For people like myself, the realization of the Large European Market will be :

	%
Something good	36.1
Something bad	5.6
Neither bad nor good	27.8
I do not know	27.7
Both good and bad	2.8

Table 5

As far as myself is concerned, I believe that next year (in the framework of the EU) will be :

	%
Better	22.2
Worse	38.9
The same	22.2
I do not know	16.7

Table 6

I believe that I have a satisfactory knowledge about EU issues and matters:

	%
Yes, I agree	41.7
No, I disagree	55.5
No answer	2.8

Table 7

I would like to know more things about the structure, the functioning and the different activities of the EU:

	%
Definitely, Yes	83.4
Not necessarily	8.3
I am not sure	8.3

Table 8

The overall functioning and the different activities of the EU do influence the daily lives of all Greeks and the daily life of each of us separately :

	%
Yes, I agree	72.2
No, I disagree	13.9
I do not know	13.9

Table 9

Today's Greek school and the school subjects provide opportunites for acquiring information/knowledge about EU aspects and developments :

	%
Yes, quite often	2.8
Sometimes (only)	2.8
Rarely (very)	38.9
Never (almost)	55.5

Table 10

My classmates and my agemates in general have a satisfactory knowledge and information about EU issues and developments :

	%
Always	5.6
Quite often	25.0
Rarely	58.3
Never (almost)	11.1

Table 11

All developments within the EU do influence (positively or negatively) the Greek "educational affairs" :

	%
Yes, I agree	50.0
No, I disagree	13.9
I do not know	36.1

Table 12

The (Greek) school has the obligation and it should provide (at least) some concrete information/knowledge about the EU :

	%
Yes, I agree	91.7
No, I disagree	8.3

Table 13

Today's Greek school is in a position and has the "means" to inform its students effectively for and about the EU :

	%
Definitely, Yes	16.7
Rather, No	72.2
I do not know	11.1

Table 14

There are specific school subjects through which today's greek school could introduce and "initiate" its students into EU aspects and developments:

	%
Yes, I agree	25.0
No, I disagree	33.3
I do not know	38.9
No answer	2.8

RECENSIONS/BOOK REVIEWS

DIMITRI C. CONSTAS AND ATHANASSIOS G. PLATIAS EDITORS, DIASPORAS IN WORLD POLITICS: THE GREEKS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, FORWARD BY JAMES ROSENAU, LONDON: THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD, 1993, XXI+ 239PP.

The term *diaspora*, from the Greek word meaning dispersion (its lexical meaning being planting seeds the traditional way), has been politically associated with the Jewish people following their dispersal from their homeland at the beginning of the first millenium. Today the term is a political one and means the dispersal of people, voluntarily or forcefully, from their place of origin and their presence amidst other peoples and cultures, some hostile, some not.

Diasporas have played a significant role throughout history. One need only mention the role of Greeks in the Roman empire and, just prior to the Renaissance in Europe, the role of Jews in the spiritual and artistic life of Central Europe in particular, the role of Greeks, Jews and Armenians in the administrative and commercial life of the Ottoman Empire, the Chinese and Indians in many parts of Asia and Africa and the Palestinians in the Arab World.

Diaspora communities, in the form of immigrant groups, have also played a vital role in the building of the new worlds of the Americas and of Oceania, though not without a high cost paid by the indigenous cultures, some of which were either wiped off the face of the earth or forced into a marginal existence.

The systematic study of diasporas as political non-state actors affecting international and domestic politics is in its infancy. One recent study other than the one under review edited by Professor G. Sheffer entitled *Modern Diasporas in International Politics,* is one of the first attempts to study diasporas as an international phenomenon. The few other studies done until now have focused primarily on the Jewish and to a lesser extend on the Armenian diaspora. This may be expected since these two groups have gone through horrendous genocidal experiences in the hands of the Germans and the Turks respectively. The predicament that befell these two ancient peoples, naturally begot a divergent form of literature, mostly introspective, but also political, the latter centering on their role as non-state actors in world politics.

The Greeks along with the Jews and the Armenians comprise the three archetypical world diasporas. But unlile the Armenians and especially the Jews, the Greeks as a diaspora have hardly been studied in a systematic way and especially as a political force in world politics. The current study, edited by professors D. Constas and A. Platias of the Panteion University of Athens, is a first attempt to do just that. Moreover the study is done in a comparative perspective and the current volume includes articles on the Jews and the Armenians.

The Constas-Platias volume resulted from an international symposium on the

importance of international diasporas organized by the Institute of International Relations of the Panteion University in Athens in May 1990.

The movements of people within Europe itself, in the aftermath of the upheavals that followed the end of the Cold War and prior to that, the ongoing flow of political and especially economic refugees from south to north, provides added importance to the study of diasporas since the phenomenon of compact ethnic groups that resist affiliation is now becoming worldwide with worldwide implications.

Besides being a comparative study of the Greek diaspora, the Constas-Platias volume is also an attempt to make sense of diasporas as non-state actors of international politics and, as such, it is a modest contribution to international relations theory. As James A. Rosenau, an acknowledged authority on international relations theory, notes in his foreword to the present volume, "it seems unimaginable" that the role of diasporas should not have a place in the analytical framework of international theorists (p.3).

The present volume is divided into four parts. In a joint analysis in Part One, Constas and Platias examine diasporas in the context of international theory, identify some problem areas and raise questions for further study. Part two, which forms the bulk of the study, includes contributions from notable scholars, mostly of Greek origin, that study the role and influence of diaspora Greeks in the United States and Canada, Australia and South Africa. There is heavy emphasis in this part on the mobilization, role and effectiveness of the Greek-Ameriacn and Greek-Canadian communities that followed the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. This mobilization climaxed with the Congressionally-mandated partial US arms embargo against Turkey (1975-1978). The embargo marked the apogee of Greek-American influence and the Greeks of North America have, as of yet, been unable to attain any comparable levels of success.

Two of the contributions in this part are particularly relevant for our times. One by Van Coufoudakis examines the "reverse influence" phenomenon, namely the attempt of Greek-Americans to align Greek foreign policy goals with American ones and not the other way around. The other is the contribution of N. Stavrou that provides insightful observations into the varied Greek-American community and the mechanical and patronizing way in which successive Greek governments have dealt with it without being able to utilize its true potential and, all too often, alienating the community to the disadvangage of Greece and Cyprus. Those in Greece and Cyprus who often talk about the almost metaphysical potential of the Greek diaspora and want to utilize it to counter forces hostile to Hellenism, ought to read this contribution and learn something from it before going, once again, on a wild goose chase of the Greek diaspora hoping for a miracle.

The third part contains contributions from notable international scholars who analyse the opportunities for ethnic groups to function effectively as well as their

restraints in pluralistic societies such as Canada, the US and Australia. In the fourth part, two well known students of Armenians and Jews, R. Hovannisian and G. Sheffer respectively, analyse the role of these two groups in influencing foreign policy and offer areas of comparison with the Greeks. The contribution of Hovannisian entitled "The Armenian Diaspora and the Narrative of Power" provides a fascinating account and an analysis of the power politics as well as the cynicism that permerted the US Congress when the American-Armenians tried but failed to obtain a resolution marking the 75th anniversary of genocide the Turkish committed against the Armenian people.

Diasporas in World Politics is a most welcome addition in an area where the dearth of information is the exception rather than the rule. For Hellenes in particular, this volume provides a much needed comparative perspective for scholars and policy makers alike. One hopes that this erudite publication will serve as an example and inspiration to other scholars to approach the study of diasporas and especially of the Greek diaspora, with the attention, evidenced in this work, that diasporas deserve.

Marios Leonida EVRIVIADES

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Contributors:

Dimitri Constas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in world Politics - An Introduction.*

Paul Watanabe, *Ethnicity and Foreign Policy: Greek-American Activism and the Turkish Arms Ban.*

Van Coufoudakis, *The Reverse Influence Phenomenon: The Impact of the Greek-American Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Greece.*

Nicolaos A. Stavrou, *The Hellenic-American Community in Foreign Policy Considerations of the Motherland.*

Andrew C. Theophanous and Michalis s. Michael, *The Greek Community and Australian Foreign Policy: With Particular Reference to the Cyprus Issue.*

Stephanos Constantinides, *The Role of the Greek Communities in the Formulation of Canadian Foreign Policy.*

Christos Theodoropoulos, *The Involvement of the Greek Community in South Africa in the Formulation of the Foreign Policy of Greece.*

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James Jupp, *Ethnic Groups in Australian Politics.*

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Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Armenian Diaspora and the Narrative of Power.*

Gabriel Sheffer, *Jewry, Jews and Israeli Foreign Policy: A Critical Perspective.*

GREECE, THE NEW EUROPE, AND THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER, HARRY J. PSOMIADES, STAVROS B. THOMADAKIS EDS., NEW YORK: PELLA, 1993, 442 PP.

This volume contains the papers presented at a conference jointly sponsored by the City University of New York - Center for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies (Queens college), the Center for European Studies (the Graduate Center of the City University of New York) - and the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM) of Athens, on May 1991. The papers are classified in three sections:

Part I: Culture, Politics and Society

Part I: The Economy

Part III: Defense and Foreign Policy

Eighteen experts in various fields such as culture, economics, sociology, politics and law have collaborated to produce this interesting publication.

The first section - Culture, Politics and Society - deals with the notion of identity, with the Greek participation in the European integration process, the situation of the Greek State since 1974 (subordination of the State bureaucracy to the party that assumes power) and the Greek culture in the new Europe. As one of the contributors to this volume has mentioned, the entry of Greece in the European Union "provides a final answer to the age-old question of whether Greece belongs to the West or to the East" (Arghyris Fatouros, p.23). In fact the present crisis in the Balkans revives the idea of an Eastern Greek identity related with orthodoxy and tradition, real or mythical, especially because of support from Europe to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.

The section on the economy deals with "Greece's position, prospects and responsabilities within the emerging European economic order from a variety of perspectives". (p.15) Greece has to solve a number of problems such as public deficit and inflation in order to fully participate in the economic and monetary union of the European Union. On the other hand, the Greek economy faces serious structural problems in a world of market integration. The country's economic relations are analysed not only from the point of view of the European Community but also from the one of countries of Eastern Europe. Also the Greek public sector (including the pension system and social security) is examined from the perspective of its competitiveness with public sectors in Europe.

There is no doubt that the second part of the volume on the economy is the most important.

The part on defense and foreign policy, refers to Greek-US relations, the

Cyprus problem with regard to the triangle Greece-Turkey and US, Greece and the Balkans and Greece and the European Community.

As the editors mentioned, Greece faces at this time - it was in 1992 when most papers were completed but it is also true today - " a critical period of lively debates and self-examination concerning its values, institutions, and place in the universe" (p.11). The end of the Cold War and the crisis in the Balkans with the triumph of nationalism pose a challenge to Greece. On the other hand relations with Turkey over the Cyprus question and the Aegean remain tense.

The debate over the national culture and identity in a time of globalization and integration, especially European integration, is very important for a small country like Greece. Greek culture and Greek identity are, if not in peril, in a situation of siege.

This volume provides comprehensive analysis of the challenges that Greece faces in this period of transition as a new international order arises, as the European Union is enlarging and as the zones of influence in the Balkans are redrawn.

Nevertheless a collective work poses some difficulties when the authors deal with so many issues. Indeed this volume focuses on so many different aspects of Greek life that it makes it difficult sometimes to pass from one subject to another; for exemple, from problems of internal order like institutions and society, bureaucracy, culture to problems of external order like relations with the US, Turkey, the European Union and the Balkans, or to problems touching both of them like the economy.

But *Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order,* has the advantage of presenting a global vision of Greece and giving an interesting account of what is going on in this country. From this point of view, the book is an interesting contribution towards the understanding of the Greek position in the new European and international order.

The editors stress that "the purpose of this volume is to provoke inquiry into the major issues and policy choices confronting Greece and the forces that will shape them in the post-Cold War era" (p.11). It is obvious from the different papers that they succeed in achieving this goal.

This book is also welcomed for another reason: its bibliography on Greece, a rather rare item that fills partially the vacuum.

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LIVRES REÇUS/BOOKS RECEIVED

Helen Nickas, Migrant Daughters, *The female voice in Greek-Australian prose fiction*, Melbourne, Owl Publishing, 1992.

Dimitris Tsaloumas reads a selection of his poems in Greek and English, edited by Helen Nickas, music by Costas Tsicaderis, introductions by John Barnes and Stathis Gauntlett, Melbourne, Owl publishing, 1994.

Re-telling the tale, Poetry and prose by Greek-Australain Women Writers, edited by Helen Nickas and Konstandina Doumis, Melbourne, Owl publishing, 1994.

Paris Arnopoulos, *Mediterranean 2000, A Systematic Study of the Regional Prospects in a Global Perspective*, Foundation for Mediterranean Studies, Athens, 1992.

William Anselmi and Kosta Gouliamos, Editors, *Mediating Culture, the Politics of Representation*, Toronto/Montreal, Guernica Editions, 1994.

ACTIVITES ACADEMIQUES /ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES

CONTACTS AVEC L'AUSTRALIE

Le Centre de recherches helléniques en collaboration avec l'Association des écrivains Grecs de Montréal a accueilli du 6 au 13 novembre Mme Helen Nickas, qui enseigne la littérature grecque moderne à l'Université de la Trobe à Melbourne en Australie. Mme Nickas était de passage au Canada dans le cadre de sa recherche sur les écrivains Grecs de la diaspora.

Pendant son sejour à Montréal, et sous les auspices du Centre de recherches helléniques, Mme Nickas a donné deux conférences sur les Grecs de l'Australie et en particulier les écrivains Grecs de ce pays, une pour la Commmunauté grecque à l'Association des travailleurs Grecs du Québec et l'autre à l'Université McGill. Elle a aussi rencontré des écrivains, des universitaires et des artistes avec qui elle a discuté de la situation de la culture grecque au Canada et en particulier de la littérature de la diaspora.

Par ailleurs sous les auspices du Centre de recherches helléniques elle a rencontré des universitaires et des écrivains Grecs d'Ottawa où elle a fait une brève visite.

Le Centre de recherches helléniques envisage toujours une collaboration plus étroite avec des universitaires et de chercheurs de la diaspora hellénique. La visite de Helen Nickas au Canada renforce nos liens avec l'hellénisme australien.

COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF THE RESEARCH INSTITUTES OF HELLENISM FORMED

First Conference to be Held in Nicosia in November 1995

Representatives of eleven social science research institutes having to do with various aspects of Hellenism in Greece, Cyprus, France, Australia, Canada, and the United States met in Athens last summer to discuss ways to advance closer cooperation. Also attending the meeting, on July 7, 1994, were representatives of the Greek and Cypriot foreign ministries.

During the meeting, which took place at the Intercontinental Hotel, the group decided to form a committee from among those present to foster this cooperation. It is called the Coordinating Committee of the Research Institutes of Hellenism (Syntonistike Epitrope Ereunetikon Institouton Hellenismou).

The Vryonis Center was represented at the meeting by its director, Dr. Christos P. Ioannides. Also participating were the secretary of the Hellenic Studies Forum in Melbourne, Australia, Demetra Egan, and the director of the Center for Hellenic Studies and Research in Montreal, Dr. Stephanos Constantinides, who

both took part in the three-day conference organized by the Vryonis Center on "Greeks in English-Speaking countries : Culture, Identity, Politics" in Sacramento, May 12-14, 1994.

Greek research centers in Athens were represented by Dr. Theodore Couloumbis, Dr. Yiannis Valinakis, and P. Voudouris of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP); Vassilis Konstantineas and Nikos Stylianides of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies; Dr. Yiannis Freris of the Institute for Research and Policy Strategy (INERPOST); George Spyropoulos of the Center for European Studies (EKEM); and Dr. Marios Evriviades of the Institute of International Studies, Panteion University.

In addition, Dr. John Hasiotis of the Institute for Balkan Studies (IMXA) in Thessaloniki took part. The Cyprus Research Center (KYKEM) in Nicosia was represented by Nikos Koutsou, and Dr. George Prevelakis of the Group for the Study of the Greek Diaspora, part of the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in Paris, also attended.

The Cypriot Foreign Ministry was represented by the director of the ministry's Diaspora Office, Platon Kyriakides, while the Secretariat for Diaspora Greeks of the Greek Foreign Ministry sent Christos Dimitriou.

KYKEM Serves as Ad Hoc Secretariat

The new Coordinating Committee decided that KYKEM would serve as the ad hoc secretariat for 1994-1995. The main objective of the secretariat will be to organize the first world conference of the Research Institutes of Hellenism in Nicosia from November 9-11, 1995.

KYKEM will be the host of the conference and will be assisted in this capacity by the Coordinating Committee. The working topic of the conference is "Hellenism in a global Village".

A conference of the Research Institutes of Hellenism will be held every other year, in odd-numbered years, and will complement the biennial conference on Greeks in English-speaking countries, which is held in even-numbered years.

The Vryonis Center will be coordinating Greek-American participation in the Nicosia conference. An announcement by the Center will be forthcoming as to the specifics of this conference.

The participants in the July meeting in Athens also discussed ways to link the research centers they represent through electronic networks.

The Coordinating Committee will convene a follow-up meeting in Athens in the fall of 1994 to finalize the program of the conference in Nicosia in November 1995.

(From the Vryonis Center News-letter/Fall 1994)

The Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research will be coordinating Greek-Canadian participation in the Nicosia conference.

THE CENTRE FOR HELLENIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH TAKES PART IN CONFERENCE IN CALIFORNIA

The director of the Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research, Dr. Stephanos Constantinides presented a paper at an international conference in Sacramento,California, on May 12-14, 1994. The conference, entitled "Greeks in English-speaking countries-Culture, Identity, Politics", was organized by the Sacramento-based Vryonis Centre for the Study of Hellenism.

The three-day conference, was cosponsored by the Hellenic Studies Forum, in Melbourne, Australia, in cooperation with the Hellenic Studies Institute of South Australia in Adelaide, and by the Department of Humanities and religious Studies at the California State University.

Dr. Constantinides' paper was entitled *"The "Greek Lobby" in Canada: The Role of the Greek Communities in the Formulation of Canadian Foreign policy"*. Dr. Constantinides analyzed the impact Greek Canadians have on the decision-making process concerning Canada's policies on the Cyprus problem and the Macedonian question. He said the Greek-Canadian "lobby" is not as effective as it could be because of poor organization and a lack of coordination, clear objectives, and leadership.

The Sacramento conference brought together academics, government officials, political figures, economists, lawyers, artists, clerics, authors, and journalists from U.S., Canada, Australia, England, Greece, and Cyprus to examine the challenges faced by Greek communities in anglophone countries and the strides made by them in a variety of fields.

The conference was opened by Dr. Christos P. Ioannides, director of the Vryonis Centre. Dr. Ioannides noted that the Greeks in English-speaking countries share common democratic values and institutions and that the cultural bond of Hellenism which unites the English-speaking Greek communities around the world is alive and is reflected in the unprecedented mass mobilization of the Greeks in those communities over the Cyprus and Macedonian issues.

The general subjects addressed at the conference were Greek Ethnicity and Culture in English-Speaking Countries; Hellenism and Greek Orthodoxy in the Diaspora : Towards Convergence or Divergence ? Education and Identity; Greek Diaspora Women in 1990s : Beyond the Kale Noikokyra (Good Housewife) Image ; Linkages Between the Diaspora and Greece; The Sense of "Greekness" in Literature and the Arts Among Diaspora Greeks; The Cyprus and Macedonian Issues, and Diaspora Political Activism; and Greeks in Politics in the United States and Australia.

The closing event of the conference was a reception and dinner for 400 people in honor of George Stephanopoulos, Senior Advisor to President Bill Clinton, at the home of Vryonis Center Trustee Angelo Tsakopoulos and his wife Sophia in

Sacramento. U.S. Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, who had spoken at the conference earlier in the day on the panel "Greeks in Politics in the U.S. and Australia", was also a guest of honor at the reception.

THE CENTRE FOR HELLENIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH TAKES PART IN CONFERENCE IN GREECE

The director of the Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research, Dr. Stephanos Constantinides presented a paper at an international conference in Komotini, Greece, on July 8-9, 1994.

The conference, entitled "Cultural Identity and a Strategy for Hellenism", was organized by the Athens-based Institute for Research and Policy Strategy (INERPOST). The president of the institute is Ms. Louka Katseli, who is also Special Economic Advisor to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou.The Scientific Director of INERPOST is Dr. Yiannis Freris.

A number of distinguished Greek academics, artists, and journalists participated in the conference, which was the first conference of its type to be held in Thrace. The Greek government was represented at the event by Minister of Education and Religious Affairs George Papandreou and Minister of Defence Gerasimos Arsenis. Both ministers addressed the conference at length.

Dr. Constantinides' paper was entitled *"Ethno-cultural Identity and Pluralism"*.

DOCUMENTS

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 550 OF 11 MAY 1984

The Security Council adopted by a vote of 13 in favour (U.S.S.R., People's Republic of China, United Kingdom, France, India, Egypt, Peru, Ukraine (S.S.R.), Upper Volta, Zimbabwe, Netherlands, Malta and Nicaragua), to one against (Pakistan) with one abstention (United States), resolution 55O (1984) on Cyprus. The resolution reads as follows : -

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in Cyprus at the request of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Having heard the statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/16519),

Recalling its resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983) and 544 (1983),

Gravely concerned by the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of resolution 541 (1983), namely, the purported "exchange of Ambassadors" between Turkey and the legally invalid "Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus" and contemplated holding of a "constitutional referendum" and "elections", as well as by other actions or threats of actions aimed at further consolidating the purported independant state and the division of Cyprus,

Deeply concerned by recent threats for settlement of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants,

Reaffirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 541 (1983) and calls for its urgent and effective implementation,

2. Condemns all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of Ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal,

3. Reiterates the call upon all states not to recognize the purported state of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" set up by the secessionist acts and calls upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity,

4. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus,

5. Considers attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations,

6. Considers any attempts to interfere with the status or the deployment of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus as contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations,

7. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the urgent implementation of Security Council resolution 541 (1983),

8. Reaffirms its mandate of good offices given to the Secretary-General and requests him to undertake new effforts to attain an overall solution to the Cyprus problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions for such a settlement laid down in the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution,

9. Calls upon all parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices,

10. Decides to remain seized of the situation with a view to taking, in the event of non-implementation of its resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution, urgent and appropriate measures,

11. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council as developments require.

RESOLUTION 789 (1992)

Adopted by the Security council at its 3140th meeting, on 25 November 1992

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 November 1992 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/24830),

Noting with satisfaction that the two leaders discussed all the issues in the Set of Ideas with the result that there were areas of agreement as noted in the report,

Welcoming the agreement by the two sides to meet again with the Secretary-General in early March 1993 to complete the work on an agreed Set of Ideas,

1. **Reaffirms** all its previous resolutions on Cyprus, including resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983), 550 (1984) and 774 (1992);

2. **Endorses** the report of the Secretary-General and commends him for his efforts;

3. **Reaffirms** also its endorsement of the Set of Ideas including the territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the report of the Secretary-General of 21 August 1992 (S/24472) as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement;

4. **Reaffirms further** its position that the present status quo is not acceptable and that an overall agreement in line with the Set of Ideas should be achieved without further delay;

5. **Notes** that the recent joint meetings dit not achieve their intended goal, in particular because certain positions adopted by the Turkish Cypriot side were fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas;

6. **Calls upon** the Turkish Cypriot side to adopt positions that are consistent with the Set of Ideas on those issues identified by the Secretary-General in his report, and for all concerned to be prepared in the next round of talks to make decisions that will bring about a speedy agreement;

7. **Recognizes** that the completion of this process in March 1993 would be greatly facilitated by the implementation by each side of measures designed to promote mutual confidence;

8. **Urges** all concerned to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out below;

a) That, as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces envisaged in the Set of Ideas, the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus undergo a significant reduction and that a reduction of defence spending be effected in the Republic of Cyprus;

b) That the military authorities on each side cooperate with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus in order to extend the unmanning agreement of 1989 to all areas of the United Nations-controlled Buffer Zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other;

c) That, with a view to the implementation of resolution 550 (1984), the area at present under the control of the United Nations Peace-keeping force in Cyprus be extended to include Varosha;

d) That each side take active measures to promote people-to-people contact between the two communities by reducing restrictions to the movement of persons across the Buffer Zone;

e) That restrictions imposed on foreign visitors crossing the buffer Zone be reduced;

f) That each side propose bi-communal projects, for possible financing by lending and donor governements as well as internationl institutions;

g) That both sides commit themselves to the holding of a Cyprus-wide census under the auspices of the United Nations,

h) That both sides cooperate to enable the United Nations to undertake, in the relevant locations, feasibility studies (i) in connection with the resettlement and rehabilitation of persons who would be affected by the territorial adjustments as part of the overall agreement, and (ii) in connection with the programme of economic development that would, as part of the overall agreement, benefit those persons who would resettle in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration;

9. **Requests** the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the above confidence-building measures and to keep the Security council informed as appropriate;

10. **Also requests** the Secretary-General to maintain such preparatory contacts as he considers appropriate before the resumption of the joint meetings in March 1993, and to propose for the Security Council's consideration revisions in the negotiating format to make it more effective.

11. **Further requests** the Secretary-General, during the March 1993 joint meetings, to assess developments on a regular basis with the Council with a view to considering what further action may be needed by the Council;

12. **Requests** the Secretary-General to submit a full report after the conclusion of the joint meetings that will resume in March 1993.

RESOLUTION 789 (1992)

Adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 3140e séance, le 25 novembre 1992

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Ayant examiné le rapport du 19 novembre 1992 du Secrétaire général sur sa mission de bons offices concernant Chypre (S/24830).

Notant avec satisfaction que les deux dirigeants se sont entretenus de toutes les questions figurant dans l'Ensemble d'idées, ce qui leur a permis de dégager des points d'accord comme il est noté dans le rapport,

Se félicitant que les deux parties soient prêtes à rencontrer à nouveau le Secrétaire général au début de mars 1993 pour achever le travail sur un Ensemble d'idées recueillant leur accord,

1. **Réaffirme** toutes ses résolutions antérieures sur Chypre, notamment les résolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983), 550 (1984) et 774 (1992);

2. **Fait sien** le rapport du Secrétaire général et félicite ce dernier des efforts qu'il déploie;

3. **Réaffirme également** son approbation de l'Ensemble d'idées, y compris les ajustements territoriaux dont il est tenu compte dans la carte figurant dans l'appendice au rapport du Secrétaire général, en date du 21 août 1992 (S24472), en tant que base appropriée pour conclure un accord-cadre global;

4. **Réaffirme en outre** sa position que l'actuel statu quo n'est pas acceptable et qu'un accord global conforme à l'Ensemble d'idées devrait intervenir sans plus tarder;

5. **Note** que les récentes réunions communes n'ont pas permis d'atteindre le but recherché, en particulier parce que certaines positions adoptées par la partie chypriote turque étaient fondamentalement en contradiction avec l'Ensemble d'idées;

6. **Engage** la partie chypriote turque à adopter des positions qui soient compatibles avec l'Ensemble d'idées pour ce qui est des questions que le Secrétaire général a identifiées dans son rapport, et demande à tous les intéressés d'être prêts, lors de la prochaine série d'entretiens, à prendre les décisions qui permettront de parvenir rapidement à un accord;

7. **Considère** que l'achèvement de ce processus en mars 1993 serait grandement facilité par l'application par chacune des parties de mesures destinées à promouvoir la confiance mutuelle;

8. **Demande instamment** à tous les intéressés de s'engager à respecter les mesures de confiance énoncées ci-après :

a) Qu'en tant que première étape vers le retrait des troupes non chypriotes envisagé dans l'Ensemble d'idées, les effectifs des forces étrangères dans la République de Chypre soient sensiblement diminués et qu'il soit procédé à une réduction des dépenses de défense dans la République de Chypre;

b) Que les autorités militaires de chaque partie coopèrent avec la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre pour étendre l'accord d'évacuation de 1989 à tous les secteurs de la zone tampon contrôlée par les Nations Unies où les deux parties sont très proches l'une de l'autre;

c) Qu'aux fins de l'application de la résolution 550 (1984), la zone actuellement placée sous le contrôle de la Force soit étendue de manière à englober Varosha;

d) Que chaque partie prenne activement des mesures pour promouvoir des contacts directs au niveau de la population entre les deux communautés en allégeant les restrictions aux mouvements des personnes à travers la zone tampon;

e) Que soient allégées les restrictions imposées aux visiteurs étrangers traversant la zone tampon;

f) Que chaque partie propose des projets bicommunautaires, qui seraient éventuellement financés par des gouvernements bailleurs de fonds et des gouvernements donateurs, ainsi que par des institutions internationales;

g) Que les deux parties s'engagent à procéder à un recensement à l'échelle de toute l'île, sous les auspices de l'Organisation des Nations Unies;

h) Que les deux parties coopèrent pour permettre à l'Organisation des Nations Unies d'effectuer, dans les lieux appropriés, des études de faisabilité i) en ce qui concerne la réinstallation et la réinsertion des personnes qui seraient touchées par les ajustements territoriaux dans le cadre de l'accord global et ii) en ce qui concerne le programme de développement économique dont bénéficieraient, dans le cadre de l'accord global, les personnes qui se réinstalleraient dans la zone sous administration chypriote turque;

9. **Prie** le Secrétaire général de suivre l'application des mesures de confiance susmentionnées et de tenir le Conseil de sécurité informé selon que de besoin;

10. **Prie également** le Secrétaire général de maintenir les contacts préparatoires qu'il jugera appropriés avant la reprise des réunions communes en mars 1993 et de proposer au Conseil de sécurité, pour examen, des modifications aux modalités de négociation afin de rendre celles-ci plus efficaces;

11. **Prie en outre** le Secrétaire général, pendant les réunions communes de mars 1993, de faire régulièrement le point de l'évolution de la situation avec le Conseil, en vue d'envisager les mesures supplémentaires que celui-ci pourrait devoir prendre;

12. **Prie** le Secrétaire général de lui présenter un rapport complet à l'issue des réunions communes qui reprendront en mars 1993.

RESOLUTION 889 (1993)

Adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité à sa 3322e séance, le 15 décembre 1993

Le Conseil de Sécurité,

Rappelant sa résolution 186 (1964) et ses autres résolutions pertinentes,

Ayant examiné le rapport daté du 22 novembre 1993 (S/26777 et Add. 1) que le Secrétaire Général lui a présenté en application des résolutions 831 (1993) du 27 mai 1993 et 839 (1993) du 11 juin 1993 à l'occasion de la réévaluation d'ensemble de l'opération des Nations-Unies à Chypre à laquelle doit procéder le Conseil de Sécurité;

Notant que le Secrétaire Général lui a recommandé de proroger pour une nouvelle période de six mois le stationnement de la force des Nations-Unies chargée du maintien de la paix avec son effectif actuel;

Notant en outre que le Gouvernement chypriote est convenu qu'en raison de la situation qui règne dans l'île, il est indispensable de maintenir la Force à Chypre au-delà du 15 décembre 1993;

1. **Proroge** à nouveau, pour une période se terminant le 15 juin 1994, le stationnement à Chypre de la Force des Nations-Unies chargée du maintien de la paix, créée en vertu de la résolution de 186 (1964);

2. **Note** la conclusion du Secrétaire Général selon laquelle les circonstances actuelles n'autorisent aucune modification de la structure ni de l'effectif de la Force, et le prie de maintenir cette question à l'étude en vue d'une nouvelle restructuration éventuelle de la Force;

3. **Demande** aux autorités militaires des deux parties de veiller à ce qu'aucun incident ne se produise le long de la zone tampon et d'apporter leur pleine coopération à la Force;

4. **Prie instamment** toutes les parties intéressées de s'engager à réduire sensiblement l'effectif des troupes étrangères sur le territoire de la République de Chypre ainsi que leur budget de défense dans la République de Chypre, ce afin d'aider au rétablissement de la confiance entre les parties et d'ouvrir la voie au retrait des troupes non chypriotes comme le prévoit l'Ensemble d'idées;

5. **Demande** aux autorités militaires des deux parties, dans l'esprit du paragraphe 3 de la résolution 839 (1993) du 11 juin 1993, d'entamer sans plus attendre des pourparlers avec la Force en vue de s'engager mutuellement à interdire le long des lignes de cessez-le-feu les munitions réelles ou les armes autres que les armes de poing, et à interdire de même les tirs d'armes à portée de vue ou d'ouie de la zone tampon;

6. **Demande** aux autorités militaires des deux parties de coopérer avec la Force pour étendre l'accord d'évacuation de 1989 à tous les secteurs de la zone tampon où les deux parties sont très proches l'une de l'autre;

7. **Prie instamment** leurs responsables de promouvoir la tolérance et la réconciliation entre les deux communautés ainsi que l'a recommandé le Secrétaire Général au paragraphe 102 de son rapport du 22 novembre 1993;

8. **Réaffirme** que le **statu quo** n'est pas acceptable, et **encourage** le Secrétaire Général et son Représentant spécial à poursuivre leur mission de bons offices sur la base de l'Ensemble d'idées et des mesures de confiance relatives à Varosha et à l'aéroport international de Nicosie visées au paragraphe 45 du rapport du Secrétaire Général en date du 22 novembre 1993;

9. **Note avec intérêt** que l'équipe internationale d'experts en économie confirme que les mesures de confiance présentent des avantages importants et équilibrés pour les deux parties, et **attend avec intérêt** les rapports complets des experts en économie et des experts de l'aviation civile;

10. **Se félicite**, dans ce contexte, de la décision prise par le Secrétaire Général de reprendre des rapports suivis avec les deux parties ainsi qu'avec d'autres parties intéressées et de s'employer, au stade actuel, à parvenir à un accord sur l'ensemble de mesures de confiance, le but étant de faciliter le processus politique menant à un règlement global.

11. **Se félicite en outre** de l'appui déclaré du Gouvernement turc à cet ensemble de mesures, se féliciterait également que le Gouvernement grec déclare y apporter aussi son appui, et espère que des progrès rapides permettront d'aboutir à un accord sur ces mesures;

12. **Prie** le Secrétaire Général de lui présenter d'ici au 28 février 1994 au plus tard un rapport sur le résultat de ses efforts pour parvenir à un accord sur l'ensemble de mesures de confiance;

13. **Décide** d'entreprendre, sur la base de ce rapport, un examen détaillé de la situation, y compris le rôle futur de l'Organisation des Nations-Unies, et au besoin, d'examiner les divers moyens possibles de promouvoir l'application de ses résolutions sur Chypre.

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